Notes
Ancient literature is cited without indication of edition used, as long as the authors involved are well-known persons like Plato and Diogenes Laertius and there are no particular textual problems. When quoting Latin texts I do not necessarily follow the orthography of the edition used. Translations from the Greek are my own. Abbreviations of titles of Greek works generally follow the practice of Liddell-Scott-Jones, A Greek-English Lexicon, Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1940. The following abbreviations are used for major series and collections of fragments: CAG = Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca, Berlin, Reimer, 1882-1907; GG = Grammatici Graeci, Leipzig, Teubner, 1867-1889; GL = Grammatici Latini, Leipzig, Teubner, 1855-1880; FDS = Karlheinz Hülser, Die Fragmente zur Dialektik der Stoiker, 4 vols., Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt, Frommann-Holzboog, 1987-1988; SVF = Hans von Arnim, Stoicorum Veterum Fragmenta, 4 vols., Leipzig, Teubner, 1905-1924.
Plato, Cratylus 401b.
Used by Alcinous, Ammonius, Philoponus and Simplicius, among others. See the electronic Thesaurus Linguae Graecae.
Aristotle’s in De interpretatione 2.16a19-29 stresses that names owe their signification to συνθἠκη and not to φύσις, and only puts one restriction on the choice of phonetic material: noises that cannot be represented in letters (ἀγράμματοι ψὀφοι) are not allowed. I am unconvinced by arguments that κατὰ συνθήκην in the context equals κατὰ σύνθεσιν, as has repeatedly been suggested (for a spirited defence of the view, see Lo Piparo, Franco (2003), Aristotele e il linguaggio, Roma-Bari, Laterza).
For the latter, see Plato, Cratylus 384d.
Bonitz, Hermann (1870), Index Aristotelicus (= Aristotelis Opera V), Berlin, Reimer, p. 327b, s.v. θέσις mentions a possible φύσει / θέσει opposition in Aristotle, Physics III.5.205b34, but the θέσις mentioned there is probably a location. Alexander of Aphrodisias, in Top., CAG II.2: 82.13-16 wrongly attributes the dichotomy to Aristotle. Strictly speaking, Aristotle never says νόμωι about the value of linguistic items, but in Nicomachean Ethics V.8.1133a28-31 he says that money is what it is κατὰ συνθήκην ‟by convention”, and this is why it is called νόμισμα, because it is money νόμωι and not φύσει. This is closely parallelled in De interpretatione 2.16a27-28, where it is said that κατὰ συνθήκην is included in the definition of a name (noun) because no name is φύσει.
Thus already in Epicurus, Epistula ad Herodotum, apud Diogenes Laertius, Vitae philosophorum X.75. Laws, ethical norms: Philo, De ebrietate 34; Legum allegoriae III.126 (and elsewhere). Syllables long φύσει or θέσει: Dionysius Thrax, Ars grammatica, GG I.1.17-18.
Simplicius, in Cat., CAG VIII: 40.5-13: ‟Διὰ τί δὲ Ἀρχύτας παραλέλοιπεν ταύτην τὴν περὶ τῶν ὀνομάτων διδασκαλίαν ἐν τῷ Περὶ τῶν καθόλου λόγων; ἢ ἐπειδὴ φύσει τὰ ὀνόματα καὶ οὐ θέσει λέγουσιν οἱ Πυθαγόρειοι, καὶ τὰ ὁμώνυμα καὶ τὰ πολυώνυμα παραιτοῦνται, ὡς ἑνὸς ὀνόματος πρὸς ἓν πρᾶγμα κατὰ φύσιν λεγομένου. διακρίνειν οὖν ἐκείνους εἰκὸς τὰ μὲν ὁμώνυμα τῇ προγονικῇ ἢ κατ’ ἐλπίδα ἀναφορᾷ, τὰ δὲ πολυώνυμα δείξουσιν οὐ καθ’ ἓν λεγόμενα, ἀλλὰ κατὰ διαφόρους ἐτυμολογίας ἀποδιδόμενα, ὅταν ὄντως ὀνόματα ᾖ· τῶν δὲ παρωνύμων τὸν παρασχηματισμὸν οἰκείως ἐκεῖνοι ταῖς κατὰ τὰ πράγματα συζυγίαις ἐξηγήσονται.” Simplicius attributes the naturalist view to the original Pythagoreans, but his picture of the sect was one painted for him by late ancient Platonists who considered themselves Pythagoreans. He explains how they might defend their denial of genuine polyonymy by assuming a different etymology underlying each name, i.e. that each name highlights a different feature of the thing signified. The same strategy is used by Anonymus Domus Petri 205, Commentarium in librum Divisionum Boethii (mid 13th century), ms Cambridge, Peterhouse 205: 54rA: ‟licet una et eadem vox sit communis multis significationibus, non tamen est possibile recipere unam et eandem significationem communem pluribus vocibus, una tamen <res> significari potest per plures voces, non tamen una et eadem est significatio; secundum enim diversas rationes imponebantur illae voces ad significandum illam rem, et ita sunt diversae significationes. Unde sicut <trium> filiorum respectu eiusdem patris non est eadem relatio sed diversa, eodem modo trium vocum respecu unius rei non est eadem significatio sed diversa.”
Philo Iudaeus, De cherubim 56: “ὁ μὲν ἄλλος ἅπας ἀνθρώπων ὅμιλος ὀνόματα τίθεται πράγμασι διαφέροντα τῶν πραγμάτων, ὥσθ' ἕτερα μὲν εἶναι τὰ τυγχάνοντα, ἑτέρας δὲ κλήσεις τὰς ἐπ' αὐτοῖς· παρὰ Μωυσεῖ δὲ αἱ τῶν ὀνομάτων θέσεις ἐνάργειαι πραγμάτων εἰσὶν ἐμφαντικώταται, ὡς αὐτὸ τὸ πρᾶγμα ἐξ ἀνάγκης εὐθὺς εἶναι τοὔνομα καὶ <τοὔνομα καὶ> καθ' οὗ τίθεται διαφέρειν μηδέν.”
Diodorus Siculus, Bibliotheca historica V.67.3: ‟Τῶν δὲ Τιτανίδων φασὶ Μνημοσύνην λογισμοὺς εὑρεῖν καὶ τὰς τῶν ὀνομάτων θέσεις ἑκάστῳ τῶν ὄντων τάξαι, δι’ ὧν καὶ δηλοῦμεν ἕκαστα καὶ πρὸς ἀλλήλους ὁμιλοῦμεν· ἅ τινες τὸν Ἑρμῆν φασιν εἰσηγήσασθαι. Προσάπτουσι δὲ τῇ θεῷ ταύτῃ καὶ τὰ πρὸς ἀνανέωσιν καὶ μνήμην γινόμενα παρὰ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις, ἀφ’ ὧν δὴ καὶ τῆς προσηγορίας τυχεῖν αὐτὴν ταύτης.”
Aristotle, De interpretatione 3.16b19-20: ‟αὐτὰ μὲν οὖν καθ' αὑτὰ λεγόμενα τὰ ῥήματα ὀνόματά
ἐστι καὶ σημαίνει τι”.
About function words, see S. Ebbesen, Commentators and Commentaries on Aristotle’s Sophistici Elenchi. A Study of Post-Aristotelian Ancient and Medieval Writings on Fallacies, 3 vols., = Corpus Latinum Commentariorum in Aristotelem Graecorum VII.1-3, Leiden, Brill, 1981, I: 151 with source references in note 29 on p. 158. About Apollonius Dyscolus’ ideas about the relation between the imposition of nouns and verbs (the primary, reality-oriented parts of speech) and that of the remaining parts of speech, see Luhtala, Anneli (2011), “Imposition of Names in Ancient Grammar and Philosophy” in Stephanos Matthaios, Franco Montanari & Antonios Rengakos (eds.), Ancient Scholarship and Grammar. Archetypes, Concepts and Contexts, Berlin, W. De Gruyter, p. 479-498.
See, e.g., Flavius Sosipater Charisius, Ars grammatica, Karl Barwick (ed.), Leipzig, Teubner, 1925 (rp. 1964), V, p. 380: ‟cum ab omni sermone Graeco Latina lingua pendere videatur, quaedam inveniuntur vel licentia ab antiquis vel proprietate linguae Latinae dicta praeter consuetudinem Graecorum.”
See Dante’s De vulgari eloquentia.
See, e.g., Schmidt, Rudolf (1839), Stoicorum grammatica, Halle (rp. Amsterdam, Hakkert, 1967), 21ff. Somewhat more nuanced, Steinthal, Heymann (18902), Geschichte der Sprachwissenschaft bei den Griechen und Römern, Berlin, Dümmler (rp. Hildesheim-New York, Georg Olms, 1971), I: 328ff. Also more nuanced, but still appealing to Origenes, Allen, James (2005), ‘The Stoics on the Origin of Language and the Foundations of Etymology’ in Dorothea Frede & Brad Inwood (ed.), Language and Learning. Philosophy of Language in the Hellenistic Age, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, p. 14-35, and Long, Anthony A. (2005), ‘Stoic Linguistics, Plato’s Cratylus and Augustine’s De dialectica’ in the same book, p. 36- 55.
Pohlenz, Max (1959), Die Stoa, Göttingen, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht (here quoted from 4. Auflage, 1970), I: 41. Cf. Pohlenz’ notes in II.23-24.
I suspect a printing error, an indefinite article having fallen out, so that the text should read ‟durch einen bestimmten Willensakt”.
Origenes, Contra Celsum 1.24 (= FDS F 643): ‟Λεκτέον δὲ καὶ πρὸς τοῦτο ὅτι ἐμπίπτει εἰς τὸ προκείμενον λόγος βαθὺς καὶ ἀπόρρητος, ὁ περὶ φύσεως ὀνομάτων· πότερον, ὡς οἴεται Ἀριστοτέλης, θέσει εἰσὶ τὰ ὀνόματα ἤ, ὡς νομίζουσιν οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς Στοᾶς, φύσει, μιμουμένων τῶν πρώτων φωνῶν τὰ πράγματα, καθ’ ὧν τὰ ὀνόματα, καθὸ καὶ στοιχεῖά τινα τῆς ἐτυμολογίας εἰσάγουσιν, ἤ, ὡς διδάσκει Ἐπίκουρος, ἑτέρως ἢ ὡς οἴονται οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς Στοᾶς, φύσει ἐστὶ τὰ ὀνόματα, ἀπορρηξάντων τῶν πρώτων ἀνθρώπων τινὰς φωνὰς κατὰ τῶν πραγμάτων.” The main part of the text is also reproduced in SVF II: 44, frgm. 146. Another important source usually adduced to support the notion of Stoic naturalism concerning the imposition of names is Augustine’s De dialectica, which (no doubt correctly) is assumed to contain Stoic material transmitted via Varro’s Disciplinarum libri.
See, e.g. Cicero, De natura deorum III.xxiv.63 (= FDS F 606) and the examples of Stoic etymologizing assembled in FDS F 650-680. Not explicitly ascribed to the Stoics, but in my opinion indisputably of Stoic ancestry, is Apollonius Dyscolus’ definition of a noun (ὄνομα) that includes a derivation from νέμει. See Scholia in Dionysii Thracis Artem grammaticam, GG I.3: 524: ‟Ἰστέον δὲ ὅτι οἱ περὶ Ἀπολλώνιον καὶ Ἡρωδιανὸν οὕτως ὁρίζονται τὸ ὄνομα· ὄνομά ἐστι μέρος λόγου πτωτικόν, ἑκάστῳ τῶν ὑποκειμένων σωμάτων ἢ πραγμάτων κοινὴν ἢ ἰδίαν ποιότητα ἀπονέμον.”
Plato, Cratylus 396a-b: ‟ἔστι δὲ οὐ ῥᾴδιον κατανοῆσαι. ἀτεχνῶς γάρ ἐστιν οἷον λόγος τὸ τοῦ Διὸς ὄνομα, διελόντες δὲ αὐτὸ διχῇ οἱ μὲν τῷ ἑτέρῳ μέρει, οἱ δὲ τῷ ἑτέρῳ χρώμεθα –οἱ μὲν γὰρ “Ζῆνα,” οἱ δὲ “Δία” καλοῦσιν– συντιθέμενα δ’ εἰς ἓν δηλοῖ τὴν φύσιν τοῦ θεοῦ, ὃ δὴ προσήκειν φαμὲν ὀνόματι οἵῳ τε εἶναι ἀπεργάζεσθαι. οὐ γὰρ ἔστιν ἡμῖν καὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις πᾶσιν ὅστις ἐστὶν αἴτιος μᾶλλον τοῦ ζῆν ἢ ὁ ἄρχων τε καὶ βασιλεὺς τῶν πάντων. συμβαίνει οὖν ὀρθῶς ὀνομάζεσθαι οὗτος ὁ θεὸς εἶναι, δι’ ὃν ζῆν ἀεὶ πᾶσι τοῖς ζῶσιν ὑπάρχει”. Chrysippus is reported to have adopted Plato’s etymology: see Stobaeus, Eclogae I.1.26 (= FDS 563): ‟Χρυσίππου· Ζεὺς μὲν οὖν φαίνεται ὠνομάσθαι ἀπὸ τοῦ πᾶσι δεδωκέναι τὸ ζῆν· Δία δὲ αὐτὸν λέγουσιν, ὅτι πάντων ἐστὶν αἴτιος καὶ δι’ αὐτὸν πάντα.”
There is a long, somewhat rambling, discussion supporting the compromise view in Ammonius, in Int., CAG IV.5: 34-37.
For words in the category of when, see Simplicius, in Cat., CAG VIII: 350.4-5: ‟διὰ τοῦτο δὲ οἱ ὀνοματοθέται ἐπὶ τοῦ ποτὲ ὀνόματα διάφορα τεθείκασι, τὸ χθὲς καὶ αὔριον καὶ πέρυσιν καὶ τῆτες καὶ εἰς νέωτα”.
Simplicius, in Cat., CAG VIII: 15.8-12: ‟ἡ πρώτη θέσις τῶν φωνῶν ὡς ὀνομάτων ἐστίν· δεηθέντες γὰρ οἱ ἄνθρωποι σημαίνειν ἀλλήλοις τὰ πράγματα διὰ τὸ τῆς κοινῆς ἀποστῆναι νοήσεως ἔθεντο τῷδε μὲν ὄνομα σῶμα, τῷδε δὲ δεξιόν, καὶ ἄλλῳ ποιεῖν ἢ πάσχειν, οὔπω διαφορᾶς οὔσης, καθ' ἣν τὰ μὲν ὑπόκειται, τὰ δὲ κατηγορεῖται καὶ τὰ μὲν προσσημαίνει χρόνον, τὰ δὲ οὔ.”
Ammonius, in Cat., CAG IV.4: 11.8 ff. Ammonios offers a hopelessly naive picture of the first imposition of names as an occasion when people gathered and decided what things were to be called. The same ridiculous scenario reappears in Olympiodorus, Prolegomena, CAG XII.1: 21.26-38: ‟ἀλλ' ἵνα μάθωμεν τίς ἡ πρώτη θέσις καὶ τίς ἡ δευτέρα θέσις, ἔνθεν ἀρξώμεθα· ἰστέον τοίνυν ὅτι ἡ φύσις κοινωνικὸν τὸν ἄνθρωπον ἐβούλετο προαγαγεῖν· οὐκοῦν τοῦτον ἔχουσα τὸν σκοπὸν καὶ τὸ διαλέγεσθαι αὐτῷ δεδώρηται, ἵνα σημᾶναι δύνηται τοῖς πέλας τὰ πράγματα. οὐκ ἂν δὲ κοινωνεῖν οὕτως ἠδύνατο, εἰ μὴ καὶ κατὰ τὰς φωνὰς ἡ κοινωνία ἦν, ὃν τρόπον οὐδὲ οἱ διαφόρους ἔχοντες νόμους τῆς αὐτῆς εἶναι δύνανται πολιτείας. κοινωνία δὲ τῶν φωνῶν ἔνθεν ἐγένετο· χορὸς σοφῶν ἀνδρῶν συνελθὼν ἑκάστῳ πράγματι ἴδιον ἀφώρισεν ὄνομα, καὶ τὸ μὲν ἐκάλεσαν οὐσίαν τὸ δὲ συμβεβηκός, καὶ ἁπλοῖς πράγμασιν ἁπλᾶ ἔθεντο τὰ ὀνόματα, καὶ οὕτω παρὰ πᾶσιν χαρακτηρίζεται. αὕτη λέγεται πρώτη θέσις. εἶτα ἐπειδὴ ἑώρων τὰ μὲν τῶν ὑπ' αὐτῶν τεθέντων ὀνομάτων ἐπιδεχόμενα ἄρθρα, τὰ δὲ μὴ ἐπιδεχόμενα ἀλλὰ καὶ χρόνον σημαίνοντα, ἐκάλουν τὰ μὲν ὀνόματα τὰ δὲ ῥήματα. καὶ ἐκάλουν ταύτην δευτέραν θέσιν.” Olympiodorus has misunderstood his source, which must have said that the first imposition created words for both substances and accidents. In his account this become that it introduced the technical terms ‘substance’ and ‘accident’, which, of course, are second imposition words.
Dexippus, in Cat., CAG IV.2: 11.14-15: ‟προηγουμένως ἡ σημαντικὴ λέξις τῆς πρώτης ἔχεται χρείας τοῦ λόγου, καθ’ ἣν τὰ πράγματα δηλοῦν ἀλλήλοις ἐφιέμεθα”; 15.24: “Τῆς δευτέρας τοῦ λόγου χρείας ἔχεται καὶ ταῦτα.‟
Thus in Philoponus, in Cat., CAG XIII.1: 85.23.
There is a beautiful book in Danish about Quintilian’s use of ancient theories of language: Pinborg, Jan (1963), Quintilian og den antikke sprogteori, Studier fra Sprog- og Oldtidsforskning 253, København, Gads Forlag.
Quintilian, Institutio oratoria I.6.43-45. Notice his concluding remark: ‟Ergo consuetudinem sermonis vocabo consensum eruditorum, sicut vivendi consensum bonorum.”
Simplicius, in Cat., CAG VIII: 19.26-20.5. The context is a discussion of why Aristotle put the antepraedicamenta in front of the main body of his text and the postpraedicamenta after it, although the purpose of both passages is to clarify the meaning of some words that he needed to use in the main text: “τί οὖν μὴ καὶ ταῦτα [the postpraedicamenta] προὔταξεν τοῦ περὶ τῶν κατηγοριῶν λόγου ἢ διὰ τί μὴ κἀκεῖνα [the antepraedicamenta] μετὰ τὰς κατηγορίας ἐπήγαγεν ἀπορήσας ὁ Πορφύριος λύει καλῶς τὴν ἀπορίαν· ὅτι ἐκεῖνα μὲν ἄγνωστα παντελῶς ἦν ἀπὸ τῆς συνηθείας, τούτων δὲ ἐννοίας μὲν ἔχομέν τινας, οὐ μὴν ἀκριβῆ διάκρισιν οὐδὲ αὐτῶν · μὴ βουλόμενος οὖν ἐπὶ πολὺ τὸν περὶ αὐτῶν τῶν κατηγοριῶν ἀναβάλλεσθαι λόγον ὑπερέθετο ταῦτα εἰς ὕστερον, οὔτε προδιδάξαι αὐτὰ ἀναγκασθεὶς διὰ τὴν ὁποιανοῦν προϋπάρχουσαν αὐτῶν ἔννοιαν οὔτε ἀτεχνῆ τὴν περὶ αὐτῶν γνῶσιν καταλείπεσθαι τῷ ἀκροατῇ συγχωρῶν· εἰ γὰρ καὶ χρώμεθά τισιν ἀπὸ τῆς συνηθείας ὀνόμασιν, ἀλλ’ οὐ γινώσκοντες
αὐτῶν τὰς φύσεις ἀκριβῶς, εἰς ἃς οἱ ὀνοματοθέται βλέποντες τεθείκασιν.”
Simplicius, in Cat., CAG VIII: 187.8-9: “εἰ μὲν θέσει τὰ ὀνόματα, στοχαστέον τοῦ σκοποῦ τῆς θέσεως· εἰ δὲ φύσει, προσέχειν τῇ φύσει τοῖς οἰκείοις πράγμασιν τοὺς οἰκείους φθόγγους συντάττοντας.”
See note 19, above.
Philoponus, in Cat., CAG XIII.1: 157: 7-13: ‟oὔτε γὰρ ὁ δρομικὸς οὔτε ὁ πυκτικός, οἱ φυσικήν τινα ἐπιτηδειότητα ἐν τούτοις ἔχοντες, παρωνύμως ἀπὸ τούτων τῶν δυνάμεων λέγονται· οὐδὲ γὰρ κεῖται ὀνόματα ταῖς δυνάμεσι ταύταις διὰ τὸ τὴν συνήθειαν τοῖς τελείοις τῶν πραγμάτων καὶ κατ’ ἐνέργειαν οὖσιν ἐσπουδακέναι θεῖναι τὰ ὀνόματα· τὸ γὰρ πυκτικὸς ἢ δρομικὸς ἀπὸ τῶν κατ’ ἐνέργειαν ἐπιστημῶν, τῆς τε πυκτικῆς λέγω καὶ δρομικῆς, ὀνομάζονται.”
Philoponus, in Cat., CAG XIII.1: 113.19 ff.: ‟λέγει οὖν <sc. ο Ἀριστοτέλης> πρὸς τοῦτο ὅτι οὐδὲν χαλεπὸν οἷς μὴ ἐφρόντισε θεῖναι ὀνόματα ἡ συνήθεια, ἐκείνοις ἡμᾶς αὐτοὺς ἐπινοεῖν· ἡ γὰρ συνήθεια ἐκείνοις τίθησιν ὀνόματα οἷς γινώσκει, αἱ δὲ τέχναι ἅτε δὴ καινοτέρων πραγμάτων οὖσαι εὑρέτιδες ὀφείλουσι τοῖς πράγμασι τοῖς ὑπ’ αὐτῶν εὑρισκομένοις τιθέναι ὀνόματα πρὸς τὴν τούτων σημασίαν· οἷον ὁ γεωμέτρης [...] καὶ ὁ μουσικὸς ὁμοίως [...]”. Simplicius, Cat. 187.1-4: ‟ἔτι δὲ πάσης τέχνης οἰκεῖον τὸ ὀνοματοποιεῖν· καὶ γὰρ ὁ γεωμέτρης καὶ ὁ μουσικὸς περὶ πράγματα τοῖς πολλοῖς ἄγνωστα διατρίβοντες ἴδια τιθέναι τοῖς πράγμασιν ἐκείνοις ὀνόματα καὶ ἀσυνήθη τοῖς πολλοῖς ἀναγκάζονται.”
See Dexippus, in Cat., CAG IV.2: 26.29-27.2. In 15.23-16.13 Dexippus further includes ‘whole’ and ‘part’ and several other words among those resulting from a second imposition: ‟Τὸ ὅλον καὶ τὸ μέρος εἰς ποίαν κατηγορίαν τάξομεν; –Τῆς δευτέρας τοῦ λόγου χρείας ἔχεται καὶ ταῦτα. χεὶρ μὲν γὰρ καὶ κεφαλὴ πρῶτα ὀνόματα, ὅτι δὲ ἡ χεὶρ καὶ ἡ κεφαλὴ μέρη ἐστὶν ὅλου καὶ ὡς μέρη ὀνομάζονται, δευτέρα κίνησις λεκτικῆς μηνύσεως· Σωκράτης μὲν γὰρ τῆς οὐσίας προσηγορία, ὅτι δὲ τὸ Σωκράτης ὄνομα, δευτέρα θέσις ὀνόματος ἐπὶ τῇ πρώτῃ. οὕτως οὖν ἔχει καὶ τὸ ὅλον καὶ τὸ μέρος, καὶ διὰ τοῦτο παραιτητέον εἰς τὰς κατηγορίας αὐτὸ ἀνάγειν· εἰ δ’ ἄρα, πρός τι τοῦτο τάξομεν· ὅλου γὰρ μέρος τὸ μέρος καὶ τὸ ὅλον ἐκ τῶν μερῶν ὅλον. –Τὸ καθόλου καὶ τὸ καθάπαξ καὶ τὸ ἄρδην εἰς ποίαν κατηγορίαν ἀνάξομεν; –Ταῦτα τῶν κατηγοριῶν ἐξῄρηται· κατὰ μετοχὴν γὰρ πρώτων τινῶν καὶ ἀρχετύπων κατηγοριῶν ἀναφέρεται. –Τὸ ταὐτὸν καὶ τὸ ἕτερον καὶ τὸ ἴδιον καὶ τὸ ἀλλότριον καὶ τὸ οινὸν καὶ τὴν ἀδιαφορίαν τήν τε ἀμφιβολίαν καὶ τὴν συνωνυμίαν ποῦ τάξομεν; –Εἴρηται μὲν ὅτι κατὰ πάσας ἕκαστον τούτων λέγεται· ἐπεὶ δὲ ὀνομάτων ἐστὶ καὶ τῆς δευτέρας ὄντα θέσεως τῶν ὀνομάτων φαίνεται, τῶν κατηγοριῶν ἐκπίπτει. ἤδη γὰρ πολλάκις εἰρήκαμεν, ὅτι αἱ κατηγορίαι κατὰ τὸ σημαντικὸν τῶν ἐν τοῖς οὖσι διαφορῶν ὑφίστανται· διὸ καὶ μᾶλλον ἀξιοῦμεν τὰ ἄτομα καὶ ἔχοντα δεῖξιν θεωρεῖν ὡς κυριώτερα ἐν ταῖς κατηγορίαις καὶ μᾶλλον ἀποπληροῦν αὐτῶν τὴν ἐπαγγελίαν δυνάμενα. τούτων τοίνυν διωρισμένων ἄξιον ἐπιστῆσαι πρὸς τὴν τελεωτάτην ἐπιστήμην ἀναφέροντας αὐτῶν τὴν εἴδησιν.”
Simplicius, in Cat., CAG VIII: 187.5-6: ‟ἢ τοῖς κειμένοις ἤδη αὐτοὶ χρώμενοι ἐπ’ ἄλλοις, ὡς τῷ χρώματι καὶ τῇ διέσει ὁ μουσικὸς καὶ τῷ κέντρῳ ὁ γεωμέτρης.”
Trypho, De tropis, in Rhetores Graeci, Leonhard Spengel (ed.), Leipzig, Teubner, 1856, III, p. 191: “κυριολογία μὲν οὖν ἐστιν ἡ διὰ τῆς πρώτης θέσεως τῶν ὀνομάτων τὰ πράγματα σημαίνουσα <sc. φράσις>”.
Simplicius, in Cat., CAG VIII: 186.34-187.1: ‟καὶ γὰρ ἀσφαλέστατος τρόπος ὀνοματοποιίας ὁ ἀπὸ τῶν ἤδη κειμένων καὶ τῆς κρατούσης συνηθείας· καὶ γὰρ οἱ πρῶτοι ὀνοματοθέται φαίνονται ἀπὸ τῶν συνήθων καὶ ἁπλουστέρων τὰ ἄλλα συντιθέντες, ὡς αἱ ἐτυμολογίαι δηλοῦσι, καὶ μέντοι ὁ οὕτως ποιῶν περὶ τὴν λέξιν ὀλίγον καινίζει, τὴν συνήθη περὶ τῶν πραγμάτων ἔννοιαν φυλάττων.” The remark falls in a longish note on Cat. 7.7a5-7, where Aristotle excuses his neologisms πτερωτόν and πηδαλιωτόν with the remark that sometimes it may be necessary to make up a name (ὀνοματοποιεῖν) when there is no established one —ἐὰν μὴ κείμενον ᾖ ὄνομα: notice that κείμενον functions as a perfect passive participle of τίθεσθαι.
Apollonius, Pron. 26.6-8: ‟οὐκ ἄλογον δὲ τὸ τὴν τῶν ὀνομάτων ἐκφορὰν ἐν τρίτοις νοεῖσθαι, ἐπεὶ αἱ ἴδιαι θέσεις τῶν ὀνομάτων οὐ τὸν πρός τινα λόγον ἔχουσιν, ἀλλὰ τὸν περί τινος.” The same point is made in Synt. II.43, p. 156.
Priscian, Partitiones 68, GL III: 474-5: ‟quaedam enim adverbiorum sunt πρωτότυπα, id est primitiva vel primae positionis, quaedam derivativa; primitiva, ut ‘saepe’ ‘satis’, derivativa ut ‘saepius’ ‘satius’.” Cf. Inst. IV.iii.18, GL II: 127. Quintilian (Inst. I.v.60, I.vi.10-11) and several Latin grammarians use prīma posítiō about the basic form of a lexeme, which in practice means the citation form. In, Inst. I.v.65 Quintilian contrasts simple words, which ‟keep to their first imposition, i.e. their nature” (‟prima positione, id est natura sua, constant”) with compound ones.
Priscian, Inst. VIII.xii.63, GL II: 421-2: ‟quia prima positio verbi, quae videtur ab ipsa natura esse prolata, in hoc est modo <sc. indicativo>, quemadmodum in nominibus est casus nominativus”.
Stobaeus, Eclogae I.13.1c, p. 138 (= SVF I: 25, frgm. 89; FDS F 762): ‟αἴτιον δ’ ὁ Ζήνων φησὶν εἶναι δι’ ὅ· οὗ δὲ αἴτιον συμβεβηκός· καὶ τὸ μὲν αἴτιον σῶμα, οὗ δὲ αἴτιον κατηγόρημα.”
Diogenes Laertius, Vitae philosophorum VII.58 (= SVF III.213, frgm. 22; FDS F 536).
E.g., Plutarch, De communibus notitiis 30, 1074D; Sextus Empiricus, Adversus Mathematicos IX.211.
For the difference between λέξις and λόγος see Diogenes Laertius, Vitae Philosophorum VII.56-57 (= SVF III.213, frgm. 20; FDS F 476).
For these θέματα, see Frede, Michael (1974), Die stoische Logik, Göttingen, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, p. 172 ff.
Sextus Empiricus, Adversus Mathematicos VIII.301: ‟ἀπόδειξις κατὰ μὲν τὸ γένος ἐστὶ λόγος· οὐ γὰρ δή γε αἰσθητὸν ἦν πρᾶγμα, ἀλλὰ διανοίας τις κίνησις καὶ συγκατάθεσις, ἅπερ ἦν λογικά.”
Sextus Empiricus, Adversus Mathematicos VIII.301-302: “λόγος δέ ἐστιν, ὡς ἁπλούστερον εἰπεῖν, τὸ συνεστηκὸς ἐκ λημμάτων καὶ ἐπιφορᾶς. λήμματα δὲ καλοῦμεν οὐ θέματά τινα, ἃ συναρπάζομεν, ἀλλ’ ἅπερ ὁ προσδιαλεγόμενος τῷ ἐμφανῆ εἶναι δίδωσι καὶ παραχωρεῖ.”
One non-logical instance in Poetics 1457b7, and two in De spiritu (482b10, 483a14).
The description of an argument in first period of the passage from Sextus Empiricus quoted two notes back is virtually identical to the one found in Diogenes Laertius VII.45, which guarantees that it is Stoic. All manuscripts of Diogenes offer εἶναι δὲ λόγον αὐτὸν συστημάτων καὶ ἐπιφορᾶς, but already in 1815 Beier corrected συστημάτων into σύστη<μα ἐκ λημ>μάτων καὶ ἐπιφορᾶς on the basis of a comparison with Sextus Empiricus, Pyrrhoneae hypotyposes II.135, where the definition is cited without attribution to any particular school. There thus is a certain circularity in the proof of the definition’s Stoic credentials, but not one that can justify serious doubt.
Sextus Empiricus, Adversus Mathematicos I.148-153: ‟ τὰ δὲ αὐτὰ ὀνόματα οὐ πᾶσίν ἐστι τὰ αὐτά, ἀλλὰ τοῖς μὲν ἀρρενικὰ τοῖς δὲ θηλυκὰ τοῖς δὲ οὐδέτερα· οἷον Ἀθηναῖοι μὲν τὴν στάμνον λέγουσι θηλυκῶς, Πελοποννήσιοι δὲ τὸν στάμνον ἀρρενικῶς, καὶ οἱ μὲν τὴν θόλον οἱ δὲ τὸν θόλον, καὶ οἱ μὲν τὴν βῶλον οἱ δὲ τὸν βῶλον, καὶ οὐ διὰ τοῦτο οὗτοι ἢ ἐκεῖνοι λέγονται ἁμαρτάνειν· ἕκαστος γάρ, ὡς τεθεμάτικεν, οὕτω χρῆται. καὶ οἱ αὐτοὶ δὲ διαφόρως ταὐτὰ ὁτὲ μὲν ἀρρενικῶς ἐκφέρουσιν ὁτὲ δὲ θηλυκῶς, λέγοντες τὸν λιμόν καὶ τὴν λιμόν. οὐκ ἄρα φύσει τῶν ὀνομάτων τὰ μὲν ἀρρενικὰ τὰ δὲ θηλυκά, ἀλλὰ κατὰ θεματισμὸν τὰ μὲν τοιαῦτα γίνεται τὰ δὲ τοιαῦτα. [...] τοίνυν εἰ φύσει οὐδέν ἐστιν ἀρρενικὸν ἢ θηλυκὸν ὄνομα, ζητῶ πῶς ὁ γραμματικὸς ἐπιλήψεται τοῦ διαστρόφως λέγοντος ὁ χελιδών καὶ ἡ ἀετός. ἤτοι γὰρ ὡς φύσει τοῦ ὀνόματος τῆς χελιδόνος θηλυκοῦ ὄντος, ἐκείνου δὲ ἀρρενικὸν αὐτὸ τῷ ἄρθρῳ βιαζομένου γενέσθαι, ἢ ὡς τῆς κοινῆς συνηθείας θηλυκὸν αὐτὸ θεματισάσης ἀλλ’ οὐκ ἀρρενικόν. ἀλλ' εἰ μὲν ὡς φύσει θηλυκοῦ καθεστῶτος, ἐπεὶ οὐδὲν φύσει θηλυκόν ἐστι καθὼς παρεστήσαμεν, ἀδιάφορον τὸ ὅσον ἐπὶ τούτῳ ἐάν τε οὕτως ἐάν τε ἐκείνως ἐκφέρηται· εἰ δ' ὡς ὑπὸ τῆς κοινῆς συνηθείας ἀντὶ θηλυκοῦ θεματισθέν, γενήσεται τοῦ τε εὖ λεγομένου καὶ μὴ κριτήριον οὐχὶ τεχνικός τις καὶ γραμματικὸς λόγος ἀλλ’ ἡ ἄτεχνος καὶ ἀφελὴς τῆς συνηθείας παρατήρησις.” Id., op. cit., VIII.202: ‟διαφέρει τοίνυν τοῦ ὑπομνηστικοῦ σημείου τὸ ἐνδεικτικόν, καὶ οὐ μεταβατέον ἐστὶν ἀπ' ἐκείνου ἐπὶ τοῦτο, παρόσον τὸ μὲν ἑνὸς μόνου δεῖ μηνυτικὸν ὑπάρχειν, τὸ δὲ πλειόνων δύναται εἶναι παραστατικὸν καὶ ὡς ἂν ἡμεῖς θεματίσωμεν σημαίνειν.”
GG III.3: 211a.
Apollonius, De pronomine, GG II.1: 60.7-8: ‟ἄμεινον οὖν ἦν θέμα καταλιπεῖν, ἢ ἀποκοπὴν τοῦ ὁδεῖνα, ἵνα καὶ τὰ τοῦ τόνου συμφωνῇ καὶ τὰ τῆς σημασίας.” The manuscripts have an addition, which Schneider excises because it does not fit into the syntax, but which might actually be a parenthetical afterthought due to Apollonius himself: ‟βέλτιον θέμα, ἐπεὶ καὶ αἱ ἀποκοπαὶ ἄκλιτοι”.
Apollonius, De pronomine 90.12: ‟θέμα γὰρ ἴδιόν ἐστιν ὀξύτονον, οὐχὶ ἔγκλιμα τῆς σφῶιν.”
Seneca, Epistulae ad Lucilium V.42.1.
Diogenes Laertius, Vitae philosophorum VII.192: ‟Περὶ τῆς κατὰ τὰς λέξεις ἀνωμαλίας πρὸς Δίωνα α΄β΄γ΄δ΄.”
Varro, De lingua latina IX.1 (= SVF II.45, frgm. 151; FDS F 640; I follow the text in FDS): ‟Crates, nobilis grammaticus, qui fretus Chrysippo, homine acutissimo qui reliquit περὶ ἀνωμαλίας †lei libri† contra analogian atque Aristarchum est nixus, sed ita, ut scripta indicant eius, ut neutrius videatur pervidisse voluntatem, quod et Chrysippus de inaequabilitate cum scribit sermonis, propositum habet ostendere similes res dissimilibus verbis et dissimiles similibus esse vocabulis notatas.”
Simplicius, in Cat. 102.22-24: ‟ καλῶς δὲ εἶπεν ὅτι πᾶσα οὐσία δοκεῖ τόδε τι σημαίνειν, διότι τὴν ἑτέρων δόξαν ἀπαγγέλλει καὶ τὴν ἀνωμαλίαν τῆς συνηθείας, ἥτις τὰ ἀνόμοια πράγματα ὁμοίοις σχήμασι λέξεων εἴωθεν πολλάκις σημαίνειν”. I first connected the Simplicius passage with the one in Varro in Ebbesen, Sten (1981), Commentators and Commentaries on Aristotle’s Sophistici Elenchi, Leiden, Brill, I, p. 211-212, and suggested that Simplicius is here reproducing Porphyry, to whom he and the other late commentators on Categories and Peri hermeneias seem to owe just about everything of Stoic origin occurring in their works, as they no longer had access to genuine Stoic works, whereas Porphyry had (though he probably also pilfered a lot of his information about Stoics from Alexander of Aphrodisias).
Cf. ἡ τῆς συνηθείας ἀνωμαλία at Simplicius, in Cat. 160.25 and ἡ τῆς χρήσεως ἀνωμαλία at 264.22.
Simplicius, in Cat., CAG VIII: 396.19-21: ‟πολλῆς δὲ οὔσης τῆς ἀνωμαλίας Χρύσιππος μὲν ἐν τοῖς Περὶ τῶν στερητικῶν λεγομένοις ἐπεξῆλθεν αὐτῇ”; further references to the same work at 389.22, 394.31, 395.10, 401.7, 403.6. Simplicius’ τὰ περὶ τῶν στερητικῶν λεγόμενα seems to be a distorted version of the title Περὶ τῶν κατὰ στέρησιν λεγομένων reported in Diogenes Laertius’ list of Chrysippus’ writings (D.L. VII.190).
Cf. the title Λόγοι παρὰ τὰς συνηθείας in Diogenes Laertius, Vitae philosophorum VII.192.
Thus also κρίσις/κρῖμα, κατόρθωσις/κατόρθωμα, φρόνησις/φρόνημα, φρονίμευσις/φρονίμευμα. See the index in SVF IV.
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