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The Rise and Fall of the Right-Centre Coalition Government in Portugal (2002-2005)

A ascensão e a queda do governo de coligação do centro-direita em Portugal (2002-2005)
Essor et chute du gouvernement de coalition de centre-droit au Portugal (2002-2005)
José M. Magone
p. 39-59

Résumés

Quelle a été l’influence de la coalition de centre-droit sur l’économie, la société et la politique portugaises ? L’analyse du processus de formation de cette coalition est replacée dans l’histoire des autres gouvernements de coalition qu’a connus le Portugal. Elle est suivie d’une étude approfondie des mesures d’austérité appliquées prises par ce gouvernement, dans le contexte de la politique monétaire et fiscale du processus d’intégration européenne.

Les mesures d’austérité du gouvernement furent peu et de ce fait les partis d’opposition de gauche furent capables d’engranger des gains électoraux tant aux élections pour le Parlement européen que pour les assemblées régionales de Madère et des Açores. L’image de désorganisation donnée par le gouvernement de Santana Lopes a poussé le président Jorge Sampaio à provoquer des élections législatives anticipées. Le 20 février 2005, le parti socialiste sous la direction de son populaire leader José Socrates, a alors gagné les élections, à la majorité absolue.

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Texte intégral

1After 1998, Portugal became one of the twelve member-states belonging to the third phase of Economic and Monetary Union. As member it was and is obliged to keep the criteria attached to the growth and stability pact. Among these criteria is the containment of the budget deficit below 3 percent of the gross domestic product (GDP). Although until 1999, the Portuguese government was able to keep the convergence criteria attached to the growth and stability pact, the deteriorating economic situation and the overall increase in social expenditure and last but not least, the lack of reforms in the public administration led to a budget deficit of 4.4 percent of GDP.

  • 1 Commission of the European Communities, Council Recommendation on the Implementation of Member Stat (...)
  • 2 J.M. Magone, “Portugal”, in “European Data Yearbook 2000”, special issue of European Journal of Pol (...)

2The Portuguese population has the worst structure of qualifications of the European Union and there is need for long-term investment in education and vocational training to change this situation1. In terms of global recession, the open Portuguese economy is more vulnerable to asymmetrical shocks than other stronger economies in the European Union. The very fast rise of unemployment leads to a considerable reduction of budget receipts and an increase of the expenditures. Moreover, Portugal is one of the countries with the largest informal economy along with Spain, Italy and Greece of the European Union. In times of crisis, the informal economic sector comprising mainly capital-poor small firms tends to grow leading to increased tax evasion. There is also a tendency to introduce new indirect taxes over direct taxes to close the gap between receipts and expenditures. This is what happened in the late phase of the Antonio Guterres government which had to recur to so called amended budgetary lines to match the gap between receipts and expenditures. In 2000 and 2001, due to lack of an absolute majority by one seat, it had to rely on the support of a rebel Member of Parliament from the Social Democratic Centre-People’s Party (CDS-PP, Centro Democrático Social-Partido Popular). In exchange the government promised allegedly to support financially a cheese-processing factory in its constituency of Ponte de Lima2.

  • 3 On the portuguese economy see D. Corkill, The Portuguese Economy. A Case of Europeanization, London (...)

3The centre-right coalition government, consisting of the socialdemocratic party (PSD, Partido Social-democrata) and the CDS-PP was a reaction to a deteriorating budgetary situation, that led to more divergence from the criteria of the Economic Monetary Union set out at Maastricht and kept in the growth and stability pact. The recent right-centre coalition government in Portugal is an excellent example of how difficult it is to implement austerity measures in a country with a weak economy. In spite of thirty years of democracy and twenty years of European integration, Portugal is still characterised by intensive-labour industries, with a low investment in research and development and an inadequate education system for the labour market3.

  • 4 M. Chang, “Economic and Monetary Union”, in N. Nugent (ed.), European Union Enlargement. Basingstok (...)

4Portugal was the first country, which had to deal with the excessive budget deficit procedure of the European Commission. After 2002, other countries including Germany, France, Italy and Greece were either on the brink or were also submitted to the same procedure. Germany and France tried to change the rules of the game in 2003, but European Court Justice decision upheld the position of the European Commission. Inspite of that, all member-states agreed to ease the excessive budget procedure in periods of crisis4.

5In this article, we want to study the rise of this right-centre coalition government in 2002 until its downfall in 2005. One of the main reasons for its downfall was that their austerity programme became more and more unpopular over time. Instead, a growing number of people were switching their support for the opposition left-wing parties. The elections of 18 February 2005 confirmed this trend.

6The article discusses first the aspect of coalition government in Portugal, applying it then to the centre-right coalition government. Afterwards, the difficulties of the government in presenting the agenda is explored. The subsequent sections analyses the European elections of 12 June 2004, before we turn to the handover of power of Barroso to Santana Lopes. The last section deals with the elections of 18 February 2005. The article will end with some conclusions.

The Elections of 17 March 2002: an Unconvincing Victory for the Right-Centre Parties

7The catastrophic results in the local elections of 16 December 2001, led to the sudden resignation of prime-minister António Guterres and his socialist government. President Jorge Sampaio decided to call for early elections. Guterres sudden resignation happened in a period of recession and growing budgetary deficits. At this point in time it was assumed that the budget deficit was above the 3 percent of gross domestic product (GDP) prescribed by the criteria of Economic and Monetary Union. The right-centre parties, in particular the PSD under José Manuel Barroso conducted an opposition strategy around the topic of Portugal diverging more and more from the mainstream in the European Union. The resignation of Guterres could be regarded as a major victory for the PSD. The position of the PSD was supported by the eurosceptic conservative CDS-PP which also regarded the management of the economy by the Socialist party as deteriorating considerably. The CDS-PP was led by the young former journalist Paulo Portas, who was quite charismatic among the population. Guterres faced also opposition from some quarters inside the party, which felt that he was no longer up to the job. The Socialist party elected new leader Eduardo Ferro Rodrigues, who had been a member of the Guterres government. In the communist party (PCP, Partido Comunista Portugues), the lack of reform and acceptance of opposition groups undermined its electoral chances. The perception that it remained a fossilized and autocratic party and characterized by a lack of renewal was the main reason for its continuing internal crisis. Party leader Carlos Carvalhas lacked the charisma and was too dependent on eminence grise Álvaro Cunhal.

  • 5 C. Jalali, “As mesmas clivagens de sempre? Velhas clivagens e novos valores no comportamento eleito (...)

8The campaign for the 17 March elections was quite polarised. These elections were regarded as one of the most polarised ones since the founding elections on 25 April 1975. Nevertheless, both main parties, PS and PSD, avoided to be specific about the policies that they wanted to implement in order to sort out the growing budget deficit. The PS acknowledged the importance to tackle the deficit, but tended to refer to the social dimension of convergence. The PSD stressed the need to re-converge towards the European mainstream, but remained quite vague about the policies to achieve it. The main objective for both parties was the maximization of the highest number of votes through catch-all strategies. PS and PSD share a large number of voters in the centre. These voters belong to the new middle-classes and are value-oriented, not class-oriented. Carlos Jalali calls it an “electorate marais”, which is apolitical and more electoral-market oriented5.

  • 6 This is one of the popular self-characterizations of the party according to M. Frain, “The Right in(...)
  • 7 The best studies on the PSD are naturally M. Frain, PPD/PSD e a consolidação do regime democrático, (...)

9In spite of the deteriorating economic situation, the victory of the PSD was quite unconvincing. The PS under the leadership of Ferro Rodrigues was able to achieve a respectable 37 percent and remain only 3 percentage points behind the PSD. One of the main reasons for this weak result for the PSD may be the lack of charisma of leader José Manuel Durão Barroso, who had to face opposition inside the party since he was elected by an extraordinary party conference in the spring 1999. From the outset, this “most Portuguese party”6 has been characterised by factionalism and dominated by regional political barons, which were able to shape the direction of the party7. Barroso had always to deal with these existing factions inside the party.

10The main loser of the elections was the Communist Party which lost more than 100,000 votes in comparison to the legislative elections of 1999. In contrast, the Block of the Left (BE, Bloco da Esquerda), an electoral coalition consisting of the trotzkyite Revolutionary Socialist Party (PSR, Partido Socialista Revolucionário), the maoist Democratic People’s Union (UDP, União Democrática Popular) and the post-modern Politics XXI (Política XXI). was able to increase its 1999 result to 2.74 percent and 3 seats. It shows that the Communist Party is under pressure to reform itself, in order to become more attractive to the younger leftwing electorate, which has been voting for the BE.

11The CDS-PP was able to consolidate its result from the previous elections, in spite of the catastrophic electoral results of December 2001. Arithmetically, the two right-centre parties had enough support in parliament to establish a coalition. Soon after the elections the PSD privileged the possibility to coalesce with this small conservative party.

Tabl. I.— Results of the 17th March 2002 Legislative Elections

Parties

2002

1999-2002

Percentage

Number

+/- Percentage

PSD

40.21

105

+7.89

PS

37.79

96

-6.21

CDS-PP

8.7

14

+0.32

PCP-The Greens

6.94

12

-2.08

BE

2.74

3

+0.28

Source: Commissão Nacional de Eleições, <http://www.cne.pt>, accessed on 28th sept. 2005.

  • 8 For an account of the AD government under Francisco Pinto Balsemão see J. Magone, “Portugal: the Ra (...)

12The configuration of a right-centre coalition is not something new in Portuguese politics. Indeed, between 1979 and 1983, there was a pre-electoral coalition called the Democratic Alliance (AD, Aliança Democrática) which included the PSD, CDS and the tiny People’s Monarchic Party (Partido Popular Monárquico-PPM). One of the main aims of the AD was to change the highly revolutionary constitution towards liberal-democratic principles. Nevertheless, the coalition government collapsed due to intra-party factionalism and due to the fact that prime-minister Francisco Pinto Balsemão was quite uncharismatic and unable to control dissent inside the party8.

13This idea of a right-centre coalition was re-activated by the predecessor of José Manuel Durão Barroso, Marcelo Rebelo Sousa, who was leader of the party between 1997 and 1999. Actually, his strategy to develop a pre-electoral coalition with the CDS-PP called the Democratic Alternative (AD, Alternativa Democrática) emerged after the local elections of 1997. Nevertheless, Rebelo Sousa began to change his mind when there was an alternation of leader in the CDS-PP from Manuel Monteiro to Paulo Portas. Moreover, the party was not very enthusiastic about this strategy, due to the fact that opinion polls tended to suggest that such a pre-electoral strategy would lead to just a slight electoral improvement of the position of both parties. Last but not least, Durão Barroso led the opposition against such a strategy throughout 1999. The resignation of Rebelo Sousa and his replacement by Durão Barroso in the party conference of Coimbra in 1999 represented also a shift of party strategy.

14Summing up, the elections of 17 March 2002 pointed towards a coalition government between PSD and CDS-PP, in spite of the fact that Barroso’s original hope was to achieve a strong absolute majority which would allow his own party to ascend to power. A coalition government between the two main parties, PS and PSD, was not possible, due to the ongoing polarization between the two camps since 1985. The PSD would also never coalesce with the communists nor with the new leftwing party.

Setting up the Coalition-Government: the Quest for Convergence with Europe

15The coalition between the PSD and CDS-PP was a minimal winning coalition and from the outset ideologically quite convergent in many issues.

  • 9 1 government PS-CDS (1978), 3 gov. AD [PSD+CDS+PPM] (1979-1983), 1 gov. PS-PSD (1983-1985). For mor (...)
  • 10 Majoritarian means naturally a polarized two-party system and refers to the typology of Arend Lijph (...)
  • 11 P.C. Magalhães, “Elections, Parties and Policy-Making Institutions”, in A. Costa Pinto (ed.), Conte (...)

16Portugal belongs to the countries were coalition governments are quite seldom. Between 1976 and 2002, there were five very short coalition governments9. They all were characterised by instability and led to early elections. This record clearly showed the difficulty to establish a coalition culture in Portugal. The preferred outcome is a clear majority for one party, either the PS or PSD. Between 1987 and 2001, such majorities existed. The PSD under Anibal Cavaco Silva was able to gain two absolute majorities in 1987 and 1991 giving stability to the political system, while the PS under Antonio Guterres came close to absolute majorities in 1995 and 1999. There is a general trend towards a majoritarian10 two-party system, in which smaller parties are declining11.

  • 12 Full text from O Público, 29th March 2002 accessed on 3th of January 2006.
  • 13 Expresso, 23th March, 2002.
  • 14 Assembleia da República, Programa do XV Governo (Lisbon 2002): 8.
  • 15 Expresso, Economia, 29th June 2002: 3-5; O Publico, 12th July 2002: 25.

17Coalition government is regarded as a last resort in the Portuguese political system. The negotiations for a coalition started shortly after the elections and were finalised within a month. The coalition’s framework agreement was announced on 28th March and showed a strong convergence of objectives between the two main parties12. In spite of policy differences in such areas as immigration, justice and defence, both programmes were quite compatible, so that it was not difficult to find common ground13. The government programme included the reform of the public administration which was linked to reducing public spending. Measures to revitalise the ailing Portuguese economy were given priority in the overall strategy of the right-centre coalition. Overall, the programme was designed to improve the competitiveness of the Portuguese economy. At the centre of the strategy was to tackle the public finances14. In terms of ministerial positions, the junior partner CDS-PP got the defence, the justice and social security and labour ministries. Paulo Portas became the Defence Minister and Vice-Prime Minister. Barroso was very keen to keep the cabinet with the minimal number of ministers. It consisted therefore of 17 members, of which the vast majority belonged to the senior partner, 3 to the junior partner and 1 was independent. Barroso included many members of the former Cavaco Silva government. A central figure of the overall cabinet was the socalled “iron lady” Manuela Ferreira Leite, who was a super-minister in charge of finances and the reform of public administration. She had previous experience in the Cavaco Silva governments between 1985 and 1995. Her main task was to reduce considerably public spending, including the cut of bureaucratic waste, the reduction of superfluous personnel in public administration, and superfluous governmental agencies. She was given drastic powers in order to contend public spending, including powers over local authorities. According to first estimates done by the department of Ferreira Leite, Portugal had a deficit of 3.8 percent of GDP, well above the prescribed 3 percent of the EMU criteria. In the summer, the European Commission should revise the estimate to 4.4 percent. This meant that the first year of government was geared to find ways of cutting public spending in short term perspective15.

The Performance of the Coalition Government

  • 16 The concept of communicative discourse is taken from Vivien Schmidt, The Futures of European Capita (...)
  • 17 Diário de Notícias, 7th July 2002: 6.

18The coalition government had major difficulties in gaining the confidence of the population due to their poor communication skills16. Indeed, the message that the coalition government was giving to the outside world was that Portugal was in a catastrophic economic situation and diverging from the rest of the European Union. Although the data pointed towards this situation, the coalition government continued to blame the previous government for the bad economic situation. The negative discourse of the government had major impact on the economic market and foreign direct investment. This poor management of public relations on behalf of the country was one of the major reasons for the difficulties to restore credibility and confidence in government measures. When the government realised that they were not undermining the previous government nor the opposition, but actually their own prospects of success, the discourse changed towards a more optimistic message. This led prime minister Durão Barroso to announce a package of € 355 million of programmes, most of them financed through the EU structural funds, which would lead to investment in infrastructures and to the relaunching of the ailing Portuguese economy17.

Contending the Budget Deficit

  • 18 Expresso, 5th July 2002: 5.
  • 19 M.L. Cristovam, “2002 Annual Review for Portugal”, in European Industrial Relations Observatory onl (...)

19In spite of this, the government remained quite unpopular trailing in the opinion polls behind the main opposition party PS during the summer. Barroso continued to be less popular than Ferro Rodrigues, the leader of the socialist party18. The drastic policies were also accompanied by a huge legislative programme which the coalition government wanted to bring through parliament without proper consultation of the opposition parties. This further undermined cooperation between the main parties. In the autumn, the right-centre coalition government had to deal with a growing discontent of public civil servants which feared over their future prospects in view of the intended reforms of public administration by the government. The increase in the number of strikes and industrial relations conflict further undermined the right-centre coalition government. The main Communist dominated trade union confederation the General Confederation of Portuguese Workers (CGTP-In, Confederação Geral dos Trabalhadores Portugueses-Intersindical) organised a highly successful general strike against the government on 10 December 200219.

20The crisis was exacerbated when in a trial related to the University Moderna, a private Higher education institution, it was found out, that vice-prime minister Paulo Portas, who had been director of the university’s opinion polls centre, used allegedly funds of the university for his party the CDS-PP. Paulo Portas was only a witness at the trial, but this alleged non-transparent transfer of resources led to a negative reaction among public opinion.

  • 20 O Público, 12th July 2002: 2; 13th July 2002: 3.

21Prime minister Barroso had also to deal with the fact that his party continued to be highly divided and strong opposition existed against the new right-centre coalition government, among them his predecessor Marcelo Rebelo de Sousa. The 24th PSD party conference in early July 2002 was designed to rally the party around the rebirth of the party as a government party. Optimistically, he conveyed the image that his government will last for a decade and lead to major reforms similarly to what Anibal Cavaco Silva had achieved between 1985 and 1995. The overall atmosphere of the party was sober, not triumphant20.

  • 21 On the ailing Portuguese National Health see M.D. Oliveira, J.M. Magone & J.A. Pereira, “Non-Decisi (...)

22During 2003, several important measures were introduced that had a strong impact on the economy. Indeed, the government froze the salaries of public civil service servants earning more than € 1, 000 per month. This measure affected about two thirds of the 700 000 civil servants. The salaries of civil servants earning below this figure would be adjusted to inflation. Moreover, the government introduced indirect taxes and engaged in the selling of public enterprises. Ferreira Leite controlled tightly local authorities expenditure and forbid them to resort to credit. Last, but not least the ailing National Health Service had to endure tight austerity measures21. The government also increased the student fees in the public university sector to €852, leading to major protests by students.

  • 22 Banco de Portugal, Relatório para a análise da situação orçamental, Lisbon, 2005: 13.

23Quite central to Barroso’s government programme was the reform of public administration. The lack of reform has led to a growth of personnel costs of public administration. Portugal spent in 2003, 15 percent of GDP in personnel costs above the EU-15 average of 11 percent. Only Denmark (17.7 percent) and Sweden (16.6 percent) are above this average with considerably higher GDP22.

  • 23 A review of the modernization of the Portuguese administration can be found in J.M. Magone, The Dev (...)

24He asked former Minister of Foreign Affairs and former Commissioner of the European Commission João de Deus Pinheiro to chair a commission to assess how the Portuguese public service could be modernised. Barroso’s overall long term plan was to slim down public administration and move towards a post-modern reflexive public administration which would create more public-private partnerships become it more transparent and accountable. He wanted to push forward a public management model based on the principles of governance. Some of the EU structural funds were redirected to help finance these reforms, in particular to improve the qualifications and professionalization of civil servants23.

  • 24 Banco de Portugal, op.cit.: 16.

25The austerity measures had a negative impact on the Portuguese economy. At the end of 2003, Portugal registered a negative growth for the first time since transition to democracy. This had a major impact on unemployment figures which were rising quite fast. The number of firms that had to close their doors due to the recession increased dramatically in the beginning of 2004. Inspite of huge efforts, Ferreira Leite predicted that the budget deficit would remain just slightly below the EMU criteria threshold by 2.9 percent of GDP. In this sense, the Portuguese government remained with a very tight room for manoeuvre. Indeed, apart from the rising personnel costs in public administration, the main reason for the budget deficit was the considerable increase of the social expenditure in education, health and social security in the second half of the 1990s. The economic growth until 2001 allowed for an improvement of social transfers of the Portuguese welfare state, which developed quite late and still provided the population with the lowest social transfers in absolute numbers, in spite of the fact that in relative terms it represented a considerable additional burden for the budget. It is expected that social security, particularly the expenditure in pensions, will remain a major problem for the Portuguese government24.

Tabl. II.— Growth of the Portuguese Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 2002-2004

Growth of GDP

2002

2003

2004

World

3

4

5.1

Eurozone

0.9

0.5

1.8

Portugal

0.4

-1.1

1.1

Source: Banco de Portugal, Relatório annual 2004, Lisbon, Banco de Portugal 2005: 15.

26The government set big hopes on the forthcoming Football European championships to achieve a revival of the economy. Indeed, at the end of the year the figures of the economy were becoming more promising. This became evident, when they started the campaign for the European Parliament elections of 13 June 2004. These elections were regarded as the first test for the right-centre coalition government.

Reforming the labour market

  • 25 European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions, Industrial Relations Deve (...)
  • 26 This is based on the excellent study of P. Hespanha et al., Entre o Estado e o Mercado. As fragilid (...)

27Since the adoption of the Lisbon strategy for employment and competitiveness in the European economy by 2010, Portugal is engaged like other members of the European Union in introducing measures in order to achieve a more competitive labour market. One has to acknowledge that in comparative terms the Portuguese working population has a high level of employability which comply more or less with the targets set out in the Lisbon strategy. The main problem is that most of this employment is very precarious, temporary and with a low level of social protection. Indeed, one fifth of the Portuguese working population has fixed-term contracts, the highest level in the European Union, only surpassed by Spain with one third of its population in such situation. Most of these jobs are precarious and paid low wages. Similar to Spain, it is impossible to make long term plans25. The Portuguese economy is based on low wages, so that a family is dependent on the income of all its members. Although there is protective social legislation, child labour is still a reality in Portugal which naturally leads to early drop out from school in order to help the collective family income26. In cases of crises such as in 1978-79 and 1983-84 firms may just not pay out salaries, and many employees have to deal with the phenomenon of wages being several months in arrears. This includes even football teams of the Portuguese Superliga like presently Vitória de Setúbal.

  • 27 J.M. Magone, Iberian Trade Unionism. Democratization Under the Impact of the European Union, New Br (...)
  • 28 M.L. Cristovam, “CGTP Holds Strike to Oppose Draft Labour Code”, in A.C. Ferreira et al., 2002 Annu (...)
  • 29 Banco de Portugal, Relatório anual 2004, Lisbon, Banco de Portugal, 2005: 81-82.
  • 30 Ibid.: 86.
  • 31 Ibid.: 85.

28The right-centre coalition government was very keen to reform the labour market. It engaged in a dialogue with the employers’ organisations, particularly the Confederation of Portuguese Industry (CIP-Confederação da Industria Portuguesa) and the main trade union confederations the CGTP-In and the General Workers’Union ( (UGT, União Geral dos Trabalhadores). The Portuguese system of intermediation is dominated by the Economic and Social Council (CES, Conselho Economico e Social) institutionalised in 1992. The most relevant bargaining body within the CES is the Council for Social Concertation (CPCS-Conselho Portugues de Concertação Social) which was founded in 1983 by a previous coalition government of the two main parties PS and PSD. The general pattern is that employers’ organisations and the UGT tend to search for a compromise, while the CGTP-In has a record of opposition to labour market policies that reduce the rights of workers.27 After almost one year of negotiations, the new labour code (Código de Trabalho, Law nr. 99/2003 of 24 August 2003) was approved in parliament with the support of the governing parties in April 2003 and, after presidential ratification, came into force on 1 December 2003. This was the first time that such codified document existed in Portugal since 1974. The purpose of the exercise was to make the Portuguese economy more competitive. Several measures were introduced to make the labour market more flexible, particularly in relation to employee dismissal legislation. It also included aspects of compulsory arbitration determined by the Minister of Social Security and Labour in relation to the expiry of collective agreements. There was also a better regulation of night work and fixed-term contracts. Moreover, employers were obliged to draw vocational training programmes for their employees, although the enforcement of such measures was not sufficiently thought through. The code of practice was welcome by employers’organisations, because it made the labour market more competitive. The opposition came from the main trade union confederations, CGTP-In and the General Workers Union (UGT, União Geral dos Trabalhadores) and the leftwing opposition. CGTP-In organised one-day strikes on 10 December 2002 and a joint one with the UGT on 20 January 2003. The main argument of trade union confederations against the new Labour code was that it would increase the already existing high level of precariousness of labour contracts based on low salaries28. In general terms, the labour market reform did not contribute to a considerable improvement of the employment situation. On the contrary, unemployment rose over 2004. Although Portugal has a lower level of unemployment than the EU25, the precarious nature of existing jobs may lead to a fast growth of unemployment in times of crises. The most affected regions are naturally the southern regions of continental Portugal in particular Alentejo with higher unemployment figures passing the 8 percent mark. These lower unemployment figures are also sustained due to lack of reform of public administration. Furthermore, in 2004 46.7 percent of unemployed were of long duration which is a sign of deterioration of the labour market since 2001, but particularly since 200329. The main reason for unemployment in 2003 and 2004 were collective dismissal due to closure of firms and individual dismissal or the end of a temporary contract. The latter reached 24.1 percent in 2004 and 26.1 percent in 200330. In 2004 one fifth of persons with higher education degrees, which represent 9.5 percent of this specific job market group, had difficulties to find a job. More problematic were young unemployment with basic education which represent 34.2 percent of this specific job market group and of which 17.6 percent were unemployed31.

Tab. III.— Unemployment in Portugal 2001-2004

Overall

Female Unemployment

Youth Unemployment

18-24

2001

2002

2003

2004

2003

2004

2003

2004

Portugal

4.2

5.8

6.3

6.7

7.2

7.6

14.5

15.3

EU*

7.8

7.2

9.2

9.2

10.1

10.1

18.6

18.5

* EU 15 (2001-2002); EU 25 (2003-2004).
Source: Eurostat.

29The government tried also to gain the social partners for a strategic social agreement. The social contract for competitiveness and employment was geared towards fulfilling the growth and stability pact with support of the social partners. Negotiations took place during 2003 and 2004. The CGTP-In was very keen to get more concessions from the government, so that the negotiations took longer than anticipated.

Taking Sides in the Iraq War

  • 32 N.S. Teixeira, From Neutrality to Alignment: Portugal in the Foundation of the Atlantic Pact, Flore (...)
  • 33 Á. Vasconcelos, “A Europeização da política de defesa”, Estratégia, 14, 2nd Semestre,1999: 7-19.
  • 34 J. Rupnik, “Élites et opinions publiques européennes face à un moment historique pour l’Europe, in (...)
  • 35 J.M. Magone, “José Manuel Durão Barroso. A Political Scientist”, International Journal, LX (2), 200 (...)

30Portugal is traditionally a strong ally of the United States and as such aligned with the Atlanticist countries of the European Union. It was one of the founding members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (Nato)32. Nevertheless, the European integration led to a growing Europeanization of Portuguese foreign policy.33 Like in other members of the European Union, the Iraq war contributed to divisions among the political elite and the population34. Prime Minister Durão Barroso supported by Vice-Prime minister Paulo Portas strongly supported the American position. The organisation of the Azores meeting in March 2004 was an initiative of Prime minister Durão Barroso. Although the US, UK and Spain were the main visible actors in the coalition of the willing, the Portuguese government remained a staunch supporter. This support was not shared by the leftwing opposition. All three parties PSD, PCP and BE, vehemently opposed the war and followed a similar position to that of the Franco-German alliance. This opposition to the war was even supported by the Church, which normally does not intervene in the public discussion. The anti-war opposition was strengthened by the support of the Christian-democratic eminence grise, and former president of the United Nations Assembly, Diogo Freitas do Amaral. He clearly saw this support of the Portuguese government as quite negative for the country within the European Union35.

The Reshuffles of the Barroso Government

31In the year 2003, the Barroso government had to introduce several reshuffles in his cabinet. In early April 2003, he had to replace two ministers. Isaltino Morais, the Minister for Cities, Planning of the Territory and Environment had to resign because the media found out that he had evaded paying taxes and had several Swiss bank accounts. He was replaced by the experienced civil servant Amilcar Theias. The second minister was heavyweight Luis Francisco Valente de Oliveira who wanted to leave cabinet for a considerable period of time, and was waiting for the earliest possible reshuffle to do this. He was replaced by Antonio Carmona Rodrigues, a local civil servant working under mayor of Lisbon, Pedro Santana Lopes.

  • 36 J.M. Magone, “Portugal”, European Journal for Political Research, XLIII (7-8), December 2004: 1116- (...)

32The second major reshuffle took place in October 2003. Foreign minister António Martins da Cruz was forced to resign after allegations that his daughter was granted access entry to public university, without having the necessary mark for it.. According to the law, children of diplomats are allowed to enter the university without the necessary marks, but Martins da Cruz had resigned from diplomatic service, when he became minister, so that the law no longer applied. Moreover, one of his relatives tried to achieve a change of the law to accommodate his daughter’s wish. The press regarded this as a clear case of traffic of influences. He was replaced by Teresa Gouveia. Martins da Cruz was a major loss for the prime minister, because both families were quite close. The affair “Martins da Cruz” led unvoluntarily to the resignation of Minister of Science and Higher Education Pedro Lynce. He was replaced by Graça Carvalho, a civil servant of the respective ministry36.

33In sum, these reshuffles after one year in government clearly undermined the credibility of the government. The loss of heavyweights and their replacement by civil servants gave less visibility to many policy areas of the government.

The European Parliament Elections of 13 June 2004

  • 37 For a more detailed study see J.M. Magone, “Portugal”, in J. Lodge (ed.), The European Parliaments (...)

34The first half of 2004 was geared towards preparation of the campaign for the European Parliament elections37. The Nice Treaty had reduced the number of available seats from 25 to 24. There were nineteen parties competing in elections. The growing unease with the drastic austerity measures of the government was a major issue of the campaign which started one month before the election. The parties of the coalition government decided to candidate as a united list. It was called Força Portugal (Go On Portugal) and was strongly influenced by the electoral campaigns of Italian tycoon Silvio Berlusconi and his party Forza Italia (Go On Italy). The use of the strategy meant naturally a ‘footballization’ of the campaign. The coalition parties used the forthcoming European championships to present an image of optimism, which they hoped would boost their chances in the elections. The head of list was the former European Commissioner João de Deus Pinheiro whose heading in the campaign posters was competence (competencia). The main opposition party PS nominated António Sousa Franco as head of list. He served a Minister of Finances in the previous Guterres government and former Audit Court president, as head of list. From the very beginning opinion polls were strongly in favour of António Sousa Franco that criticized the austerity policies of the government and presented himself as the representative of a party which had and has been involved in shaping the European Union from its very first beginnings. Tragically, Sousa Franco died exhausted during campaigning in Matosinhos in north Portugal on 8 June, some days before the elections.

35The smaller parties presented also lists to the elections. The head of list for the Communist party and the Greens coalition was the experienced Member of the European Parliament (MEP), Ilda Figueiredo. The party focused its campaign on the opposition to the Iraq War and in the call for a referendum on the Constitutional Treaty. The BE focused on the same topics as the Communist-Green coalition. The negative impact of the economic policies of the government remained the main topic of these leftwing parties. The head of list of B.E. was actually the brother of Vice-prime minister Paulo Portas, Miguel Portas.

Tabl. IV.— Results of European Parliament Elections on 13 June 2004

Party/coalition

2004

2004-1999

Percentage

Seats

Percentage

Seats

Socialist Party (Ps)

44.5

12

+1.45

-

Força Portugal (PSD/CDS/PP)

33.3

9

-5.9

-2

Socialdemocratic Party (PSD)

9

Democratic Social Centre/People’s Party (CDS/PP)

2

Democratic Unitary Coalition (PCP-PEV)

9.1

2

-1.22

-

Block of the Left (BE)

4.9

1

+3.2

+1

Source: Commissão Nacional de Eleições, <http://www.cne.pt>, accessed on 28th sept. 2005.

36The electoral results confirmed the unpopularity of the right-centre coalition government. They were the big losers of the elections, losing 5.9 percent of the vote in comparison to 1999. This led to a loss of two seats. Although the Communist-Green coalition lost over one percent, it kept its two seats. The big winners were the Socialist party with an increase of +1.45 percent in relation to 1999 and remaining with the same number of seats, and the BE which almost tripled its vote and got one seat. Inspite of all attempts by the European Parliament and the National Electoral Commission to mobilise the population, abstention remained quite high and increased even in relation to 1999. While in 1999, 60 percent did not vote, in 2004 such figure had increased to 61.3 percent.

  • 38 J. Magone, José Manuel Durão Barroso…”, op. cit.: 550-552.

37The electoral results were a major blow to the right-centre coalition government which were severely punished for their austerity policies. In spite of this fact, the sudden emergence of the name of Prime Minister Durão Barroso as a potential compromise candidate as president of the European Commission changed the topic of the discussion. Moreover, the successful performance of the Portuguese national football team throughout the European championships diverted attention from national politics. During June and early July rumours indicated that Prime Minister Durão Barroso wanted to reshuffle his cabinet. In the end, the nomination of Barroso for the presidency of the European Commission by the Council of Ministers of the European Union, changed the situation.38

The Handover of the Prime-Ministership: from José Manuel Barroso to Pedro Santana Lopes

  • 39 Expresso, 10 July 2004.

38Prime-minister Barroso wanted to preserve the coalition government under a new prime-minister from his party. His proposed candidate was Pedro Santana Lopes, who was his long-standing friend since his period as a student in the Faculty of Law at the University of Lisbon and who was currently the mayor of Lisbon. Barroso’s main argument was that Portugal needed governmental stability to implement the austerity measures and continue the economic convergence course in the European Union. Socialist opposition leader Eduardo Ferro Rodrigues mobilised his party and activists against such an option and urged president Jorge Sampaio to call for early elections, as he had done so after the local elections of 2001. He was very hopeful that Sampaio would decide for early elections. In reality, president Jorge Sampaio accepted Barroso’s wish of continuity of the coalition government under a new prime-minister. This led to resignation of Eduardo Ferro Rodrigues, who felt that his credibility was undermined by this decision of the president39.

  • 40 O Público, 22 July 2004.

39The new government was sworn in on 23 July 2004. It led to major changes in the government personnel. Indeed, inside the PSD there were many opponents to Santana Lopes, so that many members of the Barroso government decided against taking part in a Santana Lopes government. In total, only four members of the previous Barroso government remained in the Santana Lopes government. According to O Publico, there was an increase of ministers from 17 to 19 ministers and from 36 to 38 secretary of states (junior ministers) from the Barroso to the Santana Lopes government. The CDS-PP lost two junior ministers in relation to the Barroso government40.

40The new Santana Lopes government had difficulties to impose its authority. After the summer recess, the unpopularity of the government continued to be quite high in the opinion polls. The continuation of the austerity measures under a new team was lacking consistency and coherence. Many decisions of Santana Lopes were regarded as hasty and clumsy. The image of the government deteriorated substantially during the months of October and November. This became evident in the elections for the regional assemblies in Azores and Madeira. The two coalition parties lost ground in the two autonomous regions.

Tabl. V.— Results of the Elections in the Autonomous Regions on 17 October 2004

Parties

Azores

Madeira

2004

2000-2004

2004

2000-2004

%

seats

%

seats

%

seats

%

seats

PPD/PSD

53.7

44

-2.2

+3

PPD/PSD-CDS

36.8

21

-5.6

+1

PS

57.0

31

+7.8

+1

27.5

19

+6.1

+6

CDS-PP

7.03

2

-2.7

-1

PCP-GREENS

2.80

-

-2

-2

5.50

2

+0.9

-

BE

0.97

-0.4

-

3.70

1

+3.7

1

Source: Commissão Nacional de Eleições, <http://www.cne.pt>, accessed on 28th sept. 2005.

41In Azores, regional president Carlos César and his socialist dominated autonomous region was able to make substantial gains, while the coalition parties, which formed an electoral coalition, lost heavily. In Madeira, both coalition parties run for elections separately which led also to losses, but less than in Azores. The charismatic president of the regional government Alberto João Jardim continues to be an asset for the PSD in this Atlantic island. Inspite of that, the Socialist party was able to make inroads and improve its share of the vote by 6.1 percent. This was a substantial gain for the opposition. Although the results have to be understood primarily as a reaction to regional politics, they also had some linkage and repercussion on national politics. The coalition parties lost heavily in the autonomous regions, which were natural strongholds of the right centre. A complete electoral disaster was only prevented by Jardim in Madeira.

  • 41 Visão, 25 Nov. 2004, accessed on 25th November 2004.

42The climax of the negative perception of the government came about, when Minister for Parliamentary Affairs, Rui Gomes da Silva, intervened on behalf of the government against the weekly commentaries of party member Marcelo Rebelo de Sousa in the independent television channel TVI. He accused Marcelo Rebelo de Sousa of spreading ‘hate’ against the government, and therefore he appealed to the regulating High Authority for Social Communication (AASC, Alta Autoridade para a Comunicação Social) to intervene in this matter. The channel TVI decided then to refrain from airing his weekly commentaries. This was regarded as improper pressure of the government exerted on the channel TVI. This was regarded as censorship against the critics of the government. 41 The growing discontentment with the performance of the government was responded by Prime Minister Santana Lopes with a reshuffle which went badly wrong. Although, Rui Gomes da Silva resigned from the Ministry of Parliamentary Affairs, he became now minister of the presidency of the council of ministers. The reshuffle led to no personnel changes, nevertheless some ministers moved to other ministries. Three days later the government was sworn in, Henrique Chaves, the minister for Sport decided to resign due to the fact that he felt misled by the prime minister, because no additional funding for his ministry would be available. The resignation of Chaves was quite embarrassing for the government. Moreover, resistance inside of his own party against his government continued to grow. Quite relevant was the intervention of éminence grise Anibal Cavaco Silva in the weekly newspaper Expresso end of November. He was quoted as saying, without naming Prime Minister Santana Lopes, that incompetent people should be replaced by competent ones. Moreover, the request of Prime Minister Santana Lopes to undertake another reshuffle due to the resignation of Chaves was not granted by president Jorge Sampaio. Instead, Jorge Sampaio called for early elections and asked the outgoing government to approve the budget on 2 December, before formally resigning.

  • 42 V. Mock & T. Tamis, “Defusing Portugal’s Political Crisis”, Radio Netherlands, 3th of December 2004 (...)

43This was the end of the right centre coalition government which clearly was conditioned by the need to implement very unpopular austerity measures in order to restore macro-economic convergence towards the European Union42. Apart from the very difficult agenda that the right centre coalition had to undertake, one has to acknowledge that after the power handover from Barroso to Lopes the overall discipline of the government in the implementation of the austerity measures began to slip away. This has to do with the fact, that Prime Minister Lopes had almost no time to prepare himself for the new job. Moreover, he had to select a more or less new team in order to continue the work of the previous government. Last, but not least, the highly divisive personality of Prime Minister Santana Lopes both inside as well as outside the party may have contributed to the downfall of his government. The image of a disorganised government reflected on his ability or rather inability to present a cohesive whole.

The Elections of 20 February 2005: The Historical Victory of the Socialist Party

44Since the resignation of Eduardo Ferro Rodrigues as leader of the Socialist Party, José Socrates, a former minister of the Guterres government, became interim party chief. Finally, in November 2004, he was confirmed with an overwhelming majority of the delegates as new party leader in a party conference. Socialist party leader Ferro Rodrigues was highly popular among the population, but in 2003 the paedophilia scandal of Casa Pia had damaged his authority within the party considerably. The main reason was that Ferro Rodrigues standby by his friend Paulo Pedroso, a former minister of the Guterres minister, who was put in preventive custody due to his alleged involvement in the scandal. Although Paulo Pedroso was not charged and was released in October 2003, João Soares and his supporters launched a negative campaign against him within the party. This was reinforced by a witch hunt of the Portuguese press against Paulo Pedroso. After Paulo Pedroso’s release in the autumn, Ferro Rodrigues was able again to gain a widespread popularity. Nevertheless, Jorge Sampaio’s decision to support governmental stability by nominating Pedro Santana Lopes to replace Durão Barroso in July 2004, led to his resignation.

45Throughout the autumn 2004 opinion polls were indicating that new socialist leader José Socrates was the most well-liked politician. In terms of elections, opinion polls gave a decisive lead with a possible absolute majority to the Socialist party.

  • 43 Partido Socialista, Compromisso de governo para Portugal, 2005-2009. Voltar a Acreditar, Lisbon, 20 (...)

46The popularity of José Socrates contrasted heavily with the unpopularity of the outgoing government. The socialist party could also count with the support of heavyweight outgoing European Commissioner António Vitorino, who became the electoral campaign strategist. Like during the electoral campaigns of António Guterres, the Socialist party set up a forum with an internet website called “New Frontiers” (Novas Fronteiras) which was designed to mobilise the electorate towards the project of the Socialist Party. The programme of the PS followed the model of the previous socialist government under prime minister António Guterres, who tended to emulate the British style party manifesto for the forthcoming legislature. The programme was called Government Manifesto for Portugal. 2005-2009. To Believe Again and emphasised naturally continuity to the policies of the previous governments. Nevertheless, it emphasised the aspect of social and economic cohesion and a process of economic convergence towards the European Union which should be achieved through a mid-term perspective, but also be accompanied by social measures in order to reduce the burden upon.poorest segments of the population. Moreover, the socalled growth strategy was very keen to improve the qualification structure of the Portuguese and reduce the income gap between the richest and the poorest, the largest in the European Union43.

Tabl. VI.— Results of the Legislative Elections on 20 February 2005

2005

2005-2002

+/- Percentage/Seats

%

Seats

%

Seats

PS

45.00

121

+7.20

+25

PSD

28.70

75.00

-11.50

-30

PCP-PEV

7.50

14.00

+0.60

+2.0

CDS-PP

7.24

12.00

-1.56

-2.0

BE

6.40

8.00

+3.60

+5.0

Source: Commissão Nacional de Eleições, <http://www.cne.pt>, accessed on 28th Sept. 2005.

47In the day of elections the right centre parties lost heavily. While the CDS-PP under Paulo Portas was able to contain the losses by losing only 1.56 percentage points and 2 seats, the big loser was the PSD led by Santana Lopes. His party lost 11.5 percent and 30 seats. In this sense, the party remained below the 30 percent threshold. The big winner was the Socialist party with a landslide victory which led to a comfortable absolute majority of 6 seats. The other parties of the left were also to profit from the downfall of the rightcentre coalition. The communist party-green coalition was able to improve its share of the vote in comparison to 2002. New communist leader Jerónimo de Sousa was able to appeal better to the masses than his predecessor Carlos Carvalhas. Last but not least, the Block of the Left has become a strong party challenging the Communist party. It was able to almost triple its share of the vote and seats. It shows that there is space for a new leftwing party in the Portuguese political system and the BE under the leadership of Francisco Louçã was able to capitalise on it. Meanwhile the BE is represented at local, regional, national and European levels becoming a fully-fledged national party.

  • 44 See J. Magone, “The Rationale of Democratic Regime Building”, op. cit.: particularly 539-542 and 55 (...)

48In sum, the coalition government led to substantial electoral costs for the PSD, less so for the CDS-PP. It shows, that in the Portuguese case, the senior partner tends to be punished harsher by the electorate than the junior partner. This happened in 1985, when senior partner Socialist party was punished heavily by the electorate, while the PSD with the new charismatic leader, Anibal Cavaco Silva, was able to win the elections and stay in power for a decade44.

* * *

49The right centre coalition government was formed, because the PSD under Barroso was not able to achieve an absolute majority. Its main purpose was to tackle the budget deficit and reduce public spending. Most instability of the government could be found in the senior partner PSD, less so in the junior partner CDS-PP. The factional opposition within the party to Barroso and later on to Santana Lopes undermined the credibility of the government. The government was able to bring through many important reforms, such as the Labour Code, but the lack of consultation made such changes always reversible, when a new government would come to power.

50The short-term austerity policies were ill-designed to achieve sustainable convergence. In spite of three years of cuts in public administration and the selling of public enterprises, the budget deficit remained only slightly below the threshold.

51Last but not least, the changeover from Barroso to Santana Lopes in the summer 2004 broke the rhythm of reform and implementation of austerity measures. A new prime minister and new team could not ensure the continuity and survival of an unpopular government. In this sense, Prime Minister Santana Lopes had almost no room for manoeuvre. Moreover, factionalism in the PSD itself undermined the credibility of the government.

52The end result were heavy losses at the European Parliament elections, regional elections in Azores and, finally, in the legislative elections of 18 February 2005. The absolute majority victory of the Socialist party will contribute to political and macroeconomic stability in order to undertake the necessary public administration reform, long term investment in human resources and research and development. In this effort, the Socialist government will need to tackle the continuing inequalities in Portuguese society, otherwise the gap between Portuguese political elites and the population will continue to grow.

  • 45 Banco de Portugal, Relatório da commissão para a análise da situação orçamental, Lisbon, May 2005: (...)

53A report from the Bank of Portugal commissioned by the new socialist government found out that the budget deficit of 2004-2005, taking into account the EU statistical methodology, was predicted to reach between 6.5 and 6.8 percent, if extra receipts are not included. It means, that the present Socialist government is under considerable pressure to keep on the path of convergence45.

54November, 2005

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Notes

1 Commission of the European Communities, Council Recommendation on the Implementation of Member States’ Employment Policies, Brussels, 12th of September 2001, COM-2001/512 final: 17; European Commission, Social Situation in the European Union 2002, Luxembourg, Office of the Official Publications of the European Union, 2002 : 89 and 125.

2 J.M. Magone, “Portugal”, in “European Data Yearbook 2000”, special issue of European Journal of Political Research, XXXVIII (3-4), December 2001 : 396-401, particularly p. 400; J.M. Magone, “Portugal”, in “European Data Yearbook 2001”, special issue of European Journal of Political Research, XL (7-8), December 2002.

3 On the portuguese economy see D. Corkill, The Portuguese Economy. A Case of Europeanization, London, Routledge, 1999.

4 M. Chang, “Economic and Monetary Union”, in N. Nugent (ed.), European Union Enlargement. Basingstoke, Palgrave, 2004 : 184-198, particularly p. 194-195.

5 C. Jalali, “As mesmas clivagens de sempre? Velhas clivagens e novos valores no comportamento eleitoral portugues”, in A. Freire, M. Costa Lobo, P. Magalhães (eds), Portugal a Votos. As eleições legislativas de 2002, Lisbon, Instituto de ciencias sociais, 2004 : 87-124, particularly p.95-96; the electorate marais was used for the first time by E. Deutsch, D. Lindon & P. Weil (Les familles politiques aujourd’hui en France, Paris, Éditions de Minuit, 1966) to characterise the apolitical centrist electorate of the late sixties in France.

6 This is one of the popular self-characterizations of the party according to M. Frain, “The Right in Portugal: the PSD and the CDS/PP”, in T.C. Bruneau (ed.), Political Parties and Democracy in Portugal. Organizations, Elections, and Public Opinion, Boulder (Co),Westview Press, 1997 : 77-111, particularly p. 80.

7 The best studies on the PSD are naturally M. Frain, PPD/PSD e a consolidação do regime democrático, Lisbon, Editorial Notícias, 1998, and naturally the unpublished PhD dissertation M.J. Stock, Elites, Fações, e Conflito Intra-Partidário. O PPD/PSD e o Processo Político Português de 1974 a 1985, Évora, University of Évora, 1989.

8 For an account of the AD government under Francisco Pinto Balsemão see J. Magone, “Portugal: the Rationale of Democratic Regime Building”, in W.C. Muller & K. Strom (eds), Coalition Governments in Western Europe, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2000 : 539-558, particularly p.538-539.

9 1 government PS-CDS (1978), 3 gov. AD [PSD+CDS+PPM] (1979-1983), 1 gov. PS-PSD (1983-1985). For more detailed information see Magone, op. cit.

10 Majoritarian means naturally a polarized two-party system and refers to the typology of Arend Lijphardt of consensus based coalition government and majoritarian polarized coalition government, characteristics of consensus democracies and Westminster model democracies respectively. See A. Lijphardt, Patterns of Democracy. Government Forms and Performance in Thirty – Six Countries, New Haven, Yale University Press 1999 : 90-115.

11 P.C. Magalhães, “Elections, Parties and Policy-Making Institutions”, in A. Costa Pinto (ed.), Contemporary Portugal. Politics, Society and Culture, New York, Columbia University Press, 2003 : 183-202, particularly p.188-194.

12 Full text from O Público, 29th March 2002 accessed on 3th of January 2006.

13 Expresso, 23th March, 2002.

14 Assembleia da República, Programa do XV Governo (Lisbon 2002): 8.

15 Expresso, Economia, 29th June 2002: 3-5; O Publico, 12th July 2002: 25.

16 The concept of communicative discourse is taken from Vivien Schmidt, The Futures of European Capitalism, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2003: 240.

17 Diário de Notícias, 7th July 2002: 6.

18 Expresso, 5th July 2002: 5.

19 M.L. Cristovam, “2002 Annual Review for Portugal”, in European Industrial Relations Observatory online, http://www.eiro.eurofound.eu.int>, accessed on 10th of September 2004.

20 O Público, 12th July 2002: 2; 13th July 2002: 3.

21 On the ailing Portuguese National Health see M.D. Oliveira, J.M. Magone & J.A. Pereira, “Non-Decision Making and Inertia”, Journal of Health Politics, Policy and Law, XXX (1-2), February-April 2005: 212-230.

22 Banco de Portugal, Relatório para a análise da situação orçamental, Lisbon, 2005: 13.

23 A review of the modernization of the Portuguese administration can be found in J.M. Magone, The Developing Place of Portugal in the European Union, New Brunswick, N.J., Transaction, 2004: 101-129.

24 Banco de Portugal, op.cit.: 16.

25 European Foundation for the Improvement of Living and Working Conditions, Industrial Relations Developments in Europe 2002, … 2003, … 2004, Luxembourg, Office of the Official Publications of the European Union, 2003: 55, 2004: 65, 2005: 68.

26 This is based on the excellent study of P. Hespanha et al., Entre o Estado e o Mercado. As fragilidades das instituições da protecção social em Portugal, Coimbra, Quarteto, 2000.

27 J.M. Magone, Iberian Trade Unionism. Democratization Under the Impact of the European Union, New Brunswick, N.J., Transaction, 2001: chapter five.

28 M.L. Cristovam, “CGTP Holds Strike to Oppose Draft Labour Code”, in A.C. Ferreira et al., 2002 Annual Review for Portugal, in European Industrial Relations Observatory Online (EIR Online). EIR Online, “2003 Annual Review for Portugal”, <http://www.eiro.eurofound.ie>, accessed on 10th of September 2004.

29 Banco de Portugal, Relatório anual 2004, Lisbon, Banco de Portugal, 2005: 81-82.

30 Ibid.: 86.

31 Ibid.: 85.

32 N.S. Teixeira, From Neutrality to Alignment: Portugal in the Foundation of the Atlantic Pact, Florence, European University Institute, 1991, mimeo (“Working Paper HEC”, 9).

33 Á. Vasconcelos, “A Europeização da política de defesa”, Estratégia, 14, 2nd Semestre,1999: 7-19.

34 J. Rupnik, “Élites et opinions publiques européennes face à un moment historique pour l’Europe, in J. Rupnik (ed.), Les Européens face à l’élargissement.Perceptions, acteurs, enjeux, Paris, Presses de Sciences Po, 2004: 11-45.

35 J.M. Magone, “José Manuel Durão Barroso. A Political Scientist”, International Journal, LX (2), 2005: 544-552, particularly p.550. On the Atlanticist position of José Durão Barroso see his book: Uma certa ideia da Europa, Lisbon, Grádiva, 1999: 157-158.

36 J.M. Magone, “Portugal”, European Journal for Political Research, XLIII (7-8), December 2004: 1116-1120, particularly p.1117-1118.

37 For a more detailed study see J.M. Magone, “Portugal”, in J. Lodge (ed.), The European Parliaments Elections 2004, Basingstroke, Palgrave, 2005: 211-217 ; for a background of party system dynamics European Parliament elections in Portugal, see M. Costa Lobo, “Legitimizing the EU? Elections to the European Parliament in Portugal, 1987-1999”, in A. Costa Pinto (ed.), Contemporary Portugal. Politics, Society and Culture, Boulder (Co), Columbia University Press, 2003: 203-226.

38 J. Magone, José Manuel Durão Barroso…”, op. cit.: 550-552.

39 Expresso, 10 July 2004.

40 O Público, 22 July 2004.

41 Visão, 25 Nov. 2004, accessed on 25th November 2004.

42 V. Mock & T. Tamis, “Defusing Portugal’s Political Crisis”, Radio Netherlands, 3th of December 2004, <http://www2.rnw.nl>.

43 Partido Socialista, Compromisso de governo para Portugal, 2005-2009. Voltar a Acreditar, Lisbon, 2005.

44 See J. Magone, “The Rationale of Democratic Regime Building”, op. cit.: particularly 539-542 and 554; in the PS-PSD coalition of 1983-1985, PS lost 15.68 percentage points in the 1985 elections in relation to the 1983 elections, while the PSD was able to win 2.79 percent; see also M.J. Stock, “O centrismo politico e os partidos do poder em Portugal”, in M.B. Coelho (ed.), Portugal: o sistema político e constitucional 1974-1987, Lisbon, Instituto de ciências sociais, 1989: 147-192.

45 Banco de Portugal, Relatório da commissão para a análise da situação orçamental, Lisbon, May 2005: iv; this figure is related to budget deficit without extraordinary receipts. Inspite of possible extraordinary receipts, the prediction is that the budget deficit will remain above the 3 percent threshold. It seems that for 2004, the budget deficit was 3.9 percent.

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José M. Magone, « The Rise and Fall of the Right-Centre Coalition Government in Portugal (2002-2005) »Lusotopie [En ligne], XIII(1) | 2006, mis en ligne le 10 avril 2016, consulté le 26 septembre 2021. URL : http://journals.openedition.org/lusotopie/1451

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José M. Magone

Department of Politics and International Studies. University of Hull

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