Texte intégral
- 1 Aitken, Robin. Can We Still Trust the BBC?, London, Bloomsbury, 2013, p. 272.
- 2 Seymour-Ure, Colin. The British Press and Broadcasting since 1945, Oxford, Blackwell Publishers, 1 (...)
- 3 Philo, Greg. “Television, Politics and the Rise of the New Right”, in Philo, Greg (ed.), Glasgow M (...)
1The BBC has a history of covering many – political, social, economic – violent crises and conflict situations. While its role during the Second World War helped forge its international reputation, the media coverage of the Iraq War plunged the BBC into a highly publicised crisis, which took the form of a trial of the very role of public broadcasting.1 These episodes, which raised questions about the role of the national media, in particular that of the BBC, in covering conflict situations involving the British army, are not isolated. During the Suez Canal crisis, in 1956, the Eden government expected the BBC to support their policy;2 but the BBC managed to resist government pressure partly because it was not a case of national emergency, but also because the press and politicians were strongly divided, a division that extended to the government. Similarly, during the Falklands War, broadcasters were accused of treason by Tory MPs and the tabloid press when they presented critical or oppositional views.3
- 4 Gallet, Élodie. “La BBC et l’information sur le conflit en Irlande du Nord (1960-1995)”, in Revue F (...)
2This paper is about the coverage of a conflict that posed a unique challenge to the BBC, being a domestic conflict involving not only the military but also British citizens. In 1969, the British Army was called into Northern Ireland to try to pacify loyalist and pro-reunification communities whose clashes were terrorising civilians. The upsurge in violence and the increase in attacks on both Northern Ireland and mainland Britain were brought onto national and international screens, particularly in 1972 with the broadcasting of pictures of Bloody Sunday. All around the world, including in Great Britain, people discovered with astonishment an unsuspected situation in Northern Ireland, a province thought to be at peace since the Partition of Ireland in the early 1920s. Violent pictures contributed to the identification and stigmatisation of a national enemy embodied by the IRA (understood in the broadest sense) inseparable from its political wing, Sinn Féin. Source selection strategies were put in place to guide the media coverage of the situation in Northern Ireland, in particular on British national television.4
3Motivated by vocation, ethics and a code of conduct, journalists nevertheless sought to understand the situation and to interview the parties involved, in programmes such as “Real Lives: At the Edge of the Union”. But these attempts actually led the British government to reinforce their strategy, certainly in order to convince public opinion that tougher measures were needed to deal with the Northern Irish question. The inspiration for this may have come from a similar broadcasting censorship, known as “Section 31” (of the Broadcasting Act), which was already in force in the Republic of Ireland.
4“This is not censorship”, Home Secretary Douglas Hurd said when he introduced to the British House of Commons what became known as the “broadcasting ban”, namely the direct censorship in force between 1988 and 1994 in the UK, which affected the TV and radio coverage of the situation in Northern Ireland during this period of time.
5This paper aims to shed light on a ban that officially and directly impeded the BBC in its capacity to respect its duties and act fully as a public service actor. It is divided into three main parts. After having introduced the broadcasting ban, it will focus on how the BBC reacted to it and implemented it. The last part will be dedicated to the impact of the ban.
- 5 Quéré, Mireille. “Les voies du silence”, in Revue Française de Civilisation Britannique, 1990, vol (...)
6The implementation of the broadcasting ban was the result of an escalation of paramilitary violence in Northern Ireland and of increasing tensions between the British government and broadcasters, due to the broadcasting of controversial programmes.5 On October 19th, 1988, the British Home Secretary introduced to the House of Commons the notices he had sent to the BBC and the Independent Broadcasting Authority (IBA), the regulators of the British broadcasters. Two distinct notices required the BBC and the IBA:
to refrain at all times from sending any broadcast matter which consists of or includes-
any words spoken, whether in the course of an interview or discussion or otherwise, by a person who appears or is heard on the programme in which the matter is broadcast where-
(a) the person speaking the words represents or purports to represent an organization specified in paragraph 2 below, or
(b) the words support or solicit or invite support for such an organization,
other than any matter specified in paragraph 3 below.
7The organisations specified in the second paragraph were:
(a) any organization which is for the time being a proscribed organization for the purposes of the prevention of Terrorism (Temporary Provisions) Act 1984 or the Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act 1978; and
(b) Sinn Fein, Republican Sinn Fein and the Ulster Defence Association.
8And the “matter” excluded from paragraph 1 included any words spoken:
(a) in the course of proceedings in Parliament, or
(b) by or in support of a candidate at a parliamentary, European Parliamentary or local election pending that election.
- 6 Including Ulster Defense Association, Provisional Irish Republican Army, Irish National Liberation (...)
9Basically, two political parties were targeted, namely Sinn Féin and Republican Sinn Féin, as well as nine Loyalist and Republican paramilitary organisations.6
10If these notices were construed in various ways, they were mostly perceived as the most explicit and long-lasting instrument of censorship used against the British broadcasting industry.
11The debates that took place in the House of Commons on October 19th, 1988 are instructive regarding the Government’s expectations.7 According to Douglas Hurd, then Home Secretary, the provisions of the notices did not amount to censorship. Indeed, when asked whether broadcasters would be affected by the notices while reporting events, he asserted: “This is not censorship, because it does not deal with or prohibit the reporting of events. It deals with and prohibits direct access and its extra impact on terrorism and its supporters8.” He lamented that representatives of paramilitary organisations and their political wings had used broadcasting opportunities as an attempt to justify their criminal activities.9 In order to reinforce the idea that it was not censorship, he insisted on the fact that broadcasters were not targeted:
This step is no criticism of [broadcasters]. What concerns us is the use made of broadcasting facilities by supporters of terrorism. This is not a restriction on reporting. It is a restriction on direct appearances by those who use or support violence.
The Government have decided that the time has come to deny this easy platform to those who use it to propagate terrorism.
12Nonetheless, by denying organisations and their sympathisers this “easy platform”, Douglas Hurd confirmed that the government could control the BBC, as was also highlighted by MP Tony Benn. The latter underlined that such a statement could be seen as a massive extension of state control over the broadcasting authorities as well as an attack on the rights of elected representatives and on those who elect them, to which Douglas Hurd answered: “[the broadcasters] will see that this gives them a clearer and better way to proceed than they have ever had”, insisting on the fact that “broadcasters have been wrestling, case by case and programme by programme, with some difficulty for many years. 10”
- 11 Douglas Hurd, Hansard, 19 October 1988, col. 893.
13Home Secretary Douglas Hurd also acknowledged the potential impact of TV and its role as a public forum when he said: “The terrorists themselves draw support and sustenance from access to radio and television – from addressing their views more directly to the population at large than is possible through the press.11”
14Five years later, in an article published in The Independent for the fifth anniversary of the broadcasting ban, Peter Brooke, former Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, argued that there had not been any instance of censorship since TV and radio journalists were as free “as their newspaper colleagues to report fully the actions, words and thoughts of the terrorist organisations and their supporters”.12 Brooke stated that TV and radio had been used to advocate murder and violence and should not “enjoy the same unfettered access to the broadcast media as those who are committed to, and respect, the standards and restraints of peaceful democracy”.
- 13 Corcoran, Mary P. and O’Brien, Mark. (eds), Political Censorship and the Democratic State, Dublin, (...)
- 14 See Brind v. United Kingdom 77-A DR 42 (1994). Turpin, Colin and Tomkins, Adam. British Government (...)
15Back in 1988, in response to those who insisted on the fundamental nature of freedom of speech, and whether these notices were within the bounds of the European Convention on Human Rights, Douglas Hurd referred to the similar measures already in place in the Republic of Ireland.13 The future would prove him right. The British National Union of Journalists denounced the fact that the broadcasting ban breached fundamental Human rights but their application was dismissed by the British courts. So, they turned to the European Commission of Human Rights which, after examining the application, refused to refer it to the European Court of Human Rights.14
16Others wondered whether this ban was really necessary, for in the 1970s, similar questions had been raised, without leading to such notices. In 1974, when the NI Office was engaged in dialogue with the armed wings of the Republican and Loyalist movements, Richard Francis, then Controller of BBC NI, reflected on the utility of reporting on paramilitary organisations:
It would be illogical and impracticable for the media not to cover their activities and, to do that responsibly, we believe it is necessary to interview and investigate the unpalatable side when the information to be gained overweighed the possible propaganda effect.
17In 1976, Roy Mason, Secretary of State for Northern Ireland charged the BBC with treasonable behaviour in their coverage of the conflict in NI. To which Richard Francis responded, insisting on the independent role played by the broadcast media:
The experience in Northern Ireland where communities and governments are in conflict, but not in a state of emergency or a state of war, suggests a greater need than ever for the media to function as the Fourth Estate […]. But if the functions are to remain separate, it must be left to the media themselves to take the decisions, within the limits of responsibility, as to what to publish, when and how.15
18Mason considered journalists as allies in the “dirty war”. At a private dinner in Belfast, he is reported to have made his position clear to Sir Michael Swann, Chairman of the BBC, when he accused the BBC of showing disloyalty, supporting the rebels and purveying enemy propaganda. He is also said to have remarked that if the Northern Ireland Office had been in control of BBC policy, the IRA would have been defeated.
19This therefore raises the question of how the BBC reacted and adapted its coverage of Northern Ireland.
- 16 Idem. See also Curtis, Liz. “The Reference Upwards System”, in Rolston, Bill and Miller David (eds (...)
- 17 Rolston, Bill. “Political Censorship”, in in Rolston, Bill and Miller David (eds), War and Words: (...)
20When the broadcasting ban was implemented in 1988, the BBC was already highly cautious in its coverage of the situation in Northern Ireland. Republican views had rarely been aired on screen since the mid-1970s, and a “reference upwards system”16 was in place, meaning that the executives of the BBC had to be informed of any elements about Northern Ireland which were about to be broadcast.17
21The real challenge, with the broadcasting ban, was that it involved political parties, in particular Sinn Féin, a party with local representatives as well as MPs at the House of Commons, even if they did not sit there due to the abstentionist policy of the party. That is why the directives published by the BBC one month after the broadcasting ban was implemented, focused specifically on this question, as the BBC deplored a lack of accuracy in the notice. There was no doubt that the ban would not apply “by or in support of a candidate at a parliamentary, European Parliamentary or local election pending that election” nor “in the course of proceedings in Parliament”, but people whose words could not be heard were not easy to identify. For this reason, the BBC first offered a very wide understanding of the notice, banning the quoting of any declaration from the proscribed organisations, including during a trial. The BBC’s uncertainties can be seen in the wording used, for example:
- 18 BBC Directive, 18 November 1988.
The government order applies also, we believe, to reports by news-readers, presenters, correspondents and reporters in the sense that they will not be able to quote what the banned organisations or other people say if those quotes support any of the organizations.18
- 19 Curtis, Liz. “A Catalogue of Censorship, 1959-1993”, in Jempson Mike and Curtis, Liz (eds), Interf (...)
22The broadcasters also wondered if historical archives, plays and songs were included. On October 1988, Channel 4 legal advisers stated that the ban “would cover any such material recorded at any time in the past – for example newsreel footage shot before the creation of the Republic of Ireland”.19
23This system was reinforced after 1988 as new BBC directives were released, notably regarding the words to be used:
ARMY: We call it the army and its personnel soldiers, not the British army or British soldiers when they are in Northern Ireland.
- 20 BBC Style Guide, 1989.
THE IRISH REPUBLICAN ARMY: it is never acceptable to call them that, it is acceptable to call them the Provisionals but never the Provos. Don’t give pet names to terrorists… don’t speak of IRA volunteers, we don’t know why they joined.20
24In this Style Guide, the BBC denied the IRA the status of an army and explicitly called its members “terrorists”. It also denied it any political motives insisting on the fact that the term “volunteer” was not appropriate as the reason why they joined was unknown.
25Many people remember that the notices were quickly applied quite literally as if, in the end, the broadcaster aimed at bypassing them. Indeed, since only the “words spoken” could not be broadcast, the journalists could take a subsidiary route. In another set of Directives released by the BBC in 1989, this approach was made clear:
- 21 BBC, Guidelines for Factual Programmes, 1989, section 40.
Pictures of [representatives of the proscribed organisations] speaking can be shown but the words must be spoken in voice-over by reporter or presenter or shown in caption.21
26In fact, if we look back at what Douglas Hurd or Peter Brooke said, TV and radio journalists had the same rights as their newspapers’ colleagues to “report fully the actions, words and thoughts of the terrorist organisations and their supporters” and the ban did “not deal with or prohibit the reporting of events”, reinforcing the idea that what was officially banned was the voice of the members and supporters of the banned organisations.
- 22 Jempson, Mike. “A Shameful Anniversary”, in Jempson Mike and Curtis, Liz. Interference on the Airw (...)
27The implementation of censorship measures altered the media coverage of the conflict in Northern Ireland. A 63% decrease in Sinn Féin appearances was observed between 1988 and 1989.22 However, it seems that the notices issued by the Home Secretary did not lead to a radical change in the representation of Sinn Féin and the IRA.
- 23 Curtis, Liz. “A Catalogue of Censorship, 1959-1993”, op. cit., p. 42-91. See also The British Medi (...)
- 24 Moloney, Ed. “Censorship and ‘The Troubles’”, in Corcoran, Mary P. and O’Brien Mark (eds), Politic (...)
- 25 Curtis, Liz. Ireland: The Propaganda War, London, Pluto Press, 1984, p. 139.
28Between 1970 and 1988, TV channels had been subjected to significant government pressure which had already led to the banning, modification or postponement of 63 programmes dealing with the conflict in Northern Ireland due to internal and external pressures.23 The last interview of an IRA member on both public and commercial channels dated back to 1974.24 As for the INLA (Irish National Liberation Army), it had last been interviewed in 1979 before it became illegal.25 The real difference lay in the official nature of the measures taken.
- 26 Kenny, Colum. “Censorship, not ‘Self-Censorship’”, in Corcoran, Mary P. and O’Brien Mark (eds), Po (...)
- 27 Moloney Ed., “Closing Down the Airwaves: the Story of the Broadcasting Ban”, in Rolston, Bill (ed. (...)
- 28 http://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/107202, (accessed on 22 September 2021). “I believe that (...)
29A clear consequence of the broadcasting ban was the strengthening of self-censorship of journalists who avoided producing any programme that risked infringing the ban. Also, from a professional point of view, dealing with this subject could impede a career in the media industry26 and opposing the broadcasting ban systematically implied being considered an enemy of the state.27 As Thatcher put it in 1988, not being on the side of justice and therefore of the State was tantamount to being on the side of terrorists.28
- 29 Butler, David. The Trouble with Reporting Northern Ireland: British State, the Broadcast Media and (...)
- 30 The Guardian, 15 May 1989.
30More generally, the economic impact of the broadcasting ban may have deterred the BBC from dedicating programmes to the question. A programme including members of the banned organisations required subtitling or dubbing. This was a cost that broadcasters were not always prepared to take on, knowing moreover that they were exposed to sanctions by their supervisory bodies.29 As a result, several projects were abandoned before or after their completion. Paul Hamann, then executive producer of BBC documentaries, confirmed he dropped several programmes even though they offered a new perspective on Northern Ireland.30
- 31 For instance, « The Lowdown », BBC 1, Tuesday 6 April 1993, 5.10-5.35 pm; the series « Plain Tales (...)
31Nonetheless, the broadcasting ban had the paradoxical consequence of making it possible to tackle new topics relating to the conflict in Northern Ireland. Since the ban affected mainly paramilitary groups and Republican political parties, the BBC focused on other aspects of the conflict, such as societal or economic issues. Indeed, during the ban, issues relating to life in Northern Ireland were discussed more than previously and new themes emerged, notably that of reconciliation. For example, several programmes dealt with the conflict through the prism of religion, which had not really been the case before 1990. Many programmes focused on the Catholic and Protestant communities and everyday life in Northern Ireland, in particular in 1993.31 They contemplated the idea of reconciliation between the Catholic and Protestant communities and the possibility of sharing activities.
32The collusion between Northern Irish and British security forces and loyalist paramilitary groups was also tackled for the first time. From 1990 onwards, several programmes revolved around the possibility that exchanges of information and some form of agreement had taken place, particularly between the RUC and the Loyalists. These exchanges were aimed at implementing a shoot-to-kill policy against the enemy embodied by the IRA.
- 32 Ruff, Daniel. “Margaret Thatcher et la BBC : régulation ou manipulation ?”, in Revue LISA/LISA e-jo (...)
- 33 Philo, Greg. “Television, Politics and the Rise of the New Right”, in Philo, Greg (ed.), Glasgow M (...)
33Undoubtedly, this trend was facilitated by Thatcher’s fall in 1990 who, until then, had managed to exert particularly strong control over the British broadcasting industry.32 The political transition from Thatcher to Major allowed journalists to take advantage of this context in order to denounce certain practices.33 The effects of this trend were clearly visible in 1990 and 1991 but died out in 1992.
- 34 “Circle of Deceit”, ITV, Saturday 16 October 1993, 9-11 pm.
34Regarding the coverage of the IRA and Sinn Fein, it is difficult to suggest that it totally changed. The IRA continued to be portrayed as the enemy to be fought, and as a threat to law and order. In the programmes broadcast between 1988 and 1994, the IRA was evoked only in terms of the damage caused by its attacks and the irrationality of its actions. Those who took part in these programmes included people who managed to infiltrate it.34
- 35 Shaw, Helen. “Calling the Tune: the Media, the State and the Public’s Right to Know”, in Corcoran (...)
- 36 Danny Morrison interviewed by Ed Moloney in August 1989, available in Moloney, Ed. “Closing Down t (...)
35As for Sinn Féin, in particular, some argued that its exclusion from television screens led to a distancing of the party from its voters and potential electorate.35 In the 1992 General Election, Gerry Adams lost his seat as West Belfast's MP in the British Parliament, which he had held since 1983. According to Danny Morrison, then national director of publicity for Sinn Féin, contacts with the media were drastically reduced in the months following the introduction of the broadcasting ban. He explained that in the four months before the notices were issued by the Home Secretary, the party had received half a thousand calls requesting information or interviews. This figure fell to about a hundred in the four months that followed.36
- 37 Greenslade, Roy. “Foreword”, in Corcoran, Mary P. and O’Brien Mark (eds), Political Censorship and (...)
- 38 Butler, David. The Trouble with Reporting Northern Ireland: British State, the Broadcast Media and (...)
- 39 Moloney, Ed. “Censorship, and ‘The Troubles’”, op. cit., p. 99 and 108.
36The opposite argument was also put forward by different authors. It was suggested that the broadcasting ban led to a delay in the Republicans’ decision to turn away from violence and towards politics: because of censorship, it is argued that Sinn Féin found it more difficult to convince the IRA to stop its violent campaign.37 Instead of alleviating the conflict or reducing support for the IRA, censorship, it is claimed, had the opposite effect by discouraging the media from analysing the conflict38 and leading to the belief that violence was the only way to change the situation. The fact that the broadcasting ban was only lifted when the IRA declared a ceasefire supports this view.39
37To conclude, the broadcasting ban remains today one of the most explicit examples of censorship imposed on the media in a democratic state. Nonetheless, it is often ignored in books dedicated to the BBC. The BBC’s coverage of the conflict was conditioned by direct censorship, preventing them from making an objective and balanced representation of the conflict, its actors and its stakes. More in general, this ban raises questions about the media coverage of internal conflicts and the freedom of journalists and the media, whether private or public.
Haut de page
Notes
Aitken, Robin. Can We Still Trust the BBC?, London, Bloomsbury, 2013, p. 272.
Seymour-Ure, Colin. The British Press and Broadcasting since 1945, Oxford, Blackwell Publishers, 1996, 2nd ed. (1991, 1st éd), p. 69.
Philo, Greg. “Television, Politics and the Rise of the New Right”, in Philo, Greg (ed.), Glasgow Media Group Reader: Industry, Economy, War and Politics, vol. 2, London, Routledge, 1995, p. 203. As for the Falklands War, see Parsons, Michael. “Les Malouines : une guerre de propagande ?”, in Dickason, Renée and Cervantes, Xavier (eds), La propagande au Royaume-Uni, De la Renaissance à l'Internet, Paris, Ellipses, 2002 and Le Times et la guerre des Malouines : aspects du discours de la guerre, PhD thesis, 1994, Université de Bordeaux.
Gallet, Élodie. “La BBC et l’information sur le conflit en Irlande du Nord (1960-1995)”, in Revue Française de Civilisation Britannique [Online], XXVI-1 | 2021, https://journals.openedition.org/rfcb/7491#quotation (accessed on 22/09/2021). We can also refer to another article on the Broadcasting ban in general, Gallet, Élodie. “La censure télévisuelle de 1988 et le conflit nord-irlandais”, in Dickason, Renée (ed), Expériences de guerres. Regards, témoignages, récits, Paris, Mare & Martin, 2012, p. 127-136.
Quéré, Mireille. “Les voies du silence”, in Revue Française de Civilisation Britannique, 1990, vol. 5, n° 4, p. 71-75, especially the timeline “Dix ans de rapports conflictuels entre le gouvernement, le Parti conservateur et les media”.
Including Ulster Defense Association, Provisional Irish Republican Army, Irish National Liberation Army, Cumann na mBan, Fianna na hÉireann, Red Hand Commando, Saor Eire, Ulster Freedom Fighters and Ulster Volunteer Force.
http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1988/oct/19/broadcasting-and-terrorism#S6CV0138P0_19881019_HOC_194 (accessed on 22/09/2021). For a comment on this debate, see Miller, David. “The Media and Northern Ireland: Censorship, Information Management and the Broadcasting Ban”, in Philo, Greg (ed), Glasgow Media Group Reader: Industry, Economy, War and Politics, vol. 2, op. cit., p. 61-62.
Douglas Hurd, Hansard, 19 October 1988, col. 898.
Douglas Hurd, Hansard, 19 October 1988, col. 893.
http://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1988/oct/19/broadcasting-and-terrorism#S6CV0138P0_19881019_HOC_194 col. 899 (accessed on 22/09/2021)
Douglas Hurd, Hansard, 19 October 1988, col. 893.
Independent, 12 October 1993, https://www.independent.co.uk/news/media/media-northern-ireland-a-story-stifled-david-miller-argues-that-the-fiveyearold-broadcasting-ban-has-failed-to-halt-terrorist-bombings-and-killings-instead-it-has-succeeded-in-hampering-sinn-fein-a-legal-politcal-party-1510377.html (accessed on 22 September 2021)
Corcoran, Mary P. and O’Brien, Mark. (eds), Political Censorship and the Democratic State, Dublin, Four Courts Press, 2005; Maignant, Catherine. “Liberté d’expression et raison d’État : la réponse irlandaise”, in Revue Française de civilisation Britannique, 1990, vol. 5, n° 4, p. 93-103. Douglas Hurd, Hansard, 19 October 1988, col. 896.
See Brind v. United Kingdom 77-A DR 42 (1994). Turpin, Colin and Tomkins, Adam. British Government and the Constitution: Text and Materials, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2011, p. 798-799. See also Purcell and others v/IRELAND in which “interference” was “considered to be necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security and for the prevention of crime. […] Examination of the balance to be struck between the protection of freedom of expression and protection against terrorism”, available at https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=&ved=2ahUKEwiztMus6ZLzAhWDzYUKHeWgA-cQFnoECAQQAQ&url=https%3A%2F%2Fhudoc.echr.coe.int%2Fapp%2Fconversion%2Fpdf%3Flibrary%3DECHR%26id%3D001-84354%26filename%3DPURCELL%2520AND%2520OTHERS%2520c.%2520IRLANDE.pdf&usg=AOvVaw3kehEfayL6seLhQ57FNWyO . La liberté d’expression en Europe Jurisprudence relative à l’article 10 de la Convention européenne des Droits de l’Homme, Strasbourg, Éditions du Conseil de l’Europe, 2006, p. 46-47 and Zellick, Graham. “Spies, Subversives, Terrorists and the British Government: Free Speech and other Casualties”, William and Mary Law Review, 1990, vol. 31, n° 4, p. 773-821.
https://cain.ulster.ac.uk/othelem/media/docs/freespeech1.htm (accessed on 22 September 2021)
Idem. See also Curtis, Liz. “The Reference Upwards System”, in Rolston, Bill and Miller David (eds), War and Words: the Northern Ireland Media Reader, Belfast, Beyond the Pale Publications, 1996, p. 80-95.
Rolston, Bill. “Political Censorship”, in in Rolston, Bill and Miller David (eds), War and Words: the Northern Ireland Media Reader, op. cit., p. 241; Miller, David. “The Media and Northern Ireland: Censorship, Information Management and the Broadcasting Ban”, op. cit., p. 48.
BBC Directive, 18 November 1988.
Curtis, Liz. “A Catalogue of Censorship, 1959-1993”, in Jempson Mike and Curtis, Liz (eds), Interference on the Airwaves. Ireland, the Media, and the Broadcasting Ban, London, Campaign For Press And Broadcasting Freedom, 1993, p. 67.
BBC Style Guide, 1989.
BBC, Guidelines for Factual Programmes, 1989, section 40.
Jempson, Mike. “A Shameful Anniversary”, in Jempson Mike and Curtis, Liz. Interference on the Airwaves. Ireland, the Media, and the Broadcasting Ban, op. cit., p. 31.
Curtis, Liz. “A Catalogue of Censorship, 1959-1993”, op. cit., p. 42-91. See also The British Media and Ireland. Truth: the First Casualty, London, Campaign For Press And Broadcasting Freedom, 1978.
Moloney, Ed. “Censorship and ‘The Troubles’”, in Corcoran, Mary P. and O’Brien Mark (eds), Political Censorship and the Democratic State, op. cit., p. 105.
Curtis, Liz. Ireland: The Propaganda War, London, Pluto Press, 1984, p. 139.
Kenny, Colum. “Censorship, not ‘Self-Censorship’”, in Corcoran, Mary P. and O’Brien Mark (eds), Political Censorship and the Democratic State, op. cit., p. 75.
Moloney Ed., “Closing Down the Airwaves: the Story of the Broadcasting Ban”, in Rolston, Bill (ed.), The Media and Northern Ireland, Basingstoke, Macmillan, 1991, p. 34 and Kenny, Colum, “Censorship, not ‘Self-Censorship’”, op. cit., p. 75.
http://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/107202, (accessed on 22 September 2021). “I believe that everyone, the media included, has a bounden duty to do everything they can to see that those who perpetrated the terrible crimes, which we saw on television, which disgusted the whole world, are brought to justice. Either one is on the side of justice in these matters, or one is on the side of terrorism”.
Butler, David. The Trouble with Reporting Northern Ireland: British State, the Broadcast Media and Nonfictional Representation of the Conflict, Aldershot, Avebury, 1995.
The Guardian, 15 May 1989.
For instance, « The Lowdown », BBC 1, Tuesday 6 April 1993, 5.10-5.35 pm; the series « Plain Tales from Northern Ireland, BBC 2, September 1993, 8-8.30 pm; « Out of Loyal Ulster », Channel 4, Saturday 2 October 1993, 7-8 pm.
Ruff, Daniel. “Margaret Thatcher et la BBC : régulation ou manipulation ?”, in Revue LISA/LISA e-journal [Online], Vol. IV - n°3 | 2006.
Philo, Greg. “Television, Politics and the Rise of the New Right”, in Philo, Greg (ed.), Glasgow Media Group Reader: Industry, Economy, War and Politics, vol. 2, op. cit., p. 225-226.
“Circle of Deceit”, ITV, Saturday 16 October 1993, 9-11 pm.
Shaw, Helen. “Calling the Tune: the Media, the State and the Public’s Right to Know”, in Corcoran Mary P. and O’Brien Mark (eds), Political Censorship and the Democratic State, op. cit., p. 120. See also, Miller, David. Don’t Mention the War: Northern Ireland, Propaganda and the Media, London, Pluto Press, 1994, p. 51-54.
Danny Morrison interviewed by Ed Moloney in August 1989, available in Moloney, Ed. “Closing Down the Airwaves: the Story of the Broadcasting Ban”, op. cit., p. 58.
Greenslade, Roy. “Foreword”, in Corcoran, Mary P. and O’Brien Mark (eds), Political Censorship and the Democratic State, op. cit., p. 13.
Butler, David. The Trouble with Reporting Northern Ireland: British State, the Broadcast Media and Nonfictional Representation of the Conflict, op. cit., p. 88.
Moloney, Ed. “Censorship, and ‘The Troubles’”, op. cit., p. 99 and 108.
Haut de page
Actualités
