• 1 Linz, Stepan, 1996.
• 2 Kauffman, 2010.

1When does the transition from an authoritarian regime to a democracy end? The question has been briefly answered: when democracy is “the only game in town”1. However, this marks the difference between transition and consolidation; in fact, there is no consensus over when the democratization process ends. It has been argued that democratization begins with the breakdown of the authoritarian regime and concludes with the first democratic elections2. Also, speaking either of transition or of consolidation, there are many paths to be followed until democracy becomes “the only game in town”: formal and informal, symbolic acts and political decisions, social mobilization and institutional arrangements.

• 3 Pridham, 2016.
• 4 O’Donnell & Schmitter, 1986.
• 5 Morlino, 2012.
• 6 Morlino, 2015, p. 26.
• 7 Kauffman, 2010.

2In 1984, scholars still found it difficult to describe the “new Mediterranean democracies” of Huntington’s “third wave of democratization” as stable3. The steady functioning of democracy depends on broad consensus and ideological support, which in turn entails that society must come to terms “with the most painful elements of its own past”4. The fourth wave of regime change in the postcommunist world presented new challenges to transitional theories. Despite all the criticisms and debates on the actors, patterns, mechanisms and obstacles to democratisation theories5, an idea prevails: “Successful transition to democracy means that the political regime is at least a minimalist democracy”6. In this sense, whether it is a pacted, a bottom-up or a top-down and elite driven transition, there are some structural conditions that shape it: political culture, economic development, social mobilization and civil society, and last but not least, institutions7.

• 8 Kauffman, 2010.

3Institutional building constitutes a distinct parameter, as its design shapes the transition-consolidation prospects, the main actors’ strategies and the broader support for a democratic regime8. The comparative perspective of this article enables us to examine if the Spanish, Greek and Portuguese Transitions converge or differ, in terms of ruptures and continuities, at the level of institutional reforms. Our fundamental research question is as follows: Is there a Portuguese/Greek /Spanish “exception” or, on the contrary, a “south European path” in what concerns the institutions of democratic transition and consolidation?

• 9 O’Donnell & Schmitter, 1989, p. 6.
• 10 Steinmo, 2008, p. 159.
• 11 Streeck and Thelen, 2005.
• 12 Marcussen, 2000; Hall, 1989.
• 13 Rueschemeyer, 2009, p. 204.

5In what is already a classic study on this theme, O’Donnell and Schmitter9 define transition as a period of time in which “the rules of the political game are not defined”. If this concept is widely accepted, the same is not true with regard to the definition of institutions. According to Steinmo10 “the most common definition for institutions is: rules”. Some studies in this tradition focus on formal rules and organizations11, while others address informal rules and norms12. Whether we mean formal institutions or informal rules and norms, they are important for politics because they determine who participates in a given decision and, simultaneously, their strategic behaviour. As indicated, “institutions undergird, enable, and regulate the interaction of individuals and organizations in particular areas of life”13.

• 14 Thelen, 2004, p. 208.
• 15 Steinmo, 2008, p. 167.

6Even though there is already an abundant literature on institutions, the truth is that until recently, little concern was given to analysing and explaining institutional changes14. The assessment of these arrangements is of particular interest in periods of adjustment in the political system since “changing one set of rules can and often does have implications for others”15.

• 16 Costa Pinto, 2010; O’Donnell, 1992.

7Democratic transition is a par excellence period of change in which institution-building or re-building is a matter of utmost importance and at the same time highly ambivalent. Rupture with the past should be pragmatic enough as to safeguard a smooth transition but also clear enough because if not, “the continuation of important sections of the authoritarian political elite and bureaucracy” could undermine the confidence and loyalty to the democratic regime and the accountability of its institutions16.

• 17 Agüero, 1995b; Fusi, 2000; Powell, 2001; Tusell, 2007.
• 18 Jiménez, 2009.

11Some historians present the assassination of Admiral Carrero Blanco by the Basque separatist group ETA (December 1973) as a starting point of the Spanish Transition17. Others choose Franco’s death or Juan Carlos’ coronation as milestones, despite the argument that these did not bring about a real change. Accordingly, for Jiménez18 what truly triggered the change was the appointment of Adolfo Suárez as president of the government in July 1976.

• 19 Voulgaris, 2002.

13In the Greek public debate, the question of whether the democratic transition (Metapolitefsi) was short or long remains open. Most scholars tend to consider it as an ongoing process, which encompasses the period of democratic consolidation. In the mid-1980s, a controversy began over the question “When did Metapolitefsi end?” and was brought to the forefront of the “memory” debate in the economic crisis of the 2010s. In the literature there is a broad consensus on the smooth character of the democratic transition and the institutional-building of a modern socio-political system. It seems undeniable that Metapolitefsi marked a significant change of the basis of legitimacy of the (democratic) regime: a “normal” liberal democracy, a progressive-democratic civic culture, an inclusive state, instead of anti-communism, nationalist Greek-Christian ideology and cultural conservatism19. At the same time, the question of whether Metapolitefsi has been a radical rupture not only with the dictatorship of 1967-1974 but also with the so called “meager democracy” of the post-civil war state (1949-1967) remains open.

• 20 Avgeridis et al., 2015.

14After 2010, a certain discourse has emerged blaming Metapolitefsi for the country’s bankruptcy and arguing that all the maladies were already present in the founding moment of the Third Hellenic Republic: populism, clientelism, absence of institutional checks and balances, strong vested interests, etc. On the other hand, in the anti-austerity movement, the rallying slogan “Junta didn’t end in 1973” became very popular–echoing those who believed that the continuities with the dictatorial regime were more significant than the ruptures. After all, was the democratic transition a pure and simple rupture with the dictatorship and/or the post-war period? Or should we rather consider it as a “chronotope”, as Avgeridis et alli20 indicate, a transition “in progress” which has developed in multiple dimensions and temporalities?

• 21 Pinto, 2010.

16The collapse of the dictatorship followed a systemic rupture and triggered a revolutionary process characterized by a crisis of State, the politicization of the Armed Forces and the radicalization of social movements21. In fact, among the specifics of the Portuguese Transition one should highlight the height of the colonial wars, the political role played by the military, the huge State crises, the radical experience of the revolutionary turmoil (nationalisations, land occupations, protests and demonstrations) and finally the importance of the 1975 elections for the Constituent Assembly.

• 22 Pinto, 2006.

17It is not our aim to debate the concepts of liberalization, transition and consolidation, which are essential to resolve the dispute on the essence of the Portuguese Transition. Nevertheless, another issue may emerge in this context. Despite the huge changes that took place during the 1974-75 Revolution, we will have to wait for the democratic consolidation to check their fate. Does this mean than the Portuguese Transition only ended in 1982? Schmitter’s analogies are very useful to frame the Portuguese institutional transition, as he presents transition as a “war of movements” and democratic consolidation as a “war of positions”. In fact, in mid-1976 the situation was clarified. The approval of the new constitution and the legislative and presidential elections (April-July) established the end of the revolutionary crisis. The new institutions were then defined and uncertainty as to the nature of the regime ended22. However, the process was only truly completed when political stability was achieved and the military tutelage ended in 1982.

• 23 Brito, 2010.

18Consolidation of a liberal democracy equals consolidation of the rule of law. This means a set of coherent legal rules but also a democratized elite for the judiciary and a broader sense that justice has been done for the anti-democratic deviations of the dictatorial regime and those who collaborated with it. The trials that follow the collapse of a dictatorial regime constitute a new “official history”, while at the same time being the first step in a series of cycles of memory23.

• 24 Kallivretakis, 2017.
• 25 Sotiropoulos, 2007.
• 26 Haralambous, 2017, p. 307.
• 27 Pinto, 2010; Huntington, 1990.
• 28 Sotiropoulos, 2010.

19Has justice been done in Greece? The term that was introduced for this relatively short, but not instantaneous process was “dejuntification”24. The conservative Karamanlis government chose to gently manage transitional justice25 and, according to Haralambous, “the post-junta state was anxious to absorb rather than expel remnants of the authoritarian past”26. Nevertheless, compared to the other democratic transitions in Southern Europe, the heaviest penalties were imposed in Greece, confirming Huntington’s hypothesis that the collapse of the regime facilitates remediation, while in a transition by reform the regime’s elite continues to have a role and therefore the scope for sanctions is limited27. In fact, the persecutions were short-lived (autumn 1974 to late 1975) but widespread; yet social pressure preceded them and the conservative government followed28.

• 29 Alivizatos, 2016.

20In the first days of Metapolitefsi, a Presidential Decree was issued granting amnesty to all but the “leaders” of the junta. In October 1974, five key protagonists of the regime were arrested and deported to Kea, a small island off Attica. A few days earlier, the Greek Parliament had decided that “democracy was never overthrown in law” and the junta was for the first time officially described as a “coup”. The most important trial that followed was that of the protagonists. In July 1975, 20 of the 24 officers that were brought to justice were convicted29. However, 107 non-military ministers of the junta were not brought to justice because the Supreme Court ruled that the offense was “instantaneous”; i.e. it concerned only the coup of April 1967 and not the collaboration in the 7 years that followed.

• 30 Alivizatos & Diamandouros, 1997.
• 31 Kallivretakis, 2017.

21In the Army, officers who had been persecuted by the regime were reinstated. As for the persecution of the regime’s collaborators, the government seemed reluctant, probably due to the threat of an episode with Turkey30. The real breakthrough came after the “pajama coup” (24-2-1975): within a month, 139 officers were discharged, as well as all the officers of the ESA (the military police investigative unit) and most of the military coup plotters of 1967 and 1973. In the Security Forces, more than 600 police officers prosecuted by the junta returned to their service. As for the prosecutions in Metapolitefsi, however, it is rather clear that the responsibilities of the Police were reduced to a minimum. As concerns the judiciary, 23 persecuted judges were reinstated in 1974, but only one judge of the supreme court of Areios Pagos and two members of the Court of Auditors were persecuted for collaboration with the regime31.

• 32 Karamanolakis, 2016.

22It is worth noticing that in terms of “dejuntification” the picture was different at the University. It is estimated that about 10% of the university teaching staff were fired due to relations with the junta, while those who had been expelled by the regime were reinstated. In this case, the “dejuntification” seemed deeper, as a consequence of the pressure of the dynamic student movement32.

• 33 Pinto, 2008, p. 269.

24As referred to by Pinto, the rupture with the past, unleashed after the April 25, 1974 coup, gave way to a “rapid and multi-directional” movement of political purges, evident in the immediate decision to push aside the most “visible elements of the dictatorial political elite” (President of the Republic, President of the Council, members of the government, deputies, and so on)33. Once the dome of the state apparatus was purged, a rapid and limited purge of the armed forces was carried out. With this measure, the National Salvation Junta (JSN) tried to put an end to the process. However, this claim quickly fell apart, as widespread social and political mobilisation demanded a broader and deeper intervention. In the end, purges would affect almost all sectors of national life (public servants, municipalities, the business sector, the media, etc.), often escaping the control of the authorities, in a process full of tensions, without which we would hardly understand the complexity of the Portuguese transition. Thus, the idea that, in Portugal, the political purges were limited and temporally circumscribed should be qualified. 

• 34 Raimundo, 2007.

25Although the core measures of transitional justice were performed during the 1974-75 Revolution, the trials of the political police officers and collaborators only began after the new constitution was approved. There is no consensus regarding the total number of judicial processes instituted and trials carried out, but it is estimated that almost 75% of PIDE’s agents and collaborators were sentenced. According to Pimentel (2016), the penalties applied were extremely gentle, “given that most of the inmates were in fact sentenced to penalties equivalent to the time of preventive detention already served”. This idea of a benevolent treatment is shared by Raimundo34, who argued that the criminalization and prosecution of the Portuguese political police was a punitive transitional justice process that also involved forgiveness and reconciliation.

• 35 United Nations, 2014

26Spain presents a far more complex situation concerning political justice, making it difficult to establish any parallel with the two previously mentioned cases. Once again, the frequently repeated idea of a peaceful transition vanishes under intense controversy that presently runs throughout Spanish society and academia. The recent exhumation and removal of the remains of Franco from the Valle de los Caídos (2019) revived a debate that intensified with the subsequent exhumation of victims of the Civil War. It is worth noticing that these processes were undertaken after the release of a critical report of the United Nations35, denouncing that “no state policy was ever established with respect to truth”. Because of the traumatic collective memory of the Spanish civil war, the victims of the Francoist regime were not properly rehabilitated and the dictatorship was not formally condemned until recently.

• 36 Aguilar, 2013.
• 37 Molinero, 2009 ,p. 44.

27The adoption of the so-called Pacto del Olvido (Pact of Oblivion) may explain why Franco was the only dictator whose remains had survived in a mausoleum in a democratic country. Rather than establishing a truth commission to come to terms with the past, during the democratic transition political elites and parties agreed on drawing a curtain on history. Political purges were not carried out, as would happen, decades later, in Poland and Hungary, where attempts at lustration failed or were blocked. According to Aguilar36, political leaders chose not to use the past as a weapon, fearing that this would compromise the establishment of a democracy. Rejecting the thesis of the law’s “self-amnesty”, Molinero goes further in her interpretation, defending that amnesty was a demand of anti-Francoist parliamentarians as a measure of rupture with the past and to promote reconciliation, which was understood as “overcoming–not forgetting–of the dictatorship”37.

• 38 Fishman, 2019.
• 39 Pridham, 1990.

29According to Fishman, there are four fundamental dimensions to assess the functioning of democracy: authenticity, quality, depth and consolidation38. In fact, institutional building, regime change and re-shaping of the political system are long-term components of the democratic consolidation that transcend the transition phase stricto sensu. It has been argued that consolidation begins when a new Constitution is in place and free elections are held. Nevertheless, this is not enough. As political parties are channels for democratic participation, representation and legitimization, a competitive party system needs to be formed as it will ensure not only elections and effective governance but also that the “losers” will remain in the democratic game39.

• 40 Linz & Stepan, 1996.

30The Greek Transition has been characterized as “by far the most rapid transition in southern Europe”: 142 days from July 21 to December 9, 1974, when the monarchy was abolished40. Konstantinos Karamanlis immediately formed a government of “national unity”. The 1952 Constitution came back into force and the army withdrew from Athens, while on June 7, 1975 a new Constitution was ratified by the parliament, leading to a regime change, via the referendum of December 8, 1974 when the monarchy was abolished. On September 23, 1974, the orthodox communist party KKE was legalized and on November 17, 1974, the first free elections were held. On 12 June 1975, Greece submitted an application for the acceleration of the process to become full member of the EEC.

• 41 Powell, 1996.
• 42 Also see on this the contribution by Muñoz and Balios.

31In Spain, after Franco’s death some demanded a referendum on the form of the state–such as the one held in Greece in December 1974–, while peripheral nationalists advocated the establishment of provisional governments in their own spheres of action, but that was not the path followed in Spain. The central role of Juan Carlos I as the engine of change is widely accepted41. Despite being Franco’s chosen “heir”, the way Franco prepared succession through a monarchic restoration made it almost impossible to foresee the role of the King in the Transition or the huge institutional transformations that would take place after his death42. According to this thesis, currently the subject of criticism, in Spain a plan to achieve democracy within the rule of law (an archetypal transition) was conceived by Juan Carlos, while in Portugal or Greece there was no pre-established plan. In Portugal, the programme of the Armed Forces Movement (MFA) was a precarious compromise between different visions of the road to follow, enabling an intense political struggle and a dangerous state crisis.

• 43 Tusell, 1999.
• 44 Linz & Stepan, 1996, p. 91.
• 45 Hopkin, 2000, p. 3.

33In contrast, in Spain the King had the resources to establish a new regime without breaking with the existing legality. As the engine of political change, he acted more as a catalyst than as a direct agent, leaving ground for other actors, such as Torcuato Fernández Miranda (head of the Council of the Realm) or Adolfo Suárez. Considering that Suárez had served as general secretary of the National Movement under Franco’s regime, one of the most interesting aspects of the Spanish Transition relies on the fact that the institutional mechanisms designed to maintain Franco’s system made it possible to bring a democratic constitutional monarchy into life. The presentation and debate of the Program of Political Reform (Ley de Reforma Política)43 was an important milestone in institutional reform, as Suárez called for a bicameral legislature based on universal suffrage, managing to pass the law within the regime’s constitutional framework44. This reform was described as ‘cross-eyed’ since it appeared to satisfy incompatible demands: “full democracy for the opposition, constitutional continuity for regime conservatives”45. The wide popular adhesion to the referendum on that law and the overwhelming vote in favor expressed the social support to the political reform.

• 46 Colom, 2017, p. 9.

34After the December 1976 referendum, the process of dismantling the dictatorship structure and launching the new democratic institutions speeded up. The legalization of political parties stands as an important milestone in this context. One should note that although the Spanish Transition is considered as a model of political engineering, this does not mean that the opposition played an irrelevant role. In fact, the main opposition forces merged into a political platform (the “Platform of Democratic Organizations”) in order to gain negotiating capacity and enact their terms46. Many scholars argue that neither the regime reformers nor the opposition was strong enough to impose their model, leading to the “negotiated rupture” outcome.

• 47 Martínez Roda & Rezola, 2016. Baby, 2018.
• 48 Agüero, 1995ª, p. 243.

35Despite the thorny process of legalization of the Spanish Communist Party, on June 15, 1977 free elections were held. The victory of Suárez’ new party, the Union of Democratic Centre (UCD) represented the triumph of moderation. Despite the severe crisis that the country was going through, the real thorns to democratization were the territorial problem and, above all, terrorism. Despite their differences, ETA, GRAPO (First of October Anti-Fascist Resistance Groups), FRAP (Revolutionary Antifascist Patriotic Front) and various right-wing groups agreed on the understanding that, due to their inability to directly influence political life, they needed to incite the Army to adopt a regressive attitude and delay the transition to democracy47. It should be noted that terrorism was also a common trait in the Greek case, with the organisation of “17 November” (and ELA) that punctuated the transition in the long run, nevertheless with lesser political impact and active popular support. The Spanish military did not respond to the provocation and surprisingly, since it had been the backbone of the dictatorship, did not interfere in politics48. Even the Tejero Molina failed coup d’état (February 23, 1981), promoted by a small and noisy right-wing sector of the armed forces, was more complex than a simple reaction to terrorism.

• 49 Velarde Fuertes, 1990, pp. 105-118.
• 50 Linz & Stepan, 1996, p. 90.
• 51 Fusi, 2000, p. 809.
• 52 Radcliff, 2017.

36After the 1977 elections, the need to agree on minimum political norms aimed at facilitating coexistence until the approval of the new constitution and the Moncloa Pacts symbolized the spirit of consensus that resulted in the 1978 Constitution49. According to Linz & Stepan the Moncloa Pacts were not “a social pact between trade unions and employers’ organizations, but a political pact” by which Suárez wanted to involve political society50. One of the great challenges at this stage was the drafting of a new constitution. In August 1977, the Constitutional Committee of the Cortes elected a parliamentary commission in which the most important political parties (national and regional) were represented. These included the Catalan nationalists, the UCD, the Communist party, the Socialist party and the Alianza Popular. Although members of the group disagreed over sensitive issues such as regionalism, education, abortion or labor policy, the negotiations took place under the sign of dialogue and compromise. By October 1978, the new constitution was approved by the Parliament, having the merit of being “neither the unilateral imposition of a party or the expression of one ideology, but rather the synthesis and reconciliation of divergent and potentially antagonistic ideological positions”51. At the time, the only major groups left out of the consensus were the Basque Nationalists and the tiny minority of revolutionary groups to the left of the Communist party. Even the conservative party formed by regime reformers, the Alianza Popular, went on to participate as an opposition party after disapproving of the Constitution. The referendum of December 1978 on the Constitution marked the end of institutional transition and gave way to a relatively quick consolidation, which will end with the 1982 general elections52, which marked the first peaceful transfer of power from the UCD to the Socialist party, which had evolved into a “catch all” center-left party. The party system stabilized around an “imperfect bi-party system” that rotated between the Socialist party and the Alianza Popular, later renamed the Partido Popular.

• 53 Karamanolakis, Nikolakopoulos, Sakellaropoulos, 2016.

37In Greece, rupture and continuity coexisted: much of the political personnel remained the same (Karamanlis, Mavros, Papandreou, Kyrkos, Florakis) and the 1975 Constitution was considered a revision of the 1952 Constitution although the monarchy was no longer there. On the other hand, the army returned to the barracks and the two great divisions of 20th century Greece were healed: the democrats-royalists cleavage with the abolition of the monarchy and the communists-patriots division with the legalization of the KKE, which had been outlawed since the civil war of 1946-194953. The transfer of power was smooth; constitutional and legislative reforms legitimized the new-born democracy, and with the 1981 elections, which marked a spectacular government change (a triumph of the socialist PASOK), democracy had actually become “the only game in town”.

• 54 Voulgaris, 2002.

38Metapolitefsi flagged the end of a system of power that prevailed in Greece after the Second World War and the Civil War, but also closed an unfortunate parenthesis to the broader socio-political modernization that had been triggered in the 60s. The political system’s basis of legitimation changed, as the post-war state based on anti-communism, nationalism, occupation of the state by the Right, nationalism, and social conservatism, came to an end. The post-war state was “democratic for some citizens, authoritarian for others”, whilst the army and the monarchy were key centers of power. With the fall of the dictatorship, Greece moved to a “self-regulating democracy”54.

• 55 Kaminis, 2016.
• 56 Sakellaropoulos, 2016.

39Nevertheless, as in Portugal and Spain, some parameters of the transition have been controversial. The 1975 Constitution invested the President of the Republic with increased powers, allowing the opposition to present it as a revival of a “crownless monarchy”55. The army returned to the barracks, but the esprit de corps from which the protagonists of the junta had emerged was not automatically eliminated56. Justice played a leading role in the first phase of the transition, although “dejuntification” in its ranks was rather limited.

• 57 Respectively: Mavrogordatos, 1984; Nikolakopoulos, 1990; Pappas, 2001.

40Perhaps the most crucial rupture at the institutional level was that a “normal” party system and a functioning European-style liberal democracy were now in place (a feature that, incidentally, will be somewhat shared by the other case studies being evaluated). Regardless of how the party system can be classified–limited but polarized bipartisanship, absolute polarized tripartism, non-polarized bipartisanship57, namely with two main players, the conservative New Democracy (ND) and the Socialist PASOK, plus a strong left-wing communist component–the major change was that it included all the legitimized the partisan players and finally ensured a smooth alternation of power.

• 58 Voulgaris, 2002.

41In fact, a major shift in political culture took place: the conservative New Democracy was renovated, but chose oblivion over revision58. On the contrary, PASOK, with the alliance of the communist Left in critical areas, emerged as a powerful innovator of social reform, while at the same time appropriated the radical dynamism of the 1960s; major institutional reforms were promoted, thanks to which the Greek society and democratic consolidation were in tune with the cultural progressivism of the era. These included: the right to vote at the age of 18 (Law 1224/1981), introduction of civil marriage (Law 1250/1982), decriminalization of adultery (Law 1272/1982), modernization of family law (Law 1329/1983), and establishment of Gender Equality Council (Law 1288/1982). ND had already put forward an educational reform in 1979: the colloquial language (“dimotiki”) became the formal language of the state; and then in 1983 a major reform on the democratization of tertiary education was passed by PASOK. Also, reforms were carried out in public administration (the end of the “state of the Right”, even if old and new networks of clientelism re-emerged) and in local government (decentralization). The law for the democratization of the trade union movement (1264/1982) was promoted by PASOK and the communist party (KKE); however, in practice the control of the trade union movement was maintained by the party in government (PASOK).

• 59 Reis, 1993, p. 74.

50According to António Reis, one of the most remarkable aspects of the Constitution lies in the establishment of “a prudent system of checks and balances”. By adopting a semi-presidential system, or a mitigated parliamentarism, “it designed a wise division of powers at the highest level of the State”. Additionally, the consecration of a proportional electoral system “has made single-party majorities difficult, in an implicit invitation to the formation of coalition governments”59. As a result of this agreement, democratic consolidation (1976-1982) will be characterized by twofold concern: political stability and the definition of strategies for solving the economic and financial crisis, in view of the fast development of the country under the European integration process.

• 60 Karamouzi, 2016.
• 61 Verney, 2011; Balampanidis, 2019

52Metapolitefsi is also the history of the attachment of Greece to European integration and has specificities that oblige us to present it separately from the Spanish and Portuguese cases. In the early years of the post-junta period, Greek society was wary of the “West”, as the trauma of the junta was very recent and US intervention was considered to have played a decisive role in enforcing it. The then hegemonic New Democracy considered the country’s belonging to the “West” unquestionable; the radical PASOK emerged rapidly in Greek politics, investing its political discourse with theories of dependence and third-worldism. Karamanlis considered that for a small country with weak democratic institutions, membership in the EEC was necessary for consolidation60. However, along with the “West”, the suspicion of Greeks also concerned the EEC. The questioning of the EEC reached its peak in the 1981 elections, when PASOK triumphed. A certain normalization did not take long to come: with the pro-European transformation of PASOK, Greek society quickly became one of the most pro-European in the EEC. The 1990s saw a limited revival of Euroscepticism (mainly by far-right parties), but Greek support for the European project collapsed dramatically in 2010-2011 as a result of the crisis and political austerity imposed on the bankrupt country, to recover until the end of this decade. Nevertheless, the Greeks’ loyalty to EU was never practically questioned and Grexit has never been a real choice61.

• 62 Cunha, 2012.
• 63 Sanz, 2021, p. 2. Also see Muñoz and Balios’ contribution.

54For decades, Spain and Portugal were marginalized from the European integration process for political reasons. The institutionalization of democracy in the two Iberian countries opened new perspectives in this regard which were quickly exploited: with only a slight difference of time, Portugal and Spain applied to join the EEC (March and July 1977). The Portuguese negotiations began in October 1978. The route was expected to be difficult, but, despite the magnitude of the task, the Portuguese authorities were confidant of an outcome within three years. In the end, the negotiation turned out to be more complex than desired, dragging on for almost a decade. Among the obstacles to the Portuguese claim was the fact that the EEC assumed that both Iberian candidacies should be considered together as “Siamese negotiations”62. According to Sanz, “this was the option that most suited the interests of Spain, which supported the globalisation formula in order to avoid being overtaken by the smaller countries of the South”, although Portugal would have preferred “to follow the Greek trail”63.

• 64 Sanz, 2021, p. 5.
• 65 Cavallaro, 2019.

56If the accession negotiations had caused multiple frictions (namely in the fisheries sector) and a decade of not always peaceful bilateral relations, full membership of the EEC brought the two Iberian states closer. According to Sanz, this “was a demonstration of the unifying power of European integration [and] an expression of a wider process and of the Europeanisation of Portuguese and Spanish societies and political structures”64. The crisis in the early 21^st century highlighted the structural weaknesses that, despite joining the European Community, remained in the two Iberian states, as in Greece. However, and despite the situation of institutional instability experienced in Spain following the demands of the Generalitat of Catalonia, belonging to the European community was not questioned. The European framework remains as a backbone for foreign and national policies in both countries, and, especially in Spain, the strength of today’s Europeanism is coupled with the role European integration played in the democratic transition65.

• 66 Pérez Díaz, 1993; Radcliff, 2010.
• 67 Diamandouros, 1984.

61Although it is impossible to ignore the importance of the “street pressure” and of civil society in the democratization process66, in Spain transition was launched front above. The negotiations, arrangements and pacts that took place among the elites make it hard to talk about a real break with the past. Recent battles over memory and history are one of the most obvious signs of the heavy legacy of the transition in Spain. A radically different situation is found in Portugal, where the institutional transition was characterized by a strong state crisis and a radical institutional change. The importance of the military as leading actors, but not as a cohesive or even harmonious body, acting under different “covers” and establishing unclear networks with distinct political and social groups, has made the Portuguese transition quite unique. The Greek case lies in the middle. Metapolitefsi was an elite-driven process; nevertheless, the pressures coming from a radicalized society were significant (as in the case of “dejuntification” in the universities). The transition under Karamanlis was based on a centre and centre-right founding coalition, whilst the consolidation was supported by virtually the entire political spectrum67. The break with the past has been significant, at least in the sense of the dual character of Metapolitefsi as both an epilogue to a system of power and a continuation of a long historical cycle of socio-political modernization.