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Brexit Political Debates in Perspective
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The Brexit Vote and The Trump Vote: A comparative study of the common trends and factors that led to a populist radical right vote in Britain and the United States

Le vote pour le Brexit et le vote pour Donald Trump : étude comparative des tendances et facteurs communs qui ont mené au vote pour la droite radicale populiste au Royaume-Uni et aux États-Unis
Laëtitia Langlois

Résumés

Les deux plus grandes démocraties libérales du monde occidental – le Royaume-Uni et les États-Unis – sont devenues en 2016 les symboles du succès du populisme. Le vote en faveur du Brexit et l’élection de Donald Trump représentent deux victoires spectaculaires pour la droite radicale populiste et cet article mettra en lumière les dynamiques communes de ces deux élections. Nous verrons que les deux leaders populistes, Nigel Farage au Royaume-Uni et Donald Trump aux États-Unis, ont mobilisé les mêmes arguments et les mêmes thèmes pour créer un lien avec un électorat qui depuis des années nourrissait ressentiment et colère eu égard à la gestion de la politique nationale dans leur pays respectif. Ainsi, avec la victoire du Brexit et de Trump, des récits autrefois à la marge ont intégré le discours dominant et bouleversé l’ordre politique établi. L’hostilité aux immigrants, le racisme et la xénophobie, les comportements anti-élite sont devenus les thèmes centraux du débat politique. Il est important de comprendre comment deux démocraties occidentales majeures ont pu succomber aux sirènes du populisme et cet article tente de fournir une analyse sur ce phénomène populiste au Royaume-Uni et aux États-Unis.

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Texte intégral

The temporary alliance between the elite and the mob rested largely on this genuine delight with which the former watched the latter destroy respectability.

Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism

  • 1 Francis Fukuyama, Identity, Contemporary Identity Politics and the Struggle for Recognition: The De (...)

1The American political scientist Francis Fukuyama writes in the opening chapter of Identity, The Demand for Dignity and the Politics of Resentment, “[s]ometime in the middle of the second decade of the twenty-first century, world politics changed dramatically”.1 This sentence sums up the devastating effect that the vote in favour of Brexit in Britain and the election of Donald Trump in the United States had on the world. Taking place the same year within the space of hardly six months Britain’s decision to leave the European Union and Trump’s election to the White House were two of the most bewildering phenomena of contemporary politics. Two model democracies epitomising the Western liberal order surrendered to the populist calls.

  • 2 Gideon Rachman, “Donald Trump and Brexit are no longer identical twins”, Financial Times, January 8 (...)

2In 2016, two outsiders became insiders, fringe narratives became mainstream and radical right populism made spectacular inroads into the political mainstream. In Britain, Nigel Farage – iconic leader of the populist Eurosceptic party UKIP – and Donald Trump in the US – real estate billionaire, former TV reality celebrity and complete neophyte in politics – were propelled centre stage and disrupted the established patterns of conventional politics. Both elections were momentous expressions of the people’s massive rejection of the establishment. As the Financial Times put it, “The Brexit vote and the election of Donald Trump will forever be linked in history. The two events took place within a few months of each other. Both were populist revolts that appealed to similar constituencies”.2 It has forced every one of us – academics, political analysts, historians and observers of political life – to reconsider traditional paradigms and to redefine our approach to politics. Britain and the US are two rich and educated countries with strong liberal traditions, but they are also among the most unequal among developed countries and have alarming levels of poverty.

3The 2008 economic crisis severely hit Britain and the US and caused irreparable damage to particular groups within each country. Those particular groups are the “similar constituencies” Gideon Rachman mentioned in his article. Although each election has its country-specific factors, this article will demonstrate that the points of convergence between those who voted for Brexit and those who voted for Trump were multiple: hostility towards the elites, rejection of mass immigration, anger and resentment after years of austerity and rapid change due to globalisation, the digital revolution and the 2008 economic crisis. Those points of convergence were the driving forces behind the populist groundswell, and they need careful analysis as they are the keys to unlocking the populist phenomenon in Britain and the US. Thus, this paper will argue that similar dynamics were at work in the British vote in favour of Brexit and in the American vote in favour of Donald Trump. The two countries were going through a social, economic, political, cultural, and identity crisis and two populist protagonists tapped into those deep-seated anxieties to achieve their victories. It is important to understand the reasons that motivate large sections of the population to support radical right populists and even more so when these issues affect both Britain and America.

4Thus, this article will try to offer a window into the source of this populist success and to do so, key literature references exploring each election or exploring them jointly will form the theoretical background of this paper. To provide the clearest and most comprehensive analysis, the article will be divided into three parts: the first part will provide a definition of radical right populism with specific examples from the Brexit and Trump campaigns, the second part will explore the dynamics of the politics of resentment used by Nigel Farage and Donald Trump and finally the last part will study how identity politics and nativism played a key role in explaining support for the two populist leaders.

The Populist Radical Right: Definition, Ideas and Rhetoric

  • 3 Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart, Cultural Backlash, Trump, Brexit, and Authoritarian Populism, Ca (...)

5In 2016, two leading democracies and models of Western liberalism which together had launched a neoliberal revolution under Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan in the 1980s bemused the world as they chose to support two nationalist, populist radical right votes. The Brexit vote expressed outright rejection of the European Union described as a distant, technocratic, and elitist organisation. The main arguments used by the proponents of the Leave vote focused on the dangers and threats posed by the European Union: accused of favouring mass immigration and eroding British national sovereignty as well as stealing money away from vital public services like the NHS, the EU was represented as the root cause of social ills plaguing Britain. The Trump vote was equally the expression of anti-elite, anti-establishment attitudes by people who were under the impression that no one in Washington was listening or even paying attention to their concerns. Among those most pressing concerns, mass immigration, unemployment, living standards as well as an acute feeling that they were being increasingly marginalised in their own country. This sense of marginalisation has led Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart to assert that “Millions of older white Americans living in declining communities feel that they have become ‘strangers in their own land’”.3

  • 4 Cas Mudde, The Far Right Today, Cambridge: Polity Press, 2019, 30.
  • 5 Cas Mudde, “How populism has become the concept that defines our age”, The Guardian, 22 November 20 (...)
  • 6 Margaret Canovan, Populism, New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1981.
  • 7 Paul Taggart, Populism, Buckingham: Open University Press, 2000.
  • 8 Ibid., 3.
  • 9 Ibid., 95.

6Both votes celebrated the people against the elite, national identity against multiculturalism and cosmopolitanism, nation over globalisation. Both, in essence, were expressions of populism and more specifically, of the populist radical right. For a few years now and especially since the Brexit vote and Donald Trump’s election to the White House, populism has been a ubiquitous concept in political studies and also a major debate in liberal democracies. In The Far Right Today, Cas Mudde writes that “Populism is the buzzword of the 21st century”4 and in an article he published in The Guardian in 2018 he described how “populism ha[d] become the concept that defines our age”.5 But studies on populism started well before 2016. As early as 1981, Margaret Canovan’s book Populism6 was an attempt at defining this loose and slippery concept. More recently, in 2000, Paul Taggart published a major study also entitled Populism7 in which he highlighted the fundamental relationship between populists and what he terms the “heartland”. Taggart defines the heartland as “a notion that is constructed through looking inward and backward: a world that embodies the collective ways and wisdom of the people who construct it, usually with reference to what has gone before (even if that is idealized)”.8 The heartland, Taggart writes, is “a territory of the imagination”,9 thus highlighting the artificial dimension of the references to the “people” or the “nation” proposed by populists. Populists celebrate the people as essentially wise, good, and virtuous. They equally celebrate the “nation” as a definite and monolithic bloc. This appeal to the people and the nation as well as the distinction between the good people on the one hand and the corrupt elites on the other hand is also at the heart of Cas Mudde’s definition of populism.

  • 10 Cas Mudde, “The Populist Zeitgeist”, Government and Opposition, Cambridge: Cambridge University Pre (...)
  • 11 Ibid., 544.
  • 12 Ibid.
  • 13 Ibid., 550. See also Cas Mudde, Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe, Cambridge: Cambridge Uni (...)

7Mudde’s works on populism provide the most comprehensive study on the concept and their authority in the academic community is undisputed. “The Populist Zeitgeist” (2004), Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe (2007), The Populist Radical Right: A Reader (2017), The Ideological Approach to Populism: Concepts, Theory and Analysis (2019) and The Far Right Today (2019) are Mudde’s leading books and journal articles to grasp the intricacies of populism. In the journal article entitled “The Populist Zeitgeist” he provides a very concise definition of populism which he describes as “an ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, ‘the pure people’ versus ‘the corrupt elite’, and which argues that politics should be an expression of the volonté générale (general will) of the people”.10 Thus in the populist’s worldview, society is divided into two distinctly separate and antagonistic groups: “friends and foes”.11 In this warlike interpretation of the world which understands society in terms of “us” versus “them”, no compromise, no conciliation with the “enemy” is ever possible “as it ‘corrupts’ the purity”.12 Who is the “foe”, “the enemy” or the “Other” in the populist’s mind? Mudde identifies a set of usual suspects: the urban elites, the political establishment, the medias, the aliens.13

  • 14 Mudde, Op. Cit., 138.
  • 15 Taggart, Op. Cit., 96.
  • 16 Ibid., 3.
  • 17 Mudde, Op. Cit., 63.
  • 18 Mudde, “The Populist Zeitgeist”, 547.
  • 19 Jan-Werner Müller, What is Populism?, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2016, 31.

8Aliens are most violently targeted in the populist propaganda as nativism is “the key concept of the populist radical right”.14 Nativism is both a major component of the populist ideology and another way to divide society into two separate groups: the ‘true’ people who belong to a nation and the others, the ‘out-groups’, the immigrants, always portrayed in an essentially dangerous, threatening manner. Populism advocates the politics of the nation and the national interest. Taggart mentions the fundamentally “inward-looking nature”15 of populism that “excludes elements it sees as alien, corrupt or debased”.16 Mudde speaks of the “demonization”17 of the Other which serves the populist’s propaganda: in the face of the danger posed by immigrants, only a strong authoritarian leader can redress the balance and protect the people. Them, and them only, can represent, protect, and free the people from the oppression they suffer in the hands of corrupt elites.18 This is what Jan-Werner Müller describes as “the exclusive appropriation of the people”.19 Appropriation goes along with inclusion. Not only are they the voices of the people, they are the people. Thus, we find countless examples of speeches by populists around the world claiming in every language: “We’re the people” (Nigel Farage), “Noi siamo il popolo” (Matteo Salvini), “Au nom du people” (Marine Le Pen), “Wir sind das Volk” (Pegida Party).

  • 20 Nigel Farage was a trader in the City of London before joining politics, Donald Trump is a billiona (...)
  • 21 Joanne Freeman, “America Descends Into the Politics of Rage”, The Atlantic, October 22, 2018. <http (...)

9Although some of those populist leaders have been part of the establishment for years and have held the highest positions or are among the most privileged ones,20 they have achieved this fantastic trick of presenting themselves as outsiders and including themselves in the ordinary people struggling against the establishment. Language is their most helpful instrument to achieve that trick. Populist leaders excel in the art of oratory. Their speeches are like shows that entertain and galvanise the audience. The populist communication style is skilfully tailored to connect with the audience: simple words, a colloquial language and regular onslaughts against the enemies of the nation. Indeed, the populist discourse is built upon a set of simplistic binary oppositions: people VS elite, nationalism VS globalism, big business VS hardworking taxpayers, natives VS aliens, whites VS blacks/Latinos (for the USA) – Anglo-Saxons VS non-Anglo-Saxons in the case of the UK. The ‘us’ versus ‘them’ dichotomy is a regular feature of the populist rhetoric and highlights the confrontational, divisive and exclusive dimension of populist politics. Thus, it is a simple but extremely persuasive narrative that directly taps into popular anxieties and breaks from the more technocratic style of conventional politicians. Joanne Freeman, historian at Yale University, explains that populists “feed on raw emotions with a primal power: fear, pride, hate, humiliation”.21 Populists primarily talk to people’s emotions. Pathos, not logos, is a populist’s best friend.

10From that perspective, Nigel Farage’s victory speech on the night when the Brexit results were officially announced is a perfect illustration of the classical populist rhetoric:

  • 22 Adam Withnall, “EU referendum: Nigel Farage’s 4am victory speech – the text in full”, The Independe (...)

It’s a victory for real people, a victory for ordinary people, a victory for decent people… We have fought against the multinationals, we have fought against the big merchant banks, we have fought against big politics, we have fought against lies, corruption and deceit. And today honesty, decency and belief in nation, I think now is going to win… Let June 23 go down in our history as our Independence Day.22

11In this short excerpt we find all the features of the populist rhetoric: the good people versus the corrupt establishment, the appeal to the nation, and the inclusive “we”. But we find another interesting reference: “Independence Day”. The underlying implications are clear: the European Union was a coloniser oppressing British people’s rights and freedoms. The same ideas were found in Trump’s speeches during the campaign and then later when he became President of the United States as in this excerpt of his inaugural address in Washington:

Today we are not merely transferring power from one Administration to another, or from one party to another – but we are transferring power from Washington, D.C. and giving it back to you, the American People.23

  • 24 Full transcript of Donald Trump’s speech in Florida available at <https://www.npr.org/2016/10/13/49 (...)
  • 25 Nigel Farage, Twitter, @Nigel_Farage, 5 April 2017. <https://twitter.com/Nigel_Farage?ref_src=twsrc (...)
  • 26 Annual UKIP Party Conference, Eastbourne, September 9, 2011. Quoted in Andrea Pareschi and Alessand (...)
  • 27 Annual UKIP Party Conference, London, September 20, 2013. Ibid.
  • 28 Nigel Farage’s interview with Robert Ford and Matthew Goodwin in Ford and Goodwin, op. cit., 4.
  • 29 Annual UKIP Party Conference, Doncaster, September 26, 2014. Pareschi and Albertini, op. cit.

12Although in the British case, we were dealing with a foreign form of oppression unlike the American case where Washington is presented as the enemy within, in both cases, the main idea was that voting for Brexit or voting for Trump would give the power to the people, a power they were deprived of because it was in the hands of a “rigged elite” or in the hands of “the disgusting and corrupt media” or in the hands of “a failed and corrupt political establishment”.24 It comes as no surprise to find this excessive language used by somebody like Trump, but in Britain too Nigel Farage showed the same verbal ferocity and excessiveness. Farage always used a sharp and divisive language against the EU, its institutions and representatives. Calling EU officials “gangsters” or “the mafia” was part of his usual EU-bashing tactics as well as blaming the EU for all the miseries of the British people.25 But he used the same derogatory type of language when referring to British political leaders whom he usually called “college kids”26 or “the cardboard cut-out careerists in Westminster”27 or also “the dog-whistlers”.28 He chastised the “arrogance and complacency”29 of all three political parties that, according to him,

  • 30 Ibid.

have all been committed to signing Britain up to the European project, parties that have been wholly uncritical of open door immigration, parties that have contributed directly to a downward shift in living standards in this country over the course of the last decade and more.30

13Anti-establishment attitude is part and parcel of how populist leaders frame their discourse. As conveyed in the excerpt above, elites have betrayed the people and caused them utmost misery. But thanks to populist leaders, victims can hope to “Take Back Control” and “Make America Great Again”.

14Therefore, “Take Back Control” and “Make America Great Again” expressed exactly the same populist ideas and flattered exactly the same sentiments in their audiences. On the two sides of the Atlantic the populist slogans “Take Back Control” and “Make America Great Again” were echoing and mirroring each other. Across both sides of the Atlantic, at the exact same time, two campaigns were fought on the exact same arguments and themes and appealed to the exact same audience. As we shall see in part two, Britain and the USA were two countries tortured by the same deep-seated anxieties and bound by the same feelings of revolt, anger and resentment that made them both receptive to populist radical right ideas. Nigel Farage and Donald Trump cleverly grasped that nagging feeling of resentment inside a part of the population who felt that years of globalisation, social change, digital revolution, and cultural liberation had displaced them from the centre and left them lagging behind.

The Politics of Resentment: Capitalising on Anger, Frustration and, Grievances

  • 31 Katherine J. Cramer, The Politics of Resentment, Rural Consciousness in Wisconsin and the Rise of S (...)

15The politics of resentment have long interested scholars. Among the most prominent works published on this topic, we can mention Le Ressentiment dans l’histoire, Comprendre notre temps by Marc Ferro (2007), The Politics of Resentment, A Genealogy by Jerely Engels (2015), The Politics of Resentment, Rural Consciousness in Wisconsin and the Rise of Scott Walker (2016) by Katherine J. Cramer, Francis Fukuyama’s Identity: Contemporary Identity Politics and the Struggle for Recognition: The Demand for Dignity and the Politics of Resentment (2018), and more recently Dying of Whiteness, How the Politics of Racial Resentment is Killing America’s Heartland by Jonathan M. Metzl (2019), Empire of Resentment, Populism’s Toxic Embrace of Nationalism by Lawrence Rosenthal (2020). This short list shows how resentment has become central to explaining today’s politics and the challenges faced by modern societies. Resentment seems to be a ubiquitous phenomenon as increasingly “[p]eople understand their circumstances as the fault of guilty and less deserving people, not as the product of broad social, economic, and political forces”.31 Thus, rising polarisation, grievances and the demand for recognition form the core of the politics of resentment.

  • 32 Fukuyama, op. cit., xv.
  • 33 Ibidem, 10.
  • 34 Ibid., 88.
  • 35 Ibid., 9.
  • 36 Ibid., 7.
  • 37 Ibid.
  • 38 Robert Ford and Matthew Goodwin, Revolt on the Right, Explaining Support for the Radical Right in B (...)
  • 39 Ibidem, 10.
  • 40 Ibid., 11.
  • 41 Ibid., 108.

16Francis Fukuyama considers the politics of resentment as the “master concept that unifies much of what is going on in world politics today”.32 Drawing his thesis from the German philosopher Hegel who posited that the struggle for recognition was the driving force of human history and a key element in understanding the emergence of the modern world,33 Fukuyama argues that the demand for recognition is the main reason for the rise of populism thereby representing a key threat to liberalism. To him, what caused the election of Donald Trump to the White House and the vote in favour of leaving the European Union in Britain “has been the perception of invisibility”34 among parts of the population. “Practitioners of the politics of resentment”,35 as Fukuyama calls populist leaders, identify “a humiliated group seeking restitution of its dignity”36 and mobilise “followers around the perception that the group’s dignity ha[s] been affronted, disparaged, or otherwise disregarded”.37 In Robert Ford and Matthew Goodwin’s study entitled Revolt on the Right, Explaining Support for the Radical Right in Britain,38 those people who feel invisible and humiliated are referred to as “the left behind”. The “left behind” are those people who belong to groups that have particularly suffered from deep economic changes over recent decades, mostly “older, less skilled and less well-educated working-class voters”.39 Ford and Goodwin explain how these people have felt “profoundly uncomfortable in this ‘new’ society, which they regard as alien and threatening”.40 They have seen Britain change “for the worse”41 and have seen how mainstream politicians were unable to address their concerns or simply ignored their concerns at all. They assert:

  • 42 Ibid., 114.

Their old working-class electorates became dissatisfied with a political system where their traditional voice appeared to have been lost, and showed a growing willingness to back more radical parties that articulated their sense of abandonment from the mainstream and responded to their concerns about issues that aroused little interest among new left elites: immigration; national identity; the perceived threat from the EU; and rapid social change more generally.42

  • 43 Norris and Inglehart, op. cit., 16.
  • 44 Ibid., 1.
  • 45 Ibid., 145.

17This resentment has changed traditional political attitudes both in Britain and the USA and “has spawned a counter-revolutionary conservative backlash”.43 This is what two American researchers, Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart, call “the cultural backlash” in a major study on populism in Western countries. In Cultural Backlash, Trump, Brexit, and Authoritarian Populism, they describe the concept as “a retro reaction by once-predominant sectors of the population to progressive value change”44 and explain that rising support for hard-right populist policies “reflects a long-term process of cultural evolution, triggering a backlash among traditionalists seeking to hold back the rising tide of social liberalism”.45 The vote in favour of Brexit and the vote in favour of Trump represent a major cultural and political backlash for two countries which for a decade at least were seen as immensely progressive and attractive in the eyes of the world: Obama’s election in the US, multiculturalism in Britain, the legalisation of same-sex marriage in both countries. Those were signs of a progressive tide that some white conservatives loathed and viewed as the most hideous forms of modern decadence.

  • 46 Fukuyama, Op. Cit., 8.
  • 47 Norris and Inglehart, op. cit., 261.

18For this population, the pendulum swung too far in favour of ethnic or sexual minorities, and the time has come for them to reassert their predominance. A population who used to be at the centre of world dynamics and who now feels displaced in favour of “others” nourishes resentment, anger and, also nostalgia for an idealized golden past when their status and place in society were stronger and safer.46 Thus, when Farage and Trump promised people to give them back control, they mobilized the politics of resentment to connect with the audience through their disenchantment in conventional politics. In an age of increasing inequalities and insecurity, those who feel most vulnerable and invisible, the losers of globalisation and the digital revolution, find in populism the path to regain power, status, and dignity. Overthrowing the elites and replacing them by people who speak like you and think like you offers a sense of proximity and gives voters a sense of empowerment encompassed in the slogan “Take Back Control”. If you live in the rust belt in the US or in the north of England, those places badly hit by deindustrialisation and globalisation, characterised by low levels of education, high levels of unemployment, population decline and a high number of retired citizens, conventional politics has been unable to deliver its promises. In Cultural Backlash, Norris and Inglehart point out that those places were precisely the “places where Trump gained a significant high number of votes and where the Leave vote was concentrated”.47 In those places where the least prosperous citizens live, the bigger world is seen in terms of threats, not in terms of opportunities.

  • 48 Ibid., 136.
  • 49 Ibid.

19For some, globalisation is a chance, for others it is a source of fear. As Norris & Inglehart suggest, people with college education and executive careers mastering several languages can feel equally at home anywhere in the world whether in Milan, London, Berlin, Shanghai or New York.48 The world is theirs and globalisation has abolished boundaries. On the other hand, “the ‘left behinds’ are more rooted in loyalty to particular groups and local communities, unlikely to move even when opportunities call elsewhere”.49

20This echoes David Goodhart’s study, The Road to Somewhere, The New Tribes Shaping British Politics, in which he argues:

  • 50 David Goodhart, The Road to Somewhere, The New Tribes Shaping British Politics, St Ives: Penguin Bo (...)

A large minority group of the highly educated and mobile – the Anywheres – who tend to value autonomy and openness and comfortably surf social change have recently come to dominate our society and politics. There is also a larger but less influential group – the Somewheres – who are more rooted and less well educated, who value security and familiarity and are more connected to group identities than Anywheres. Somewheres feel that their more socially conservative intuitions have been excluded from the public space in recent decades, which has destabilised our politics and led to the Brexit and Trump backlashes.50

  • 51 Ibid., 1.

21The Anywheres and Somewheres in Britain could also apply to other Western societies which experience the same growing chasm between two categories of people. Whether we call them the losers and winners, the Somewheres and Anywheres, the visibles and invisibles, it always illustrates the same phenomenon: “the great divide”51 between people who, within the same country, live in two different worlds.

  • 52 Benjamin Disraeli, Sybil or the Two Nations, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008 (first edition 1 (...)
  • 53 Ford and Goodwin, op. cit., 11.

22In the 19th century, a British Prime Minister and novelist, Benjamin Disraeli, wrote a book entitled Sybil or The Two Nations (1845) in which he described how Victorian Britain was divided into two distinct nations “between whom there is no intercourse and no sympathy; who are as ignorant of each other's habits, thoughts, and feelings, as if they were dwellers in different zones, or inhabitants of different planets; who are formed by a different breeding, are fed by a different food, are ordered by different manners, and are not governed by the same laws”.52 Nearly two hundred years later, the quotation is still valid and the challenges facing modern societies are the same. But the split is not along economic cleavages only but also and predominantly so, according to Norris and Inglehart, Ford and Goodwin, and Goodhart along cultural ones. The old left-right divide is being replaced or more precisely overlaps with a socially liberal-socially conservative divide, and this phenomenon was quickly and shrewdly understood by populist leaders. Populist leaders like Farage and Trump were the first to capitalise on the reactions against cultural change and raise this value divide to the top of the political agenda.53

23Capitalising on anger and resentment against cultural change is a forceful instrument of victory that reaps electoral success in the short term but causes irreparable damage in the long term. Anger’s “destructive power”54 can be seen in the rise of racial abuse and ethnic or religious crimes which show that the values of cohesion, tolerance and respect are collapsing. In Britain, in the eleven months following the referendum, religious and hate crimes (against Poles and Muslims mainly) rose by 23%. But if we look at some specific counties, the figures are appalling. In Gwent, Wales, figures rose by 77%; they rose by 66% in Kent, 65% in Warwickshire and 57% in Nottinghamshire.55 In the USA, Trump’s inflammatory and divisive rhetoric during his campaign and nativist tweets during his presidency were seen as incentives for some to commit hate crimes. This was known as the “Trump effect”. The FBI reports on this issue showed that hate crimes more than doubled the day after Trump’s election, they rose by 5% in 2016 and 17% in 2017 and reached an unprecedented level in 2019.56 What was unacceptable before became possible in Brexitannia and Trump’s America.

24The politics of resentment implies grievances against a group of people. In most cases this group of people will be immigrants, those who do not belong to the nation and represent a major threat to the cultural identity and cohesion of the nation. As we shall see in the next part of this paper, the issue of immigration unleashes a degree of violence in the populist rhetoric and policies that leaves no doubt as to the xenophobia and racism contained in the radical right ideology.

Nationalism and Identity Politics: The Exclusive Rhetoric

  • 57 Cas Mudde, The Far Right Today, 27.

25Nativism is central to the populist ideology and the populist rhetoric. Cas Mudde explains in The Far Right Today that nativism is “a combination of nationalism and xenophobia. It is an ideology that holds that states should be inhabited exclusively by members of the native group (the nation) and that non-native (or “alien”) elements are fundamentally threatening to the homogeneous nation-state”.57 When populists appeal to “the people”, it is nothing of an inclusive notion. The people are to be understood as either white people in the American context or Anglo-Saxons in the British context. Slogans like “Build the Wall”, “Clean the Swamp” or “Breaking Point” are illustrations of the xenophobic sentiments unleashed during the British and American campaigns in 2016. Speeches were particularly radical and the escalation in the inflammatory declarations made by the two populist contestants suggested that the boundaries of correctness and respect had vanished.

26In the American context, Donald Trump’s presidential campaign announcement contained strong and heated language against Mexican people in particular:

When Mexico sends its people, they’re not sending their best. They’re sending people that have lots of problems […] They’re bringing drugs. They’re bringing crime. They’re rapists. And some, I assume, are good people.58

  • 59 Glenn Trush and Maggie Haberman, “Trump Gives White Supremacists an Unequivocal Boost”, The New Yor (...)

27Trump’s announcement speech gave the tone of his campaign and his presidency. Racism and nationalism were strong features of the Trump years. One declaration represented a pivotal moment which identified Trump as a radical right nationalist. After the Charlottesville events on August 12, 2017 where a white supremacist drove into the crowds of people who had come to protest against this rally and killed one protester, Trump declared: “You had very fine people on both sides”,59 thus refusing to fully condemn white supremacists. Under Trump, racism was not just verbal. Actual policies such as the wall built between the American and Mexican border or the Muslim ban provided tangible examples of policies targeted against specific groups.

  • 60 Ford and Goodwin, op. cit., 90.
  • 61 Jonathan Jones, “Farage’s poster is the visual equivalent of Enoch Powell’s ‘rivers of blood’ speec (...)

28In the British context too, the Leave campaign was a display of racist attacks. Euroscepticism and anti-immigration were wrapped together as the European Union was constantly accused of encouraging open borders and therefore mass immigration.60 UKIP leaflets and billboards during the campaign read: “5,000 immigrants arrive here every week: Stop mass immigration.” Nigel Farage also mentioned “hordes of immigrants”61 arriving on the shores of Europe and then travelling up to Britain which echoed Trump’s “caravans”.

  • 62 Ford and Goodwin, Op. Cit., 122.

29This graphic and hyperbolic language used by Trump or Farage was intentional. No doubt Farage and Trump knew they would provoke outrage with their statements among those they referred to as “the liberal elite” but they also knew their statements would be cheered by those they called “the little, decent, ordinary people” who resent uncontrolled immigration. As Ford and Goodwin explain, immigration appeals more acutely to those social groups who are struggling with social and economic problems. They “see immigration as a serious economic and social threat, and want it reduced drastically”.62

  • 63 John Sides, Michael Tesler and Lynn Vavreck, Identity Crisis: The 2016 Presidential Campaign and th (...)

30In Identity Crisis: The 2016 Presidential Campaign and the Battle for the Meaning of America one can read that “Whites who believed that whites were experiencing discrimination were more likely to support Trump in both the primary and general elections”. The same behaviour also applied to British voters: “Whites who thought there was a lot of discrimination against whites were over 60% points more likely to support Brexit than whites who thought the opposite”.63 As a result, the appeal to a white identity, a white consciousness and a white solidarity was effective to create a sense of unity among insecure Whites.

  • 64 Neil Irvin Painter, “What Whiteness Means in the Trump Era”, The New York Times, November 12, 2016. (...)
  • 65 John Sides, Michael Tesler, Lynn Vavreck, “Donald Trump and the Rise of White Identity Politics”, N (...)

31The American historian Neil Irvin Painter argues that Trump’s slogan “Make America Great Again” actually meant “Make America White Again”.64 Never before 2016 had a campaign for the Presidential election been so highly racialised. The article entitled “Donald Trump and the Rise of White Identity Politics” studies the motivations behind the Trump vote and shows that “white consciousness was powerfully associated with support for Trump in the 2016 presidential primaries”.65 It also explains how changing demographics in the US as well as policies such as affirmative action have created a sense of decline among Whites who feel they need more racial solidarity and more white consciousness to resist the tide of increasing diversity. Racial solidarity used to define those ethnic groups such as Africans Americans or Hispanics who used to be marginalised and stigmatised in a country in which they felt they did not or could not belong to. But now, those studies show racial solidarity also characterises white Americans.

  • 66 Peter Baker, “’Use that Word!’: Trump embraces nationalist label”, The New York Times, October 23, (...)
  • 67 Jonathan Mahler and Julie Turkewitz, “Donald Trump’s Extremist Supporters feel like Winners Either (...)

32The policies Trump espoused when in power and the language he was prone to using (“I am a nationalist”66) are markers of white nationalism. The escalation in the inflammatory vocabulary showed there was no more restriction in the lexicon used by the President thus giving license to all kinds of extremists to voice their nationalist, racist, supremacist ideas and to turn those ideas into acts of racism and into political attitudes. The New York Times stated that “to the members of the alt-right, Mr. Trump is a transformative figure”.67 For those white extremists there was a sense of vindication: their resistance finally had a leader in the White House who spoke like them and would try to prevent the breakdown of “their” American civilisation.

  • 68 Claire Sutherland, Reimagining the Nation. Togetherness, Belonging and Mobility, Chicago: Policy Pr (...)

33This same fear of the ‘invasion effect’ was used by Nigel Farage and UKIP to create an alarming sense of insecurity among the British population and the billboard poster “Breaking Point” definitely partook of that venture. Although race relations had never been as tense and as brutal in the UK as in the US, it would be a mistake to ignore the identity and race dynamics that also lay behind the Brexit vote. Border control, mass immigration, migrant crisis, all those themes eclipsed the far more complex debate on the intricacies and complexities of the European Union during the referendum campaign. In Reimagining the Nation, Claire Sutherland insists on the skewed and biased orientation of the campaign which led “Anti-immigration rhetoric [to] become a dominant and pervasive frame of reference in British political debate”.68

34While Trump insisted on the criminal dimension of immigrants, Farage insisted on the strain they represent for the economic resources of the country:

The impact on schools, the current accident and emergency crisis that we’ve seen this winter in our hospitals, the changes that have happened within our communities and also just think on this in what is already the most crowded country in Europe the fact that we have to build one new dwelling every seven minutes just to cope with current rates of immigration. And above, I think what’s being felt by millions of ordinary, decent working families is wage compression, an unlimited supply of unskilled labour that has made for many people the minimum wage in effect the maximum wage.69

35Apart from Muslim migrants, another group is subject to intense stigmatisation in Britain: the Polish community. Poland joined the EU in 2004 and since then nearly one million Poles has come to the UK and settled down with their families.70 As a result of this massive Eastern European immigration, some small cities or villages have seen their demographics change dramatically. In Boston, Lincolnshire, the official immigrant population grew by 467% between the 2001 and 2011 censuses.71 This immigrant population is mainly composed of Poles, Lithuanians and Bulgarians. In this rural city in north England, the vote in favour of Brexit was the highest in the UK: 75.2% of the population voted to leave the EU. Matthew Smith, campaign director in UKIP, Boston, claimed that “English people are in danger of being marginalised in their own country”.72 Thus, Europhobia is deeply embedded in a sense of rejecting the Other.

36The connections between Europhobia and xenophobia are not new. In 1968 already, Enoch Powell, Conservative MP for Wolverhampton, predicted in an apocalyptic speech that Britain would be swamped over by immigration and unrecognisable in the upcoming years:

We must be mad, literally mad, as a nation to be permitting the annual inflow of some 50,000 dependents, who are for the most part the material of the future growth of the immigrant descended population. It is like watching a nation busily engaged in heaping up its own funeral pyre. So insane are we that we actually permit unmarried persons to immigrate for the purpose of founding a family with spouses and fiancées whom they have never seen.” […] That tragic and intractable phenomenon which we watch with horror on the other side of the Atlantic but which there is interwoven with the history and existence of the States itself, is coming upon us here by our own volition and our own neglect. Indeed, it has all but come. In numerical terms, it will be of American proportions long before the end of the century. Only resolute and urgent action will avert it even now. Whether there will be the public will to demand and obtain that action, I do not know. All I know is that to see, and not to speak, would be the great betrayal.73

  • 74 Stéphane Porion and Michael Kazin, “George Wallace and Enoch Powell: Comparing the Politics of Popu (...)
  • 75 Olivier Esteves & Stéphane Porion (eds.), The Lives and Afterlives of Enoch Powell: The Undying Pol (...)

37The political storm caused by the ‘Rivers of Blood’ speech as it came to be known did not stop Powell from achieving popular success among British people who viewed him as a spokesman voicing their own anxieties.74 As his anti-immigrant rhetoric became sharper, so did his anti-Europe speeches.75 Powell became one of the most vociferous opponents of Britain’s entry in the European Community:

  • 76 John Wood (ed.), A Nation Not Afraid. The Thinking of Enoch Powell, London, Hodder & Stoughton, 75.

I do not understand how a nation which is in the throes of rescuing its identity from the delusions and the deceits of a vanished Empire and Commonwealth can at the same time undertake to merge that identity again in half the continent of Europe.76

38Immigration and Europe were his two obsessions. They must be understood together for they rest on the same principles: the rejection of the Other to preserve British purity from evil foreign cultural influences. Any breach to Britain’s identity or sovereignty is seen by those nationalists like Enoch Powell or Nigel Farage as a ‘great betrayal’ to the nation, a betrayal of “a thousand years of history”. This idea of the great betrayal resurfaced recently. One of the Sun’s headlines during the Brexit negotiations was “Great Britain or Great Betrayal”77 suggesting that any concession to the EU in the negotiation of an exit deal would be a stab in the back, an abdication to the enemy. The ‘great betrayal myth’ is also the idea that Nigel Farage mobilised to illustrate the fact that immigration is, according to him, “the issue, perhaps, of the biggest disconnect between the political class and the ordinary people in this country.”78 While the elites in Westminster work for big supranational organisations, encouraging immigration, UKIP is the “the only party that stands up and speaks for them [good, decent, patriotic people]”.79

39In Britain and the USA alike, the nativist discourse was dominant during the two campaigns. The white identity crisis was a powerful undercurrent that populists successfully understood and skilfully exploited. The Brexit campaign and the Trump campaign played on the twin fears of cultural engulfment and economic insecurity. Immigrants erode the cultural purity of nations, but they also represent an economic threat as they steal white people’s jobs or live on taxpayers’ money as the usual clichés go. So, the nationalist arguments that we found in both campaigns stressed the idea that native Whites were losing out to minorities (in terms of job opportunities, housing, access to public services, but also in terms of identity) with the blessing of the EU or the political establishment in Washington which did nothing to stop the “invasion”.

40Nigel Farage left UKIP in 2018 and has not since found a prominent role in British politics. Donald Trump failed to be re-elected to the White House in 2020 and was replaced by a Democrat President, Joe Biden. Yet, what they achieved in 2016 was unprecedented in recent Western contemporary politics and will remain an immense source of speculation about the reasons that motivated voters to support populist radical right candidates. This article tried to provide some comparative study between the Brexit vote and the Trump vote to analyse the similar dynamics behind both votes. Based on major literature references such as Cas Mudde’s works on populism, Francis Fukuyama’s book on the politics of resentment, Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart’s study on the cultural backlash and Robert Ford and Matthew Goodwin’s book on UKIP, this article highlighted common trends and factors which explain the unprecedented success of the radical right in Britain and in the USA in 2016. Disenchanted and angry voters, mostly older, less skilled, socially conservative white men, who felt that the country they were living in no longer offered them a prominent place in society and favoured instead ethnic or sexual minorities, who also felt that traditional politicians had forgotten them and ignored their concerns found in Nigel Farage and Donald Trump distinctive voices they had not heard before. Farage and Trump expressed ideas and values about identity, the nation, the family or the economy that reassured those disenchanted voters and offered them a new horizon of hope, control and power. In so doing, they achieved something unprecedented in Western contemporary politics, i.e., transforming a revolt into an actual political success at the highest level. In 2016, thanks to Farage and Trump, the losers became the winners, the “left behind” became those who upset conventional traditional politics. Today, although those two men are no longer in the spotlight, their ideas remain tremendously influential and as the Western world is struggling against a major pandemic that brings chaos, division, and deprivation, radical right populism might yet resurface with renewed vigour to yet again disrupt major Western democracies.

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Notes

1 Francis Fukuyama, Identity, Contemporary Identity Politics and the Struggle for Recognition: The Demand for Dignity and the Politics of Resentment, London: Profile Books, 2018, 3.

2 Gideon Rachman, “Donald Trump and Brexit are no longer identical twins”, Financial Times, January 8, 2018. <https://www.ft.com/content/214ca7da-f455-11e7-88f7-5465a6ce1a00>, accessed on 25 February 2021.

3 Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart, Cultural Backlash, Trump, Brexit, and Authoritarian Populism, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 340.

4 Cas Mudde, The Far Right Today, Cambridge: Polity Press, 2019, 30.

5 Cas Mudde, “How populism has become the concept that defines our age”, The Guardian, 22 November 2018. <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/nov/22/populism-concept-defines-our-age>, accessed on 21 February 2021.

6 Margaret Canovan, Populism, New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1981.

7 Paul Taggart, Populism, Buckingham: Open University Press, 2000.

8 Ibid., 3.

9 Ibid., 95.

10 Cas Mudde, “The Populist Zeitgeist”, Government and Opposition, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, vol. 39, No. 4, Autumn 2004, 541-563. <https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/government-and-opposition/article/populist-zeitgeist/2CD34F8B25C4FFF4F322316833DB94B7>, accessed on 21 February 2021.

11 Ibid., 544.

12 Ibid.

13 Ibid., 550. See also Cas Mudde, Populist Radical Right Parties in Europe, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007, 70.

14 Mudde, Op. Cit., 138.

15 Taggart, Op. Cit., 96.

16 Ibid., 3.

17 Mudde, Op. Cit., 63.

18 Mudde, “The Populist Zeitgeist”, 547.

19 Jan-Werner Müller, What is Populism?, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2016, 31.

20 Nigel Farage was a trader in the City of London before joining politics, Donald Trump is a billionaire, Matteo Salvini was Home Secretary, Marine Le Pen is the daughter of Jean-Marie Le Pen, founder of the Front National.

21 Joanne Freeman, “America Descends Into the Politics of Rage”, The Atlantic, October 22, 2018. <https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2018/10/trump-and-politics-anger/57355>, accessed on 5 March 2021.

22 Adam Withnall, “EU referendum: Nigel Farage’s 4am victory speech – the text in full”, The Independent, June 24, 2016. <https://www.independent.co.uk/news/uk/politics/eu-referendum-nigel-farage-4am-victory-speech-the-text-in-full-a7099156.html>, accessed on 1 March 2021.

23 Full transcript of Donald Trump’s inaugural address available at <https://www.politico.com/story/2017/01/full-text-donald-trump-inauguration-speech-transcript-233907>, accessed on 25 March 2021.

24 Full transcript of Donald Trump’s speech in Florida available at <https://www.npr.org/2016/10/13/497857068/transcript-donald-trumps-speech-responding-to-assault-accusations?t=1617695870022>, accessed on 25 March 2021.

25 Nigel Farage, Twitter, @Nigel_Farage, 5 April 2017. <https://twitter.com/Nigel_Farage?ref_src=twsrc%5Egoogle%7Ctwcamp%5Eserp%7Ctwgr%5Eauthor>, accessed on 4 May 2020.

26 Annual UKIP Party Conference, Eastbourne, September 9, 2011. Quoted in Andrea Pareschi and Alessandro Albertini, “Immigration, Elites and the European Union. The Framing of Populism in the Discourse of Farage’s UKIP”, September 2018. <https://www.researchgate.net/publication/327580283_Immigration_Elites-and_the_European_Union_The_Framing_of_Populism_in_the_Discourse_of_Farage’s_UKIP>, accessed on 2 April 2021.

27 Annual UKIP Party Conference, London, September 20, 2013. Ibid.

28 Nigel Farage’s interview with Robert Ford and Matthew Goodwin in Ford and Goodwin, op. cit., 4.

29 Annual UKIP Party Conference, Doncaster, September 26, 2014. Pareschi and Albertini, op. cit.

30 Ibid.

31 Katherine J. Cramer, The Politics of Resentment, Rural Consciousness in Wisconsin and the Rise of Scott Walker, Chicago: Chicago University Press, 2016, 9.

32 Fukuyama, op. cit., xv.

33 Ibidem, 10.

34 Ibid., 88.

35 Ibid., 9.

36 Ibid., 7.

37 Ibid.

38 Robert Ford and Matthew Goodwin, Revolt on the Right, Explaining Support for the Radical Right in Britain, London and New York: Routledge, 2014.

39 Ibidem, 10.

40 Ibid., 11.

41 Ibid., 108.

42 Ibid., 114.

43 Norris and Inglehart, op. cit., 16.

44 Ibid., 1.

45 Ibid., 145.

46 Fukuyama, Op. Cit., 8.

47 Norris and Inglehart, op. cit., 261.

48 Ibid., 136.

49 Ibid.

50 David Goodhart, The Road to Somewhere, The New Tribes Shaping British Politics, St Ives: Penguin Books, 2017, vii.

51 Ibid., 1.

52 Benjamin Disraeli, Sybil or the Two Nations, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008 (first edition 1845).

53 Ford and Goodwin, op. cit., 11.

54 Charles Duhigg, “The Roots of American Rage”, The Atlantic, January-February 2019. <https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2019/01/charles-duhigg-american-anger/576424/>, accessed on 4 March 2021.

55 See <https://www.gov.uk/government/statistics/hate-crime-england-and-wales-2017-to-2018>, accessed on May 4, 2020.

56 Tim Arango, “Hate Crimes in U.S. Rose to Highest Level in More Than a Decade in 2019”, The New York Times, 16 November 2020. <https://www.nytimes.com/2020/11/16/us/hate-crime-rate.html>, accessed on 4 April 2021.

57 Cas Mudde, The Far Right Today, 27.

58 For full transcript see Donald Trump’s Announcement Speech, Time, 16 June 2015, <https://time.com/3923128/donald-trump-announcement-speech>, accessed on 3 April 2021.

59 Glenn Trush and Maggie Haberman, “Trump Gives White Supremacists an Unequivocal Boost”, The New York Times, 15 August 2017. <https://wwwnytimes.com/2017/08/15/us/politics/trump-charlottesville-white-nationalists.html>, accessed on 3 April 2021.

60 Ford and Goodwin, op. cit., 90.

61 Jonathan Jones, “Farage’s poster is the visual equivalent of Enoch Powell’s ‘rivers of blood’ speech”, The Guardian, June 15, 2016. <https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2016/jun/16/farage-poster-enoch-powell-rivers-of-blood-racism-ukip-european-union>, accessed on 28 February 2021.

62 Ford and Goodwin, Op. Cit., 122.

63 John Sides, Michael Tesler and Lynn Vavreck, Identity Crisis: The 2016 Presidential Campaign and the Battle for the Meaning of America, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2018, 56-58.

64 Neil Irvin Painter, “What Whiteness Means in the Trump Era”, The New York Times, November 12, 2016. <https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/13/opinion/what-whiteness-means-in-the-trump-era.html>, accessed on 1 February 2021.

65 John Sides, Michael Tesler, Lynn Vavreck, “Donald Trump and the Rise of White Identity Politics”, November 2017, 3. <http://qipsr.as.uky.edu/sites/default/files/Sides%20et%20al%20MP%202018%20Donald%20Trump%20and%20the%20Rise%20of%20White%20Identity%20Politics%20II.pdf>, accessed on 23 March 2020.

66 Peter Baker, “’Use that Word!’: Trump embraces nationalist label”, The New York Times, October 23, 2018. <https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/23/us/politics/nationalist-president-trump.html>, accessed on 4 May 2020.

67 Jonathan Mahler and Julie Turkewitz, “Donald Trump’s Extremist Supporters feel like Winners Either Way”, The New York Times, November 6, 2016. <https://www.nytimes.com/2016/11/07/us/politics/donald-trump-extremist-supporters.html>, accessed on 23 April 2020.

68 Claire Sutherland, Reimagining the Nation. Togetherness, Belonging and Mobility, Chicago: Policy Press Shorts Research, 2017, 8.

69 Sky News, “Farage Immigration Speech”, March 4, 2015. <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FUnCMJw1tfM&t=85s>, accessed on 26 April 2020.

70 For more figures, see <https://www.ons.gov.uk/peoplepopulationandcommunity/populationandmigration/internationalmigration/bulletins/ukpopulationbycountryofbirthandnationality/2018>, accessed on 4 May 2020.

71 For more, see <https://migrationobservatory.ox.ac.uk/resources/briefings/england-census-profile/>, accessed on May 4, 2020.

72 Ben Judah, “The most Polish Town in Britain”, Politico, April 30, 2015. <https://www.politico.eu/article/the-most-polish-town-in-britain/>, accessed on 3 March 2021.

73 The Telegraph, “Enoch Powell’s ‘Rivers of Blood’ Speech”, November 6, 2007. <https://www.telegraph.co.uk/comment/3643823/Enoch-Powells-Rivers-of-Blood-speech.html>, accessed on 22 April 2020.

74 Stéphane Porion and Michael Kazin, “George Wallace and Enoch Powell: Comparing the Politics of Populist Conservatism in the US and the UK”, in Clarisse Berthezène and Jean-Christian Vinel (eds.), Postwar Conservatism, A Transnational Investigation: Britain, France, and the United States, 1930-1990, Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2017, 243-268.

75 Olivier Esteves & Stéphane Porion (eds.), The Lives and Afterlives of Enoch Powell: The Undying Political Animal, Abingdon: Routledge, 2019.

76 John Wood (ed.), A Nation Not Afraid. The Thinking of Enoch Powell, London, Hodder & Stoughton, 75.

77 The Sun, “Great Britain or Great Betrayal”, July 12, 2018. <https://www.thesun.co.uk/news/6505185/the-sun-says-great-britain-brexit-vote-betrayal-leave-remain/>, accessed on 1 December 2021.

78 Annual UKIP Party Conference, London, September 20, 2013. Pareschi and Albertini, op. cit.

79 Ibid.

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Laëtitia Langlois, « The Brexit Vote and The Trump Vote: A comparative study of the common trends and factors that led to a populist radical right vote in Britain and the United States »Revue LISA/LISA e-journal [En ligne], vol. 19-n°51 | 2021, document 3, mis en ligne le 20 juillet 2021, consulté le 23 juillet 2021. URL : http://journals.openedition.org/lisa/13054 ; DOI : https://doi.org/10.4000/lisa.13054

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Laëtitia Langlois

Laëtitia Langlois est maître de conférences à l’Université d’Angers où elle enseigne l’histoire et la civilisation britannique. Ses recherches portent sur l’euroscepticisme au Royaume-Uni ainsi que sur les droites populistes au Royaume-Uni et aux États-Unis.

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