After Primakov

The evolving context of Russian national security policy

Stephen Blank

Electronic version

URL: <https://journals.openedition.org/monderusse/31>

DOI: 10.4000/monderusse.31

ISSN: 1777-5388

Publisher

Éditions de l'EHESS

Printed version

Date of publication: 1 November 1999

Number of pages: 695-722

ISBN: 2-7132-1341-X

ISSN: 1252-6576

Electronic reference

Stephen Blank, "After Primakov", *Cahiers du monde russe* [Online], 40/4 | 1999, Online since 15 January 2007, connection on 03 September 2022. URL: <http://journals.openedition.org/monderusse/31> ; DOI: <https://doi.org/10.4000/monderusse.31>

STEPHEN BLANK

AFTER PRIMAKOV

The evolving context of Russian national security policy

FACING IMMINENT IMPEACHMENT, on May 12, 1999 President Boris Yeltsin replaced Prime Minister Evgenii Primakov with Minister of the Interior, Sergei Stepashin. Although Stepashin's future policies were then undefined, Yeltsin's action reveals much about the context of Russian national security policy. First of all, Yeltsin elevated his personal security and power above any concern for Russia's stability or security and consciously risked using force to do so. In this respect he resembles his opponents. By firing Primakov and installing a new cabinet Yeltsin showed his determination to retain unchecked power at the expense of the state's stabilization and thereby reaffirmed the primacy of the personal, private, factional, and sectoral interests of Russia's elites over any concept of a national interest. Yeltsin's actions, like those of his rivals, reflect what many observers have called the general privatization of the state.¹

That condition denotes a government of men, not laws, and thus arbitrary rule. Private or sectoral interests can impose their policy agenda and goals upon the whole state. The elites who make and conduct national security policy constantly contend with each other, often for purely private, departmental, or sectoral goals, not clearly defined Russian interests. Similarly private, sectoral, or institutional actors use the multiple armed forces to erode the state's monopoly over the use of legitimate force and use the state, and even their own official positions as a vehicle for their personal gain. This situation both reflects and causes the absence of a settled inter-agency process for security policy or other issues.

Although Primakov's external policies were clearly anti-American and anti-Western, in the domestic context his government enjoyed considerable Duma support and represented the first sign of constitutional stabilization in Russia.

1. This applies as well to Russian observers, Celestine Bohlen, "A plea to Yeltsin: Free Russia from 'puppet masters'," *New York Times* (May 30, 1999): 10.

Sergei Rogov, director of the Institute for the Study of the USA and Canada (ISKAN) observed,

“The fact that a new kind of collaboration among the branches of power has emerged is equally important. For the first time, the Russian Federation Government is based on the parliamentary majority and is formed to take its opinion into account. One can dispute the correctness of that opinion but one cannot deny that the government’s de facto accountability to Parliament is a step toward the creation of a more effective system of checks and balances, without which it is impossible to arrive at a stable democratic system in Russia and the restoration of the state’s ability to fulfill its basic functions”.²

Precisely such a government threatened Yeltsin and his court camarilla: the presidential staff that doubles as an executive branch of the government, his family, and their retainers, most notably Boris Berezovskii. This kind of regime also has gained support from the rest of Russia’s political elite because it lets them make personal deals and avoid excessive public, legislative, or international scrutiny. This deinstitutionalization of Russia’s government, perhaps even more than lasting economic crisis, lies at the root of all of Russia’s failures in this decade, reflects the incompleteness of Russia’s democratic transition, and is a major cause of its military weakness.

As a result Russia increasingly resembles a Third World state and such states’ typical security profile. Rogov quoted Donald Jensen, the Director of Radio Liberty who wrote that,

“The Russian state’s inability to fulfill basic functions — to maintain public order, preserve the financial system, collect taxes and distribute income, and provide minimal social security — prompts comparison with developing countries like Somalia, Haiti, and Liberia where the state has collapsed. [...] whereas in Africa the collapse was mainly the result of the tribalist struggle, in Russia it is the consequence of heated rivalry within the elite, self-interest, and administrative chaos in Moscow, which together have undermined the Center’s ability to govern effectively. However, to a large extent Russia’s degeneration reflects its social disintegration, which has reached the stage where the concept of the national interest is lost”.³

Yeltsin’s system of multiple militaries that permits a privatization of the means of public violence also resembles prominent trends in failing African states.⁴ We can also analyze the state’s privatization separately from the concurrent and overlapping criminalization of the state and society which itself can cause the state

2. Moscow, *Nezavisimaia gazeta* (electronic version), in Russian (March 3, 1999), *Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Central Eurasia* (Henceforth *FBIS SOV*) (March 4, 1999).

3. *Ibid.*

4. Michael Bratton, “Deciphering Africa’s divergent transitions,” *Political Science Quarterly*, CXII, 1 (Spring, 1997): 88-89.

to disintegrate.⁵ Stepashin's successor at the Ministry of Interior, Vladimir Rushailo, stated that criminal gangs had become so powerful that they could influence entire regions. This fusion of criminal and ruling elites was visible already in 1995, if not earlier and also evokes the Third World pattern.⁶

In essence, the crises of governance and Russian elites' "reform" responses reflect the pattern of development — or maldevelopment — present in many African states. In the absence of normal state building, Russia's political elites, like their African counterparts, undertook to construct a parallel political authority — a shadow state — whose defining characteristics are a corrupt fusion between government and private sector elites, that stunts institutional development, survives through predation on productive processes in society, and compels the majority of the population to withdraw from the sphere of legitimate commerce and political activity.⁷

Many observers detect similar analogies to the Third World or to earlier feudalist and Tsarist structures.⁸ African militaries in many respects bear uncanny resemblance to Russia's multiple militaries. African forces, like Russia's, are riven with politically based factionalism based on leaders' personal ambitions, and ethnic solidarities among soldiers. This factionalism means that they incorporate into themselves all the cleavages of their societies and states and are thus cliques and cabals. Often they are not even truly professional military forces but armed mobs. Deeply politicized, these militaries search for rents to extract from the economy, endemic criminality, privileged access to resources or the political process, and are averse to true civilian control.⁹

Similarly reports from Nizhnii Novgorod state that soldiers are begging outside virtually every shop, not just due to their hunger but because their superior officers

5. E.G. Timothy Shaw, Clement E. Adibe, "Africa and global developments in the twenty-first century," *International Journal*, LI, 1 (Winter, 1996): 1-26; Mohammad Ayoob, *The Third World security predicament: State making and the international system* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1995).

6. Moscow, *Radio Rossii Network*, in Russian (May 26, 1999), *FBIS SOV* (May 26, 1999); Stephen Blank, "The code and civil-military relations: The Russian case," in Gert de Nooy, ed., *Cooperative security, the OSCE, and its code of conduct* (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1996): 107-109.

7. Peter Stavrakis, "The Russian state in the twenty-first century," Paper presented to the VIII Annual Strategy Conference of the U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pa., April 22-24, 1997, p. 2.

8. *Ibid.*; M. Ayoob, *op. cit.*; Vladimir Shlapentokh, "Early feudalism – The best parallel for contemporary Russia", *Euro-Asia Studies*, XLVIII, 2 (1996): 391-411; Peter Stavrakis, *State-building in post-Soviet Russia: The Chicago boys and the decline of administrative capacity*, Occasional Papers of the Kennan Institute for Advanced Russian Studies, 254, 1993, and Eugene Huskey, "The State-legal administration and the politics of redundancy," *Post-Soviet Studies*, XI, 2 (1995): 115-143; David M. McDonald, "A lever without a fulcrum: Domestic factors and Russian foreign policy, 1905-1914," in Hugh Ragsdale, ed. and trans., *Imperial Russian foreign policy* (Washington, D.C. — Cambridge: Woodrow Wilson Center Press — Cambridge University Press, 1993): 281.

9. One should compare M. Bratton, *art. cit.*: 88-89 to Anders Aslund, "The state of transition economies," *Demokratizatsiia*, V, 4 (Fall, 1997): 502.

use threats to force them to get money which they then extort. Naturally nobody complains since nobody has any confidence in their officers.¹⁰ This pattern certainly bears comparison to earlier European or current Third World models of backward and failed states. Whereas some observers invoke feudalism, Anatol Lieven of the International Institute of Strategic Studies compares the utter irresponsibility of Russia's elites and Spain's *Caciques* who failed even to have a sense of the social contract or restraints that true feudalism manifested.¹¹

Therefore Russia's state building challenge resembles that of Third World states, who face enormous internal and external pressures emanating from international economic institutions and economic globalization.¹² Since Russia too must follow those institutions' guidelines to survive, it cannot be fully sovereign, faces tight political constraints, and is very vulnerable to economic sanctions and threats. Many elites have long feared Russia's consignment to a permanent role as a colonial or semi-colonial dependency who exports oil, gas, and raw materials. It cannot compete in the global economy and is essentially exploited by other richer powers. Alternatively Russia, who is already in default, may be declared bankrupt, shutting off almost all foreign investment. Then it would confront coercive pressures to comply with the U.S. and Western security agenda on a broad range of issues all the way up to the START treaties. This is not an idle fantasy as there are U.S. voices urging such steps.¹³

For many Russians even those agencies who can help appear to inhabit a fantasy world about what can be done. Rogov wrote that,

"The IMF's demand for a 4% primary budget surplus as a condition for granting credit (which must be immediately returned to the IMF as payment for past loans) means reducing federal expenditure to a level of less than 10% of GNP. That proportion of spending is less than half that in the United States, and one-third to one-fourth of that in the West European countries. No state in the world, not even the prosperous United States, even dreams of a surplus of more than 1% of GDP. The fulfillment of the IMF's demand would lead in effect to the Russian Government refusing to fulfill the most elementary functions that are carried out by the state in any country of the world. The inevitable consequences of this will be not only socioeconomic collapse, but also the disintegration of the Russian Federation."¹⁴

These warnings resemble those of Third World states who have undergone similar, coinciding, economic, and political crises stemming from trying to placate these

10. *Moscow Center TV*, in Russian (March 26, 1999), *FBIS SOV* (March 26, 1999).

11. Anatol Lieven, "Freedom and anarchy: Russia stumbles toward the twenty-first century," *Washington Quarterly*, XX, 1 (Winter, 1997): 42-43.

12. Ayoob's model of the Third World state's security dilemmas is particularly telling here.

13. *FBIS SOV* (March 4, 1999); Moscow, *Rossiiskaia gazeta*, in Russian (April 30, 1999), *FBIS SOV* (April 30, 1999).

14. *Ibid.*

foreign economic masters while effective civil-military control collapses.¹⁵ Indeed, Russia's inflation through 1998 and the regime's endemic lawlessness are partly traceable to its efforts to circumvent the IMF, retain state power or resort to dubious budgetary procedures of extra-budgetary spending, many of which were undertaken precisely to sustain one or more military institution.¹⁶

Obviously security dialogues in such a system remain largely a state or elite preserve with little popular input. Yet no consensus exists about the national interest.¹⁷ Russia's continuing failure to produce a military doctrine underlines that inability to agree on a definition of the national interest, threats to it, and ways to defend it. Similarly Yeltsin's decree to merge all the nuclear forces into one strategic nuclear command has still not been implemented due to the General Staff's and the services' opposition. Likewise, the military's budget is not what the Duma authorizes but whatever the Ministry of Finance cares to, or is obliged through outside pressures, to give. This has led military figures to complain that the Ministry constitutes a second government. Nor are such intra-elite disputes confined to military issues. The oil and gas companies fought with the Foreign Ministry over Caspian energy sources for several years and generally prevailed because of their economic clout, even forcing Primakov to retract some policies.¹⁸

The fact that Yeltsin was facing impeachment, *inter alia*, for destroying the Soviet Union, represents a second element of Russia's policy context, namely that for major constituencies the present system remains fundamentally illegitimate. Hence they seek to subvert it from within if possible. As Yeltsin said in his speech to the Duma in March, 1999, their policy is largely one of *revanche* and revisionism at home and abroad.¹⁹ Yet impeachment probably failed because legislators feared losing their private perks if the Duma was dissolved. Their failure to impeach Yeltsin tells us that despite their hostility the system's inherent instability is paradoxically a stable feature of Russian politics. Hence we can expect a period of stably operating or repeated manifestations of instability. Still, the vituperativeness of modern Russian politics is evident in the fact that Deputy Defense Minister, Colonel General Leonid Ivashov told *Novosti News Agency* and *Argumenty i fakty* that Iabloko Party leader Grigorii Iavlinskii and former Foreign Minister and now Duma Deputy, Andrei Kozyrev were "traitors to the motherland."²⁰ Consequently

15. M. Ayoob, *op. cit.*: *passim*.

16. Internet communication from Jerry Hough, *Johnson's Russia List*, DJohnson@cdi.org (May 2, 1997) who has been constant in observing how the Yeltsin regime has subsidized banks and other institutions off the books, see also Clifford G. Gaddy and Barry W. Ickes, "Russia's virtual economy," *Foreign Affairs*, LXXVII, 5 (September-October, 1998): 53-67.

17. Sergei Medvedev, "Former Soviet Union," in Paul B. Stares, ed., *The new security agenda: A global survey* (Tokyo: Japan Center for international Exchange, 1998): 78-81.

18. S. Blank, "Every shark East of Suez: The Great Powers and their energy rivalries," in *Central Asian Survey*, XVIII, 2 (1999): 149-184.

19. Moscow, *Russian Television Network*, in Russian (March 30, 1999), *FBIS SOV* (March 30, 1999).

20. *Moscow Center TV*, in Russian (March 25, 1999), *FBIS SOV* (March 25, 1999).

agreement on basic issues that are essential to Russia's ability to function and present itself abroad as a state remains in contention.

Vladimir Ryzhkov, leader of the Our Home is Russia faction in the Duma lamented that Russia's main political forces are so divided, weak, mutually irresponsible, and immature that their views cancel each other's out. As a result,

"Debates are still on whether the republic proclaimed by Kerensky on 10 September 1917 was legitimate, whether it is worthwhile to revert to monarchy. This is the subject of serious debate, as before. We still cannot either recognize or contest the existing border of the Russian Federation. This is the subject of heated debate. There is no unity. We have not decided yet whether private property is legitimate or illegitimate in Russia. This is still the subject of heated debate. We are still arguing about whether Russia should be a unitary or federal state. We are still arguing about limits of freedom — political freedom, freedom of speech, religious freedom. These are also subjects of heated debate and attacks from all quarters. As a result, I am compelled very regretfully to conclude that there is no ground for accord in modern-day Russia. That all attempts to reach accord are not unlike attempts to paste together two icebergs. I also am obliged to say that these differences are not the result of irresponsibility, ill will, or incompetence of politicians. This is to a large extent a real reflection of the attitudes existing among the masses of people."²¹

This observation leads to the third aspect of the policy context revealed in Primakov's firing. Russia's internal strife and disorganization make the main threats to Russia internal, not external ones.²² Military strategy, even when it postulates the West as a whole, or NATO, or specifically the United States as a danger or potential threat, has been intended, at least until now, first of all for deterrence, not actual warfighting.²³ Not surprisingly, the main mission of the multiple armed forces, as revealed by its post-1991 actions and the 1993 defense doctrine is to defend Yeltsin's power and the status quo. And since the main threat is internal, control of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (MVD) is as crucial as control over the regular army, a factor that helps explain Stepashin's elevation. Thus all the various armed forces have been thoroughly politicized. Indeed, their politicization has reached the point where many officers and commentators make it clear that many of the armed forces would not defend Yeltsin, the legally elected head of state, against certain kinds of threat to his rule.²⁴

21. "Realities of the fourth Russian Republic and war in the Balkans: Editor-in-chief of *International Affairs*, Boris Piadyshev interviews Vladimir Ryzhkov," *International Affairs*, 2 (1999): 2.

22. See the new national security blueprint, Moscow, *Rossiiskaia gazeta*, in Russian (December 26, 1997), *FBIS SOV*, 97-364 (December 30, 1997).

23. Presentation by Brigadier General (Ret) John Reppert USA to The Council on Foreign Relations, Washington, D.C., May 12, 1999.

24. Deborah Yarsike Ball, "How reliable are Russia's officers?," *Jane's Intelligence Review* (May, 1996): 204-207.

Ivashov's outburst exemplified this politicization but is only a small part of the problem. Locally, especially in tense areas like the North Caucasus, officials engage in all kinds of machinations to involve the serving troops in their political rivalries.²⁵ But in Moscow this politicization of the military affects the most basic issues of Russian national security.

Two examples illustrate the depth of the danger. On March 31, 1999 the Duma met in closed plenary session with Chief of the General Staff, General Anatolii Kvashnin, on a broad range of military issues because of NATO's Kosovo campaign. Kvashnin connived with the Duma to draft resolutions stating that due to this campaign the Conventional Forces in Europe treaty does not meet Russian national interests.²⁶ Official news reports stated that the Duma also,

"intends to draw the attention of the head of state to the fact that the 'strategy of reforming the Russian armed forces, in accordance with which cardinal reductions in personnel and changes in the organizational-staff structures have been effected for several years now without reequipping the armed forces with modern arms and military technology, no longer meets new geopolitical realities and poses a threat to Russia's national security.' In the draft resolution the State Duma is also planning to point out that 'the doctrine provisions on the types and specificities of military actions in which the Russian armed forces may participate have not been worked out.' In the deputies' opinion, 'the adoption of a decision to change the operations control of troops and arms, first of all, nuclear without a profound military-scientific and economic substantiation may cause a substantial damage to Russia's defense capability.' The State Duma is planning to draw the attention of the head of state to the fact that: 'financing the state defense order in 1996-1998 was carried out with violations of the federal law On the state defense order.'"²⁷

Since Kvashnin publicly and strongly opposes Defense Minister General Igor Sergeev's plans for restructuring all nuclear forces under one strategic nuclear forces command as Yeltsin decreed, his actions constitute clear insubordination, efforts to reverse major foreign policies, and corrupt the political process. But nobody seems to have noticed this. By now such phenomena seem quite normal in a situation where military politicization has long been tolerated as the rule, by officers and by the government.

The second example is equally revealing. Apparently the armed forces as a whole and most of Russia's diplomats had "no interest" in Viktor Chernomyrdin, Yeltsin's roving ambassador on Kosovo, succeeding in finding an acceptable solution for NATO, Serbia, and Russia in this conflict. Therefore they "are active in seeking to strengthen Mr. Milosevic in his defiance of NATO." Indeed, members of the military delegation traveling with Chernomyrdin publicly attacked the NATO

25. Rostov-na Donu, *Voennyi vestnik Iuga Rossii*, in Russian (March 22-28, 1999), *FBIS SOV* (May 23, 1999).

26. Moscow, *RIA*, in English (March 31, 1999), *FBIS SOV* (March 31, 1999).

27. *Ibid.*

peace plan that he helped to negotiate.²⁸ These elements are bitter about NATO enlargement and the attacks upon Serbia and have therefore isolated Chernomyrdin. Of course, Stepashin has no incentive to give power to an extra-cabinet figure loyal to Yeltsin alone.²⁹ Thus they are subverting Yeltsin's policy and incurring great risks to Russian security to satisfy their own sectoral anger and interests.

At the same time, Yeltsin's sense of a lurking threat from within explains many of his military policies since 1991. He has consistently divided and broken up Russia's multiple militaries, playing them off against each other, corrupting biddable elites within them, and elevating the MVD at the expense of the regular army. Since 1991 Yeltsin has also consistently refused to raise military spending. And in any event the funds are unavailable.

But this feckless approach to military policy entails major costs to Russian security, because it has destroyed the army's defense capability. Except for very low-level contingencies, Russia lacks usable military force and will do so for a long time. Furthermore, military spending priorities ensure that this situation will continue. If the entire state order for 1998 went to the strategic nuclear forces' pet project, the Topol-M SS-27 ICBM — and the current level of finances permits at best annual production of perhaps 10-15 missiles a year — a revival of the Russian army by 2005 is a fantasy. High-tech weapons and professional soldiers may exist in design bureaus or planning boards but they will not come to life under these circumstances. Thus the military cannot support the objectives of Russian foreign policy or of self-defense except by invoking nuclear weapons, a dangerous strategy at any time.³⁰

The fourth element of the policy context is that foreign and defense policy are as much weapons for the domestic struggle as they are disputes and debates over Russia's national interests and how they should be pursued. Primakov's valiant effort to forge a consensus defining what those interests are and how they should be pursued is one reason he was fired. This consensus challenged Yeltsin's power, authority, and sense of Russia's objectives. By designating Chernomyrdin to negotiate on Kosovo Yeltsin tried to steer policy away from Primakov's openly and aggressively anti-American line — complete with Cold War-like military rhetoric akin to that of Brezhnev's and Andropov's times — to a policy that he could control and modulate. Primakov's mastery over foreign policy had become a threat to Yeltsin's power and policies which were less stridently anti-American and supportive of higher military spending than were Primakov's and the armed forces.³¹

28. John Lloyd, "Moscow rivalry hampers envoy's effectiveness," *Financial Times* (May 24, 1999): 2.

29. *Ibid.*; *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Newsline* (June 3, 1999).

30. S. Blank, *Russia's armed forces on the brink of reform* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1998); Moscow, *Nezavisimoe voennoe obozrenie*, in Russian (March 4, 1999), *FBIS SOV* (March 24, 1999).

31. *Moskovskii komsomolets* (May 18, 1999), *Johnson's Russia List*, 3301 (May 23, 1999), djohnson@erols.com.

Nevertheless, NATO enlargement, Kosovo, attacks on Russian proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the collapse of the economy, supposedly due to American-inspired policies, and the U.S.' perceived attempt to oust Russia from all of its traditional zones of influence and interest have made anti-Americanism the only basis for an elite consensus on national security policy. This consensus is a fifth major aspect of the national security policy context. It is ideological and emotional more than a guide to specific policies and indeed, in many cases it postulates a never-never land that policy cannot materialize. As articulated by Primakov and others who supported a global policy to counterbalance American policies this consensus proclaimed Russia as one of the major poles of a foreordained and objectively emerging multipolarity because of its potential, if not reality.³² Russian diplomats and analysts call this policy limited globalism. This posture mandates a global policy on the basis of a selective engagement in areas where vital Russian interests are at stake, Europe, Central Asia and the Middle East, and the Far East, the traditional areas of Russian interests.³³ Another view coming to the fore is one that repolarizes the world into the West "and the rest" i.e. a West/East-South polarization.³⁴ This approach too naturally applies to many in Russia, but both these schemes have a common origin based on anger, fear, shame, years of unending frustration, resentment, a burning desire for compensation and recognition that cannot be satisfied. At the source of this common origin lies the mystique of "derzhavnost'" — Russia's supposedly "objective" status of a great power now and in the future. At the core of this mystique is a refusal or inability to accept conclusively the full sovereignty of the CIS states and the rest of the today's status quo.

Even a liberal like Duma member Aleksei Arbatov of the Iabloko party writes that Russia is objectively a great power because of its global political clout. In the broad geopolitical zone that it inhabits it is the most important player, even if sometimes the decision goes against its interests. Russia is therefore destined to be

32. "Yeltsin address to diplomats," *Mezhdunarodnaia zhizn'*, 6 (June 1998), and *The Russian Weekly*, 6 (July 24, 1998), davidjohnson@erols.com (henceforth "Yeltsin address"). See also Moscow, *Vooruzhenie, politika, konversia*, 2 (February 1, 1997), *FBIS SOV* (August 23, 1998) for an interview with Ivan Rybkin, then Secretary of the Security Council, and "Russia's national interests," *Johnson's Russia List* (August 15, 1997), davidjohnson@erols.com; Paul Goble, "Can Russian diplomacy hold Russia together," *Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Newsline* (September 23, 1998); *The Monitor* (March 19, 1998 and September 23, 1998); Yevgeny Primakov, "Russia: Reforms and foreign policy," *International Affairs* (Moscow), 4 (1998): 3-6.

33. "Yeltsin address"; "Ivan Rybkin on Russia's global role," *Johnson's Russia List* (July 8, 1997), davidjohnson@erols.com; Moscow, *Izvestiia*, in Russian (January 21, 1998), *FBIS SOV*, 98-034 (February 3, 1998); Oleg V. Davydov, "Russia's foreign policy in transition: Prospects and challenges in the Asia-Pacific region," *Asian Perspective*, XXII, 1 (Spring, 1998): 53-69; Mikhail A. Alekseev, "Russia's cold peace consensus: Transcending the presidential election," *Fletcher Forum of World Affairs*, XXI, 1 (Winter-Spring 1997): 33-51; Ambassador Evgeny V. Afanasiev, "Asia-Pacific region: A Russian perspective," Paper presented to the Annual National Defense University, Asia-Pacific Symposium, Honolulu, Hawaii, March, 1-2, 1999.

34. E. V. Afanasiev, *art. cit.*

a great power because objectively it has great responsibilities that nobody else can assume, especially in the CIS.³⁵ The problem with this assessment is that it forces Moscow to confront challenges that it cannot now or in the foreseeable future sustain. As it is, Russia in fact cannot conduct such a policy except by diplomatic legerdemain.³⁶ If the West can “do whatever it wishes with us” Russia is not a great power but rather an enormous, unwieldy, quasi-colonial dependency, a great power by the sufferance of others.

Because this mystique of “*derzhavnost*” precludes recognition of the CIS members equal sovereignty, its conceptualization leads Russia to assume enormous but unrealizable military-political burdens and goals. Certainly it lies at the heart of the elite’s widespread aspirations for a major revision of the post-1989 status quo. Key Russian figures embrace a frankly revisionist agenda as the cornerstone of their aspirations for the future. Since Russian elites tie Russia’s continuation as a state to the reintegration of the CIS, NATO enlargement threatens to frustrate that reintegration and undermine their sense of Russia’s state identity. Russian elite definitions of the state are bound up with the belief in a predestined reintegration of the CIS — whose members supposedly cannot govern themselves and remain “artificial” states — around Russia lest Russia otherwise collapse.³⁷ Accordingly, though not logically, Russian officials persist in believing that reintegration, largely on Russia’s terms, will take place, that it is objectively (a favorite word) determined, and is necessary for Russia’s survival. Hence a revisionist agenda is called for even if it must be expressed sotto voce. Primakov told the OSCE in 1996 that:

“Today, the balance of forces resulting from the confrontation of the two blocs no longer exists, but the Helsinki agreements are not being fully applied. After the end of the Cold War certain countries in Europe — the Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, and Yugoslavia — have disintegrated. A number of new states were formed in this space, but their borders are neither fixed nor guaranteed by the Helsinki agreements. Under the circumstances, there is a need for the establishment of a new system of security.”³⁸

As Russia also demands guarantees of its integrity against secessionist threats while the Ministry of Defense insists on retaining the old Soviet borders, Primakov

35. Aleksei Arbatov, “Iz točki zreniia Parlamenta,” *Mezhdunarodnaia zhizn*, 3 (1999): 80-93.

36. *Ibid.*

37. Andrei Kokoshin, *Reflections on Russia’s past, present, and future* (Cambridge, Ma.: Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government, 1998), Strengthening Democratic Institutions Project, 1998: 31 is an excellent example of this pervasive mentality. At the time he was Deputy Defense Minister and soon after Secretary of the Defense Council. See also Moscow, *Rossiiskaia gazeta*, in Russian (November 6, 1996), *FBIS SOV*, 96-217 (November 8, 1996).

38. Address by Y.M. Primakov to the OSCE Permanent Council, Vienna, September 20, 1996, p. 2, Transcript made available by the Embassy of the Russian Federation to the United States.

confirmed what Aleksei Arbatov called the duplicity of Russian border policy.³⁹ Nor is Primakov alone in this quest.

Andrei Kokoshin, former Secretary of the Security Council and Deputy Defense Minister, wrote in 1997 that:

“Russia’s security will be determined to a great extent by the process of the reintegration of the former Soviet Union. The social, cultural, geopolitical, and even historical prerequisites for the strengthening of this process already exist. Russian history bears witness to the fact that the changes in the geography of the state that occurred in the 1990s are not irreversible. If one looks at the space occupied by the Russian empire in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, and by the Soviet Union in the twentieth century, one can envisage the emergence there of a new, viable state-political entity.”⁴⁰

Alla Iaz’kova of Moscow State University and the Institute of World Economics International Relations (IMEMO), openly says that Russia really would prefer a situation like that of 1945 and that the Russian elite intends to use the issue of Russians abroad as a means to destabilize Georgia, Moldova, the Baltic states, and possibly Ukraine.⁴¹ She goes on to observe that:

“After a series of nationalist demonstrations, both within the newly independent states and the Russian Federation, a consensus has emerged among a wide spectrum of Russian political organizations that Russian minorities in the Near Abroad must be protected. In this regard it is worth noting that a majority of Russians living in the new independent states appear to support some variant of the extremist agenda of Vladimir Zhirinovskii. Many have backed secessionist efforts such as those in Abkhazia and Transnistria, as well as the armed conflict in Chechnya. Despite this tendency toward extremism, Russia will continue to gear its policies toward the new independent states on the basis of their treatment of Russian minorities, though the means via which influence will be exerted will differ depending on the situation.”⁴²

The linked fear of disintegration leads Russia’s elite to make the “defensive” demand a sphere for influence along Russia’s perimeter, i.e. the Baltic and CIS states, to guard against further disintegration of Russia proper.⁴³ And there are analysts who believe that border revisions among CIS states that carve them up are feasible solutions to the problems of ethnic conflict that have plagued them and

39. Moscow, *Mirovaia ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia*, in Russian, (July-September, 1994), *FBIS SOV*, 94-129 (November 29, 1994): 48.

40. A. Kokoshin, *op. cit.*: 31.

41. Alla Iaz’kova, “The emergence of post-Cold War Russian foreign policy priorities,” in Robert Craig Nation and Stefano Bianchini, eds, *The Yugoslav conflict and its implications for international relations* (Ravenna: Longo Editore, 1998): 112.

42. *Ibid.*: 111.

43. Moscow, *Nezavisimaia gazeta (NG stsenarii-supplement)*, in Russian (June 28, 1996), *FBIS SOV*, 96-128 (July 3, 1996).

Russia since 1992.⁴⁴ Vasilii Krivokhiza, First Deputy Director of Russia's Institute for Strategic Studies, brings together much of what passes for establishment thinking by insisting on Primakov's concept of a multipolar world, global equality with Washington, defense of Russia's integrity through reintegration, and regional engagement in a single whole that is shot through with old-fashioned and frankly imperialist notions of Russian security objectives. Krivokhiza writes that:

"The more than thousand year experience of the Russian state and elementary common sense demonstrate that geopolitical constants exist. One of these is the fact that stability inside Russia leads to her 'augmentation' whereas instability leads to her neighbors' seizing [of] her territory, and even to centrifugal inclinations on the part of a number of her territories. This means that, in order to consolidate the CIS in one form or another, after having in parallel strengthened Russia, it is necessary in the first place to solve the problems inside Russia itself and to create international conditions that are favorable for the achievement of these goals. This is why any kind of isolationism in our relations with our close and distant neighbors is undesirable. But it is better to solve this task by means of the promotion of global or, at a minimum, of regional initiatives."⁴⁵

Because the disparity between Russian objectives and the available means is enormous it could be the source of a major international crisis. And there is no way that Russia's armed forces can realize these goals even for the CIS under present conditions. For example, Russia now seeks to redouble its efforts to impose extended nuclear deterrence against any attack on CIS states, even if nobody asked for it and despite the profoundly dangerous risks for Russia.⁴⁶

Russia must extend this deterrence, not only because of its legitimate vital interest in CIS affairs, but also lest it too becomes a target of those attacks.⁴⁷ This reasoning applies even to small-scale conventional attacks for which a nuclear response is contraindicated.⁴⁸ Also on the basis of this logic Primakov advocated a global foreign policy because Russia is a great power without whom no major international problem can be solved, just as in Brezhnev's time.⁴⁹ As two high-

44. Edward Ozhiganov, "The Republic of Moldova: Transdniester and the 14th Army," in Alexei Arbatov, Abram Chayes, Antonia Handler Chayes, and Lara Olson, eds, *Managing conflict in the former Soviet Union* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1997): 206-207.

45. Vasily Krivokhiza, *Russia's national security policy: Conceptions and realities*, Richard Weitz, trans. (Cambridge, Ma.: Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government, 1998), Strengthening Democratic Institutions Project, 1998: 32.

46. Moscow, *Segodnia*, in Russian (April 30, 1999), *FBIS SOV* (April 30, 1999).

47. S. Blank, "Proliferation and counterproliferation in Russian strategy," and "Remarks on Russia", in Jim Colbert, ed., *Proceedings from the Conference on countering the missile threat: International military strategies, February 22, 1999* (Washington, DC: Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs, 1999): 127-149; 41-45.

48. *Ibid.*

49. E-mail letter from Darrell Hammer, *Johnson's Russia List* (February 5, 1997), Dmitry Trenin, "Transformation of Russian foreign policy: NATO expansion can have negative consequences for the West," *Nezavisimaia gazeta* (February 5, 1997), E-mail transmission, J. Michael Waller, "Primakov's imperial line," *Perspective*, VII,3 (January-February 1997): 2-6,

ranking General Staff officers argued in a 1997 study even states lacking political and economic power can play major roles and be system forming poles in world politics' supposedly objectively emerging multipolar structure.⁵⁰ The fact that Russia has nothing to contribute to many issues other than obstruction seems to elude such analysts.

These policies are ruinous to Russia. They also destabilize its neighborhood making foreign intervention that much more likely. Foreign observers who see how Moscow tramples upon its neighbors' interests and acts like a neo-imperial hegemonic bully retain "an enemy image" of Russia. As the Finnish Institute of International Affairs' Russia 2010 report recently stated:

"In the realm of foreign and security policy, Russia is not committed to the principles of democratic peace and common values. Its chosen line of multipolarity implies that Russia is entitled to its own sphere of influence and the unilateral use of military force within it. Russia refuses to countenance any unipolar hegemonic aspirations, in particular it will not accept security arrangements in which the United States seems to have a leading role. As a solution, Russia proposes a Europe without dividing boundaries which will, however, require a buffer zone of militarily non-aligned countries between Russia and NATO. Russia's idea of Europe's new security architecture is therefore based on an equal partnership of great powers and supportive geopolitical solutions — not on common values accepted by all, nor on the right of every small state to define their own security policy. *The above summary of recent Russian developments is, in every aspect, practically in opposition to Finland's and the EU's fairly optimistic goals.*"⁵¹

This consensus exists alongside the bitter quarrels over exactly what to do. In conformity to a sense of imminent danger of the state's disintegration,

"All political leaders and groups in Russia agree, therefore, that Russia's first foreign policy objective must be to reverse Russia's internal decline. Russia today cannot be a major international actor with a shrinking economy that today is roughly the size of Denmark. Russia cannot be a serious player on the international stage if it cannot control its own borders. No major political force in Russia disagrees with these objectives. How Russia should achieve economic growth and preserve internal unity, however, remain contested issues."⁵²

"Primakov, setting a new, tougher foreign policy," *Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press*, XLIX, 2 (February 12, 1997): 4-7; Mohiaddin Mesbahi, "Russian foreign policy and security in Central Asia and the Caucasus," *Central Asian Survey*, XII, 2 (1993): 187 for Primakov's globalism and statement that history never nullifies geopolitical values.

50. V. K. Potemkin and Yu. V. Morozov, "Strategic stability in the twenty-first century," *European Security*, VI, 3 (Autumn, 1997): 43.

51. Finnish Institute of International Affairs, *Russia beyond 2000: The prospects for Russian developments and their implications for Finland* (Helsinki, 1999): 1-2 (Emphasis author).

52. Michael McFaul, "Testimony on what are Russian foreign policy objectives," House Committee on International Relations, May 12, 1999, *Johnson's Russia List*, 3283 (May 12, 1999), djohnson@erols.com.

Similarly all serious Russian political forces agree on the need for greater economics, political, and military cooperation with neighboring CIS states and on establishing a sphere of influence there. Nor do they disagree on maintaining Russia's nuclear superpower status since that stockpile is the one thing that gives Russia whatever status it now possesses. Yet, as nobody can agree how to carry out these objectives, the means of achieving them increasingly elude realization.⁵³

The sixth aspect of the security policy context is, of course, the terrifying economic situation. Yeltsin officially fired Primakov for failing to shift the economy onto a growth track. Although the bottom did not fall out of the economy as was widely predicted, it still cannot grow. Primakov's government had no recipe for growth other than a quasi-statist policy that Primakov strangely likened to the New Deal.⁵⁴

Meanwhile the economy, even after much transformation, remains excessively burdened by military requirements that cannot be sustained yet are inserted into the economy either legally or through "extra-budgetary" machinations.

Any perusal of the Russian press reveals at once a state threatened on all sides by not just classical security threats but by rising epidemics of drug use, broken down ecological and health systems, lack of investment in science, education, housing, etc., an army that cannot feed itself — official denials to the contrary notwithstanding — and so on. Russia could come apart simply from these internal pathologies without any exertion of foreign pressure and the elites know it. Yet pressure to remilitarize the economy has grown without interruption since Primakov took power.⁵⁵

Many military and political elites still believe in living beyond Russia's means. Kosovo encouraged them to demand major increases in military spending, review of all arms control treaties to which Russia is a party, enhanced readiness of the nuclear component, and guarantees that Russia could test its weapons without violating the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. In the realm of strategy Kosovo has led them to openly urge combat use at a lower threshold for Tactical Nuclear Weapons (TNW) in the context of a new military doctrine that emphasizes large-scale conventional or even nuclear war again.⁵⁶ There are also many signs of a determination to upgrade conventional forces like the SU-25 Fighter, expand substantially the extent of military cooperation with Armenia and Belarus, increase defense spending or at least make it more reliable and in tune with Yeltsin's past

53. *Ibid.*

54. Moscow, *Kommersant-Daily* (September 22, 1998), *FBIS SOV* (September 22, 1998).

55. S. Blank, "Yevgeny Primakov and Russia's proliferation strategy: What we should expect," *The Monitor* (University of Georgia), IV, 4 (Fall, 1998): 3-14; Moscow, *Segodnia*, in Russian (May 27, 1999), *FBIS SOV* (May 28, 1999).

56. S. Blank, *New trends in Russian defense strategy and policy* (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: Strategic Studies Institute US Army War College, forthcoming); Deborah Yarsike Ball, *How Kosovo empowers the Russian military* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, Davis Center for Russian Studies, April, 1999), Program on new approaches to Russian security, Policy memo, 61: 2-4; Russia's national security concept, Moscow, *Nezavisimoe voennoe obozrenie*, in Russian (January 14, 2000), *FBIS SOV* (January 14, 2000).

orders, and enhance conventional forces readiness.⁵⁷ Kosovo also led to the largest across the board exercises ever conducted by Russia's regular forces. The fact that these exercises occurred while the armed forces cannot guarantee their men three meals a day and cannot afford its full complement of uniforms, let alone usable weapons reveals the Ministry of Defense's (MOD) true priorities.⁵⁸ All this takes place meanwhile military reform as planned and decreed since 1997 cannot be consummated because it is based on economic indicators and expectations that remain essentially unreal or unrealizable within the term of the projected reform.⁵⁹

Obviously while the economy stagnates no creative departures or restoration of Russia's international weight and national power are possible irrespective of whatever policy the United States or other governments adopt. Russia's marginality or sheer irrelevance to many of today's pressing international security issues will then continue and probably grow. Thus in a real sense, the issue is not economic policy, but as Vladimir Ryzhkov observes, the absence of a functioning state.⁶⁰

As long as the state itself is in upheaval Russia cannot meet the requirements of either the classical security agenda of military capability, prosperity, and territorial integrity nor the so called new security agenda that adds migration, pollution in all its forms, drug trafficking, transnational crime, etc. to the classical agenda.⁶¹ If the state cannot be the engine of stability and recovery, nobody else will replace it and Russia risks further anomie and social disintegration. The state's power to obstruct other agencies' or the ruined civil society's initiatives is still too great to be checked in the conditions of a blasted economy and half-pauperized society.

Military strategy and doctrine comprise a seventh element of this context, but were not directly on view in Primakov's firing. These issues are undergoing serious review due to Kosovo. Defense Minister General Igor' Sergeev recently announced that publication of a new military doctrine would await updated Russian assessments of the Kosovo campaign. Nevertheless Yeltsin has ordered a new doctrine and/or strategy, largely due to Kosovo.⁶² While this may be a political dodge since the oft-promised new doctrine has yet to appear despite many earlier promises; it may also represent at least part of the truth. The failure to sustain the goals of the 1997 military reform because the armed forces are still too large (1.2 million as opposed to a total force of about 60% of that size) and the inability to climb out of economic crisis has not led Moscow to revise its still global threat

57. Moscow, *Rossiiskaia gazeta*, in Russian (May 7, 1999), *FBIS SOV* (May 7, 1999); Moscow, *Moskovskii komsomolets*, in Russian (May 6, 1999), *FBIS SOV* (May 7, 1999); Moscow, *Nezavisimoe voennoe obozrenie*, in Russian (April 16-22, 1999), *FBIS SOV* (May 3, 1999).

58. Moscow, *Voeninform military news agency*, e-mail service in English (May 4, 1999), *FBIS SOV* (May 8, 1999); D. Y. Ball, *How Kosovo ...*, *op. cit.*: 3.

59. S. Blank, *Russia's armed forces...*, *op. cit.*

60. "Realities of the fourth Russian Republic," *art. cit.*: 1-12.

61. S. Medvedev, *op. cit.*: 75-116.

62. Erevan, *Snark*, in Russian (May 20, 1999), *FBIS SOV* (May 20, 1999).

assessments which lack any sense of priority among them.⁶³ Instead Kosovo, coming on top of NATO enlargement has added to the intensity with which those assessments are made. As a recent Western analysis of Russian perceptions argues:

“For Russia all the hypothetical security concerns of the past decade are the threats of today. NATO is now closer to Russian borders, and is bombing a non-NATO state. Even before NATO’s new strategic concept, the alliance’s development of Combined Joint Task Forces offered ways for the alliance to employ forces outside the constraints of Article 5 (self-defense). NATO’s changes, combined with its determination to use force against non-members threatens Russia because political turmoil in the former Soviet Union increases the likelihood of NATO involvement near and perhaps even in Russia. Moscow has long feared that expansion of the alliance could radicalize or destabilize neighboring countries, sparking internal splits or civil wars that could drag in Russia – a role it neither wants nor can afford.

Unfortunately, NATO-Russia cooperation failed to address these concerns even before Kosovo. After Kosovo, it is difficult to see what kind of cooperative relationship NATO and Russia can have. For one thing, the air strikes [as viewed from Russia–SB] violated several principles of the NATO-Russia Founding Act—primarily NATO’s commitments limiting its right to use force and promising the settlement of disputes by peaceful means. Russians interpret the ongoing military campaign absent UN Security Council approval as NATO’s drive for unilateral security in Europe. NATO’s new Strategic Concept adopted at the 50th anniversary expanded the alliance’s mission to include non-NATO Europe as a potential area for further NATO use of force. While the Concept recognizes the role of the UN Security council, it does not require that NATO obtain [a] UN mandate for actions beyond the alliance’s border.”⁶⁴

Rather, based on these perceptions, we can see a further change in strategy towards even greater reliance on nuclear weapons, particularly TNW that has ominous implications.

While the new trends in military strategy and doctrine are most disturbing, the two most immediate areas that are especially stressful for Russia are the federal structure of Russia, the impact of the Kosovo issue on Russia. This is because those issues highlight the dangerous implications of the intersection or interaction of many of these contextual features for the future conduct of national security policy.

63. Colonel-General V. M. Barynkin, “Voennye ugrozy Rossii i problemy razvitiia ee vooruzhennykh sil,” *Voennaia mysl*, 1 (January-February, 1999): 2-10; S. Blank, “Valuing the human factor: The reform of Russian military manpower,” *Proceedings of the JINSA-SSI Conference on Manpower and Technology at the End of the 20th Century* (Washington, DC: Jewish Institute of National Security Affairs, 1998): 36-46.

64. Celeste A. Wallander, *Russian views on Kosovo: Synopsis of May 6 panel discussion* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, Davis Center for Russian Studies, April, 1999), Program on new approaches to Russian security, Policy memo, 62: 3-4.

Kosovo and Russian strategy

Russia's response to Kosovo ties together the consequences of military weakness and isolation due to excessive claims in Europe. NATO's campaign in Kosovo has exacerbated the military's bloody-mindedness and its fears. This reaction may be humanly understandable but these strategic responses contain high levels of risk for Russia. Military and political writers led by Primakov and the MOD castigated the Kosovo campaign as a rupture of all civilized post-1945 rules of international conduct.⁶⁵ This reportage betrayed both the armed forces' Soviet-type rhetoric and the unreformed quality of military thinking under constant crisis conditions.

The Kosovo crisis confronts Moscow with many of the threats that it charged would arise out of NATO's enlargement.

First of all, the specter of a rebellious province seeking both independence and outside military-political support due to ethnic misrule greatly alarms Moscow. Russia's leaders all state that Russia's greatest threat is the breakup of the state.⁶⁶ Kosovo's example awakens fears of another Chechnya, but now with foreign support.

Second, Kosovo, coupled with NATO enlargement and the U.S.' clear determination to make NATO an expanding extra-European peacemaker that can act directly on the basis of humanitarian issues, ethnic, and civil violence outside treaty members' borders, ties together many issues that could threaten Russia.

NATO could then bypass the UN and any Russian check on its activities. Moscow has always charged that NATO enlargement and the promise of a second or third round shows that ultimately, and despite rhetoric to the contrary, NATO does not take Russian interests seriously. If NATO acts alone then Russia is excluded from the most dynamic and active security organization in Europe. Thus Kosovo could portend Russia's marginalization in the Balkans.

This danger became more acute once Moscow commenced intensive negotiations with NATO because Moscow suspects that NATO regards it solely as its courier to Milosevic and not as a power with something to contribute. Materially speaking this perception is accurate, but it is no less infuriating for being correct. Chernomyrdin was quite obviously infuriated by President Clinton's recent article where he said that "Russia is now helping to work out a way for Belgrade to meet our conditions" and that NATO's strategy can "strengthen, not weaken our fundamental interest in a long-term positive relationship with Russia."⁶⁷ This shows Moscow that Washington neither understands it nor cares to and is

65. D. Y. Ball, *How Kosovo...*, *op. cit.*: 1-2.

66. *Prism*, 20, Pt. 1 (October 16, 1998); "Yeltsin address;" see also Moscow, *Vooruzhenie, politika, konversiia*, *op. cit.*, and "Russia's National Interests," *art. cit.*; P. Goble, *art. cit.*; *The Monitor* (March 19, 1998 and September 23, 1998); Yevgeny Primakov, "Russia: reforms and foreign policy," *art. cit.*.

67. Viktor S. Chernomyrdin, "Impossible to talk peace with bombs falling," *Washington Post* (May 27, 1999): 39; William Jefferson Clinton, "A just and necessary war," *New York Times* (May 23, 1999): E15.

essentially lost in some dangerous irresponsible dream of its own global mandate based on its own self-appointed rectitude.

Third, because Russia views NATO as essentially a military alliance, whatever NATO may claim, it regards NATO's expansion as the further augmentation of a hostile military alliance and a negative correlation of armed forces with a proven tendency for acting irresponsibly. Even if there is no threat today and Russia is downsizing its forces due to its own needs and the absence of threat, its threat assessment process remains heavily based on correlation of forces modeling that demands an inordinately large force in order to defend against a conventional NATO attack.⁶⁸

Foreign Minister Igor' Ivanov even told a Canadian audience that the future world structure will depend on the Balkan settlement.⁶⁹ Therefore Russian spokesmen contend that because of Kosovo states will go nuclear to thwart U.S. military power, thereby accelerating the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.⁷⁰ Ukraine's Supreme Council voted to do this and many in Russia and Belarus advocate moving nuclear weapons into Belarus, thereby renuclearizing Europe's security agenda.⁷¹ Such outcomes only heighten Russia's security dilemmas by forcing it into unsustainable multilateral and global arms races at both the conventional and nuclear levels. Fourth, NATO's forceful action also suggests that it might forcibly reply to any effort to realize Moscow's revisionist aspirations.

Kosovo's fifth threat to Russia is that to the degree that NATO expands towards former Soviet borders, it directly threatens either constant pressure on Russia proper with the threat of force, or the actual possibility of the use of overwhelming conventional forces in such fashion as to negate possibilities even for nuclear reprisal.⁷² In response to NATO's unilateralism Russian diplomats endlessly urge that the OSCE be the core and coordinator of European security, but they will not give it the authority to "command" or to make sure that its desiderata are implemented. They still believe that Moscow can impose its own solution in ethnic

68. Reiner Huber, "NATO enlargement and CFE ceilings: A preliminary analysis in anticipation of a Russian proposal," *European Security*, V, 3 (Autumn, 1996): 400; Reiner K. Huber, Gernot Friedrich, "NATO enlargement and Russian security: A comparison of findings from two analytical approaches," *ibid.*, VII, 3 (Autumn, 1998): 28-42, and V. Tsygichko and Reiner Huber, "Assessing strategic stability in a multi-polar international system: Two approaches," Robert Lowe, trans. (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Foreign Military Studies office, 1997), unpublished paper; Col.-General Nikolai Pishchev, "NATO: Myths and reality," *Krasnaia zvezda* (January 5, 1997), cited in *Johnson's Russia List* (January 5, 1997), davidjohnson@erols.com; Moscow, *Krasnaia zvezda*, in Russian (October 14, 1998), *FBIS SOV* (October 15, 1998).

69. Moscow, *RIA News Agency*, in Russian (May 19, 1999), *FBIS SOV* (May 19, 1999).

70. Moscow, *Segodnia*, in Russian (March 25, 1999), *FBIS SOV* (March 25, 1999).

71. *Ibid.* Such complaints ignore the fact that Russia since 1991 has consciously abetted every proliferator from North Korea to Libya, except possibly Pakistan, as a matter of state policy.

72. Moscow, *Krasnaia zvezda*, in Russian (June 26, 1998), *FBIS SOV*, 98-177 (June 29, 1998).

issues on its periphery despite long-standing evidence to the contrary.⁷³ Russia has not previously heeded OSCE criticisms of its conduct and will defy it when it believes its interests are at stake.⁷⁴ Instead, Moscow wants nobody to be able to act in Europe unless it is consulted, while simultaneously retaining an exclusive free hand in the CIS. Moscow interprets the Founding Act with NATO as giving it the right to veto any NATO action and demand prior consultation, an interpretation that NATO vehemently denies.⁷⁵ But as there was certainly plenty of consultation with Russia before the bombing, the real problem is that NATO disregarded Russia's claims and rightly suspected its motives. Hence Russia is angered by its own impotence to make its voice heard or achieve its objectives.

But Moscow now fears that NATO might use force unilaterally to intervene in ethnic or civil conflicts within the CIS. Russian spokesmen see the "humanitarian" grounds for intervention in Kosovo, that the violent suppression of an ethnic minority threatens European security, as a potential pretext for NATO's unilateral intervention in the CIS or even in Russia proper.⁷⁶ Therefore Deputy Chief of Staff, General Valerii Manilov stated that any such intervention would be regarded as an act of aggression and probably break up the NATO-Russian Permanent Joint Council.⁷⁷ Lt. General Leonid Ivashov threatened that Moscow would then walk out of the Permanent Joint Council and the Partnership for Peace, repudiate the arms embargo against Serbia, and generally rupture East-West relations.⁷⁸

Another issue arising out of Kosovo is that since Serbia also seeks to resist the United States and NATO, its support for Russia and Russian support for it are of value to Moscow in forcing others to take Russia seriously and in preserving its standing as a great European power. Finally, some Russian analysts see the attacks on Serbia not only as efforts to undermine multi-national states like Russia, they also argue that the United States is trying to oust Russia from the Balkans and beyond that the CIS as it extends its influence there.⁷⁹

73. Nikolai Afanas'evskii, "The OSCE summit in Lisbon," *International Affairs* (Moscow), 1 (1997): 35. At the time he was Deputy Foreign Minister of Russia; Alexander A. Kononov and Dmitri Evstatiev, "The problem of ethnic minority rights protection in the newly independent states", in Ian M. Cuthbertson, Jane Leibowitz, eds, *Minorities: The new Europe's old issue*, Joseph S. Nye Jr., foreword (New York: Institute for East-West Studies, 1993): 159-160.

74. S. Blank, "Russia and Europe in the Caucasus," *European Security*, IV, 4 (Autumn, 1995): 622-645; S. Neil MacFarlane, "The UN, the OSCE, and the Southern Caucasus," *Caspian Crossroads*, III, 1 (1997): 18-22; S. Blank, "The code and civil-military relations," *art. cit.*: 93-112.

75. Moscow, *Interfax*, in English (October 10, 1996), *FBIS SOV*, 96-199 (October 15, 1996); Lawrence McQuillan, "Who has veto power under NATO-Russia accord," *Reuters* (May 14, 1997).

76. *FBIS SOV* (October 14, 1998), Moscow, *Krasnaia zvezda*, in Russian (November 23, 1996), *FBIS SOV*, 96-229 (November 27, 1996).

77. Moscow, *Kommersant*, in Russian (November 13, 1998), *FBIS SOV* (November 13, 1998), Moscow, *ITAR-TASS*, in English (November 12, 1998), *FBIS SOV* (November 12, 1998).

78. Moscow, *Novye izvestiia*, in Russian (October 14, 1998), *FBIS SOV* (October 14, 1998).

79. "Russia makes another attempt to protect Serbs from NATO," *Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press*, L, 23 (July 8, 1998): 23; Sofia, *Demokratiia*, in Bulgarian (July 2, 1998), *Foreign Broadcast Information Service, Eastern Europe*, 98-183 (July 6, 1998).

There are, however, still other fears that lie behind Moscow's response to this intervention. They are tied to the sense of Russia's economic-military-political weakness and that its stability "hangs by a thread." NATO's demonstrated ability to act unilaterally in Iraq and Kosovo with impunity threatens the basis of strategic stability and Moscow's deep-rooted hope of a multipolar evolution of the international system. The General Staff study cited above makes this clear. The study's authors offered what must be taken as authoritative definitions of the terms "strategic stability" and "international stability" that clearly rule out NATO's campaign in Kosovo. If Kosovo is not an aberration Russia then faces what these writers consider to be a unipolar outcome with highly dangerous consequences.

"Strategic *stability* relates to the sphere of inter-state relations and is a structural element of international stability. In turn, *international stability* should be understood as a condition of international relations in which these relations develop without crisis, despite the existence of destabilizing factors in the political, economic, military, and other spheres. In the context of this approach, strategic stability should be understood as a quality of inter-state relations in the military-political sphere, which even under crisis conditions, prevents the sides from using methods of military force to achieve their purposes. This quality also prevents a quantitative and qualitative arms race and makes it possible to avoid provoking military activity."⁸⁰

If Kosovo is a harbinger of the future then strategic stability as well as a broader international stability are at risk due to NATO's unipolar drive and Russia faces the threat of quantitative and qualitative arms races. To counterbalance the United States Russia must go back to a hopeless nuclear arms race that will bankrupt it and which it cannot win since these weapons are not usable except dire conditions and have predictable results. As they write,

"In a *monopolar model of the world* in which the dominant role is played by some single state, the other actors in inter-state relations will invariably have to use a system of counterbalances. If this system of counterbalances is going to rest on nuclear weapons, then nuclear weapons could become a destabilizing factor in the twenty-first century."⁸¹

Two conclusions immediately suggest themselves. One is political and the other is military. Politically Russia objects to any intervention by force and stresses that only the UN or OSCE can allow such intervention. Yeltsin's threats to leave the negotiations if the West did not take Russia seriously indicates that Russia is not taken seriously, mainly because it has nothing to offer and it is not clear that it can deliver Milosevic to the allies. But NATO disregards Russia's diplomacy and has continued to bomb even while negotiating with Moscow. NATO spokesmen intimate that Yeltsin's rhetorical threat of pulling out of the negotiations is for

80. V. K. Potemkin and Yu. V. Morozov, *art. cit.*: 39 (Italics in the original)..

81. *Ibid.*: 41-42 (Italics in the original).

domestic purposes only and continue to profess Russia's importance while conducting their policy as if Russia were not there.

This leaves Russia with only the second, military response. It appears in Sergeev's demands for more spending and widespread political-military calls for a new nuclear and TNW-based strategy as noted above. While this is not truly a new strategy since many hints of this go back several years — and it is not clear what those thresholds for nuclear use would be and against what contingencies they would be employed — nevertheless the turn in Russian strategy to consider the primacy of nuclear weapons is corroborated by much military argumentation and post-1991 production figures. Those figures have emphasized production of weapons suited for East-West conventional theater offensives, intercontinental nuclear war at land and sea, and heavy spending on nuclear command and control.⁸²

Federal issues and Russian national security

Another key factor shaping Russia's policy context is its failed federal bargain. This failure brings together many of the pathologies in state building, economics, and civil-military relations. These pathologies oblige local governments to grab ever more power and resources from a faltering center. Absent respect for legal and constitutional procedure, the government and the Federation Council both regularly flout the constitution, making Russian federalism a decidedly uneven and uncertain affair. Therefore the various power ministries and multiple militaries cannot protect either local parts of the federation, as in the North Caucasus, or the overall Federation itself.

The dangers to Russia's stability hardly end there. While Moscow still controls the money supply, and natural monopolies like energy, transport, and power, are political instruments of central or federal power, powerful financial and economic groups have also arisen in the provinces and increasingly act like laws unto themselves.⁸³ Often these associations are also permeated or controlled by outright criminal gangs as Rushailo suggested.⁸⁴

The ensuing political economy amounts to a replacement of true market economics by an economy that is neither fully controlled nor market yet which seems to be regressing towards a bloated public sector.⁸⁵ Thus the federal failure reproduces state control of the economy at lower, local levels and inhibits true

82. S. Blank, *Why Russian policy is failing in Asia* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1997): 27-34.

83. Graeme Herd, "Russia: Systemic transformation or federal collapse?" *Journal of Peace Research*, XXXVI, 3 (1999): 259-269.

84. For example, the PAKT organization in the Far Eastern Republic under Governor Evgenii Nazdratenko. Julia Latynina, "The economy: New actors, old legacies," in Heyward Isham, ed., *Reconstructing Russia: Perspectives from within* (New York: Institute for East-West Studies, 1996): 8.

85. *Russia beyond 2000*, op. cit.: 8-16.

economic reform and international integration.⁸⁶ Equally importantly, since many provincial governors act without accountability to the law and apparently have almost total power and even usurp the federal constitution on key points, e.g. citizenship.⁸⁷ Arguably (although there are those who disagree like Alexander Sergounin) the devolution of power has not fostered the deconcentration of power as often as might be hoped.⁸⁸

In regard to security policy and foreign affairs this failure is most dangerous in those provinces that are borderlands or gateways to neighboring states: Kaliningrad, the North Caucasus, and the Far East. But the pervasive crisis leads governors in the interior as well to conduct autonomous foreign economic policy. Governor Eduard Rossel in Sverdlovsk has pushed to create his own Ministry of Foreign and International Economic Relations.⁸⁹ The regional Duma also passed laws giving Sverdlovsk region the de facto status of a subject of international law.⁹⁰ Other provincial leaders also negotiate on their own with foreign governments over economic issues because they know Moscow cannot or will not help them.⁹¹ While this trend greatly disturbs Moscow, it is necessary for otherwise these provinces might just fall apart. In northwestern Russia and Kaliningrad, for example, officials well understand the need for effective transborder collaboration to sustain those regions and enhance Baltic security in general, but they are ambivalent at best, and often much worse than that about allowing more autonomy or about strategically implementing such collaboration as a key instrument of overall or even regional foreign policy.⁹²

Second, new inter-regional linkages and dependencies that will make it harder for Moscow to exercise future power are replacing the Soviet cross-linkages between the center and the provinces. Often these are military linkages as well and thus erode military cohesion and Moscow's ability to exercise full command over its troops. Nazdratenko has paid the Pacific Fleet's wage arrears in return for ensuring that only regionally born officers serve there and Krasnoyarsk Governor Aleksandr' Lebed is following suit.⁹³ As British scholar Graeme Herd recently wrote,

86. *Ibid.*; Moscow, *Ekspert*, in Russian (May 10, 1999), *FBIS SOV* (May 20, 1999).

87. G. Herd, *art. cit.*: 261.

88. Alexander Sergounin, *The bright side of Russia's regionalization* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, Davis Center for Russian Studies, April, 1999), Program on new approaches to Russian security, Policy memo, 59.

89. G. Herd, *art. cit.*: 263.

90. *Ibid.*

91. *FBIS SOV* (May 20, 1999); Moscow, *Nezavisimaia gazeta* (electronic version), in Russian (April 30, 1999), *FBIS SOV* (May 4, 1999).

92. An excellent example is S. Romanov, "Russia's regions and transborder cooperation," *International Affairs*, 1 (1998): 85-89.

93. G. Herd, *art. cit.*: 263.

“Even before the August 1998 meltdown, it was apparent that federal military structures were being regionalized. As the federal budget has proven ineffective in paying for basic provisions such as food, accommodations, and energy, federal troops located in the regions have become dependent upon the regions in which they are located to survive. The quality of their existence is linked to the strength of the regional governors’ support for military units based on their territories or republics. Thus, the reality of defense cuts and budget mismanagement, or even outright corruption, means that regional governors who are keen to maintain stability in their provinces will provide the necessary resources gratis.”⁹⁴

The August, 1998 crisis forced 23 of 66 regions to engage in economic separatism by declaring an emergency and imposing price or food controls that, if unchecked could erode the federation’s cohesion. If economic, constitutional, and military processes of regionalization continue without a break, Moscow will be unable to dispose of the instruments of security policy nor will foreign governments know with whom they should deal in Russia. Finally, all three of these three border regions has become major centers of Russian and/or international crime.

While observers like Sergounin argue that regionalization has important benefits because it forces Moscow to adapt to localist pressures, allows provincial governments to negotiate with foreign governments to prevent conflicts over territory and other disputes and gain real access to foreign economic-political governments and institutions as real players; it is unclear whether the existing infrastructure of provincial ties with other states can really answer their problems and provide them with real security.⁹⁵ Furthermore Russia’s asymmetric federalism obstructs CIS integration. Primakov championed integrating Belarus with Russia despite strong opposition from reformers like Boris Nemtsov and Anatolii Chubais. Such a merger would create a single political, economic, and military space, amounting to a leveraged buyout by Moscow of Belarus. It would also supposedly generate pressures to further integrate CIS states around Russia and thrust Moscow back into Europe militarily, even if it further pauperized Russia.

However, Tatarstan and Ingushetia, who negotiated their own deals with Moscow, announced that any effort to bring Belarus into the Russian Federation via an alliance with Moscow will lead them to demand expansion of their powers to the level of sovereign states’ equal to that of Belarus.⁹⁶ That could trigger a new “parade of sovereignties” like that of the early 1990s that helped undo the Soviet Union and would fragment further the already weakened Russian Federation.

Since the federation’s structural weaknesses are important factors in any assessment of Russian national security policy, Primakov consistently sought to

94. *Ibid.*: 261.

95. A. Sergounin, *op. cit.*

96. On Ingushetia’s already independent conduct see, Anna Matveeva, “Russia’s policy toward the North Caucasus: present situation,” in Tracey German, ed., *Russia’s security interest in the North Caucasus* (Camberley, Surrey, UK: Conflict Studies Research Centre, Royal Military Academy Sandhurst, 1998): 22.

weaken the regions' ability to act autonomously and invoked the danger of Russia coming apart. But his successes were quite limited. Nazdratenko has defied Moscow's every effort to gain control in Primorskii *krai*. Moscow's long war of attrition with the Far East has left the latter a barely surviving backwater in Asia's economy and Russian economic-political influence in Asia remains negligible.⁹⁷

Population is falling in the Far East as Russians return to Russia and their place is often taken by a creeping Chinese migration whose size cannot be verified but whose presence visibly alarms the local government and some central elites. Not surprisingly hopes for growing Sino-Russian economic interchange, based here and in China's adjoining provinces, have been dashed and officially buried. While both sides abetted this outcome, Russian policies were probably the most harmful ones here.⁹⁸

The North Caucasus' situation is even more desperate. Its economic crisis reinforces the separatist trends most evident in Chechnya and the general collapse of legal order in adjacent provinces like Dagestan. Most Russian analysts would concur that one of the greatest, if not the greatest, threats to Russia's security and territorial integrity are located here. Indeed, at the time of this writing Karachai-Cherkessia almost exploded and there are widespread fears that Dagestan might join with Chechnya thereby obliging a forceful response from Moscow.⁹⁹ Violence in the form of kidnappings, bombings, and hijackings is endemic and pervasive. This is not surprising since in many areas unemployment is 80%. But it is also clear that Moscow lacks resources, policies, or answers to deal with the economic, political, ethnic, and other issues that torment this region. Yet Moscow almost went to war with Chechnya in April, 1999. The region remains out of control except in heavily militarized areas and even there one cannot be sure for the Russian armed forces are notoriously corrupt. For example, military officers routinely sell their men to the Chechens as slaves since Moscow does not pay them!¹⁰⁰ Here the collapse of the federal bargain intersects with the general incoherence of defense policy in a state of multiple rival militaries. The resulting disarray constantly threatens to unhinge the entire state. For the center of gravity in any future wars in the North Caucasus will be the regime in Moscow more than whatever local

97. Felix K. Chang, "The unraveling of Russia's Far Eastern power," *Orbis*, XLIII, 2 (Spring, 1999): 257-284, id., "The Russian Far East's endless winter," *ibid.*, XLIII, 1 (Winter, 1999): 77-110.

98. The many recent works by Gilbert Rozman illustrate the dilemmas of local regionalization, see G. Rozman, "Northeast China: Waiting for regionalization," *Problems of Post-Communism*, XLV, 4 (July-August, 1998): 3-13, id., "The crisis of the Russian Far East: Who is to blame?," *ibid.*, XLIV, 5 (September-October, 1997): 3-12; id., "Flawed regionalization: Reconceptualizing Northeast Asia in the 1990s," *The Pacific Review*, XI, 1 (1998): 1-27, and "Cross-national integration in Northeast Asia: Geopolitical and economic goals in conflict," *East Asia*, XVI, 1-2 (1998): 6-43.

99. Moscow, *Nezavisimaia gazeta*, in Russian (May 25, 1999), *FBIS SOV* (May 25, 1999); Igor Rotar, "The North Caucasus — Specific tension factors in the region," *Prism*, 8 (April 23, 1999): Part 3.

100. Moscow, *Kommersant Digest* (May 19, 1999).

governments are involved. And one cannot be certain of Moscow's victory in such conflicts.¹⁰¹

Moscow has been unable to visualize Kaliningrad in primarily economic terms. Thus neither Moscow nor the regional government has been able to turn this "exclave" into a true economic gateway to one of Europe's fastest growing regions. Instead, Moscow continues to view Kaliningrad as mainly a geopolitical asset whose destiny must be centrally controlled. This approach, along with previously ham-fisted policies towards the Baltic states, has inhibited regional economic growth to the point where the Kaliningrad Special Military District's forces had to forage for food in the fall of 1998. Nor were they alone in experiencing food shortages.¹⁰² While some Russian politicians toy with making it a state on its own or other solutions, clearly misguided policies have held back a region that adjoins some of Europe's fastest growing states. Hence Kaliningrad could easily explode.¹⁰³

The net result of the struggle between the regions and governments in Moscow is not a strong center with strong regions, or one strong and the other weak, but rather weak regions and a weak center. Consequently analysts like Herd now discern trends pointing toward the Federation's fragmentation.¹⁰⁴ While this outcome is hardly foreordained; today the current runs away from Moscow.

Trends in military policy confirm this trend and could become very dangerous indeed for Russian security. Russia's interior regions and republics already have successfully obstructed key security policies.¹⁰⁵ The crisis of center-periphery relations has already also encouraged potentially dangerous symbiotic local governmental relationships with the armed forces. Already in 1992 opportunistic regional politicians formed coalitions with the armed forces to frustrate major

101. Neither can Russia's current forces suffice to defend against internal secessionist threats. In March-April, 1999 when Chechen guerrillas kidnapped high-ranking MVD General Gennadii Shpigun, Stepashin seemed ready to start a war against them on his own authority. Yeltsin and his national security advisor, General Nikolai Bordyuzha, both made themselves scarce, leaving Primakov with the unhappy burden of decision. Primakov rightly insisted that there be no war despite the MVD's missile rattling because he understood that such a war was not winnable, something that may have been lost on the MVD.

102. St. Petersburg, *Na srazhe rodiny*, in Russian (February 26, 1999), *FBIS SOV* (March 29, 1999); Moscow, *Vremia* (September 29, 1998) as quoted in Sergei Khrushchev, "Russia's gambling capitalism," *Mediterranean Quarterly*, X, 1 (Winter, 1999): 53; see also Moscow, *Nezavisimaia gazeta* (electronic version), (March 12, 1999), *FBIS-SOV* (March 16, 1999).

103. For an overall and international discussion of Kaliningrad, see Pertti Joenniemi and Jan Prawitz, eds., *Kaliningrad: The European amber region* (Aldershot, Hampshire, England: Ashgate Publishing Ltd., 1998).

104. G. Herd, *art. cit.*: 259-269.

105. "Nikolai Fedorov 'exempts' his servicemen from being sent to Grozny," *Current Digest of the Post-Soviet Press*, XLVII, 2 (February 8, 1995): 23; Philip Hanson, "Regions, local power and economic change in Russia," in Alan Smith, ed., *Challenges for Russian economic reform* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution for the Royal Institute of International Affairs, London, 1995): 26n.

central diplomatic initiatives.¹⁰⁶ They thereby established a dangerous but lasting precedent by showing Moscow's inability to prevent them and the armed forces from openly forging political coalitions against central policies.

Indeed, precisely because Moscow has often abdicated its responsibilities to the regions and the armed forces or cannot fulfill them, it has frequently encouraged joint action by regional political and military authorities.¹⁰⁷ Now any further devolution of power becomes an incentive for civilian and military leaders to join to defend shared defense or foreign policies. Incentives for autonomous action may grow as the devolution of military power in the newly created military districts empower their commanders and give them more opportunities to cooperate with local political authorities, even if their territorial jurisdictions do not always overlap with those of the latter. Since the regions can withhold tax revenues from Moscow for use at home, they possess real resources with which to buy armed support.¹⁰⁸

While the internal fractures among the armed forces militate against a coup by a serving officer, today's situation holds several real risks. Regional or central leaders may use the armed forces who support them in a bid for power or secession. In that case, polls conducted among army officers reveal that a large majority of them oppose using the army for internal purposes like stopping a province's secession.¹⁰⁹ That finding raises the danger that some military forces will go over to the secessionist side or rebel against Moscow if a coup or another misconceived war like that against Chechnya is launched. Alternatively a commander could begin conducting his own foreign policy, e.g. using the Border Troops. Or he and/or political leader could create their own military-police forces from official and paramilitary forces. In multiethnic areas, like the North Caucasus, the potential for a scenario, reminiscent of OAS (*Organisation armée secrète*) in Algeria could also develop. Since the military reforms of 1997 gave district commanders in chief enormous and unprecedented powers and stripped them away from the central MOD apparatus in Moscow, the power of a regional commander to bolt from central control and form powerful and even independent local or regional political alliances with the authorities in the province has greatly grown. Simultaneously the practical motive for doing so has also grown spectacularly.

106. S. Blank, "The New Russia in the New Asia," *International Journal*, XLIX, 4 (Autumn, 1994): 875-877.

107. Andrei Zhukov, "Gubernatorial elections," *Prism*, II, 2, Part 4 (September, 1996); *Krasnaia zvezda*, in Russian (May 28, 1996), *FBIS-SOV*, 96-103 (May 28, 1996): 29-30; Timothy L. Thomas, "Fault lines and factions in the Russian army," *Orbis*, XXXIX, 4 (Fall, 1995): 538.

108. Jacques Sapir, "What kind of armed forces the Russian economy could support," Paper presented to the SSI, RAND, University of London, Conference on the Russian Armed Forces, University of London, May 16-18, 1995, pp. 22-23.

109. D. Y. Ball, "How reliable are Russia's officers,?" *art. cit.*: 204-207.

Conclusions

Clearly we stand at a turning point. Due to the confluence of pressures: Kosovo, NATO enlargement, U.S. efforts to bypass the ABM treaty, political stagnation, economic collapse, military decrepitude, etc. Russian national security policy appears to stand before an impasse. Having failed to make a transition either to democracy or to the market, Russia is now bereft of political or intellectual guidance as to what must be done. It demands a role it cannot fulfill, destabilizes itself and its neighborhood with disturbing regularity, and faces enormous challenges in every area of security.

One cannot even begin to predict what direction Russia might choose or be forced to take. But the context within which it operates, not to mention the changing international system, seems to forestall any hope of escape from another protracted crisis. But given the context delineated above what basis exists upon which we can predict a resolution to that crisis that gives us a liberal Russia, integrated into Europe and at peace with itself, not to mention its neighbors and interlocutors? Unfortunately only Russia can answer that question. Until and unless it does so, Russia's foreign partners will have to hedge against Moscow as much as they welcome her into their community. However, increasingly that complex double task seems to be not only beyond their capabilities but also beyond their interest.

June 1999.

*Strategic Studies Institute
US Army War College
Carlisle Barracks, PA 17013*

e-mail : BlankS@awc.carlisle.army.mil