• 1  For more detailed information on the denominational categorization, see Lyman Kellstedt and John G (...)

Table 1: Denominational segments of the total population in 1965 and 1996 (in %)1

• 2  See Kohut et al., The Diminishing Divide, op. cit..
• 3  In 1987 the percentage was 19%. See Kohut et al., The Diminishing Divide, op. cit., 4.
• 4  See also Geoffrey Layman, The Great Divide: Religious and Cultural Conflict in American Party Poli (...)
• 5  See Clyde Wilcox, God’sWarriors: The Christian Right in Twentieth-Century America, Baltimore, MD: (...)

4American observers have noted a “diminishing divide” between religion and politics:2 “True believers,” especially white Evangelical Protestants, have become more active politically. White Evangelical Protestants now comprise about one quarter of registered voters,3 24% in 2000, and display considerable religious persuasiveness and political zeal. The majority of this group are close to the Republican Party.4 Within three decades, from 1964 to 2000 (see Figure 1), the percentage of white Evangelicals who are Republican has increased both among the “committed” (from 42% to 74%) and among the “others” (from 30% to 49%). This trend has been especially pronounced since the mid-1980s.5 In addition, the percentage of Republican voters among Catholics has doubled.

• 6  Kohut et al. developed this distinction by adding the aforementioned factors to a total index. See (...)

5Denominational membership has become an indicator of ideology and political outlook. Moreover, the depth of personal belief and degree of activism are other important indicators of political behavior. “Committed” or practicing members distinguish themselves from others by factors such as the frequency of church attendance and prayer, the exceptional role that faith plays in their everyday life, and adherence to traditional beliefs, such as the belief in heaven and hell.6 Committed members of a congregation generally display more conservative political outlooks and have a markedly higher preference for the Republican Party. In contrast, the less committed tend to prefer the Democratic Party.

• 9  See Kohut et al., The Diminishing Divide, op. cit., 86.

8This divide has been working in favor of Republicans. Empirical regression analyses, which illustrate the specific weight of distinct factors, show that in the U.S. “the influence of religious affiliation on voting behavior is substantial, rivalling that of demographic factors such as income and education.”9 Religious factors have increasingly influenced Americans’ voting behavior since the 1980s, thanks to political entrepreneurship and professional mobilization of the religious vote.

• 10  See Byron Shafer and William Claggett, The Two Majorities: The Issue Context of Modern American Po (...)

9It is important to note that well into the 1960s many devout citizens shunned political activities. Indeed, to this day, many Evangelicals are still wary, because their individual hopes for salvation focus on the afterlife. This means that their earthly commitment is primarily devoted to maintaining traditional values and practices and protecting them against the modern world. However, the Supreme Court decision on abortion (Roe v. Wade, 1973) and the questioning of tax benefits for Christian schools in 1978 politicized many of the faithful, who had already been alarmed by the abolition of school prayer in the 1960s.10 Furthermore, the emergence of feminist political activism, the gay rights movement, civil rights activists and environmentalists mobilized those who felt that traditional values were being threatened. Political activism among Evangelical Protestants became acceptable, although not without lengthy theological rumination, in which the blessing of fundamentalist religious leaders played an important role.

• 11  For further information see James Guth and John Green, The Bible and the Ballot Box: Religion in t (...)

10Both the political clout of the Christian Right and its political preference for or affiliation with the Republican Party have not always been obvious. The Christian Right’s political weight became evident with Pat Robertson’s primary campaign in 1987/1988. Although Robertson lost to the then Vice-President George H.W. Bush, the father of George W. Bush, the Evangelicals proved that they had evolved into a cohesive force within the Republican constituency. They became instrumental in Bush’s eventual victory, as Pat Robertson sent his troops into battle for the Republicans during the main campaign. Almost three out of four (70%) Evangelicals ended up voting for Bush. Thus, the Evangelical voter base was even able to compensate for losses among Catholic voters.11

• 12  See John Green, “Murphy Brown Revisited: The Social Issues in the 1992 Election”, in Michael Croma (...)

11Two cardinal mistakes prevented Bush’s re-election. He underestimated the importance of economic issues and he lacked the support of the Christian Right. In 1992, only 56% of Evangelicals voted for him.12 George W. Bush drew his own conclusions from his father’s defeat. He was the liaison to the Christian Right in Bush Senior’s campaign. In this capacity, he met Christian Right activists and established a network that would form the cornerstone of his own career. His later election victory―and his defeat of John McCain in the primaries―would not have been possible without the support of these allies.

• 13  See Laurie Goodstein and William Yardley, “Bush Benefits From Efforts to Build a Coalition of Fait (...)
• 14  See Phillips, American Dynasty, op. cit., 215. See also Green and DiIulio, Evangelicals in Civil L (...)
• 15  See Green and DiIulio, Evangelicals in Civil Life, op. cit..
• 16  Elisabeth Bumiller, “Evangelicals Sway White House on Human Rights Issues Abroad”, New York Times, (...)

12With 71% of Evangelicals voting for him, George W. Bush not only surpassed the Evangelical voter share of his father, but even outdid Ronald Reagan’s support among Evangelical voters in the 1984 election.13 “For the first time,” recalled Kevin Phillips, a former Republican campaign strategist and long-time political observer, “a Republican presidential victory rested on a religious, conservative, southern- centered coalition led by a bloc of white Protestant fundamentalists and evangelicals,”14 which constituted 40% of George W. Bush’s total number of votes.15 This voter base presented itself with considerable self-confidence: “Karl understands the importance of this segment of his coalition, and I think the president understands it,” Rove intimate Richard Land, President of the Ethics and Religious Liberty Commission of the Southern Baptist Convention, explained. Land added: “The president feels that one of the contributory factors to his father’s loss is that he didn’t get as many evangelical votes as Reagan did.”16

• 17  This was John Green’s assessment. See Goodstein and Yardley, “Bush Benefits From Efforts to Build (...)

13The election results in November 2004 confirmed this view: George W. Bush not only enhanced his voter share among Catholics, he even managed to increase his already high support among white Evangelicals from 71% in 2000 to 76% in 2004 (or even 78% according to the National Exit Polls).17 Thus, the Christian Right again constituted the key constituency of the Republican base. Nevertheless, it takes two equal partners for a lasting political marriage:

• 19  The continuous losses of the Democratic Party since the 1960s can be attributed to the disintegrat (...)

14In the past few decades, the Republican Party has been able to make significant inroads into the so-called Bible Belt in the South―the region with the largest population of Evangelicals.19 Today, the Evangelical strongholds are in the rural South and to a certain degree in the Midwest among older, somewhat less educated citizens. Income is not a factor distinguishing Evangelicals from other segments of the population (see Table 2).

• 20  John Green, Mark Rozell and Clyde Wilcox, The Christian Right in American Politics: Marching to th (...)
• 21  According to John Persinos, the Christian Right is the dominant faction in 18 state-level Republic (...)

15Activist Evangelicals, especially those in the Southern states, have become an important element of the Republican constituency. A more in-depth analysis of case studies in individual states where the Christian Right has been involved, such as Florida, South Carolina, Virginia, Texas, Iowa, Kansas, Michigan, Minnesota, Colorado, California, Maine, Oregon and Washington,20 allows one to come to the following conclusions: The Christian Right is strongest in the South―in South Carolina, Virginia, Texas and Florida―and has evolved into an established, even dominant part of the Republican Party organizations in those states. The Christian Right also has strongholds in the Midwest and influences the Republican Party organizations in Michigan, Iowa, Kansas and Minnesota.21 It is important to note that Florida, Michigan, Iowa and Minnesota are so-called “battleground states,” hotly contested states in presidential elections, where every vote counts and where the Christian Right’s organization and mobilization of potential voters can decide victory or defeat.

• 22  Quoted in Melani McAlister, Epic Encounters: Culture, Media, and U.S. Interests in the Middle East (...)

18Already in the early 1970s, the late Paul Weyrich was developing strategies to bring together various denominations in a political ecumenical movement. At a meeting in Lynchburg, Virginia, in 1979, organized by the late Reverend Jerry Falwell, Weyrich proposed the idea of creating a moral majority in America. The “Moral Majority” was described as a movement across denominational lines engaging politically on a platform of common issues, namely a pro-life, pro-family, pro-traditional morality, pro-America and pro-Israel platform. Thus, abortion was no longer an issue just for Evangelicals or Catholics. In the view of this political alliance of faith, abortion had become a moral issue across denominational lines. In the words of the late Jerry Falwell, the Moral Majority did not see itself as a purely Christian organization, but was willing to cooperate with anyone “who shared [its] views on the family and abortion, strong national defense, and Israel.”22 Thus, the Christian Right or rather the Religious Right occupied key political territory.

• 24  Green Rozell and Wilcox, The Christian Right in American Politics, op. cit., 8.

21The Christian Right organizations mentioned above recruit their members from practicing religious conservatives of all denominations. It is important to note that the Evangelicals are central to all the major Christian Right organizations.24 The Religious Right’s strategy has been to “save human lives, baptize them and register them to vote.”

• 25  Anna Greenberg and Jennifer Berktold, “Evangelicals in America, Religion and Ethics”, News Weekly, (...)

22In the late 1970s, only about half of the Evangelicals were registered voters (the average percentage of registered voters in the total population was 70%). In order to mobilize the enormous army of approximately 60-70 million potential voters, the churches became involved in voter registration initiatives. Today, white Evangelical Protestants are even more active than the average population in America and proportionately, more Evangelicals are registered to vote: 82% compared to a national average of 77%. White Evangelicals are also more active voters: 65% of them compared to a national figure of 61% indicated that they had cast their votes in the in 2000 and 2002 elections.25 As a result, the Christian Right’s organizational networking pays off during campaigns. Not only is the Christian Right permanently campaigning and thus mobilizing its constituency and expanding the Republican voter base at the grassroots level, but its highly evolved organizational structures also constitute an increasingly important financial pillar.

• 26  Interview by the author with Deana Funderburk, Policy Analyst for then Majority Leader Tom DeLay ( (...)

24Other channels of communication have also been used in addition to the activities of legions of volunteers going from door to door. The technological development of both parties indicates that not only the traditional direct mail appeals, but also the internet is a theatre of the so-called “ground war.” The internet also serves to tap into previously unexploited financial resources, and the Christian Right is reaping the rewards of its pioneering use of this strategy. Its political treasure-trove of donor lists and electronic databases has not only paid off when selecting a candidate and in intra-party power struggles, but in legislative battles too. In fact, the aforementioned grassroots organizations and interest groups of the Christian Right deserve special attention within the legislative process: the office of the former Republican Majority Leader Tom DeLay has deemed them to be significant.26

• 27  For more information on the concept of advocacy coalitions, see Paul Sabatier, “An Advocacy Coalit (...)
• 28  See Hugh Heclo, “Issue Networks and the Executive Establishment”, in Samuel Beer and Anthony King, (...)

29The Religious Right is an “issue network” or “advocacy coalition.”27 It comprises individuals, organizations and institutions from different fields with common values and problem perceptions, i.e. common worldviews. Among these actors are the Executive, Congress, media, universities, churches, interest groups, grassroots organizations and think tanks. These issue networks or advocacy coalitions can be bipartisan, but can also focus on a partisan agenda. The “issue networks”28 define and organize themselves politically on the basis of similar interests and political convictions: “True believers” are partisans of “traditional American family values,” thus fighting secularism, feminism and relativism. In the international realm, Evangelicals are eager to make sure that America retains the necessary military means to defend itself and Israel.

• 29  Interview by the author with Jim Backlin, Legislative Director of the Christian Coalition of Ameri (...)

31The moral network is thus linked to economic policy: “We also get into tax cuts,” says Jim Backlin, Chief Lobbyist of the Christian Coalition. “That is when we get involved with Grover Norquist.”29 Norquist, President of Americans for Tax Reform (ATR) and then adviser to George W. Bush’s long-time strategist Karl Rove, organizes a weekly “Wednesday Meeting” in his offices in downtown Washington with 100 to 150 legislative and executive decision-makers, as well as representatives of the aforementioned organizations, to discuss fiscal and foreign policy. The “Lunch Meeting” of the late Paul Weyrich, Chairman and CEO of the Free Congress Foundation, with approximately 70 participants, also takes place on Wednesdays, with moral issues of social policy, national security and other foreign policy themes being on the agenda. The meetings are organized so that participants of one can also attend the other. Norquist’s and Weyrich’s networks operate on the edge of the political playing field, but also become directly involved in the discussions of the central decision-making mechanisms. Conversely, the leading lights of the Legislative and Executive participate in these Wednesday meetings to discuss and brainstorm tactics for pending bills or to discuss the team’s composition for future campaigns and political newcomers from their own ranks.

• 30  See Charles Caldwell, “Government by Caucus: Informal Legislative Groups in an Era of Congressiona (...)
• 31  Jeffrey DeBoer, President and Chief Operating Officer of the Real Estate Roundtable, quoted in Ala (...)

32Policy-making within the legislative branch is also organized through networks of people with similar beliefs or interests. In the US system of checks and balances political parties do not have the same significance as their counterparts in parliamentary systems. Their weakness is institutionally anchored and they have a limited means to recruit staff or formulate policies. There is no strict party discipline. Thus networks, informal groups, so-called caucuses or congressional member organizations have aprominent, central role in the legislative process.30 Belonging to such groups is an important point of orientation for voters and interest groups, as it enables external actors the possibility to gain influence as opinion leaders and multipliers: “When we need votes,” explains business lobbyist Jeffrey DeBoer, “we don’t have to start from scratch. We have a ready base of support.” Political professionals like to call it “one-stop shopping.”31 The party leadership also appreciates these groups’ predictability when it comes to gauging support and forging majorities for specific Congressional votes. Caucuses can have a bipartisan impact or strengthen certain alliances within the party.

• 32  Alan Ota, “Republican Study Committee Revels in Conservative Clout”, CQ Weekly, September 27, 2003 (...)
• 33  Grover Norquist, President of the organization Americans for Tax Reform, lobbies very effectively (...)

33Congressmen that are moral and fiscal conservatives are very well organized. One of the most influential groups in Congress is the 85-member Republican Study Committee (RSC). Until the mid-1990s, it was headed by the Majority Leader Tom DeLay, in cooperation with Jim Backlin, now the Chief Lobbyist of the Christian Coalition. The group promotes high moral values and considers itself the “conservative conscience” of the Republican Party.32 The proximity to the leadership in the House of Representatives enables the RSC to play an important role, especially when mediating between economically libertarian, socially liberal,33 and morally conservative party members.

• 34  Interview by the author with Deana Funderburk, Policy Analyst for then Majority Leader Tom DeLay ( (...)

34The morally conservative Representatives, numbering about 40, have joined together in the Value Action Team (VAT). “It was the idea of my boss,” explained Deana Funderburk, who used to be a member of Tom DeLay’s staff, “he asked Mr. Pitts [Representative Joseph Pitts] to coordinate and implement this group. He said, we need to have these outside family groups on the same page and get them together to kind of be a force within the party to push our traditional family values agenda.”34 In other words, the political leadership in the House of Representatives can muster support at the grassroots level to influence morally-sensitive issues in its favor.

• 36  Interview by the author with Cindy Diggs, Legislative Assistant, Representative Joseph Pitts (R-PA (...)
• 37  Interview by the author with Deana Funderburk, Policy Analyst for then Majority Leader Tom DeLay ( (...)

36The network’s recently established counterpart in the Senate is headed by Senator Sam Brownback.36 Here, too, likeminded Senators or their senior staff members meet on a weekly basis to coordinate their legislative work with religious interest groups. Senator Sam Brownback and Representative Joseph Pitts regularly compare notes and hold weekly briefings for their respective groups in the Senate and the House about upcoming issues and positions.37

• 38  Interview by the author with Kristin Hansen, Media Director of the Family Research Council (FRC), (...)
• 39  This is the assessment of Jim Backlin, chief lobbyist of the Christian Coalition of America during (...)

37The network’s influence reaches all the way to the Senate leadership. “We have a good relationship with former Majority LeaderFrist’s office,” Kristin Hansen, Media Director of the Family Research Council, confirmed, “and he appointed a staff member, who was formerly very instrumental within the Values Action Team, so that indicates to us that Bill Frist recognizes the importance of the social conservatives within the Republican Party.”38 About one-third of the circles on both sides of the Capitol consist of Congressional staffers and about two-thirds of external, grassroots organizations, interest groups, lobbyists and think tanks.39

• 40  “These terrorists kill not merely to end lives but to disrupt and end a way of life“: such was the (...)
• 41  In common usage, the term “realignment“ refers to a lasting phenomenon. Thus, it is only possible (...)

39A common denominator in foreign policy is important to enable the creation of a durable electoral coalition. National security issues provide a sustainable platform for different conservative elites and voters, as well as a glue to strengthen the cohesion of a broader Republican majority. Given the terrorist threat, it seems necessary to unite domestically in order to face a foreign enemy. In President Bush’s view, on September 11, 2001 the terrorists attacked the “American way of life,“ a way of life foreseen by the Almighty. To be sure, America feels that it was struck, but it is also well-prepared and certain to defeat “evil” ―under the strong leadership of its President.40 In some ways reminiscent of Ronald Reagan’s pugnacious declaration against the “Evil Empire” before a group of Evangelicals, George W. Bush has similarly mobilized America to fight against the “Axis of Evil.” Karl Rove, head of strategy and confidant of the President, has been trying hard to establish a permanent Republican majority. Such a structural majority would imply a so-called realignment, an enduring change in the electorate and in voting behavior.41 In addition to economic and moral issues, it would above all be driven by national security.