Introduction

3Overseas Vietnamese—often more affluent than those in Vietnam—have a duty to support their families back home. This intra-family giving, intended to provide material and financial assistance, may also be formalized through investments and the creation of family businesses. By controlling the flow of the gifts—often without material return—the Việt Kiều (Vietnamese living abroad) may exercise a form of domination over their relatives back home. Nevertheless, in some cases these contributions are not seen by the recipients as simple gifts, but as socially obligated expressions of gratitude for some past or present help or favor (Small 2018: 60). Rather than seeing them as unilateral gifts, the contribution is sometimes perceived as the return for material or moral debts incurred. By interpreting these gifts as counter-gifts, the potential domination is defused. In the absence of regular personal interactions due to distance, monetary gifts also provide opportunities for Việt Kiều to gain recognition by participating in the life of their family, village, or neighborhood. Gifts are not only confined to the family sphere but may be intended for the native community or have a religious, philanthropic, or patriotic objective.

4Through an ethnographic study conducted in South Vietnam and the Vietnamese community in California, U.S.A., Ivan V. Small clearly demonstrates that the impact of giving goes beyond the economic sphere (Small 2018). Giving also impacts emotional relationships (improving, rupturing, frustrating, or causing misunderstanding) as well as the imaginaries and mobilities of those who perceive them. The diasporic gift also influences policies of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (SRV) as it strives to attain access to the funds for political and economic purposes; this strategy being part of a broader policy that can be characterized as “transnational nationalism” or “nationalism at a distance” (Kastoryano 2006; Dufoix et al. 2010).

6Focusing primarily on the gifts and foreign exchange (remittances and investments) of Vietnamese living in the West, this article analyzes how the Vietnamese party-state interferes with the complex interpersonal networks and social logics constituting diaspora giving by giving them a political dimension. This strategy relies in part on the dissemination of a national unity discourse structured around the notion of quê hương (native country/village) exalting the attachment and solidarity of the Việt Kiều to their country of origin. In doing so, the state not only instrumentalizes solidarity practices but also shapes them. Analyzing the workings of this discourse reveals how the SRV interprets, presents, and leverages diaspora giving. Furthermore, it provides a broader perspective on the context in which transfers take place and acquire meaning.

7Following this description, this article outlines the changing nature of the gift and the effects it may have on its recipients (standard of living, imagination, and social mobility). In parallel, it examines the evolution of the party-state’s policies aimed at framing and guiding the diasporic gift. The post-war decade (1975-1986) was a period of adaptation during which the party-state opted for a policy of compromise combining opportunism and ideological rigor. Then, starting with the Renovation (Đổi Mới, 1986), the SRV pursued a pragmatic policy towards the reform of its institutions and legal framework. In the mid-1990s, Vietnam’s integration into globalization and its rapprochement with the diaspora contributed to the liberalization of transfers now transiting through a multitude of channels. In order to be as much a part of these financial circuits as possible, the SRV set up transnational networks linking Vietnam and its diaspora. For example, as we will see in the last part of this article, associations mobilizing the relatives of Việt Kiều were founded on national territory. By establishing such social links, these structures constitute a means for the authorities to interfere in transfers destinies.

At the Origins of the National Unity Discourse: The Quê Hương

9Since the 1990s, Vietnam has increasingly benefited from the support of its diaspora. Support is manifested through the transfer of skills and funds, humanitarian efforts, and political actions in favor of the regime. Instrumentalized by the Vietnamese Communist Party (VCP), these contributions nourish and legitimize the national unity discourse addressed to overseas Vietnamese. For example, in January 2020, the official journal of the VCP, the “Communist Review” (“Tạp Chí Cộng sản”), published an online article recounting an interview with the Vice Chairman of the State Committee of Overseas Vietnamese (SCOV), Lương Thanh Nghị, in which he outlined the most notable contributions of overseas Vietnamese during 2019 (Khanh Linh 2020b).

11This premise also applies to the many overseas Vietnamese who return on the occasion of Tết (Vietnamese Lunar New Year). As such, they are evidence of the Việt Kiềus’ attachment to the nation. While this logic can be applied to gifts to support VCP policy, it cannot be extended to diaspora returns or to most of the economic flows they generate, as these rather reflect family, cultural or personal purposes. The Vietnamese government, without denying these objectives, tries to conceal them within its discourse of national unity. The latter is widely disseminated by the official media by devoting, for example, articles to việt kiều entrepreneurs who have invested in Vietnam (Hà Thanh 2011; Hiếu Thiện 2002). It is also relayed by official historiography and in particular by the imposing book Kiều Bào và quê hương (Nhiều Tác già 2006). Published in 2006, this book attempts to demonstrate by presenting a picture of consistency and continuity, that Vietnam and the Việt Kiều have always maintained ties based on patriotic solidarity.

12Devoid of explicit political ideology and exalting cultural references common to all Vietnamese, the message of national unity is also peddled within the diaspora via a media sphere (television, radio, magazine, Internet), the diplomatic channel, and is relayed by rumor and informal discussions (Vigne 2012: 26). It clearly plays on nostalgia for the country of origin and aims, by appealing to emotions, to stimulate love for the homeland. In addition to encouraging and capturing the contributions of việt kiều, this long-distance nationalism aims to marginalize dissident organizations in the diaspora.

13The cornerstone of the national unity discourse is found in the notion of quê hương. This term, which translates as “homeland” or “home village,” evokes the sense of family, lineage, and identity that culturally and sentimentally binds each Vietnamese to his or her place of origin and ancestors. During the Revolution, attachment to the village, and by extension loyalty to the sovereign, was assimilated to the notion of nation, giving rise to patriotism (Tréglodé 2001: 46). At the time of independence (September 1945), Vietnamese were expected to pledge loyalty not only to their families and ancestors but also to the new Vietnamese state, the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV). The “native land” (quê hương) initially associated with the village of origin was thus, as part of the state’s strategy, equated with the nation (Hardy 2008: 105).

14Despite their remoteness, President Hồ Chí Minh considered the Việt Kiều still attached to their quê hương and thus to the new Vietnamese nation. At that time, and still today, it was indeed perfectly acceptable to leave one’s native country for good reasons (study or work stay) especially if the departure benefited those who remained. Thus, the quê hương is not necessarily a physical space but rather, first and foremost, a space of reference in which the Vietnamese find identity markers and seek recognition (Tessier 2002: 122-123). Those who are remote from their quê hương retain the moral duty to comply with religious (ancestor worship), social (village festivals) and family (economic aid) requirements. It is these marks of loyalty and solidarity that are actualized and signified through the transfer of gifts. The government effectively instrumentalized this moral obligation and the resulting transfers to serve its politics by directly associating the Việt Kiều’s quê hương (native village) with the broader scale of his “native country.”

15It was by using this construct that the DRV managed to mobilize the majority of Việt Kiều during the Indochina (1946-1954) and Vietnam (1955-1975) wars. Their contributions manifested in the transfer of money, equipment, medicine, and especially in propaganda and political agitation. These transfers and practices came mostly from so-called “patriotic” associations founded by exiled Vietnamese in Europe, Japan, and to a lesser extent in North America (Vigne 2018). The DRV also invited exiled intellectuals to return to their quê hương to put their skills to work for the nation.

16After 1975, the message of national unity was put on hold. The exodus following the North Vietnamese victory gave an entirely new face to the overseas community, which had asserted itself as a high place of opposition to the communist power. Former Saigon regime officials quickly gathered in military organizations hoping to retake South Vietnam. Extremely concerned by these actions and faced with a tense geopolitical context (Vietnam’s intervention in Cambodia and conflict with China), the VCP leadership made the choice to break ties with the Việt Kiều. It was not until 1986, and the beginning of a policy of opening that the discourse of national unity was reactivated.

The Diasporic Gift During the Collectivist Era (1976-1986)

17Although it began in North Vietnam before 1975, the period known as the “subsidy economy” (thời Bao Cấp) is generally dated from 1976 to 1986. During these ten years, the private sectors of the economy were suppressed, and the Party and the State pursued a policy of economic planning to which enterprises and factories had to submit. This policy, whose objectives were too ambitious in view of the post-war situation, was a failure. Weakened by the American embargo, the country was experiencing severe shortages and its population was surviving only through rationing measures. In this context, the help provided by the Vietnamese abroad, and especially by those living in the West, played a decisive role for many families. During this period, the SRV seemed reluctant to pursue a pragmatic policy toward diaspora giving as it was adapting to a new situation as well as trying to control it as much as possible according to ideological and national security criteria. The diaspora giving had important repercussions on the economy as well as on the population’s imagination. This was especially the case in the south of the country from where the majority of the Việt Kiều originated.

18Despite the SRV’s reluctance to do so, the diaspora, then numbering more than one million people, was taking part in Vietnam’s economic development. Turning to the land of their ancestors where they had family, sentimental and cultural ties, the Việt Kiều supported their families in the name of lineage solidarity. The massive influx of parcels was telling proof of this. Intended to provide for the basic needs of the families, they mostly contained essentials (clothes, soap, food, and medicine). Others also sent goods to improve daily life, such as household appliances or cultural items. The flood of parcels made the Vietnamese authorities nervous. They claimed the packages actually hid “cultural poisons” of “American-fantasy reactionaries” such as anti-communist books and audio tapes or pornographic films (Vu Dao 1981: 15).

21This process officially took 15 days in major cities and 30 days in other localities. Armed with their authorization, recipients would then go to the banks where they paid a 10 đồng fee to withdraw their money or to the post offices where they paid a fee of 50 đồng to receive their package. In the first case, they had already been required to inform the authorities about the amount they were receiving and how it would be used. In addition, once received, the money had to be obligatorily converted into national currency and at an exchange rate that caused recipients to lose half or even 70 percent of the value of their money (Đặng Phong 2000a: 199). Finally, carried out in a poisonous postwar climate, these administrative procedures probably involved the payment of bribes. The Việt Kiều therefore shunned the official channels established by the SRV as much as possible.

22Despite the unfavorable environment described above, overseas Vietnamese played an important economic role in the country. Đặng Phong estimated that between 1976 and 1986, contributions (in goods and money) amounted to at least one billion dollars. During this same period, as this economist pointed out, international aid to Vietnam averaged only $4 million to $600 million (Đặng Phong 2000b: 30). Less significant than diaspora contributions, the international aid nevertheless had the advantage of directly benefiting the state. It was fed back into the budget, and then into commerce to be redistributed to businesses and invested in the construction of infrastructure and public projects.

23In contrast, diaspora giving was beyond the control of the RSV. Families receiving goods sold them and then spent the money in the commercial sector. Those who received foreign currency converted it (often on the black market for a cheaper rate) and spent it on purchases as well. Thus, these economic flows led to the emergence of a free market (Đặng Phong 2000a: 198) in Ho Chi Minh City, which was then officially subject to a collectivist economy. Consequently, diaspora giving was involved in changing the very essence of the economy and in the resurgence, all things considered, of the capitalist frenzy of the late Saigon.

24In addition to the South Vietnamese economy, and particularly that of Ho Chi Minh City, the gifts of overseas Vietnamese also influenced the perceptions and imaginaries of Vietnamese back home. The idea that the Việt Kiều were privileged in that they lived in the “opulence” of capitalist countries was widely held. The gifts and money they sent granted them a higher status related to wealth. Although it was far from true, it was imagined that those overseas could easily provide for themselves and as a result, facing poverty and scarcity and cut off from the outside world, families sometimes overly solicited the help of their relatives in the West. In the name of family solidarity, the requests multiplied; money to finance a hospital stay, studies, the construction of a house, the renovation of a temple to honor the ancestors, etc. This situation led in some cases to severe tensions within families (Đặng Phong 2000a: 91; Small 2018: 60).

25Envied for their so-called “good life,” the Việt Kiều nevertheless nourished Vietnamese dreams of a better life elsewhere. Many wanted to reach the Western El Dorado and enjoy the same riches as their relatives abroad. In consideration of the UNHCR’s assistance and the reception policy of Western countries, the possibility of departure was real. Thus, in the context of the economic slump that hit Vietnam in the early 1980s, the imaginary images conveyed by the diasporic gift gave an additional dimension to the exodus following the communist takeover. It was not until the early 1990s that preconceptions about the wealth of overseas Vietnamese and the fantasized image of the West began to fade.

A Pragmatic Vision Emerges (1986-1990)

26By the end of 1986, the failure of Vietnam’s economic policy had become obvious, and the implementation of pragmatic reforms became urgent. This situation facilitated the arrival in power of the CPV’s renovationist wing. As a result, in December 1986 less than two years after the perestroika in the USSR, the RSV formalized the Đổi Mới (Renovation) at the 6^th Congress of the CPV. The new policy included a new vision of international relations and Vietnam’s place in the world (Đỗ 2009:180-181) and it was in this context that the VCP renewed its policy towards the diaspora. At the VI Congress, the media, and high-ranking politicians such as Nguyễn Văn Linh (VCP general secretary) and Võ Văn Kiệt (chairman of the Council of Ministers) declared that the overseas Vietnamese represented a force for the development of the country. Soon after, the RSV was working to modernize its institutions and legal framework to encourage economic participation by the diaspora.

Hoàng Bích Sơn’s Speech on the Overseas Vietnamese Community

28Hoàng Bích Sơn estimated that about 300,000 intellectuals of Vietnamese origin were employed in capitalist countries and that among them, some were highly qualified or held important positions in commercial and industrial enterprises and scientific research centers. On the economic level, Hoàng Bích Sơn mentioned that the overseas Vietnamese did not yet have large capital or big enterprises, but that their potential was still worthy of consideration and should be developed through visionary policy:

• 10 Ibid.

From 1980 to the present, Việt Kiều residing in capitalist countries have sent money and goods to their relatives worth more than one hundred million U.S. dollars each year; in addition, other hundreds of millions of U.S. dollars pass through illegal networks that are uncontrollable by our government. If an appropriate policy is set in place, this important source of foreign exchange and capital goods could, as in many other countries, contribute to a significant part of economic development.10

29Hoàng Bích Sơn thereby signaled the government’s pragmatic interest in the diaspora’s financial resources amounting to several hundred million dollars. These words could not have been uttered a few years earlier in a context marked by the ideological rigor of a socialist economy. Aware of the shortfalls of previous policies, the VCP planned structural reforms to capture diaspora financial flows.

30As the last sentence of the quotation suggests, the VCP was inspired by other countries which were benefiting from the foreign exchange of their expatriates, for example, China. In the late 1970s, under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping, Beijing began a rapprochement with its diaspora. This policy resulted in the application of tax exemptions and favorable exchange rates on the sums sent by overseas Chinese to their families. “Prestige” investments (building infrastructure, schools, hospitals, etc.) were encouraged and received official recognition from the Chinese authorities (Guerassimoff 2010: 72).

Institutional and Legal Reform

36The goals set at the VI Congress of the CPV had been achieved. The reforms undertaken by Võ Văn Kiệt and his successors had transformed and adapted the gift and transfers from diaspora to the requirements of the state. Not only did sending money take precedence over sending parcels, but such flows now more often passed through state institutions. Hence, the RSV’s policies were not only intended to foster links and exchanges between Vietnamese inside and outside the country. They also reflected the state’s desire to capture remittances to re-inject them into the national economy and service the country’s development.

The Liberalization of Diaspora Giving

37The 1990s saw Vietnam concretize its policy of political and economic opening. The country normalized its relations with non-communist countries and joined several international organizations (World Trade Organization [WTO], Association of Southeast Asian Nations [ASEAN], Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation [APEC], etc.). Given this new reality, the mistrust felt by part of the diaspora decreased in intensity. Diplomatic dialogue between Hanoi and Washington helped to improve RSV’s image among many U.S.A. based Vietnamese. As a result of this and the easing of visa requirements, visits by Việt Kiều to their home country became more common. This participated in the liberalization of diasporic giving which was now being practiced in a globalized economic environment. Consequently, its uses, the circuits through which it transited and the imaginaries it conveyed evolved. As the RSV accelerated its outreach to the diaspora, it sought to deploy transnational networks to capture and direct the gifts and remittances.

39Now possible, the many returns for Tết became an opportunity for overseas Vietnamese to express their generosity, fulfill their obligations, and maintain emotional ties (tình cảm) with their families. Cash gifts to family members and relatives on the occasion of the Lunar New Year, slipped into a red envelope (lì xì), are estimated by Small's interviewees at $200 to $300 per year. These sums, given primarily to children and the elderly, but also to all relatives, bring good luck for the new year. In practice, they are usually used for entertainment purposes (banquet, restaurant, etc.) or buying convenience goods (smartphone, motorcycle, etc.), but they can also improve the difficult daily life of certain families.

40Financial assistance is also extended when relatives need hospitalization or to cover life cycle ceremonies: births, weddings, inauguration of a new house, longevity celebrations, funerals, commemoration of the death of an ancestor, etc. As for the monetary gifts intended for the community (village and lineage), these often aid in the construction or restoration of various places of worship (pagodas, temples and tombs of ancestors, temple dedicated to local deities, but also churches, etc.) or that of “communal houses” (đình).

41Stays in Vietnam also allowed Việt Kiều to prospect for investment opportunities through a family business or personal project. In 2006, 1,465 projects worth $380 million were registered primarily in the industrial, service, and agriculture, forestry, and fish farming sectors (Vine 2012: 74-75). The most spectacular investments were in tourism, including, for example, the huge Vinh Pearl complex located on the island of Hòn Tre off the city of Nha Trang (Peyvel & Vigne 2010: 109). Founded in 2006 by Ukrainian Việt Kiều, it was a symbol of diasporic economic participation and as such, it was praised by the national press and presented as a demonstration of patriotism by overseas Vietnamese.

42Apart from this kind of colossal project, family investments were made on a smaller scale. For example, thanks to the 2 billion đồng granted by her relatives residing in Toronto, Mrs. Tran, then 36 years old, opened a hotel in the seaside town of Vũng Tàu in 1994 (Interview by Emmanuelle Peyvel, Peyvel & Vigne 2010: 110). Following a family visit to Ho Chi Minh City, coupled with a tourist trip to Đà Lạt and Vũng Tàu, Mrs. Tran’s father and brothers decided to guide her in this project. Having realized the new economic prospects in the tourism field, they were exceptionally good advisors. The profits from the 14-room hotel allowed Mr. Tran to start exporting cashew nuts and diversify the family income. This money was also used to finance their son’s studies at a Canadian university.

43In some cases, diasporic transfers, or the income they generated, were invested in mobility strategies. They were used, as described above, to finance a study abroad but also language training or learning a trade in preparation for departure. Diaspora giving, especially from the United States, sometimes spurred the ambitions of its recipients who while striving to become financially independent, and also provide gifts for their families, they too hope to move to the United States where they feel it is easier to succeed (Small 2018: 69-70). Nevertheless, diasporic giving has not influenced the migration phenomenon as much as it did in the early 1980s, especially since visas to the West and especially to the United States remain difficult to obtain.

44In 2008, Việt Kiều (mainly from the United States, Canada, Australia, and France) sent $7.2 billion to their relatives in Vietnam. This placed the country second only to the Philippines in Southeast Asia in terms of total financial transfers. After a slight decrease in 2009 due to the global economic crisis, the record amount of $8 billion was reached in 2010. This figure increased further in the following years and Việt Kiều foreign exchange represented an average of 7% of the national GDP (Chan Hồ 2018).

45The Việt Kiều remittance estimates, accounting for bank transactions and transfers via specialized agencies, are not, however, significant of the real value of diasporic giving. First, they do not consider goods and parcels. Second, because the percentage of the Vietnamese population with bank accounts is still relatively low (34% in 2016), overseas Vietnamese rely more on personal couriers (family members or friends) who hand-deliver money (or a material gift) (Small 2018: 161)—also allowing the recipients to avoid paying taxes. Although difficult to calculate, these informal transfers contribute to an increase in purchasing power and boost the Vietnamese economy.

46Faced with the multiplication of economic flows generated by the diaspora, the RVN is not content with structural reforms and the dissemination of a discourse of national unity. It creates transnational networks linking the diaspora and Vietnam in order to boost and manage these flows as much as possible. One example of this is the branches of the Việt Kiều entrepreneurs’ association (Hiệp Hội Doanh nhân Việt Kiều) established mainly in Eastern Europe but also in Western Europe and North America (Vigne 2012:83). Founded in Hanoi in 2009, this association is supervised by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and collaborates with the EEVC as well as the Chamber of Commerce and Industry. Its goal is to tap into Việt Kiều capital and economic know-how while using them to expand consumption channels for Vietnamese products and scale up cooperation with foreign businesses.

47Another example is the multiplication of new pro-government associations. Created through Vietnamese embassies, these associations (12 in 2011) are present in former communist countries (Poland, Russia, Czech Republic, and East Germany), in countries where Vietnam has recently exported labor (South Korea, Qatar, Angola and Taiwan) and also in Western Europe (Norway, Finland, Sweden and Switzerland). In addition to cultural and economic activities within the diaspora, these associations regularly send money or goods to support humanitarian and patriotic causes (Vigne 2012: 51).

The Associations of The Relations of Vietnamese Residing Abroad

48From the mid-1980s, the Vietnamese authorities mobilized the relatives of the Việt Kiều by means of registered associations. In this way, they hoped to interfere with the family economic solidarity taking place between those abroad and at home. The official objective was that the economic assistance generated by the Việt Kiều would be “both beneficial to their families and to the state” [lợi nhà vừa ích nước] (Trần Trọng Đăng Đàn 1997: 446). After initial experiments in Nha Trang and Hải Phòng and amendments to the Vietnamese Constitution made in 1992, these associations multiplied.

49The new Vietnamese Constitution stated that:

• 22 Les Constitutions du Viêt Nam [1946-1959-1980-1992], 2003, Éditions Thế Giới, Hà Nội, p. 164. This (...)

The State encourages overseas Vietnamese to maintain close relations with their families and native place (quê hương) and contribute to the building of their native place (quê hương), and the country, and to this end, creates favorable conditions for their benefit.22

50In addition to facilitating the flow of gifts and returns, this policy was embodied in the creation of associations for liaising with the Việt Kiều [Hội liên lạc Việt Kiều]—and associations of the relatives of the Kiều Bào [Hội thân nhân Kiều Bào], which, in spite of different names, performed the same functions. By creating social ties between members and conveying a patriotic discourse, these associations allowed the authorities to frame and direct the gifts and investments of the Việt Kiều. In 2010, mixed results reflected the remaining political tensions with the diaspora but the Việt Kiều Liaison Association of Hải Phòng, a pioneering association driven by Việt Kiều “patriots” repatriated before 1975, was nevertheless doing well.

Building a Solidarity Movement Through the Kin of Việt Kiều o

51Shortly after the constitutional amendments, the inter-ministerial text No. 5/HD-LB issued jointly by the Committee of the Fatherland Front and the Central Committee of the Việt Kiều, formalized the foundation of kinship associations [Trần Trọng Đăng Đàn 1997:449]. These were affiliated with the Fatherland Front [Mặt Trận Tổ Quốc], a body encompassing the “mass associations” that constitute, according to the Vietnamese Constitution, “the base of popular power.” An important element of the Vietnamese political system, the Front comprises 44 organizations, including the Communist Party. These various associations serve to mobilize, channel and control civil society. The Fatherland Front symbolizes the greater national unity and represents, among others, women, youth, the elderly, religious groups, ethnic groups, farmers and, since the 2001 amendments to the 1992 Constitution, overseas Vietnamese.

52Founded and supervised by committees of the Fatherland Front in provinces and cities, the associations of Việt Kiều kin have, in addition to mobilizing their members, the following missions: to organize actions to strengthen the solidarity, mutual affection, and patriotic spirit of members and their relatives abroad; to disseminate and implement policies and laws related to the Việt Kiều; and to guide the Việt Kiều in their administrative procedures, economic investments, as well as in carrying out humanitarian or development projects. The main mission of the associations was therefore to facilitate Việt Kiềus’ relationships with their families and native places thereby building confidence for economic participation.

53After all, in the early 1990s the Việt Kiều still suffered from many prejudices and encountered many obstacles. They sometimes felt “oppressed” by the many demands of their relatives (Đặng Phong 2000a: 91; Small 2018: 60). Cumbersome administrative procedures and/or corruption also served to discourage them from pursuing projects. The associations helped local relatives to be more understanding and accompany the Việt Kiều through complicated procedures. This accompaniment enabled local authorities to direct material support to families, investments or humanitarian donations and give them a patriotic dimension.

54In 2010, eighteen associations existed on Vietnamese territory. The most important concentration (twelve) was in the south, especially in the south of Ho Chi Minh City (eight). Seven associations were located in the North, including two in Hanoi. A gap remained in the center of the country where only the city of Đà Nẵng hosted an association. This gap reflected the difficulties faced by the Fatherland Front in mobilizing Việt Kiều relatives there. Hence,” the journal “Quê Hương” estimated that 41 (out of a total of 60) provinces were home to families of overseas Vietnamese and therefore potential hosts of associations, although statistics were described as “incomplete (Khánh 2001: 2-3).

55The situation had been even more worrisome a decade earlier and had led Fatherland Front chairman Phạm Thế Duyệt (2001) to point out the shortcomings of the mobilization policy at a conference in Hải Phòng in June 2001. He blamed the Fatherland Front committees for negligence in training mobilization cadres and for a lack of initiative in founding or consolidating associations. He also deplored the persistence of prejudice against overseas Vietnamese and urged the Fatherland Front committees to overcome political blockages. Phạm Thế Duyệt nevertheless suggested that “the activities of a small number of extremists opposing the country” (2001) should be countered. Thus, the overseas opposition and the fears it raised hindered the implementation of RSVN's policies toward the overseas Vietnamese community.

Case Study: Việt Kiều Liaison Association of Hải Phòng

58After 20 years of activity, the ALVK of Hải Phòng had an honorable record. It had increased foreign remittances sent by expatriates, carried out humanitarian programs (aid to Agent Orange victims, the poor, and the disabled) and realized investment projects beneficial to the city’s development (hospital and university) (Hoàng Hướng 2010). According to Nguyễn Hữu Thông, a leader of the association met in Hải Phòng in June 2010, this success was the result of the work of the members who showed skill in creating bonds, based on solidarity, trust, and love of the country, with overseas Vietnamese. Nguyễn Hữu Thông furthermore emphasized the association’s support effort in enabling Việt Kiều to reconnect with their home country under the best conditions:

The members of the Việt Kiều Liaison Association of Hải Phòng are very open. They are admirable in that they are voluntary and conscientious. They act as guides for business, housing, weddings, etc. Thanks to the relatives, the returning Việt Kiều could integrate with diverse networks. It would have been difficult to do business or participate in the development of the city without this guidance. (Interviewed by the author in Hải Phòng in June 2010).

59The association’s superior results—27 investment projects by Việt Kiều entrepreneurs worth $100 million—were also linked to the city’s economic attractions which included a port, an airport, and an abundant labor force (Thu Hằng, 2010). Among these projects, the construction of the “Việt Kiều Village [Làng Việt Kiều]” was particularly symbolic. Worth $21 million and covering an area of 9.8 hectares, the real estate complex includes luxury villas, shopping malls, schools, nurseries, and recreation centers. According to its developer, Nguyễn Tài Phương, a U.S. based Việt Kiều, the village had three objectives: to contribute to the city’s urbanization and development process, to meet the housing and service needs of the Việt Kiều, and lastly, to persuade other Việt Kiều originating from Hải Phòng to take part in the city’s economic development (Khánh Linh) 2010. With these objectives, he was in line with the political logic of the Vietnamese authorities.

61The engagement of Việt Kiều “patriots” of Hải Phòng was decisive for the association. These “patriots” succeeded in building a relationship of trust and solidarity between the city authorities and overseas Vietnamese. However, the association’s good results hide some difficulties. Nguyễn Hữu Thông, a manager of the Hải Phòng association already mentioned above, admitted that mentalities towards overseas Vietnamese were slow to change and that there remained some resistance towards them (remarks collected by the author in Hải Phòng in June 2010). Thus, projects, especially Việt Kiều Village, required a lot of time and many administrative steps. However, these difficulties were minor compared to those encountered in some provinces and cities in the Center and South where many political exiles originated.

Conclusion

62The emergence of diasporic giving came at a time when Vietnam was economically bereft and defiant toward the outside world. In this context, the solidarity of the Việt Kiều was essentially expressed through the sending of goods intended to improve the daily lives of their relatives facing shortages. For a time held back by ideological and national security imperatives, the state gradually managed to influence the circuits of giving and the intentions of those doing the giving. Thus, from the 1990s onwards, parcel shipments were supplanted by financial transfers channeled through state institutions although informal channels remained and are still predominant today.

63The opening of Vietnam to globalization and its diaspora has led to the diversification of diasporic giving, resulting in the emergence of a variety of non-commercial “type of transfers.” Typically, diaspora members from time to time give financial assistance or a parcel (containing household goods) to their relatives in Vietnam to fulfill their duties and obligations while expressing affection (tình cảm). Cash gifts are also common during the New Year but may be given also for events and ceremonies marking the stages of the life cycle. Financial transfers may also occur regularly to facilitate the daily life of relatives (Small 2018: 58). In some cases, a loan requested from a relative living abroad may be converted into a gift.

64More than just a support for daily life or social events, a monetary gift can be used to support family investment projects that will improve the standard of living of the family members and, in the best case, lead to a certain prosperity. It should be noted that the donor of the invested sum may be a stakeholder in the project or remain simply an advisor and spectator coupling the contribution with an offering of skills and expertise. In addition, overseas Vietnamese might also leverage their financial and cultural capital into personal investments. In this case, it is not a gift transfer anymore, it becomes a commercial transaction.

65At the community (village and lineage) level, gifts are usually expressed through evergetic acts. Through this, the Việt Kiều finance the maintenance or construction of worship places or collective spaces. Diasporic giving is also characterized by financial participation in humanitarian work or development projects. The sponsors of this type of gift are most often international non-governmental organizations (NGOs) or associations. Among the latter are those sponsored by the Vietnamese State established in the diaspora and in-country. Members of these associations are often the providers of “patriotic” contributions that support the economic and political interests of the SRV.

66The analysis of Vietnamese diasporic giving is extraordinarily rich in lessons. First of all, as is the case in any study of gift-giving, it reveals the particular relationships between donors and recipients while addressing the multiple effects of transfers. Secondly, it has the particularity of highlighting the nationalism-at-a-distance disseminated by the SRV among Vietnamese abroad and the policies designed for the Việt Kiều (mobility, rights, consular protection, national unity discourse, constitutional change) to appropriate the diasporic gift.

67The steady growth of economic contributions from the diaspora (foreign currencies and remittances, investments, and humanitarian works) might suggest a clear success of these measures. However, the motivations for diasporic giving respond to particular histories and contexts as well as complexities that cannot be codified and explained by a state-constructed and disseminated narratives. The diasporic gift is developing outside of the intentions of the SRV, thus escaping its political and economic project. Nonetheless, although gifting is generally a process of personal, family or community interests, it is sometimes carried out with an assumed and consenting patriotic perspective. Thus, taken in its political dimension, the gift reflects the ambiguity of the relations between Vietnam and its diaspora.

68In fact, the message of national unity within the diaspora received a mixed reception. In the mid-1990s, its reception was quite positive in Europe—notably in England, Belgium, and Germany—and in countries close to Vietnam—Cambodia, Laos, and Thailand (Vigne 2012: 28). In subsequent years, the SRV developed good relationships with Eastern European communities. In contrast, relations remained difficult in countries with high concentrations of political exiles, particularly in the United States where the message of national unity was opposed by anti-communist organizations. The ideological divisions inherited from the Vietnam War and the tragic memory of the boat people exodus still compromise Vietnam’s reconciliation with some of its diaspora.

69The survival of this antagonism seemed to influence the local leaders of the Fatherland Front who were hostile to the creation of associations of relatives for fear of encountering problems of a political nature. In their opinion, these structures represented spaces for potential infiltration by anti-communist militants and for generating unrest. As a result, such associations showed little develop in Vietnam. However, these obstacles must be put into perspective. It is possible these associations were simply not attractive to overseas Vietnamese who preferred to act outside a framework proposed by the authorities instead mobilizing within their private circle, religious organizations, or international NGOs. It reflects the personal dimension of the gift.

70Although the limits of the message of national unity have been acknowledged, they must also be qualified. Vietnam’s integration into the international arena and the country’s new image have helped to make the message more audible. Moreover, the integration measures dedicated to overseas Vietnamese facilitate their economic activities and have led to the liberalization of the gift. The attractiveness of the country, open to capitalism and brimming with opportunities, means that a growing number of Việt Kiều, especially the new generations, have turned the painful pages of Vietnamese history. This does not necessarily result in full adherence to the authorities’ discourse but shows a readiness to accommodate or even engage with it. This was hardly evident for those who fled the communist regime in the post-war decade.

71Whether new generations of overseas Vietnamese, especially those in the United States, will be able to forge more peaceful ties with Vietnam is far from clear. The assertion of transnational Vietnamese nationalism in the form of increasing interventionism in the diaspora is double-edged. It contributes to the unification of anti-communist movements and to the emergence of a collective memory in North American Vietnamese communities. The continuation of this process could transmit to new generations a feeling of animosity towards Hanoi and anchor dissent in the diaspora, potentially jeopardizing the future of patriotic gifts.