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Maximilian Beck and Martin Heidegger: A Forgotten Episode of the Early Phenomenological Tradition—Reconstruction and Interpretation

Maximilian Beck et Martin Heidegger : un épisode oublié de la première tradition phénoménologique. Reconstruction et interprétation
Daniele De Santis

Résumés

Nous proposons de suite la première reconstruction de la discussion entre Martin Heidegger et Maximilian Beck, ancien membre du Cercle phénoménologique de Munich. Celle-ci a porté pour l’essentiel sur l’interprétation que Beck a donnée de « l’ontologie fondamentale » d’Être et Temps. En s’appuyant sur la correspondance encore inédite entre Heidegger et Beck, l’essai revient d’abord sur leur relation ; il analyse ensuite la critique majeure de Beck à l’égard de Heidegger, à savoir son « corrélativisme », ainsi que la réponse de ce dernier à cette critique dans ses cours de 1928.

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Texte intégral

Introductory Remarks

1The present text is the result of a long yet still quite partial study of the published and unpublished works of Maximilian Beck, with special focus on his correspondence. The original letters quoted in the following paper (and published in both German and English in the Appendix) are preserved in the archives of the Munich Circle of Phenomenology at the Bayerische Staatsbibliothek in Munich (Ana 354, Section C, I and II). Whereas Beck’s letters are usually typewritten, the ones from Heidegger, Daubert, Pfänder, and Becker are handwritten. Accordingly, I would have never been able to accomplish the reading and the transcription of these documents without the invaluable help of my colleague Anna Tropia. The letters by Heidegger were still unknown to the Heidegger family, and I am thankful to Arnulf Heidegger (and Alfred Denker) for checking our transcriptions of these letters and for the permission to quote from them. However, since the Heidegger family never responded to my request to publish the letters separately as well, accompanied by a translation, the reader will not find the texts of these letters in the Appendix; hence they are present only as part of the paper itself and its analyses. I want to express my gratitude to Peter and Harold Marcuse for letting me include the letter of Herbert Marcuse and Sophie Wertheim to Beck (a letter of whose existence they were as yet unaware); to Stephan Roth and Burt C. Hopkins for their suggestions regarding the German and English language, to Elizabeth Behnke for her swonderful editing and help with the translations, and to Alessandro Salice for his remarks. It goes without saying that the responsibility for any possible mistakes in the transcription and translation of all these documents would be exclusively mine.

Maximilian Beck and Martin Heidegger: A Bit of History and Some Facts

  • 1 Maximilian Beck (1928e), “Martin Heidegger, Sein und Zeit. Referat und Kritik,” Philosophische Heft (...)

2It is hard to imagine two more different philosophical trajectories than those of Martin Heidegger—by far one of the most important representatives of the phenomenological tradition and one of the most influential philosophers of the 20th century—and Maximilian Beck, a former member of the Munich Circle, whose role and contribution to the early history of phenomenology has completely fallen into oblivion. Yet the paths of these two trajectories crossed in 1928, when Beck first reached out to Heidegger to invite him to contribute to his recently founded journal—the Philosophische Hefte—and to share with him his review of Being and Time, which appeared in the first Heft of July 1928.1

  • 2 Maximilian Beck (1916), Inwiefern können in einem Urteil andere Urteile impliziert sein?, Borna-Lei (...)
  • 3 See Maximilian Beck (1936), Brief an Herbert Marcuse (December 29), p. 2, where a lecture is mentio (...)
  • 4 For a first introduction, see Daniele De Santis (2020), “A Wrong Conception of Reason and the Solid (...)

3Who exactly was Maximilian or Max Beck? Maximilian Beck was born on February 14, 1887, in Plzeň, where he studied at the deutsche Volksschule and at the Staatsgymnasium. In 1909 Beck enrolled at the university in Munich, at first to study philology; however, under the influence of Alexander Pfänder and the activity of the Munich Circle of Phenomenology, he finally decided to switch to philosophy. Beck graduated on January 28, 1915, with a dissertation on the “implication-relation” between judgments.2 In 1924 he moved to Berlin, where he inaugurated the publication of a philosophy journal, namely, the Philosophische Hefte. Since he was Jewish, Beck moved to Prague in 1934, where he participated in the activities of the Cercle philosophique;3 in 1938 he left Europe once and for all and moved to the United States, where he lived and taught until the end of his life in 1950.4

  • 5 Maximilian Beck (1928a), Programm der Philosophischen Hefte, Philosophische Hefte, 1, p. 1-2.

4The role of the Philosophische Hefte in the history of the early phenomenological tradition is yet to be recognized and appreciated. Besides the review of Being and Time by Beck himself, the material published in the journal includes Franz Brentano’s correspondence with Anton Marty and contributions by thinkers such as Jacques Maritain and Hedwig Conrad-Martius, Karl Löwith, Paul Linke, and Herbert Spiegelberg. The title of the first issue, published in July 1928, is “Special Issue on Heidegger, Sein und Zeit,” and begins with a presentation of the Hefte’s program and editorial line. “Why another philosophical magazine?” Because philosophy is nowadays caught up between two extreme opposites: on the one hand, “the abstract and difficult fundamental investigations” that reconnect to the aspiration of the philosophia perennis to ground philosophy as an “exact science”; on the other hand, “the threatening and distressing actuality of our times,” which shakes the foundation of our historical existence. The ambition of this journal—Beck remarks—is not that of “overcoming” such opposition; rather, it aims “at pondering it and all its consequences.”5

5Based on these programmatic statements, the decision to dedicate almost the entire inaugural issue to Being and Time is justified as follows:

  • 6 Maximilian Beck (1928a), Philosophische Hefte, 1, p. 2.

The first volume is dedicated to a fundamental discussion of Martin Heidegger’s book Being and Time because in it—more than in any other book—all the vital problems of today’s philosophy are thought through to their ultimate consequences [zu Ende gedacht sind], and in a most consistent way.6

6Given these premises, the exchange between Beck and Heidegger could only begin in the best way possible. The extant correspondence between the two consists of five letters: one from Beck to Heidegger (July 1, 1928), and four from Heidegger to Beck (April 12; July 4; October 29; November 3, 1928).

  • 7 Here is the full text of Heidegger’s answer: “Ich danke Ihnen für Ihre freundliche Aufforderung zur (...)

7It is evident from Heidegger’s first letter that the two had already been in contact for a while, and that Beck had tried to convince Heidegger to write something for the Hefte. As Heidegger responds, however, even if “I am very sympathetic with the editorial line of the journal,” the call to Freiburg and the plan to finish up “the second part of my work” force him to decline the invitation politely.7

8The only letter from Beck that we still have is dated two months later and is accompanied by a first gift for Heidegger: the first Heft. Here is how Beck presents his Report on Being and Time:

If my discussion of your book were to be followed by your discussion of my discussion, this would greatly fit with the dialectical character that I am striving to give to this journal. My essay is the result of the study that for almost a year I dedicated every day, all day long, exclusively to your book. Thus even if my objections were partially based on some misunderstandings, I cannot believe that they could be so unjustified as to deserve no reply. And a public reply would certainly only foster better comprehension of your work.

  • 8 Maximilian Beck (1928b), Brief an Martin Heidegger (July 1), p. 1.

I want to be open enough to admit that here and there, it was not easy for me to assume the objective tone of the critique. Indeed, it was not easy because your doctrine represents an endorsement of the philosophical “Zeitgeist” against which I believe it is radically necessary to fight. I was prepared for anything except for the fact that this contemporary attitude could itself receive support from the phenomenological camp. Please take this confession for what it is: the expression of the regret that what I found was an opponent rather than the fellow fighter I had so hoped for. As a consequence, I myself must take on the burden and the responsibility for the fight. All the polemical harshness of my essay is rooted in this.8

  • 9 Maximilian Beck (1928c), Brief an Oskar Becker (July 1), p. 1.

9“It would have been false of me to write [the report] otherwise,” Beck explained on the same day to Oskar Becker.9

  • 10 This is what we have inferred based upon Hermann Lübbe (1957), “Bibliographie der Heidegger-Literat (...)

10Heidegger’s reply is friendly and does not show any sign of tension between the two. Not only does he reciprocate Beck’s present by sending “a small gift in return” (quite likely, his review of E. Cassirer10), he also acknowledges: “Your critique is the first detailed one.” However, “due to external and internal reasons,” he makes it clear that he will not be able to engage in any direct discussion.

  • 11 Here is the full German text of Heidegger’s reply: “Für die Zusendung der beiden Hefte Ihrer Zeitsc (...)

Yet this is no disaster, because the discussion of Bergson, Dilthey, and Husserl that you put forward is quite an essential one. This task could be very rewarding, especially if you do not start off from what I myself have taken on from these authors, but rather from other essential aspects, namely, those that—along with what I have borrowed—have been available to everyone for more than three decades.11

  • 12 Oskar Becker (1928b), Brief an Maximilian Beck (July 9), p. 1.
  • 13 Oskar Becker (1928b), Brief an Maximilian Beck (July 9), p. 2.

11Eight days later, Oskar Becker (whom Beck also tried to convince to contribute to the Hefte) confesses to Beck: “I find your critique of Heidegger extremely interesting” because it represents “the most serious—actually the one and only—attempt to appear so far that confronts the ‘new ontology.’”12 Yet as he hastens to points out, “you have by no means convinced me,” because “it is certainly very wrong when you affirm here and there in your critique that H. ‘overlooks’ the fundamental concepts and questions of classical ontology”.13

  • 14 Oskar Becker (1928b), Brief an Maximilian Beck (July 9), p. 2.
  • 15 Maximilian Beck (1928c), Brief an Oskar Becker (July 1), p. 1.
  • 16 Oskar Becker (1928a), Brief an Maximilian Beck (April 18) p. 3 and p. 4.

12However, for Becker the Report does not seem to represent a “fundamental objection to the idea of cooperating with your journal”.14 This is a crucial point, for if Beck’s letter of July 1 expressed his own concern that the “polemical tone of my essay” might represent “an obstacle to your collaboration with the journal”,15 it is because Becker himself had already made it very clear that both “as a student and a personal friend of Heidegger”, he would not like to find himself “numbered among the opponents of my own fundamental ideas”.16 Thus Becker had added in his first letter that his participation would be contingent on what sort of position the journal would take vis-à-vis Heidegger.

13Now that the Report published in the first Heft would not represent for Becker an “obstacle” to his possible collaboration could be read as a sign, if not of the quality of the Report itself, at least of the fact that—albeit affected by “errors” here and there—its interpretation of Being and Time is not as crass and inaccurate as future letters from Heidegger will contend, or in other words, it did not look to Becker that a collaboration was to be ruled out in principle.

  • 17 Maximilian Beck (1928d), “Die neue Problemlage der Erkenntnistheorie, Deutsche Vierteljahrsschrift (...)

14The third letter from Heidegger testifies to a turning point in the relation with Beck. Since we do not have the text to which Heidegger responds, it is not easy to tell whether his new tone is due to the way in which Beck had been pursuing the conversation, or if it is the reading of a new paper that pushes Heidegger over the edge. Indeed, the last letter from Beck had included a new gift: the just published “Die neue Problemlage der Erkenntnistheorie,”17 where the case is made for reading Being and Time as a radicalization of the mistakes of Husserl’s philosophy rather than as a break with it.

15Here is how Heidegger opens up his reply:

  • 18 Martin Heidegger (1928c), Brief an Maximilian Beck (October 29), p. 1.

I hereby confirm the reception of your essay, “The New Problematic Situation of the Theory of Knowledge.” What could already be presumed based on your Report has now become full certainty: you have not grasped anything of the problematic, the fundamental theses, the approach, and the structure of what has thus far been published of Being and Time.18

16Whether Heidegger is right in complaining about Beck lacking any understanding of his text will not be decided here. The crucial point for us is less Heidegger’s disappointment per se than the fact that it is the combination of the Report and “The New Problematic Situation” that seems to have convinced him once and for all of Beck’s lack of insight into his work. Interestingly enough, although in his previous letter Heidegger suggested that Beck should avoid focusing on what he, Heidegger, had personally borrowed from Bergson, Dilthey, and Husserl, this is precisely what Beck does in his new essay, thereby endorsing the interpretative line first set forth in the Report.

  • 19 Heidegger, Martin, Jaspers, Karl (1992), Briefwechsel 1920–1963, München, Frankfurt am Main, Piper, (...)
  • 20 For a quick reference to Beck within the context of the Marxism-phenomenology confrontation, see Ni (...)

17In a letter to Karl Jaspers of September 24, 1928 (between his second and third letter to Beck), Heidegger wrote: “How often have I already read that I am […] the actually accomplished synthesis of Dilthey and Husserl, with some spice added from Kierkegaard and Bergson.” That Heidegger is here referring to Beck can be surmised from Jaspers’ own letter of July 8: “A Heidegger-issue [Heidegger-Heft] came in yesterday, which—I am sure—you also have. I could not read it; what I saw while skimming it is that you are put together with Marxism.”19 (The text indicated by Jaspers in which Heidegger and Marxism are “put together” is Marcuse’s “Beiträge zur Phänomenologie des Historischen Materialismus,” which was also published in the first issue of the Hefte.20)

  • 21 Here is the German text of Heidegger’s reply: “Ich bestätige den Empfang Ihres Aufsatzes ‘Die neue (...)
  • 22 Beck’s harsh tone against Being and Time is what on the contrary the philosopher Peter Wust praised (...)

18The idea of any possible collaboration between Beck and Heidegger seems to have completely vanished at this point. If Beck was still hoping for a critical and dialectical form of confrontation, Heidegger refuses even to acknowledge his interlocutor’s competence and ability to have a proper philosophical grasp not only of own his thought, but first and foremost of Kant, Fichte, and Schelling [kein Verständnis erwarten]. He refers to Beck as “my judge” [mein Beurteiler] and goes as far as to label him ein heutiger Knirps, a “little squirt”.21 From the last lines of Heidegger’s letter, it is evident that what was annoying him the most was Beck’s “tone” and “discussion style”.22

  • 23 Martin Heidegger (1928d), Brief an Maximilian Beck (November 3), p. 1.

19It is quite likely that in the postcard that Beck sent to Heidegger in response, he attempted to defend his approach to Being and Time. But Heidegger is not convinced.23 He makes it clear once again that his reasons for not entering into any discussion were Beck’s “tone” and “the crass misunderstandings of the content” [inhaltlichen groben Mißverständnisse]. Heidegger judges Beck’s reading to be lacking in content, and at this point his own tone turns quite harsh:

If you want to take the responsibility for going on providing your readers with such more and more untenable things about Being and Time, then do it.

  • 24 Here is the full German text of Heidegger’s reply: “Die Argumentation auf Ihrer Postkarte hat mich (...)

This is my last word on the matter.24

20Heidegger’s words mark the very end of the correspondence with Beck and—quite likely—also of the latter’s attempt at seeking a philosophical confrontation with him. As far as we can tell, at least for Heidegger the end of the correspondence coincides with the end of his interest in Beck, both in his philosophical work and in the vicissitudes of his life De facto, his name is nowhere to be found in the Register zur Martin Heidegger Gesamtausgabe. Whether this also means that Heidegger never tried to publicly respond to Beck we shall verify later on.

21As for Beck, the situation seems different. Even though it is not easy to tell how closely he kept following Heidegger’s career and publications, the latter’s name and philosophy constantly appear in the texts published before Beck left Europe: they are often explicitly cited and discussed, sometimes evoked and indirectly referred to. Now the texts in which Beck addresses Heidegger in general—and Being and Time in particular—can ideally be divided into three groups.

The first group would include just one text, already mentioned:

(a) “Martin Heidegger, Sein und Zeit (Referat und Kritik)”

The second group includes two essays:

(b) “Die neue Problemlage der Erkenntnistheorie”

(c) “Der phänomenologische Idealismus, die phänomenologische Methode und Hermeneutik”

Finally, the third group includes:

(d) “Hermeneutik und philosophia perennis”

  • 25 Maximilian Beck (1929), “Der phänomenologische Idealismus, die phänomenologische Methode und Hermen (...)

(e) “Kritik der Schelling-Jaspers-Heidegger’schen Ontologie”25

  • 26 See Hedwig Conrad-Martius (1963), “Bemerkungen über Metaphysik und ihre methodische Stellung,” in S (...)

22Whereas (a) is the only essay ever published by Beck in which Heidegger represents the one and only subject of discussion, the second group includes essays in which Heidegger is tackled from the angle of his position within the development of the phenomenological movement. Here the assessment of Heidegger is part of what Conrad-Martius labeled “the philosophical struggle” against idealism that “for many years” Beck pursued in “a totally independent way”.26 Finally, the last group addresses Heidegger from within a broader horizon—that of the relations between ontology and metaphysics (d), or of a more encompassing tendency that harks all the way back to Schelling (e).

  • 27 The goal of our study is not to evaluate Beck’s Report. For a different approach, see Claudius Stru (...)

23Having pointed this out, and given the impossibility of covering all the different phases of Beck’s interpretation, the following analysis will be confined to the two essays that he sent to Heidegger.27 A first section (§2) will be on Beck’s Report and “The New Problematic Situation”; after the influence of the Report is evaluated (§2.1), an assessment of Beck’s systematic discussion of Heidegger will be offered (§2.2). A section (§3) will then follow in which we show to what extent Heidegger took Beck’s criticism into serious consideration. The last section (§4) will make a few observations concerning the outcomes of our analyses.

Maximilian Beck on Being and Time and Correlativism

Introduction, or: How Much Ado about Beck?

24A future study, of which we intend to offer here only an initial, partial outline, will have to explore, trace out, and deeply weigh the effects and the Wirkungsgeschichte of Beck’s Report on Being and Time (henceforth RBT)—whether of a positive nature (in cases where Beck met with approval) or a negative nature (in cases where his analyses prompted critical reactions). The examples that follow represent three different types of texts: (a) a few private exchanges concerning the reception of RBT; (b) a systematic work meant for publication (though not published during the author’s lifetime) in which RBT is assessed positively; (c) a book actually published in which RBT is on the contrary referred to critically.

  • 28 Alexander Pfänder (1928), Brief an Maximilian Beck (July 28), p. 1.
  • 29 Johannes Daubert (1929), Brief an Maximilian Beck (December 31) p. 3. On Heidegger and Daubert—nota (...)

25In a letter that immediately followed the publication of the first Heft, Alexander Pfänder (whom Beck tried in vain to convince to contribute to the journal) expressed his approval of his former student’s discussion of Being and Time with the following words: “I find your essay on Heidegger’s Being and Time excellent, both as a report and as a critique.” As he hastens to add: “Mr. Daubert has also commented on it with great appreciation. Even in Marburg, within Heidegger’s circle, people are satisfied with your report.28 We cannot directly tell in what sense Johannes Daubert appreciated RBT because none of the letters between them that we still have addresses the Report. However, when it comes to Heidegger, Daubert writes in a letter of 1929 to Beck as follows: “I am under the impression that nowadays […] it should be possible to take a few decisive steps in the theory of knowledge, moving away from the Husserl-Heidegger conceptual constellation, and fix the authentic sense of phenomenology.”29

  • 30 Even though a French translation of this letter has already been published (in our humble opinion, (...)

26As for the second comment by Pfänder, we have not yet found any direct evidence. Nonetheless, a 1929 letter to Beck from Herbert Marcuse (who by then had moved to Freiburg precisely in order to study with Heidegger) seems to allude to something quite similar.30

  • 31 Herbert Marcuse, Sophie Wertheim (1929), Brief an Maximilian Beck (May 9), p. 1.

27After a very short description of the idyllic life that Marcuse is living in a village near Freiburg, an account is offered of Husserl’s seminar on “empathy” and of Heidegger as a “teacher,” “educator,” “prophet”, and “guide”.31 Marcuse first describes the subject matter of Heidegger’s seminars; then he mentions the transformation that Heidegger’s philosophy is undergoing, which will become evident in his “new Kant-interpretation”. Finally, “as to his position vis-à-vis your Report, all I could learn from [Alfred] Seidemann is that he was angry.” Why?

  • 32 Herbert Marcuse, Sophie Wertheim (1929), Brief an Maximilian Beck (May 9), p. 2.

[…] because many readers of your Report have used it as a substitute for his book and have not even read Being and Time, or they have read it only badly. He believed he could hear in your critique a great deal of those colleagues who did not speak up (perhaps one can also think of Pfänder). Accordingly, the reasons determining his attacks, if we could put it this way, were less the immanent-material ones contained in your Report than those just mentioned. As said, this is what Seidemann relates, not a firsthand account.32

28Whether by “his attacks” Marcuse is referring to the words employed by Heidegger against Beck in his letters is not easy to tell, nor is it possible (besides the quick and quite vague reference to Pfänder) to identify those who allegedly regarded RBT as a surrogate allowing them to dispense with a proper reading of Being and Time. Yet we can mention at least two philosophers who did carefully read Being and Time and in whose exegesis explicit traces of RBT can be found, i.e. Edith Stein and Georg Misch.

  • 33 Edith Stein (2009), “Martin Heideggers Existenzphilosophie,” in her Endliches und ewiges Sein. Vers (...)

29Edith Stein explicitly refers to RBT four times in her 1936 essay Martin Heideggers Existenzphilosophie.” It is not our intention to raise the question as to whether, and to what extent, Stein’s analyses of the many specific aspects or concepts of Being and Time were influenced by Beck: what we want to emphasize is only the main motives that Stein borrows from RBT.33

  • 34 Edith Stein (2009), “Martin Heideggers Existenzphilosophie,” p. 445, note.
  • 35 Edith Stein (2009), “Martin Heideggers Existenzphilosophie,” p. 483.
  • 36 Edith Stein (2009), “Martin Heideggers Existenzphilosophie,” p. 462.

30Right at the beginning of her investigation, Stein indicates her immediate agreement with Beck’s general statement that in Being and Time “all the vital problems of today’s philosophy are thought through to their ultimate consequences, and in a most consistent way”34—yet without specifying in what “today’s philosophy” would properly consist. It is only later on that she refers to Beck’s effort to trace the speculative roots of Being and Time back to a series of figures such as Marx, Dilthey, Bergson, and Husserl.35 The second reference to Beck is more specific and follows up on an observation by Stein bearing upon the difficulties of Heidegger’s “self-coined language”: like Beck, Stein admits that the “sense” of Heidegger’s teaching might turn out to be quite different once it is “discussed in another language”.36 The two aspects just mentioned are linked together, for if we do not let ourselves be seduced by Heidegger’s jargon, and instead assess his thought in a terminology other than his own, then his philosophy will disclose itself for what it properly is: namely, the expression of the most advanced trajectories of “today’s philosophy”. As Beck would explain: “The most intelligible introduction to Heidegger’s train of thought needs to start out with its presuppositions. They repeatedly appear in Heidegger’s book in a language and contexts that make their recognition difficult” (RBT, 6).

  • 37 Edith Stein (2009), “Martin Heideggers Existenzphilosophie,” p. 483. See Martin Heidegger (1967), S (...)

31Even more specifically, the third reference concerns one of the most critical reproaches made by Beck against Heidegger—which Stein embraces toto corde, i.e. that the category of “being-present-at-hand” [Vorhandensein] does not capture what the “tradition meant by ‘being.’”37

  • 38 Georg Misch (1967), Lebensphilosophie und Phänomenologie. Eine Auseinandersetzung der Diltheyschen (...)
  • 39 A quick discussion of Misch’s reading of Being and Time is offered by Theodore Kisiel (1997), The G (...)
  • 40 Georg Misch (1967), Lebensphilosophie und Phänomenologie, p. 1-2.

32Like Stein, Misch too seems to agree with Beck both in taking Being and Time as “the synthesis of all of today’s living philosophical tendencies” (the passage is from RBT, 5) and in considering Dilthey and Husserl as the major “presuppositions” of the book.38 As he hastens to add, however, “in this way one will never actually touch the nerve of that undertaking” [der Nerv des Unternehmens wird dadurch nicht getroffen].39 Indeed, as a former disciple of Dilthey, Misch cannot agree with Beck on how to evaluate Heidegger’s presuppositions; moreover, he also understands the sense of “the overall development of philosophy over the last thirty years of the last century” in a way completely different from that of the “detailed discussion of the book that comes out of the older circle of phenomenologists”.40 For if the question were in what such a “development of philosophy” consists (a development directly displayed “in Heidegger’s work”), Misch would refer the reader to an essay in which he had already addressed this question, “Der internationale Zusammenhang in den philosophischen Bewegungen des 19. Jahrhunderts.”

  • 41 Georg Misch (1916–17), “Der internationale Zusammenhang in den philosophischen Bewegungen des 19. J (...)

33The latter essay—composed in 1911 and published only five years later—is not only an account of the development of philosophy in the 19th century and of its national self-differentiation in accordance with the rise of “national consciousness”; it is an effort to show that certain “international” traits can be recognized that are shared by all the different tendencies. When it comes to the “scientific situation of German philosophy” in the 1860s and 1870s, Misch describes it in terms of three characteristics borrowed from Dilthey: (i) the “subject” is taken as “the point of departure” [Ausgang vom Subjekt] (ii) for the analysis of the many material domains [die sachlichen Zusammenhänge] (iii) that are thereby elucidated in their essence and based on their givenness [am Gegebenen].41

  • 42 Georg Misch (1916–17), “Der internationale Zusammenhang,” p. 168-169.

34The combination of these three aspects represents an “essential improvement” for philosophy, since philosophy is now able “to put into effect the modern principle of paying attention to the given and what is experienced [Hingabe an das Gegebene und Erlebte], yet without falling into positivism”. Misch speaks of agreement between schools that prior to this point were still “divided”. This allows him to couple together both Austrian objectivism and the “Hegelian intention” that aims at clarifying “the identity of the spiritual life and history” from the angle of “subjective experience [Erlebnis]”.42

  • 43 See Misch’s explanation in the introduction—Georg Misch (1967), Lebensphilosophie und Phänomenologi (...)
  • 44 Georg Misch (1967), Lebensphilosophie und Phänomenologie, p. 22. The reference is made by Misch him (...)
  • 45 However, it would be a mistake to believe that for Misch there is no difference between Dilthey and (...)

35If we now go back to Misch’s Lebensphilosophie und Phänomenologie, the reason why the book opens with a direct reference to the essay of 1916 should not be too difficult to fathom. Were we to describe in a few blunt words one of the book’s core theses, we could claim the following: the analytic of Dasein is an attempt to reconcile two “tendencies” that have been traditionally held to be opposite—Lebensphilosophie and ontology (= life and being).43 For in spite of what is suggested by some of Heidegger’s own statements on this matter (e.g. that Lebensphilosophie means the same as “the botany of plants”44), Being and Time follows in Dilthey’s footsteps and perfectly epitomizes the above points (i), (ii), and (iii); this is therefore the sense in which the book is to be deemed “the synthesis of all of today’s living philosophical tendencies”.45 Moreover, the reason why Misch’s book also opens by immediately dismissing Beck’s overall evaluation of the sense of Heidegger’s work is that what Misch sees as the great merit of Being and Time—the synthesis of (i), (ii), and (iii) in relation to the question of being—is for Beck, as we will soon verify, the very emblem of what should be rejected altogether.

Beck and Heidegger’s Correlativism

  • 46 Martin Heidegger, Karl Jaspers (1992), Briefwechsel, p. 103-104.

36As we saw above, in a letter to Karl Jaspers, Heidegger wrote: “How often have I already read that I am […] the actually accomplished synthesis of Dilthey and Husserl, with some spice added from Kierkegaard and Bergson.”46 What does Heidegger actually mean by the expression Wie oft ich nun schon gelesen habe? The latter can be in fact understood in several ways. In the strictest sense, Heidegger could be referring specifically only to Beck without naming him. In this case, he would be hinting at both RBT and their correspondence: thus, the turn of phrase Wie oft would mean the many occasions on which Beck had insisted upon reading Being and Time in a certain way. Less strictly, the reference might be to all those reviews of his book (not only Beck’s) in which Heidegger had already repeatedly been considered as the “synthesis of Dilthey and Husserl”. According to such a scenario, the Wie oft would mean the many public occasions on which his work had already been judged in a certain way. In an even looser way, Heidegger would have in mind not only a series of reviews and public texts or interpretations of his work, but also letters and personal exchanges with different interlocutors (besides Beck himself) in which his thought had been privately described as the “synthesis of Dilthey and Husserl, with some spice added from Kierkegaard and Bergson”.

37Now since the last option cannot be verified in the present context and the first option might sound too strict, one could opt for the second reading of Heidegger’s own words to Jaspers. Accordingly, Heidegger would be implicitly suggesting that by the time of his letter to Jaspers, what Beck says about Being and Time in his Report had already become some sort of refrain and common opinion (whether first inspired by Beck or not). If this is the case, then the following observation should be kept in mind.

  • 47 Heinrich Barth (1928), “Kant und die moderne Metaphysik,” Zwischen den Zeiten, 6, p. 406-428, now i (...)
  • 48 Snz [Hans C. Syz?] (1928), “Martin Heidegger, Sein und Zeit,” Annalen der Philosophie und philosoph (...)
  • 49 Hinrich Knittermeyer (1928), “Besprechung von M. Heidegger, Sein und Zeit; E. Grisebach, Gegenwart. (...)
  • 50 The only other case that comes to mind is the very short entry on “Martin Heidegger” by Rudolf Bult (...)

38Not only do none of the works included by Claudius Strube in his “Kritik und Rezeption von ‘Sein und Zeit’” actually seem to build upon the same arguments as Beck’s, but crucially, none of them had already been published by the time of Heidegger’s letter to Jaspers. One of the earliest reactions to Being and Time—Heinrich Barth’s lecture on “Kant und die moderne Metaphysik”—was held in December 1927, yet it was published in 1928 and includes no reference to the authors mentioned by Heidegger in his letter.47 A short description of the book appeared in 1928 in the journal Annalen der Philosophie und philosophischen Kritik,48 whereas a long discussion of the book was to appear only in October 1928 in the Theologische Literaturzeitung.49 And none of them would fit with Heidegger’s words to Jaspers. Hence it can be surmised that it is Beck who—for better or worse—publicly established the thesis to the effect that Being and Time is the “accomplished synthesis of Dilthey and Husserl […]”.50

39This being preliminarily clarified, let us now finally turn to Beck’s Report on Being and Time. The Referat includes seven sections; the “critique” is presented first in §5 (and mostly bears upon §§3–4), then once again toward the very end of the essay (§8). Here is the table of contents:

40§1. Äußere Kennzeichnung (p. 5-6)

41§2. Die Voraussetzungen (p. 6-17)

42§3. Der Ansatz des Systems (p. 17-22)

43§4. Die “Welt” des menschlichen Daseins und das “In-der-Welt-Sein” (p. 22-26)

44§5. Kritik (p. 26-29)

45§6. Die “Zeitlichkeit” als der eigentliche “Sinn” menschlicher Daseinsexistenz (p. 29-33)

46§7. Sorge als existenzielles Sein menschlichen Daseins (p. 33-35)

47§8. Verhältnis der eigentlichen Existenz zur uneigentlichen (p. 35-38)

48There are six authors specified in §2 who represent the “presuppositions” of Heidegger’s philosophy (in the literal sense of the ground on which it builds), and each one of them contributes in his own way to shaping it: Bergson (p. 6–7), Kierkegaard (p. 7–8), Nietzsche (p. 8–9), Marx (p. 9–10), Husserl (p. 10–15), and Dilthey (p. 15–17). Since a discussion of all these authors would stretch far beyond the ambition of the present paper, let us confine the account to Husserl, for as Beck says: “In spite of everything, Husserl has found in Heidegger not only the thinker who has consistently taken his philosophy to its ultimate consequences; he is also the one who carries on his most decisive presuppositions” (RBT, p. 13). Which ones, exactly?

• There is no dualism of “world-subject and world-object,” but rather “the I and the world” are “constituted” exclusively “as specific modes of ‘consciousness’ or Dasein [als spezifische Weisen des Bewußtseins resp. Daseins]” (RBT, p. 10).

• Husserl’s understanding of the constitution of the world as a “nexus of sense” turns into the constitution of the world “as a stable meaningful interconnection” (RBT, p. 11).

• Husserl’s own tenet that things can be “resolved” into the “orderly connection of a manifold of appearances” is a “preliminary step toward the radical dissolution of the thing-like substantiality into the pure dynamism” of Dasein (RBT, p. 11).

  • 51 If we are on the right track, it seems that Beck’s criticism of Heidegger and correlativism is prio (...)

49Let us immediately warn the reader that since we know that it was the combination of RBT and “The New Problematic Situation” (henceforth NPS) that made Heidegger fully realize that Beck had not grasped anything of Being and Time, our comments are not meant to cover the Report in its full extent, nor will they even try to address all of Beck’s arguments against the many aspects or concrete analyses developed in Being and Time. Rather, our aim is to discuss the theoretical pillar upon which the edifice of Being and Time builds: what NPS labels “correlativism” [Korrelativismus] or the “correlativistic position” [korrelativistische Position].51

50Whereas in NPS correlativism, i.e. a certain construal of it, will be assumed both as the very core of Heidegger’s thought and as his way of taking Husserl’s thought to its ultimate consequences, in the Report Beck’s ambition is to understand the way it determines den Ansatz des Systems. As a consequence, in what follows we will first flesh out how Beck frames the “starting point” of Being and Time, then we will move on to NPS so as to tackle correlativism per se and the consciousness-being relation.

51“Heidegger’s book posits the problem: What is ‘being’?” Yet as Beck goes on to emphasize, “no solution is provided in the part published thus far. Rather, it delves into a metaphysics of the human being, because the latter is the one who raises such a question”; he or she “has a natural understanding of being prior to any philosophically explicit thematization” (RBT, p. 17). This is what Beck takes as den Ansatz des Systems—which consists in Heidegger setting up the question of being based on the privilege ascribed to a certain entity. Beck’s goal is precisely to call into question the idea that the question of being can be grounded on the metaphysics of Dasein (or of any other entity). To do that, he tackles what Heidegger—in §2 of his book—describes as “the formal structure of the question” (of being) by means of which the “exemplary entity” for the investigation (= Dasein) is singled out.

  • 52 Martin Heidegger (1967), Sein und Zeit, p. 6-7 [our translation].

52As is well known, the formal structure of the question (of being) entails a distinction between the Gefragte (“being, which determines the entity as entity”); the Erfragte (“the sense of being, which requires its own conceptualization”); and the Befragte (the entity to be interrogated “with regard to its being”). Now the argument for assuming Dasein as the Befragte so as to raise the question of the sense of being is that “the position itself of the question” is a “mode of being of an entity” and is “essentially determined by what is asked about in it, namely, being”. Such an entity is the entity that we ourselves are.52 Here is what Beck points out: “Only based upon a certain pre-conception of the essence of knowledge as essentially grounded in—or as identical with—a certain relation (i.e. as identity or immanence) […] does Heidegger’s way of positing the problem of being by means of an analysis of the human being seem consistent” (RBT, p. 17). What, exactly, does all of this mean?

[The position of the question itself] presupposes that the identity between the one who asks the question [des Fragenden], the interrogated [des Befragten], and what is asked about [des Gefragten] conditions a specific self-assurance of the answer. It also implicitly presupposes that knowledge is somehow grounded on an identity of the knowing and the known. (RBT, p. 17)

53As far as we understand Beck, Heidegger’s analysis of the structure of the question (of being), hence the “starting point” of Being and Time, rests upon the presupposition—a presupposition “that Heidegger takes for granted”—according to which knowledge is not the “transcendent and direct apprehension of an entity that breaks with all forms of continuity or mediation; for such a transcendence-apprehension does not constitute the irreducible and absolutely fundamental essence of knowledge” (RBT, p. 18).

  • 53 Martin Heidegger (1997a), Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie, GA 24, Frankfurt am Main, Vittorio (...)

54If Dasein has a “pre-ontological” understanding of being in general, thereby being able to ask this fundamental question itself, it is because being is not “absolutely other” (RBT, p. 17), nor is it something that Dasein “has” (as one might be tempted to state in relation to all non-Dasein kinds of entities53). Rather, being is what Dasein itself “is” (in the mode of “existence”). Only upon the basis of such an identity can Dasein be singled out as the exemplary entity for addressing the question of being: “Is there anything more obvious than the very fact that the human being can have the best knowledge of what ‘being’ is precisely because it itself is already ‘being’?” (RBT, p. 17).

  • 54 See, for example, Maximilian Beck (1938), Psychologie. Wesen und Wirklichkeit der Seele, Leiden, A. (...)

55Now were we to resort to more technical jargon in order properly to label what Beck refers to as the “presupposition” lying at the basis of the starting point of Being and Time, we would speak of “ontological identity,” “ontological continuity”, or even of “ontological contact” (the expressions are Seinsidentität, Seinskontinuität, and Seinskontakt).54 What Beck usually intends to express by these turns of phrase is the very principle that in his opinion sustains and nourishes any and every form of idealism, a principle according to which knowledge is possible only to the extent that there obtains some sort of “contact,” “continuity”, or “identity” (a whole spectrum of possibilities and degrees seems to be implicitly acknowledged) between the “being” of the knower and the “being” of what is known—here, between Dasein, as the entity that actually posits the question, and what is asked about in it.

56The same principle, Beck would further contend, determines the very way in which Heidegger characterizes the “existential” that—along with the “comprehension of being”—is deemed the most fundamental one, i.e. Dasein’s “being-in-the-world” (see RBT, §4). Here is what Beck points out: “What the concrete analyses show is first of all that the assumption of a distinguishing opposition between knowing Who (‘subject’) and known What (‘object’), as isolated present-at-hand things, is a fiction. Rather, both stand from the outset in an immediate ontological contact, which determines their being and being-thus via a relation of mutual influence and assimilation” (RBT, p. 22). By arguing in this way, Beck traces back to the very same root both the overall starting point of Being and Time (= the question of being is to be rooted in a “metaphysics of Dasein” based on the ontological identity of der Fragende, das Befragte, and das Gefragte) and that “existential” which—as primordial as the comprehension of being—determines all of Dasein’s possible encounters with the entity.

57As far as we understand Beck, his reasoning seems to run as follows. The concept of Dasein, as standing for the mode of being of the entity that we are, combined with the presupposition of ontological continuity, implies that any non-Dasein kind of entity can be encountered de facto by Dasein as long as it is determined based upon the latter’s mode of being. In sum, if Dasein can encounter non-Dasein kinds of entities only against the backdrop of an ontological continuity, then it is not possible to speak of “modes of being” other than Dasein’s, for everything that is, is either Dasein or a more or less derived expression of its “mode of being”. And from this there follows the concept of Zuhandenheit that properly describes the entities as they fall within the horizon of Dasein.

58What is at stake in Beck’s dismissal of Heidegger’s “anthropological metaphysics of being” (RBT, p. 22), then, is less the anthropological or even “anthropocentric” tendency than the ontological reductionism that inevitably comes along with it. Having said this, we can now approach NPS.

59The term “correlativism” is introduced at the outset of NPS to stand for a “perspective” (proper to Husserl and Dilthey) that has overcome “the old disjunctions (idealism or realism, subjectivism or objectivism, immanence-philosophy and phenomenalism or philosophy of the real) in favour of the thesis that there exists neither a world in itself, and independent of any consciousness of it, nor simply a consciousness”. Positively framed, correlativism is the tenet that “consciousness and world, subject and object, I and world stand to each other in a correlative ontological connection in which they are reciprocally determined [sich gegenseitig bedingenden Seinszusammenhang]” (NPS, p. 611).

  • 55 In Beck’s words: “Erkenntnis, die ja selbst nur ein spezifisches Sein ist, oder gar das Sein des Me (...)

60Let us hasten to make it clear that it would be a mistake to believe that Beck’s objective is to dismiss correlativism altogether; rather, his aim is to provide the correct understanding of it by rejecting its misleading and wrong interpretations [Interpretation or Deutung] (NPS, p. 629). In other words, Beck plays “correlativism” against “correlativism.” Now without getting into any discussion of the latter point (for it goes far beyond the scope of this paper and concerns Beck’s “realistic perspectivism”, understood as his own version of the correlativistic position), the line of thought in NPS could be summed up as follows. Whereas Husserl’s correlativism ends up in an “antinomy”, Heidegger is deemed by Beck to be the philosopher who takes Husserl’s own position to its ultimate consequences and gives it its most coherent form (NPS, p. 622). Husserl acknowledges that cognition means “consciousness of an entity that is in itself”, yet also maintains that “this entity-in-itself is not really in itself, but rather is correlatively related to knowledge itself. Hence it is for consciousness” (NPS, p. 621). Heidegger, in contrast, is able to get rid of such an antinomy—thereby embracing a form of “absolute continuity” between subject and object—by assuming knowledge as a “mode of being” of Dasein55 (NPS, p. 625). The radical conclusion drawn by Beck is to the effect that for Heidegger, there is no such thing as an entity but “only different ways of to be [nur verschiedene Arten zu sein]” (NPS, p. 622)—all of them ultimately to be traced back to different modes of Dasein itself.

61In other words, for Husserl, to say that something is means to assume the presence of consciousness and to pinpoint a specific correlation between the two; for Heidegger, to state that something is amounts to assuming the existence of Dasein, i.e. a relevant understanding of being on its part.

62Against this scenario, on the very last page of his essay Beck argues as follows.

63When I affirm that something is, I do not mean to state that “the being of something also exists as something distinct from this something, or that ‘being’ itself [das Sein selbst] has objective being”. What I mean is merely “that something ‘is’” (NPS, p. 639). What then corresponds to the “judgment’s intention toward something transcendent is the transcendent as an in-itself [als ein An-Sich], i.e. as something independent from its being-intended”. In other words, the purported necessary relation of being to the subject (here, as Meinen) is only of negative nature. As Beck concludes:

“Being” [Sein] means independence from mere conceptual intention. What follows is not that were there no thinking, there would be nothing to which objective being could be ascribed. What follows is only this: the entity [Seiendes], as independent from every intention directed to it, nonetheless exists and has objective being—yet there would be no possibility to attribute to it such objective being-in-itself by means of adequate conceptuality, that is, as “being” or “existence”. What would be lacking is that element of the relation, namely, the intention (as a conceptual positing), with respect to which “being” and “existence” signify to-be-independent. (NPS, p. 639)

64Even if Beck seems to acknowledge no distinction between being and entity, we will soon see that what he is referring to is §44 of Being and Time.

65Let us now turn to Heidegger in order better to understand what is at stake here.

“The Little Moritz,” or: Heidegger Replies

66As we have seen, Beck’s reading of Being and Time hinges on two issues. On the one hand, there is the “historical” claim that the analytic of Dasein is the “accomplished synthesis” of a series of philosophical tendencies. On the other hand, there is the systematic thesis that Heidegger’s thought builds on a presupposition (called correlativism) that he inherits from Husserl.

  • 56 Rudolf Bultmann & Martin Heidegger (2009), Briefwechsel, p. 48.

67It should be clear by now why Georg Misch opens his own book by dissociating himself from Beck. Even though he would agree with what we have called the historical claim (especially regarding the Heidegger-Dilthey relation), the way in which he evaluates such a legacy is different. Misch considers the positing of the question of being based upon the Ausgang vom Subjekt to be the great merit of Heidegger’s text; likewise, Heidegger himself had already written to Bultmann that: “the foundation of [ontology] lies in the Ausgang vom Subjekt.’”56 On the contrary, for Beck this is precisely where Heidegger’s unquestioned, historically inherited presupposition comes to light.

68While Heidegger will explicitly tackle Misch’s book in his 1929 lectures on German idealism, the name of Max Beck is nowhere to be found, as though he never tried to take a public position vis-à-vis RBT. Yet as we firmly believe, it can be shown that Heidegger voiced his disagreements with Beck during his 1928 Summer Semester lectures on The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic (which he held until July 28, overlapping with the beginning of the correspondence with Beck).

69In what is now §10 of these lectures, after he raises the question why the analytic of Dasein requires an analysis of temporality, Heidegger makes a long polemical remark. Here is the text in extenso:

  • 57 Martin Heidegger (1978), Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Logik am Ausgang von Leibniz, GA 26, Frank (...)

Possibly because relativity theory treats time or the principle of an objective measurement of time? Or maybe because Bergson, and following him, Spengler deal with time? Or because Husserl worked at a phenomenology of internal time-consciousness? Or because Kierkegaard speaks, in the Christian sense, of temporality in opposition to eternity? Or maybe because Dilthey considers the historicity of Dasein to be central, and historicity is connected with time? Was the analysis of Dasein then projected upon the backdrop of time because it was believed the result would be good if the abovementioned were fused together? In short, because one can get the idea of mixing together these various treatments of the problem of time and, as the phrase goes, “think them to their ultimate consequences [zu Ende zu denken]”? This is all too much the little Moritz’s understanding of philosophy, the one who believes that out of five authors you can make a sixth. […] Furthermore, the so-called thinking to ultimate consequences has its own special difficulty. In order to think something to its ultimate consequences, especially bringing in Kierkegaard, Husserl, Bergson, and Dilthey, one must first be in possession of that end [dieses Ende haben] toward which one is supposed to think them out; and still the question always remains: why just these particular thinkers mentioned?57

  • 58 It might be the case that Heidegger’s indirect yet very subtle reference to Max Beck is also implie (...)

70There should be no doubt about this passage being directed against RBT. Not only do all the authors listed match both the letter to Jaspers and §2 of the Report, but the phrase zu Ende zu denken is the one Beck resorts to in his essays to characterize Heidegger’s relation vis-à-vis his predecessors.58

71It is true that the passage does not seem to address any of the philosophical concerns raised in RBT. Yet it is probably no accident that such an indirect dismissal of Beck is part of a larger discussion of the concept of transcendence, which is the focus of Beck’s diagnosis of Heidegger’s correlativism in RBT and NPS. Moreover, since RBT coupled together the understanding of being and being-in-the-world by tracing both of them back to the same presupposition, then it should come as no surprise that the passage above is immediately preceded and followed by an assessment of such topics.

  • 59 Martin Heidegger (1978), Metaphysische Anfangsgründe, p. 213-214.
  • 60 Martin Heidegger (1978), Metaphysische Anfangsgründe, p. 180.
  • 61 Martin Heidegger (1978), Metaphysische Anfangsgründe, p. 170.

72Heidegger is clear that “neither Bergson […] along with Dilthey nor Husserl sees the problem and the phenomenon” of Dasein’s transcendence (as being-in-the-world).59 And while Beck quickly equates “consciousness” and “knowledge,” “being” and “object”, Heidegger hastens to say to his students that the issue with which Parmenides was already grappling (the relation between νοεῖν and εἶναι) should not be framed gnoseologically, “because the fundamental problem (being) has nothing to do with the problems of theory of knowledge”.60 The point had already been made that “transcendence is not identical with the subject-object relation”, for the latter is grounded im Seinsverständnis.61

73As far as our discussion here is concerned, three of the points Heidegger makes are worthy of our attention: first, the manner in which he denounces the ambiguity of the very phrase “subject-object relation”; second, how such an ambiguity affects the talk of “independence”; and third, how the relation between the ontological difference and the understanding of being should more properly be comprehended. On the first issue, here is what Heidegger explains:

  • 62 Martin Heidegger (1978), Metaphysische Anfangsgründe, p. 161.

Regarding [the] claim: “No object without subject,” the term “object” here is ambiguous. It is something present-at-hand by itself, and, taken in its objectivity as an object [hinsichtlich seiner Objektivität als Gegenstand], it is intended and grasped in its objectivity as an entity such that it is of itself as present-at-hand, and yet in its being-present-at-hand does not at all require to be grasped [der Erfaßtheit durchaus unbedürftig ist]. For in grasping something present-at-hand as present-at-hand, there is, in other words, a withdrawing release of what is present-at-hand; the grasping of it has the character of allowing what is grasped to abide by itself, and this grasping understands itself as an acceptance. Now if by object is meant what is present-at-hand of itself, what needs not be grasped, then the claim is false. What is present-at-hand is not in need of a subject, and its being present-at-hand does not establish a subject’s being present-at-hand. […] The subject can be what it is, Dasein can exist without grasping the entity merely qua object. Objectification, or even theoretical thematization, does not necessarily belong to being-by [Sein-bei]. (Nevertheless, if one were to take the object with regard to its objectification, then it is correct that this objectification is dependent on a grasping subject.)62

74Heidegger’s argument rests on the distinctions between (i) entity, (ii) presence-at-hand, and (iii) object.

(A) The thesis No object without subject holds true if it is applied to (iii), for in this case a subject is required [bedürftig] in order to grasp [erfassen] or thematize the entity as an object.

(B) The thesis No object without subject does not hold true if it is applied to (ii). As the excerpt states, “what is present-at-hand is not in need of a subject, and its being present-at-hand does not establish a subject’s being present-at-hand.” This is why Heidegger calls it das der Erfaßtheit Unbedürftige.

(C) The thesis No object without subject holds true if applied to (i), yet only if the subject is not assumed als ein erfassendes (= A), but as one that withdraws and releases [Freigeben] the entity.

75While (A) seems to correspond to Beck’s own assessment of (the subject-object) correlativism, in contrast, (B) implies no correlativism. Finally, (C) would represent a species of correlativism—but one in which the role of the subject is to release the entity and not to grasp it as an object.

  • 63 Martin Heidegger (1978), Metaphysische Anfangsgründe, p. 163.

76Here Heidegger seems to aim both at circumscribing the validity of Beck’s discourse to (A) and at bringing to the fore a more fundamental “correlativism” (let us remark that Heidegger does not employ the term)—one that is identified with Dasein’s Sein-bei (C)—in which the entity is released, which cannot be equated with (A). It is only upon the basis of such release (C) that the entity present-at-hand (B) can be eventually grasped (A). Moreover, if Beck contends that “‘Being’ means independence” and that the relation to the subject can be exclusively negative, Heidegger replies—word for word—that precisely because Un-abhängigkeit is “a negative determination and can only mean in-dependence from the subject [our italics],” we cannot excuse ourselves from clarifying such a “relation”.63 Hence the distinction between (B) and (C) and the claim that (ontic) independence—which Beck would assume as characterizing the essence of knowledge—requires a more fundamental (ontological) dependence.

77Now whether such a refined distinction upon the part of Heidegger would really address Beck’s objection is a doubt that needs to be raised, but which nevertheless cannot really be discussed here. We should never forget that in RBT, Beck seems fully to acknowledge the distinction between (B) and (C) when he maintains that for Heidegger the very “opposition between the knowing Who (‘subject’) and the known What (‘object’), as isolated present-at-hand things, is a fiction”. For him—Beck adds—they “stand from the outset in an immediate ontological contact”.

78The difficulty that might arise while trying to assess their different views, objections, and counter-objections hinges on a terminological discrepancy. Since Beck admits no ontological difference, it is easy for Heidegger to diminish his criticism by identifying it with (A). However, if by (C) Heidegger pinpoints a more fundamental correlation whose peculiarity Beck misses altogether, the latter does in fact speak of “ontological contact” to refer to this very same phenomenon. On Heidegger’s view, Beck would be concerned merely with the articulation between (A) and (B), while it seems to us that Beck is tackling (B) and (C). Yet his employing both “object” and “being” indifferently can be misleading.

  • 64 Martin Heidegger (1996), Einleitung in die Philosophie, GA 27, Frankfurt am Main, Vittorio Klosterm (...)

79A fundamental confirmation of our reconstruction is offered by Heidegger’s lectures from the Winter Semester of 1928/29—the first part of which overlaps with the last phase of the exchange with Beck. We do not know when Beck sent Heidegger “The New Problematic Situation of the Theory of Knowledge,” but we do know that Heidegger confirmed its reception on October 29. In §§10 and 11 of the text Einleitung in die Philosophie—during the discussion of the traditional concept of truth—Heidegger asks the question whether “the subject-object-relation, and a fortiori all ‘theory of knowledge’, rests on the problem of truth and not the other way around (as assumed by the common opinion)”.64 This will lead us into an exploration of “the essence of truth”, which is not to be primarily sought in the judgment’s own correspondence to the object, nor in any “subject-object-relation”. As Heidegger adds:

  • 65 Martin Heidegger (1996), Einleitung in die Philosophie, p. 63.

No matter how interesting the purported “new problematic situation of the theory of knowledge” [die neue angeblich Problemlage der Erkenntnistheorie] may be—and one can amuse its readers with all sort of things—we do not tell them anything about the situation of the problem [die Lage des Problems] if we keep quiet about what, in this problematic, determines the essence of truth.65

80And the essence of truth can be disclosed only if we analyze the phenomenon of Dasein’s Sein-bei (which Heidegger introduces in §12), something that he had already done a few months previously. Since the phrase new problematic situation of the theory of knowledge” is presented as a citation, there can be no doubt that in these pages, Max Beck is once again Heidegger’s interlocutor.

81Before we move on to our last point, let us briefly recapitulate what has been argued so far. If we are on the right track, in his lectures from the Summer Semester of 1928 Heidegger de facto systematically tackles the reading of Being and Time that Beck develops in his 1928 essays (although without ever mentioning Beck’s name). He both casts doubts upon Beck’s “historical” thesis and elaborates on the subject-object relation—thereby denouncing the ambiguity of the latter’s diagnosis of correlativism. Just as Beck did not dismiss correlativism per se but only some misinterpretations of it, so Heidegger wants to present a more fine-grained framework within which Beck’s position can be accommodated, his polemical vis underplayed, and—last but not least—Dasein’s transcendence rightly understood.

82This being said, let us add that the passage by Beck quoted at the very end of §2.2 above also hints at a second crucial aspect concerning the ontological difference. What Beck is arguing for could be summarized as follows. Since Beck recognizes no ontological difference, and since what “being” or “entity” or “existence” mean is to be independent from the subject (see §4 below for a hint toward Beck’s ontology), then the disappearance of the subject does not imply the disappearance of such beings or entities. In short, were there no subject, what Beck calls “being” or “entity” would still be what it is, yet—and here comes the point—there would be no possibility to account for it by means of “adequate conceptuality”.

  • 66 Martin Heidegger (1967), Sein und Zeit, p. 230 [our translation].

83As already mentioned, with such an argument Beck seems to be referring to §44 of Being and Time, where the scenario is addressed in which there would be no Dasein at all. Here is the text: “only because Dasein is as constituted by disclosedness (that is, by understanding) can something like being be understood; only so is an understanding of being possible at all. Being—not the entity—is something that ‘there is’ only as long as truth is. And truth is only insofar as and as long as Dasein is.”66

84The passage is difficult, and with his remarks Beck puts his finger on one of the most thorny and delicate issues of Heidegger’s thought, one that not only concerns the understanding of being and the distinction between “being” and “entity,” but bears upon the difference between the relation—one of mutual dependence—between Dasein and being on the one hand and the relation—one of independence—between Dasein and entity on the other. Two problems arise here. First, what is not apparent is the thesis—tacitly assumed—that the entity would be even if there were no Dasein, therefore no being. Second, if we assume that there were no Dasein, and therefore no being, what would the entity be since the expression Seiendes signifies “something that is”?

85On Beck’s view, the two relations are incompatible and mutually exclusive. For if being or entity mean “independence” from the subject (as seems to be the case based on what Heidegger says about the entity), then the disappearance of Dasein could not imply that there was no being; in contrast, were we to stick to the correlativism between Dasein and being, then (and based on the first part of the passage), if there were no Dasein there would be neither being nor entity.

86That Beck’s observations might have provoked Heidegger to come back to this issue can now indeed be claimed on the basis of the end of §10 of The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic (after the excerpt above on the little Moritz). After many pages devoted to Dasein’s transcendence, the discourse is brought to a conclusion by the introduction and discussion of “three theses”:

1. The entity is in itself the entity, i.e. what it is and how it is even when, for example, there exists no Dasein.

2. Being “is” not, but there is being exclusively as long as Dasein exists. […]

  • 67 Martin Heidegger (1978), Metaphysische Anfangsgründe, p. 194-195.

3. Only as long as the existing Dasein gives itself something like being can the entity show itself in its in-itself [in seinem An-Sich], namely, can the first thesis likewise be understood and acknowledged.67

87Although the passage is perfectly in line with §44 (and thus our thesis is not at all that Heidegger is revising his position), a discrepancy emerges that needs to be emphasized. If in §44 the sequence goes from the dependence-relation between Dasein and being to the independence-relation between Dasein and entity (“Being—not the entity”), here it is the other way around. Heidegger first affirms that the entity is what it is regardless of Dasein’s existence, then the “dependence”-relation between Dasein and being is acknowledged as the condition for “the first thesis [to] be understood”. The correlation between Dasein and being (3) is introduced in order for die These that “the entity is […] what it is even when […] there exists no Dasein” to be “understood”. In short, Heidegger presents the problem as that of the intelligibility of claim (1), in such a way that—as Beck states—the entity depends here on the existence of the subject only in order for its independence to be adequately conceptualized.

88Now if for Beck this is all we are allowed to state about the necessary dependence of the entity or being on the subject, a closer reading of the text would show that Heidegger is trying, once again, both to accommodate Beck’s objections and to reaffirm the basic function of Seinsverständnis.

Final Remarks

89We have finally reached the end of our analyses. Since we have already announced that our ambition is neither to follow Beck’s Heidegger-interpretation after 1928 nor to critically evaluate his Report, a few remarks will be now made on the overall significance of the confrontation between the two.

90At first glance, one might be tempted to characterize the discussion between Heidegger and Beck as a variation upon the famous or infamous idealism-realism debate that inflamed the spirit of so many phenomenologists at this early phase. Given a certain number of statements by Heidegger and Beck, it would be quite easy to have the latter play the “realist” whereas the former would assume the role of his “idealistic” antagonist. However, no matter how reassuring this hermeneutical hypothesis may be, upon closer examination the situation will turn out to be far more complex.

91As mentioned in passing, Beck’s ambition is never to dismiss correlativism per se, but only some misconceptions of it; moreover, he recognizes two kinds of relation between “subject” and “object” that derive from the distinction and relevant articulation between two concepts of subjectivity. For the sake of our discussion, the following will suffice.

  • 68 Maximlian Beck (1938), Psychologie, p. 26.
  • 69 Maximlian Beck (1938), Psychologie, p. 58.

92In the more traditional terminology that Beck uses, a clear-cut distinction is made between the “psyche” [Seele] and “consciousness” (which is sometimes also called “spirit” [Geist]). Whereas the essence of consciousness consists in passively “receiving” [empfangen] whatever is given to it as an object, the psyche or psychological I is “the acting subject”68 characterized by directedness toward any object already given to consciousness. Now the only form of correlativism that Beck is willing to accept is the one between “consciousness” and “object” in the peculiar sense that it belongs to the essence of consciousness to “receive” whatever there is as an “objective being” and as “existentially independent” from consciousness itself (= no ontological continuity). In contrast, the psyche is always unique—it can refer to the object only “as one that interests me in a specific respect, or that concerns me. […] Every I is different and is interested in something else.”69 In other words, given a multiplicity of objects objectively given to consciousness, the I actively refers to them based on its own unique “character,” “interests”, and “concerns”.

93While in the former case one can actually speak of a consciousness-object correlation in which the relation is determined by the object itself, in the latter case what we have is a system of individual subjective modes of comportment with no correlate of their own.

94This being summarized, we can understand the problem of what the confrontation was about, if regarded from the angle of Beck, as follows. On the one hand, Beck dismisses the notion of Dasein for conflating the two “subjective” dimensions above, or better, since Dasein is absolutely unique, the result of Heidegger not recognizing a fundamental receptive layer—one to which objects would be given in their objectivity—is subjectivism. On the other hand, the multiplicity of beings (that is, the many entities that would be given to consciousness in their own ontological peculiarity) cannot be recognized as such, for whatever Dasein experiences is experienced based on its own (= Dasein’s) mode of being and not on the object’s (see above, §2.2). In this debate—at the center of which is how to understand the very expression Ausgang vom Subjekt in relation to the question of being (and its multiplicity)—Beck accuses Heidegger of both subjectivism and ontological reductionism.

  • 70 Martin Heidegger (1996), Einleitung in die Philosophie, p. 71.
  • 71 Martin Heidegger (1996), Einleitung in die Philosophie, p. 74-75.

95Now if the reader of Being and Time could agree with Beck that the concept of Zuhandenheit is mobilized in such a manner that it becomes a fundamental all-encompassing category characterizing or capturing everything that is encountered by Dasein and as long as it is encountered by it, then it must be noted that immediately after the release of the book, Heidegger started acknowledging many different and irreducible modes of being. In the 1928/29 lectures, for example, he distinguishes existence (Dasein), life (animal and plants), readiness-at-hand (tools), presence-at-hand (stones), and subsistence (numbers and space).70 Moreover, as a sort of ideal reply to Beck’s own claim that a fundamental receiving layer is to be recognized to which entities are given in the first place, Heidegger points out to his students—in those very same weeks in which his exchange with Beck was coming to an end—that Dasein’s transcendence is to be correctly comprehended as a “peculiar receptivity”.71

  • 72 The idea of a “schism” comes from Herbert Spiegelberg (1982), “Epoché und Reduktion bei Pfänder und (...)
  • 73 For a critical reading of such an alleged second “schism,” see George Heffernan (2016), “A Tale of (...)

96It is not possible to tell whether the Report and the overall discussion with Beck played any role (even if just a tiny one) in prompting Heidegger to make such remarks. But just how would one account for the “Heidegger-Beck confrontation”? Is the “episode”, as we have been trying to reconstruct it, part of the early phase of the phenomenological movement, hence one of the many expressions of the first phenomenological “schism” (the one between Husserl and some of the early students from Munich and Göttingen, which was due to the former’s turn toward a form of transcendental idealism72)? Or is it to be considered part of a so-called “second” schism (i.e. the existential one that took place from within the already established “transcendental” understanding of phenomenology73)? Or—as we in contrast firmly believe—is the time perhaps now ripe to drop such broad and all-encompassing hermeneutical categories so as to start writing what for the sake of a better expression we would simply designate as “micro-conceptual histories”?

Appendix

Maximilian Beck’s Letter to Martin Heidegger

97Ber[lin]–Wannsee, d[en] 1. Juli 1928

Robertstr. 9

Sehr verehrter Herr Professor!

Mit gleicher Post sende ich an Sie das schon aus der Druckerei gekommene erste Heft der Philosophischen Hefte.

Es entspräche sehr dem dialektischen Charakter, den ich dieser Zeitschrift zu geben bestrebt bin, wenn meiner Auseinandersetzung mit Ihrem Buch Ihre Auseinandersetzung mit meiner Auseinandersetzung folgen würde. Mein Aufsatz ist das Resultat eines fast ganzjährigen, ausschließlich d.i. von früh bis abends Ihrem Buch gewidmeten Studiums. Ich kann daher nicht glauben, dass meine Einwände, und selbst wenn sie zum Teil auf Missverständnissen beruhen sollten, so unbegründet sein könnten, dass sie eine Erwiderung nicht verdienten. Und eine öffentliche Erwiderung würde sicherlich nur das bessere Verständnis Ihrer Lehre fördern.

Ich will so offen sein zu bekennen, dass mir der sachliche Ton der Kritik stellenweise nicht leicht würde—u. zw. deshalb nicht leicht, weil Ihre Lehre eine Stärkung des von mir radikaler Bekämpfung für nötig gehaltenen philosophischen „Zeitgeistes“ bedeutet. Auf alles war ich eher gefasst, als dass dieser zeitgenössischen Einstellung selbst aus dem Lager der Phänomenologie Unterstützung zufließen würde. Ich bitte Sie, dieses Geständnis so zu nehmen, wie es gegeben wird: Als Ausdruck des Bedauerns, statt eines sehr gewünschten Mitkämpfers, einen Gegner zu finden, sodass ich feststellen muss, Last und Verantwortung des Kampfes liege allein auf mir. Alle Schärfe der Polemik meines Aufsatzes hat darin ihren Grund.

Für Ihr Antwortschreiben auf meine Einladung zur Mitarbeit an den Philos[ophischen] Heften danke ich Ihnen sehr. Es täte mir aufrichtig [2] leid, wenn es nur bei der Bedingtheit Ihrer Zusage bleiben sollte. Da ich das Niveau der Philosophischen Hefte möglichst hoch halten will und alles fernhalten möchte, was an den gehaltlosen Papierraschelten der übrigen philosophischen Zeitschriften anklingt, bin ich auf die Mitarbeit der ganz, ganz Wenigen, deren Erster Sie sind, angewiesen.

Mit hochachtungsvollem Gruße,

Ihr sehr ergebener

[Keine Unterschrift]

* * *

98Berlin–Wannsee

Robertstraße 9

July 1, 1928

Dear Professor,

Enclosed I am sending you the first issue of the Philosophische Hefte, hot off the press.

If my discussion of your book were to be followed by your discussion of my discussion, this would greatly fit with the dialectical character that I am striving to give to this journal. My essay is the result of the study that for almost a year I dedicated every day, all day long, exclusively to your book. Thus, and even if my objections were partially based on some misunderstandings, I cannot believe that they could be so unjustified as to deserve no reply. And a public reply would certainly only foster better comprehension of your work.

I want to be open enough to admit that here and there, it was not easy for me to assume the objective tone of the critique. Indeed, it was not easy because your doctrine represents an endorsement of the philosophical “Zeitgeist” against which I believe it is radically necessary to fight. I was prepared for anything except for the fact that this contemporary attitude could itself receive support from the phenomenological camp. Please take this confession for what it is: the expression of the regret that what I found was an opponent rather than the fellow fighter I had so hoped for. As a consequence, I myself must take on the burden and the responsibility for the fight. All the polemical harshness of my essay is rooted in this.

Thank you very much for your reply to my invitation to collaborate with the Philosophische Hefte. I am sincerely [2] sorry to hear about the conditions of your commitment. Since I want to keep the level of the Philosophische Hefte as high as possible and want to stay away from the empty paper rustling of the other philosophy journals, I depend on the cooperation of very, very few—among whom you are the first.

Very sincerely yours,

[No signature]

Alexander Pfänder’s Letter to Maximilian Beck

99München

28. Juli 1928

Lieber Herr Dr. Beck!

Jetzt, so die wirre Geschäftigkeit des Semesterschlusses, die mich bisher verhindert hat, nachläßt, möchte ich Ihnen noch nachträglich zum 1. Heft Ihrer neunen Zeitschrift gratulieren. Ich finde Ihren Artikel über Heideggers „Sein und Zeit“ sowohl in Referat, als auch in Kritik ausgezeichnet. Auch Herr Daubert hat sich sehr anerkennend darüber ausgesprochen. Selbst im Kreise Heideggers im Marburg ist man zufrieden mit Ihrem Referat.

Bei flüchtiger Lektüre des Artikels von H. Marcuse habe ich noch kein rechtes Verständnis gewinnen können.

Mit bestem Gruße

Ihr. A. Pfänder

* * *

100Munich

July 28, 1928

Dear Dr. Beck,

Now that the confused bustle of the end of the semester, which has kept me very busy, subsides, I would like to congratulate you retrospectively on the first issue of your new journal. I find your essay on Heidegger’s Being and Time excellent, both as a report and as a critique. Mr. Daubert has also commented on it with great appreciation. Even in Marburg, within Heidegger’s circle, people are satisfied with your report.

A cursory reading of the article by H. Marcuse has not yet given me any proper understanding of it.

Best regards,

A. Pfänder

Maximilian Beck–Oskar Becker Correspondence

Letter Nr. 1 (Becker-Beck)

101Freiburg i. B., 18. IV. 28

Sehr geehrter Herr Doktor!

Verzeihen Sie mir bitte, dass ich auf Ihre sehr freundliche Aufforderung zur Mitarbeit an Ihrer neuzubegründeten Zeitschrift jetzt erst antworte. Das hat nicht nur die üblichen Gründe solcher Verzögerungen, sondern auch den, dass ich mir die Angelegenheit reiflich überlege wollte.

Ich begrüße eine Zeitschrift, die über die sog. „Richtungen“ in der Philosophie hinauskommen will und bin, wohl mit Ihnen, der Meinung, [2] dass die gegenwärtige Lage der Philosophie als Wissenschaft trotz der äußerlich vielfach glänzenden „Betriebe“, der Fälle der Neuerscheinungen etc., eine sehr gefährdete und tief problematische ist. Insofern ich mit Ihnen in dieser Grundauffassung zusammentreffe, bin ich gerne zur Mitarbeit grundsätzlich bereit, obschon ich Ihnen in absehbarer Zeit keine konkreten Arbeiten von mir in Ansicht stellen kann.

Ich möchte aber anschließend auch einige Bedenken zur Sprache bringen, die mir eine formelle [3] Erklärung (die etwa eine Kennung meines Namens auf einen Prospekt, Titelblatt nicht zur Folge haben könnte) Schluss macht.

1) Ich begrüße an sich sehr, dass Sie Heideggers „Sein u. Zeit“ in Ihrem ersten Heft zum Gegenstand einer Diskussion machen wollen. Ich stehe nun aber, als Schüler und persönlicher Freund Heideggers so nahe, dass meine Stellungnahme zu Ihrer Zeitschrift von der Art, wie darin zur H. Stellung genommen wird, nicht unabhängig sein kann. Ich würde in eine schiefe Lage kommen, wenn ich an einem Blatt mitarbeiten wollte, das sich in [4] ausgesprochener Gegnerschaft zu der grundsätzlichen Anschauungsweise Heideggers sehen würde. Es ist selbstverständlich, dass ich jede sachliche Kritik in der Philosophie begrüße. Aber ich wäre offenbar am falschen Platz, wenn ich mich in die Reihe der Gegner meiner eigenen Grundhaltung stellen würde. Ich möchte daher zum mindesten das Erscheinen dieses ersten Heftes abwarten, ehe ich mich endgültig entscheide.

2) Ich möchte mir erlauben, anlässlich einiger Wendungen in Ihrem Prospekt bzw. Programm zu bemerken, dass ich weder von einer Erneue[5]rung scholastischer Denkweise noch von einem Allzu-Ernst-Nehmen des Marxismus eine wesentliche Forderung der gegenwärtigen philosophischen Problematik erwarte. Ich müsste auch die Bezeichnung „philosophia perennis“, sofern sie nicht rein formal gemeint sein sollte und mit der sog. „Neuscholastik“ einen nähren Zusammenhang anzeigen sollte, ablehnen. —Und, was das Marxismus betrifft, so möchte ich meinen, dass zwar den „kollektivistischen“ Tendenzen der ersten Zeit gewiss eine große Bedeutung innewohnt, dass [6] aber etwa das Fasc[h]ismus und ähnliche Bildungen und vor Allem die noch nicht mit einem bestimmten „...ismus“ etikettierte Mentalität Nordamerikas an Wichtigkeit dem Marxismus zum mindesten gleich kommen.

Ich hoffe, dass Sie mir die offene Angabe meiner Gründe für eine zum mindesten vorläufige Zurückhaltung nicht verübeln werden; ich hielt diesen Weg für den besten,—besser jedenfalls, als mich hinter [7] den in solchen Fällen üblichen Ausflüchten zu verschanzen.

So darf ich Ihnen aufrichtig wünschen, dass Ihre Bestrebungen ihr Ziel der Forderung wissenschaftlichen Philosophierens in möglichst weitergehendem Masse ausreichen!

Mit der Versicherung meiner vorzüglichsten Hochachtung,

Ihr sehr ergebener

Oskar Becker

* * *

102Freiburg i. B.

April 18, 1928

Dear Doctor [Beck],

Please forgive me for responding only now to your very friendly invitation to collaborate with your newly founded journal. The reasons for this are not only the usual hesitations, but also that I wanted to think the matter through carefully.

I welcome a journal that wants to move beyond the so-called “orientations” in philosophy, and along with you, I am convinced [2] that—despite the many superficially brilliant “enterprises” as well as the many new publications, etc.—the current state of philosophy as a science is precarious and deeply problematic. To the extent that I agree with you on this fundamental conception, I am basically ready to collaborate, although I cannot offer you any concrete work in the foreseeable future.

Moreover, I would also like to raise some concerns that will end with a formal [3] statement (which could not result, for example, in my name being listed on a prospectus or a title page).

1) I very much welcome that you want to make Heidegger’s Being and Time the topic of discussion of your first issue. However, as a student and a personal friend of Heidegger, I am now so close [to him] that my position in relation to your journal cannot be independent from the type of position taken there vis-à-vis H. I would find myself in an awkward situation were I to collaborate with a journal that [4] would regard itself in outspoken opposition to Heidegger’s fundamental views. It goes without saying that I welcome every material critique in philosophy. Yet I would clearly be in the wrong place if I were to be numbered among the opponents of my own fundamental ideas. Accordingly, I would at least like to wait for the first issue to appear before I make a final decision.

2) As regards some of the turns of phrase in your prospectus or program, I would like to take the liberty to remark that I expect no essential improvement of the current philosophical problematic by a renewal [5] of the Scholastic mode of thinking nor by the Marxist plea to take everything very seriously. I would also have to reject the label “philosophia perennis” to the extent to which it is not understood purely formally in close connection with so-called “Neo-Scholasticism.” And as far as Marxism is concerned, I would like to think that even if the early “collectivistic” tendencies were certainly very important, [6] Fascism and similar movements, and above all the North-American mindset—which has not been yet labeled with any specific “…ism”—are at least equally important as Marxism.

I hope that you will not blame me for openly giving you my reasons for holding back, at least for the time being; I felt this to be the best way, or in any case better than hiding behind [7] the usual excuses.

So I can sincerely wish that your endeavors realize in the best way possible the demand for a scientific philosophy!

With the assurance of my highest esteem,

Sincerely yours,

Oskar Becker

Letter Nr. 2 (Beck-Becker)

103Berlin–Wannsee, d[en] 1. 7. 28

Robertstr. 9

Sehr verehrter Herr Professor!

Mit gleicher Post erreicht Sie das erste der Philosophischen Hefte. Ich hoffe, dass der stellenweise scharfe polemische Ton meines Aufsatzes kein Einwand gegen Ihre Mitarbeit an der Zeitschrift sein wird. Anders zu schreiben, wäre für mich Unaufrichtigkeit gewesen.

Falls Sie nun zur Mitarbeit bereit sind, hätte ich—ohne Ihren eigenen Entschlüssen irgendwie vorgreifen zu wollen—eine spezielle Bitte: Das zweite, im Oktober erscheinende Heft gilt dem Thema Philosophie und Naturwissenschaft. Geplant ist eine prinzipielle vor allem wissenschaftstheoretische Auseinandersetzung. Und im Speziellen der mathematisch–physikalischen Auflösung von Raum, Zeit und Materie in absolute Relation und Funktion. Es liegt sehr nahe, dass ich gerade von Ihnen zu solchen Themen gerne einen Beitrag haben möchte. Sind Sie dazu bereit, dann bitte ich, zwecks rechtzeitiger Disposition dieses Heftes, um baldige Antwort. (Diese Disposition hängt auch davon ab, ob Herr Professor Heidegger auf mein Ansuchen um Erwiderung eingeht.)

Ich danke sehr für Ihren Brief. Zum Thema Marxismus möchte ich folgendes bemerken: Ich selbst bin nicht Marxist. Im Gegenteil: Ich sehe in einer zunehmenden Kollektivierung und Sozialisierung ein katastrophales Elend und bin der Überzeugung, dass nur im Kampfe dagegen der Mensch seine Wert retten und steigern kann. Für richtig halte ich aber die marxistische Kritik der kapitalistischen Gesellschaft (der Versachlichung des Menschen). So zu tun, als wäre [2] in den geschichtlichen Fundamenten alles in Ordnung, und Karikaturen des Marxismus zu entwerfen und zu bekämpfen oder ihn als indiskutabel einfach zu ignorieren, halte ich nachgerade für blamabel. Man kann den Marxismus als philosophische Theorie nicht ernst genug nehmen, wenn man ihn wirklich widerlegen will. Die Sphäre des Schwerpunktes polemischer Argumentation liegt aber im Ethischen: in Phrasen wie „Kollektivethik“ und dergl. Ich möchte in den Philos[ophischen] Heften die Diskussion allmählich in diese Sphäre dirigieren. Nicht aber ohne hochstehende Gegner (und deren Anhänger), indem ich sie frei zu [W]orte komme lasse, für diese Diskussion zu interessieren. So viel um nicht missverstanden zu werden.

Ich bin mit sehr verehrungsvollem Gruße,

Ihr sehr ergebener

[Keine Unterschrift]

* * *

104Berlin–Wannsee

Robertstraße 9

July 1, 1928

Dear Professor,

Enclosed I am sending you the first issue of the Philosophische Hefte. I hope that the occasionally polemical tone of my essay will not be an obstacle to your collaboration with the journal. It would have been false of me to write [the report] otherwise.

In case you are now ready to collaborate, I would have a special requestwithout wanting to anticipate your own decision in any way whatsoever: the second issue, which will appear in October, is dedicated to philosophy and the natural sciences. The plan is to have a fundamental discussion, mainly of an epistemological nature, and concerning, in particular, the mathematical-physical dissolution of space, time, and matter into absolute relation and function. It stands to reason that I would like to have a contribution from you on just such a theme. If you are ready, I would ask you to reply as soon as possible in order to plan the issue in a timely manner. (The planning also depends upon whether Prof. Heidegger will agree to my request for a reply.)

Thank you very much for your letter. On the subject of Marxism, I would like to emphasize the following: I myself am not a Marxist. Quite the opposite: what I see in the increasing collectivization and socialization is a catastrophic misery, and I am convinced that human beings can save and improve their own value only by fighting against these tendencies. But I deem correct the Marxist critique of capitalist society (the reification of human beings). I consider it almost embarrassing to pretend that everything [2] is in order in the historical foundations and to propose and oppose a caricature of Marxism, or simply to ignore it as unworthy of discussion. If we actually want to refute Marxism, we need to take it seriously as a philosophical theory. The main focus of the critical discussion is of an ethical character, i.e., it bears on such turns of phrase as “collective ethics” and the like. I would gradually like to take the discussion in the Philosophische Hefte in this direction, but not without involving high-profile adversaries (and their supporters)who would be free to express themselves. So much so as not to be misunderstood.

My very best regards,

Sincerely yours,

[No signature]

Letter Nr. 3 (Becker-Beck)

105Freiburg i. B., den 9. 7. 28

Reiterstrasse 10 II

Seher geehrter Herr Doktor!

Für Ihre freundliche Übersendung Ihres ersten Heftes und Ihren liebenswürdigen Brief sage ich Ihnen meinen verbindlichsten Dank. Ihre Heidegger-Kritik hat mich außerordentlich interessiert. Sie stellt den bei weitem ernsthaftesten—und eigentlich den einzigen—bisher erschienen Versuch einer Auseinandersetzung mit der „neuen Ontologie“ dar. Freilich: überzeugt haben Sie mich keineswegs; es würde zu einer weiteren Klärung noch sehr viel gesagt werden müssen. Nur einiges Wenige dar ich vielleicht jetzt schon bemerken: Heidegger ist sich der Kontinuität der Philosophiegeschichte in viel höherem Masse bewusst als Sie vielleicht meinen; er würde sein Hineingestelltsein in die Tradition ohne weiteres zugeben und—ganz im Sinne seiner Interpretation von Geschichtlichkeit—positiv empfinden; er ist durchaus keine „revolutionäre Natur“! (Ich hörte kürzlich eine charakteristische Äußerung von ihm: „Es fragt sich, ob das überhaupt noch Philosophie ist“—nämlich, die an den Geist nicht mehr glaubende Philosophie von Feuerbach bis Scheler—„wenn sich nicht imstande ist, in die zentrale Kommunikation mit der großen philosophischen Tradition von Parmenides bis Hegel einzutreten.“) Die von Ihnen aufgezeigten Verbindungen mir früheren Denken bestehen in der Tat bis auf die mit Marx (auch nicht über Lukács, höchstens indirekt, vielleicht durch Scheler, Spengler u. ä.). Dagegen haben Sie nicht genannt, obwohl das vielleicht am wichtigsten ist, Aristoteles, Augustinus, den jungen Luther, die H. alle sehr gut kennt. Überhaupt ist H. außerhalb des eigentlich neoscholastischen Kreises einer der besten Kenner der antik-mittelalterlichen Ontologie und Theologie. (Er war ursprünglich katholischer Theologe.) Es ist [2] in diesem Zusammenhang charakteristisch, dass „Sein und Zeit“ erwachsen ist aus dem Entwurf einer „systematischen“ Einleitung in eine umfangreiche Interpretation der aristotelischen Ontologie, deren Veröffentlichung leider jetzt zurückgestellt ist, von der mir aber Teile aus Vorlesungen und Übungen bekannt sind.

Wenn Sie an einigen Stellen Ihrer Kritik meinen, dass H. fundamentale Begriffe und Fragestellungen der klassischen Ontologie „übersieht“, so ist das wohl sicher irrtümlich; aber die prinzipiellen ontologischen Probleme werden erst in dem (im MS. fertiggestellten) II. Teil von „S[ein] u[nd] Z[eit]“ diskutiert. (Insbes. die Frage der „ontologischen Differenz“, d.h. des Unterschieds von Sein und Seiendem, der allgemeinste Seinsbegriff—freilich ist er für H. gar nicht selbstverständlich; die Frage der „phänomenologischen Konstruktion und Destruktion“ u. s. w.)

  • * Am Rand [Vgl. auch S. 220–234]

Aber ich möchte mich für jetzt nicht in eine sachliche Diskussion einlassen. Ich glaube, dass Sie die Punkte, wo die „hermeneutische“ Phänomenologie vielleicht Ihrer Grenzen hat (das ästhetische Phänomen, das Leben als Kreislauf in der Natur, überhaupt eigentliche „Natur“), mit sicherem Gefühl bemerkt haben. Aber ich glaube nicht, dass man die Konstatierung solcher Grenzen, vorausgesetzt, dass sie gelingt, gegen die H.sche Ontologie als solche ausnutzen kann. Meine eigene Stellung finden Sie angedeutet im Schlussabschnitt meiner Abhandlung „Mathematische Existenz“ (S. 321–328).*

  • * * Am Rand Vielleicht ist aber eine Beteiligung an der Diskussion in einem späteren Heft möglich. Ic (...)
  • * ** Gestrichen das Nähere

Nach alldem habe ich gewiss kein prinzipielles Bedenken gegen eine Beteiligung an Ihrer Zeitschrift. Aber bis zum Oktober kann ich leider nichts versprechen,** weil da schon der Ablieferungstermin für eine andere Arbeit liegt, die ich in den Sommerferien schreiben muss. Ich weiß übrigens nicht, ob man wirklich den Raum-Zeit-Kausalitätsbegriff der heutigen Physik von der Alternative Dynamik (Idealismus, Relativismus)–Substanz (Realismus, Absolutismus) aus fassen kann und soll. Ich müsste mir in dieser Hinsicht meine Stellungnahme*** durchaus vorbehalten.

Mit der Versicherung meiner vorzüglichsten Hochachtung,

Ihr sehr ergebener

Oskar Becker

* * *

106Freiburg i. B.

Reiterstrasse 10 II

July 9, 1928

Dear Doctor [Beck],

I wish to thank you most sincerely for kindly sending me the first issue and for your amicable letter. I find your critique of Heidegger extremely interesting. It represents by far the most serious—actually the one and only—attempt to appear so far that confronts the “new ontology.” Of course, you have by no means convinced me; a great deal more would have to be said by way of further clarification. Perhaps I will make only a few remarks now: Heidegger is much more aware of the continuity of the history of philosophy than you might think; he would readily admit his embeddedness in the tradition and—wholly in line with his interpretation of the history of philosophy—he would also welcome it positively. He does not at all have a “revolutionary nature”! (I briefly heard him say something telling: “The question arises whether this”—i.e., the philosophy that goes from Feuerbach to Scheler and no longer believes in the spirit—“is still philosophy at all, since it is no longer able to enter into any essential communication with the great philosophical tradition from Parmenides to Hegel”). The connections with previous thinkers that you have pointed out do actually exist, including the one with Marx (yet not via Lukács—most likely indirectly through Scheler, Spengler and the like). On the other hand, you did not mention the most important ones, i.e., Aristotle, Augustine, and the young Luther—all of whom H. knows very well. Generally speaking, outside of specifically Neo-Scholastic circles, H. is one of the best experts on ancient and medieval ontology and theology. (He was originally a Catholic theologian.) In this regard, it is telling that [2] Being and Time developed out of a draft for a “systematic” introduction to a comprehensive interpretation of Aristotelian ontology, the publication of which has unfortunately now been postponed (but parts of which are known to me from lectures and seminars).

It is certainly very wrong when you affirm here and there in your critique that H. “overlooks” the fundamental concepts and questions of classical ontology; however, the fundamental ontological problems (in particular, the question of the “ontological difference,” namely, the distinction between being and entity; the most general concept of being, which for H. is certainly not at all self-evident; the question of “phenomenological construction and destruction”; and so on) will be discussed only in the second part of Being and Time (completed in manuscript).

  • * [In the margin:] See also pp. 220–234.
  • 74 The reference here is to Oskar Becker (1927), Mathematische Existenz. Untersuchung zur Logik und On (...)

But I do not intend to enter into any material discussion now. I believe that you have properly sensed that there are questions in relation to which “hermeneutical” phenomenology probably encounters its limits (the aesthetic phenomenon, life as a natural cycle, and in general “nature” in the proper sense). Nevertheless—and even taking for granted that such limits could be ascertained—I do not believe they could successfully be utilized against H.’s ontology per se. You can find my own views on the matter in the final section of my work on Mathematical Existence (pp. 321–328).* 74

  • * * [In the margin:] I would be very pleased, however, if it were possible to join the discussion in (...)
  • * ** [Crossed out:] [in] further detail.

Despite all this, I certainly have no fundamental objection to the idea of cooperating with your journal. Unfortunately, however, I cannot make any promises for October, because I already have a deadline then for another work** that I will have to write during the summer vacation. By the way, I really do not know if one actually can and should understand the concepts of space, time, and causality in today’s physics based on the alternative between dynamism (idealism, relativism) and substance (realism, absolutism). On this matter, I would completely hold my judgment*** in abeyance.

With the assurance of my highest esteem,

Sincerely yours,

Oskar Becker

Herbert Marcuse–Sophie Wertheim’s Letter to Maximilian Beck

107Freiburg i. Br.–Günterstal

Kybfelsenstr. 3

9. 5. 29

Liebe Leute,

wir haben uns nun soweit eingeräumt (ontologisch und ontisch), um eine ersten Bericht erstatten zu können.

Wir wohnen schlechthin idyllisch. Ganz in Grünen, oder vielmehr in allen nur denkbaren Farben des Frühlings, der hier so schön ist wie nirgends. Auf einem Dorfe und doch eine Viertelstunde vor der Stadt. Kucken von allen Fenstern und Balkons aus auf die Berge und Wälder, und haben Sonne von morgens bis abends. Ruhe soviel wir wollen, und nur anständige Erregungen (was sich nicht auf die sexuelle Sphäre bezieht, welche Meinung beim Beck voraussetzen ist). Wie dem auch sei, es ist um herzukommen. Näheres über die wirtschaftlichen Verhältnisse wird mein Weib berichten.

Nun die Philosophie. Hier ist zu betonen, dass die folgenden Andeutungen nur ganz vorläufig sind, in wesentlichen Punkten noch korrigiert werden können, zumindest aber ergänzt. Ich sage das nicht aus Vorsicht, sondern weil die Kollegs und Seminare noch im allerersten Einleitungsstadium sind.

Heidegger: Einen größeren Unterschied kann man sich nicht denken als zwischen dem scheuen und verbissenen Privatdozenten der vor acht Jahren in einem kleinen Hörsaal aus dem Fenster heraus sprach, und dem Nachfolger Husserls, der im überfüllten Auditorium max. vor ca. 600 Hören (meist Hörerinnen) in glänzendem Vortrag mit unerschütterlicher Sicherheit redet, mit jenem angenehmen Zittern in der Stimme, das die Mädchen so kitzelt, in einem Sportanzug, der fast wie eine Chauffeurslivree aussieht, schwarz gebrannt, mit dem Pathos des Lehrers, der sich ganz als Erzieher, als Prophet und Wegweiser fühlt und dem man es auch glaubt. So sind die in „Sein und Zeit“ angelehnten ethischen Tendenzen, die auf ein Praktischwerden des Philosophierens abzielten wirklich zum Durchbruch gekommen, allerdings in einer Weise, die Befremden erregt. Es ist alles etwas zu rhetorisch, zu predigerhaft, zu primitiv. Erinnert etwas an Guardini, dem er auch in der Haltung ähnelt. Im dem großen Kolleg über den deutschen Idealismus und die Problemlage der Gegenwart hat er bis jetzt die großen Tendenzen gegenwärtiger Philosophie als Tendenz zur Anthropologie und zur Metaphysik behandelt. Erstere lehnt er als dem Wesen der Philosophie nicht gerecht werdend ab: philosophische Anthropologie ist wie „runder Kreis“, da Philosophie ihrem Wesen nach in der Idee des Menschen gründet, die Fragen nach dem Menschen in ihr noch in ganz anderer, tieferer weise verwurzelt sind als die Anthropologie es wahr haben will. Dabei fallen anerkennende Worte für Scheler, wird–zum ersten Mal bei Heidegger–Nietzsche positiv gesehen.

Die Tendenz zur Metaphysik wird gerade noch behandelt. Das Seminar über Idealismus und Realismus ist ganz vorzüglich und gleicht die peinlichen Eindrücke der ersten Kollegstunden aus. An den primitivsten Tatsachen der Wahrnehmung u. a. werden die philosophischen Grundprobleme sichtbar gemacht. Rein phänomenologisch im besten Sinne. An der Kreide wird expliziert. Er: wie erkennen wir die Kreide? Wie, womit fassen wir sie auf? – Antwort eines Mädchens: Wir erkennen sie als Gebrauchsding, im alltäglichen Umgang. – Er: Das ist Heidegger, das geht uns hier nichts an.

Die „Einführung in das akademische Studium“ im Ton ganz ethisch, im Rahmen der Universität sehr radikal, so wenn er vom Warenhauscharakter der heutigen Universität spricht, wenn er Jura und Medizin in ihrem heutigen Betrieb aus der Universität verweisen will.

Schüler im eigentlichen Sinne hat er überhaupt nicht. Die Mädchen sind allerdings schlimm. Sie sind schon vielfach aus Marburg mit[2]gekommen, sind ganz auf ihn eingefuchst, wissen um Aristoteles hinlänglich Bescheid, um im gegebenen Augenblick die richtige Vokabel nennen zu können, haben aber sicher noch gar nicht gemerkt, dass sich Heidegger seit seiner ersten Freiburger und seit der Marburger Zeit sehr gewandelt hat. Über diese Wandlung ist noch wenig zu sagen, weil sie noch lange nicht abgeschlossen ist. In ihrem Mittelpunkt steht die neue Kantinterpretation, die ja jetzt bald erscheinen wird. Deutlich Anzeichen in dem Aufsatz „Vom Wesen des Grundes“ und in der Diskussion mit Cassirer (deren vollständige fast stenographische Niederschrift, 45 Schreibmaschineseiten, ich von Seidemann bekomme). Interessantes Material hierzu verspricht auch die zweite verbesserte Auflage von „Sein und Zeit“ zu liefern, die demnächst herauskommt. Man kann die Richtung dieser Wandlung vielleicht vorsichtig als Tendenz zu einer transzendentalen Metaphysik bezeichnen. Plato und Kant, Ontologie und Transzendentalphilosophie werden im Mittelpunkt stehen. Doch warten wir ab. – Gesamteindruck: er ist ein ganzer Kerl, eine quicklebendige Persönlichkeit, ein echter Lehrer, ein wirklicher Philosoph (wenn zur Philosophie auch dies alles gehört), und das ist heute mehr genug.

Was nun seine Stellung zu Ihrem Referat betrifft, so konnte ich darüber von Seidemann nur erfahren, dass er wütend war, weil viele Leser Ihr Referat als Surrogat für sein Buch benutzt haben und „Sein und Zeit“ gar nicht oder nur schlecht gelesen haben. Weil er glaubte, in Ihrer Kritik eine große Anzahl seiner Kollegen zu hören, die sich nur nicht herausstellen wollten (auch auf Pfänder darf man vielleicht tippen), also waren für seine Angriffe, wenn man so sagen darf, weniger immanent-sachliche Gründe in Ihrem Referat maßgebend als die eben angeführten. Dies, wie gesagt, Seidemanns Bericht, nichts authentisches.

Die Philosophische Hefte sieht man hier nirgends, obwohl sicher am Anfang des Semesters hier viel zu machen gewesen wäre, das philosophische Interesse ist auch in der Breite sehr groß. Also mit dem Brentanoheft wieder Spezialpropaganda an die Universitätsbuchhandlungen, Gratishefte für Husserl und das Seminar.

Bei Husserl hören wir das Seminar über Einfühlung. Leider ist hier ein völliger Niedergang eklatant. Er klammert ununterbrochen ein, kennt nur noch die transzendentale Phänomenologie, das reine Ich als „Urmonade“ und macht sich nun natürlich große Sorge, wie er von dieser Urmonade zu den anderen Ichen kommt!

Nun können Sie auch einmal etwas sagen. Ich setzte meine Berichte nur fort, wenn Sie mit ebenso langen aufwarten. Also immer lustig.

Mit herzlichen Grüßen,

Ihr,

Herbert Marcuse

***

108Liebe Becks!

Staunt und kapiert: Sophie tippt! Wir haben gestern auf Stottern eine Remington Portable erstanden und ich habe nun ein kindisches Vergnügen am Probieren: es geht schon beinahe so fix wie beim Schreiben!

Beim Vorstellen bei Husserl zum Seminar glaubte er mich von früher wiederzuerkennen; dann fragte er nach der Vorbildung und als Hauptsache nach der Erkenntnis der „Ideen“. Ich sagte, dass ich sie vor 8 Jahren gelesen hätte. Er: Na, dann will ich Sie zu den alten Philosophen rechnen! Niedlich, nicht? Es ist ein guter weißhaariger Großpapa, der–ceterum censeo–immer wieder auf Descartes’ Zweifelversuch zurückkommt und seine umändernde Stellung.

Wir haben uns schon ganz gut eingelebt; ich denke manchmal an Dich, ohne Zentralheizung und Warmwasser. Der Isegrim fühlt sich sauwohl, er hat schon eins der blauen Schühchen etwas kaputt gestrampelt! Jetzt am Anfang hatten wir viele größere Ausgaben–in der Küche z.B. war kaum ein Teller und Gerät–, aber im ganzen richtet man sich in der ganzen Lebenshaltung hier viel billiger ein als in Berlin. Ich hoffe, Dir nächstens mal ausführlicher zu schreiben, aber sicher handgeschrieben!!! Wie geht’s Putz? Was gibt’s in Berlin? Schreibt von allem!

Herzlichst,

Sophie

* * *

109Freiburg i. Br.–Günterstal

Kybfelsenstrasse 3

May 9, 1929

Dear folks,

We have finally settled down (ontologically and ontically) and are able to write our first report.

We live idyllically, surrounded by green, or rather by all the imaginable colors of spring, which is more beautiful here than anywhere else. In a village, and yet only fifteen minutes from the city. From all our windows and balconies we can see mountains and forests, and have sunlight from morning to evening. Rest as much as we want and also some fair excitement (which does not refer to the sexual sphere, contrary to what Beck would assume). Anyway, this is the place to be! My wife will tell you in more detail about the financial situation.

Now let’s get to philosophy. Let me remark that the following observations are only provisional and the essential points could still be corrected, or at least supplemented. I am not affirming this out of caution, but because the lectures and the seminars are still at a very introductory level.

  • 75 The reference is here to Martin Heidegger (1997b), Der deutsche Idealismus (Fichte, Schelling, Hege (...)

Heidegger: You cannot imagine a bigger difference than between the shy and grimly determined lecturer who, eight years ago, would speak in a small lecture room while looking out the window and Husserl’s successor, who, in an overcrowded auditorium filled with around 600 listeners (mostly female), lectures in a brilliant way, with unshakable security and with that pleasant tremor in the voice that tickles the girls, in a sports suit that looks almost like a chauffeur’s livery, suntanned, and with the pathos of the teacher who feels he is an educator, a prophet, and a guide—which others too believe. The ethical tendencies present in Being and Time—which aimed at making philosophy practical—really achieved a breakthrough, but in such a way that they arouse disconcerting astonishment. It is all a little too rhetorical, too preachy, too primitive. He somehow reminds us of Guardini, whom he also resembles in posture. In the big lectures on German idealism and the present situation of philosophical problems, he has so far treated the great tendencies of contemporary philosophy as tendencies toward anthropology and metaphysics.75 He rejects the former because it does not conform to the essence of philosophy: philosophical anthropology is a like a “round circle,” since philosophy is essentially grounded on the idea of the human being, yet its questions about the human being are rooted in this idea in a way completely different from and deeper than anthropology would concede. He expressed appreciation for Scheler, and regarded Nietzsche positively—the first time he had done so.

The discussion of the tendency toward metaphysics has just started. The seminar on idealism and realism is excellent and compensates for the awkward impressions of the first lecture. The philosophically fundamental problems are made visible against the backdrop of the most basic facts of perception and the like. Pure phenomenology in the best sense. This was explicated by considering a piece of chalk.

He: How do we recognize the chalk? How do we grasp it?

Answer of a girl: We recognize it as an object of use in our everyday life.

He: This is Heidegger, and does not work here!

The “Introduction to University Studies” has an entirely ethical tone and is quite radical in this context, as when Heidegger speaks of the department store–character of today’s university and claims that in their current form, law and medicine should be banned from the university.

  • 76 Martin Heidegger (1976), “Vom Wesen des Grundes” [1929], in Wegmarken, GA 9, Frankfurt am Main, Vit (...)
  • 77 On Kant and the Heidegger-Cassirer discussion, see Martin Heidegger (2010), Kant und das Problem de (...)

He has no disciples in the strict sense of the term. The girls are indeed bad. Many of them have followed him from Marburg [2] and are quite familiar with him; they know enough about Aristotle to be able to use the right word at the right moment, but they have not yet realized that Heidegger has changed a lot since his first stay in Freiburg and then Marburg. Little can be said about this change, because it is not yet completed. At its center is the new Kant-interpretation, which will soon appear. Some clear signs of it are in the essay “On the Essence of Reasons”76 and in the discussion with Cassirer (whose stenographic transcription of about 45 typewritten pages, which I got from Seidemann, is almost finished).77 The second, improved edition of Being and Time, which will be published soon, is expected to provide interesting material on this. One could perhaps cautiously designate the direction of this turn as a tendency toward transcendental metaphysics. The focus will be on Plato and Kant, ontology, and transcendental philosophy. But let’s wait for it.

General impression: he is quite a guy, a lively personality, a genuine teacher, a real philosopher (if all of this belongs to philosophy), and nowadays this is more than enough.

Now as to his position vis-à-vis your Report, all I could learn from Seidemann is that he was angry because many readers of your Report have used it as a substitute for his book and have not even read Being and Time, or they have read it only badly. He believed he could hear in your critique a great deal of those colleagues who did not speak up (perhaps one can also think of Pfänder). Accordingly, the reasons determining his attacks, if we could put it this way, were less the immanent-material ones contained in your Report than those just mentioned. As said, this is what Seidemann relates, not a firsthand account.

  • 78 The reference is to the fourth issue of the Philosophische Hefte (1929), dedicated to Franz Brentan (...)

The Philosophische Hefte are nowhere to be found here, although a lot could have been done there at the beginning of the semester because there is also a lot of interest in philosophy around here. With the Brentano Heft78 some propaganda should be systematically made in the university bookstores, and free copies should be sent to Husserl and to the department.

We attended Husserl’s seminars on empathy. Unfortunately, what is striking here is a complete decline. He brackets all the time, knows only transcendental phenomenology, the pure ego as a “primal monad,” and is of course pretty much concerned about how to get from this primal monad to the other egos!

Now it is your turn to say something. I will not continue my report unless you too write something equally long. And funny as well.

Best regards,

Yours,

Herbert Marcuse

***

110Dear Becks,

You will not believe it: Sophie is now typing! Yesterday we bought a portable Remington on the installment plan, and now I have the childish desire to try it out: typing goes almost as quickly as handwriting!

When I introduced myself in Husserl’s seminar, he thought he recognized me from before; then he inquired about my previous education, and most importantly, about my knowledge of Ideas I. I said I read it eight years ago. He: Well, then I will number you among the old philosophers! Cute, isn’t it? He is a nice white-haired grandpa who—ceterum censeo—keeps coming back to Descartes’ attempt to doubt and his transformative stance.

We have settled in quite well; sometimes I think of you without central heating and hot water. Isegrim feels really good; he has already begun to wear out one of the little blue shoes! At first we had lots of expenses; for example, in the kitchen there were nearly no plates and utensils. However, in general life is much cheaper here than in Berlin. I hope to write to you in more detail soon, but certainly handwritten! How is it with Putz? What’s going on in Berlin? Write about everything!

Most sincerely,

Sophie

***

Johannes Daubert’s Letter to Maximilian Beck

Fürstenfeldbruck

31.12.29

Sehr geehrter Herr Dr.!

Ihr Brief hat mich sehr gefreut. Vielen Dank dafür. Sie haben recht, es gehen mit dem Bauerntum Kulturwerte zu Grunde, die uns Wurzel geben. Die Ursachen des unaufhaltsamen Verfalls sind nur zu einem Teil wirtschaftliche (Verschuldung u[nd] Mangel an Arbeitskräften), sie liegen zum anderen Teil in der psychischen Infektion u[nd] in der magnetischen Anziehungskraft der Großstädte u[nd] weiterhin in dem tiefgründenden Haß des sozialistischen u[nd] demokratischen Zeitgeistes (schon bei Brentano spürbar) gegen das freie, bodenständige Bauerntum, das unverdauliche Element im sozialistische-kapitalistischen Weltbilde. Zwangsläufig wird zunächst eine Art Industrialisierung innerhalb der Landwirtschaft versucht werden. Aber ich glaube, daß dieser Entwicklung, so sehr sie auch von sozialistischen Theoretikern propagiert wird, in Deutschland durch Klima u[nd] Bodenverhältnisse sehr enge Grenzen gesetzt sind. Der Abstand zu den günstigeren Produktionsbedingungen (Natur—Arbeiterfrage—Kapital) der modernen Großagrargebiete wird in der neuen Wirtschaftsweise immer fühlbarer werden. Eine [2] industrialisierte Landwirtschaft in Deutschland ist von vorn herein verloren, weil sie nackt der {bisher gestellten} großen internationalen Konkurrenz mit ihren Konjunkturschwankungen u[nd] ihren Börsenmanövern ausgeliefert ist. Die Verteilung der Produktion u[nd] des Absatzes auf zahlreiche kleine, zähe, autonome Bauernhöfe stand dem bisher im Wege. Die Folgen der Verdrängung unserer Landwirtschaft werden seelisch, kulturell u[nd] politisch gleich groß u[nd] wohl auch gleich schlimm sein.

Was mich betrifft, so habe ich meinen Hof aufgegeben—nicht gern—um meine wirtschaftliche Selbständigkeit zu wahren. Die Auseinandersetzungen mit meinem Nachfolger sind abgeschlossen u[nd] ich habe mit Kuchenried nichts mehr zu tun. Übrigens hat er, ein Diplomlandwirt u[nd] Tierzuchtinspektor (diese unglücklichen Schulen u[nd] Examina überall!), der die Sache modern u[nd] fortschrittlich anpacken wollte, schon umgeschmissen. Zur Ruhe setzen kann ich mich noch nicht, halte also nach einer anderen praktischen Tätigkeit Umschau. Die Zeit in Bruck was mir aber eine recht willkommene Pause.

Natürlich bin ich wieder in meine alte Gewohnheit des Philosophierens zurückgefallen. Aber die fast 15jährige Unterbrechung ist nicht ungeschehen zu machen. Wenn auch in mancher Hinsicht der Blick für Wichtiges u[nd] Verschrobenes [3] sicherer geworden sein mag, das Gedächtnis u[nd] die exakte Gedankenarbeit sind schwerfällig geworden.

Wenn es mit leichter fiele, hätte ich mich längst mit Beiträgen für Ihre Zeitschrift angemeldet. Die Hefte interessieren mich immer sehr u[nd] ich spreche oft mit Pfänder darüber. Ich verstehe die Schwierigkeiten, von denen Sie sprechen, durchaus. Man kann phaenomenolog[ische] Analysen nicht von einer Ecke aus mit unbestimmten Ziele[n] treiben. Aber mit dem Blick auf große Probleme die entscheidenden Tatsachen dem phaenomenolog[ischen] Verständnis frei zu legen, erfordert viel konzentrierte Arbeit u[nd] Geduld. Da werden Sie die Forderungen der regelmäßigen Zeitschriftversorgung freilich oft als verzettelnde Störungen empfinden und wirklich gegenüber Ihren eigenen Beiträgen den Wunsch haben, die gedankliche Systematik Ihrer Problemstellungen eingehender durch phaenomenolog[ische] Grundlegung zu rechtfertigen. Ich habe den Eindruck, daß es bei entsprechender Konzentration heute möglich wäre, aus der Gedankenkonstellation Husserl-Heidegger heraus ein paar entscheidende Schritte in der Erkenntnistheorie weiter zu machen u[nd] den eigentlichen Sinn der Phaenomenologie zu fixieren. Die verfehlte Fassung gewisser Grundbegriffe bei Husserl (z.B. „intentional“, „erfüllender [4] Akt“ u.a.) tritt in den unmöglichen konstruktiv-idealistischen Konsequenzen seiner letzten Schrift über form[ale] u[nd] transzend[entale] Logik klar zu Tage. (Die vorzügl[iche] Kritik von Celms ist also voll berechtigt).

Ich hoffe, daß die „philop[hischen] Hefte“ in der kommenden Entwicklung dieser Probleme eine bedeutsame Rolle spielen werden und daß sich damit von selbst ergibt, was ich Ihnen für das neue Jahr wünsche: eine Erleichterung in der schriftstellerischen u[nd] verlegerischen Bedrängnis, die Ihnen der erste Jahrgang Ihrer Zeitschrift gebracht hat.

Ein glückliches neues Jahr Ihnen und Ihrer Familie! Diesem Wunsche bittet auch meine Frau sich anschließen zu dürfen.

Mit herzlichen Grüße,

Ihr ergebener,

Joh[annes] Daubert

* * *

111Fürstenfeldbruck

December 31, 1929

Dear Dr. [Beck],

I was delighted to receive your letter. Thank you very much. You are right: with the collapse of the peasantry, the cultural values that give us roots are perishing as well. The causes of such an inexorable decline are only in part economic (indebtedness and shortage of labor), for they lie on the other hand in the psychological distress and the magnetic attraction of the big cities, and furthermore in the profound hatred of the socialist and democratic Zeitgeist (already noticeable in Brentano) for the free, down-to-earth peasantry, the indigestible element in the socialist-capitalist worldview. Inevitably, at the very beginning a kind of industrialization within agriculture will be attempted. But I do believe that this development, no matter how much it is endorsed by socialist intellectuals, will be very limited in Germany due to climate and soil conditions. The gap with respect to the more favorable conditions of production (nature—labor problems—capital) that characterizes the large modern agricultural areas will become more and more palpable in the new economic system. An [2] industrialized agriculture in Germany is doomed from the outset, since it is exposed without any protection to the huge international competition already present along with its economic fluctuations and stock market maneuvers. The distribution of production and revenues to numerous small, resilient, autonomous farms has hindered this up until now. The consequences of the displacement of our agriculture will be psychologically and culturally as well as politically great, and probably equally bad.

As far as I am concerned, it was not a pleasure to give up my farm in order to keep my economic independence. The dispute with my successor is over and I have nothing more to do with Kuchenried. By the way, hea qualified farmer and animal-breeding inspector (these damn schools and exams everywhere!) who wanted to approach the matter in a modern and progressive wayhas already thrown it overboard. Since I cannot retire yet, I am looking for some other practical activity. But the time in Bruck was a very welcome break for me.

Of course, I have fallen back into my old habit of philosophizing. But the almost 15-year break cannot be undone. Even if in some respects the eye for important and unusual things [3] may have become sharper, the memory and the capacity to think exactly have become sluggish.

  • 79 Theodor Celms (1992), “Der phänomenologische Idealismus Husserls” [1928], in his Der phänomenologis (...)

Had it been easier for me, I would have sent some contributions to your journal a while ago. I am always very interested in the Hefte and I often talk with Pfänder about them. I fully understand the difficulties you are talking about. One cannot go off into a corner and carry out phenomenological analyses with undetermined goals and aims. But lots of patience and focused work are required in order to submit the essential issues to phenomenological understanding with a view to the big problems. Of course, you will certainly often feel the obligations related to the regular search for material for the journal as time-wasting disruptions at the expense of your own contributions—what you really want to do is to justify in detail the conceptual system of your problems by means of a phenomenological foundation. I am under the impression that nowadays, with the appropriate concentration, it should be possible to take a few decisive steps in the theory of knowledge, moving away from the Husserl-Heidegger conceptual constellation, and fix the authentic sense of phenomenology. Husserl’s erroneous conception of certain fundamental concepts (e.g., “intentional,” “fulfilling [4] act,” and the like) is clearly apparent in the untenable, constructive-idealistic consequences of his most recent work on formal and transcendental logic. (Thus the excellent critique by Celms is fully justified.79)

I hope that the Philosophische Hefte will play a significant role in the further development of such problems; it then goes without saying that what I wish for you in the new year is a relief from the literary and publishing distress that the first year of your journal has brought you.

Happy New Year to you and your family! My wife joins me in this wish.

With best regards,

Sincerely,

Johannes Daubert

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Bibliographie

References

Barth, Heinrich (2016), “Kant und die moderne Metaphysik,” Zwischen den Zeiten, 6, 1928, p. 406-428, now in Metaphysik und Metaphysikkritik. Bulletin der Heinrich Barth–Gesellschaft, 20, p. 54-72.

Beck, Maximilian (1916), Inwiefern können in einem Urteil andere Urteile impliziert sein?. Borna-Leipzig, Druck von Robert Noske.

Beck, Maximilian (1928a), Programm der Philosophischen Hefte, Philosophische Hefte, 1, p. 1-2.

Beck, Maximilian (1928b), Brief an Martin Heidegger (July 1) (see Appendix).

Beck, Maximilian (1928c), Brief an Oskar Becker (July 1) (see Appendix).

Beck, Maximilian (1928d), “Die neue Problemlage der Erkenntnistheorie,” Deutsche Vierteljahrsschrift für Literaturwissenschaft und Geistesgeschichte, 6, p. 611-639.

Beck, Maximilian (1928e), “Martin Heidegger, Sein und Zeit. Referat und Kritik,” Philosophische Hefte, 1, p. 5-44.

Beck, Maximilian (1929), “Der phänomenologische Idealismus, die phänomenologische Methode und Hermeneutik,” Philosophische Hefte, 2, p. 97-101.

Beck, Maximilian (1930), “Hermeneutik und philosophia perennis,” Philosophische Hefte, 1, p. 13-46.

Beck, Maximilian (1933–34), “Kritik der Schelling-Jaspers-Heidegger’schen Ontologie,” Philosophische Hefte, 3/4, p. 97-164.

Beck, Maximilian (1936), Brief an Herbert Marcuse (December 29) (Unpublished).

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Beck, Maximilian (1946), “Existentialism, Rationalism and Christian Faith,” The Journal of Religion, 26, p. 283-295.

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Notes

1 Maximilian Beck (1928e), “Martin Heidegger, Sein und Zeit. Referat und Kritik,” Philosophische Hefte, 1, p. 5-44.

2 Maximilian Beck (1916), Inwiefern können in einem Urteil andere Urteile impliziert sein?, Borna-Leipzig, Druck von Robert Noske.

3 See Maximilian Beck (1936), Brief an Herbert Marcuse (December 29), p. 2, where a lecture is mentioned that Beck delivered to the Cercle Philosophique, which he discussed with Emile Utitz (title of the paper: “Der Unterschied von Sein und Schein—kein Unterschied der Erkenntnis sondern des Seins”).

4 For a first introduction, see Daniele De Santis (2020), “A Wrong Conception of Reason and the Solid Rock: The Debate that Never Was between Maximilian Beck and Dorion Cairns,” Discipline filosofiche, 1, p. 111-133. See also Beck’s own autobiographical presentation in Maximilian Beck (1946), “Existentialism, Rationalism and Christian Faith,” The Journal of Religion, 26, p. 283-295, especially p. 283, note.

5 Maximilian Beck (1928a), Programm der Philosophischen Hefte, Philosophische Hefte, 1, p. 1-2.

6 Maximilian Beck (1928a), Philosophische Hefte, 1, p. 2.

7 Here is the full text of Heidegger’s answer: “Ich danke Ihnen für Ihre freundliche Aufforderung zur Mitarbeit an Ihrer Zeitschrift, deren Tendenz mir sehr sympathisch ist. Wenn es ihr gelänge, wieder eine wirkliche philosophische Auseinandersetzung statt steriler Polemik oder gegenseitiger Belobigungen ins Leben zu rufen, wäre das ein besonderes Verdienst. Leider muß ich vorläufig auf eine Mitarbeit verzichten, da ich durch meine Berufung nach Freiburg vor ganz neue Aufgaben gestellt bin u[nd] überdies den II Teil meiner Arbeit in diesen Monaten abschließe. Sobald ich etwas für die Zeitschrift Geeignetes zur Verfügung habe, werde ich mir erlauben, ein Manuskript einzusenden. Ich möchte aber ausdrücklich bitten, mich nicht unter den Mitarbeitern aufzuführen, bevor ich nicht wirklich etwas veröffentlicht habe”—Martin Heidegger (1928a), Brief an Maximilian Beck (April 12), p. 1.

8 Maximilian Beck (1928b), Brief an Martin Heidegger (July 1), p. 1.

9 Maximilian Beck (1928c), Brief an Oskar Becker (July 1), p. 1.

10 This is what we have inferred based upon Hermann Lübbe (1957), “Bibliographie der Heidegger-Literatur 1917–1955,” Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung, 11, p. 401-452, here p. 403.

11 Here is the full German text of Heidegger’s reply: “Für die Zusendung der beiden Hefte Ihrer Zeitschrift danke ich Ihnen bestens. Mit gleicher Post sende ich Ihnen eine kleine Gegengabe. Ihre Kritik ist die erste ausführliche. Leider muß ich aus äußerer u[nd] innerer Gründe von einer Auseinandersetzung vorläufig absehen. Das ist kein Unglück, da ja die von Ihnen angekündigte Auseinandersetzung mit Bergson, Dilthey, Husserl sehr viel wesentlicher ist. Diese Aufgabe wird sehr fruchtbringend sein, besonders dann, wenn sie den Ansatz nicht bei dem nimmt, was ich selbst aus diesen Autoren übernommen habe, sondern bei anderen wesentlichen Seiten, die genau so wie das von mir Übernommene seit drei Jahrzehnten u[nd] mehr für jedermann bereitliegt. Ich glaube, Sie geben meinem Buch eine viel zu große Wichtigkeit mit Bezug auf die Auseinandersetzung mit dem Zeitgeist. Denn es will ja gerade, wie die erste Seite deutlich genug zeigt, nur helfen, dazu zu erziehen, die alten wenigen Fragen zu wiederholen u[nd] die große Philosophie wieder ursprünglich anzueignen, statt sich in der Diskussion von Zeiterscheinungen, die immer nur für die Neugierigen, die sog. Anhänger u[nd] sog. Gegner wichtig werden kann, zu verstricken”—Martin Heidegger (1928b), Brief an Maximilian Beck (July 4), p. 1.

12 Oskar Becker (1928b), Brief an Maximilian Beck (July 9), p. 1.

13 Oskar Becker (1928b), Brief an Maximilian Beck (July 9), p. 2.

14 Oskar Becker (1928b), Brief an Maximilian Beck (July 9), p. 2.

15 Maximilian Beck (1928c), Brief an Oskar Becker (July 1), p. 1.

16 Oskar Becker (1928a), Brief an Maximilian Beck (April 18) p. 3 and p. 4.

17 Maximilian Beck (1928d), “Die neue Problemlage der Erkenntnistheorie, Deutsche Vierteljahrsschrift für Literaturwissenschaft und Geistesgeschichte, 6, p. 611-639.

18 Martin Heidegger (1928c), Brief an Maximilian Beck (October 29), p. 1.

19 Heidegger, Martin, Jaspers, Karl (1992), Briefwechsel 1920–1963, München, Frankfurt am Main, Piper, Vittorio Klostermann. p. 103-104.

20 For a quick reference to Beck within the context of the Marxism-phenomenology confrontation, see Nicolas Tertulian (2006), “Aliènation et desaliènation: Une confrontation Lukács-Heidegger,” Actuel Marx, 39, p. 25-53, here p. 44-45.

21 Here is the German text of Heidegger’s reply: “Ich bestätige den Empfang Ihres Aufsatzes ‘Die neue Problemlage der Erkenntnistheorie.’ Was schon Ihr ‘Referat’ vermuten ließ, ist jetzt zur völligen Gewißheit geworden: Sie haben von der Problematik, den Grundthesen u[nd] gar von Ansatz und Aufbau des bisher in ‘Sein u[nd] Zeit’ Veröffentlichten auch nicht die Spur begriffen. Freilich darf von einem Beurteiler, der mit Kant so schnell fertig ist und Fichtes und Schellings Metaphysik in die Nähe von ‘Taschenspielerkunststücken’ zu bringen wagt, ein heutiger Knirps in der Tat, kein Verständnis erwarten. Und gar über den Ton und die selbstsame Darstellungsart, die Sie anzuwenden belieben, etwas zu sagen, werden Sie mir ersparen”—Martin Heidegger (1928c), Brief an Maximilian Beck (October 29), p. 1.

22 Beck’s harsh tone against Being and Time is what on the contrary the philosopher Peter Wust praised in his review of the first Heft, the publication of which he warmly and openly welcomed. See Peter Wust (2013), “Rezension der Philosophische Hefte, Kölnische Volkszeitung, August 18, 1928, now in Philosophenbriefe von und an Peter Wust, Berlin, LIT Verlag, p. 227-229.

23 Martin Heidegger (1928d), Brief an Maximilian Beck (November 3), p. 1.

24 Here is the full German text of Heidegger’s reply: “Die Argumentation auf Ihrer Postkarte hat mich nicht überzeugt. Bezüglich Fichte und Schelling sprechen Sie nicht – wenn Sie sich bitte überzeugen wollen – von sprachlichen‚ Formeln’ sondern von der‚ Primitivität der metaphysischen Ansätze’. Mein erster Brief sagt nichts anderes als der zweite. Die ‚inneren’ Gründe meiner Ablehnung der Diskussion sind dort Ihre inhaltlichen groben Mißverständnisse; die ‚äußeren’ Ihr Ton u[nd] die Darstellung. Darnach können Sie sich den weiteren Text des Briefes auslegen. Ein prinzipielles Geltenlassen Ihrer Polemik ist nirgends ausgesprochen. Daß Sie mir auch so etwas nur zumuten, zeigt, wie unmöglich es Ihnen schon geworden ist, auch nur für Augenblicke Ihr eigenes Gebahren in Ihrer Zeitschrift zu prüfen. Wenn Sie es verantworten können, weiterhin Ihren Lesern so unentwegt dieselben haltlosen Dinge über Sein u[nd] Zeit zu unterbreiten, dann tun Sie das. Dies mein letztes Wort in dieser Sache”—Martin Heidegger (1928d), Brief an Maximilian Beck (November 3), p. 1.

25 Maximilian Beck (1929), “Der phänomenologische Idealismus, die phänomenologische Methode und Hermeneutik,” Philosophische Hefte, 2, p. 97-101; Maximilian Beck (1930), “Hermeneutik und philosophia perennis,” Philosophische Hefte, 1, p. 13-46; Maximilian Beck (1933–34), “Kritik der Schelling-Jaspers-Heidegger’schen Ontologie,” Philosophische Hefte, 3/4, p. 97-164.

26 See Hedwig Conrad-Martius (1963), “Bemerkungen über Metaphysik und ihre methodische Stellung,” in Schriften zur Philosophie. Erster Band, München, Kösel Verlag, p. 49-88, here p. 83, note. This essay was originally published by Conrad-Martius in one of Beck’s Philosophische Hefte.

27 The goal of our study is not to evaluate Beck’s Report. For a different approach, see Claudius Strube (1983), “Kritik und Rezeption von ‘Sein und Zeit’ in den ersten Jahren nach seinem Erscheinen,” Perspektiven der Philosophie. Neues Jahrbuch, 9, p. 41-67, especially p. 48-51. See also François Jaran (2010), La métaphysique du Dasein: Heidegger et la possibilité de la métaphysique (1927–1930), Bucarest, Zeta Books, p. 35-36, which touches upon Beck’s review.

28 Alexander Pfänder (1928), Brief an Maximilian Beck (July 28), p. 1.

29 Johannes Daubert (1929), Brief an Maximilian Beck (December 31) p. 3. On Heidegger and Daubert—notably, on the criticism of the former on the part of the latter—see the work by Karl Schuhmann (2005), “Daubert und Heidegger,” in Selected Papers on Phenomenology, Dordrecht, Springer, p. 185-199 (in which Beck is also mentioned).

30 Even though a French translation of this letter has already been published (in our humble opinion, with some translation inaccuracies, e.g., the translator takes the name of “Pfänder” to be the plural form of Pfand, thereby completely missing the reference to Beck’s former teacher), its meaning cannot be fully appreciated without knowing the Beck-Heidegger relation as we have been trying to reconstruct it here. See Michel Haar (Ed.) (1983), Martin Heidegger, Cahier de L’Herne, Paris, Éditions de l’Herne, p. 163-165. In what follows we will be quoting from the German version, which the reader can find in the Appendix to this paper.

31 Herbert Marcuse, Sophie Wertheim (1929), Brief an Maximilian Beck (May 9), p. 1.

32 Herbert Marcuse, Sophie Wertheim (1929), Brief an Maximilian Beck (May 9), p. 2.

33 Edith Stein (2009), “Martin Heideggers Existenzphilosophie,” in her Endliches und ewiges Sein. Versuch eines Aufstieges zum Sinn des Seins, Freiburg, Basel, Wien, Herder Verlag, p. 445-499. The references are on p. 445, p. 462 and p. 483.

34 Edith Stein (2009), “Martin Heideggers Existenzphilosophie,” p. 445, note.

35 Edith Stein (2009), “Martin Heideggers Existenzphilosophie,” p. 483.

36 Edith Stein (2009), “Martin Heideggers Existenzphilosophie,” p. 462.

37 Edith Stein (2009), “Martin Heideggers Existenzphilosophie,” p. 483. See Martin Heidegger (1967), Sein und Zeit, GA 2, Tübingen, Max Niemeyer, p. 45, where the opposition between “existentials” and “categories” suggests that traditional ontology rests on the understanding of being as Vorhandenheit.

38 Georg Misch (1967), Lebensphilosophie und Phänomenologie. Eine Auseinandersetzung der Diltheyschen Richtung mit Heidegger und Husserl [1929], Darmstadt, Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, p. 2.

39 A quick discussion of Misch’s reading of Being and Time is offered by Theodore Kisiel (1997), The Genesis of Being and Time, Berkeley, University of California Press, p. 454ff.

40 Georg Misch (1967), Lebensphilosophie und Phänomenologie, p. 1-2.

41 Georg Misch (1916–17), “Der internationale Zusammenhang in den philosophischen Bewegungen des 19. Jahrhunderts,” Logos: Zeitschrift für systematische Philosophie, 2, p. 161-172, here p. 168.

42 Georg Misch (1916–17), “Der internationale Zusammenhang,” p. 168-169.

43 See Misch’s explanation in the introduction—Georg Misch (1967), Lebensphilosophie und Phänomenologie, p. 5-11.

44 Georg Misch (1967), Lebensphilosophie und Phänomenologie, p. 22. The reference is made by Misch himself to §10 of Martin Heidegger (1967), Sein und Zeit, p. 46.

45 However, it would be a mistake to believe that for Misch there is no difference between Dilthey and Heidegger: if the attempt at a reconciliation of life and being represents an advancement with respect to Dilthey (who aimed only at a “conversion” of “the concept of being into the idea of life”), the superiority of the latter over Heidegger is affirmed in relation to specific topics such as the determination of the concept of truth. On Heidegger and Dilthey, see Robert C. Scharff (2019), Heidegger Becoming Phenomenological: Interpreting Husserl through Dilthey, 1916–1925, New York, London, Rowman & Littlefield, especially Part I.

46 Martin Heidegger, Karl Jaspers (1992), Briefwechsel, p. 103-104.

47 Heinrich Barth (1928), “Kant und die moderne Metaphysik,” Zwischen den Zeiten, 6, p. 406-428, now in Metaphysik und Metaphysikkritik. Bulletin der Heinrich Barth-Gesellschaft, 20, 2016, p. 54-72. On Heidegger, see p. 57-59.

48 Snz [Hans C. Syz?] (1928), “Martin Heidegger, Sein und Zeit,” Annalen der Philosophie und philosophischen Kritik, 7, p. 162.

49 Hinrich Knittermeyer (1928), “Besprechung von M. Heidegger, Sein und Zeit; E. Grisebach, Gegenwart. Eine kritische Ethik,” Theologische Literaturzeitung, 53, p. 481-493. On Heidegger, see p. 481-491 (Kierkegaard is on p. 486).

50 The only other case that comes to mind is the very short entry on “Martin Heidegger” by Rudolf Bultmann, in Rudolf Bultmann, Martin Heidegger (2009), Briefwechsel 1925–1975, Frankfurt am Main, Vittorio Klostermann, p. 272. Bultmann speaks of a universal ontology that takes into account the “region of history,” and whose starting point is the “subject” understood as “the human Dasein.” Among others, Dilthey, Kierkegaard, and Husserl are here identified as those who exerted an influence on Heidegger. However, as is evident from a letter of 1927 (see p. 47-48), however, it was Heidegger himself who dictated to his friend—almost word for word—what to write in the entry.

51 If we are on the right track, it seems that Beck’s criticism of Heidegger and correlativism is prior to the one made by Nicolai Hartmann (1948), Zur Grundlegung der Ontologie [1935], Meisenheim am Glan, Weltkulturverlag—see p. 15, where Hartmann speaks of the “correlativistic argument” [das korrelativistische Argument]. The hypothesis should also be verified in connection with Nicolai Hartmann (1925), Grundzüge einer Metaphysik der Erkenntnis [1921], 2nd ed., Berlin, De Gruyter, keeping in mind that Beck and Hartmann were in contact (and a few letters between the two are still preserved at the archives). On Hartmann and correlativism, see Edoardo Nasser (2018), “Sobre o caráter ontológico da ciência: Possíveis contribuições de Nicolai Hartmann para um problema do realismo especulativo,” Cadernos de filosofia alemã, 23, p. 67-79.

52 Martin Heidegger (1967), Sein und Zeit, p. 6-7 [our translation].

53 Martin Heidegger (1997a), Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie, GA 24, Frankfurt am Main, Vittorio Klostermann, p. 23. As Beck points out: “Daher die entscheidende terminologische Festsetzung: Mensch = ‘Dasein’ und nicht: Daseiendes, oder Etwas, das Dasein hat!” (RBT, p. 23, note).

54 See, for example, Maximilian Beck (1938), Psychologie. Wesen und Wirklichkeit der Seele, Leiden, A. W. Sijthoff’s Uitgeversmaatschappij N. V., p. 41-42.

55 In Beck’s words: “Erkenntnis, die ja selbst nur ein spezifisches Sein ist, oder gar das Sein des Menschen.”

56 Rudolf Bultmann & Martin Heidegger (2009), Briefwechsel, p. 48.

57 Martin Heidegger (1978), Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Logik am Ausgang von Leibniz, GA 26, Frankfurt am Main, Vittorio Klostermann, p. 178.

58 It might be the case that Heidegger’s indirect yet very subtle reference to Max Beck is also implied by the mention of “the little Moritz,” who is one of the two characters of the popular story in verse, Max und Moritz. Eine Bubengeschichte in sieben Streichen, created by Wilhelm Busch about the pranks played by Moritz and his friend Max.

59 Martin Heidegger (1978), Metaphysische Anfangsgründe, p. 213-214.

60 Martin Heidegger (1978), Metaphysische Anfangsgründe, p. 180.

61 Martin Heidegger (1978), Metaphysische Anfangsgründe, p. 170.

62 Martin Heidegger (1978), Metaphysische Anfangsgründe, p. 161.

63 Martin Heidegger (1978), Metaphysische Anfangsgründe, p. 163.

64 Martin Heidegger (1996), Einleitung in die Philosophie, GA 27, Frankfurt am Main, Vittorio Klostermann, p. 63.

65 Martin Heidegger (1996), Einleitung in die Philosophie, p. 63.

66 Martin Heidegger (1967), Sein und Zeit, p. 230 [our translation].

67 Martin Heidegger (1978), Metaphysische Anfangsgründe, p. 194-195.

68 Maximlian Beck (1938), Psychologie, p. 26.

69 Maximlian Beck (1938), Psychologie, p. 58.

70 Martin Heidegger (1996), Einleitung in die Philosophie, p. 71.

71 Martin Heidegger (1996), Einleitung in die Philosophie, p. 74-75.

72 The idea of a “schism” comes from Herbert Spiegelberg (1982), “Epoché und Reduktion bei Pfänder und Husserl,” in Herbert Spiegelberg, Eberhard Avè-Lallement (Eds.), Pfänder-Studien, Den Haag, Martinus Nijhoff, p. 3-34.

73 For a critical reading of such an alleged second “schism,” see George Heffernan (2016), “A Tale of Two Schisms: Heidegger’s Critique of Husserl’s Move into Transcendental Idealism,” The European Legacy, 21, p. 556-575.

* Am Rand [Vgl. auch S. 220–234]

* * Am Rand Vielleicht ist aber eine Beteiligung an der Diskussion in einem späteren Heft möglich. Ich würde mich darüber sehr freuen.

* ** Gestrichen das Nähere

* [In the margin:] See also pp. 220–234.

74 The reference here is to Oskar Becker (1927), Mathematische Existenz. Untersuchung zur Logik und Ontologie mathematischer Phänomene (reprinted from Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung, 8, Halle, Max Niemeyer, 1927, 441–809), pp. 761–768 (“Welches ist der Seinssinn des Mathematischen, der hier sichtbar ist?”); pp. 660–674 (“Die historische und die naturhafte Zeit”; “Mathematik und Zeitlichkeit”) [DDS].

* * [In the margin:] I would be very pleased, however, if it were possible to join the discussion in a later issue.

* ** [Crossed out:] [in] further detail.

75 The reference is here to Martin Heidegger (1997b), Der deutsche Idealismus (Fichte, Schelling, Hegel) und die philosophische Problemlage der Gegenwart, GA 28, Frankfurt am Main, Vittorio Klostermann. The discussion of the tendency toward anthropology is in §1 (p. 10–23), while that of the tendency toward metaphysics is in §2 (p. 23–40) [DDS].

76 Martin Heidegger (1976), “Vom Wesen des Grundes” [1929], in Wegmarken, GA 9, Frankfurt am Main, Vittorio Klostermann, p. 123–175 [DDS].

77 On Kant and the Heidegger-Cassirer discussion, see Martin Heidegger (2010), Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik, GA 3, Frankfurt am Main, Vittorio Klostermann, notably, §IV of the Anhang (“Davoser Disputation zwischen Ernst Cassirer und Martin Heidegger”) [DDS].

78 The reference is to the fourth issue of the Philosophische Hefte (1929), dedicated to Franz Brentano and the problem of universals. The issue includes some of the letters, edited by Oskar Kraus, between Brentano and Marty on the entia rationis. See Franz C. Brentano (1929), “Gegen entia rationis, sogenannte irreale oder ideale Gegenstände,Philosophische Hefte, 4, p. 257–273 [DDS].

79 Theodor Celms (1992), “Der phänomenologische Idealismus Husserls” [1928], in his Der phänomenologische Idealismus Husserls und andere Schriften (1928–1943), Frankfurt am Main, Peter Lang, p. 31-199 [DDS].

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Daniele De Santis, « Maximilian Beck and Martin Heidegger: A Forgotten Episode of the Early Phenomenological Tradition—Reconstruction and Interpretation »Methodos [En ligne], 23 | 2023, mis en ligne le 01 février 2023, consulté le 06 février 2025. URL : http://journals.openedition.org/methodos/10036 ; DOI : https://doi.org/10.4000/methodos.10036

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Daniele De Santis

ÚFAR, Karlova univerzita, Prague

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