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Firmes, marchés financiers et innovation : un modèle anglo-saxon ?

The New York Stock Exchange: A Conservative or Innovative Market?

Le New York Stock Exchange : bourse conservatrice ou innovante ?
Michel Van der Yeught
p. 327-338

Résumé

Cet article analyse les relations du New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) et de l’innovation. Le NYSE se présente comme une bourse très innovante mais son histoire montre qu’il a une relation ambivalente avec l’innovation. Le NYSE a beaucoup investi en technologie pour s’imposer comme la première bourse de valeurs des États-Unis mais il s’est opposé à la plupart des réformes fonctionnelles de son modèle de marché, quand celles-ci menaçaient les intérêts de ses membres. La crise qu’il traverse actuellement semble avoir essentiellement pour origine son ambivalence envers l’innovation.

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Texte intégral

1Just like companies, financial markets have to innovate to remain competitive. The New York Stock Exchange (also called the NYSE or the Big Board1), which concentrates about 80% of the stock trading volume in the United States, introduces itself as “the world’s leading and most technologically advanced equities market”.2 Indeed, thanks to its relentless drive to put technological innovation to good use, the NYSE has been the world’s foremost stock exchange in the past 100 years due to its capacity to offer a more liquid market, faster transactions and lower prices.

2Nevertheless, its history shows that the NYSE’s professional community is in two minds concerning innovation. The reason for this is that, in the field of financial markets, innovation means two different things. It may refer to the new technologies used by markets to speed up information transfers and transactions. But it may also characterize the process by which markets improve their functional models, i.e. the systems and the procedures used by their operators to discover stock prices and to execute orders.

3Throughout its two-hundred years’ history, the NYSE’s attitude toward innovation has been ambivalent because, while fostering technological innovation, its community has been deeply reluctant to change the way its market operates. In the past, far-reaching functional innovations often saved the NYSE from decline, but its members only eventually endorsed them when they were compelled to do so by external forces such as competitors or government. These contradictions are clearly exemplified by the NYSE’s present critical situation. Its members are struggling to choose their future market model. Opting for today’s best technological innovation—a screen-based trading platform—might entail far-reaching functional reforms that would destroy the floor-based Big Board they have always known.

4The objectives of this article are, first, to show how technological innovation has been highly instrumental in making the NYSE the world’s premier stock exchange, a process which began notably in the second half of the 19th century; second, to explain why NYSE members have always resisted functional innovation; third, to analyze the NYSE’s present crisis as the result of its ambivalent position toward innovation.

Technological innovation as a competitive advantage for the NYSE

5The effects of technological progress on the NYSE basically date back to the 1840s when telegraph connections opened the Exchange to non-New Yorkers. When Samuel F. B. Morse formed the Magnetic Telegraph Company in 1844, NYSE members quickly awoke to the potential of his new invention and used it to overtake other stock markets, particularly the Exchange’s main rival at the time, the Philadelphia Stock Exchange.

  • 3  Robert Sobel, The Big Board: The History of the New York Stock Market, Washington D.C.: Beard Book (...)

Significantly, the first customers […] were lottery dealers and stock brokers. Now Wall Street prices could be quoted the same day on Chestnut Street [Philadelphia’s main business street]. The telegraph did away with the need for two major auctions, and Philadelphia slipped to second place. Other cities fell in line as soon as the telegraph was extended to their exchanges. […] By the end of the decade Wall Street was connected to every major important American city, and set prices for them all.3

  • 4  John Steele Gordon, The Great Game: A History of Wall Street, London: Orion Business Books, 1999, (...)
  • 5  Humphrey B. Neill, The Inside Story of the Stock Exchange, New York: Forbes, 1950, 93-94.
  • 6  Henry Clews, Twenty-Eight Years in Wall Street, New York: Irving Publishing, 1888, 15.

6In the 1860s, two other types of technological advances were swiftly put into effect by the NYSE and confirmed its leadership over other U.S. markets. On July 27 1866, a telegraph cable was successfully laid between Britain and America and the following August, New York and London brokers could trade one another’s securities and engage in arbitrage operations. In 1867, Edward A. Callahan invented the first stock ticker, “a mechanical device that could print out, on a paper tape, stock prices sent to it by telegraph from the floor of the exchange”.4 Wall Street quickly adopted the new machine and the first ticker was installed in the office of David Grosbeck & Co. where the famous operator, Daniel Drew, used it to carry out his raids in 1868.5 Later in the century, Henry Clews, a well-known Wall Street banker and insider, startlingly summed up the close relationship between the Stock Exchange and technological innovation: “Wherever the electric wires have penetrated the Wall Street broker has followed”.6

  • 7 Michel Van der Yeught, « Le transfert d’information, moteur de l’histoire boursière américaine »,AS (...)
  • 8  R. C. Michie, The London and New York Stock Exchanges 1850-1914, London: Allen & Unwin, 1987, 200- (...)
  • 9 Ibid., 20.

7The telegraph, the Atlantic cable and the stock ticker brought obvious benefits to the general investing public. Channeling domestic and international orders onto one single trading floor facilitated price discovery and made the market more transparent for everyone. But at the same time, NYSE members realized that technological innovations could give them a long-term competitive edge over their rivals. The concentration of order flows increased the volume of activity of their stock exchange and made it a deeper and more liquid market. It also gave Wall Street insiders a crucial strategic advantage in terms of information transfers and trading opportunities. Indeed, the new telecommunication technologies built a structural situation of profitable information asymmetrics, which insiders came to regard as Wall Street’s historical privilege.7 So much so that from the 1870s to the 1890s, they repeatedly attempted to increase their information advantage by monopolizing access to the ticker or by carefully selecting telegraph companies to distribute quotations.8 Because the use of the telegraph and the ticker was by then so widespread in the U.S., these restrictive policies were eventually impossible to enforce. Yet, the NYSE lost no time in adopting a new technology, the telephone, as soon as it proved reliable, barely two years after it was invented by Alexander G. Bell in 1876. By contrast, the London Stock Exchange, which at the time was a much larger market than New York, took a good ten years to provide its members with telephone facilities.9 In the second half of the 19th century, technological innovation clearly contributed to making the NYSE the largest and most advanced stock market in the world.

  • 10  John Steele Gordon, op. cit., 275-276.

8About a century later, in the 1960s and 1970s, technological innovation also enabled the NYSE to regain the competitive advantage it was then losing to its rivals, the NASDAQ, the regional exchanges and the over-the-counter market (OTC).10 As computers became smaller and cheaper, the digital revolution offered the U.S. stock markets the technology they needed to build an Intermarket Trading System (ITS) which started to connect nine financial centers in 1978. The NYSE was the natural hub of the new network and it recaptured the orders which had been flowing to other markets:

  • 11 Ibid., 280.

The rule that the best prices are usually to be had in the biggest market still applied. In the 1840s the telegraph had allowed this law of financial gravity to make New York not just the largest stock market in the country but the dominant one. In the 1970s the ITS and computer technology did exactly the same. The NYSE had been losing market share in its listed securities in the late sixties and seventies as its old system made it hard to compete. Now the business that had drifted away from the Street flowed back into it.11

9The Exchange also decided to revamp its huge trading hall and launch it into the computer age. In 1981, electronic TV monitors fed by computerized information networks linked the trading floor to all the brokerages and markets of the world. In the 1980s, further computerized integration turned the global financial market into a 24h/day business and put the NYSE again well ahead of its closest international rivals, Tokyo and London. Since then, the NYSE has constantly upgraded its order routing and trading technologies to remain competitive. Thanks to DOT (Designated Order Turnaround) in 1976 and SuperDot in 1984, practically all orders are delivered to floor operators electronically. In 1995, the trading floor was thoroughly re-engineered to make the most of state-of-the-art technology: handheld terminals for brokers, fiber optics, cellular communications and flat-screen readouts.

Functional innovation as a threat to NYSE members’ vested interests

  • 12  The NYSE has had a stable number of members since the 1950s: 1,366. Most of them are specialists o (...)

10The NYSE’s determination to stay ahead of competition thanks to constant technological upgrades comes into sharp contrast with the reluctant attitude of its professionals concerning functional innovation. On many counts, the Big Board may be both regarded as the world’s most advanced stock market, and as the world’s most archaic. While most stock exchanges have now become for-profit corporations, the NYSE clings to its mutual status. As in 1792 when it was first established in Wall Street by 24 traders under the legendary Buttonwood Tree, it still belongs to its members12 and it remains a non-profit-making organization. While most markets have gone electronic and have deserted their trading premises, the NYSE is the last major securities market which still operates from a trading floor. As far as functional innovations are concerned, the NYSE has been deeply conservative and has only grudgingly evolved under external pressure.

  • 13  Specialists are a characteristic feature of the NYSE trading system. They are prominent members of (...)
  • 14  James K. Medbury, Men and Mysteries of Wall Street, Wells, Vermont: Fraser Publishing Company, 196 (...)
  • 15  John Steele Gordon, op. cit., 95.
  • 16  George Garvy, “Rivals and Interlopers in the History of the New York Security Market”, The Journal (...)
  • 17  A form of continuous trading had been practiced in the NYSE building from 1865. The so-called “Lon (...)

11Basically, the NYSE market model is a heavily computerized evolution of its 19th century trading sessions. Its floor brokers and “specialists”13 practice a type of trading which is reminiscent of the produce auctions that took place in the streets of Lower Manhattan in the 18th century. During the major part of the 19th century, the Exchange’s vice-chairman used to call the listed securities one after the other as if they were commodities while brokers shouted their bids and offers from their seats.14 That is why sessions were sometimes called “call auctions” or “sit-down auctions”.15 In those days, NYSE members looked down on minor stock markets because they did not practice the gentlemen’s traditional “call auctions” but used the more modern model of “continuous auctions”. In continuous auctions, trading was decentralized. Brokers constantly moved and met at assigned points of the trading floor (or sometimes in the streets) to trade certain securities on a continuous basis. Compared to call auctions, continuous auctions were difficult to supervise and were often disorderly and risky. On the other hand, they could handle a much larger volume of activity and they proved wildly popular during the speculative period of the Gilded Age (1865-1900). After the Civil War, some twenty rival exchanges sprung up in New York alone.16 They generally practiced continuous auctions and snatched a lot of business from the NYSE. One of its most dangerous competitors was the Open Board of Stock Brokers. It was formed in 1864 and had been successful in regulating continuous trading. In 1869, the Big Board agreed to merge with its younger rival and in 1871 it eventually adopted continuous auctions which are still used today.17

  • 18  George Garvy, op. cit., 142.

Because of the conservative attitude of the Big Board, many of the modifications in the scope and technique of its transactions originated with its rivals. The most important of these reforms found their place in the constitution of the New York Stock Exchange only under the pressure of competition from rival exchanges. The continuous market was originally practiced in the Long Room. It was the Open Board which first vested a committee to regulate its activities. […] Under the pressure of the more dynamic and flexible rival institutions the Big Board finally adopted many of the more adequate techniques developed by them.18

  • 19  John Steele Gordon, op. cit., 238.
  • 20  Charles R. Geisst, Wall Street, A History, New York: Oxford University Press, 1997, 251-252.

12This episode set a pattern for the subsequent periods when the NYSE was forced to adopt functional innovations which were likely to alter its traditional market model. After the 1929 Crash for instance, Congress-sponsored investigations resulted in the creation of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) which was to regulate and modernize the investment industry. Its main task was, and still is, to reduce information asymmetrics between Wall Street and Main Street and to eliminate or curb the dubious practices which had led to the stock market meltdown (e.g. insider trading, margin trading, short selling, bucket shops). The NYSE community fiercely resisted federal intrusion into what it regarded as its private turf. Members refused to change their ways and to collaborate with the authorities. When called upon by investigators, the president of the NYSE, Richard Whitney, famously replied: “You gentlemen are making a great mistake. The exchange is a perfect institution”.19 In 1938, the NYSE’s conservative “Old Guard” finally gave in to the federal authorities after the same Richard Whitney was shamefully incarcerated for fraud in Sing Sing Penitentiary.20 Under the pressure of the financial authorities, they then accepted long overdue market reforms in the hope of restoring the investing public’s shattered confidence.

  • 21  Marshall Blume, Jeremy J. Siegel and Dan Rottenberg, Revolution on Wall Street: The Rise and Decli (...)
  • 22  The third market is a market outside a regular exchange for the trading of exchange-listed stocks, (...)
  • 23  Marshall Blume, Jeremy J. Siegel and Dan Rottenberg, op. cit., 13-17.
  • 24  Marshall Blume, Jeremy J. Siegel and Dan Rottenberg, ibid., 50-51.

13The same pattern applied to the process by which the Exchange’s fixed commissions were abolished in 1975. Ever since the Buttonwood Agreement of 1792, NYSE brokers had agreed on minimum commission rates between them so that they did not have to compete for business.21 In the 1960s and 1970s, outside brokers bitterly complained against this price-fixing policy. On competing markets like the NASDAQ (launched in 1971) or the third and the fourth markets,22 rebates were offered to lure clients. To preserve its market share, the NYSE community fought back by forcing brokers to execute their orders on its floor, and, as in the 1890s, it threatened to take their stock tickers from dissenting outside firms.23 The SEC then engaged in a long battle against fixed commissions and NYSE members finally voted to accept the inevitable reform of negotiated commissions.24 The fixed commission system was abolished on May 1 1975, thereafter remembered as “Mayday.” Ironically, the “defeat” of the NYSE’s conservatives and the adoption of the much-dreaded negotiated commissions proved to be a boon for the Big Board. Competition restructured and consolidated Wall Street’s brokerages. They soon started to look for new business opportunities across the Atlantic and the City of London was in turn forced to innovate by launching its “Big Bang” in 1986. Once again, the NYSE had survived thanks to functional innovations which had been forced upon it by the external pressure of competitors and the authorities.

  • 25  Rule 394 was voted in 1939 to preserve the NYSE’s declining market share. The rule was renumbered (...)
  • 26  Jeremy Blume, J. Siegel and Dan Rottenberg, ibidem, 13-17.

14The steadfast resistance of the NYSE’s owners to functional innovation is best explained by the favors they have long enjoyed thanks to the historical dominance of the Big Board on the U.S. stock market. NYSE-listed stocks are the most active and the most profitable securities in the country and a special rule (Regulation 39025) used to prohibit members from trading certain of these stocks off the floor of the Exchange.26 Many similar regulations provide the NYSE with a monopoly position and its members have repeatedly fought tooth and nail to preserve the privileges acquired by the Exchange over the years. Each new functional innovation—sharing stock market information, accepting federal supervision, abolishing fixed commissions or banning Rule 390—has been regarded as a threat to vested interests and as an attempt to dismantle the NYSE. Yet, when functional innovations are finally adopted and force members to accept competition, they benefit the Exchange instead of leading to its downfall. Arthur Levitt, former SEC chairman from 1993 to 2001, explains how the NYSE’s ambivalence toward functional innovation is related to the interests of its members. His analysis applies to the specific case of Rule 390:

  • 27  Richard Grasso was the NYSE chairman from 1995 to 2003 when he was dismissed after a pay package s (...)
  • 28  Arthur Levitt, Take on the Street: What Wall Street and Corporate America Don’t Want You to Know, (...)

The NYSE is innovating, but keeping a lid on it, so as not to undermine the specialists. Still, some of its protectionist barriers have come tumbling down like the Berlin Wall. The most controversial was the NYSE’s Rule 390, which kept its member firms from trading stocks of companies that listed before April 1979 anywhere but at the exchange. I had hinted several times to Dick Grasso27 that Rule 390 was anticompetitive, but he clung to it—under pressure from his seat holders. I […] publicly threatened to force Grasso to get rid of it. […] Grasso had no choice but to tell his members that the rule had to go, and his board voted to eliminate it in December 1999. So far, there hasn’t been much erosion of the NYSE’s market share.28

The NYSE Hybrid Market: an attempt to make technological and functional innovations compatible?

15The Exchange’s ambivalence toward innovation may also be the major cause of its present crisis. During the 1990s, rapid progress in Information Technology and the advent of the Internet favored electronic trading platforms over the floor-based open outcry model of the NYSE. Computerized markets such as the NASDAQ and online operators such as ECNs (electronic communications networks) or ATCs (alternative trading centers) provided fast and cheap stock trading service to the growing multitude of e-investors. The NYSE also benefited from the economic boom but its advance was eclipsed by the dazzling success of the screen-based networks. The NASDAQ Composite Index, fuelled by the speculative growth of dot-com stocks, increased fivefold (from 1,000 to 5,000 points) in five years and the NASDAQ arrogantly dubbed itself “the stock market of the future”.29 By contrast, the Big Board’s trading floor looked increasingly anachronistic and out of touch with the demands of the new generations of “wired” investors.30 To preserve its market share, the NYSE injected as much technology into its system as its human operators could withstand but its members refused to shift to a screen-based model. At the turn of the century, although the crash of the Internet Bubble humbled electronic operators, the NYSE’s ambivalence toward innovation reached a climactic dilemma. Members realized that they could no longer adopt the cutting-edge technological innovation they needed to stay ahead without adopting functional innovations that could destroy their vested interests. In other words, they could not go electronic without scrapping the floor-based specialist system which was their mainstay. They could not opt for a decentralized screen-based network without losing the benefits of centralization. They were acutely aware that the adoption of electronic trading might quickly lead to the demise of their trading floor, as the recent examples of the London and Paris stock exchanges clearly attested.

16In May 2005, John Thain, the NYSE’s chairman unveiled an ambitious plan which looks like an attempt to move ahead by making technological and functional innovations compatible. His NYSE Hybrid Market project proposes to merge the Big Board with Archipelago, a Chicago-based electronic trading platform. The project also includes the end of the NYSE’s mutual status and the adoption of a full for-profit corporate identity. The new NYSE Group, by far the largest and most liquid market in the world would offer investors the widest array of screen- and floor-based execution choices. The hybrid and compromising nature of the new model would satisfy the members’ ambivalence toward innovation by going electronic without sacrificing the NYSE’s hub position. At the time of writing, the project is being scrutinized by the SEC and several questions remain unanswered. Here are two examples: (1) Will the NYSE’s members finally accept this new innovation package considering that it comes with a for-profit corporate status which will put an end to their ownership? (2) Will the Big Board’s trading floor survive the assaults of electronic trading?

17The near future will show whether technological innovation will save the NYSE again or push through functional innovations that will definitely alter its historical market model. The deal is strangely reminiscent of the Big Board-Open Board merger of 1869 which led the NYSE to shift from the old call auction system to the new continuous auctions in 1871. Call auctions survived for a while after the change but they disappeared for good in 1882. The Exchange’s trading floor is a symbolic part of its identity, but it may disappear even quicker if the market goes electronic. Will history repeat itself?

Conclusion

  • 31  See John G. Fuller, The Money Changers, New York: The Dial Press, 1962; Richard Ney, The Wall Stre (...)

18The NYSE has long prided itself on being an innovative exchange. However, history shows that its members have always nourished a deep ambivalence toward innovation. The Big Board has aggressively used technological innovation to build its leading position while refusing the functional innovations that could threaten the vested interests of its owners. This ambivalence has influenced the Exchange’s brand image and is reflected in the opinions of the general public. Main Street’s view of the NYSE is similarly ambivalent. Most Americans appreciate the economic role of the New York Stock Exchange but, at the same time, many of them regard it as a protectionist cartel which selfishly protects its members’ privileges.31 As far as technological innovation is concerned, the NYSE community has clearly been progressive, but as regards functional innovation, it has definitely been a protectionist and conservative institution. Time will tell if the new NYSE Hybrid Market will open an era of straightforward functional innovation that will contribute to the economic and social benefit of all investors.

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Bibliographie

BLUME Marshall, Jeremy J. SIEGEL and Dan ROTTENBERG, Revolution on Wall Street: The Rise and Decline of the New York Stock Exchange, New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1993.

CLEWS Henry, Twenty-Eight Years in Wall Street, New York: Irving Publishing, 1888.

ELIAS Christopher,Fleecing the Lambs: A Startling Look at Wall Street’s Most Powerful Institution—The New York Stock Exchange, Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1970.

FRANK Thomas,One Market Under God: Extreme Capitalism, Market Populism and the End of Economic Democracy, London: Vintage, 2002.

FULLER John G., The Money Changers, New York: The Dial Press, 1962.

GARVY George, “Rivals and Interlopers in the History of the New York Security Market”, The Journal of Political Economy, LII, June 1944, 128-143.

GEISST Charles R., Wall Street, A History, New York: Oxford University Press, 1997.

GORDON John Steele,The Great Game: A History of Wall Street, London: Orion Business Books, 1999.

LEVITT Arthur, Take on the Street: What Wall Street and Corporate America Don’t Want You to Know, New York: Pantheon Books, 2002.

MEDBURY James K., Men and Mysteries of Wall Street, Wells, Vermont: Fraser Publishing Company, 1968 [Boston: Fields, Osgood & Co, 1870].

MICHIE R. C., The London and New York Stock Exchanges 1850-1914, London: Allen & Unwin, 1987.

NASD,<http://www.nasd.com/web/idcplg?idcService=SS_GET_PAGE&ssDocName=…>, consulted on July 6 2005.

NEILL Humphrey B., The Inside Story of the Stock Exchange, New York: Forbes, 1950.

NEY Richard, The Wall Street Jungle, New York: Grove Press, 1970.

NYSE, <http://www.nyse.com/about/technology/1091792165957.html>, consulted on July 6 2005.

SOBEL Robert, The Big Board: The History of the New York Stock Market, Washington D.C.: Beard Books, 1965.

VAN DER YEUGHT Michel, « Le transfert d’information, moteur de l’histoire boursière américaine », ASp, la revue du GERAS, n° 39-40, 2003, 3-19.

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Notes

1  From 1817 to 1863, the Exchange was named the New York Stock & Exchange Board. For the sake of simplicity, the terms New York Stock Exchange and NYSE are used throughout this article.

2  NYSE, <http://www.nyse.com/about/technology/1091792165957.html>, consulted on July 6 2005.

3  Robert Sobel, The Big Board: The History of the New York Stock Market, Washington D.C.: Beard Books, 1965, 52-53.

4  John Steele Gordon, The Great Game: A History of Wall Street, London: Orion Business Books, 1999, 109.

5  Humphrey B. Neill, The Inside Story of the Stock Exchange, New York: Forbes, 1950, 93-94.

6  Henry Clews, Twenty-Eight Years in Wall Street, New York: Irving Publishing, 1888, 15.

7 Michel Van der Yeught, « Le transfert d’information, moteur de l’histoire boursière américaine »,ASp, la revue du GERAS, n° 39-40, 2003, 3-19.

8  R. C. Michie, The London and New York Stock Exchanges 1850-1914, London: Allen & Unwin, 1987, 200-201.

9 Ibid., 20.

10  John Steele Gordon, op. cit., 275-276.

11 Ibid., 280.

12  The NYSE has had a stable number of members since the 1950s: 1,366. Most of them are specialists or floor brokers who own a “seat” at the Exchange.

13  Specialists are a characteristic feature of the NYSE trading system. They are prominent members of the Exchange whose mission is to ensure “price continuity” in certain securities in order to keep a “fair and orderly market.” They assume great financial risks but derive many advantages from their central trading position on the floor.

14  James K. Medbury, Men and Mysteries of Wall Street, Wells, Vermont: Fraser Publishing Company, 1968 [Boston: Fields, Osgood & Co, 1870], 28-29.

15  John Steele Gordon, op. cit., 95.

16  George Garvy, “Rivals and Interlopers in the History of the New York Security Market”, The Journal of Political Economy, LII, June 1944, 128.

17  A form of continuous trading had been practiced in the NYSE building from 1865. The so-called “Long Room” admitted members of various exchanges for a fee and they could trade freely the securities of their choice. However, trading in the Long Room was not supervised by the NYSE and was not regulated by its constitution. See James K. Medbury, Men and Mysteries of Wall Street, op. cit., 22, 25, and George Garvy, “Rivals and Interlopers in the History of the New York Security Market”, op. cit., 133.

18  George Garvy, op. cit., 142.

19  John Steele Gordon, op. cit., 238.

20  Charles R. Geisst, Wall Street, A History, New York: Oxford University Press, 1997, 251-252.

21  Marshall Blume, Jeremy J. Siegel and Dan Rottenberg, Revolution on Wall Street: The Rise and Decline of the New York Stock Exchange, New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1993, 14.

22  The third market is a market outside a regular exchange for the trading of exchange-listed stocks, usually by non-NYSE brokers. The fourth market represents the buying and selling of securities among large institutional investors directly with each other without resorting to an exchange or to brokers.

23  Marshall Blume, Jeremy J. Siegel and Dan Rottenberg, op. cit., 13-17.

24  Marshall Blume, Jeremy J. Siegel and Dan Rottenberg, ibid., 50-51.

25  Rule 394 was voted in 1939 to preserve the NYSE’s declining market share. The rule was renumbered 390, gradually adapted, and then canceled in 1999.

26  Jeremy Blume, J. Siegel and Dan Rottenberg, ibidem, 13-17.

27  Richard Grasso was the NYSE chairman from 1995 to 2003 when he was dismissed after a pay package scandal.

28  Arthur Levitt, Take on the Street: What Wall Street and Corporate America Don’t Want You to Know, New York: Pantheon Books, 2002, 198-199.

29  NASD, <http://www.nasd.com/web/idcplg?idcService=SS_GET_PAGE&ssDocName=…> (July 6 2005).

30  Thomas Frank, One Market Under God: Extreme Capitalism, Market Populism and the End of Economic Democracy, London: Vintage, 2002, 157.

31  See John G. Fuller, The Money Changers, New York: The Dial Press, 1962; Richard Ney, The Wall Street Jungle, New York: Grove Press, 1970; Christopher Elias, Fleecing the Lambs: A Startling Look at Wall Street’s Most Powerful Institution—The New York Stock Exchange, Chicago: Henry Regnery Company, 1970.

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Michel Van der Yeught, « The New York Stock Exchange: A Conservative or Innovative Market? », Revue LISA/LISA e-journal, Vol. IV - n°1 | 2006, 327-338.

Référence électronique

Michel Van der Yeught, « The New York Stock Exchange: A Conservative or Innovative Market? », Revue LISA/LISA e-journal [En ligne], Vol. IV - n°1 | 2006, mis en ligne le 27 octobre 2009, consulté le 20 septembre 2020. URL : http://journals.openedition.org/lisa/2409 ; DOI : https://doi.org/10.4000/lisa.2409

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Auteur

Michel Van der Yeught

Dr. (Toulon, France)
Michel Van der Yeught is maître de conférences at the University of Toulon (France) where he teaches financial English. His research interests focus on Wall Street and its relationships with the Americans (history, language, culture). He contributed as “specialist consultant” to Routledge’s English-French/French-English Dictionary of Business, Commerce and Finance, London/New York, 1996. His books include: Initiation à l’anglais comptable et à la comptabilité anglo-saxonne, Ellipses, Paris, 1992 ; Initiation à l’anglais financier et à la finance anglo-saxonne, Ellipses, Paris, 2002.

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