We thank Abdussamet Özkan, Ferhat Taşkın, Mahmut Temurci, Recep Gürkan Göktaş, and the anonymous reviewers of the article for their valuable contributions.

Introduction

2The work we have recently located, referred to by its author as a Risāla fī qawāʿid ʿilm al-naẓar and by its copyist as a Kitāb al-Fuṣūl, closely parallels al-Nasafī’s al-Fuṣūl in terms of composition and content. This, along with its being written by a Shāfiʿī author, is the reason why we gave this new al-Fuṣūl the title, ‘Opponent-al-Fuṣūl’ (hereafter OF) and referred to it as such throughout. In the present study, we attempt to answer the following questions: Who is the author of this OF? What kind of relationship does it have with al-Nasafī’s al-Fuṣūl? Why has it not received the same attention in the classical tradition or been subjected to the same amount of commentaries and ḥāshiyas as al-Nasafī’s al-Fuṣūl? We have also appended a critical edition of the Arabic text from the OF as a contribution to the ʿilm al-naẓar literature, with the hope that it will lead to new relevant studies.

5In the following section we will first provide information about the majmūʿa (convolute) in which the work is located, and then go on to show that the work we have located belongs to al-Kātibī, and argue why it can be qualified as an Opponent-al-Fuṣūl.

Examining the Majmūʿ a Containing the Opponent-al-Fuṣūl

6The OF is located at the Çorum Hasan Pasha Manuscripts Library, in majmūʿa number 1071. According to the library catalogue, there are seven works in this majmūʿa, while there are nine according to the list titled “فهرست ما فيه من الكتب المعتبرة” on folio 1a of the majmūʿa itself. In fact, the majmūʿa contains ten works, as well as lengthy quotations and annotations. When the calligraphic style of the above index record found on folio 1a is examined, it does not appear to belong to the copyist of the works in the majmūʿa. It seems to have been compiled at a later time from notes located between the folios containing the works. The works found in majmūʿa number 1071 at the Çorum Hasan Pasha Manuscripts Library are as follows:

• There are two notes between folios 48b-49a under the title ‘masʾala’ (issue) addressing the disputation between the Ḥanafīs and the Shāfiʿīs on whether making an intention (al-niyya) is required before performing ablution, and whether the selling of goods that are not present during trading between parties is legitimate. The second issue is discussed in reference to Athīr al-Dīn al-Abharī (d. 663/1265 [?]).

• Another two notes found between folios 49b-50a, both of which are also named masʾala, are related to the ʿilm al-naẓar. The first is about the type of murder weapon which is used in the act of killing that requires retaliation (qiṣāṣ); while the second one is about whether the Ramaḍān fast requires atonement (kaffāra) if it is broken by eating and drinking.

• There is also another note related to the ʿilm al-naẓar on folio 50b, which, considering the scribal hand, belongs to al-Wasāʾil’s copyist Muḥammad b. ʿUmar b. Muḥammad al-Anasī/al-Unsī (?). This note is about the disputation between the Ḥanafīs and Shāfiʿīs on whether the obligation of zakāt is imposed on the debtor or not.

2. al-ʿUmda. This work of ʿilm al-naẓar is recorded as “ʿUmdetü’l-ʿakāʾid” in the library catalogue, as “al-ʿUmdat fī ʿilm al-kalām” on folio 1a and as “Risāla fī l-munāẓara al-fiqhiyya” on folio 51b where the work begins. Based on the work’s content, the latter appears to be recorded at a later date. However, the correct name should be al-ʿUmdat. It has an ownership note (tamlīk) on folio 51a as follows:

من كتب العبد الضعيف محمد بن عمر بن محمد الأنسي

4. al-Fuṣūl. This work is recorded as “Mukaddime fî’l-Cedel ve’l-Hilâf ve’n-Nazar” in the library catalogue, and as Muqaddimat al-naẓar li-Burhān al-Dīn al-Nasafī both on folio 1a and folio 73a, but with the addition of hādhihī Muqaddimat al-naẓar in the latter. Its attribution to its author in the library catalogue is as follows: “Burhân ed-dîn Muhammed b. Muhammed en-Nesefî (606-687/1209-1288)”. It is located between folios 73b-80a, each containing 25 lines, and the margins of the text have frequent correction notes. The copyist is ʿAbd Allāh b. Sulaymān and the copy date is 13 Muḥarram 681 (May 3, 1282). This date is significant, as it is seven years before al-Nasafī’s death. Al-Anasī/al-Unsī, copyist of the other works, left the following ownership note, without giving any date:

من كتب المفتقر إلى عفو الصمد محمد بن عمر بن محمد الأنسي متع به وسائر كتبه

• • 18 Malik ʿAlāʾ al-Dīn is the Anatolian Seljuk ruler ʿAlāʾ al-Dīn Keykubad I. His reign was between 122 (...)
  • 19 The full name of al-Malik al-Ashraf, ruler of the al-Jazeera and Damascus regions of the Ayyubids, (...)
  • 20 Our colleague Halide Aslan is currently composing an article about the content of this letter.

  After the al-Mutimma, on folio 138b, there is a copy of a letter from Malik ʿAlāʾ al-Dīn (d. 634/1237)18 to al-Malik al-Ashraf (d. 635/1237),19 in which the former responds to the latter’s threat of war and demand for goods.20 (Following this there is some disorder in the folios.)

• On folio 140a there is the suggested solution to a fallacy (mughālaṭa) claiming the possibility of a contradiction between two things.

6. al-Risāla fī qawāʿid ʿilm al-naẓar. The work that is the subject of the present study is recorded as “Risâle fî Kavâ’id İlmi’l-Nazar” in the library catalogue, as al-Fuṣūl li-mawlānā Najm al-Dīn al-Kātibī on folio 1a, and as Kitāb al-Fuṣūl li-mawlānā Najm al-Milla wa-l-Dīn afḍal al-mutaʾakhkhirīn al-Kātibī al-Qazwīnī -raḥmat Allāh ʿalayh- on folio 141a. The author’s name does not appear in the library catalogue, possibly due to the following note found on the TUYATOK Manuscript Registration Sheet in the majmūʿa: “although it is said that the work is attributed to Najm al-Dīn al-Qazwīnī, there is no evidence in our sources to confirm this.” Considering the scribal hand, the following note on folio 141a was most likely written by the copyist al-Anasī/al-Unsī:

كتاب الفصول لمولانا نجم الملة والدين أفضل المتأخرين الكاتبي القزويني -رحمة الله عليه-

Based on his notes and the works he copied, the copyist also appears to be the first-hand owner of the majmūʿa. The following note is found on folio 141a:

من كتب العبد الضعيف محمد بن عمر محمد الأنسي

min kutub al-ʿabd al-ḍaʿīf Muḥammad b. ʿUmar b. Muḥammad al-Anasī/al-Unsī.

In the introduction, the author describes the work as follows:

فهذه رسالة في قواعد علم النظر...

fa-hādhihī Risāla fī qawāʿid ʿilm al-naẓar

The manuscript is located between folios 141b-157a, each page containing 21 lines. It was copied by al-Anasī/al-Unsī in the Mustanṣiriyya Madrasa, though no copy date is recorded. There are no notes throughout the text other than a handful of corrections (noted in our edition, below), which seem to belong to the copyist himself.

7. Masāʾil ʿashara. This incomplete manuscript is located between folios 157b-158b. The author of the work is ʿAfīf al-Dīn Abū Ḥafṣ ʿUmar b. ʿUthmān al-Janzī (d. [?]). There are 23 lines on folio 157b-158a, and 27 lines on folio 158b. The work is not recorded on folio 1a, where what we count as the eighth work is instead recorded as the seventh. Although it seems like the work ends on folio 159a, there are some missing folios after 158b. This is evident, first of all, because, as per the title, there should be ten issues covered in the work, but only three are present. Secondly, the catchword fī maḥalli on 158b has no correlation on folio 159a. Considering the scribal hand, the copyist is most likely al-Anasī/al-Unsī.

• The text on folio 159a has content differing from that of the previous folios. It concerns a disputation, covered in the ʿilm al-naẓar, as to whether there should be compensation in cases where a convicted thief dies as a result of the specific punishment for theft. It appears to be the last folio of a work that has been removed from the majmūʿa. The scribal hand suggests that it was also copied by al-Anasī/al-Unsī.

8. Mubāḥatha ʿalā ṭarīq al-mukātaba bayn al-Imām Muḥyī l-Dīn wa-bayn al-Imām Shams al-Dīn. This work is located between folios 160b-168b, with each containing about 19 lines. The copyist is al-Anasī/al-Unsī and the copy date is 696 (1296). As mentioned above, on folio 1a this is recorded as the seventh work.

• Following this eighth work, there is a text between folios 169a-170a discussing the existence of the subject term (maḥkūm ʿalayh) in the science of logic. Judging by the scribal hand, it seems to belong to the majmūʿa’s apparent owner, al-Anasī/al-Unsī.

• On folio 170b there is a disputation, covered in the ʿilm al-naẓar, on whether it is obligatory to pay zakāt on a woman’s jewelry.

9. al-Fuṣūl fī tamhīd al-qawāʿid wa-l-uṣūl. This work, which is also about the ‘ilm al-naẓar, is not recorded in the library catalogue. The title on folio 1a is Tamhīd al-qawāʿid, but the author of the work is anonymous. It is located between folios 171b-172b, each containing 27 lines. Unfortunately the work is incomplete, since only the first part of the first chapter, on specification (takhṣīṣ), is found.

• On folio 173a there is a quotation, without mentioning the source, from Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī. It discusses whether or not an affirmative metathetic proposition (maʿdūla) entails the existence of the subject.

10. Not mentioned in the library catalog, the final work of the majmūʿa is in Persian, and is recorded as Muqaddima bi-l-fārisiyya fī ʿilm al-tārīkh on folio 1a. It is found between folios 173a-176a. The folios are disordered; although it appears the work should begin on folio 174, and continue with folios 173 and 175, folio 174b was numbered 175, 175a-b was omitted, and folio 176a-b was renumbered 175a-b.

• Following this work (in folios 175a-179b), there are some lengthy notes about the ʿilm al-naẓar recorded, on the ninth line of folio 1a, under the title Fawāʾid wa-nukat kathīra.

• The first of these notes (found on the unnumbered folio 175a and the numbered folio 175b) concerns whether atonement is required in the case where a Ramaḍān fast is broken by sexual intercourse, as well as eating and drinking. Considering the scribal hand, it appears to belong to al-Anasī/al-Unsī, the owner of the majmūʿa.

• The second (folios 175b-176a) contains a disputation between the Ḥanafīs and the Shāfiʿīs on whether or not adultery gives rise to prohibition of marriage (ḥurmat al-muṣāhara), and whether one can marry the sister of one’s previous wife fulfilling her waiting period (ʿidda) after an irrevocable divorce (ṭalāq bāʾin).

• The third (folios 176b-177b) is a discussion about quiddity, with no reference to the text’s author.

• The fourth (folios 178a-179b) contains the three different correspondences between the authors found in the eighth work above, the Mubāḥatha ʿalā ṭarīq al-mukātaba bayn Muḥyī l-Dīn wa-bayn Shams al-Dīn. All three concern whether or not conditional propositions require each other.

The Opponent-al-Fuṣūl’s Attribution to al-Kātibī

7 In this section we will present our findings that suggest the work we have located belongs to al-Kātibī. As mentioned earlier, the work is not attributed to al-Kātibī among classic and modern references, except for the two records in the majmūʿa in which this work is found. Although there are certain ambiguities as to whether it belongs to al-Kātibī, there is no doubt that he employs the ʿilm al-naẓar at the highest degree in all his works, and even provides information about the theoretical functioning of the ʿilm al-naẓar in relevant contexts. In particular, he gives extensive theoretical knowledge about the ʿilm al-naẓar in the al-Munaṣṣaṣ, his commentary on Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī’s Kitāb al-Mulakhkhaṣ; the al-Mufaḍḍal, his commentary on al-Rāzī’s Kitāb al-Muḥaṣṣal; and the Sharḥ Kashf al-asrār, his commentary on al-Khūnajī’s Kashf al-asrār. Following a thorough examination of the extant works that evidently belong to him, we have come across a number of indicators tying him to the OF which we will discuss one by one.

8Before proceeding to that, however, we would like to draw attention to another point: the work recorded as al-Fuṣūl li-mawlānā Najm al-Dīn al-Kātibī on folio 1a, and as Kitāb al-Fuṣūl li-mawlānā Najm al-Milla wa-l-Dīn afḍal al-mutaʾakhkhirīn al-Kātibī al-Qazwīnī -raḥmat Allāh ʿalayh on folio 141a, is recorded by the author as a Risāla fī qawāʿid ʿilm al-naẓar in the introduction. Considering the writing style of the classical tradition, we can take this phrase to be the title of the work. Therefore, the title al-Fuṣūl on folios 1a and 141a might have been written by the student/teacher copyist of the Mustanṣiriyya Madrasa, who was aware of al-Nasafī’s al-Fuṣūl and the works that emerged in this context, as a kind of imitation. In the present study, we will continue to characterize this work as an Opponent-al-Fuṣūl (OF) in recognition of the old rivalry between the two leading traditions of fiqh, but we will use the designation Risāla fī qawāʿid ʿilm al-naẓar when referencing the text directly.

9As for the evidence that this work belongs to al-Kātibī, it is as follows.

Third: Al-Kātibī, in his self-commentary on al-Shamsiyya, amends the description of tamthīl (analogy) he had given in al-Shamsiyya, rather than interpreting it in exactly the same way. This amendment overlaps closely with the definition of qiyās (analogical reasoning in uṣūl al-fiqh) in the fifth chapter of the Risāla fī qawāʿid ʿilm al-naẓar, except for a few minor differences. This is seen in the table below:

Al-Shamsiyya	Sharḥ al-mawāḍiʿ al-mushkila min al-Risāla al-Shamsiyya fī l-qawāʿid al-manṭiqiyya	Risāla fī qawāʿid ʿilm al-naẓar
التمثيل وهو إثبات حكم في جزئي وجد في جزئي آخر لمعنى مشترك بينهما.	التمثيل وهو عبارة عن إثبات الحكم في صورة معينة لثبوت ذلك الحكم في صورة أخرى معينة فعلل بمعنى مشترك بين الصورتين.	وهو عبارة عن إثبات الحكم في صورة معينة أو غير معينة لعلة مشتركة بينها وبين صورة أخرى معينة أو غير معينة يثبت الحكم فيها بالاتفاق.
Özpilavcı edition, p.179	Özpilavcı-Öztop edition, p.100	pr. 47

Descriptions of this kind of reasoning, which scholars in uṣūl al-fiqh refer to as qiyās and logicians as tamthīl, have been generally well-accepted. So one might question whether the similarity between the amendment made in the commentary on al-Shamsiyya and the definition of qiyās in the Risāla fī qawāʿid ʿilm al-naẓar support the latter’s belonging to al-Kātibī. Of course, authors sometimes make alterations in their descriptions within the framework of their jurisprudential approaches. What we see here is therefore relatively uncommon, i.e., both the deliberate amendment from al-Shamsiyya to self-commentary and the similarity between self-commentary and Risāla. Furthermore, the fact that these descriptions are unique to the author is evident when compared with the descriptions of qiyās by other prominent Shāfiʿī-Ashʿarī scholars, both contemporaries as well as those who lived before al-Kātibī. Below are some examples of varying definitions, first of the legal theorists’ qiyās, then of the logicians’ tamthīl:

إثبات مثل حكم معلوم لمعلوم آخر لأجل اشتباههما في علة الحكم عند المثبت.

الاستواء بين الفرع والأصل في العلة المستنبطة من حكم الأصل.

مساواة فرع لاصل في علة حكمه.

After examining the descriptions of tamthīl provided by various logicians, we have not yet come across a description in agreement with al-Kātibī’s. Consider, for example, the following:

التمثيل وهو الحكم على جزئي لوجوده في جزئي آخر معين أو جزئيات أخر لمشابهة بينهما.

التمثيل وهو إسناد الحكم الثابت في جزئي إى المعنى المشترك بينه وبين آخر لتعليل الحكم إليه.

والتمثيل هو إلحاق شيء بشبيهه في حكم ثابت له.

التمثيل وهو إلحاق شيء بشبيهه في حكم ثابت له.

... التمثيل...وهو إثبات الحكم في جزئي لثبوته في جزئي آخر مشابه له.

...التمثيل... وهو عبارة عن إثبات الحكم في جزئي لثبوته في جزئي آخر لمعنى مشترك بينهما.

التمثيل وهو إثبات حكم في جزئي لثبوته في جزئي آخر لمعنى مشترك بينهما.

...التمثيل... بأنه إثبات الحكم في جزئي لثبوته في جزئي آخر لمعنى مشترك بينهما.

...التمثيل... وهو إثبات حكم في شيء لوجوده في مثله بعلية الجامع بينهما.

Sharḥ al-mawāḍiʿ al-mushkila min al-Risāla al-Shamsiyya fī l-qawāʿid al-manṭiqiyya	Baḥr al-Fawāʾid fī l-Manṭiq	Risāla fī qawāʿid ʿilm al-naẓar
وذكروا لبيان علية المعنى المشترك وجهين: أحدهما الترديد بين عين المتناقضين كقولهم في هذه الصورة: علة حدوث البيت إما التأليف أو الوجود أو كونه قائما بنفسه، والأخيران باطلان وإلا لكان كل موجود وكل قائم بنفسه حادثا فتعين الأول وهو المطلوب. وثانيهما الدوران وصورته أن يقال الحدوث ثبت في بعض وجود صور وجود التأليف وانعدم في بعض صور عدمه ودوران الشيء مع الشيء وجودا وعدما على ما ذكرنا من التفسير علة لكون المدار علة للدائر. وقد بين ذلك في علم النظر. وكلاهما ضعيف.	وذكروا لبيان علية المعنى المشترك طريقين: أحدهما الدوران وذلك لأن الحكم وجد في بعض صور وجود المشترك وانعدم في بعض صور عدمه. ومتى كان كذلك، كان الحكم دائرا مع المعنى المشترك وجودا وعدما. ودوران الشيء مع الشيء وجودا وعدما على ما ذكرنا من التفسير موجب لعلية المدار للدائر. وقد بين ذلك في علم النظر. الطريق الثاني الترديد الذي بين المتناقضين كقولهم علة الحكم اما المعنى المشترك أو معنى كذا ثم يثبتون بطلان القسم الثاني بدليل يختص بذلك الموضع يتعين لهم الأول وكل واحد من الطريقين ضعيف.	[26] وهو عبارة عن وجود أمر في بعض صور وجود غيره وعدمه في بعض صور عدمه. وذلك الغير يسمى "مدارا"، وذلك الأمر "دائرا". [27] والدوران على هذا التفسير يقتضي كون المدار علة للدائر إذا لم يقطع بعدم علية المدار للدائر، ولا بالتخلف عنه ولا بوجود مزاحم لعليته له. ............................................ [37] واعلم أن المدار: (1) قد يكون مدار الشيء وجودا وعدما على معنى أنه يوجد في جميع صور وجوده وينعدم في جميع صور عدمه كالزنا الصادر من المحصن لوجوب الرجم عليه، فإنه بحاله يجب الرجم في جميع صور وجوده ولا يجب في جميع صور عدمه. (2) وقد يكون مدارا وجودا لا عدما كالهبة لثبوت الملك، فإنه يوجد ثبوت الملك حيث وجدت، ولكن لا يلزم من عدمها عدم ثبوت الملك لجواز ثبوته بطريق آخر من الطرق الموجبة لثبوت الملك كالبيع والإرث. (3) وقد يكون مدارا عدما لا وجودا كالوضوء بالنسبة إلى صحة الصلوة، فإنه يلزم من عدم الوضوء عدم صحة الصلوة ولكن لا يلزم من وجوده صحة الصلوة لجواز توقف الصحة على أمر آخر لو يوجد كاستقبال القبلة وغيره. ........................................... [ 39] ودوران الأثر مع الشيء وجودا وعدما علة لعلية المدار للدائر لما مر من الوجهين.
p.100.	175b.	pr. 26-27, 37, 39.

What is referred to above in the bold text from al-Kātibī’s two logic commentaries is found in detail in the Risāla fī qawāʿid ʿilm al-naẓar. In the Risāla, the author re-discusses the matter of dawarān in the context of intellectual proofs in the ‘ilm al-naẓar under the heading of ‘qiyās,’ in accordance with the context of his earlier discussion under the heading of ‘dawarān’. Therefore, we think that the text in bold: “this has been explained in the ‘ilm al-naẓar” may very well refer to the Risāla, not to the ‘ilm al-naẓar in general. This is further strengthened by the fact that he does not make such references in his voluminous commentaries al-Munaṣṣaṣ and Sharḥ Kashf al-asrār.

Fifth: What is treated under tamthīl in al-Kātibī’s Sharḥ Kashf al-asrār is covered in the chapter on (juristic) qiyās in the Risāla fī qawāʿid ʿilm al-naẓar. When explaining that tamthīl/qiyās is made with a categorical syllogism (qiyās iqtirānī) and a hypothetical syllogism (qiyās istithnāʾī), the works employ similar expressions, as follows:

Sharḥ Kashf al-asrār	Risāla fī qawāʿid ʿilm al-naẓar
[ك 5106] فظهر: أن التمثيل على تقدير صحة مقدماته إنّما يتمّ بقياسين منطقيين أحدهما اقتراني مركب من متصلتين كليتين موجبتين والثاني استثنائي مركب من متصلة واستثناء عين مقدمها…	[50] فظهر: أن القياس في عرف الفقهاء إنما يتم بقياسين منطقيين: أحدهما اقتراني مركب من متصلتين، والآخر: استثنائي.
v. 1, p. 1221, pr. 5106.	pr. 50

The author’s description of jurisprudential qiyās in the Risāla comes after he has exemplified how to apply it in the method of logic. Interestingly, this practice is not found in al-Nasafī’s al-Fuṣūl. Therefore, it is fair to suggest that the author of the Risāla was more interested in logic than al-Nasafī; this particular example makes even more sense considering al-Kātibī’s identity as a logician.

Sixth: When discussing tamthīl in the Sharḥ Kashf al-asrār, al-Kātibī’s statements match the explanations made in the OF’s chapter on dawarān, both in terms of content and context. Since we cannot determine which of the two was written first, we are not - for the time being - able to answer whether the statements in the OF are an abridgment of those in the Sharḥ Kashf al-asrār, or whether the latter are simply an expansion on those in the OF. However, as can be seen in the table below, there appears to be an essential link between the two texts. In both examples, the author begins with a reference to Rukn al-Dīn al-ʿAmīdī (d. 615/1218), one of the distinguished scholars of the ʿilm al-naẓar, when determining whether or not the madār (concomitant presumed cause) is the ʿilla of the dāʾir (concomitant presumed effect), and then criticizes al-ʿAmīdī’s approach on the same grounds.

Sharḥ Kashf al-asrār	Risāla fī qawāʿid ʿilm al-naẓar
[ك 5109] وأجود ما قيل في بيان أن المدار علة للدائر ما ذكره الإمام المبرز من أهل النظر ركن الدين العميدي وسماه "البرهان القاطع" وهو أن أحد الأمرين وهو إما كون هذا الدوران علة لعليّة هذا المدار للدائر أو علية هذا المدار للدائر لازم، وأيّاما كان يلزم علية هذا المدار للدائر.	[28] واحتج الإمام المحقق المبرز من أهل النظر ركن الدين العميدي على ذلك بأن يقال: (1) (أ) لو كان الدوران علة لعلية المدار للدائر منضما إلى جملة الأمور الواقعة، لكان الدوران علة لعلية المدار للدائر على هذا التقدير. (ب) وإذا كان علة على هذا التقدير، كان علة في نفس الأمر.
[ك 5110] وإنّما قلنا ‘أن أحد هذين الأمرين لازم’، لأنه لو ثبت أحدهما منضما إلى جملة الأمور الواقعة في نفس الأمر وجودية كانت تلك الأمور أو عدمية، لثبت أحدهما جزما ضرورة استلزام الكلّ للجزء. ويلزم من ثبوت أحدهما على هذا التقدير ثبوت أحدهما في نفس الأمر لوجوه:	- أما الشرطية الأولى، فظاهرة ضرورة وجوب استلزام الكل للجزء.
[ك 5111] أحدها: أنه يصدق حينئذ "كل ما ليس بثابت في نفس الأمر فهو ليس بثابت على هذا التقدير لثبوت جملة الأمور الواقعة على هذا التقدير". وينعكس بعكس النقيض إلى قولنا "كل ما هو ثابت على هذا التقدير فهو ثابت في نفس الأمر". وينتظم مع قولنا "أحد هذين الأمرين ثابت على هذا التقدير" قياسا منتجا "لثبوت أحدهما في نفس الأمر". هكذا: "أحدهما ثابت على هذا التقدير"، "وكل ما هو ثابت على هذا التقدير فهو ثابت في نفس الأمر". ينتج: "أن أحدهما ثابت في نفس الأمر". وهو المطلوب.	- وأما الشرطية الثانية، فلأن كل ما ليس بعلة في نفس الأمر، فهو ليس بعلة على هذا التقدير ضرورة ثبوت جملة الأمور الواقعة على هذا التقدير. فينعكس بعكس النقيض: - كل ما هو علة على هذا التقدير فهو علة في نفس الأمر، - ويصير كبرى لقولنا: "الدوران علة لعلية المدار للدائر على هذا التقدير." حتى ينتظم قياس في الشكل الأول. - وينتج: "الدوران علة لعلية المدار للدائر في نفس الأمر."
[ك 5112] وثانيها: إذا صدق قولنا "كل ما ليس بثابت في نفس الأمر ليس بثابت على هذا التقدير" يلزمه "لا شيء مما ليس بثابت في نفس الأمر بثابت على هذا التقدير" لما عرفت. [ك 5113] أن الموجبة المعدولة المحمول أخص من السالبة المحصلة المحمول وحينئذ ينتظم هذا اللازم مع صغرى القياس الأوّل قياسا في الشكل الثاني منتجا للمطلوب. هكذا: "أحد ما ذكرنا من الأمرين ثابت على هذا التقدير" "ولا شيء مما ليس بثابت في نفس الأمر بثابت على هذا التقدير". ينتج: "ليس أحد هذين الأمرين ليس بثابت في نفس الأمر" ويلزمه "أحدهما ثابت في نفس الأمر". لأنّ سلب السلب إيجاب.	(2) أو نقول: يلزم القضية المذكورة قولنا: "لا شيء مما ليس بعلة في نفس الأمر بعلة على هذا التقدير"، ويصير كبرى لما ذكرناه من المقدمة حتى ينتظم معها قياس في الشكل الثاني منتج لقولنا: "ليس الدوران ليس بعلة في نفس الأمر أي هو علة في نفس الأمر." لأن سلب السلب إيجاب.
[ك 5114] وثالثها: أنّه "لو ثبت عدم كلّ واحد من هذين الأمرين في نفس الأمر لثبت عدم كلّ منهما على هذا التقدير" لتحقق جملة الأمور الواقعة على هذا التقدير. واللّازم باطل ضرورة "أن أحدهما ثابت على هذا التقدير" فيلزم "ثبوت أحدهما في نفس الأمر".	(3) أو نقول: "لو لم يكن علة في نفس الأمر، لم تكن علة على هذا التقدير" ضرورة صدق قولنا: "كل ما ليس بعلة في نفس الأمر، فهو ليس بعلة على هذا التقدير." واللازم منتف ضرورة علية هذا التقدير، وهو ضعيف:
[ك 5115] فعلم: "أن أحد ما ذكرنا من الأمرين ثابت في نفس الأمر". وأمّا أن كلّ واحد منهما ملزوم للمدعى، فظاهر. لأنّ الواقع إن كان هو علية هذا المدار للدائر، فقد حصل المطلوب. وإن كان هو دلالة هذا الدوران على علية هذا المدار للدائر، فيلزم أيضا علية هذا المدار للدائر عملا بالعلة. (....) [ك 5118] لم قلتم بــ"ـأن أحد ما ذكرتم من الأمرين إذا كان ثابتا على ذلك التقدير، يلزم أن يكون ثابتا في نفس الأمر". والوجوه التى ذكرها لبيان ذلك مغالطة.
[ك 5119] أمّا الأوّل: فلأنا لا نسلّم أن قولنا "كلّ ما ليس بثابت في نفس الأمر ليس بثابت على ذلك التقدير" ينعكس بعكس النقيض إلى قولنا "كلّ ما هو ثابت على ذلك التقدير فهو ثابت في نفس الأمر". فلئن قلت: وإلا لصدق نقيضه وهو قولنا "بعض ما هو ثابت على ذلك التقدير ليس بثابت في نفس الأمر". وينتظم مع الأصل قياسا منتجا لقولنا "بعض ما هو ثابت على ذلك التقدير ليس بثابت على ذلك التقدير". وإنه محال.	[29] أما <ضعف> الأول، فلأنا لا نسلم انعكاس القضية المذكورة إلى ما ذكرتم. - ولئن قال: لو لم يصدق ذلك، يصدق نقيضه وهو قولنا: - بعض ما هو علية على هذا التقدير، فهو ليس بعلة في نفس الأمر. – وكل ما ليس بعلة في نفس الأمر، فهو ليس بعلة على هذا التقدير. - ينتج: بعض ما هو علة على هذا التقدير ليس بعلة على هذا التقدير. وإنه محال.
[ك 5120] قلنا: ما ذكرتموه ليس نقيضا للموجبة الكلية التى ادّعيتم أنها عكس للأصل المذكور بل نقيضها قولنا "ليس بعض ما ليس بثابت على ذلك التقدير بثابت في نفس الأمر" وهو لا يستلزم صدق قولنا "بعض ما هو ثابت على ذلك التقدير فهو ليس بثابت في نفس الأمر" لجواز صدق هذا النقيض مع نقيض هذه الموجبة الجزئية وهو قولنا "لا شيء مما هو ثابت على ذلك التقدير ليس بثابت في نفس الأمر".	- قلنا: لا نسلم بأن ما ذكرتموه نقيض لتلك القضية بل نقيضها قولنا: "ليس كل ما هو علة على هذا التقدير، فهو علة في نفس الأمر." وهذا لا يستلزم قولنا: "بعض ما هو علة على هذا التقدير، فهو ليس بعلة في نفس الأمر" لجواز صدق نقيضه معه.
[ك 5121] غاية ما في الباب: أنه يلزم من صدقهما سلب النقيضين عن بعض ما هو ثابت على ذلك التقدير. وذلك جائز لكون ذلك التقدير محالا وجواز استلزام المحال المحال.	غاية ما في الباب أن صدقهما يستلزم سلب علية الشيء في نفس الأمر، وعدمها في بعض ما هو علة على هذا التقدير، لكن ذلك عندنا جائز لكون هذاا لتقدير محالا.
[ك 5122] ولئن سلمنا ذلك، لكن لم قلتم بأن قولنا "بعض ما هو ثابت على ذلك التقدير ليس بثابت على ذلك التقدير" محال؟ والمستند ما مرّ آنفا.	سلمناه، لكن لم قلتم بأن اجتماع العلية وعدم العلية في شيء واحد على هذا التقدير محال. فإن هذا التقدير محال. والمحال جاز أن يستلزم محالا آخر. - لا يقال: عدم المحال واقع على هذا التقدير ضرورة كونه من جملة الأمور الواقعة. - لأنا نقول: نعم ولكن لم قلتم بأنه يلزم منه أن لا يكون المحال واقعا على هذا التقدير. فإن هذا التقدير لما كان محالا، جاز أن يلزمه المحال. وعدمه لم قلتم بأن ليس كذلك.
[ك 5123] وأمّا الثاني: فلا نسلّم استلزام قولنا "كل ما ليس بثابت في نفس الأمر ليس بثابت على ذلك التقدير" كقولنا "لا شيء مما ليس بثابت في نفس الأمر بثابت على ذلك التقدير". وإنّما يستلزم هذه السالبة أن لو امتنع نقيضها معه، وهو ممنوع. [ك 5124] لا يقال: لو صدق نقيض هذه السالبة الكلية مع تلك الموجبة الكلية لا ينتظم منهما قياس في الشكل الثالث هكذا: "بعض ما ليس بثابت في نفس الأمر ثابت على ذلك التقدير". "وكلّ ما ليس بثابت في نفس الأمر ليس بثابت على ذلك التقدير". وينتج: "بعض ما هو ثابت على ذلك التقدير ليس بثابت على ذلك التقدير". وإنه محال، لأنّا نقول: لا نسلّم استحالة صدق ذلك. والمستند ما مرّ.	[30] وأما <ضعف> الثاني، فنقول: لا نسلم استلزام القضية المذكورة لما ذكرتم من السالبة الكلية على تقدير صدق القضية المذكورة لصدق نقيضها وهو قولنا: "بعض ما ليس بعلة في نفس الأمر بعلة على هذا التقدير." وينتظم معها قياس في الشكل الثالث. وينتج: "بعض ما هو علة على هذا التقدير، فهو ليس بعلة على هذا التقدير." - قلنا: قد عرفت عدم استحالة ذلك.
[ك 5125] وأمّا الثالث: فلا نسلّم أنه "لو ثبت عدم كل واحد من الأمرين المذكورين في نفس الأمر لثبت على ذلك التقدير" قوله ‘لتحقق جملة الأمور الواقعة على هذا التقدير’. [ك 5126] قلنا: مسلم، ولكن لماذا يلزم منه صدق ما ذكرتم من الشرطية وإنّما يلزم منه صدقها أن لو انتظم من مقدمها ومن قولنا "كل ما ليس بثابت في نفس الأمر ليس بثابت على ذلك التقدير" قياسا منتج لتاليها. وعدم انتظام هذا القياس منهما ظاهر لعدم اتحاد الحد الأوسط ضرورة أن عدم كلّ واحد من الأمرين مقدر في نفس الأمر. والثابت على ذلك التقدير هو الأمور المحققة في نفس الأمر وجودية كانت أو عدمية لا الأمور التى فرض وجودها أو عدمها في نفس الأمر. وإذا كان كذلك، لا يتّحد الوسط ولا ينتج القياس شيئا فضلا عن تاليها. نعم، لو لزم من صدق الشرطية الأولى، صدق كل ما قدر تحققه في نفس الأمر على ذلك. والتقدير كان صدقها لازما، لكنك خبير بعدم لزوم ذلك منها.	[31] وأما <ضعف> الثالث، قلنا لم قلتم بأنه يلزم من فرض عدم عليته في نفس الأمر بصدق قولنا: "كل ما ليس بعلة في نفس الأمر، فهو ليس بعلة على هذا التقدير عدم عليته على هذا التقدير." وإنما يلزم ذلك أن لو اندرج عدم عليته المفروضة في نفس الأمر في موضوع هذه القضية الكلية وهو ممنوع. لأن معنى هذه القضية: "أن كل ما يثبت له عدم العلية في نفس الأمر، فهو ليس بعلة على هذا التقدير" لا أنها: "كل ما فرض عدم عليته في نفس الأمر."
v. 1, p. 1221, pr. 5109-5126	pr. 28-31

Comparison of al-Fuṣūl and the Opponent al-Fuṣūl

Comparison in Terms of Contents

11Firstly, we will provide information on the composition of both works. As the saying goes, “knowledge is nothing more than classification/composition (taṣnīf) and justice (inṣāf);” and we believe that it might be easier to understand the part of inṣāf once the parallel-composition between the two texts is revealed. Just as it is not likely for the composition of logic, as an instrumental and canonical science, to change from one work to another to the extent of affecting the content entirely, the similarity of composition between works of the ʿilm al-naẓar, as an instrumental and canonical science, can be seen as ordinary. We acknowledge this in one respect, but would like to draw attention to a further point that needs to be taken into consideration. On the one hand, due to its intellectual proofs (talāzum, tanāfī and dawarān), the ʿilm al-naẓar is founded on logic. On the other hand, it is based on methodologies developed by the schools of jurisprudence in Islamic thought. Thus, just as there are different approaches to the instrumental-canonical science of logic, there emerge different approaches to the theoretical structure of the ʿilm al-naẓar, as a result of the different methodologies developed by the schools of Islamic jurisprudence.

12The composition of the works is the first place where we can see this difference, and there is no doubt that composition is the essence of content. Hence, the composition of both works will give us some serious clues about the structure and the content of the ʿilm al-naẓar. The monolithic character of the composition of the two works can be regarded as a result of Rukn al-Dīn al-ʿAmīdī’s effort to make the ʿilm al-naẓar attain the position of a canonical and instrumental science. For al-ʿAmīdī sought to grant the ʿilm al-naẓar an identity equivalent to that of logic, that is, an independent identity that had nothing to do with being closer to or more distant from one science or school of law than another. His endeavor neared its goal with Burhān al-Dīn al-Nasafī and reached it with Shams al-Dīn al-Samarqandī. However, as stated above, since certain principles of the ʿilm al-naẓar are based on jurisprudential methodologies, the methodologies of the schools to which the authors are affiliated will necessitate separation on certain issues, just as we find in the many acquired (kasbī) issues of logic.

13The difference in methodology between the Ḥanafī and the Shāfiʿī schools of Islamic jurisprudence manifested itself early on as a rivalry between the ahl al-raʾy and the ahl al-ḥadīth, with Shāfiʿīs as supporters of the former and Ḥanafīs as supporters of the latter. This opposition was so intense that it occasionally culminated in political crises. Consequently, the competitive relationship between these two schools is something which must be born in mind with all inquiries into the development of their thought. However, as will be shown in detail below, the OF embodies both the rivalry and the friendship aspects between these two influential schools of Islamic jurisprudence.

Al-Nasafī, al-Fuṣūl		Risāla fī qawāʿid ʿilm al-naẓar
[مقدمة الفصول]		الفصل الأول في أمور يجب تقديمها	1
فصل في التلازم	1	الفصل الثاني في التلازم الإيجابي	2
فصل في التنافي بين الحكمين	2	الفصل الثالث في التنافي بين الحكمين	3
فصل في الدوران	3	الفصل الرابع في الدوران	4
فصل في القياس	4	الفصل الخامس في القياس	5
فصل في القياس	5	الفصل السادس في تعدية العدم	6
فصل في تعدية العدم	6	الفصل السابع في توجيه النقض	7
فصل في توجيه النقوض	7	الفصل الثامن في كيفية إيراد الفرق إذا لم يكن المقيس عليه أو المقيس معينا أو كلاهما	8
فصل في النقض المجهول	8	الفصل التاسع <في القياس المجهول>	9
فصل في النقض المفرد	9	الفصل العاشر في التمسك بالنص وهو الكتاب والسنة	10
فصل في بيان عدم الإضافة بطريق الفرق (تعيين المقيس والمقيس عليه في القياس)	10	الفصل الحادي عشر أن دعوى أحد الأمرين اللذين أحدهما لازم الانتفاء في نفس الأمر لا يتم	11
فصل <في القياس المجهول>	11	الفصل الثاني عشر في أن الأمر يقتضي الوجوب والنهي الحرمة	12
فصل في التمسك بالنص هو الكتاب والسنة	12	الفصل الثالث عشر في وجه التمسك بالنافي	13
فصل في التمسك بالنص	13	الفصل الرابع عشر في التمسك بالأثر	14
فصل في بيان إدعاء المعلّل	14	الفصل الخامس عشر في الإجماع المركب	15
فصل في الأمر	15	الفصل السادس عشر في الاستصحاب	16
فصل في النهي	16
فصل في التّمسّك بالنافي للضرر	17
فصل في الأثر والتمسك به	18
فصل في الإجماع المركب	19
فصل في الاستصحاب	20

17As we see, the author of the Risāla employs fewer chapter titles by combining subjects that could have been contained under a single heading in al-Nasafī’s composition. With the exception of this practice, however, the order of the chapters, with their similar contents, is exactly the same. The content in both works shows us that the author of the Risāla followed a framework similar to that of al-Nasafī, even attempting to make it more organized. We interpret this as a sign of the “eternal friendship” in the title of our present study. Despite association with a different jurisprudential school, the author of the Risāla did not hesitate to take al-Nasafī’s text as an example, recognizing the reputation of al-Nasafī’s al-Fuṣūl and adopting its method. Moreover, this imitation and adoption is reflected not only in the arrangement of the titles of each chapter, but also in their content, and even the expressions used in dealing with their various issues. In many chapters, the author of the Risāla addresses the same issues that al-Nasafī addresses, in the same order, using almost the same sentences except for minor changes in expression. Below we have two examples of this, the first on al-tamassuk bi-l-naṣṣ, and the second on objections to qiyās.

Al-Nasafī, al-Fuṣūl	Risāla fī qawāʿid ʿilm al-naẓar
فصل في التمسك بالنص هو الكتاب والسنة	الفصل العاشر في التمسك بالنص وهو الكتاب والسنة
[٧١] واعلم أوّلا بأنه لا يراد من اللفظ معنى إلاّ وأن يكون جائز الإرادة والمعنى من جواز الإرادة أنه لو ذكر وأراد ما أراد لا يخطئ لغة. ويقال في الخلافيات جواز الإرادة مما يوجب الإرادة لدواران الظن بالإرادة معه وجودا وعدما. ويقال إذا كان جائز الإرادة، يكون مرادا. لأنه لو لم يكن مرادا، فلا يخلو إما إن كان غيره مرادا أو لم يكن. فإن لم يكن مرادا، يلزم تعطيل النص. وإن كان مرادا، فلا يخلو إما إن كان جائز الارادة أو لم يكن. فإن لم يكن، يلزم إرادة ما لا يجوز إرادته. وإنه قبيح جدا. وإن كان جائز الارادة، يلزم اختلال الفهم وخرج الانقسام بين كونه مرادا وبين عدم كونه مرادا.	[103] اعلم أوّلا أنه لا يجوز إرادة معنى من اللفظ إلا إذا كان ذلك المعنى جائز الإرادة من ذلك اللفظ ويعني بجواز الإرادة كونه بحالة لو عرض على اللغوي لا يخطيء. وجواز الإرادة على ما ذكرنا من التفسير من اللفظ موجب لإرادة ذلك المعنى منه لوجهين: - أحدهما: الدوران، لأن الظن بالإرادة دار معه وجودا وعدما. - الثاني: أنه لو لم يكن مرادا مع كونه جائز الإرادة، فلا يخلو إما أن يكون غيره مرادا أو لم يكن. فإن لم يكن مرادا، يلزم تعطيل النص وأنه خلاف الأصل. وإن كان غيره مرادا، فلا يخلو إما إن كان جائز الإرادة أو لم يكن. فإن لم يكن جائز الإرادة، يلزم من إرادة ما لا يجوز إرادته من اللفظ. وإنه قبيح جدا. وإن كان جائز الإرادة، يلزم افتراق أفراد ما يجوز إرادته من اللفظ في الإرادة وعدم الإرادة. وهذا الافتراق باطل، لأن جواز الإرادة إما أن يكون موجبا للإرادة أو لم يكن. فإن كان موجبا، يلزم إرادة الكل. وإن لم يكن موجبا، يلزم عدم إرادة الكل عملا بالأصل السالم عن كون جواز الإرادة موجبا للإرادة.
p. 65, pr. 71.	pr. 103.

Al-Nasafī, al-Fuṣūl	Risāla fī qawāʿid ʿilm al-naẓar
فصل في القياس	الفصل الخامس في القياس
First Objection
[٣٥] ولئن قال الحكم في الأصل لا يضاف إلى المشترك بين الأصل والفرع، فإن الأصل راجح على الفرع وإلا لـما ثبت الحكم فيه بالنافي أو بالقياس على النقض السالم عن معارضة كونه راجحا. والحكم ثابت فيه، فيتحقق الرجحان. والرجحان مانع عن الإضافة أو ملزوم لعدم الإضافة وإلا لكان الحكم في الأصل مضافا إلى المشترك بينه وبين النقض بالمناسبة السالـمة عن معارضة كون الرجحان مانعا أو ملزوما ولا يضاف بالاتفاق. فنقول لا نسلم بأن الأصل إذا لم يكن راجحا، لـما ثبت الحكم فيه بل يثبت بالمقتضى أو بالقياس على الوجوب في أحدهما أعني الفرع أو الأصل.	[51]-ولئن قال: الحكم في الأصل غير مضاف على المشترك، لأن المصالح المتعلقة بالوجوب فيه راجحة على المشترك وإلا لما وجبت الزكوة في مال البالغ إما بالنافي أو بالقياس على عدم الوجوب على الفقير السالم عن معارضة كون تلك المصالح راجحة على المشترك. واللازم منتف. ويتحقق رجحان تلك المصالح على المشترك والحكم مضاف إلى تلك المصالح الراجحة بالمناسبة. وإذا كان مضافا إليها، لا يضاف إلى المشترك لامتناع إضافة الحكم الواحد إلى أمرين مختلفين. أو نقول: بعد ثبوت الرجحان رجحان تلك المصالح مانع من الإضافة إلى غيرها أو ملزوم لعدم الإضافة إلى غيرها وإلا لكان الحكم في الأصل مضافا إلى المشترك بينه وبين صورة النقض بالمناسبة السالمة عن معارضة كون الرجحان مانعا من الاضافة إلى غيرها أو ملزوما لعدم الإضافة إلى غيرها. والحكم في الأصل غير مضاف إلى هذا المشترك بالإجماع. لأنه لو كان مضافا إليه، يلزم تخلف المعلول عن العلة ضرورة عدم الوجوب في صورة النقض. - فنقول: لا نسلم تحقق الرجحان في الأصل. - قوله "لو لا ذلك، لما ثبت الحكم فيه." - قلنا: لثبت إما بالمقتضى وهو النصوص المقتضية لوجوب الزكاة أو بالقياس على الوجوب في أحدهما -أعني الأصل والفرع-.
Second Objection
[٣٦] ولئن منع الحكم في أحدهما على ذلك التقدير، فنقول الحكم متحقّق في أحدهما إمّا في الواقع أو على ذلك التقدير، فتحقّق في الأصل على ذلك التقدير بالقياس السالم عن المعارض القطعي وهو العدم فيهما على أن الأصل لا يكون راجحا، إذ لو كان راجحا، لكان الرجحان مختصّا بالأصل على معنى أنه يكون راجحا على الغير فرعا ونقضا بخلاف كل واحد منهما ولا يكون الرجحان مختصا بالأصل، لأن الغير راجح عليه أو هو غير راجح لـقيام الدليل على أحدهما وهو المناسبة مثلا، أو نقول الأصل لا يكون راجحا لكونه قاصرا أو مساويا لما مر، أو نقول ابتداء كما قال السائل في التلازم.	[52]-ولئن منع الحكم في أحدهما على ذلك التقدير. -قلنا: الحكم ثابت في أحدهما إما نفس الأمر أو على ذلك التقدير. فيثبت في الأصل على ذلك التقدير بالقياس السالم عن المعارض القطعي وهو العدم فيهما. [53] على أنا نقول: "ما ذكرتم من الدليل، وإن دل على رجحان تلك المصالح على المشترك ولكن معنا ما ينفى رجحانها عليه." لأن أحد الأمرين لازم وهو إما رجحان المشترك عليها أو عدم رجحانها على المشترك لدلالة الدليل على أحدهما وهو الأصل المقتضى لعدم رجحان شيء على غيره. وإنما كان يلزم عدم رجحان تلك المصالح على المشترك. [54] أو نقول: أحد الأمرين لازم وهو إما قصور تلك المصالح على المشترك أو مساواتها إياه لما مر من الدليل. وإنما كان يلزم عدم رجحان تلك المصالح على المشترك.
Third Objection
[٣٧] ولئن قال الحكم في الأصل يضاف إلى ما هو جائز العدم في احدى الصورتيـْن. وذلك لا يكون مشتركا، إذ المشترك هو الثابت فيهما قطعا، فنقول الحكم يضاف إلى ما هو اللازم فيهما قطعا أو في الفرع على تقدير اللزوم في الأصل، وإنه هو المشترك بينهما.	[55]- ولئن قال: الحكم في الأصل مضاف إلى أمر هو جائز الوجود والعدم في احدي الصورتين أعني الأصل والفرع. والمشترك غير جائز الوجود والعدم في احدي الصورتين. فلا يكون ذلك الأمر المضاف إليه الحكم في الأصل هو المشترك. والمقدمة الأولى مبرهنة، والثانية قطعية. أو يقول: كلما هو علة فهو علة قطعا والمشترك ليس بعلة قطعا، فلا يكون علة. - قلنا: أما الوجه الأول، فنقول في جوابه: الحكم مضاف إلى أمر هو واجب الثبوت في الأصل والفرع على تقدير وجوب ثبوته في الأصل لما مر. وغير المشترك ليس بهذه الحالة جزما، فلا يكون الحكم مضافا إلى غير المشترك. وأما الثاني، فلا نسلم أن كل ما هو علة فهو علة قطعا، إن عنيت بالقطع جزم الذهن به، فمسلم. وإن عنيت به كونه في الخارج كذلك، لكن لا نسلم أن المشترك ليس بعلة في الخارج.
p. 52, pr. 35-37.	pr. 51-55.

18Interestingly, the author of the Risāla at times chooses examples of substantive rulings that support the Ḥanafī approach. For instance, when explaining the response to a counter-argument (muʿāraḍa) against an unknown qiyās, he adopts the example used in justifying the Ḥanafī view that zakāt is obligatory on women’s jewelry. A similar instance occurs in the issue of limiting the general (ʿāmm) by way of qiyās; he gives as example the Ḥanafī view that the stoning-punishment for the crime of adultery cannot be imposed via the testimony of a non-Muslim (dhimmī). Similarly, the author’s adoption of al-Nasafī’s views on certain legal-theoretical issues, without mentioning the response from his own school of thought, can also be considered an indication of what we consider the “eternal friendship” between their respective schools. For example, although the issue of commanding (amr) signifying obligation (wujūb) while forbidding (nahy) signifies proscription (taḥrīm) is controversial in the Shāfiʿī-Ashʿarī tradition, the Risāla’s discussion is in line with the Ḥanafī approach. Similarly, when it comes to considering the Companions’ fatwās as proofs, the common view of the Shāfiʿī School is that they cannot be taken as valid proofs; the author of the Risāla, however, attempts to justify the Ḥanafī view that they can be.

19What in fact makes the Risāla a manifestation of the old rivalry between the Ḥanafī and Shāfiʿī traditions is its selection of legal examples supportive of the Shāfiʿī tradition in the chapters on talāzum, tanāfī, dawarān and qiyās. These four topics are fundamental to the art of juristic disputation (ʿilm al-khilāf). In the discussion on talāzum, the author of the Risāla provides an example refuting the Ḥanafī view that zakāt is obligatory on women’s jewelry. Al-Nasafī’s example in the corresponding chapter, however, is built on the refutation of the Shāfiʿī view that the debtor is obliged to pay zakāt. And again in the chapter on tanāfī, the author of the Risāla tries to justify, as an example, that zakāt is not obligatory on jewelry, while al-Nasafī employs the example that the debtor is not obliged to pay zakāt. In their chapters on dawarān, the author of the Risāla defends the Shāfiʿī view with the example that breaking the Ramaḍān fast by deliberately eating and drinking does not require expiation, while al-Nasafī deals with the same subject with an example demonstrating how deliberate eating and drinking require expiation. On the same topic of qiyās, the author of the Risāla argues that zakāt should be paid on children’s property, supporting his position with an example demonstrating this Shāfiʿī view, while al-Nasafī gives an example justifying the Ḥanafī view that zakāt is obligatory on women’s jewelry.

Comparing the Introductions

21We will now compare the two works in terms of their introductions. Although al-Nasafī’s introduction and that of the Risāla overlap significantly in terms of issues treated, they differ in many aspects, such as terms, definitions, classification and purpose. In both introductions, the following four subjects, which can be considered subheadings, are discussed: (1) the primary duty of a person who initiates the disputation, (2) the proofs they put forward to justify their claim and the objections that may be put forth to refute these proofs, (3) the proof (dalīl) and (4) the bringing of proof (istidlāl).

22(1) Al-Nasafī calls the person who initiates the disputation the munāẓir (disputant), while the author of the Risāla calls him the muddaʿī (claimant). According to the author of the Risāla, this person must first identify (taʿyīn) his claim and then put forward his proof which should be a compound consisting of two premises (tarkīb al-dalīl), no more and no less. In the tradition of the ādāb al-baḥth, defining the claim is the principle called taʿyīn maḥall al-nizāʿ (identifying the point of disputation). For example, the statement “intention is not obligatory for ablution” expressed at the beginning of a disputation is the act of identifying the claim. If what is meant by the terms stated in this claim is not clear, clarifying it is also part of the process of identifying the claim. The author of the Risāla states that such a claim should be based on an argument in the form of a logical syllogism.

Al-Nasafī addresses the process of identifying a claim in more detail than the author of the Risāla. If we were to explain it by appealing to al-Samarqandī’s interpretation, the disputant must first deliberate the subject in their mind (taqdīm al-ishāra/taḥqīq al-masāʾil) and think over what kind of claim their proofs will be supportive of and how, and only then should they express (taḥrīr) the claim (mabḥath). Thereafter, views belonging to the imams of the different legal schools, either in favor of or against this claim should be stated (taqrīr al-aqwāl), in the way of li-Abī Ḥanīfa, or khilāfan li-l-Shāfiʿī, etc. Since, until this point, the disputant has only related their claim (ʿan ṭarīq al-ḥikāya), there cannot be any interference from the opposite side. Once the disputant is finished presenting the proofs justifying their position (iqāmat al-dalīl), the stage of objection begins, and it is the opposite side’s turn.

When this first stage is examined comparatively, the following two points stand out: [1] The author of the Risāla seems to have merely summarised the first part, on identifying the claim, with the concept of taʿyīn al-muddaʿā, while al-Nasafī explains it in more detail. [2] As for the second part of this stage, i.e., on justifying the claim, in our opinion the author of the Risāla considers it to be more important; in contrast to al-Nasafī’s statement of iqāmat al-dalīl, he emphasizes that the proof should be attained by compounding premises in the form of a logical argument, describing this point in detail. Thus, the author of the Risāla seems to give more weight to the science of logic. The fact that al-Nasafī prefers the term munāẓir, while the author of the Risāla prefers muddaʿī, can also be explained in connection with logic. The conclusion supported by the premises in a syllogism is referred to as iddiʿāʾ before the argument is put forward; once this claim (iddiʿāʾ) proposition is supported by the premises in a syllogism, it becomes the conclusion proposition. It seems likely the author of the Risāla took this into consideration and therefore named the proponent, whom he thought should support their claim with an argument in the form of a syllogism, a muddaʿī instead of a munāẓir.

23(2) The most obvious difference between al-Nasafī and the author of the Risāla in dealing with the objections of the opponent (khaṣm), the second main topic of the introductions, is that the former aims to name and define the kinds of objections, while the latter provides no technical definitions and is concerned more with which kind of objection is worthy of responding to. For example, al-Nasafī names and defines with technical terms such as munāqaḍa (objection), ghaṣb (usurpation) and muʿāraḍa (bringing counter-evidence), while the author of the Risāla uses verbal cognates of these terms in describing the kinds of objections, focusing more on which should be responded to. Consider the following examples:

“If the opponent objects to both or one of the premises of the muddaʿī, the muddaʿī should bring a demonstration proving the truth of the premises.”

“If the opponent brings counter-evidence to any of the premises of the muddaʿī… and if the demonstration he brings does not prove the contradictory (naqīḍ) of what has been claimed, the muddaʿī should respond to this. And if it does prove the contradictory, it is not valid [i.e., it shall not be responded to], since in this situation the opponent has usurped the office of taʿlīl (causal justification).”

• 47 Risāla fī qawāʿid ‘ilm al-naẓar, pr. 2.

“If the opponent accepts the premises of the muddaʿī but brings counter-evidence to the conclusion (ḥukm),… the muddaʿī shall also respond to this.”47

Another important term is muʿāraḍa, to which our authors give different meanings. Al-Nasafī employs it to refer to the method of objecting only to a conclusion, while the author of the Risāla uses it to refer to objecting to a premise or a conclusion. Thus, the author of the Risāla positions this term as the genus of al-Nasafī’s munāqaḍa and muʿāraḍa.

Both authors agree, however, on two things regarding ghaṣb (usurpation): first, its content, and second, that it is not a valid move. Interestingly, while both authors state that ghaṣb has been accepted by one of the scholars of the ʿilm al-naẓar, neither directly names the distinguished Rukn al-Dīn al-ʿAmīdī, who was well-known for considering this move valid.

24(3) The definitions of al-Nasafī and the author of the Risāla for the term dalīl (proof) are largely similar. What distinguishes the Risāla’s definition from that of al-Nasafī is the author’s inclusion of both the certain proof and the suppositional proof with the disjunction “or”:

• 53 Risāla fī qawāʿid ‘ilm al-naẓar, pr. 3.

“The dalīl is something such that knowledge (ʿilm) or supposition (ẓann) of it entails knowledge or supposition of the presence of the madlūl (the thing indicated).”53

What remains, once the words in bold are removed, is al-Nasafī’s definition. Highlighting the difference between authors, we see that the author of the Risāla divides proof premises into two categories, qaṭʿī (certain) and ẓannī (suppositional), providing information on how to name proofs constructed from them: if a proof consists of two certain (qaṭʿī) premises, it is called burhān (demonstration); and if it consists of two premises both of which are suppositional (ẓannī), or one of which is certain and the other suppositional, then it is called amāra (hint), which supposes the presence of the madlūl. The principle of the author’s earlier statement “a proof should be compound in a way that consists of two premises, no more, no less” is implicit here, unlike in al-Nasafī’s al-Fuṣūl.

• 56 Necmettin Pehlivan and Hadi Ensar Ceylan, Ankara Üniversitesi İlahiyat Fakültesi Dergisi, 56:2 (201 (...)

“Proof is the thing which, when thought of alone, causes overwhelming probability (yaghlibu ʿalā al-ẓann) for the affirmation of the thing indicated (madlūl).”56

The distinction between qaṭʿī- and ẓannī-based proofs thus results when both definitions provided by al-Nasafī are considered. In this respect, one could think that the expression of a second definition for proof (dalīl) in the text has to mean something. However, although the author of the Risāla included the distinction between qaṭʿī and ẓannī in his definition, he too provided a second definition just like al-Nasafī. Thus, the possibility that a proof can also be ẓannī is a matter merely repeated in Risāla.

As we see, another matter distinguishing the author of the Risāla from al-Nasafī in the context of istidlāl is that he also considers the signification of one effect by another effect. In his example, burning and producing light are two different effects of fire; the signification of producing light by burning is istidlāl from one effect to another effect.

Comparison in Terms of Intellectual Proofs

26Now we will proceed to a comparison of the two works in terms of their treatment of the three intellectual proofs of the ʿilm al-naẓar, namely, talāzum (implication), tanāfī (incompatibility) and dawarān (concomitance).

Talāzum

27There are three differences between al-Nasafī’s al-Fuṣūl and the Risāla with respect to talāzum (implication): (1) the definition of talāzum, (2) the division of talāzum, and (3) the conclusion of talāzum.

This prompts the following question: Why would al-Nasafī explain talāzum with its result, instead of defining it in a technical sense? Perhaps the author preferred a functional explanation. Those employing implication in an argument are often trying to reveal the falsity of the claimed proposition (the malzūm) on the basis of the falsity of what it purportedly implicates (the lāzim). For example, when a Shāfiʿī jurist claims that a debtor possessing the minimum amount of wealth (niṣāb) is obliged to pay zakāt, a Ḥanafī jurist might respond as follows:

If the debtor were obliged to pay zakāt, then the poor person would also be obliged to pay it. But the poor person is not accountable for paying zakāt. Therefore, the debtor is not accountable either.

Here, the debtor’s being obliged to pay zakāt is the malzūm, while the poor person’s being obliged to pay it is the lāzim. Appealing to al-Nasafī’s explanation, it is only possible for the debtor to be accountable for paying zakāt if the poor person is also accountable for it. Since the lāzim is not justified, it is impossible that the malzūm be justified. Consequently, al-Nasafī’s explanation of talāzum can be used as a formula for things that allegedly have a relation of talāzum.

As for the statement of the author of the Risāla on talāzum, it seems to qualify as a definition; and the fact that his definition does not rely upon cognates of talāzum (he merely interjects them as component names) might be considered a criticism of al-Nasafī. More importantly, another aspect of the definition draws our attention: the author of the Risāla conceives implication as something that occurs between propositions (qaḍāyā, s. qaḍiyya). For this reason, he uses the term truth in his definition, which is an attribute of propositions and not necessarily of terms. He even points to this aspect by naming his chapter, differently from al-Nasafī’s corresponding chapter, as: al-talāzum al-ījābī (positive implication).

Thus, the author of the Risāla adopts the talāzum relation on a smaller scale compared to al-Nasafī. While the talāzum described by al-Nasafī is a relation that can occur both between terms and between propositions, the author of the Risāla restricts it only to propositions. This preference can be defended by noting that, in juristic discussions, claims of talāzum are generally constructed between propositions.

Is al-Nasafī’s approach based on universal implication defensible in the face of this criticism? We claim that it is. In terms of concepts, that the term “human” should be necessitated by the term “animal” is, as expressed in al-Fuṣūl, “a mere possibility” (ʿalā sabīl al-iḥtimāl)—that is, not certain (qaṭʿī). However, the conclusions of implications are expected to be certain by definition. Based on the certainty that implications are supposed to provide, al-Nasafī seems to have deliberately ignored implications which yield only possible conclusions. In this context, the following should also be noted as an important detail. Dealing with the issue by referring to the distinction between universal and particular implications, the author of the Risāla examines the conclusions of implications only in terms of universal implication. In effect, he had to keep silent about the conclusions of particular implication due to the problem that al-Nasafī seems to have anticipated.

The author of the Risāla differs from al-Nasafī in his approach to the conclusions of implicative syllogisms on two points. The first is that, according to him, the necessitation of the presence of the lāzim by the presence of the malzūm and the necessitation of the absence of the malzūm by the absence of the lāzim depends upon the truth of the implication between these two. If the implication between the two things is not true in the thing-itself (fī nafs al-amr), then the proposition stating that “the presence of the malzūm necessitates the presence of the lāzim” cannot be true. For this reason, he believes that the truth of the proposition regarding the presence of the malzūm will turn out to be the case if that truth is supported by the truth of the implication.

Tanāfī

Dawarān

The first type of madār is a madār in terms of presence and absence; its presence causes the presence of the dāʾir and its absence causes the absence of the dāʾir. This relationship can also be stated as follows: “When eligible cause A is present, effect B is also present; when eligible cause A is absent, effect B is also absent.” According to the example used in both texts, the adultery (zinā) of a muḥṣan person is the madār, in terms of both presence and absence, for the dāʾir of punishment by stoning. The presence of a muḥṣan person’s adultery causes the presence of punishment by stoning; its absence causes the absence of punishment by stoning.

The second type of madār is a madār in terms of presence only; that is, “When eligible cause A is present, effect B is also present; but when A is absent, B is not necessarily absent.” For example, a grant contract (hiba) is the madār for the dāʾir of ownership only in terms of presence, since ownership can also occur through other means, such as inheritance. In other words, the absence of the grant does not necessitate the absence of ownership.

The third type of madār is a madār in terms of absence only; that is, “When eligible cause A is absent, effect B is also absent; but when A is present, B is not necessarily present.” For example, ritual cleanliness is the madār for the dāʾir of valid prayer only in terms of absence. In other words, while the absence of ritual cleanliness causes the absence of valid prayer, its presence does not alone cause the presence of valid prayer, since other conditions requisite to the allowance of prayer may not have been fulfilled.

When we examine the relationship between these three types of concomitance, which have been presented in terms of the division of the madār, it is plain that the concept of dawarān is related to the concept of ʿilla (effective cause). For, while the madār in terms of both presence and absence is in the position of a complete ʿilla for the dāʾir, the madār in terms of presence only or absence only is its ʿilla only in terms of presence or absence. For example, with the madār in terms of absence, ritual cleanliness being the condition of valid prayer can be understood as the absence of ritual cleanliness being the ʿilla of the absence of valid prayer.

Due to this obvious role of dawarān as a test for justifying the ʿilla, ʿilla is one of the key terms in the chapters on dawarān in both al-Nasafī and the Risāla. Al-Nasafī uses the term ʿilliyya (causation) in his definition of dawarān; and although the author of the Risāla does not use it in his definition, he addresses the matter of the madār’s causation immediately afterwards. Perhaps because he did not use the concept of ʿilliyya in his definition like al-Nasafī, he provides a lengthy discussion on how to ground the causation of the madār, almost as one would in a commentary. In the content of the Risāla, especially in terms of volume, this is where the most important difference occurs from al-Nasafī’s Fuṣūl. The author of the Risāla first quotes and criticizes Rukn al-Dīn al-ʿAmīdī’s three arguments on this issue (which are all based on talāzum), and then quotes and defends Athīr al-Dīn al-Abharī’s two arguments, one of which is based on tanāfī and the other on talāzum.

Apart from this apparent difference in theoretical approach to the relationship between dawarān and ‘illa, the chapters on dawarān in both al-Fuṣūl and Opponent-al-Fuṣūl deal with the same issues, just as we saw in their chapters on tanāfī. As we have seen, both authors classify the madār in the same way. Likewise, both authors state that dawarān’s validity or invalidity depending on whether or not the madār can be determined.

Conclusion

33The results of our study of the Risāla fī qawāʿid ʿilm al-naẓar and its comparison with al-Nasafī’s al-Fuṣūl are as follows:

• The evidence we have discussed above—such as the definition of qiyās in the Risāla overlapping with al-Kātibī’s definition of tamthīl, and the criticism of al-ʿAmīdī’s approach to dawarān as signifying the ʿilla being expressed in the Risāla and by al-Kātibī in exactly the same way—prove, in our opinion, that the Risāla belongs to al-Kātibī. For, as far as we can see, his approaches to these two points are not found among his contemporaries. This point is reinforced when other pieces of evidence for the Risāla belonging to al-Kātibī are taken into consideration.

• This Risāla we have discovered is, in itself, more important than the question of authorship, because it is a unique example of the influence of Burhān al-Dīn al-Nasafī’s al-Fuṣūl. And we hope to have shown that it indicates both a friendly relationship and a state of rivalry between the Ḥanafī and the Shāfiʿī traditions. On the one hand, it is a manifestation of a friendly relationship since, despite the author’s being a Shāfiʿī, he adopted al-Nasafī’s theoretical approaches to a great extent. On the other hand, it is a manifestation of a state of rivalry, because in transferring theory into practice, the author writes in favor of the Shāfiʿī school and differs from al-Nasafī especially in his approach to talāzum and dawarān. Since Ḥanafī-Shāfiʿī rivalry is a well-known phenomenon, we think that the friendly relationship displayed in the Risāla is the more important in terms of the al-Fuṣūl’s influence.

• Despite its importance in terms of displaying the influence of al-Fuṣūl, it is unfortunate that neither a second copy of, nor a commentary on, the Risāla, which would indicate its recognition and popularity, has yet been found. We will bear in mind, however, that such works may come to light, as detailed catalogs of manuscripts in Turkey and around the world continue to be produced. On the other hand, and despite their shared circumstances, the popularity of al-Fuṣūl, and the fact that it has been commented upon and copied in the course of the post-classical literary tradition, leads us to conclude that it overshadowed the Risāla. Since it mostly follows al-Fuṣūl, this attempt at an Opponent-al-Fuṣūl failed to actualize the expectation of the Shāfiʿī tradition in altering the axis of rivalry; the Ḥanafīs seem to have mostly ignored it. As the saying goes: “imitations merely keep originals alive.”

About the Critical Edition of the Risāla fī qawāʿid ʿilm al-naẓar

34We have provided detailed information on the copy of the work we have used when introducing the majmūʿa in which it is located. Although we have been unable to discover a second copy, the fact that the text was easily readable assisted us in its reconstruction. Overall, we did not encounter any obstacles to understanding the text’s meanings. However, we made several modifications to its structure, and we will briefly review them now.

35First, we numbered the paragraphs in the text (and have referred to these in the above comparison study). Second, the divisions made by the author have also been numbered. Third, the letter م in the second paragraph of the first chapter indicates muddaʿī, and the letter خ indicates khaṣm. Fourth, technical terms have been enclosed in quotation marks (“…”). Fifth, the complete forms of certain instances of qiyās have been given in the footnotes throughout the text. Finally, while comparing the text with that of al-Nasafī in our study, we have already provided information about the composition of the two texts. However, we have recorded the subjects that, unlike al-Nasafī, the author examined under a single title, with the heading ‘faṣl’ together with its subjects, in accordance with the text, without including the author’s own numbering, and included them in the index. This was done so that even by looking at the index, readers can see traces of the old rivalry and eternal friendship.

36The following symbols are used in the critical edition:

(A) The symbol of the manuscript:

Çorum Hasan Pasha Manuscripts Library 1071: م serves as its symbol in the critical edition.

(B) The symbols used in the critical edition:

<< : Reading that indicates repeated expression.

-  xxx  : Reading that indicates the expression was deleted from the text by striking through it.

 ....  : Reading that indicates an additional expression by the editors.

#: Reading that indicates the expression was corrected in line or in the margin.