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Local Languages and Education Amidst Conflict and Federal Aspirations in Myanmar

Langues locales et Éducation en contexte de conflits et d’aspirations fédérales au Myanmar
Nicolas Salem-Gervais, Amber Spreelung, Hawng Tsai et Pau Sian Lian
p. 105-147

Résumés

Le Myanmar est un pays d’une grande diversité ethnique et linguistique, dont l’indépendance a été fondée sur des principes et compromis de nature fédérale. La politique linguistique scolaire est demeurée une question controversée depuis, en particulier sous les juntes militaires successives qui ont systématiquement restreint l’utilisation des langues des minorités ethniques dans l’éducation formelle. En revanche, la période de réforme de 2011 à 2021 a vu des progrès lents mais notables à cet égard : en 2020, 64 langues minoritaires avaient été introduites comme matières dans les écoles publiques, et la collaboration entre divers systèmes d'éducation « ethnique » non étatiques – souvent affiliés à des organisations armées – et le ministère de l'éducation s’est progressivement améliorée. Le coup d'État militaire de 2021 a brutalement interrompu ces progrès, bouleversant le paysage politique du Myanmar et déclenchant des conflits dans tout le pays. Cet évènement a également contribué à intensifier les appels à une reconfiguration fondamentale du système fédéral du Myanmar, et provoqué une augmentation considérable des inscriptions dans les programmes d’éducation non étatiques, et notamment les organisations éducatives « ethniques », historiques ou nouvellement crées. S’appuyant sur une revue de la littérature existante, une analyse historique, un examen de la situation actuelle et trois études de cas, cet article évalue de manière critique l’évolution du rôle des langues locales dans l'éducation au Myanmar après le coup d’État, soulignant à la fois les opportunités émergentes et les défis persistants.

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The authors wish to thank the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung and the Agence nationale pour la recherche (EVIMOB, Grant number ANR-24-CE53-7244-01), whose support on several other projects has contributed to the team-building and logistics leading to the present paper.

Framing the Discussion

  • 1 According to the estimates produced by Ethnologue (URL: http://www.ethnologue.com/) between 2016 an (...)
  • 2 In this article—while acknowledging that the distinction is not an exact science—we adopt the conve (...)

1Even by Southeast Asian standards, Myanmar has notable ethnolinguistic diversity, with an estimated 115 to 118 languages spoken by its 55 million inhabitants.1 These multiple languages, cultures, and identities undeniably hold significant importance and appreciating the relative magnitudes of this diversity is essential for interpreting the country’s ethnolinguistic landscape and its political implications. As a general message, however, this article suggests caution with the notion—largely a colonial construct in Myanmar’s case—of a ‘genuine’2 or ‘definitive’ listing of discrete ethnic identities, with a simple one-to-one correspondence with a list of languages (McCormick 2016), which risks being framed as a ‘natural’ basis for future political solutions. More often than not, the production of a list of ethnolinguistic labels is an exercise which is arbitrary to a significant extent, and underpinned by competing, debatable and evolving political visions of belonging to multiple ethnic identities, rather than by strictly ‘scientific’ linguistic considerations.

2Similarly, and as discussed in the general introduction of this special issue, the mapping of languages and ethnic identities (Map 1) appears to be double-edged: on the one hand, this type of document serves as a useful and powerful conceptual tool for illustrating the diversity and spatial distribution of these ethnolinguistic identities. On the other hand, it inevitably greatly oversimplifies a highly intricate reality: the senses of belonging and language practices of groups and individuals are typically much more heterogeneous, intertwined, multilayered, and dynamic than the visual representation of distinct colored areas might suggest.

Ethnolinguistic Diversity and the Challenge of Building a Nation

3The Bamar majority is usually estimated to account for just under 70% of Myanmar’s population of 55 million (Jap & Courtin, 2022), with Burmese serving as both their mother tongue and the national language. Most of the remaining population also acquire Burmese as an L2 or L3 to varying degrees, with government schools historically constituting one of the main vehicles for its dissemination. The Myanmar state officially recognizes 135 “national races” or “ethnic nationalities,” some of the established translations of the Burmese taingyintha (တိုင်းရင်းသား), a term strongly linked to the idea of ‘indigeneity’ (Cheesman 2017). However, the listing of the specific groups that constitute the 135 taingyintha categories—a legacy of colonial censuses and possibly influenced by numerological auspiciousness—is widely contested and often deemed inaccurate (Ferguson 2015).

4In linguistic terms, Ethnologue has catalogued between 111 and 115 living local languages in recent years, distinguishing these as “indigenous” languages, compared to six or seven “non-indigenous” languages.3 These non-Burmese local languages, commonly referred to as “ethnic languages,”4 vary widely in their vitality, number of speakers, dialectal homogeneity, presence or absence of written traditions (or multiple written traditions), institutional recognition (including in education), domains of use, and roles within regional multilingual settings.

5While unquestionably constituting a richness of cultural heritage, Myanmar’s ethnolinguistic diversity has also proven to be an enduring political challenge to nation-building. Efforts following World War II, including the Panglong Agreement in 1947, sought federal compromises to support the creation of the “Union” of Burma at independence in 1948 (later the Union of Myanmar). However, the country’s modern history has been largely characterized by protracted armed conflicts, chiefly underpinned by the mobilization of ethnic identities and aspirations for full independence or some degree of autonomy from a central state widely perceived as Bamar-dominated.

6This threat of a centrifugal “disintegration” of the country has, in turn, been used by successive military juntas since 1962 to consolidate power, pushing insurgencies to the peripheries while maintaining highly centralized, authoritarian rule. This governance model has advanced an overall Bamar-centric conception of national identity—including through language-in-education policy—at the expense of meaningful inclusion. Moreover, the state has largely failed to deliver on progressive economic development, which might have otherwise facilitated its assimilation project, instead perpetuating grievances and further entrenching ethnic divisions.

Aborted Reform, Renewed Federal Aspirations

7The decade from 2011 to 2020 marked a significant period in Myanmar’s contemporary history. Important reforms in free speech, democratization, decentralization, and economic development fostered optimism that the country was finally on a path toward addressing its longstanding political issues. However, the February 2021 military coup and the formation of the State Administrative Council (SAC) abruptly reversed this trajectory, shattering Myanmar’s political landscape. At the time of writing, armed conflict is pervasive in nearly all regions of the country, with the junta and its proxies facing resistance from several hundred different historical and newly created armed groups, whose sizes range from a few dozen soldiers to several thousand or even tens of thousands.

8While the widespread participation of predominantly Bamar armed groups in resisting the SAC by and large represents a new development in Myanmar’s conflict history, many of the largest armed organizations are centered around ethnic minority identities. This includes longstanding ethnic armed organizations (EAOs) such as the Karen National Liberation Army (KNLA) and the Kachin Independence Army (KIA), as well as newly formed groups like the Chin Defense Forces (CDF) and the Karenni Nationalities Defence Force (KNDF). Most of these groups are in general alignment with the “Spring Revolution” and the National Unity Government (NUG), established in response to the 2021 coup. However, the political priorities and influence of these actors—whether directed toward the SAC, the NUG, or among themselves—remain fluid, influenced by shifting dynamics on the battlefield.

9As the SAC continues to lose ground to revolutionary forces, discussions around a ‘genuine’ federal future for the country have returned to center stage. This vision, fully endorsed by the NUG and encapsulated in its Federal Democracy Charter, represents a renewed aspiration to address historical grievances around national identity and the self-determination of ethnic minorities. Unlike the gradual decentralization reforms pursued during the 2011-2020 period, this proposed federalism aims to deliver a more profound restructuring of the state. Despite daunting latent challenges towards its design and implementation, federalism is widely regarded as a potential pathway to achieving a peaceful and enduring political settlement for Myanmar.

Language-in-Education: A Key Sector of Resistance and Federal Prospects

10Education has long been a highly politicized arena in Myanmar, both during the colonial era and throughout its post-independence history. In the aftermath of the 2021 coup it remains central as a sector of resistance and a space to articulate alternative visions of politics and belonging (Salem-Gervais et al. 2024). This article examines the developments, achievements, and challenges of incorporating ethnic minority languages into formal education across different systems—an issue that has been a pivotal political and symbolic concern throughout Myanmar’s modern history.

11This issue appears more relevant than ever in post-coup Myanmar, particularly as non-state ‘ethnic’ education systems—often, though not always, connected to an EAO—have gained momentum as alternatives to SAC-controlled schools. Aligned with the NUG MoE to different extents and in different ways, these systems are characterized by an increasing number of schools and enrolled students, reflecting their growing significance. Language-in-education policy choices and the representation of ethnic identities in formal education are undoubtedly crucial to the federal aspirations shared by many in the country. Ethnic education systems have been described as “building blocks” of a bottom-up “federating” process, in contrast to top-down “federalization” approaches, such as those predominant during the 2011-2020 decade (South, Stenning & Schroeder 2024). It is thus vital during the post-coup ‘interim’ period to monitor the developments across ethnic education systems, as this period is marked by conflict and political uncertainty but also by the resilience and determination of many actors to provide education on their terms for children and youth.

Map 1. Main langu...Map 1. Main languages spoken across the sub-national administrative boundaries of Myanmar and its borders with neighboring countries

Map 1. Main languages spoken across the sub-national administrative boundaries of Myanmar and its borders with neighboring countries

Sources: MIMU, SIL, LSDO.

12This article builds on previous work by our constantly evolving team (see bibliography), albeit in different political contexts and with a different scope, length, and intended audience. It begins by presenting a comparative literature review to offer insights from other contexts on the leverage, benefits, and challenges of including diverse local languages in formal education as part of broader decentralization efforts aimed at building peace, social harmony, and national cohesion. A concise historical background of the issue in Myanmar follows, with a particular focus on the language-in-education dimensions of the decentralization reforms implemented during the 2011-2020 period. We then turn to the impact of the 2021 coup on education, highlighting the curtailment of ethnic language teaching in SAC-controlled schools and the parallel growth of historical and newly created ethnic education systems, each utilizing their respective languages to different extents. After ‘zooming-in’ on three brief case studies set in Chin, Ta’ang, and Kayan areas, the article concludes by discussing the opportunities and challenges of building a peace-conducive federal system for Myanmar through the prism of language-in-education.

Language Education, Conflict, Social Cohesion, and Federalism

13As described in the general introduction of this special issue, advocacy towards introducing and using local languages in education around the world typically revolves around three main arguments: (1) contributing to cultural and linguistic diversity preservation, (2) promoting access to (quality) education, and (3) strengthening national cohesion. While the two first arguments absolutely deserve the attention they have attracted among academics, educators, and activists, the third argument—towards nation-building and peace-building through the promotion of an inclusive national identity—is the most relevant to the perspectives of this article.

14This section highlights observations gathered from the experiences of other countries regarding the political implications of their language-in-education reforms. As a preliminary remark, it is important to note that this type of brief literature review, typically presenting ‘success stories’ (or ‘failures’) in other countries, simply cannot do justice to the actual complexity of language-in-education issues in diverse and dynamic contexts. In a rapidly evolving world shaped by advancements in technology and the global circulation of information and ideas, each country’s ethnolinguistic situation and trajectory as a nation remain unique. Policies that have succeeded or failed in forging national unity in one context may yield entirely different outcomes in another, depending on specific historical and sociopolitical conditions.

15Nonetheless, we believe that comparative insights are valuable, in broadening perspectives beyond Myanmar’s unique case. A fairly consistent trend also seems to emerge in the literature, suggesting that language policies that embrace a nation’s diversity are generally more effective at fostering unity than assimilationist policies around a monolithic conception of national identity, which are liable to create resentment and mobilization of local identities against the state (Brown & Ganguly 2003; Lo Bianco 2016).

16Countries that have successfully implemented inclusive language-in-education reforms demonstrate the potential of such policies to ease conflict and foster social cohesion within nation-states. In Southern Thailand, the introduction of Patani Malay in schools during the 2010s marked a significant shift from historical monolingual policies. This reform is credited with contributing to a reduction in separatist violence (Premsrirat & Burarungrot 2021). Similarly, in Sri Lanka, initiatives like teaching Tamil as a second language to Sinhala students have also been recognized as opportunities for peace-building, addressing the historical marginalization of the Tamil language—a key factor in the country’s civil war (Perera & Khodos 2024).

17Despite these successes, in many cases the implementation of inclusive language-in-education policies faces significant challenges, particularly in linguistically diverse nations. Key obstacles include the sheer number of languages involved in the reforms, the geographical intermixing of populations speaking different languages, and the politicization of languages at both national and local levels; a single language can be perceived as marginalized in the national context while being also dominant over other varieties when considering a specific region. Depending on the context, the diversity of languages may be beyond what can be practically addressed through a federal framework or decentralization reforms, or at least entail choices and tradeoffs, inevitably contributing to the stratification of language hierarchies. For example, India, with an estimated 424 living languages spoken (the Ethnologue database’s latest estimate),5 officially recognizes only 22 languages and uses fewer than 50 as media of instruction or subjects in schools (Devi 2017). The classification of ‘languages’ (explicitly or implicitly versus the notion of ‘dialects’) further complicates reforms. This distinction is not purely linguistic but also deeply political, as evidenced by discrepancies between the 2001 Census of India—which identified 122 “major” languages and 1,599 “other” languages—and the above-mentioned figures.

  • 6 Ibid.

18Nigeria presents a similar case of diversity, with an estimated 520 living languages.6 Since 1977, its official policy has required primary education to be conducted in a child’s “mother tongue” or the “language of the immediate community” (LIC), an orientation reaffirmed in the country’s 2022 National Language Policy. However, in resource-limited contexts, determining which particular languages to prioritize as LICs in multilingual areas has proven to be challenging, with serious educational and political implications for speakers of less dominant languages/dialects (Ebube Obiakor 2024).

  • 7 Ibid.

19Similar challenges have been observed in the Philippines, a Southeast Asia pioneer for mother tongue-based education, which implemented an education policy supporting 19 languages out of the estimated 175 spoken throughout the country7 (significantly higher language figures are common). This great linguistic diversity, including situations in which students of a single classroom have diverse linguistic backgrounds, constituted one of the challenges contributing to the policy’s rescission in 2024 (see Bustos-Orosa & Symaco 2025, in this special issue). This type of challenge has led some researchers to suggest that countries with a high degree of linguistic diversity may also want to consider alternative approaches for improving learning outcomes for minority language users (Wa-Mbaleka 2015; Igarashi Maulana & Suryadarna 2024).

20Ethiopia also exemplifies the complexities of managing multilingualism within a federal framework. The country, with an estimated 90 to 110 languages, has been historically centered around the Amhara ethnic group and Amharic language. In 1992, Ethiopia transitioned to a federal system, with regions (thirteen at the time of writing) established along ethnic and linguistic lines, such as Somali, Oromiya, and Amhara. More recently, from 2021 to 2023, additional regions with pluri-ethnic identities and geographical toponyms, such as South West Ethiopia and Central Ethiopia, have been created. This federal restructuring has led to different regions making different choices regarding official language(s) and language(s) used in primary schooling, moving away from the historical dominance of Amharic and English being the sole media of instruction. Some researchers, however, highlight significant local controversies over language policies, including in education, which involve enduring forms of oppression (Welesilassie & Gerencheal 2024), and challenges in providing mother tongue education in the most linguistically diverse regions (Seid 2019). Situations are diverse, but critics argue that this transformation tends to sideline ‘smaller’ ethnic groups and languages, and in some instances exacerbate ethnic division and inequality (Alem 2024).

21Nepal, which transitioned from a unitary system to federalism in 2008, provides another example of progress and challenges in embracing linguistic and cultural diversity. With 124 recognized languages across its seven provinces, Nepal has made strides in promoting language inclusion, although defining what constitutes a mother tongue and developing teaching materials for less-used languages remain pressing issues (Dhakal 2021; Dhami 2024).

22As outlined, this brief literature review provides only a glimpse into the complex and evolving dynamics surrounding language-in-education reforms, where diverse actors often hold varying perspectives on their successes and limitations. A reasonable conclusion is that incorporating ethnic minority languages into formal education—particularly within decentralization reforms or transitions to federalism—offers significant potential across the above-mentioned three key dimensions (preserving linguistic and cultural diversity, improving access to education, and fostering social cohesion). But at the same time, such reforms are not necessarily panacea. Resource limitations and the inherent complexities of linguistically diverse contexts typically necessitate difficult choices and tradeoffs. These decisions often result in the elevation of certain languages or dialects at the expense of others, potentially reinforcing inequalities and marginalization. Acknowledging these challenges is critical when envisioning federal solutions and considering the role of language-in-education policies in fostering peacebuilding within Myanmar’s conflict-affected landscape.

Education, Language, and Identity in Myanmar Prior to the 2021 Coup

  • 8 See Salem-Gervais & Raynaud (2020) as well as other works of our team.

23While a detailed examination of Myanmar’s language-in-education history is beyond this paper’s scope,8 a brief historical overview is indispensable for understanding ongoing dynamics and envisioning future prospects and challenges. In this section, we outline language-in-education developments across Myanmar’s political history, with a particular focus on the 2011-2020 decade of reforms. Despite the distinct differences compared to post-coup Myanmar, this period offers valuable insights into language policy and decentralization, which are relevant to current widely held federal aspirations.

Education, Language, and Politics up to 2011

24Formal education in Myanmar has deep roots tied primarily to religion. Famously, the first European visitors to this region of the world were impressed by the comparatively high ‘literacy rates’ among Buddhist lowland populations, owing to the tradition of young boys spending time as novices in the monasteries. As the British colonial conquest of what would come to be known as Burma/Myanmar progressed throughout the 19th century, the colonial administration initially attempted to establish an education system for the masses by modernizing schooling in the existing monasteries, aiming to extend it beyond religious instruction. However, this pragmatic and cost-effective solution largely failed. The Sangha, and later on the students, became central forces of resistance to colonial rule, and most monks were reluctant to provide education supervised by a colonial state that overthrew the Buddhist monarchy in 1885 and was largely seen as supporting Christian missionary activities. What emerged instead was a layered education system, stratified by social class and differentiated in terms of opportunities, with English-medium schools at the top, often run by missionaries, and ‘vernacular’ and monastic schools, primarily Burmese-medium, at the bottom.

25The colonization of a large part of mainland Southeast Asia introduced Western concepts of the nation-state, which were defined by fixed borders, replacing the region’s traditional ‘mandala’/‘galactic’ model of fluctuating relations between centers of power and their shifting areas of influence. Colonial essentialist ideas about ‘race’ also influenced Burmese understandings of belonging, particularly through colonial censuses that reified ethnic categories by distinguishing ‘indigenous races’ from ‘non-indigenous races’ (Lieberman 1978; Ferguson 2015; Candier 2019). Prior to the British conquest, avoiding written language was possibly part of an overall strategy of highland populations to remain outside of the reach of lowland states (Scott 2009; Michaud 2020), which in turn largely perceived them ‘backwards.’ This dynamic, however, changed during the colonial period, notably with the arrival in highland areas of Christian missionaries, who developed scripts for local languages to translate Christian sacred texts, and opened mission schools using combinations of local languages, Burmese, and English, which was largely viewed as important for personal and economic success (Bagshawe 1998; Sadan 2013; Saw Soe Gyi & Waters 2023). British policies involved ‘indirect rule’ in the ‘frontier areas,’ which maintained local elites such as Shan Sawbwas and Kachin Duwas, and the recruitment of soldiers from upland populations, often recently Christianised, described as ‘martial races,’ and perceived as more ‘loyal’ than the Burmans (Callahan 2003; Taylor 2006; Sadan 2013). Such colonial practices decisively contributed to emerging national consciousnesses and aspirations among highland communities.

Fig. 1. Grammar o...Fig. 1. Grammar of the Sgaw Karen by American Baptist missionary Rev. D. Gilmore (1898)

Fig. 1. Grammar of the Sgaw Karen by American Baptist missionary Rev. D. Gilmore (1898)

Fig. 2. Grammar a...Fig. 2. Grammar and Dictionary of the Lakher (Mara) Language by British missionary F. W. Savidge (1908)

Fig. 2. Grammar and Dictionary of the Lakher (Mara) Language by British missionary F. W. Savidge (1908)

Fig. 3. Kachin Re...Fig. 3. Kachin Reader by Baptist missionary Rev. J. F. Ingram (1916)

Fig. 3. Kachin Reader by Baptist missionary Rev. J. F. Ingram (1916)

26Starting in the early 1920s, Burmese historians involved in the National Schools movement revisited the Burmese king dynasties’ Chronicles to write and teach patriotic accounts of their nation’s history, contrasting with the textbooks produced by colonial historians. Similar nationalist endeavors emerged among some Christianized ethnic groups, contributing to divergent, and at times antagonistic, historical narratives and aspirations that persist today (Salem-Gervais & Metro 2012). Broadly, the Burmese nationalist perspective regards successive Burmese empires as golden eras, underpinned by the ‘unity’ of the diverse ‘national races’ which was later fractured by colonial ‘divide and rule’ strategies. In contrast, many ethnic minorities view Burmese kings as oppressors and tend to see colonial Burma as a period of progress and the birth of their modern history, with the introduction of written languages, new faiths, and relative freedom and recognition compared to post-independence political dynamics.

27Following World War II, which saw the Burmese and other ethnic groups often fighting on opposing sides, the Panglong Agreement in February 1947 laid the groundwork for the birth of the independent Union of Burma. While the agreement does not explicitly mention federalism, the Constitution drafted that same year granted some degree of autonomy to five ethnic territories: the Shan, Kachin, Kayah and Karen States, and the Special Division of the Chin. South, Stenning and Shroeder (2024), referencing Walton (2008), suggest the agreement reflected different interpretations: Shan, Kachin and Chin leaders saw this as a ‘federating moment,’ a voluntary union, while Aung San and the Burmese politicians viewed it as a ‘federalizing moment,’ offering limited autonomy from the central government to the most prominent ethnic groups.

  • 9 Burma Gazetteer, the Bhamo District, 1960.
  • 10 Salem-Gervais & Van Cung Lian (2020).

28In the years following independence, amid ongoing conflicts and limited educational access outside urban centers and for non-elites, Myanmar’s education system was largely shaped by Burmese nationalism. Beginning in 1955, the matriculation exam was only available in Burmese (displacing English), and other local languages were restricted to instruction up to third standard in government schools. Private mission schools nevertheless remained influential, both among urban elites and in the mountainous peripheries (Tinker 1967). For instance, in 1960 there were only five government schools in Bhamo district compared to ten Private Kachin schools operated by the American Baptist Mission,9 and it seems local languages were also widely used as media of instruction in primary schools in Chin areas.10

  • 11 Salem-Gervais & Raynaud (2020).

29This situation drastically changed following the 1962 military coup led by General Ne Win, who invoked the risk of ‘disintegration’ of the Union of Burma to halt discussions about federalism. During the first years of the Burmese Way to Socialism, the government centralized power, nationalized major companies, and imposed strict censorship. Universities, often hotbeds for political dissent, faced heavy regulations, and student protests met with brutal repression. By 1965-66, private schools—seen as colonial vestiges controlled by missionaries that contributed to class divides—were nationalized, and foreign missionaries were expelled. Although the issue is often described too simplistically, in terms of language policy, priority was largely given to Burmese at the expense of both English and ethnic minority languages. Local languages perceived as the ‘main’ ethnic language of each State could in theory be taught as subjects three periods per week and up to Grade 3, and some textbooks were drafted by the government for this purpose.11 However, in practice the actual possibility to teach these languages likely differed from one region, or even one school, to another, and depended on a variety of factors such as the proximity of armed ethnic rebellions, the priorities and directives of regional and local MoE administrators, the availability of teachers proficient in local languages, and the willingness of the local population to formally learn these languages within school hours.

Fig. 4. “Our coun...Fig. 4. “Our country’s family” representation of the ethnic diversity in a Grade 2 reader of the national curriculum published in 1966

Fig. 4. “Our country’s family” representation of the ethnic diversity in a Grade 2 reader of the national curriculum published in 1966

30Ethnic minority languages were further sidelined from government schools following the 1988 uprising and under the SLORC/SPDC rule. In the early 1990s, the MoE’s official policy allowed schools to allocate up to two 30-minute sessions per week to the teaching of ethnic languages, substituting for physical education and school activities (Than Oo 1999). However, this option was extremely minimal and seemingly disappeared altogether from the official policy by the end of the decade (Than Oo 1999; Thaung Htut 2000).

31Unlike under Ne Win, the SLORC/SPDC relinquished some direct control over all forms of education, allowing private, monastic and Chinese schools to re-emerge. Meanwhile, outside State-controlled territories, some education systems linked to different EAOs—which had begun as ‘jungle schools’ in the 1960s and 1970s—were becoming more structured following ceasefire agreements with the junta. For instance, the Kachin Independence Organization (KIO) and the New Mon State Party (NMSP) signed such ceasefires in 1994 and 1995 and expanded their education systems to approximately 160 and 150 schools respectively by the late 2000s. Kachin schools largely followed the government curriculum throughout all grades with some modifications, such as the addition of Kachin (Jinghpaw) language and culture and the frequent use of Kachin as an informal ‘classroom language.’ In contrast, the NMSP’s Mon National Schools have followed a model largely aligned with classic mother tongue-based multilingual education (MTB-MLE) practices, progressively transitioning from the local language (Mon) to the national language (Burmese) as the main anguage of instruction from primary to secondary schooling.

Nascent Language-in-Education Decentralization Reforms (2011-2020)

  • 12 Salem-Gervais et al. (2024).

32Following the brutal crackdown on the ‘Saffron Revolution’ in 2007, the adoption of a military-backed constitution in 2008, and the dubious victory of the military proxy party during the elections in 2010, the pace of the reforms initiated by Myanmar’s semi-civilian government in 2011 surprised most observers. Education emerged as a significant priority, and although reforms in this sector are typically slow processes, they eventually brought significant quantitative and qualitative progress in Myanmar.12 In particular, two developments regarding the use of ethnic minority languages in formal education took shape, within the context of an ‘asymmetric’ decentralization process, which is relevant to ongoing post-coup discussions about federalism.

  • 13 စာသင်ခန်းသုံးဘာသာစကား, informal oral medium of instruction to support the teaching of the national (...)

33The first was interpreted as primarily ‘top-down,’ through the (re)introduction of ethnic minority languages in government schools, which were catering to a total of more than nine million students before the coup. Per the 2014-15 National Education Law, ethnic minority languages could be taught as subjects and be used as ‘classroom languages.’13 This process only began to gain momentum around 2017-18 and largely involved the States and Regions’ Governments and Parliaments working alongside local ethnic minorities’ Literature and Culture Committees (LCC), the State/Region, District and Township-level branches of the MoE, and UNICEF. By 2019-20, 64 languages were being taught as subjects (typically three periods per week), reaching over 765,000 students through nearly 25,000 teachers nationwide. These developments also included efforts to hire local teachers with ethnic language skills, mostly as Teaching Assistants. Additionally, “Local Knowledge” textbooks for the teaching of local cultures and histories were drafted for five pilot States (Kachin, Mon, Karen, Chin, and Kayah) in 2019-20 and were scheduled for gradual introduction, to be taught in two periods per week as part of developing the Local Curriculum (Salem-Gervais & Raynaud 2020).

  • 14 See Salem-Gervais & Van Cung Lian (2020) on the case of Chin State, and Salem-Gervais & Ja Seng (20 (...)

34This process was disrupted, first by the Covid-19 pandemic in 2020 and more severely by the 2021 coup. While more time was needed to assess the reform’s impact, two notable challenges emerged, which are relevant when considering political solutions of a federal nature beyond the SAC. The first was the challenge of language choice in the most linguistically diverse settings, including urban centers in minority-populated regions where multilingual classrooms require the inclusion of multiple languages, leading to difficult choices, extra costs, and logistic hurdles. The second challenge, similar in nature but perhaps even more deeply political, involved debates around producing lists of ‘languages’ (as opposed to mere ‘dialects’) to be recognized and included in the relevant schools for each State and Region, amidst complex language situations and with actors often holding different views on which variety and/or script should be promoted (and standardized) as the ‘common’ language of a given group.14 Already significant in the case of introducing local languages as subjects and ‘classroom languages,’ these challenges would arguably have been much greater in more ambitious language-in-education reforms, such as MTB-MLE, with much higher stakes for all the actors involved.

Fig. 5. Covers of...Fig. 5. Covers of some of the textbooks to teach ethnic minority languages as subjects, drafted around 2019 (here Tai Leng and Zaiwa) and of one of the draft Local Knowledge textbooks for Chin State (Grade 1, 2019-2020)

Fig. 5. Covers of some of the textbooks to teach ethnic minority languages as subjects, drafted around 2019 (here Tai Leng and Zaiwa) and of one of the draft Local Knowledge textbooks for Chin State (Grade 1, 2019-2020)

  • 15 See Salem-Gervais & Raynaud (2020).

35The second development was more ‘bottom-up’ in nature, through the overall improvement of relations and bridging between most ethnic education providers—which were estimated to cater to around 300,000 students prior to the coup (Lall 2020)—and the MoE. Unsurprisingly, these relations were highly contingent upon the specific relationships between different EAOs, the Myanmar State, and the regional administration. Significantly, armed groups with different political trajectories—such as the NMSP, the Karen National Union (KNU), and the Restoration Council of Shan State (RCSS)—had an increasing number of “mixed-schools” in joint administration with the Myanmar MoE and often with curricular compromises between their respective programs and the national program. Among other slow but overall positive developments, the education departments of the KNU and NMSP were involved in the production of the aforementioned “Local Knowledge” textbooks for Karen and Mon States.15 Before Covid and the coup, the National League for Democracy (NLD) government was also working on a framework with some of these ethnic education providers towards beginning to recognize their curricula (South, Stenning & Shroeder 2024).

The 2021 Military Coup and its Language-in-Education Aftermaths

36In stark contrast to the reform-driven 2011-2020 decade, the February 2021 coup has shattered Myanmar’s political landscape, triggering widespread conflicts involving hundreds of historical and newly created armed groups of diverse sizes fighting primarily against the SAC and its proxies. As of January 2025, the Assistance Association for Political Prisoners (AAPP) has documented over 28,200 arrests and 6,100 deaths by the SAC,16 although the total casualties from all warring sides are likely to be in the tens of thousands, including at least 10,000 civilians (Gascon 2024). The UNHCR reports over 3.5 million internally displaced persons as of January 2025, while the IOM estimates that 40,000 people are leaving Myanmar each month.17 Economic fallout has been severe, with inflation surging and GDP still down 20% since the October 2020-September 2021 period.18

  • 19 Salem-Gervais et al. (2024).

37In line with its history as a highly politicized realm, education has been much more than a collateral victim of the coup and its consequences. Teachers have played one of the leading roles in the Civil Disobedience Movement (CDM) launched immediately after the coup, with widespread boycotts of schools and universities showing their opposition to the SAC. By May 2021, around 30% of basic education teachers and 60% of higher education staff had been dismissed for refusing to return to work. Students and their families have also boycotted SAC-controlled education en masse, though the ability to make this decision is likely impacted by many factors: the local political situation and presence of armed actors; the availability of credible alternatives to public schooling; the financial resources of families to access available alternatives. The student boycott has been particularly striking in higher levels of schooling. While over 910,000 students sat the matriculation exam in 2019-20, fewer than 129,000 did so in 2023-24. By the end of this same academic year, public university enrollment plummeted to less than 87,000, compared to about one million pre-coup.19

38Amidst this profoundly disrupted situation for the country and its education sector, important developments regarding language-in-education have also taken place, both in the schools under the control of the military regime and in the expanding alternatives to the national education system.

Language-in-Education Legislative Steps Backward under the SAC

  • 20 Padone, “Lack of teachers will affect education well into the future”, University World News, Novem (...)
  • 21 Salem-Gervais et al. (2024).

39Despite a certain continuity in the official discourse—with the box-ticking of relatively consensual concepts on the roles of education in fostering ‘critical thinking,’ ‘analytical and problem-solving skills,’ ‘creativity’ or ‘justice’—the SAC has largely aimed at bringing the rebellious education sector to heel, using a playbook based on decades of military know-how. As in previous uprisings, student demonstrations have been swiftly suppressed, remaining teachers have faced increasing scrutiny, and replacement teachers and MoE staff have been trained and hired on the basis of their loyalty to the military rather than on their academic and technical qualifications.20 Pass rates also suggest exams have been made significantly easier, rewarding students who have not joined the CDM.21

  • 22 “Shanni language teachers assist schools facing teacher shortage in western Banmauk”, Shanni Voice, (...)
  • 23 “လစ်လပ်နေသည့် ကရင်စာသင် TA နှင့် LT ဆရာ၊ ဆရာမများကို ထပ်မံခေါ်ယူ”, Karen Information Center, Septem (...)
  • 24 “Myanmar students highlight multilingual education benefits on int'l literacy day”, Xinhua, Septemb (...)

40Unlike the decentralization efforts and the inclusion of local content seen during the 2011-20 reforms, the SAC has reverted to a largely Bamar and Buddhist-centric conception of the nation. This shift is evidenced by the frequent appearance of the coup leader at Buddhist ceremonies in the State media and the granting of a national award to the infamous Wirathu, a monk previously jailed for anti-Muslim hate speech. In government schools under the SAC MoE, ethnic language classes have been reduced but have not disappeared altogether, and Teaching Assistants in charge of ethnic language instruction have often been promoted to full-fledged teachers (if they did not join the CDM) or asked to teach additional subjects from the main curriculum.22 This move can be perceived to serve the dual purpose of reinforcing a compliant workforce, often grateful for the substantial career promotion, while building on pre-coup momentum to project the image of inclusive government schools. While local situations vary according to multiple factors, in September 2024, just like during previous years since the coup, local branches of the SAC MoE were spreading calls to hire ethnic language Teaching Assistants,23 and the institution was claiming that more than 450,000 students were still learning an ethnic language at school throughout the country,24 a figure that is both surprising and impossible to verify.

  • 25 Salem-Gervais et al. (2024).

41At the legislative level, however, the SAC has taken explicit steps back regarding the use of ethnic minority languages in formal education, through the October 2022 amendment of the National Education Law. In addition to the suppression of articles that had allowed the formation of teachers’ and students’ unions, this amendment nullified article 49(f), which had granted State/Region governments the freedom to administer educational matters. In terms of language-in-education policy more specifically, the amendment explicitly suppressed the possibility of using ethnic minority languages as ‘classroom languages’ (oral media of instruction) through changes to article 43(b). The teaching of these languages as subjects has also been restricted to the primary level only by the amendment of article 44, whereas previously it had been permitted to expand to higher grades.25 These legislative steps backward not only limit the use of ethnic minority languages in government schools, they also limit the possibilities of bridging between SAC MoE schools and ethnic education systems, which typically use local languages to a wider extent.

The NUG Education Policy

42Established on April 16, 2021, the National Unity Government (NUG) consists of representatives from the NLD, ethnic organizations, and civil society. The NUG serves as a parallel government seen as more legitimate than the SAC by many opposition groups. Operating largely in exile, the NUG aims to oversee different sectors in regions controlled by armed groups more or less directly aligned with its authority. Notable sectors include defense and the overseeing of People’s Defence Forces (PDFs) as well as education, which has involved the coordination and construction of a national framework for online educational provisions and those in regions under the control of the PDFs and allied EAOs. Reflecting the demands of the protests immediately following the coup and in a bid to gain the trust and cooperation of as many EAOs as possible, the NUG has taken a strong federalist stance. Claiming to follow a (UN development goals-inspired) “no one left behind” policy, it may also work with actors holding divergent political perspectives in certain regions.

43By September 2024, the NUG’s MoE reported overseeing nearly 6,000 schools with over 63,300 teachers and 756,000 students, mostly through physical schools but including some online provisions. Drafted in 2021 and finalized in 2023, the NUG’s Federal Democracy Education Policy contains a strong emphasis on values such as ‘self-determination,’ ‘equity,’ ‘academic freedom,’ ‘social justice,’ ‘human rights,’ and ‘critical thinking,’ existing in stark contrast to the SAC’s reversion to ‘top-down’ cardinal military values such as ‘discipline’ and ‘patriotism.’ The curriculum prescribed by the NUG largely follows the curriculum drafted under the NLD government, with the exclusion of the components deemed as “incompatible with the Federal Democracy” (which most directly concerns social subjects and history textbooks). New textbooks for Grade 12 have also been drafted by the NUG MoE in 2024, including Burmese language, English, and History.

44Inspired by pre-coup proposals, this policy encourages decentralized decision-making in curriculum and language of instruction, within a framework set by the Federal, State, and Township Education Councils. Unlike the SAC’s restrictive language policies, the NUG prioritizes a MTB-MLE approach. Interestingly, the NUG’s policy document contains several references to “mother tongue” (မိခင်ဘာသာစကား) but also “local/regional language” (ဒေသသုံးဘာသာစကား), which can be read as an acknowledgment of the challenges (described in the previous sections) of ensuring every child will begin education in their exact tongue in highly linguistically diverse areas.

Expanding Ethnic Education Systems

45As described earlier, the historical roots of ‘ethnic’ education are diverse and strongly grounded in religion, most notably in monastic education for the Buddhist population and mission schools for Christians. Contemporary non-state ethnic education systems first appeared in the 1960s following the nationalization of all private schools by Ne Win’s regime. Some of these systems were consolidated under the education departments of different EAOs in the 1990s, at a time when some of them were signing cease-fire agreements with the junta.

46In the years preceding the coup, ethnic education providers were estimated to serve around 300,000 students (South et al. 2018; Lall 2020). These systems vary in size, curriculum, and language of instruction. For example, the education department of the KNU has primarily employed a Sgaw Karen language curriculum with limited Burmese content, while the education system under the KIO has mostly followed the Burmese national curriculum with some added Kachin content. Some commit to a systematic MTB-MLE approach, such as in the case of the NMSP’s education system transitioning from a Mon curriculum to the Burmese national curriculum across grades. During the 2011-20 decade of reforms, several systems—including those of the KNU, NMSP, and RCSS—adopted “mixed-schools” jointly administered with the state MoE, often allowing for some ethnic curricula to be taught within public schools.

  • 26 This higher estimate is provided in South, Stenning & Shroeder (2024).

47Since the coup, most ethnic education systems have experienced substantial growth due to widespread displacement and the boycott of SAC-controlled schools. Although exact figures are challenging to confirm, if not impossible to produce, estimates suggest student enrollments now range between 500,000 and one million26 (Table 1). The territorial gains of many EAOs at the expense of the SAC have contributed to an increasing number of schools, teachers and students as areas and their educational infrastructure and personnel come to fall under the governance of expanding EAOs. Ethnic education providers often operate in extremely difficult conditions with the constant risk of airstrikes (and drone strikes) by the SAC and are essential for providing education access to some of the most conflict-affected populations.

  • 27 “KIO to build 223 new schools in areas under its control”, Mizzima, June 8, 2024, URL: https://eng. (...)
  • 28 “ကရင်ပြည်နယ်မှာရှိတဲ့ ကရင်ပညာရေးနဲ့ ယဉ်ကျေးမှုဌာန (KECD)ဟာ လက်ရှိမှာ ဘာပြဿနာတွေကိုအဓိက ရင်ဆိုင်နေရလ (...)

48For ethnic education providers, maintaining and expanding their schools is not only a means of providing education but is also a statement of legitimacy and territorial presence, particularly as armed groups negotiate shared control of territory. Situations vary widely, including with new institutions established post-coup (see the case studies that follow). For instance, the KIO reported 3,126 students taking its matriculation exam in 2023-24, more than three times the pre-coup figures, and announced the opening of more than 230 new schools, bringing the total to almost 500 for the 2024-25 academic year.27 Similarly, the KNU’s Karen Education and Culture Department (KECD) reported significant growth, with over 1,460 schools, 9,500 teachers, and 123,000 students for 2023-24.28

Fig. 6. Badges of...Fig. 6. Badges of the Mon National College and the Kachin State Comprehensive University, two non-State ‘ethnic’ higher education institutions which began operations in 2022

Fig. 6. Badges of the Mon National College and the Kachin State Comprehensive University, two non-State ‘ethnic’ higher education institutions which began operations in 2022

  • 29 “Mon National College to Sign MOUs with Four International Universities Within a Year”, Independent (...)

49Ethnic education providers continue to adopt different models for language-in-education policy, shaped by their priorities and regional language contexts. Since the coup, there seems to be a general shift towards promoting mother tongues—or, more precisely, the languages endorsed by respective EAOs—in rough alignment with federal education aspirations. In a notable post-coup development, the KNU has introduced additional Karen language classes for non-Karen speaking students who have sought refuge in KNU territories, in order to help them navigate a Karen-speaking education system. Multiple ethnic higher education institutions have also emerged in different regions since the coup. While Burmese and English are often the primary languages of instruction, many institutions bear ethnonyms in their names (e.g. Kachin State Comprehensive University, Karenni Youth Academy College, Ta’ang Land University) and, depending on regional language contexts, may incorporate local languages. For example, the Mon National College, which opened in 2022 and has signed MoUs with international universities, offers a degree in Mon literature and culture, among other subjects.29

Table 1. Estimated number of schools and students for some of the main ethnic education providers (for the year 2024-25, unless specified otherwise)

Ethnic and community-based education providersa Number of schools Number of students

Number of

teachers

Interim Executive Council and Karenni Education Department (KNPP) 527 61,489 2,787
Karenni Nationalities Peoples Liberation Front (KNPLF) 24 2,500 n/a
Karen Education and Culture Department (KNU) 1,467 123,331 9,512
Mon National Education Committee (NMSP) 183 14,835 880
RCSS Education Department (estimated for 2023-24) 350 11,000 n/a
KIO Education Department 486 66,790 4,777
Ta’ang Land Education Committee 481 46,000 2,460
Kachin Church and community-based schools in Kachin and Northern Shan States 172 27,053 n/a
Kayan National Education Committee 146 11,030 976
Chin State Education Board 835 50,962 5,040
a. Estimates often vary, sometimes dramatically, for the numbers of students enrolled in these ethnic education systems, especially in the chaotic and volatile post-coup context. These estimated figures were either publicly released by ethnic education providers or collected directly through conversation with them, but guaranteeing the accuracy and currency of these figures at the time of publishing is difficult.

Three Brief Case Studies

50In this section, we narrow our focus to examine case studies involving ethnic education providers operating in Northern Shan State, Chin State (with a focus on Tedim Township), and the borderland between Kayah (Karenni) State and Southern Shan State. These educational initiatives have been created, or have undergone significant transformations, in the wake of the 2021 coup and now face a range of complex challenges, including security concerns, resource constraints, and critical choices regarding language-in-education policy. Given the constraints of this paper’s length and the challenges in obtaining accurate and up-to-date information, we acknowledge that this discussion may not fully capture the complexity of these evolving situations. Any errors or inaccuracies in the following case studies remain our responsibility.

Case Study (1): Ta’ang Education

  • 30 “Treading a Rocky Path: The Ta’ang Army Expands in Myanmar’s Shan State”, International Crisis Grou (...)

51Formerly designated primarily by the Burmese exonym ‘Palaung,’ the Ta’ang people have emerged as an increasingly influential political group in Northern Shan State, particularly since the formation of the Ta’ang National Liberation Army (TNLA) in 2009. While other Palaung/Ta’ang armed organizations existed as early as the 1960s, the TNLA has gained prominence, through alliances with neighboring ethnic armed organizations (including the Kachin Independence Organization, KIO) and most notably the formation of the Three Brotherhood Alliance in 2019 with the Arakan Army (AA) and the Myanmar National Democratic Alliance Army (MNDAA). The 2021 coup has further bolstered the TNLA’s position, as the Myanmar army has found itself stretched across multiple fronts. The TNLA is currently estimated to consist of 10,000 to 15,000 personnel,30 and has considerably extended its territorial control and influence, most decisively in the year following the Three Brotherhood Alliance’s ‘1027’ joint operation in October 2023.

52Unlike many other ethnic education providers, the Ta’ang education system does not fall under the direct governance of an ethnic armed organization. However, as a governing authority in Ta’ang areas, the TNLA inevitably exerts influence over educational provisions. In fact, Ta’ang education has its origins in civil society. Building on the work and experience of Ta’ang CSOs involved in education and gradually established since the late 1990s—such as the Ta’ang Student and Youth Union, the Ta’ang Education Institute, and the Ta’ang Women’s Organization—the Ta’ang National Education Committee (TNEC) was established in February 2022 to provide education in Ta’ang-population regions. The need for non-state education provision had become particularly pressing following the major disruptions to education services caused by the Covid pandemic, and the aftermath of the coup, including the CDM and the spreading of conflict.

  • 31 Presentation during the Education Everywhere 3 online conference organized by the Inclusive Educati (...)
  • 32 Salem-Gervais et al. (2024).

53As the TNLA consolidated control over new territories in Northern Shan State, TNEC was rebranded as the Ta’ang Land Education Committee (TLEC) in March 2024, a name that the organization presents as more inclusive of the ethnic diversity within the region where they operate. With an expanded reach due to the territorial gains of the TNLA, and aided by the recruitment of CDM teachers formerly employed in government schools, TLEC saw a rapid increase in engagement. By late 2023, TLEC was managing 380 schools, with 28,000 students and 1,690 teachers. For the 2024-2025 academic year, this increased to 481 schools, 46,000 students and 2,460 teachers,31 alongside the opening of several new higher education institutions.32 The relative affordability of attending TLEC schools—as opposed to private options in neighboring regions—has driven these growing numbers, though challenges remain, including limited financial and human resources (most funds, including those generated by a lottery created in 2023, going to teacher salaries), significant security concerns due to the proximity of airstrikes and ground battles, limited experience in educational administration, and inadequate transportation infrastructure.

Fig. 7. Morning a...Fig. 7. Morning assembly in a TLEC (TNEC at the time) school in 2022

Fig. 7. Morning assembly in a TLEC (TNEC at the time) school in 2022

Source: Posted publicly in 2022 on TLEC Facebook page, URL: https://web.facebook.com/​photo.php?fbid=149009417875867&set=pb.100083004288913.-2207520000&type=3

Fig. 8. Badge of ...Fig. 8. Badge of the Ta’ang Education Academy

Fig. 8. Badge of the Ta’ang Education Academy

Fig. 9. Map indic...Fig. 9. Map indicating the townships of Northern Shan State in which TLEC operates schools

Fig. 9. Map indicating the townships of Northern Shan State in which TLEC operates schools

Presented during the panel discussion “Hard Lessons: Post-coup Schooling in Myanmar” organised by Frontier Myanmar on August 29, 2024.

Fig. 10. Teaching...Fig. 10. Teaching of the common/official Ta’ang script/language (consonants, vowels, as well as the 5 points oath of the TNLA) by an officer to a group of TNLA soldiers

Fig. 10. Teaching of the common/official Ta’ang script/language (consonants, vowels, as well as the 5 points oath of the TNLA) by an officer to a group of TNLA soldiers

Source: From The Irrawaddy video report တအာင်းရုံးသုံးစာအတွက် ကြိုးပမ်း ဆောင်ရွက်ခဲ့တဲ့ TNLA, 2022, URL: https://www.youtube.com/​watch?v=t-DLoFwelHM

Fig. 11. TNLA lea...Fig. 11. TNLA leaders attending the 52nd anniversary of the Ta’ang Literature Committee in 2024

Fig. 11. TNLA leaders attending the 52nd anniversary of the Ta’ang Literature Committee in 2024

Source: The Ta’ang Post, August 31, 2024, URL: https://web.facebook.com/​photo?fbid=122174920130186850&set=pcb.122174905910186850

  • 33 Linguists suggest different classifications and numbers of Ta’ang dialects. Interviewed in Lashio i (...)
  • 34 Salem-Gervais & Raynaud (2020).
  • 35 “Common Ta’ang language widely taught in Ta’ang area”, Myanmar Peace Monitor, March 2, 2023, URL: h (...)

54TLEC follows the curriculum endorsed by the NUG, which adapts the national curriculum by excluding history and other subjects deemed incompatible with federal democratic ideals. Efforts are also underway to develop Ta’ang language education materials with the aim of a transition to an MTB-MLE model in the coming years. This aspiration draws from initiatives that predate the coup, as Ta’ang leaders and educators have long aspired to create a ‘common’/‘official’ (ဘုံစကား/ရုံးသုံးစာ) Ta’ang language from among the various dialects and scripts.33 This project was revived in the 2010s, and in 2017 the first textbook in this ‘common’ language was published. This has entailed both the standardization of a ‘Burmese-based’ script as well as the standardization of lexicon by selecting terms that appear to be similar across most Ta’ang dialects. At the time, the project appeared to be somewhat challenging, especially for the Southern Palaung varieties, which are typically written with different scripts and whose users may have had comparatively less influence on the production of the ‘common’ language.34 Nonetheless, the TNLA has been supportive of this standardization effort and has organized classes to teach this language since 2017.35 In the context of the disruptions caused by the 2021 coup, the TNLA’s backing of a standardized language has gained traction as part of a broader nation-building effort. This ‘common’ language is now taught across multiple townships and used to develop the MTB-MLE curriculum. TNLA leaders have been attending cultural events, such as the anniversaries of the Ta’ang Literature Association, to reassert the ongoing linguistic unification project.

  • 36 “မန်ပိန်းရွာ စာသင်ကျောင်းမှာတပ်မစွဲဖို့ပြောတဲ့ ကျောင်းသားမိဘတွေကို TNLA က သေနတ်နဲ့ခြိမ်းခြောက်ပြီး (...)

55This move away from diverse dialects and toward a common language, however, presents challenges and tradeoffs. Beyond the inherent linguistic difficulties of standardization, the shift may strengthen the status of Ta’ang language in education and other domains but could do so at the expense of internal linguistic diversity, with the ‘common’ language possibly threatening the preservation of diverse Ta’ang dialects. Additionally, the implications of assigning nation-building objectives to education are not limited to ‘intra-Ta’ang’ issues. As the TNLA expands control over territories with mixed ethnic populations, TLEC’s rapid expansion has occasionally sparked some tension. For example, at a school in Kutkai—where many residents identify as Kachin—a confrontation arose when TNLA closed the school, leading Kachin residents to demand its reopening and raise the Kachin flag.36 While such incidents appear to be rare, they nonetheless raise concerns when considering the transition to an MTB-MLE model in TLEC schools and the possible implications of Ta’ang identity content for ‘non-Ta’ang’ students.

56The evolution of Ta’ang education amidst the political turbulence of Myanmar following the coup highlights the dual role of education as both a tool for empowerment and a source of contention. The significant growth of the TLEC reflects an urgent response to systemic disruptions and the aspirations for self-determination within the Ta’ang political realm. Efforts to standardize a common language and implement a mother tongue-based curriculum highlight the centrality of language-in-education in nation-building. However, these are not without challenges, which include the delicate balance between linguistic standardization and diversity and the navigation of interethnic relations in newly controlled territories. Should the TNLA and, by extension, TNEC expand their reach further, sustainability and inclusivity of educational efforts will remain crucial in shaping the future of Ta’ang identity and governance in northern Shan State.

Case Study (2): Chin State and its Tedim Township

57Chin State and its surrounding areas rank among the regions most affected by the coup and its aftermath. Since the early weeks following the coup, local populations have mounted vigorous resistance to the SAC, forming the Chin Defense Forces (CDFs) beginning in March and April 2021, alongside the pre-existing Chin National Front (an EAO established in 1988). As of January 2025, the conflict has led to 90,800 IDPs from Chin State, over 60,000 Chin refugees in India, and the destruction of over 1,000 households by the SAC.37

Education in Chin State, Post-Coup

  • 38 “ချင်းပြည်နယ်က CDM လှုပ်ရှားမှု (သို့) လက်နက်မဲ့ တော်လှန်ရေးတပ်ဦး”, Myanmar Peace Monitor, April 4, (...)
  • 39 Salai Kur Bung Bel, “National passing rate decreases while Chin State’s passing rate increases in S (...)
  • 40 Detailed statistics reproduced in Salem-Gervais et al. (2024).

58Chin State has seen what seems to be the strongest participation in the CDM nationwide, with an estimated 72% of its civil servants joining the movement in 2021.38 This resistance, combined with ongoing conflict, has profoundly disrupted public services under the SAC administration, including education. In 2019-20, around 135,000 students were enrolled across 1,500 schools in Chin State. By 2023-24, SAC-controlled MoE figures indicated a drastic decline, with only 580 schools and fewer than 50,000 students. Resistance-aligned estimates for 2024-25 suggest an even steeper decline, reporting just 38 SAC MoE schools operating.39 Disruptions to education have been especially severe at the higher levels of basic education, similar to trends elsewhere in the country; only 401 students sat for the matriculation exam in 2023-24 compared to 12,373 in 2019-20.40

59In response to this educational crisis, the CDFs—primarily organized according to the pre-existing township structures—have taken over many schools to provide education aligned with the resistance. Despite the lack of reliable and accurate data, estimates from 2024 suggest that at least 779 such schools serve over 41,100 children across many, but not all, townships. These schools typically operate under extremely precarious conditions, with minimal resources and ongoing threats of attacks from the military, including airstrikes. In 2023 alone, close to 300 airstrikes were documented in Chin State, at least 30 of which targeted schools, tragically resulting in multiple child fatalities. Given these risks, schooling sometimes happens in improvised locations, such as other relatively safer spaces.

  • 41 “An interview with Chinland’s Education Minister Salai Cross Thang on the transformation of Chin St (...)
  • 42 Angshuman Choudhury, “‘Two lions in a cave’: Revolutionary divisions in Chin State”, Frontier Myanm (...)
  • 43 Interview Chairman of the Paletwa Township Education Board, Myanmar Peace Monitor, November 30, 202 (...)

60The curriculum taught in these schools typically follows the NUG’s guidelines and leads toward the parallel government’s matriculation exam at the end of high school. The NUG MoE, however, grants flexibility in curriculum design, and local content textbooks are used or in the process of being developed by diverse actors.41 In terms of languages, Chin State’s linguistic and ethnic diversity presents longstanding challenges, such as the pre-coup issue of deciding which Chin languages to include in formal education (Salem-Gervais & Van Cung Lian 2020), and now contributes to diverging political views and alliances among Chin resistance forces in the post-coup context.42 In Paletwa, the southwesternmost township of Chin State, the Arakan Army (AA) also wants to implement an Arakanese language education system, a prospect which is often rejected by local Chin populations.43 More generally, linguistic diversity has contributed to Burmese and English remaining common media of instruction, although local languages are often used as ‘classroom languages’ and taught as subjects. These choices depend on factors such as local linguistic contexts, teacher availability, and access to teaching materials in the relevant languages.

Tedim Township

61Situated in the northern region of Chin State, Tedim Township borders Mizoram in India and Sagaing Region in Myanmar. By Chin standards it is densely populated, with a population slightly below 90,000 prior to the coup. More than 95% adhere to Christianity, predominantly denominations of Protestantism, while the remainder practices either Buddhist or the indigenous religion known as Laipian, often translated as ‘script religion’ and established in 1902 by Pau Cin Hau, who claimed to have received a logographic script from the Pasian (God) in a dream.

62Local revolutionary forces established the Tedim Township Administration Board on March 1, 2021, later reorganized as a branch of the political leadership body the Zomi Federal Union (ZFU), which governs Tedim and Tonzang Townships.44 By late 2023, the ZFU controlled roughly 80% of the two townships, leaving the SAC largely in control of urban areas.45 Now a member of the Chin Brotherhood Alliance since 2023, the ZFU comprises an armed defense forces branch—the PDF-Zoland—that clashes regularly with the SAC and its proxies, including the Manipur-based Zomi Revolutionary Army. The ZFU also encompasses departments for police, health, humanitarian activities, CDM matters, and education, which operates the Tedim Township Education Board.

63The Tedim Township Education Board oversaw around 45 schools in 2024-25, which served approximately 6,690 students with 432 teachers, a mix of CDM-affiliated and volunteer instructors. Higher education is represented by the National University of Zoland (NUZ), established in 2023, which offers a Master’s in Public Affairs via Zoom, the only local secular higher education option beyond pre-existing theological programs. In contrast, the SAC MoE oversees about 20 schools in Tedim, enrolling an estimated 1,000 students, though this number likely includes schools not operating regularly. The Tedim Township Education Board is a constituent member of the Chin State Education Board and thus engages in collaborative activities with the Interim Chin National Consultative Council (ICNCC) at the state level and the National Unity Government (NUG) at the national level.

64The curriculum under the Tedim Township Education Board aligns with NUG guidelines, adapted from the curriculum developed under the NLD government (also used by the SAC MoE, see previous section). Consequently, textbooks are primarily in Burmese and, in higher grades, English for science subjects.

Fig. 12. Geograph...Fig. 12. Geography textbook in the ‘Kamhau dialect’ (today known as ‘Tedim’) published in 1927 by the American Baptist Mission Press

Fig. 12. Geography textbook in the ‘Kamhau dialect’ (today known as ‘Tedim’) published in 1927 by the American Baptist Mission Press

Fig. 13. Poster f...Fig. 13. Poster for the teaching of Laipian literacy

Fig. 13. Poster for the teaching of Laipian literacy

Fig. 14. Cover of...Fig. 14. Cover of the Grade 1 textbook of the Zolai Simbu, teaching material for Zolai literacy

Fig. 14. Cover of the Grade 1 textbook of the Zolai Simbu, teaching material for Zolai literacy

Fig. 15. Badge of...Fig. 15. Badge of the National University of Zoland, opened in 2023

Fig. 15. Badge of the National University of Zoland, opened in 2023

65Tedim Township reflects Chin State’s rich ethnolinguistic diversity, encompassing multiple ethnic/tribal identities, each with distinct languages or dialects, but in diverse situations in terms of possessing or not written traditions (using the Roman alphabet with the exception of Laipian), translations of the Christian sacred texts, and teaching materials for schools. In the disrupted post-coup political landscape, the identities of some groups may be more entrenched than others, perhaps reflected in the formation of armed groups bearing an ethnic or tribal name in its acronym.

  • 46 A similar typology can for instance be found in Lian Tial (2019).

66Local ethnolinguistic labels—such as “Zo”—are similarly liable to have multiple and shifting definitions, including across borders. Such labels can sometimes refer both to a very specific group or encompass several groups/tribes and languages/dialects. Some groups may be spread over several townships, or perceive themselves as very close to ethno-linguistic identities across the Indian border, such as Mizo. In Tedim, like in the rest of Chin State, multiple political actors are liable to seek to promote, or on the contrary downplay, specific ethnic identities in order to directly or indirectly serve their diverse political agendas, raising concerns regarding the potential outcomes of identity/tribal politics in a region greatly diverse in terms of languages and ethnic labels. Amidst this complex backdrop, ethnolinguistic typologies are assuredly diverse and debatable to some extent, though the pre-existing typology adopted by the ZFU categorizes nine local groups/varieties—Saizang, Sihzang, Zo(u), Khuano, Hualngo, Thahdo, Tedim, Teizang, and Dim46—many of which share significant mutual intelligibility.

  • 47 Salem-Gervais & Van Cung Lian (2020).

67Since most teachers in Tedim are from the township, with the few exceptions of educators who have fled conflict in other regions, local languages are commonly used as informal ‘classroom languages’ in primary schools, which is not a new practice in Chin State. Regarding the teaching of local languages as subjects, similar to what was happening prior to the coup,47 priority is often given to Zolai, which is also known as ‘Tedim’ (or ‘Zopau’ when referring to the spoken language). While there are actors engaged in the mobilization of other ethnic identities and associated languages, Zolai still holds a comparatively high status. It is chiefly spoken in Tedim, which is one of the largest towns of Chin State, and in the surrounding urban areas. Zolai has a well-established written tradition, dating back to Rev. Herbert Cope in 1910, with textbooks in the ‘Kamhau dialect’—a former name of Tedim—used during the colonial period. Amidst very limited textbook availability in all local languages, the Zolai Simbu textbooks, published by the Tedim Literary Committee in 1972 for Zolai literacy instruction in Kindergarten to Grade 4, remain widely used in schools across Tedim Township.

68The case of Chin State—and specifically Tedim Township—exemplifies both profound challenges and innovative responses. The collapse of the SAC-administered systems throughout much of the State and the rise of resistance-led (albeit fragmented) governance have reshaped education as a tool for both survival and the preservation of identity. In Tedim, the interplay between ethnolinguistic diversity and education presents the potential for cultural empowerment and also divisiveness through implications of identity politics. While localized efforts such as the promotion of Zolai and the development of alternative curricula reflect resilience and adaptability, they also reveal the fragility of education systems in conflict-affected contexts.

Brief Case Study (3): Kayan Education

69The Kayan are an ethnic group with a population which was estimated to about 180,000 in 2004 (Eden Phan 2004), comprising multiple subgroups and linguistic variations, residing primarily in Kayah (Karenni), Shan, and Karen States, as well as in the Naypyidaw Union Territory (and, to a lesser extent, Mae Hong Son Province in Thailand). Within Myanmar’s political context, Kayan identity is often framed as a component of the broader ‘Karenni’ collective identity, which encompasses multiple, shifting and overlapping ethnonyms that have been classified in multiple fashions, both by linguists and local political actors (such as Kayah, Kayaw, Gaybar, Yintelay, Geko, Manumanaw, Lahta, and Zayein, among others). While the Kayah identity and language typically occupy a central role in the mobilization of the Karenni identity, the Kayan have increasingly consolidated their distinct ethnic identity and political influence over the past decades. This has been facilitated by the establishment of multiple CSOs and political entities representing Kayan interests.

70Prior to the coup, Kayan was among several regional languages gradually introduced as a subject in government schools in Kayah State, alongside Kayah, Kayaw, Gaybar, Yintelay, Manumanaw, Shan (Tai Long), Karen (Sgaw), and Pa-O. Outside of the MoE, the Kayan New Generation Youth (KNGY), established in 2002, had been supporting education in Kayan speaking areas, gradually expanding its influence through teacher training, hiring and support to community schools, with classes often held in religious buildings, makeshift schools and private houses.

  • 48 Brian Wei, “More Than 80% of The Population of Myanmar’s Karenni State Has Been Displaced by War”, (...)
  • 49 “400 Basic Education Schools Open in Resistance-Controlled Areas”, Kantarawaddy Times, May 31, 2024 (...)

71Kayah (Karenni) State and its surrounding regions have been particularly severely impacted by the post-coup armed conflict, with as much as 80% of the population displaced.48 Over 1,100 individuals have been killed, arrested or injured, while more than 2,600 education staff participating in the CDM have been dismissed. Schools run by groups opposing the military regime have been targeted by SAC military operations, including direct attacks and airstrikes. This disruption to education has been profound. Official figures from the SAC reveal that less than 25% of the 459 government schools operating before the coup in Kayah State are now running under its MoE,49 and that no candidates registered for the matriculation exam in the 2023-24 academic year. This stands in stark contrast to the 7,000 to 8,000 students who typically sat for the exam in Kayah State in pre-coup academic years.

72Kayah State now constitutes an anti-regime stronghold, where as many as 90% of students attend schooling outside the system administered by the SAC’s MoE. Diverse education initiatives include those associated with the Karenni State Interim Executive Council (IEC), the Karenni National Progressive Party (KNPP) and the Karenni Nationalities Peoples Liberation Front (KNPLF), which provide education to an estimated total of 64,000 students in about 550 schools.

Fig. 16. Distribu...Fig. 16. Distribution of children learning different ethnic languages as subjects in government schools, across the different townships of Kayah State in 2019-20, before the coup and the mass displacement it has caused across the State

Fig. 16. Distribution of children learning different ethnic languages as subjects in government schools, across the different townships of Kayah State in 2019-20, before the coup and the mass displacement it has caused across the State

Fig. 17. Textbook...Fig. 17. Textbook for the teaching of Kayan language (Pekon standard) produced by the Kayan Literature and Culture Committee around 2019

Fig. 17. Textbook for the teaching of Kayan language (Pekon standard) produced by the Kayan Literature and Culture Committee around 2019

Fig. 18. Badge of...Fig. 18. Badge of the Kayan National Education Committee

Fig. 18. Badge of the Kayan National Education Committee

Fig. 19. Online v...Fig. 19. Online visual to encourage financial support to Kayan education

Fig. 19. Online visual to encourage financial support to Kayan education

Source: Posted publicly by the Kayan Literature and Culture Committee on its Facebook page on August 28, 2024.

  • 50 “Shadow Govt Operates Network of Schools in Resistance Strongholds”, The Irrawaddy, June 7, 2022, U (...)

73Regarding Kayan Education, by 2022, in the context of the post-coup momentum towards alternatives to SAC-controlled education, it was reported that KNGY had supported the education of over 8,000 primary school students across Kayan-populated areas of Shan, Kayah and Karen States.50 Connected to several different education authorities, these schools typically adhere to the national curriculum but with the employment of Kayan language(s) in the classroom and the progressive introduction of Kayan language materials in the early primary years.

  • 51 “Kayan National University opens”, Kantarawaddy Times, August 8, 2024, URL: https://www.bnionline.n (...)
  • 52 “Schools in Kayan region experimenting multilingual education”, Kantarawaddy Times, December 30, 20 (...)

74In addition, the Kayan National Education Committee (KNEC) was established in May 2022 under the leadership of the Kayan New Land Party (KNLP), originally founded in 1964. The KNEC now oversees, with the support of KNGY, education in about 145 schools, most being ex-government schools with CDM teachers, with also some recently established community schools. These schools serve an estimated total of over 11,000 students, with the support of close to 1,000 teaching staff, and approximately half of them are located within Kayah State.51 In addition to the significant growth in scale of Kayan education post-coup, a notable development is an increased use of the Kayan language in education, an orientation that predates the coup but has been encouraged by the prospect of a future federal education system.52

  • 53 “70 Kayan Schools Use Their Mother Tongue in Education”, Kantarawaddy Times, June 6, 2024, URL: htt (...)

75Kayan is typically described as comprising diverse dialects with significant variation between the most distant varieties (Lewis, Simons & Fennig 2016; Manson 2019). The Pekon dialect spoken in Southern Shan State, however, is often regarded as the prestige variety, and since the early 2000s, it has been adopted as the standard/common language by most Kayan organizations, including in education. While teaching material is being developed towards the implementation of MTB-MLE—a priority for Kayan education providers, implemented in a few schools—by June 2024, around half of KNEC schools were reportedly employing (standard Pekon) Kayan within a bilingual education model, while the remaining schools continued to teach primarily in Burmese.53 Other languages such as Geko or Geba, often described as belonging to the overarching Kayan identity (although other actors tend to link them primarily with Karen), are also used orally in relevant schools, with both Christian and Buddhist populations, through different modalities depending on diverse factors, including the availability of resources in different local languages and the linguistic distance or similarities with the teaching material in the Pekon standard.

76In addition to promoting Kayan language through basic education, the KNEC established the Kayan National University in 2024, which offers, among several other disciplines, programs in teacher education and in Kayan Literature and Language(s), with the involvement of the Kayan Literature and Culture Committee. Despite the university’s ethnonym-specific name, the KNEC has invited scholars from other ethnic groups to contribute to its academic programming, with the university envisioned as reflecting Kayan cultural identity as well as the physical geography of the loosely-defined Kayan territory.54

  • 55 “New Ethnic Army Hopes to Represent All Kayan People”, The Irrawaddy, November 6, 2024, URL: https: (...)

77Should the pro-democracy resistance succeed in its struggle against the SAC, the establishment of a more precisely defined Kayan territory appears increasingly plausible. Alongside the longstanding Kayan New Land Party (KNLP) and various armed Karenni actors opposing the SAC, the newly-formed Kayan National Army (KNA) emerged in late 2024. Representing younger and smaller Kayan armed groups that have surfaced since 2021, the KNA operates independently of both the KNLP and NUG while aligning with their broader goal of establishing a federal democracy. The KNA envisions the formation of a future Kayan State encompassing territories in western Kayah State, Southern Shan State, Karen State and Naypyidaw Union Territory.55

78While the future is highly unpredictable, the Kayan education endeavors—through the relation between Kayan and Karenni identities, the process of promoting the Pekon dialect as the standard Kayan language, and the prospect of building a Kayan territory encompassing regions currently belonging to four different States—constitute a good illustration of the opportunities and challenges involved in (re)designing a federal system rooted in ethnic identities, including in the realm of education. The development of Kayan-specific educational initiatives evidences the role of education in fostering cultural preservation and political aspirations. However, these efforts also reveal possible challenges and tensions inherent in linguistic standardization (and language-in-education efforts more generally) and the potential trade-offs between ‘unity’ and ‘diversity.’ As some Kayan groups envision a future territory spanning multiple States, the intersection of education, identity, and governance reflects both the promise and complexity of federalism amidst Myanmar’s ethnic diversity.

Conclusion: Navigating the Politics of Language-in-Education

79Like many pluri-ethnic nations with histories of colonialism and protracted conflict, Myanmar has grappled with language-in-education policy as a critical and contentious issue, reflecting deep political, social and cultural implications across successive political eras. Although the country gained independence as a “Union” in 1948, ethnic minority languages have by and large been sidelined or excluded from formal education, particularly under military juntas.

80The decade from 2011 to 2020 marked a significant shift towards modest but meaningful efforts to introduce ethnic minority languages into formal education. Through limited decentralization efforts, these languages began to be incorporated as both subjects and “classroom languages” within States and Regions, and bridging between ethnic education providers and the MoE was overall improving. While progress was slow, reforms gained momentum in the latter half of the decade despite daunting structural challenges. Chief among these were decisions about which particular languages should be introduced in which schools or administrative units—a complex issue in a country of vast ethno-linguistic diversity. Geographic intermixing of populations, multilingual identities, and fluid ethnic affiliations further complicated these decisions. Additionally, determining what constitutes a ‘language’ (versus a ‘dialect’) and producing standardized written textbooks are inherently political and often contentious processes.

81The February 2021 military coup abruptly halted these decentralization efforts and upended Myanmar’s political landscape, triggering widespread conflict and the emergence or strengthening of numerous armed groups, many of which exist in reference to a particular ethnic identity. Many of these groups, aligned to varying degrees with the broader resistance movement and the parallel government agenda, advocate for a comprehensive restructuring of the state into a ‘genuine’ federal system. This envisioned framework would grant constituent entities significant autonomy, including in terms of education policy and provision as well as language of instruction. As of this writing, the momentum appears to favor the ‘revolution,’ with the SAC steadily losing ground to various armed groups across multiple fronts. Amidst multiple and profound uncertainties, a scenario in which the military collapses or becomes politically marginal appears to be within the realm of possibility.

82Beyond the ongoing war against the SAC and its proxies, and the immense suffering this conflict inflicts on the country, a critical challenge lies in envisioning the design of a federal state. This involves not only defining the general principles and prerogatives of the constituent entities in relation to the federal government but also determining the number, names and geographical boundaries of these entities. Since independence, ethnicity has been viewed as the primary—if not the only—lens through which federalism can be designed. However, given Myanmar’s vast and complex diversity, there is no clear or ‘natural’ territorial division along ethnic lines. Any federal configuration would inevitably encompass populations with diverse languages, identities, and ethnic affiliations, complicating the process of defining federal units around notions of ethnicity.

83As our earlier comparative literature review suggests, language-in-education reforms within decentralization or federal systems can yield significant educational and political benefits. But they are neither simple nor universally effective solutions. In Myanmar’s case, such reforms would necessitate substantial compromises and tradeoffs if consensus emerges regarding the political map of a federal state. As illustrated in our case-studies, these compromises are unlikely to eliminate inequalities between languages/dialects—both oral and written—but they may redistribute or reshape them.

84Against this backdrop of protracted conflict and considerable uncertainty surrounding Myanmar’s federal future, a significant number of both historical and newly formed armed groups are gaining control over increasing portions of the territory. The political influence of these groups has greatly expanded since the coup, including through their provisions of education to a growing number of students in areas under their control. While facing varying degrees of language diversity and having different political priorities, these groups are typically engaged in parallel nation- and state-building projects, where schooling and language-in-education policies play a pivotal role. These efforts include promoting languages widely regarded as distinct, as well as attempts to elevate specific varieties or even create a common language for dialects perceived to share an overarching ethnic identity. In some cases, this has led to competition between groups over the control of schools and the promotion of ethnic identities, often symbolized through language.

85In this politically volatile context, armed actors are likely to remain central in the country’s political landscape. They may emerge as key components or ‘building blocks’ of a future federal system (South, Stenning & Shroeder 2024) or maintain de facto control over territories in a conflict-ridden Myanmar. While a political resolution remains the most desirable outcome, both scenarios suggest an increased role for ethnic minority languages in education. However, they also raise significant challenges regarding the capacity of language policies to contribute to social justice, inclusivity, and durable peacebuilding.

86In other words, while the current crisis indeed presents opportunities to incorporate multiple and diverse languages and cultures into formal education, it also carries a significant risk: the increasing instrumentalization of education as a battleground for competing nation-building projects. This dynamic not only threatens to exacerbate conflict between groups widely perceived as distinct—with the assertion of control and legitimacy over territories by symbolically raising (ethnic) flags in front of schools—but also raises concerns about different forms of ‘intra-group’ assimilation. In particular, armed leaderships may promote specific linguistic varieties and identities at the expense of others.

87Although some degree of linguistic inequality may be inevitable, the arrangements of ‘classroom languages’—the oral medium of instruction—continue to offer relative flexibility and room for inclusivity. More ambitious language-in-education approaches, particularly those involving the production of written materials in specific languages, would benefit from explicit, inclusive discussions among all relevant stakeholders. These conversations should address the selection of ‘mother tongue(s),’ their broader implications, and the trade-offs they entail, ideally with assurance that language policies contribute to both educational equity and social cohesion. Ultimately, success will hinge on a balance being struck between the desire for greater local autonomy and the imperative to foster local inclusivity, thereby ensuring that education functions as a bridge rather than a barrier in the pursuit for a more democratic and equitable Union.

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Note de fin

1 According to the estimates produced by Ethnologue (URL: http://www.ethnologue.com/) between 2016 and 2025.

2 In this article—while acknowledging that the distinction is not an exact science—we adopt the convention of using double quotation marks for exact citations, and single quotation marks to signal a degree of critical distance or nuance in relation to a concept or a term.

3 URL: http://www.ethnologue.com/.

4 In contrast to the relatively neutral “local languages” chosen for the title of this special issue of Moussons, in the Myanmar context local languages other than Burmese are typically referred to as “ethnic languages.” Actors involved in education linked to an ethnic identity—often referred to as “ethnic education providers”—typically prefer this designation over “ethnic minority languages.” The latter is often viewed as disempowering, particularly in a country founded on federal principles, where the term “minority” may be perceived as undermining claims to equality and self-determination. While expressions like “ethnic languages” or “ethnic educators” are convenient and widely recognized in the Myanmar context, they are not necessarily scientifically precise. For instance, they implicitly raise the question of what constitutes a “non-ethnic” language or education system. To address this complexity, quotation marks are used selectively in this article to signal the term’s contested nature. Nevertheless, for the sake of readability, this article uses these expressions without systematically applying quotation marks, acknowledging their practical utility in referencing well-defined categories. These categories include local languages other than Burmese (the national language) and parallel, non-state education systems established in connection with a specific ethnic identity.

5 URL: www.ethnologue.com, accessed January 2025.

6 Ibid.

7 Ibid.

8 See Salem-Gervais & Raynaud (2020) as well as other works of our team.

9 Burma Gazetteer, the Bhamo District, 1960.

10 Salem-Gervais & Van Cung Lian (2020).

11 Salem-Gervais & Raynaud (2020).

12 Salem-Gervais et al. (2024).

13 စာသင်ခန်းသုံးဘာသာစကား, informal oral medium of instruction to support the teaching of the national curriculum in lower grades when relevant.

14 See Salem-Gervais & Van Cung Lian (2020) on the case of Chin State, and Salem-Gervais & Ja Seng (2022) regarding Kachin State.

15 See Salem-Gervais & Raynaud (2020).

16 URL: https://aappb.org/, accessed January 2025.

17 URL: https://data.unhcr.org/en/country/mmr, accessed January 2025; URL: https://reliefweb.int/report/myanmar/myanmar-crisis-response-plan-2024.

18 The World Bank, Myanmar Economic Monitor: Compounding Crises, December 2024, URL: https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/099121024092015654/pdf/P50720310fc16e0251ba691e1227abb7375.pdf.

19 Salem-Gervais et al. (2024).

20 Padone, “Lack of teachers will affect education well into the future”, University World News, November 19, 2024, URL: https://www.universityworldnews.com/post.php?story=20241119093416105.

21 Salem-Gervais et al. (2024).

22 “Shanni language teachers assist schools facing teacher shortage in western Banmauk”, Shanni Voice, November 26, 2024, URL: https://mmpeacemonitor.org/en/332283/shanni-language-teachers-assist-schools-facing-teacher-shortage-in-western-banmauk/.

23 “လစ်လပ်နေသည့် ကရင်စာသင် TA နှင့် LT ဆရာ၊ ဆရာမများကို ထပ်မံခေါ်ယူ”, Karen Information Center, September 18, 2024, URL: https://kicnews.org/. See also this MRTV vidéo clip posted on the Facebook page of Magay Region’s Government, May 24, 2024, URL: https://www.facebook.com/61551004202347/videos/1101758520894291/, or the article “တိုင်းရင်းသားလူမျိုးများရေးရာဝန်ကြီးဌာန၊ ပြည်ထောင်စုဝန်ကြီး Jeng Phang နော်တောင် ပအိုဝ်းကိုယ်ပိုင်အုပ်ချုပ်ခွင့် ရဒေသအတွင်းရှိ တိုင်းရင်းသားစာပေနှင့်ယဉ်ကျေးမှု အသင်းအဖွဲ့ များနှင့် တွေ့ဆုံဆွေးနွေး”, URL: https://myanmar.gov.mm/news-media/news/latest-news/-/asset_publisher/idasset354/content/, Ministry of Ethnic Affairs website, October 30, 2024, URL: https://myanmar.gov.mm/news-media/news/latest-news/-/asset_publisher/idasset354/content/

24 “Myanmar students highlight multilingual education benefits on int'l literacy day”, Xinhua, September 8, 2024, URL: http://www.china.org.cn/world/Off_the_Wire/2024-09/08/content_117415281.htm.

25 Salem-Gervais et al. (2024).

26 This higher estimate is provided in South, Stenning & Shroeder (2024).

27 “KIO to build 223 new schools in areas under its control”, Mizzima, June 8, 2024, URL: https://eng.mizzima.com/2024/06/08/10632.

28 “ကရင်ပြည်နယ်မှာရှိတဲ့ ကရင်ပညာရေးနဲ့ ယဉ်ကျေးမှုဌာန (KECD)ဟာ လက်ရှိမှာ ဘာပြဿနာတွေကိုအဓိက ရင်ဆိုင်နေရလဲ”, Mizzima, October 7, 2023, URL: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Aw919Ah0omc.

29 “Mon National College to Sign MOUs with Four International Universities Within a Year”, Independent Mon News Agency, November 7, 2024, URL: https://www.bnionline.net/en/news/mon-national-college-sign-mous-four-international-universities-within-year.

30 “Treading a Rocky Path: The Ta’ang Army Expands in Myanmar’s Shan State”, International Crisis Group, September 4, 2023, URL: https://www.crisisgroup.org/asia/south-east-asia/myanmar/b177-treading-rocky-path-taang-army-expands-myanmars-shan-state.

31 Presentation during the Education Everywhere 3 online conference organized by the Inclusive Education Foundation (with anonymity guidelines), November 24, 2023. Post on TLEC Facebook page, April 23, 2024. “TNLA ထိန်းချုပ်နယ်မြေ၌ ကျောင်း ၄၈၀ ကျော် ဖွင့်လှစ်”, The Irrawaddy (Facebook page), June 14, 2024, URL: https://web.facebook.com/theirrawaddyburmese/posts/. Htet Aung and Carlos Sardiña Galache, “Ta’ang schooling and its discontents”, Frontier Myanmar, September 8, 2024, URL: https://mailchi.mp/frontiermyanmar.net/taang-schooling-and-its-discontents?e=f4849f40fc.

32 Salem-Gervais et al. (2024).

33 Linguists suggest different classifications and numbers of Ta’ang dialects. Interviewed in Lashio in January 2019, the Ta’ang Literature and Culture Committee representatives estimated that there were a total of 13-14 Palaung languages/dialects; estimates around 5-6 varieties seem to be more frequent.

34 Salem-Gervais & Raynaud (2020).

35 “Common Ta’ang language widely taught in Ta’ang area”, Myanmar Peace Monitor, March 2, 2023, URL: https://mmpeacemonitor.org/en/en-news/common-taang-language-widely-taught-in-taang-area-northern-shan-state/.

36 “မန်ပိန်းရွာ စာသင်ကျောင်းမှာတပ်မစွဲဖို့ပြောတဲ့ ကျောင်းသားမိဘတွေကို TNLA က သေနတ်နဲ့ခြိမ်းခြောက်ပြီး အတင်းအဓ္ဓမ တပ်စွဲနေ”, Kachin News Group, December 3, 2024, URL: https://burmese.kachinnews.com/2024/12/03/ld1-212/. “Ta’ang schooling and its discontents”, Frontier Myanmar Political Insider, September 8, 2024, URL: https://mailchi.mp/frontiermyanmar.net/taang-schooling-and-its-discontents?e=f4849f40fc. “KIA နဲ့ TNLA နယ်မြေအငြင်းပွားမှု ပြဿနာကို ညှိနှိုင်းဖို့ ဆောင်ရွက်နေဟုဆို”, Kachin News Group, January 28, 2025, URL: https://www.bnionline.net/mm/news-108263.

37 URL: https://data.unhcr.org/en/country/mmr, accessed January 2025. Salai Za Uk, “Three Years of Atrocities in Myanmar’s Chin State”, The Diplomat, November 10, 2024, URL: https://thediplomat.com/2024/11/three-years-of-atrocities-in-myanmars-chin-state/.

38 “ချင်းပြည်နယ်က CDM လှုပ်ရှားမှု (သို့) လက်နက်မဲ့ တော်လှန်ရေးတပ်ဦး”, Myanmar Peace Monitor, April 4, 2022, URL: https://mmpeacemonitor.org/en/mmr-news/.

39 Salai Kur Bung Bel, “National passing rate decreases while Chin State’s passing rate increases in SAC’s 2024 matriculation results”, Institute of Chin Affairs, June 19, 2024, URL: https://chinaffairs.org/?p=3724.

40 Detailed statistics reproduced in Salem-Gervais et al. (2024).

41 “An interview with Chinland’s Education Minister Salai Cross Thang on the transformation of Chin State’s education sector alongside the Chin revolution”, Khonumthung Media, September 17, 2024, URL: https://khonumthung.org/english/an-interview-with-chinlands-education-minister-salai-cross-thang-on-the-transformation-of-chin-states-education-sector-alongside-the-chin-revolution/.

42 Angshuman Choudhury, “‘Two lions in a cave’: Revolutionary divisions in Chin State”, Frontier Myanmar, August 28, 2024, URL: https://www.frontiermyanmar.net/en/two-lions-in-a-cave-revolutionary-divisions-in-chin-state/. Ben Dunant and Hein Thar, “Hornbill blues: Resistance discord in Chin State”, Frontier Myanmar, April 7, 2024, URL: https://mailchi.mp/frontiermyanmar.net/hornbill-blues-resistance-discord-in-chin-state?e=d5d1d1d6fa. The early months of 2025 have seen encouraging developments, but this reconciliation process is still in its early stages at the time of writing.

43 Interview Chairman of the Paletwa Township Education Board, Myanmar Peace Monitor, November 30, 2024, URL: https://mmpeacemonitor.org/en/en-interviews/while-we-can-make-some-progress-with-the-teachers-we-have-our-biggest-challenge-is-that-we-cant-provide-them-with-financial-support-john-bosco-chairman-of-paletwa-township-edu/.

44 See for instance the Zomi Federal Union website, URL: https://www.zomifederalunion.org/about.

45 See for instance “The Chin State’s Military-Political Dynamics: Challenges and Opportunities”, Myanmar Peace Monitor, Issue 138, February 18, 2024, URL: https://mmpeacemonitor.org/download/the-chin-states-military-political-dynamics-challenges-and-opportunities-issue-138-31-january-13-february-2024-eng/.

46 A similar typology can for instance be found in Lian Tial (2019).

47 Salem-Gervais & Van Cung Lian (2020).

48 Brian Wei, “More Than 80% of The Population of Myanmar’s Karenni State Has Been Displaced by War”, The Irrawaddy, January 17, 2024, https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/more-than-80-of-the-population-of-myanmars-karenni-state-has-been-displaced-by-war.html.

49 “400 Basic Education Schools Open in Resistance-Controlled Areas”, Kantarawaddy Times, May 31, 2024, URL: https://www.bnionline.net/en/news/400-basic-education-schools-open-resistance-controlled-areas.

50 “Shadow Govt Operates Network of Schools in Resistance Strongholds”, The Irrawaddy, June 7, 2022, URL: https://www.irrawaddy.com/news/burma/myanmars-shadow-govt-operates-network-of-schools-in-resistance-strongholds.html.

51 “Kayan National University opens”, Kantarawaddy Times, August 8, 2024, URL: https://www.bnionline.net/en/news/kayan-national-university-opens.

52 “Schools in Kayan region experimenting multilingual education”, Kantarawaddy Times, December 30, 2022, URL: https://ktnews.org/some-schools-in-the-kayan-region-are-experimenting-with-multilingual-education/.

53 “70 Kayan Schools Use Their Mother Tongue in Education”, Kantarawaddy Times, June 6, 2024, URL: https://www.bnionline.net/en/news/70-kayan-schools-use-their-mother-tongue-education.

54 “Kayan National University opens”, Kantarawaddy Times, August 8, 2024, URL: https://www.bnionline.net/en/news/kayan-national-university-opens.

55 “New Ethnic Army Hopes to Represent All Kayan People”, The Irrawaddy, November 6, 2024, URL: https://www.irrawaddy.com/in-person/interview/new-ethnic-army-hopes-to-represent-all-kayan-people.html.

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Table des illustrations

Titre Map 1. Main languages spoken across the sub-national administrative boundaries of Myanmar and its borders with neighboring countries
Crédits Sources: MIMU, SIL, LSDO.
URL http://journals.openedition.org/moussons/docannexe/image/12594/img-1.jpg
Fichier image/jpeg, 725k
Titre Fig. 1. Grammar of the Sgaw Karen by American Baptist missionary Rev. D. Gilmore (1898)
URL http://journals.openedition.org/moussons/docannexe/image/12594/img-2.jpg
Fichier image/jpeg, 73k
Titre Fig. 2. Grammar and Dictionary of the Lakher (Mara) Language by British missionary F. W. Savidge (1908)
URL http://journals.openedition.org/moussons/docannexe/image/12594/img-3.jpg
Fichier image/jpeg, 89k
Titre Fig. 3. Kachin Reader by Baptist missionary Rev. J. F. Ingram (1916)
URL http://journals.openedition.org/moussons/docannexe/image/12594/img-4.jpg
Fichier image/jpeg, 79k
Titre Fig. 4. “Our country’s family” representation of the ethnic diversity in a Grade 2 reader of the national curriculum published in 1966
URL http://journals.openedition.org/moussons/docannexe/image/12594/img-5.jpg
Fichier image/jpeg, 406k
Titre Fig. 5. Covers of some of the textbooks to teach ethnic minority languages as subjects, drafted around 2019 (here Tai Leng and Zaiwa) and of one of the draft Local Knowledge textbooks for Chin State (Grade 1, 2019-2020)
URL http://journals.openedition.org/moussons/docannexe/image/12594/img-6.jpg
Fichier image/jpeg, 496k
Titre Fig. 6. Badges of the Mon National College and the Kachin State Comprehensive University, two non-State ‘ethnic’ higher education institutions which began operations in 2022
URL http://journals.openedition.org/moussons/docannexe/image/12594/img-7.jpg
Fichier image/jpeg, 126k
Titre Fig. 7. Morning assembly in a TLEC (TNEC at the time) school in 2022
Crédits Source: Posted publicly in 2022 on TLEC Facebook page, URL: https://web.facebook.com/​photo.php?fbid=149009417875867&set=pb.100083004288913.-2207520000&type=3
URL http://journals.openedition.org/moussons/docannexe/image/12594/img-8.jpg
Fichier image/jpeg, 145k
Titre Fig. 8. Badge of the Ta’ang Education Academy
URL http://journals.openedition.org/moussons/docannexe/image/12594/img-9.jpg
Fichier image/jpeg, 251k
Titre Fig. 9. Map indicating the townships of Northern Shan State in which TLEC operates schools
Légende Presented during the panel discussion “Hard Lessons: Post-coup Schooling in Myanmar” organised by Frontier Myanmar on August 29, 2024.
URL http://journals.openedition.org/moussons/docannexe/image/12594/img-10.jpg
Fichier image/jpeg, 101k
Titre Fig. 10. Teaching of the common/official Ta’ang script/language (consonants, vowels, as well as the 5 points oath of the TNLA) by an officer to a group of TNLA soldiers
Crédits Source: From The Irrawaddy video report တအာင်းရုံးသုံးစာအတွက် ကြိုးပမ်း ဆောင်ရွက်ခဲ့တဲ့ TNLA, 2022, URL: https://www.youtube.com/​watch?v=t-DLoFwelHM
URL http://journals.openedition.org/moussons/docannexe/image/12594/img-11.jpg
Fichier image/jpeg, 650k
Titre Fig. 11. TNLA leaders attending the 52nd anniversary of the Ta’ang Literature Committee in 2024
Crédits Source: The Ta’ang Post, August 31, 2024, URL: https://web.facebook.com/​photo?fbid=122174920130186850&set=pcb.122174905910186850
URL http://journals.openedition.org/moussons/docannexe/image/12594/img-12.jpg
Fichier image/jpeg, 357k
Titre Fig. 12. Geography textbook in the ‘Kamhau dialect’ (today known as ‘Tedim’) published in 1927 by the American Baptist Mission Press
URL http://journals.openedition.org/moussons/docannexe/image/12594/img-13.jpg
Fichier image/jpeg, 171k
Titre Fig. 13. Poster for the teaching of Laipian literacy
URL http://journals.openedition.org/moussons/docannexe/image/12594/img-14.jpg
Fichier image/jpeg, 336k
Titre Fig. 14. Cover of the Grade 1 textbook of the Zolai Simbu, teaching material for Zolai literacy
URL http://journals.openedition.org/moussons/docannexe/image/12594/img-15.jpg
Fichier image/jpeg, 236k
Titre Fig. 15. Badge of the National University of Zoland, opened in 2023
URL http://journals.openedition.org/moussons/docannexe/image/12594/img-16.jpg
Fichier image/jpeg, 121k
Titre Fig. 16. Distribution of children learning different ethnic languages as subjects in government schools, across the different townships of Kayah State in 2019-20, before the coup and the mass displacement it has caused across the State
URL http://journals.openedition.org/moussons/docannexe/image/12594/img-17.jpg
Fichier image/jpeg, 310k
Titre Fig. 17. Textbook for the teaching of Kayan language (Pekon standard) produced by the Kayan Literature and Culture Committee around 2019
URL http://journals.openedition.org/moussons/docannexe/image/12594/img-18.jpg
Fichier image/jpeg, 173k
Titre Fig. 18. Badge of the Kayan National Education Committee
URL http://journals.openedition.org/moussons/docannexe/image/12594/img-19.jpg
Fichier image/jpeg, 75k
Titre Fig. 19. Online visual to encourage financial support to Kayan education
Crédits Source: Posted publicly by the Kayan Literature and Culture Committee on its Facebook page on August 28, 2024.
URL http://journals.openedition.org/moussons/docannexe/image/12594/img-20.jpg
Fichier image/jpeg, 366k
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Pour citer cet article

Référence papier

Nicolas Salem-Gervais, Amber Spreelung, Hawng Tsai et Pau Sian Lian, « Local Languages and Education Amidst Conflict and Federal Aspirations in Myanmar »Moussons, 45 | 2025, 105-147.

Référence électronique

Nicolas Salem-Gervais, Amber Spreelung, Hawng Tsai et Pau Sian Lian, « Local Languages and Education Amidst Conflict and Federal Aspirations in Myanmar »Moussons [En ligne], 45 | 2025, mis en ligne le 11 juillet 2025, consulté le 16 juillet 2025. URL : http://journals.openedition.org/moussons/12594 ; DOI : https://doi.org/10.4000/147jq

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Auteurs

Nicolas Salem-Gervais

UMR CASE (CNRS-Inalco-EHESS)

Affiliated with Centre Asie du Sud-Est (statutory), and IRASEC (adjunct), Nicolas Salem-Gervais is an associate professor in the Southeast Asia Department of INALCO University, France. He has been working on different aspects of education and language-in-education in Myanmar for almost two decades.

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Amber Spreelung

Independent researcher

Amber Spreelung is an independent researcher who currently resides and works in Southeast Asia. Her research output has primarily focused on education policy, planning, and political economy analysis.

Hawng Tsai



Hawng Tsai is a teacher educator, practitioner, and education policy advocate with two decades of experience working with various grassroots, community-based education organizations, including ethnic education groups, migrant and refugee education initiatives, and education in emergencies and conflict settings in Burma/Myanmar and its border regions.

Pau Sian Lian

Waseda University, Japan

Pau Sian Lian is a Research Fellow at Waseda University (Japan) and an Affiliate Faculty member at George Mason University. His expertise spans comparative politics, federalism, reconciliation, and Myanmar studies.

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Le texte seul est utilisable sous licence CC BY-NC-ND 4.0. Les autres éléments (illustrations, fichiers annexes importés) sont « Tous droits réservés », sauf mention contraire.

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