• 1 The Sephardic exile is but one of many phenomena revealing the permeability and cross-influences be (...)

1The notion of Sefarad addresses a single, though internally differentiated and multifocal cultural and religious Jewish Iberian legacy, pertaining to Spain and Portugal – despite these regions geopolitical, dynastic and socio-cultural differences – since ancestral times up to the Decrees of Expulsion from Spain in 1492 and from Portugal in 1497. This Sephardic legacy manifested itself through three temporal dimensions that affected the Spanish and Portuguese Jewish communities at the time of the expulsion: a shared Iberian past, a threatened present and an irreversible diasporic future (Orfali 2018). Such foundational experiences became part of the Iberian Jews’ being in the world as they underwent uprooting, forced conversion, expulsion, secret return, internal exile or re-settlement in foreign lands.1 Notwithstanding the different paths taken by the Sephardic diasporas, Sefarad as a dense grid of traditions (e.g. life experiences, memories, texts, liturgy, music and other material and immaterial traces) has remained an enduring diptych linking Spain and Portugal. In a parallel fashion, the relations between Iberia and its Sephardic diasporas have undergone innumerable twists, reversals and revivals as Spain and Portugal experienced their own processes of nation-state building in the modern and contemporary periods.

• 2 TheMarker, Foreign Passport: The Road to European Citizenship, March 2019, pp. 1-4 (in Hebrew).

4The caption “Portugal- Your entrance to Europe,” published in the financial section of the prestigious Israeli daily Ha ʾAretz, inviting Israelis whose families came from Morocco, Tunisia, Libya, Algeria, Egypt, Greece, Turkey, Bulgaria, The Balkan States, Syria, Lebanon and Latin American Countries to apply for “Portuguese-European citizenship through simple a procedure” is eloquent enough.2 The add catches in a nutshell the media coverage of the Iberian Laws that have been capturing the social imaginary of many Israelis since 2012. It also reveals the extreme competition between ad hoc legal services agencies that respond to the rising “demand” and “supply” of passports, opportunities and services. An inflated market that most often blurs the fact that issues of nationality and citizenship, whether dual or multiple come first. Undoubtedly, Israelis’ responses are part and parcel of what Ayelet Shachar defines as a qualitative change in the way citizenship and immigration practices are being globally understood (Shachar 2018, 2017). With increasing numbers of states offering their visas and passports “up for sale”, she contends, the commodification of access to membership shows the hollowing out of the “status, rights, and identity” components of citizenship. The reception of the new Nationality Laws in Israeli society attests to this process, fostering “conspicuous citizenship” and the illusion of global mobility. In turn, Israelis’ reception of these laws also shows how and when the affirmation of Sephardic identities may function as a form of distinction within a complex grammar of cultural and ethnic forms of belonging and boundary making.

• 3 Ribeiro e Castro sent a Parliamentary request to the Ministry of Internal Affairs 10 May 2010. The (...)

8While the two New Nationality Laws came out almost simultaneously, the parliamentary debates that preceded them and the laws themselves present significant differences. In Portugal, it was José Ribeiro e Castro, then deputy of the Christian conservative party CDS-PP who introduced the initiative in 2013, after being contacted – via Facebook – by representatives of Sephardic communities of Brazil who sought to institutionalize a symbolic reparation to “Sephardic Jews”.3 Their platform Petição Pública gathered over 1,400 signatories supporting the restitution of Portuguese citizenship to descendants of expelled Jews. The petition was followed by a motion of the Portuguese Socialist Parliamentary Group who requested a Fifth Reform to the Law 37/81” (Silva 2014). It was the Socialist deputy Maria de Belém who lobbied for the elaboration of a restitutive law as a gesture of historical reparation. Later discussions at the Portuguese Parliament counted with the presence of representatives of the Jewish communities in Portugal and the Spanish Ambassador in Lisbon and received the full support of the Bloco de Esquerda and the Portuguese Communist Party. The bill did not address issues of historical reparation, specify why Sephardic Jews deserved citizenship nor it required applicants to identify with Portugal or be acquainted with the Portuguese language. Instead, its final preamble provided a generic characterization of today’s Sephardic Jews: cosmopolitan, highly educated and practicing liberal professions. In so doing, the law echoed Portuguese stereotypes of Jews dating back to the nineteenthcentury liberal discourse (Quental 1871, Remédios 1895, Franco 2004). After brief political negotiations on who could be considered a Sephardic Jew, the Portuguese nationality law was unanimously approved with the consent of the Commission for Constitutional Affairs, Rights, Liberties and Guarantees on 12 April 2013. It was published in Diário da República as the 30-A/2015 law and came into effect on March 1, 2015.

• 4 The PP ignored the request to include Moriscos and Sahrawi, arguing that this was a particular law (...)

10Parliamentary debates lasted a year and the deadline for amendments to the law was postponed 19 times. It was Rafael Català Polo, who replaced Ruiz Gallardón as Minister of Justice, who finally presented the law for discussion in Parliament. Strong criticism followed. Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya demanded including the Sahrawi People, the Arab-Berber tribes originating from the western part of the Sahara desert that had been under Spanish rule. Izquierda Unida pleaded for the inclusion of the descendants of the Moriscos expelled between 1609 and 1614. The Catalan Convergència I Unió opposed the State’s request from potential applicants to prove language skills in Spanish and give evidence of cultural ties with Spain (Rogel Vide 2015: 35 et sq.). Likewise, all left-wing groups criticized the law for charging fees to those who request citizenship, on the grounds that the government was privatizing a public service.4 After no less than 67 amendments, the bill, approved in Congress in June 24, entered into force on October 1, 2015, seven months after the Portuguese law.

• 5 The Jews were massively expelled in December 1496 from the Portuguese territory by Manuel I and aft (...)
• 6 Original: “A presença dessas comunidades na Península Ibérica é muito antiga, sendo mesmo anterior (...)

11The New Laws’ preambles have opted for ambiguity and historical inaccuracy. Portugal applied the definition of the Sephardic Jews to those who left after the 1497 decree of expulsion but ignored those forced into exile after the Lisbon pogrom of 1506 and the ones forced to convert to Catholicism in order to remain in Portugal (Yerushalmi 1976).5 At the same time, the Portuguese law offered a wide definition of “Sephardic Jews”: those Jews who descended from the old and traditional Jewish communities of the Iberian Peninsula – Portugal and Spain, declaring that the presence of a Jewish community in Portuguese land was “older than the formation of the reign of Portugal in the twelfth century.”6

• 7 Original: “En verdad, la presencia judía en tierras ibéricas era firme y milenaria” (Ley 12/2015: 1 (...)
• 8 Ladino is the Romance language of Sephardic Jews, based on Old Spanish and written in the Hebrew sc (...)

12The Spanish law also boasted “a millenary presence of Jewish communities in the Iberian world” but emphasized instead a five hundred-year continuity rooted in the Sephardic Jews’ maintenance of the Judeo-Spanish language, culture, mores and a longing for a return to Sepharad, that is, to Spain.7 Thus, the Spanish law emphasized the presence of Ladino and Haketía as identity markers, reinforcing the role of language as a major bond between Spain and the Sephardic communities worldwide.8

• 9 Ley 12/2015: 1. In the original: “Se denomina sefardíes a los judíos que vivieron en la Península I (...)
• 10 In the original: “La diferenciación con los expulsados de Portugal, aquellos que se dirigi-eron a A (...)

13While the Portuguese New Nationality Law for Sephardim has no language requirement given that the Portuguese language did not survive in the diaspora – even if, some descendants of Portuguese Sephardim spoke Ladino – the law declares Ladino as a language originated from both Castilian and Portuguese. In so doing, Portugal subverts Spain’s restricted definition. The manoeuvre contrasts with the Spanish preamble which clearly differentiates between the Spanish Sephardic diaspora, that is, those originating in Spain who were later integrated with or founded new communities especially in North Africa, the Balkans and the Ottoman Empire and, those expelled from Portugal. The Spanish law that defines “Sephardim” as the Jews who lived in the Iberian Peninsula”,9 justifies the definition of Sepharad as “Spain” on the ground that this is the meaning of Sepharad in classic and modern Hebrew. For the law, Spain and not Spain and Portugal is the only and legitimate territory in question. According to the Spanish preamble, the Sephardic Jews who went to Amsterdam, to Bordeaux in France and to Livorno in Italy constituted the “New Portuguese Nation.” They incorporated the languages of the countries of arrival, be these Dutch, Italian or French, gradually leaving aside the Portuguese as their lingua franca.10 Thus, the Spanish preamble differentiates between the Sephardic and the Portuguese diasporas despite the fact that, historically, they mingled and were intertwined in multiple ways.

• 11 The Real Decreto 1004/2015 made knowledge of culture and history of Spain and knowledge of Spanish (...)

14Another interesting point is the zigzagging position regarding language and other socio-cultural test requirements that characterized the Spanish Law as opposed to the lesser demands of the Portuguese bill. The first news about the Spanish proposal that came out in 2012 announced an “automatic” path to naturalization for those Sephardic Jews who could prove their Spanish origins, a position ratified in the bill’s preliminary draft from February 2014 (EFE 2012). Nevertheless, the June 2014 draft already required passing an “integration test” that was to be designed and administered by the Cervantes Institute. The new law proposal now demanded assessing the applicants’ command of the Spanish language and their knowledge of Spain’s constitutional and sociocultural principles. By April, 2015 Judiciary Committee that approved the law established the DELE exam as required language proficiency and the CCSE, as an exam testing knowledge of Spain’s culture and history.11 The requisites added another expensive stumbling block to the thorough genealogy reports and other documentation that applicants had to present in order to cope with an intricate “politics of surnames.”

• 12 Interview with Israeli-Spanish translator, 12.3. 2019, HaSharon, Israel.

15Indeed, in the Spanish case, surname validation has been complex and the law stipulated various legal stages that were, in part, coordinated with the Federation of Jewish Communities of Spain or FCJE (Federación de Comunidades Judías de España) that represents Spanish Judaism vis-à-vis the Spanish State. The FCJE is in charge of relations with Israel, with the Jewish diaspora worldwide and with all other Jewish entities at home and abroad. It constitutes the ultimate Jewish instance that can certify the applicants’ eligibility by validating their Sephardic descent vis-à-vis the Spanish State. Yet this is still not a sufficient procedure. The final decision about the applicants’ “authenticity” as descendants of Megurashei Sepharad (the ones expelled from the Iberian Peninsula), together with other legal requisites as having no criminal records and the like, fall on the General Directorate of Registries and Notaries of the Spanish State, and on the figure of the Notary as its representative. At first, the procedure was bumpy and somehow inefficient. The notary that could be from any Spanish city was randomly assigned to a candidate’s application by the State. Unsurprisingly, notaries interpreted the Law’s instructions differently as they themselves had to learn the law and be able to discern among the diverse documentation they received – original documents, supporting evidence and the socio-cultural reconstruction.12 The procedure resulted in much inconsistency as some notaries were stricter than others. As admitted by a Spanish-Israeli intermediary present at the consultations and informal meetings that preceded the formulation of the Law at the Spanish Parliament:

• 14 Interview 5.4.2017, Madrid.

16Be that as it may, in a private interview with Javier Gómez Garrido, the General Director of Registries and Notaries, he admitted the gap between the initial expectations of 80.000 applications, and the 600 submissions that had managed to make through the entire process by April, 2017, almost two years out of three that the Law was to last, had been successful.14

• 15 See El gobierno concede a 4.302 sefardíes la nacionalidad por carta de naturaleza,Confilegal, Octob (...)
• 16 Interview 5.4.2017, Madrid.

17These cases added to another 4.302 applications that had been directly approved by Royal Decree or carta de naturaleza, an exceptional granting of citizenship extended in this case by the King Felipe VI who took this measure a few days prior to the passing of the Law.15 Well aware of the bottlenecks the Law presented, the General Director of Registries insisted on “the Spanish commitment to speed up procedures”. In his words, “the fact that the special link to Spain that the Law initially targeted as having maintained Ladino as a cultural legacy was now being replaced by other types of links that included donations to Spanish cultural associations shows Spain’s intention to stretch the interpretation of the Law to a maximum”.16

• 17 See the position paper presented to the Nationality Law Committee on behalf the Jewish Community of (...)
• 18 The fact that both the Spanish and the Portuguese laws have given attention to surnames as a marker (...)
• 19 Ibid. p. 6. Despite the fact that the DNA tests are indeed very controversial, researchers in Portu (...)

18In the case of Portugal, the validation channel is much simpler. The monitoring and exclusive verification of the surnames’ authenticity rest on the Portuguese Jewish Communities of Lisbon and the tiny enclave in Porto which monopolize the process even though, as opposed to the centralist FCJE, they act independently from one other. As opposed to the Spanish case where the last word rests on the Directory of Registries and Notaries of the Spanish State, in Portugal the ultimate authority, at times in a rather contradictory fashion, lies with the Jewish Communities themselves where official numbers attest to no more than 1,000 members out of 10 million population in the country. Even when the Portuguese Jewish Communities claim that “there are no official lists” of surnames related to the Portuguese Diaspora, they at the same time emphasize that a “Portuguese surname is a proven objective requirement of the connection to Portugal” and therefore they examine the applications “on a case by case basis”.17 As opposed to the Jewish Communities, the Portuguese Nationality Law does provide a short list of only 112 surnames related to the Portuguese Diaspora, organized according to the world regions in which people settled: The Netherlands, Great Britain, Asia, Latin America and the Portuguese ex-colonies.18 In any case, the Porto Community, more outspoken than that of Lisbon, is ready to give the certificate to applicants who do not have Portuguese surnames (and who do not speak Ladino) if they can prove their Sephardic Portuguese descent. In so doing, they recommend providing evidence from genealogists and Portuguese Diaspora experts, reputable witnesses and even DNA tests from IPATIMUP, the Institute of Molecular Pathology and Immunology of the University of Porto!19

• 20 The term Juderías originally referred to the ghettos in the Peninsula. Today the term has acquired (...)
• 21 The “Network of Spanish Jewish Quarters” was nominated as an institutional mem-ber of Casa Sefarad- (...)
• 22 Such appreciation, widely expressed in the Israeli press appears in Cnaan Liphshiz 2016, “New citiz (...)

19The “attraction and disenchantment” between the Iberian states and their Sephardic legacies have experienced ups and downs throughout the 20th century. However, the Iberian states’ entrance to the European Union in the 1980s, and the 1992 celebrations of the discovery of the New World that could not take place without the acknowledgement of the Decrees of Expulsion came hand in hand with an unprecedented Jewish revival that clearly targeted a tourist market (Aliberti 2018: 265-285). The establishment of the Spanish Red de Juderías in 1995 and the Portuguese Rede de Judiarias in 2011 are a case in point.20 These developments responded, among other factors, to novel forms of cultural and institutional interconnectedness that were sponsored by supranational Jewish organisations such as the European Association for the Preservation and Promotion of Jewish Culture and Heritage, together with the activism of the B’nai B’rith Europe which promoted the revival and exhibition of Jewish architectural and cultural remnants in the old continent. After joining the EU, Spain and Portugal took part in the ongoing “reinvention” of Jewish-related relics that was taking place in many European towns and cities.21 The passing of the New Nationality Laws in Portugal and Spain have further stimulated these trends as potential Israeli applicants and non-applicants alike have increased their curiosity and entrepreneurial interests in “Jewish” Iberia. Indeed, the latter appears as a space ripe with opportunities on behalf Spaniards, Portuguese, Israelis and Jews worldwide.22

• 23 The event was sponsored by the Israeli Ministry of Tourism, accessed on June 10, 2019, https://even (...)

20In the case of Portugal, the elective affinities nurtured by the Portuguese to attract Israeli initiatives were clearly expressed in the “win-win situation” formula that the Portuguese Ambassador in Israel chose to greet a group of 75 attendees, Israelis and Portuguese, who gathered at his official residence on February, 2017 to welcome the committee representing the Portuguese Network of Jewish Quarters. The Portuguese committee included the Net work’s President and mayor of Belmonte, António Rocha and Belmonte’s Rabbi Elisha Salas; the mayors of Castelo de Vide, Alenquer, Covilhã, Tomar and Sabugal; entrepreneurs of the Portuguese touristic sector and members of the Portuguese Press – Agência Lusa. They had all come to Israel to attend the IMTM 2017, the 23^rd Annual International Tourism Exhibition, a mega-event held in Tel Aviv that has turned into a trendsetter for the global and local tourist industries.23

• 26 See the detailed reportage by Roy Chico Arad, “Israel broke our hearts. In Portugal we feel they wa (...)

24Indeed, the Rede de Judiarias has been targeted as a major source for Portuguese cultural, tourist and economic empowerment and even investment in international trade, even considering kosher wine and food exports worldwide. Thus, it is important to emphasize that, as in all public events sponsored by the Portuguese Embassy and the Camões Institute in Israel, these entities have conspicuously omitted discussing the New Nationality Law. Instead, they opted for stressing Portugal as a major reservoir of Jewish past and as a land ripe with opportunities, be they in the field of tourism, technological entrepreneurship, real estate investment or trade between Portugal and the Portuguese Sephardic diaspora worldwide, especially in Israel.26

• 27 Recorded at the event by the author on 29.2.2016, a few months after the official passing of the Sp (...)
• 28 Ibid.

25These strategies radically differ from those of the Spanish institutions which have taken great efforts in implementing Passport to Sepharad, a wellorchestrated campaign that promoted applying to the “Spanish Nationality Law.” In major cities as Jerusalem, Haifa, Tel Aviv but also in smaller places as Ashdod, Ashkelon and Petach Tikva. The campaign led by the Spanish Embassy and the Cervantes Institute was followed by the Israeli media. Even the Israel academy opened its doors to make public Spain’s desire to give Megurashie Sepharad the opportunity to get the Spanish nationality as far as they fulfilled the “official” requirements. During the campaign, the Spanish Consul invoked time and again the “spirit of reconciliation and recognition of the fate that befell all those who did not want to convert to Christianity after 1492.”27 The law, he declared, meant to open the doors of Spain to many Israelis because it was an honor for Spain to acknowledge the legacy of Sepharad. Hence, he invited “all those who preserved that legacy so well and were enriching the Spanish community to be in touch”. “Come to us because we are your home in Jerusalem” was the phrase that sealed many of the campaign meetings.28 Indeed, between 2015 and 2017, the Spanish authorities in Israel did their utmost to explain the law and its procedures which, at that time, were intended to expire after three years. In 2018 the law was extended for another year.

• 29 Ynet, an Israeli news site already reported these developments. See Danny Sade, 2011 “Iberia may of (...)

26Even when the Spanish law initially met with skeptical responses on behalf of Israelis, it did raise of lot of buzz, interest and curiosity in the Israeli media and the always increasing visits of Israeli tourists to Barcelona and Madrid who indulged in Jewish Iberian circuits.29

• 30 The DELE dates from 1988 and in 1992 became part of a series of measures taken by Spanish authoriti (...)

28This does not mean that the Cervantes Institute and the Spanish Consulate did not develop aggressive marketing policies to make the most of the Law. Quite the contrary. By inviting Israelis of Sephardic origins to apply for citizenship they were actually selling language and culture programs that prepared applicants for the exams that the Spanish law required. The Cervantes became the only platform offering courses for the DELE language proficiency exam.30

• 31 Interview with members of the staff at the Cervantes Institute, February, 22, 2017, Tel Aviv.
• 32 Interview with members of the staff at the Cervantes Institute, February, 22, 2017, Tel Aviv.

29The exam that was originally designed for cultural and tourist purposes, was later employed as a mechanism to create de facto language policies for restricting immigration. In both cases, the DELE pre-dated the new citizenship legislation. Its becoming an obligatory requirement of the New Nationality Law, and the immediate monetization of such compulsory tests allowed worldwide, and the Cervantes Institute of Tel Aviv in particular, which at the time was suffering serious budget problems, to obtain new sources of income from tuition, testing location, and the like.31 Indeed, the Cervantes Institute in Tel Aviv reported a 70% attendance increase in 2016 for its preparatory courses, and exams (Lerner and Sitman 2017). Last but not least, the Cervantes Institute received significant monetary donations by prospective applicants, a gesture that falls under the category of especial vinculación con España.32

• 33 See Max Schindler, 2018 “Sign of Booming Economy. Almost Half of Israelis Going Abroad”, Jerusalem (...)

30The immediate interest and widespread reception that the New Iberian Nationality Laws have had in Israeli society respond to multiple factors. The first relates to the migratory character of the Israeli Jewish population. For a young State conceived as an ever-increasing melting pot national formation, migration is a constitutive and distinctive element of individual and collective identities. A second factor responds to the intractable Arab-Israeli conflict and the inherent tensions that permeate all aspects of daily life, the latter always marked by the danger of imminent armed conflict, real or imagined. Third, the feeling of confinement produced by the geopolitical reality whereby two bordering countries (Lebanon and Syria) are nonviable and the cold peace with two other neighboring nations – Jordan and Egypt – leave Israel with only one natural border: the Mediterranean Sea. Such structural situation not only makes travelling by land to any other country highly difficult and expensive but also renders flight as a most required commodity. A clear case is the new and comprehensive Euro-Mediterranean Aviation Agreement between the European Union and Israel signed in June 2013 that has allowed greater competition by offering more fly routes between Israel and Europe in general and in low-cost carriers in particular. The increasing number of Israelis travelling or vacationing abroad due to economic well-being and low-cost airlines services have transformed Barcelona and Madrid, and to a lesser extent, Porto and Lisbon, among other European cities, into high-demand destinations. It is no wonder then that the sum of Israel’s immigration character; its geopolitical instability; its extended sense of confinement and the Israelis’ travelling habits and stays abroad – which are always considerably cheaper in comparison to Israeli pricelists at home – have exacerbated the crave for a valid foreign passport.33

• 35 The Brexit crisis in the UK has brought a significant conditioning to this tendency, see Harpaz 201 (...)
• 36 Recorded Interview with Moshe Shaul, Autoridad Nasionala del Ladino i su Kultura, March 6, 2012, ac (...)

36Most applications for ancestry-based non-resident European citizenship are made by groups outside West Europe: Central and Latin America, East Europe, North Africa and Asia. Their approach to dual citizenship rests first on their attempt to gain a sort of insurance policy against economic crisis, unemployment, chronic insecurity, war or persecution. Second, on achieving upward mobility and the prestige of a “European passport” and only then, to a lesser extent, the desire to express one’s ethnic identity. Conversely, citizens of Western countries (e.g. North America, Western Europe, Australia), who apply for dual citizenship, exhibit a lower demand that is perdurable in time and may remain unaffected by economic pressures given that it is, first and foremost, an identity issue.35 It is against this backdrop that we can better understand the different attitudes towards and the impact of the New Nationality Laws among the senior (the oldest being born in 1934) and younger generations (the youngest born in 1996) in Israel. For the older generation among the interviewees, the assertion of their Judeo-Spanish and Sephardic culture and identity have a tremendous weight to their sense of belonging, ethnic pride and self and collective image. Thus, for those aged 65 or more, the New Nationality Laws are first and foremost, a sentimental issue. Applicants aged between 70 and 85 or even more expressed deep and emotional involvement. For Moshe Shaul, publisher of Aki Yerushalaim, founding father and ex vice-director of the National Authority for Ladino in Israel, born in Izmir in 1929, and seen in Israel and abroad as the “Ladino Don Quixote,” applying to Iberian citizenship is an issue of personal dignity. A public acknowledgement whereby Spain ratifies the importance of the Sephardic heritage.36

• 37 Interview with Portuguese teacher at Tel Aviv University who also worked at the Portuguese Embassy. (...)

37Conversely, the younger cohorts, aged between 23 and 45 present a clear instrumental approach. Having gathered practical information at the relevant institutions in Israel and verified the benefits of European citizenship and labor market, they strategically “indulge in a diasporic condition” that might afford them greater rights and mobility. While their enthusiasm was capitalized by the Cervantes Institute as discussed above, the instrumental attitude displayed by the young Israeli applicants descending from the Spanish branch of “the expelled” led some to apply for a Portuguese passport first; others to optimize their chances for obtaining an European passport by having different members of the same family group to apply to Portuguese Nationality the parents and to Spanish Nationality, their children or vice-versa or, even in not few cases, having the same member apply simultaneously for both passports. The popular belief in Israel that the Portuguese passport is easier and cheaper to obtain than the Spanish one enabled V. K., a young Israeli woman in her late 20s, who had applied at an early stage to Portuguese citizenship herself, to open up a business to help others in the procedures even though she was not a lawyer, and had no academic background or qualifications as a translator of Portuguese.37

• 38 Recorded interview, with Israeli scholar, Jerusalem, 18.2.2015. This position is also shared by Mos (...)

40The double standard that the Spanish Law opted for regarding language proficiency is a case in point. Initially, the spirit of the Spanish Law pointed to the existence of language subtypes as Ladino, Judezmo and Haketia as presenting unique identity traits of the Megurashei Sepharad. However, the law now requires an exam to show proficiency in modern Spanish. The manoeuvre provoked distress among the older generations of Ladino speakers, especially in Israel, who found it awfully difficult to learn Spanish grammar. Given their protest, the law was changed and applicants who are 70 years old or more have been exempted. The elasticity, nonetheless, reveals that the criteria of speaking Ladino as a mother tongue is not in itself a sufficient trait. Paradoxically, to many senior Israelis who are Ladino speakers, “only those who can speak Judeoespañol are authentic Sepharadim.”38 Indeed, the language issue raises a hot debate. For some scholars, the fact that the Spanish Law places only Ladino and not Jewish Arabic as a marker of Sephardic identity is a major historical mistake. Mostly because it is supposed to exclude descendants of the linage of great figures as Maimonides, (Cordoba, al-Andalus, Almoravid Empire 1135; El Cairo, Egipt,1204); Ibn Gabirol, (Malaga, Caliphate of Cordoba, 1022; Taifa of Valencia, 1070?) or Abraham Ibn Ezra (Tudela, 1092-3; Calahorra, 1167, Spain) scholars who lived and wrote in Arabic speaking and Arabic writing spaces in Iberia, but also in the host societies to which they later emigrated.

• 39 Recorded interview with a Spanish-Israeli scholar, Jerusalem, 23.2.2015.

41The attempts to define who exactly are the Sephardic Jews from the Ottoman Empire are equally problematic. There are many groups among the Sephardic diasporas in the Middle East who do not speak Ladino, and yet they have retained much of the Sephardic culture and mores. They are Sephardic in their habits, customs and traditions. In turn, not all local Byzantine and Greek Jews who have embraced part of the Sephardic customs and traditions – when in many villages and cities became hegemonic – came from Spain. Yet, they experimented a process of cultural contact and immersion in the Iberian world at the end of the sixteenth century and beginning of the seventeenth century. Does this fact make them have less rights than others or rather have equal or even more rights that those who were physically deported from Spain?39

• 40 The Halacha is the body of Jewish law supplementing the scriptural law and forming especially the l (...)
• 41 Recorded interview with Israeli scholar, Beer Sheva, 15.3. 2015.

42For Jewish scholars specializing in the Sephardi diasporas in the East, the definition of who are the Sephardi is related to Jewish law. That is, it is a Halachic question related to ritual.40 For Chachamei Sepharad, the learned men in Jewish law and spiritual leaders among Sephardic Jews, all those who have adopted and behaved according to the Jewish laws and rituals and embraced the Sephardi liturgy and prayers as these were molded in Spain, are Sephardim. That is, Sephardi Sages do not consider Spanish ancestry a condition sine qua non because as long as Jews keep the Sephardic rituals and liturgy corpus jure, they are identified as Sephardi.41

• 42 Miguel González, 2019 “Avalancha de solicitudes al cerrarse el plazo para que los sefardíes puedan (...)

44As opposed to the Portuguese Nationality Law that has no expiration date, the non-extendable term for the descendants of the Jews expelled from Sepharad (Spain) in 1492 to ask for Spanish nationality ended in October 1^st 2019. Despite the high expectations on behalf the Spanish Authorities which forecasted up to half a million petitioners, less than 2,500 were presented in the first year of the Law’s validity. Gradually, the interest in and the decision to apply for the Nationality Law took cruising speed: “a sprint against the clock”, as declared by Pedro Garrido, General Director of the Registries and Notaries at El País, Spain’s most important newspaper. The latter reported that 60,226 applications had been presented by the end of August, 2019, followed by almost 50,000 in September. All in all, El País reported that circa 100,000 applications from more than 60 countries were submitted to the Spanish State throughout the four years the Law was in effect.42

• 43 Ibid.

45Unsurprisingly, the Spanish official numbers published in the press are less than revealing. They offer the amount of applications that have been apparently submitted after having undergone all the required procedures rather than the final number of applicants who were actually given or are still waiting to receive Spanish nationality. In any case, Central and South America had the highest application rates: Mexico with 6,975; followed by Venezuela with 6,601; Colombia, 2,673; Argentina, 1,686; Panama, 1,082; Brazil, 697; Chile, 322 and Peru, 273. North America had 1,381 applications from the USA and, 149 from Canada. Europe with 186 from France and 117 from the UK. Africa with 203 from Morocco and the Middle East with 868 from Turkey and 860 from Israel.43 Be that as it may, the Iberian Laws of Nationality have triggered different but simultaneous agendas and contested interests on behalf of the States, the intermediary agents and the applicants. These agendas are still in the making. However, it is possible to observe certain trends. First, the revalorization of the Sephardic legacy and its diasporas in Iberia needs to be analyzed within the alternation between silences and omission versus infatuation and fascination that have marked the return to Sepharad in Portugal and Spain since the mid 19th century. Second, the Spanish and Portuguese attempts to come to terms with their Jewish absence and their traces equally respond to an instrumentalization of the past to serve not only diplomatic, cultural and social agendas but also economic investments in the expectations of return, especially since the great recession of 2008. Third, the easy-going approach in the spirit of the Portuguese Nationality Law as opposed to the Spanish one reflects a crystal clear motivation: Portugal needs and craves for immigrants. Spain does not. Fourth, the increasing demands for applying to Iberian citizenship has created a grey zone that is being occupied by ad hoc, aggressive law firms and startups which, acting as intermediates, seek to monopolize this niche and actually do so with great success. Cases in point are Passport to Go and Portugalis which market their services in the digital media, the press and even in central malls at the expense of less sophisticated imitators such as The Israeli Centre for Portuguese Citizenship. In turn, for the younger generation of Israelis among the applicants to the Spanish and Portuguese Laws, the citizenship these laws offer is no more than a portable property and a status object that allow access to high-valued markets and countries. Within the zigzagging changes towards a post-exclusive and post-territorial understanding of citizenship, colored now by the recent outbursts of nationalist populisms and xenophobia in Europe and the USA, the case of Sephardic Jews is no exception.