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Argumentation and Arabic Philosophy of Language

Al-Ashʿarī’s Adab al-jadal : A Few Remarks on its Genre

L'Adab al-jadal d'Al-Ashʿarī : Quelques remarques sur son genre littéraire
Abdessamad Belhaj

Résumés

À ce jour, le genre de l'Adab al-jadal d'al-Ashʿarī (mort en 936 CE) en tant que document de la théorie islamique de l'argumentation reste peu clair. Les chercheurs ont accordé peu d'attention à cet important document conservé dans le Mujarrad maqālāt al-Ashʿarī d'Ibn Fūrak (mort en 1015 CE). Les chercheurs ne s'accordent pas sur la question de savoir si les principaux éléments constitutifs de l'Adab al-jadal d'al-Ashʿarī sont théologiques ou philosophiques. En me basant sur la terminologie, la procédure et l'objectif des questions et réponses dialectiques dans l'Adab al-jadal d'al-Ashʿarī, je soutiens que ce document emprunte sa méthode à la dialectique juridique.

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Introduction

  • 1 Ibn Fūrak, Abū Bakr Muḥammad ibn al-Ḥasan (1987), Mujarrad maqālāt al-shaykh Abī al-Ḥasan al-Ashʿar (...)
  • 2 Miller, Larry B. (2020), Islamic Disputation Theory: The Uses & Rules of Argument in Medieval Islam(...)
  • 3 Zahra, Muḥammad Abū (1934), Tārīkh al-jadal, Cairo, Dār al-Fikr al-ʿArabī.
  • 4 Muḥammad Salāma ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz (2002), Majallat al-dirāsāt al-ʿArabiyya 2, p. 9-67.
  • 5 Young, Walter E. (2017), The Dialectical Forge: Juridical Disputation and the Evolution of Islamic (...)
  • 6 Belhaj, Abdessamad (2010), Argumentation et dialectique en islam : formes et séquences de la munāẓa (...)

1Al-Ashʿarī’s (d. 936 CE) Adab al-jadal is one of the earliest sources of Islamic theological and legal argumentation theory. However, modern scholars have paid little attention to this document, which is available to us in the form of a forty-page text reworked in Ibn Fūrak’s (d. 1015 CE) Mujarrad maqālāt al-Ashʿarī.1 L. B. Miller argues that al-Ashʿarī's Adab al-jadal bears the mark of philosophical influence, and that some of its passages can be traced back to Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics.2 Conversely, Muḥammad Salāma ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz (following a long Muslim tradition on the history of jadal)3 espouses the theological thesis and believes that theological debates within kalām led to the development of the discipline of Islamic disputation (jadal / munāẓara); and in that enterprise, al-Ashʿarī was decisive.4 More recently, W. E. Young has made a compelling argument for the priority of juridical dialectics, demonstrating how its practice “forged” both legal theory (uṣūl al-fiqh) and subsequent dialectical theory.5 I have, myself, argued for the central role juridical dialectics played in the history of Islamic disputation theory;6 and based on the terminology, procedure, and purpose of dialectical questions and answers in al-Ashʿarī’s Adab al-jadal, I maintain, here, that this source owes its structure to juridical dialectics.

  • 7 Daniel Gimaret (1985), Arabica 32, p. 201.
  • 8 Daniel Gimaret (1985), Arabica 32, p. 205.

2I have not conducted a critical study of Mujarrad maqālāt al-Ashʿarī, and therefore cannot claim its authorship for Ibn Fūrak. For the time being, I will follow Daniel Gimaret who conducted such a study and ascribed authorship to Ibn Fūrak.7 I will also, at this stage of my analysis, take for granted (as did Gimaret) that Ibn Fūrak in Mujarrad maqālāt al-Ashʿarī does not quote al-Ashʿarī but reworks his teachings; and, as most of the works of al-Ashʿarī are lost, including those on dialectics, there is no way one can see how faithful Ibn Fūrak was to the terminology and argument theory of al-Ashʿarī.8

  • 9 Abū Bakr Muḥammad ibn al-Ḥasan Ibn Fūrak (1987), Mujarrad maqālāt, p. 284.
  • 10 Abū Bakr Muḥammad ibn al-Ḥasan Ibn Fūrak (1987), Mujarrad maqālāt, p. 292.
  • 11 Abū Bakr Muḥammad ibn al-Ḥasan Ibn Fūrak (1987), Mujarrad maqālāt, p. 317.

3It is of crucial importance, though, that the title of chapter 59 of Mujarrad maqālāt al-Ashʿarī, which launches a series of chapters on dialectics, clearly mentions that Ibn Fūrak intends it as an introduction to his own elaborations on dialectics.9 Ibn Fūrak thus assumes the responsibility of the content that follows on dialectics in his Mujarrad, although he sometimes attributes to al-Ashʿarī certain specific propositions. In chapter 61, Ibn Fūrak says that he aimed at clarifying the theses of al-Ashʿarī on jadal, its rules and ethics.10 Then he adds in chapter 64 that what he mentions there, in connection to the ethics of jadal, was obtained from what al-Ashʿarī indicated (mā dalla ʻalayhi kalām shaykhinā) in a scattered manner in his books, and that he compiled the whole briefly in this chapter.11

  • 12 Daniel Gimaret (1985), Arabica 32, p. 215.
  • 13 Walter E. Young (2017), The Dialectical Forge, p. 15.

4Thus, Ibn Fūrak did not work from the Adab al-jadal and Sharḥ adab al-jadal (both attributed to al-Ashʿarī, but now lost) as Gimaret argues,12 but from various non-systematic propositions of al-Ashʿarī on jadal, loosely formulated and expanded upon. It seems to me that rather than paraphrasing al-Ashʿarī (as is generally believed) Ibn Fūrak is expanding upon al-Ashʿarī’s teachings on jadal; and it is therefore more accurate to read Mujarrad maqālāt al-Ashʿarī (including its dialectical parts) as originating in the late 10th / early 11th century, rather than in the late 9th / early 10th century (if we accept Gimaret’s argument that Ibn Fūrak is the author of Mujarrad). This sets the context of our document almost a century later than the death of Ibn Surayj (d. 918 CE), described by Young as a “founding figure in both uṣūl al-fiqh and jadal–theory,”13 and in the same period in which systematic works of uṣūl and jadal theory simultaneously appeared.

Miller’s philosophical thesis

  • 14 Larry B. Miller (2020), Islamic Disputation Theory, p. 6.

5In his seminal work on Islamic disputation theory, L. B. Miller argues that al-Ashʿarī’s Islamic jadal has “an Aristotelian flavour,” although he also admits that it maintained an Islamic focus of serving truth, commanding the right, and forbidding the wrong.14 Miller went further than just ascribing an Aristotelian flavour to al-Ashʿarī’s Adab al-jadal, establishing consistent parallels between passages in this work and the Organon, especially Aristotle’s Posterior analytics. To illustrate the sort of philosophical influence Miller sees in the Adab al-jadal, I present two of his examples, which should suffice to do justice to his argument while allowing us to discuss the extent of this debatable influence.

6Let us begin with the passage on perception in Posterior analytics 99b35, which goes as follows:

  • 15 Aristotle (2002), Posterior Analytics, tran. Jonathan Barnes, Oxford, Clarendon Press, p. 73.

And this is clearly true of all animals: they have a connate discriminatory capacity, which is called perception. Given that perception is present in them, in some animals the precepts are retained and in others they are not. If they are not, then the animal has no knowledge when it is not perceiving (either in general or with regard to items which are not retained). But some can still hold the precepts in their soul after perceiving them.15

  • 16 Larry B. Miller (2020), Islamic Disputation Theory, p. 7.

Miller argues that traces of this Aristotelian passage can be found in al-Ashʿarī’s passage on necessary types of knowledge.16 Al-Ashʿarī argues that:

  • 17 Abū Bakr Muḥammad ibn al-Ḥasan Ibn Fūrak (1987), Mujarrad maqālāt, p. 287. This is my own translati (...)

Sense-based knowledge and reason-based knowledge are necessary in the intellectual sciences the same way that transmitted and textual knowledge are necessary in the sciences of sharīʻa. For both types of knowledge are the foundations and the sources. They are the references of everything and all claims end with them. At this point, then, it is indecent for the questioner, in a debate, to ask “why is that?”17

It is clear, however, that the two passages discuss different matters. Aristotle explains that perception is a connate discriminatory capacity in all animals and that some of them develop memory while others do not. This discussion belongs to Aristotelian physics and explains a principle in epistemology. Al-Ashʿarī, on the other hand, states that necessary knowledge in intellectual and traditional sciences is the reference in any debate. Thus, al-Ashʿarī is less preoccupied here with epistemology than with reminding the student of jadal the principle that a debate should have an end, as defined by the foundations of necessary knowledge (sense-based, reason-based, transmitted and textual knowledge).

7Al-Ashʿarī is particularly keen to posit the criteria which should “judge” between two debaters. Therefore, I do not see any reason to assume an Aristotelian flavour in this particular passage. I would rather consider that al-Ashʿarī (or Ibn Fūrak, to be precise) draws here on a familiar discussion of necessary knowledge found in books of kalām and uṣūl al-fiqh. Al-Ashʿarī’s concern, it seems to me, is to forestall the infinitely regressing argument whereby any claim could require a justification endlessly. While there is no doubt that philosophers, including Aristotle, have debunked the regress argument, and that Muslim theologians owe much to Greek philosophy in this regard, al-Ashʿarī is by no means here in solely philosophical territory; his concern is a matter which long preoccupied theological and legal disciplines, prone as they are to endless discussions.

  • 18 Larry B. Miller (2020), Islamic Disputation Theory, p. 16.

8In another passage, Miller sees the origins of the four dialectical questions of jadal in Aristotle’s elaborations on knowledge and scientific inquiry in the Posterior Analytics.18 Let us turn to al-Ashʿarī first, as reported by Ibn Fūrak:

  • 19 Abū Bakr Muḥammad ibn al-Ḥasan Ibn Fūrak (1987), Mujarrad maqālāt, p. 294-295. Translation is mine.

Al-Ashʿarī used to say: the question is divided into four types. The first type is to ask about the doctrine, madhhab, and that is when someone asks: what do you say about such and such? He said: and if he already knows the doctrine of his opponent, he should not ask this question, since this question pertains to obtaining information about the doctrine of the opponent. If he knows the opponent’s doctrine, he could require his opponent to prove his doctrine, such as in the case of someone who is known to believe and to follow the doctrine of the contingency of the world. He should start by asking him to prove the contingency of the world; and it is valid to start the debate by this request…. The third stage is to demand the relevance of the proof to the opponent’s thesis, wajh al-dalāla. If he believes that the opponent is arguing from a particular knowledge that could be opposed by a counter-argument, the questioner should proceed to make his argument, provided that he intended to do so.19

9Now I will reproduce the whole passage of Aristotle (Posterior Analytics 89b21), rather than only the first two lines quoted by Miller. My purpose here is to understand what Aristotle meant by the four scientific questions and whether they pertain in any manner to the four dialectical questions of al-Ashʿarī.

  • 20 Aristotle (2002), Posterior Analytics, p. 48.

The things we seek are equal in number to those we understand. We seek four things: the fact, the reason why, if something is, what something is. When we seek whether this or that is the case, setting down a plurality of terms (e.g. whether the sun is eclipsed or not), we are seeking the fact. Evidence for this: on finding that it is eclipsed we stop; and if from the beginning we know that it is eclipsed, we do not seek whether it is. When we know the fact we seek the reason why (e.g. knowing that it is eclipsed or that the earth moves, we seek the reason why it is eclipsed or why it moves). These things we seek in this way; but certain items we seek in another way - e.g. if a centaur or a god is or is not. (I mean if one is or is not simpliciter and not if one is white or not.) And having come to know that it is, we seek what it is (e.g.: Then what is a god? or What is a man?).20

In brief, Aristotle describes the questions that correspond to our object of inquiry: we use questions to obtain basic knowledge, and from there we go to the next stage by asking the appropriate questions.

10Note that Aristotle’s discussion here is heuristic and not dialectical. Aristotle’s four scientific questions which seek to discover the unknown do not match the dialectical questions of al-Ashʿarī. The latter is stating the sequence of debate between the questioner and the opponent: 1. the doctrine (the questioner is seeking to establish the opposing view that stands between him and the opponent, otherwise, there is no point to the procedure); 2. the proof that supports the opponent’s thesis; 3. how the proof pertains to the thesis; and 4. whether the same proof could invalidate the opponent’s argument if considered from another angle. The context is obviously different between Aristotle and al-Ashʿarī (heuristics in Aristotle’s passage vs. framing the opponent’s view and argument in order to invalidate both in al-Ashʿarī’s passage). Moreover, the question, suʾāl, in al-Ashʿarī’s text is an objection (a dialectical objection, to be precise) and not a scientific question aimed at inquiry (as in the case of Aristotle’s passage).

11To conclude, al-Ashʿarī’s dialectical method in the Adab al-jadal does not appear to evolve from a philosophical stream. The following section of this paper addresses whether theology, kalām is foundational to his method.

The theological thesis

12Modern Muslim scholarship on al-Ashʿarī’s Adab al-jadal tends to promote the theological thesis, ascribing to its dialectical methodology a theological character. In this regard, three Arabic works have appeared on al-Ashʿarī’s Adab al-jadal: al-Manhaj al-jadalī ʿinda l-Ashāʿira by Wafāʾ Samīr ʿAlī, Usus ʿilm al-jadal ʿinda al-Ashʿarī by Aḥmad al-Ṭayyib and Usus al-jadal ʿinda Abī l-Ḥasan al-Ashʿarī by Muḥammad Salāma ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz. Among these three authors, ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz offers the most extensive study of al-Ashʿarī’s Adab al-jadal and its methodology. Wafāʾ Samīr ʿAlī and Aḥmad al-Ṭayyib, on the other hand, expanded their analyses to broader theological content, and often beyond al-Ashʿarī himself. ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz also has the advantage of having consulted Western research on al-Ashʿarī’s Adab al-jadal. Therefore, I will restrict my investigation of the theological thesis to this particular work by ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz.

  • 21 Muḥammad Salāma ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz (2002), Majallat al-dirāsāt al-ʿArabiyya 2, p. 16.

13In brief, he argues that the point of view of al-Ashʿarī on jadal is one of the earliest sources on jadal in a major theological school, and at the same time one of the earliest sources of kalām; he believes jadal to be the principal reason for the birth of kalām, intended to defend Islamic dogma against its detractors.21 His core approach is built on analogical reasoning by broad parallels; that is to say, he takes theoretical passages from the Adab al-jadal and tries to find cases of application in the theological works attributed to al-Ashʿarī. However, this endeavour proves largely to be far-fetched.

  • 22 Abū Bakr Muḥammad ibn al-Ḥasan Ibn Fūrak (1987), Mujarrad maqālāt, p. 294.
  • 23 Abū Bakr Muḥammad ibn al-Ḥasan Ibn Fūrak (1987), Mujarrad maqālāt, p. 295.

14I will illustrate ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz’s argument with our previous example on the dialectical questions. ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz reads in the Adab al-jadal three dialectical questions rather than four, ignoring the fact that Ibn Fūrak clearly writes that “He used to say: the question is divided to four types”.22 Perhaps the reason ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz passed over the fourth question is that al-Ashʿarī does not enumerate it as he does with questions 1 to 3, but rather formulated it at the end of the passage as a corollary to question 3 (the relevance of the proof to the thesis, wajh al-dalāla). The fourth question occurs when the questioner believes that the opponent’s proof is irrelevant to the opponent’s thesis, and that the same proof might be relevant to the thesis of the questioner (counter-argument).23

  • 24 Abū Bakr Muḥammad ibn al-Ḥasan Ibn Fūrak (1987), Mujarrad maqālāt, p. 295.

15As for question 2, namely that the questioner “could require his opponent to prove his doctrine, such as in the case of someone who is known to believe and to follow the doctrine of the contingency of the world… he should start by asking him to prove the contingency of the world,”24 ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz finds in the given example a case for the theological nature of the Adab al-jadal. Here ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz neglects to consider that al-Ashʿarī states questions 1 and 2 in a theological debate (what is your thesis? And what is your proof) but does not provide any information about question 3 (requesting to establish the link between the thesis and the proof) and question 4 (the question about whether the application of the ratio legis could yield another outcome.)

  • 25 Muḥammad Salāma ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz (2002), Majallat al-dirāsāt al-ʿArabiyya 2, p. 46.
  • 26 See the various uses of wajh al-dalīl in: Walter E. Young (2017), The Dialectical Forge, p. 256, p. (...)
  • 27 This does not exclude, as argued by Young, that the third question, wajh al-dalāla, could be applie (...)

16While the Adab al-jadal does not provide examples for questions three or four, and shies away from giving examples for most dialectical questions later, ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz voluntarily steps in to fill the gap. The absence of examples gives ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz a license to look for parallels in al-Lumaʿ and al-Ibāna—two kalām books attributed to al-Ashʿarī—and then to explain how al-Ashʿarī’s practice of debate therein illustrates the relevance of the proof, wajh al-dalāla.25 The latter, however, is a procedure of juridical dialectics26 correlated to the use of qiyās and ratio legis, as I will explain in the following section.27

The juridical thesis

  • 28 On naqḍ, see Walter E. Young (2017), The Dialectical Forge, p. 169.
  • 29 For variant translations, see the glossary in Walter E. Young (2017), The Dialectical Forge, p. 609 (...)
  • 30 I am aware that this claim goes against Miller’s and Ess’s perspective that there is a theological (...)

17I will now argue that the dialectical methodology in the Adab al-jadal is juridical, based on three elements structuring Ibn Fūrak’s synthesis of al-Ashʿarī’s teachings: the dialectical terminology, the dialectical procedure, and the dialectical questions/answers. I will begin with the terminology of the Adab al-jadal. The juridical vocabulary is dominant, including: ʿilla (ratio legis), dalāla (indication), istidlāl (argumentation), ṭard (co-presence of ratio legis and judgment), ʿaks (opposite of ṭard), muʿāraḍa (counter-argument), naqḍ (inconsistency28 or invalidation of the ratio legis), etc.29 Some of these terms are indeed used in theology, but do not form together a system of dialectics except in juridical dialectics.30

  • 31 Abū Bakr Muḥammad ibn al-Ḥasan Ibn Fūrak (1987), Mujarrad maqālāt, p. 304.

18Regarding the procedure of jadal, Ibn Fūrak reports that al-Ashʿarī used to say that the stage of the debate where the questioner cannot ask the why question is when the opponent links between the basic case and the derivative case, with a ratio legis, showing the similarity between them, and the relevance of the judgment to the ratio legis”.31 The whole discussion about the ratio legis, its co-presence or not with the judgment that precedes and follows this quote, constitutes evidence that Ibn Fūrak considered jadal to be juridical dialectics, although he envisioned juridical dialectics as a tool that can be functional in theological debates as well.

19Let us turn now to the core of the Adab al-jadal, that is the dialectical questions and answers. As we discussed briefly above, al-Ashʿarī established four questions; he also established four answers to these questions:

  • 32 Abū Bakr Muḥammad ibn al-Ḥasan Ibn Fūrak (1987), Mujarrad maqālāt, p. 294 and p. 300.
  • 33 Abū Bakr Muḥammad ibn al-Ḥasan Ibn Fūrak (1987), Mujarrad maqālāt, p. 300.
  • 34 The term māhiya taken out of this context might indicate the influence of philosophy on al-Ashʿarī,(...)
  • 35 The term burhān is also used in philosophy to mean demonstration. However, it is also used in the Q (...)
  • 36 NB: the author uses māhiya here to indicate the content of the proof, namely: the ʿilla, ratio legi (...)

Dialectical questions32

al-suʾāl ʿan al-madhhab

al-muṭālaba bi-l-dalāla ʿalayh

al-muṭālaba bi-wajh al-dalāla ʿalayh

al-suʾāl ʿan ijrāʾ al-ʿilla

This is the question: Mā taqūl fī kadhā? What do you say about such and such?

Requesting the proof.

Requesting to establish the link between the thesis and the proof.

The question about whether the application of the ratio legis could yield another outcome.

Dialectical answers33

al-ikhbār ʿan māhiyat al-madhhab34

al-ikhbār ʿan burhānih35

al-ikhbār ʿan māhiyat burhānih

ijrāʾ al-ʿilla

Expressing a thesis.

Expressing a proof.

Expressing the ratio legis of the proof.36

Explaining the application of the legal cause.

  • 37 Abū Bakr Muḥammad ibn al-Ḥasan Ibn Fūrak (1987), Mujarrad maqālāt, p. 300.
  • 38 Abū Bakr Muḥammad ibn al-Ḥasan Ibn Fūrak (1987), Mujarrad maqālāt, p. 300.
  • 39 Walter E. Young (2017), The Dialectical Forge, p. 176.

20To illustrate further the juridical character of the Adab al-jadal, I will consider its discussion on the counter-argument, muʿāraḍa, and ratio legis, ʿilla. Ibn Fūrak attributes to al-Ashʿarī the assertion that counter-arguments pertain necessarily to a ratio legis, that is to say: the questioner can only counter-argue with the same ratio legis promoted by the opponent (as opposed to bringing in another ratio legis).37 He also attributes to him the assertion that a counter-argument can be built with regard to a ratio legis in two ways: either the two elements which are connected by the ratio legis share the same genus or belong to different genera.38 This discussion is well-known in later books of uṣūl al-fiqh and juridical dialectics of the late 11th century, especially al-Kāfiya fī l-jadal of al-Juwaynī (d. 1085 CE).39

  • 40 See the works of Larry B. Miller (2020), Islamic Disputation Theory, Abdessamad Belhaj (2010), Argu (...)

21Ibn Fūrak focuses his work on the Adab al-jadal on the dialectical questions and answers in relation to the ʿilla, ratio legis. In my view, this is sufficient proof that the kind of dialectical model he had in mind was that of uṣūl al-fiqh. This does not, however, contradict an aim to adapt this model to theological debates, for we know that Islamic disputation theory went through a long history of development until the 14th century, in quest of a theoretical model of disputation applicable to all genres of debate.40

Conclusion

22The main goal of the current study was to determine the juristic genre of al-Ashʿarī’s Adab al-jadal. After discussing the possible influences of Aristotle and kalām on al-Ashʿarī’s disputation theory, the most obvious finding to emerge from this paper is that Ibn Fūrak’s synthesizing of al-Ashʿarī’s teachings owes a huge debt to juridical dialectics of the late 10th century. Analysis of the dialectical terminology and various dialectical procedures in al-Ashʿarī’s Adab al-jadal reveals a pattern of questions and answers, arguments, objections and counter-arguments which is well-established in juridical dialectics. In particular, this study has identified the four dialectical questions and answers, the core of al-Ashʿarī’s Adab al-jadal, as a procedure of juridical dialectics which focuses on the relevance of the proof, dalāla, to the thesis.

23A logical progression of this study would be to evaluate the role of al-Ashʿarī’s Adab al-jadal in the history of Islamic disputation theory. However, such work can only be done if preceded by a critical study of the Mujarrad maqālāt al-Ashʿarī attributed to Ibn Fūrak. Further research is required to determine whether Ibn Fūrak authored this book, and if so, how he compiled his material in writing it.

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Bibliographie

ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz, Muḥammad Salāma (2002), Usus al-jadal ʿinda Abī l-Ḥasan al-Ashʿarī, Majallat al-dirāsāt al-ʿArabiyya 2, p. 9-67.

ʿAlī, Wafāʾ Samīr (1990). Al-Manhaj al-jadalī ʿinda l-Ashāʿira, MA Dissertation, Ain Shams University (Cairo).

Aristotle (2002), Posterior Analytics, tran. Jonathan Barnes, Oxford, Clarendon Press.

Belhaj, Abdessamad (2010), Argumentation et dialectique en islam : formes et séquences de la munāẓara, Louvain-la-Neuve, Presses Universitaires de Louvain.

Gimaret, Daniel (1985), « Un document majeur pour l'histoire du kalām : le "Muğarrad maqālāt al-Ašʿarī" d'Ibn Fūrak », Arabica 32, p. 185-218.

Ibn Fūrak, Abū Bakr Muḥammad ibn al-Ḥasan (1987), Mujarrad maqālāt al-shaykh Abī al-Ḥasan al-Ashʿarī, ed. Daniel Gimaret, Beirut, Dār al-Mashriq.

al-Juwaynī, Abū l-Maʿālī (1979), al-Kāfiya fī l-jadal, ed. Fawqiyya Ḥusayn Maḥmūd, Cairo, Maṭbaʿat ʿĪsā al-Bābī al-Ḥalabī.

Miller, Larry Benjamin (2020), Islamic Disputation Theory: The Uses & Rules of Argument in Medieval Islam, Cham, Springer.

al-Ṭayyib, Aḥmad (1987), « Usus ʿilm al-jadal ʿinda al-Ashʿarī », Ḥawliyyat Kulliyyat uṣūl al-dīn 4, p. 219-275.

van Ess, Josef (1976) « Disputationspraxis in der Islamischen Theologie. Eine Vorläufige Skizz », Revue des Études Islamiques 44, p. 23-60.

Young, Walter Edward (2017), The Dialectical Forge: Juridical Disputation and the Evolution of Islamic Law, Cham, Springer.

Zahra, Muḥammad Abū (1934), Tārīkh al-jadal, Cairo, Dār al-Fikr al-ʿArabī.

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Notes

1 Ibn Fūrak, Abū Bakr Muḥammad ibn al-Ḥasan (1987), Mujarrad maqālāt al-shaykh Abī al-Ḥasan al-Ashʿarī, ed. Daniel Gimaret, Beirut, Dār al-Mashriq, p. 284-322.

2 Miller, Larry B. (2020), Islamic Disputation Theory: The Uses & Rules of Argument in Medieval Islam, Cham, Springer, p. 6.

3 Zahra, Muḥammad Abū (1934), Tārīkh al-jadal, Cairo, Dār al-Fikr al-ʿArabī.

4 Muḥammad Salāma ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz (2002), Majallat al-dirāsāt al-ʿArabiyya 2, p. 9-67.

5 Young, Walter E. (2017), The Dialectical Forge: Juridical Disputation and the Evolution of Islamic Law, Cham, Springer.

6 Belhaj, Abdessamad (2010), Argumentation et dialectique en islam : formes et séquences de la munāẓara, Louvain-la-Neuve, Presses Universitaires de Louvain, p. 14-15.

7 Daniel Gimaret (1985), Arabica 32, p. 201.

8 Daniel Gimaret (1985), Arabica 32, p. 205.

9 Abū Bakr Muḥammad ibn al-Ḥasan Ibn Fūrak (1987), Mujarrad maqālāt, p. 284.

10 Abū Bakr Muḥammad ibn al-Ḥasan Ibn Fūrak (1987), Mujarrad maqālāt, p. 292.

11 Abū Bakr Muḥammad ibn al-Ḥasan Ibn Fūrak (1987), Mujarrad maqālāt, p. 317.

12 Daniel Gimaret (1985), Arabica 32, p. 215.

13 Walter E. Young (2017), The Dialectical Forge, p. 15.

14 Larry B. Miller (2020), Islamic Disputation Theory, p. 6.

15 Aristotle (2002), Posterior Analytics, tran. Jonathan Barnes, Oxford, Clarendon Press, p. 73.

16 Larry B. Miller (2020), Islamic Disputation Theory, p. 7.

17 Abū Bakr Muḥammad ibn al-Ḥasan Ibn Fūrak (1987), Mujarrad maqālāt, p. 287. This is my own translation. Miller translates this passage as follows:

The “way” (sabīl) of the objects of sense and knowledge is necessary when dealing with matters of the intellect, just as the “way” that things heard (al-masmūʿāt) and explicitly expressed (in writing) (al-manṣūṣāt) is when dealing with matters of the Law; inasmuch as they are the roots (uṣūl) and sources (ummahāt) (of all our knowledge). We reduce everything to them and when we reach them, our quest draws to a close (intahā al-muṭālaba), and it is improper for the questioner to ask “why is that?”

Larry B. Miller (2020), Islamic Disputation Theory, p. 7.

18 Larry B. Miller (2020), Islamic Disputation Theory, p. 16.

19 Abū Bakr Muḥammad ibn al-Ḥasan Ibn Fūrak (1987), Mujarrad maqālāt, p. 294-295. Translation is mine.

20 Aristotle (2002), Posterior Analytics, p. 48.

21 Muḥammad Salāma ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz (2002), Majallat al-dirāsāt al-ʿArabiyya 2, p. 16.

22 Abū Bakr Muḥammad ibn al-Ḥasan Ibn Fūrak (1987), Mujarrad maqālāt, p. 294.

23 Abū Bakr Muḥammad ibn al-Ḥasan Ibn Fūrak (1987), Mujarrad maqālāt, p. 295.

24 Abū Bakr Muḥammad ibn al-Ḥasan Ibn Fūrak (1987), Mujarrad maqālāt, p. 295.

25 Muḥammad Salāma ʿAbd al-ʿAzīz (2002), Majallat al-dirāsāt al-ʿArabiyya 2, p. 46.

26 See the various uses of wajh al-dalīl in: Walter E. Young (2017), The Dialectical Forge, p. 256, p. 279, p. 293 and p. 371.

27 This does not exclude, as argued by Young, that the third question, wajh al-dalāla, could be applied in theological contexts, regardless of whether or not it is connected to the ʿilla since the latter is used by theologians and philosophers as “cause” while the jurists used it as “ratio legis.” However, it should be noted that ʿilla is denied by Ashʿaris in theology, and so is ratiocination, taʿlīl. See Walter E. Young (2017), The Dialectical Forge, p. 32.

28 On naqḍ, see Walter E. Young (2017), The Dialectical Forge, p. 169.

29 For variant translations, see the glossary in Walter E. Young (2017), The Dialectical Forge, p. 609-611.

30 I am aware that this claim goes against Miller’s and Ess’s perspective that there is a theological dialectical theory. Unlike juridical and philosophical dialectics, the existing literature does not allow us to identify a theological jadal theory. This has to be substantiated in future research. See Josef van Ess (1976), Revue des Études Islamiques 44, p. 23-60 and Larry B. Miller (2020), Islamic Disputation Theory, p. 3-27.

31 Abū Bakr Muḥammad ibn al-Ḥasan Ibn Fūrak (1987), Mujarrad maqālāt, p. 304.

32 Abū Bakr Muḥammad ibn al-Ḥasan Ibn Fūrak (1987), Mujarrad maqālāt, p. 294 and p. 300.

33 Abū Bakr Muḥammad ibn al-Ḥasan Ibn Fūrak (1987), Mujarrad maqālāt, p. 300.

34 The term māhiya taken out of this context might indicate the influence of philosophy on al-Ashʿarī, since the term has been used at least since the 9th century to mean essence / quiddity. The phrase māhiyat al-madhhab, however, here refers to the content of the thesis.

35 The term burhān is also used in philosophy to mean demonstration. However, it is also used in the Quran to mean proof. The context of usage is necessary to determine the use of similar terms, and, here, burhān is a synonym of dalīl, which is an analogical argument in this case.

36 NB: the author uses māhiya here to indicate the content of the proof, namely: the ʿilla, ratio legis.

37 Abū Bakr Muḥammad ibn al-Ḥasan Ibn Fūrak (1987), Mujarrad maqālāt, p. 300.

This is a dialectical procedure known in juridical dialectics as reversal of the correlational inference (qalb al-qiyās ). See Walter E. Young (2017), The Dialectical Forge, p. 165.

38 Abū Bakr Muḥammad ibn al-Ḥasan Ibn Fūrak (1987), Mujarrad maqālāt, p. 300.

39 Walter E. Young (2017), The Dialectical Forge, p. 176.

40 See the works of Larry B. Miller (2020), Islamic Disputation Theory, Abdessamad Belhaj (2010), Argumentation et dialectique en islam and Walter E. Young (2017), The Dialectical Forge cited in this article.

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Abdessamad Belhaj, « Al-Ashʿarī’s Adab al-jadal : A Few Remarks on its Genre »Methodos [En ligne], 22 | 2022, mis en ligne le 20 mai 2022, consulté le 05 juin 2023. URL : http://journals.openedition.org/methodos/8974 ; DOI : https://doi.org/10.4000/methodos.8974

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Abdessamad Belhaj

Nemzeti Közszolgálati Egyetem / Université Catholique de Louvain

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