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Chiara Pagnotta

Latin American migration within the continent between 1980 and 2000: a historical perspective

[10/09/2014]

Resúmenes

En este artículo quiero mostrar las correlaciones entre decisiones económicas y migración en América Latina. En particular, enfocaré mi estudio en la crisis económica de los años '80, las políticas neo-liberales de la década de los '90 en América Latina y sus repercusiones en la evolución de los flujos migratorio. Mostraré como el pasaje de un modelo económico por substitución de las importaciones hacia uno llamada neo-liberal afectó, entre otros, la movilidad de los habitantes latinoamericanos. Esto significa indagar las relaciones entre restructuraciones económicas y la metropolización, la migración rural-urbana y la migración limítrofe en el territorio latinoamericano. Por ende, mostraré la evolución - hasta los años 2000 - de la migración dirigida hacia los Estados Unidos y cuyos antecedentes se encuentran en el primer Programa Bracero (1917-1921) .

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Texto integral

  • 1 Martin, Phillip, Michael, Teitelbaum, “El espejismo de los trabajadores huésped mexicanos”, Foreign (...)

There is nothing more permanent than a temporary worker.1

  • 2 Centro de Desarrollo de la Organización para la Cooperación y el Desarrollo Económicos, Perspectiva (...)

1Currently, more that 20 million Latin-Americans live abroad. Approximately three-quarters reside in the USA and the rest in Argentina, Venezuela, Spain and Canada. At the same time, Central-American migration through Mexico towards the USA, Colombian migration to Ecuador and two-way migration between Brazil and Paraguay2 has recently increased. Latin American immigration has gradually assumed a greater importance in the Nineteenth Century.

  • 3 Inter alia: Clifford, James, Routes: Travel and Translation in the Late Twentieth Century, Harvard, (...)

2In fact, migration was easier than ever and therefore multiplied in comparison to previous centuries due to reduced geographical distances, better transportation, and the speed by which information and communication traveled between countries. The always-changing reality of contemporary migration compels us to apply a global approach to reconstructing flows to different countries, because geographical distance is losing its importance in the orientation of migration. This expansion leads one to consider not only the dynamics of a paradigm of national analysis, but also makes us analyze the correlation between the different contexts of arrival and departure3.

  • 4 Pagnotta, Chiara, Attraversando lo stagno: Storie della migrazione ecuadoriana in Europa tra contin (...)

3In this article, I wish to show the evolution of Latin American migration flows back to the economic crisis of the Eighties until the end of the Century. I will focus on the economic crises that caused an expansion of the flows that already existed within the Latin American continent, albeit internal migration from the countryside to cities, migration to neighboring countries, or migration to North America. My study focuses on the evolution of flows and their prominent features and will not delve into the evolution of migration policies of destination countries, despite their influence on the evolution and characterization of migratory flows. Since its socio-demographic characteristics are completely different from previous flows, Latin American immigration to Europe after the year 2000 has not been examined in this article. However, I have dealt with migration policies and migration towards Europe in other papers4.

An economic overview of sending countries - From the decada perdidia to the end of the 20th century

4The 1980s were characterized by a period of vast changes in Latin America. In socio-economic terms it was known as the decada perdida and after the experience of authoritarian governments of the 70s a shift toward democracy emerged. Contemporaneously, a deep spiral of violence ensued causing more than 200,000 deaths and creating 2 million refugees. Nicaragua, which was devastated by the conflicts between the Contras and Sandinistas, was the epicenter of the crisis that quickly struck El Salvador and Guatemala.

Economy

  • 5 CEPAL, Transformación productiva con equidad. La tarea prioritaria de América Latina y el Caribe en (...)

5The economic crisis in the 80s was the worst since 1929, and South America faced a dramatic recession period that in 1989 rather than growing produced the same pro-capita wealth as in 1977.5

Table 1: GNP annual growth (in million dollars)

1961-1970 (%)

1971-1980 (%)

1981-1990 (%)

Latin America

5,4

5,9

0,9

Argentina

4,4

2,5

-1,9

Bolivia

4,7

4,0

0,1

Brazil

5,4

8,6

1,3

Chile

4,2

2,6

2,7

Colombia

5,2

5,5

3,5

Ecuador

5,2

9,0

1,7

Guatemala

5,5

5,7

0,9

Mexico

7,0

6,7

1,5

Paraguay

4,6

8,7

3,1

Perù

5,5

3,6

-1,0

Venezuela

6,3

4,3

0,4

Source : author’s elaboration from CEPAL, Anuario Estadístico de América latina y el Caribe, Santiago de Chile, Publicación de las Naciones Unidas, author’s multiple years data elaboration.

  • 6 French-Davis, Ricardo, Devlin, Robert, “Il debito estero”, in Cuevas, Alberto (ed.), America latina(...)

6Discovering with the causes of this situation, it is possible to point how the economic crisis in Latin America is tightly linked to a series of interrelated variables, where the national economies progressive debt seems to be the most significant. In fact, in 1983 the total debt of the macro region more than doubled its GNP6.

  • 7 ISI model was based on the creation of a national industry with the purpose of subsidizing imports, (...)

7During the Latin American independence process, these countries contracted foreign debt - especially to buy arms from England – which had a strong effect on national economies and rose even more in the 80s. As shown below, the matter of foreign debt shed light on the systemic lack of a Latin America productivity model. It should be noted that Latin America pursued a development model - Industrialización por sustitución de importaciones (Import Substitution Industrialization, ISI)7 between the 30s and the 70s. The consequence was a very high growth rate, but the wealth was distributed only among the governing elite and deep deficits were produced by foreign debt.

  • 8 Nominal Exchange rates determined a overvaluation of Latino American currencies compared to the US (...)
  • 9 Since then, the US dollar lost its intrinsic value – the same occurred to all the other currencies- (...)

8The oil crisis in 1973 did not decisively affect Latin America, as the producing countries had raised crude oil prices by reducing production. Therefore, Latino American countries belonging to OPEC had significant increases in capital. For this reason, financial institutions continued to offer loans that sustained the overall growth of these economies, as well as for the abundance of natural resources in Latin American countries, in spite of a worldwide period of crisis. Growth was maintained by the availability of liquid assets sustained by the loans and exchange rates based on the nominal currency value linked to both gold prices and the US dollar8. On August the 15th 1971, the United States sanctioned the end of gold-dollar9 convertibility and implemented a 10% customs tax on all imports. As a result the price of gold began fluctuating freely.

9The abundance of capital in the region was also due to low and favorable interest rates applied to indebted countries. However, between 1977 and 1980 interest rates grew progressively, padding the world inflation rate and causing the system to show the first signs of collapse in 1981.

  • 10 Dabène, Olivier, L’Amérique latine à l’époque contemporaine, Paris, Armand Colin, 2006, p. 192. LIB (...)

10The United States currency interest rate increase imposed by Regan (1981) after the second oil crisis in 1979 lead to dramatic growth in the interest capital Latin American countries had to reimburse. The proof is seen in the London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR) – (the most valuable reference index for Latino American financial markets) which passed from 8% in 1979 up to 16.5% in 198110.

11This situation provoked such a strong imbalance in Latin American economic budgets that they were pushed into obtaining new loans. In the 80s, banks rapidly cut off credit to troubled countries, worsening the situation even more.

  • 11 Jedlicki, Claudio, "De l’affectation de l’importation d’épargne étranger dans le cas des grands déb (...)
  • 12 Stiglitz, Joseph, "Le cap des réformes. Vers un nouveau programme pour l’Amérique latine", Revista (...)

12The crisis spread quickly, as rapid industrialization had been sustained and fostered by its enormous dependency on financial markets, and during the 70s, most countries had fallen into debts too high to be repaid11. In 1970, debts interest payout made up 22% of income derived from exports, notwithstanding a constant incoming financial flux that was guaranteeing the possibility of paying off debts. From 1982 on, Latin America had to face higher interest rates, in a context where economic crisis provoked a decrease of Latin American exports, and new loans were not awarded. The rapid interest growth and restrictions applied to credit by industrialized countries – the USA above all – to contrast national inflation, put the economic model based on import substitution and state intervention on the economy into a serious danger, leading to new free market strategies12.

13In the following table, the amount of foreign debt in the 80s is summarized by country:

Table 2: Foreign debt in millions of dollars (public plus private sectors and IMF loans)

1980

1985

1990

Latin America

220.256

377.615

448.231

Argentina

27.162

49.326

62.233

Bolivia

2.340

3.294

3.768

Brazil

64.000

105.126

123.439

Chile

11.207

20.403

18.576

Colombia

6.805

14.063

17.993

Costa Rica

2.209

4.140

3.924

Ecuador

4.167

8.111

12.222

Guatemala

1.053

2.536

2.387

Mexico

50.700

97.800

106.700

Paraguay

861

1.772

1.670

Perù

9.595

13.721

22.856

Venezuela

26.963

31.238

35.528

Source: CEPAL, Anuario Estadístico de América latina y el Caribe 2000, Santiago de Chile, Publicación de las Naciones Unidas, 2001, p. 514. Available at http://www.eclac.org/​publicaciones/​xml/​8/​6228/​c-2-VI.pdf

14Recession in Latin America became the “debt crisis” when Mexico declared that it was unable to pay off its contracted debts (1982). When international loans were cut off, all governments reduced expenses and started to pay off debts using income.

  • 13 Dabène, Olivier, L’Amérique latine à l’époque contemporaine, op. cit., p. 192

15The situation was worsened by the fall in prices of primary goods, mainly exported by Latin American countries: soy flour, sugar, cocoa, coffee, cotton, silver and tin. This caused the industrialization process to decrease as well due to lesser income coming from exports and credits. Paradoxically, developed countries in the area, such as Brazil, Argentina and Mexico, were the ones that faced the greatest difficulties13.

  • 14 CEPAL, Transformación productiva con equidad, op. cit.

16In the early 90s, CEPAL (the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean) published a report concerning regional development in the area throughout the previous decade. It was named decada perdida, to show how most countries suffered a economic growth stop in the previous decade and faced socio-economic recession. In the same report, CEPAL outlined structural changes in productivity addressing social equality as priorities for overcoming the ongoing economic crisis14.

17During the 90s, Latin American countries adopted new strategies and policies in order to balance their budgets. On one hand, the emergency of foreign debt remained, while on the other hand the structure of internal production had to diversify in order to meet the ever changing demands of an international marketplace.

18The solution arose from a structural adjustment plan negotiated with the IMF which was mainly based on public expenditure cuts to balance national budgets, control inflation, depreciate local currencies and reduce salaries in order to attract investments and foster exports. The objective of this action was to modify the productive economic system, boosted by privatization, and sustained by greater competitiveness in the world market.

  • 15 Devlin, Robert, “Le privatizzazioni̕”, in Cuevas, Alberto (ed.), America Latina vol. 3: Le istituzi (...)

19Following the implementation of this structural program, international economic boards accepted to renegotiate foreign debts. Initial asset payouts were postponed and in the meantime implied interest was being earned. To allow this specific debt payout, Latin American countries were awarded new loans with conditions set by the same creditors15.

  • 16 Boisard, Stèphane, “Le général et le néo-libéralisme des Chicago Boys: les deux piliers de la dicta (...)

20Brazil and Argentina did not endorse this solution straightaway and sought alternative solutions by freezing prices, stabilizing exchange tax and index-linking salaries to inflation. These tactics proved to be unsuccessful. Peru tried increasing salaries, freezing prices and imposed a 12% currency depreciation with equally disappointing results. Apparently, the only valid solution was adopted by Chile which increased exports, privatization and laid out structural reforms aiming to open its economy to international competition. Along with rapid development, these changes caused a dramatic lack of democracy as well. In 1974, the Andean country started privatization of the public sector to give enterprises and companies back to their rightful owners which had been previously nationalized by Allende government16. During the Pinochet dictatorship, 550 industries (equal to 25% of GNP) were privatized. From the mid 80s onward, most Latin American countries followed Chile’s example, decreasing their role in the economic sector by privatizing companies and businesses.

21The orientation of Latin American economies leaned towards a hacia afuera, as they had at the turn of the 20th century. Commercial liberalization extended all over the continent. Customs duties dropped from 41.6% in 1985 to 13.7% on average in 1995. As a consequence, local production faced the challenge of competing with foreign products. Export volume increased due to changes in its typology and specialized in delivering specific goods to the international market (such as wood and fishery from Chile, flowers from Columbia and prawns from Ecuador)

  • 17 Cit. in Rouquié, Alain, Amérique latine: Introduction à l’Extrême-Occident, Paris, Seuil, 1987.

22The erosion of buying power of local currencies was transformed into hyper-inflation, and in 1989 prices rose up to 1800% in Brazil and 4923% in Argentina17.

23From a fiscal point of view, taxation on foreign commerce was substituted by sales tax, but no serious actions were taken to contrast tax evasion. The most amazing aspect of Latin American economies during the 90s was the privatization groundswell in 1991/1992 and 1996/1997.

  • 18 Frenkel, Roberto, “Mondialisation et crises financières en Amérique latine̕”, Revista de la CEPAL, (...)

24Following reforms, intervention led to noteworthy results in controlling inflation and increasing GNP. In the 90s, Latin America grew enough to set the region as an emerging world economy, even if it still remained vulnerable to international financial market turbulence. Due to this, some countries encountered another financial crisis. These phenomena were characterized by macro-regional processes, where local/national crises were spreading rapidly and contaminating the continent. In 1994, Mexico’s financial collapse affected the whole continent and in January 1995 all Latin American stock markets fell (Tequila effect) causing an international capital escape18.

  • 19 Started in Thailand and rapidly diffused all over the Far East
  • 20 Ocampo, José Antonio (ed.), Une décennie de développement social an Amérique latine. 1990-1999, San (...)

25Until 1997, Latin America faced new growth. The effects of the Asian crisis19 in the same year impeded further development, pointing out the regions economic weaknesses. The pitfalls of the setback were so diverse and profound, that some economists have named the period 1997/2002 a new “lost quinquennial”20.

  • 21 Frenkel, Roberto, "Mondialisation et crises financières en Amérique latine", op. cit.

26According to Robert Frenkel, the economic crises in Mexico (1994/1995), Argentina (1995), Brazil (1998/1999), and Argentina (2001/2002) occurred in countries that had previously received huge capital flows and were the most important economic markets in the region21. During the same period, environmental factors also contributed in worsening the situation. In 1998, the Niño phenomenon caused the destruction of Ecuadorian and Peruvian local agricultural and fishing economies along the coasts; Hurricane Mitch dramatically stormed Central America.

  • 22 Stiglitz, Joseph, Les cap des reformes, op. cit.

27Last but not least, as Joseph Stiglitz notes, the impact of liberal reforms during the 90's were put in danger at the turn of the century due to the insufficiency of the expected results compared with the social costs undertaken to foster them. The new century was therefore readdressing a new deal centered on governmental capacities and control reinforcement22.

28In fact, as we shall see in the next section, the phases of high growth in Latin America did not coincide with an increase in citizen welfare.

The cost of social growth (1980/2000)

29In Latin America the relationship between economic growth and poverty has often been contradictory, in other words, economic growth has not often been followed by the expected drop in poverty levels.

  • 23 Ocampo, José Antonio et al (eds.), Une décennie de développement social an Amérique latine, op. cit

30It is very difficult to outline a whole picture concerning poverty in Latin America as the situation changes dramatically country by country. Brazil, Panama, and Chile have had better results in fighting poverty while Ecuador, Columbia and Paraguay have lagged behind significantly. Venezuela faced a poverty increase from 22% in 1981 to 44% in 199923.

  • 24 Ibid.

31When utilized, public funding contrasted poverty. As a whole, social expenditure the 90s rose thanks to economic growth, and the GPD share addressed to social affairs increased from 10.4% to 13.1%24 throughout that decade, even if investments in this sector remained far too low in countries like El Salvador, Guatemala, the Dominican Republic and Paraguay.

  • 25 Klein, Emilio, Tokman, Victor, "La stratification sociale à l’épreuve de la mondialisation", Revist (...)

32Despite this trend, wealth inequality remained untouched. Social and economic differences between social classes appeared even more dramatic if one considers that 75% of the households in Latin America were earning less than the average income. On the contrary, wealthy and rich social classes encountered a significant improvement25; this process produced a significant difference between upper and lower classes with the exception of Columbia, Honduras and Panama (see table below).

Table 3: Income distribution (Comparing the wealthiest 20% to the poorest 20%.)

1990

1997

1999

Argentina

13,5

16,4

16,5

Bolivia

21,4

34,6

48,1

Brazil

35,0

38,0

35,6

Chile

18,4

18,6

19,0

Colombia

35,2

24,1

25,6

Costa Rica

13,1

12,0

15,3

Ecuador

12,3

12,2

18,4

El Salvador

16,9

15,9

19,6

Honduras

30,7

23,7

26,5

Mexico

16,9

17,4

18,5

Panama

24,3

23,8

21,6

Uruguay

9,4

9,1

9,5

Venezuela

13,4

16,1

18,0

Source: CEPAL quoted in Stiglitz, Joseph, Les cap des reformes, op cit. p. 37.

  • 26 Ocampo, José Antonio et al (eds.), Une décennie de développement social an Amérique latine, op. cit

33Education was another important factor negatively contributing to the crisis in Latin America. A chance to have a profitable education in these countries depended exclusively from the level of education of parents and family. It remained a poorly permeable system where social mobility was lacking and huge differences existed in terms of quality between public and private educational systems. The economic cost of education prevented most students from accessing private education represented a definite barrier to a better working and economic future26. All these elements were influential on Latin America population mobility as well.

  • 27 Lochore, Renel Anson, From Europe to New Zealan, Wellington, Reed, 1951; McDonald, John, McDonald, (...)

34As we know, the poorest were not the first to migrate, but the impoverishment experienced by Latin American middle class made migration a viable option to improve their standard of living, as shown in the studies on migratory chains, this model was quickly followed by other socio-economic groups27.

Migration between Latin American countries.

  • 28 Between 1850 and 1930 approximately 14 million migrants settled in Latin America
  • 29 Centro Latinoamericano y Caribeño de Demografía (CELADE) – División de Población de la CEPAL, Cuatr (...)

35The overall number of “trans-oceanic” migrants in Latin America decreased from 4 million in 197028 to 1.9 million in 2000, causing the total migrant population to shift from 76% to 41%29.

Table 4 : Immigrant population by origin. Latin America and The Caribbean

Origin

Census 1970

Census 1980

Census 1990

Census 2000

Trans-oceanic

3.873.420

3.411.426

2.350.441

1.935.499

Trans-oceanic (%)

76,1

63,1

51,2

39,4

Intra-regional

1.218.990

1.995.149

2.242.268

2.971.888

Intra-regional (%)

23,9

36,9

48,8

60,6

Total

5.092.410

5.406.575

4.592.709

4.907.387

Total (%)

100

100

100

100

Source: Centro Latinoamericano y Caribeño de Demografía (CELADE) – División de Población de la CEPAL, Cuatro temas centrales en torno a la migración internacional, derechos humanos y desarrollo, Santiago de Chile, Publicación de las Naciones Unidas, 2006, p.73.

  • 30 CEPAL, Migración internacional, derechos humanos y desarrollo en América latina y el Caribe, Montev (...)

36The table shows how a complete reverse trend occurred over 30 years: by the time transoceanic migration decreased – both in absolute and relative terms – regional mobility took the lead. Latin American countries at the end of the 20th century and the beginning of 21st century are simultaneously emigration, immigration and transit countries. In quantitative terms, regional migrants (including the Caribbean) comprised 4% of the entire population30.

37In the same period, Latin America was marked by the phenomenon of metropolitanization, migration between neighboring countries, and migration toward United States.

The Urbanization (metropolitanization) process

  • 31 Carmagnani, Marcello, L’altro Occidente: L’America Latina dall’invasione europea al nuovo millennio(...)
  • 32 Castells, Manuel, La Cuestión urbana, Siglo XXI, México, 1974, p. 49
  • 33 See Quijano, Aníbal, “Dependencia, cambio social y urbanización en América Latina”, in Cardoso, Fer (...)
  • 34 See Quijano, Aníbal, “Dependencia, cambio social y urbanización en Latino-América”, op. cit.

38Freedom, individualization, and a shift from community to society values are boosted by spatial mobility. The consequence is a process of urbanization, starting from the small urban local centers that become the end point of a larger social network31. The rapid growth of Valparaiso, Santiago, Lima, Bogotà and Mexico City was largely determined by rural-urban axis migration. According to Manuel Castells, urban agglomeration was the result of the separation of agriculture and artifact productive systems, and urbanization represented the determining factor of the population increase in Latin America32. Anibal Quijano noted how industrial production, and participation to international economy, mutated existing social relationships between rural and urban strata. Rural economic sectors had to adapt to the needs of new economies, alienating their traditional production forms and models33. With the fall of the traditional agricultural model the rise of a third sector economy in urban centers followed. If urbanization in Latin America was a social phenomenon previous to colonization, its expansion and prominence only occurred during the 1940s when the post 1929 crisis was boosted by investments in the area34.

39Industrialization represented a pull factor for the rural population causing them to migrate toward urban areas while offering opportunities in the new economic deal. Between 1940 and 1980, Latin American metropolitan growth generated both a quantitative (due to migration) and qualitative turnover (metropolitanization process). This process was largely caused by the incorporation of a large social strata with new forms of production and consumption. This phenomena produced a mass movement from rural to urban areas in a very short time. Migration toward urban centers not only satisfied the new demand for labor, but also fostered an individual desire for a better standard of living. Besides this, education and health services were much more efficient in cities than in rural areas and social mobility was more likely to occur in urban contexts. All together these factors definitely worked as a push/pull mechanism for rural-urban mobility.

40Between 1950 and 2000 urban population growth continued to rise, while it dramatically decreased in rural areas. The latter occurred mainly because of urbanization rather than endogenous processes.

Table 5 : 1950-2000 Population growth in %

Urban

Rural

Argentina

2,2

-1,0

Bolivia

3,2

0,9

Brazil

4,0

-0,1

Chile

2,6

-0,3

Colombia

3,3

0,7

Ecuador

4,1

1,4

Paraguay

3,6

1,8

Perù

3,3

0,7

Uruguay

0,9

-1,5

Venezuela

4,3

-0,1

Source: author’s elaboration from Centro Latinoamericano y Caribeño de Demografía (CELADE)- División de población de la CEPAL, Distribución espacial de la población y urbanización en América latina y el Caribe, available at www.cepal.org/celade/depualc

  • 35 See i.e. for Peru: Meneses Rivas, Max, La utopia urbana: El Movimiento de Pobladores en el Perú, Li (...)
  • 36 Between 1950 and 1968 they were called barriadas o barrios populares, between 1969 and 1980 they we (...)
  • 37 Marginality concept is an ambiguous one and difficult to be defined. On this point see Num, José, M (...)
  • 38 See also Castelles, Manuel, La Cuestión urbana, op. cit., p. 49

41With the rapid rise in urban population, housing and accommodation became a problem. Agglomeration and shanty towns suddenly appeared on urban landscapes. Migrants unlawfully occupied lands and built new settlements in expanding peripheral metropolitan areas35 that were called barriadas in Perù36, callampas o campamentos in Chile, villas miseria in Argentina, favelas in Brazil, tugurios in Colombia. Neighborhoods emerged from nothing in no time at all without any control or planning on the part of government institutions. Yet this population resided at the margin of urban and productive development not only physically but more importantly from a socio-economical standpoint. Newly settled migrants were not able to find stable work or to reach a sufficient qualitative and quantitative employment level37. Marginality was mainly caused by the impossibility of local urban work markets to meet the demands of labor force, represented by migrant workers coming en masse from rural areas into towns38.

  • 39 Naciones Unidas, Comisión Económica para América latina y el Caribe (CEPAL), Centro de las Naciones (...)

42According to CEPAL at the end of the 90s approximately 6 out of 10 poor people were living in urban areas. Starting from the 1980s, Latin America became the model of urbanization poverty worldwide (in 2000, the highest rates of Asian and African poverty was still primarily rural)39

  • 40 Quoted. in Davis, Mike, Il pianeta degli slum, Milano, Feltrinelli, 2006, p. 28

43Mexicans that were living in shanty towns were approximately 19.6% of the total urban population (14.7 million) Peruvians were 68.1% (out of 13 million) Argentines 33.1% (out of 11 million) 40.

  • 41 Naciones Unidas, Comisión Económica para América latina y el Caribe (CEPAL), Centro de las Naciones (...)
  • 42 Naciones Unidas, Comisión Económica para América latina y el Caribe (CEPAL), Centro de las Naciones (...)

44Between 1990 and 2000, the Latin America population urbanization process continued to rise shifting from 71% to 75%41 and in Colombia and Peru reached nearly 80%42.

  • 43 Mike Davis, Il pianeta degli slum, op. cit.
  • 44 Naciones Unidas, Comisión Económica para América latina y el Caribe (CEPAL), Centro de las Naciones (...)

45Even at the end of the last century, the productive potential of rural areas was far less than in urban ones. The latter still remained a magnet for those seeking stable occupation, social assistance and opportunities for a better standard of living. During the recession, a decrease in salaries and urban unemployment did not prevent people from migrating. On the contrary, it rose, proving that lower incomes does not correspond to a return to the countryside43. In the 80s and 90s, a consistent share of the urban migrant population was made up of young people and women that were seeking occupation in urban housekeeping services (which implied an increase in the average age in rural areas). 44

  • 45 CEPAL, “Latin America: urban and rural population and share of urban population by country̕̕”, Bole (...)

46According to CEPAL, in 2025 approximately 80% of Latin Americans will live in cities (56.4% in 1970 and 79.5% in 2010). The Haitian urban population grew from 19.6% in 1970 to 70.4% in 2010, in Honduras from 29% to 68.4%, in Ecuador from 39.5% to 75.5%, in Peru from 58.1% to 763%, in Guatemala from 25.1% to 78,4%, in Argentina from 79.8% to 97.9% and in Uruguay from 82% to 94.1%45.

  • 46 Sassen, Saskia, The global city: New York, London, Tokio, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 19 (...)
  • 47 Sassen, Saskia, The mobility of labor and capital: A study of international investment and labor fl (...)

47With globalization, new forms and structures of economic markets also occur on a local level; the emergence of a new model of a global city in the new world economy must provide a framework for highly specialized services and high-tech industries46. This process creates a demand for both highly specialized and unskilled labor forces. Upper class economic wealth and lifestyle represent a recruiting niche for regional and international migrants47, as well as new factories with a demand for labor. In Latin America, Mexico City, Sao Paulo and Buenos Aires can be defined as global cities.

  • 48 Caldeira Pires do Rio, Teresa, Cidade de Muros: crime, segregação e cidadania em São Paulo, São Pau (...)

48During mass movement from rural to urban areas there was a counter movement of wealthy social classes leaving city centers to move to highly protected suburban satellite villages (gated communities)48.

49Between 1980 and 2000, informal economies like housekeeping, family care giving, street vending and daily work we also on the rise. These jobs employed approximately 30-40% of the active and inactive urban population of the sub-proletarian population during the 80s.

  • 49 Naciones Unidas, Comisión Económica para América latina y el Caribe (CEPAL), Centro de las Naciones (...)

50Civil wars (especially in Colombia and Guatemala) also caused large numbers of rural population to abandon the countryside and move towards towns. It is possible to note how the largest urban areas corresponded to Mexico city, Sao Paulo and followed by Rio de Janeiro and Buenos Aires49.

  • 50 Cosio Zavala, Maria Eugenia (ed.), "Dossier: Changements démographiques en Amérique latine̕", Cahie (...)
  • 51 The maquilladoras were US-owned assembly plants (the majority) which used low cost and tax-exempt l (...)

51In 1900, Mexico city had a population of 345,000 which had grown to 20 million by 1992 becoming the largest metropolitan area in the world. The causes for this can be explained by the demographic explosion which occurred during the last Century50, as well as the second economic and industrial boom during the 1930s and 40s that took place exclusively in the city and its surrounding areas. More recently maquilladoras were also established in the suburban areas of the capital city and not only in the north of the country51.

52More recently, a decrease in housing density occurred due to the expansion of peripheral metropolitan areas, which grew outside the limits of the cityscape, and collided with the nearby urban agglomerates of the central plateau including Toluca, Cuernavaca, Puebla, Cuautla, Pachuca and Queretaro.

53San Paulo had owed its expansion to coffee cultivation and commerce ever since the end of the 19th century. Money coming from this business provided investment capital for productive sectors of consumption and transformation. Between WWI and the 1930s industrialization in Brazil was concentrated in this area. Later on, San Paulo’s expansion was so great that it was possible to speak of urban metropolitan continuity from the San Paulo and Rio de Janeiro axis (Rsper) all the way to the Campinas industrial estates.

54Similarly Gran Buenos Aires was the third largest metropolitan area, by extension, in Latin America, and included Buenos Aires city itself along with part of the homonymous province up to La Plata. Most of Argentina’s economic and productive capacity was concentrated in this area (45%), and nearly a third of the Argentinean population was also living there.

Migration between neighboring countries.

  • 52 Pellegrino, Adele, Migrantes latinoamericanos: síntesis histórica y tendencias recientes, Montevide (...)

55Intra Latin American migration started at the beginning of the 20th century, but it became relevant toward Venezuela, USA and other countries only in the 1950s. According to Adele Pellegrino, this phenomenon provided evidence of an artificial division and border design in post-independence Latin America, that separated populations and communities that had been always connected. To the author, regional migration in Central America at the frontier between Colombia and Venezuela and in Argentina were the continuation of an ancien régime52, based on economic reasons and culturally oriented practices.

  • 53 Pellegrino, Adele, La migración internacional en América Latina y el Caribe: tendencias y perfiles (...)
  • 54 Villa, Miguel, Martínez Pizarro, Jorge, “Tendencias y patrones de la migración internacional en Amé (...)

56In general terms, regional migration was influenced by two main factors: structural deficiencies of economic development in some countries and socio-political instability in others. Up to the 1980s, intercontinental movements were targeting only specific attractive poles like Argentina and Venezuela in South America, and the USA regarding emigration from Central America and the Caribbean53. At the same time, specific events were causing particular migration flows, from and towards countries that were not historically migration related. For example Nicaraguan and El Salvadorian migration to Costa Rica, and those from Guatemala and El Salvador toward Mexico, during late 70s and early 80s, were caused by civil wars and political instability in the region at that time54.

  • 55 Ibid.

57Internal migration in South America reached its peak in the 1970s when economic, political and social crises caused the number of migrants to nearly 2 million. The most important receiving countries of these flows were Argentina and Venezuela (approximately two-thirds of the total), followed by Costa Rica and Paraguay as receiving countries from primarily their neighboring countries55.

  • 56 CEPAL, Un examen de la migración internacional en la comunidad andina basados en datos censales, Sa (...)

58The period between the 1950-80s provided a constantly rising flow of inter-regional migration: Colombian workers were migrating to Venezuelan sugar and coffee plantations, Ecuadorian Banana and flower cultivation sites; Colombian women were moving to serve in the Venezuelan housekeeping sector, and Bolivian and Peruvian workers were finding jobs in Argentinean industries. The CEPAL analyses show how economic inequalities between neighboring Latin American countries generated a consistent trans-frontier macro-regional labor market56.

59Among many factors that fostered this type of migration, the most relevant were the differences between countries in terms of pro capita GDP. For example individual incomes in Argentina between 1950 and 2000 doubled in comparison to Bolivia and Paraguay; this process made Bolivia and Paraguay the most important work force suppliers for Argentinian industry.

  • 57 Martínez, Jorge, “El mapa migratorio de América Latina y el Caribe, las mujeres y el género”, CEPAL (...)

60The overall crisis of the 80s stopped inter-regional migration processes and also caused a returning process from receiving to sending countries. Migrations toward Venezuela and Argentina decreased and only Costa Rica and Chile were an exception to this57.

  • 58 Centro Latinoamericano y Caribeño de Demografía (CELADE) – División de Población de la CEPAL, Cuatr (...)

61At the beginning of the 90s, interregional mobility flows started again and involved approximately 3 million people. Venezuela, after the oil economy boom during the 70s, received a large number of Colombian and Latin American migrants that rose to 3.4 % of the total population. In Central America, Costa Rica became the preferred destination of Salvadorian and Nicaraguan migrants; in 2000 their numbers reached 300,000, and represented 8% of the entire population of the country58.

  • 59 Belbueno, Palacios Patricia, “Feminización de las migraciones: del espacio reproductivo nacional a (...)

62While Bolivian migration to Argentina was predominantly male, Colombian and Ecuadorian to Venezuela, and Paraguayan to Argentina was primarily female, and filled a demand for day work and family housekeeping sectors59.

  • 60 González Alvarado, Iván, Sánchez, Hilda, Migraciones en América Latina y el Caribe: la visión desde (...)

63According to CEPAL, gender differences and distribution among migrant population, depended on different typologies of available labor markets in receiving and sending countries. Mexican males in USA, Bolivians and Chileans in Argentina fulfilled work demand in the agricultural sector, while Colombian women in Venezuela and Paraguayans in Argentina did the same in family care and housekeeping sectors. In the Caribbean, the slight imbalance toward female rather than male migration, depended on the availability of labor in the tourist sector60.

64Concerning specialization, rural migrants with poor levels of education accepted unskilled positions in urban labor markets niches and were the vast majority in regional migration. Simultaneously, there was a smaller yet significant highly qualified migration phenomenon mainly motivated with political reasons and exile.

  • 61 CEPAL, Migración internacional, derechos humanos y desarrollo en América latina y el Caribe, Montev (...)

65Over the previous two decades, although migration towards the USA and Europe was higher numerically, regional migration maintained traditional traits and features in specific historically receiving countries yet perhaps showed lower numbers due to the transformation of some receiving countries in transit and/or returning countries as well61.

  • 62 Martínez, Jorge, El mapa migratorio de América Latina y el Caribe, las mujeres y el género, op. cit

66In Central America, Belize functioned as a magnet for Guatemalan and Salvadorian migration, while Costa Rica still remained the main destination of Nicaraguan migration. At the same time all Central American countries also functioned as transiting countries for migration toward the USA62.

  • 63 CEPAL, Migración internacional, derechos humanos y desarrollo en América latina y el Caribe, op. ci (...)

67In that period, according to CEPAL, regional migration was mainly due to local policies providing support to working mobility, especially in the Caribbean community (CARICOM), the Common South Market (MERCOSUR) and the Andean community, besides the traditional historical trajectories touching Argentina Venezuela and Costa Rica63.

  • 64 Herrera, Gioconda (ed.), Andinamigrante- Boletín del Sistema sobre Información de Migraciones andin (...)

68The Andean community migrated all over mainland Latin American countries (Argentina, Brazil, Chile and Panama) but – with the exception of Bolivia to Argentina – the number was not highly significant in comparison to the level of internal migration mobility. Colombian entering and exiting migration was more significant in Venezuela and Ecuador (desplazados – displaced people due to the civil war in Colombia) as well as Peruvian emigration to Venezuela64.

  • 65 Many studies have dealt with neighboring migration to Argentina. For an overall picture refer to: N (...)

69Over previous decades, neighboring immigration to Argentina faced important changes and increased significantly compared to the more dated and traditional European immigration of the past. Particularly, immigration from Andean countries like Bolivia and Peru increased while in Chile and Paraguay it nearly vanished over time65.

Migration towards the United States of America.

70The United States has always been a destination for internal migration to the American continent, thanks to the territorial continuity between Latin America and the United States. In fact, they are only separated by the Rio Bravo to the West and from the desert to the East. So migration flows northward developed long before migration to Europe.

Braceros

  • 66 US Immigration and Naturalization Service, quoted in Castles, Stephen, Miller, Mark, La era de la m (...)

71A discussion about immigration to the USA must deal mainly with Mexican migration. Since the 1890s it constituted the backbone of immigration to the USA. According to the US Immigration and Naturalization services, in 1999, 23% of the immigrant population in the USA were Mexican66.

  • 67 In 1848 the Guadalupe-Hidalgo treaty shifted Texas, Arizona, New México, Wyoming and some parts of (...)
  • 68 Durand, Jorge, Migration mexicaine aux États-Unis, Paris, CNRS, 1996.

72This migration flow started in the second half of the 19th century within the historically shared territories67; the extension of the first railways between Mexico and USA (1884), the expansion of the North American economy, and the demand for cheap labor increased movement between the two countries68.

  • 69 Ibid.

73In 1882, the US Congress passed a law forbidding Chinese immigration to the USA. European immigrants did not cover the void in labor demand caused by this legal action because they would not accept the poor working conditions and low salaries. The solution was found in a Mexican workforce. They were more accepted than Chinese and agreed to the same salaries and working conditions that their Asian counterparts had. In addition, the geographical proximity to America was an advantage for employers who could easily send Mexicans back to their home countries after contract termination69.

74The easiest way to employ Mexicans was through recruitment agents (called enganche) who traveled Mexican regions searching for prospective migrants.

  • 70 Bracero literally means working hands in English can be translated as worker. Braceros were largely (...)

75The enganche offered money to cover travel expenses and initial support to the family left behind to prospective migrant workers. During WWI, military engagement required a greater labor force to supply both the military industry efforts and to cover the demand created by American workers sent overseas. In these years (1917-1921) a first Bracero70 program was established to meet this goal; it allowed 70,000 Mexican workers to move to Chicago, California and Texas. The program was terminated during the recession in the 1920s, and all workers were sent back.

  • 71 Durand, Jorge, “¿Un acuerdo bilateral o un acuerdo obrero padronal?”, in Durand Jorge (ed), Bracero (...)

76Between 1921 and 1939, large expulsion programs took place due to the economic crises (1921-1929-1933-1939) 71

  • 72 Ibid.
  • 73 Jorge Durand, Migration mexicaine aux États-Unis, op. cit.

77During WWII, a second Bracero program was established. It lasted for 20 years (1942-1964) with the aim of supplying labor for agriculture, infrastructure programs and the mining industry. According to Jorge Duran, this program was the most significant model for temporary migration worldwide72. It launched a new deal in migration affairs: migrants would be temporary and allowed to stay only as long as they were necessary for local demand but not beyond. The second Bracero program was signed on July 23, 1942 by American and Mexican governments. It was based on temporary contracts (mostly 6 months), to be awarded and renewed to unskilled Mexican laborers coming from poor rural areas. Cotton, asparagus, grape, apple and orange pickers were the main activities for these contracts since they were filling the seasonal demands of the productive agricultural cycle73.

78The program was controlled by the Mexican Department for Agriculture, and its aim was to support the American effort during WWII. It became an official bilateral program and was regulated by strict rules. As a consequence, this caused a parallel irregular flow from Mexico toward the USA of those migrants that were originally refused or not qualified for the program. On September 29, 1942 the first contingent of 3000 Mexican workers reached Stockton in California. It was calculated that approx 2.5 million Mexicans took part in the program over its 20 year duration.

Towards the North

  • 74 Castles, Stephen, Miller, Mark, La era de la migración: Movimientos internacionales de población en (...)

79In the 1960s, immigration to the USA continued in a different and more unregulated way. Central governments were not involved anymore and it became mostly a matter of individual, family and community decisions. Migration remained mostly male and temporary and increased significantly during the 70s. The Immigration and nationality Act of 1965 allowed residing immigrants to reunite with their families in the USA. This created a boost in migration that significantly reshaped ethnic distribution in the country. Between 1951 and 1960 Europeans migrants were 53% of the whole immigrant population and all other Americans were 40%. In 1996, Europeans were down to 15% and all other Americans (excluding Canadians) had risen to 46% 74

80Between 1980 and 1990, migration flows from Central and Latin American became more and more relevant. The number of Latin American immigrants had doubled by 1990 and reached a peak of 8.4 million people (representing 43% of the total immigrant population in the USA).

  • 75 Villa, Miguel, Martínez Pizarro, Jorge, Tendencias y patrones de la migración internacional en Amér (...)

81More than half were Mexican, and a quarter came from the Caribbean (Cuba, Jamaica, Dominican Republic) and the rest were from Central and Latin America75.

  • 76 Loudes Arizpe, Culturas en movimiento, interactividad cultural y proceso globales, México, Universi (...)

82In the decada perdida, repetitive financial crises, a drop in agricultural salaries, and rising unemployment in urban and industrial labor markets pushed many more people to migrate to the USA76.

  • 77 Translated wetened, illegal migrants that have crossed Rio Bravo.

83In the 1980s, there were more illegal Latin American immigrants “mojados”77than legal ones, and the US government was forced to take action.

  • 78 Centro Latinoamericano y Caribeño de Demografía (CELADE) – División de Población de la CEPAL, Cuatr (...)

84The Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 granted regularization to those immigrants (mostly Cuban, Mexican and Haitian) residing in USA previously to 1982, and created sanctions to employers that were contracting illegal workers. It regularized a quota of agricultural workers and at the same time enforced more control over the US-Mexican border to contrast illegal migration78

  • 79 Massey, Douglas, Durand, Jorge, Malone, Nolane, Beyond Smoke and Mirrors: Mexican Immigration in an (...)

85Yet one of the paradoxical effects of this law was to reinforce the immigrant contingent residing in the USA as Douglas Massey, Jorge Duran and Nolane Malone have noted. In fact, most illegal seasonal workers preferred to remain in the USA, rather than to take the risk of moving back to sending countries while waiting for the next call for the picking season (circular process)79.

86In this period, a so-called “coyote” phenomenon appeared on the scene; coyotes were often Mexicans who knew the borderland and upon payment, helped guide migrants through the fences of the frontier patrol network. The price paid differed according to historical moments and the origin of the immigrants.

  • 80 Centro Latinoamericano y Caribeño de Demografía (CELADE) – División de Población de la CEPAL, Cuatr (...)

87During the 80s and 90s Latin American immigration urbanized especially in Los Angeles, Chicago, San Francisco, Dallas, Phoenix, San Diego. The kinds of employment therefore changed from agriculture to the service sector. Yet the labor market remained segmented according to ethic origin. Despite rising ethnic heterogeneity in metropolitan America, Latin American migrants whether skilled or unskilled remained at the bottom of the socio-economic scale80.

88Latin American communities in the USA rose exponentially in that 20 year period shifting from 22.4 million in 1990 to 35.3 million in 2000 and became the most numerous ethnic minority in the country (including immigrants and descendants)81

  • 82 The Chicano movement appeared during the 70s. Established by immigrant descendants, it strives to m (...)

89Cultural similarities between the two sides of Rio Bravo are so profound that, among many other facts, the Virgen de Guadalupe cult (the black virgin symbol of Mexico) has been maintained by the Chicano movement in California82. Another example of Latin cultural presence in the USA is the progressive “Latinization of consumption” by means of the creation of an ethnic market for the immigrant population. Taco Bell is a USA enterprise that – adapting to local market demands – offers Mexican gastronomy. Pollo Loco is a Mexican based company serving the US market through brand franchising. Los Lobos is a pop band that plays Mexican music for immigrants in the USA.

  • 83 Acosta, Yesenia, de la Cruz Patricia, “The Foreign Born From Latin America and the Caribbean: 2010. (...)
  • 84 To the detriment of geographical reasons, the U.S. Census of 2010 included Mexico among the Central (...)

90In a 2010 census, 53% of the foreign people born outside of the USA came from Latin America83; mostly from Central America84 (Mexico and El Salvador) followed by the Caribbean (Cuba and Dominican Republic) and South America.

Table 6: Immigrants in the USA by Region and countries of origin in 2010

Region or Country of origin

Total number (.000)

%

Caribbean

3.731

17,6

Cuba

1.105

5,2

Dominican Republic

879

4,1

Haiti

587

2,8

Jamaica

660

3,1

Caribbean Other countries

500

2,4

Central America

14,764

69,6

Mexico

11,711

55,2

El Salvador

1,214

5,7

Guatemala

831

3,9

Honduras

523

2,5

Central America Other countries

485

2,3

South America

2.730

12,9

Brazil

340

1,6

Colombia

637

3,0

Ecuador

443

2,1

Peru

429

2,0

South America. Other countries

882

4,2

Total

21,224

100

Source: author’s elaboration from the United States Census Bureau.

91Latin Americans mostly resided in California (25.8%) Texas (14.2%) Florida (13%) and New York (10%)85. In more recent years, a more widespread geographical distribution occurred; Dominicans largely concentrated in Boston, Providence, Rhode Island, Colombians in New Jersey and Los Angeles, Salvadorians in Washington and Los Angeles, and Brazilians in Massachusetts86.

  • 87 Duany, Jorge, "La nation dans la diaspora : las multiples répercussions de l’émigration portoricain (...)
  • 88 Finalized enrollment during the First World War. Puerto Rico enjoyed the status of Associated Free (...)
  • 89 Portes, Alejandro, “From South of the Border: Hispanic Minorities in the United States”, in McLaugh (...)

92Puerto Rican migration does not appear in US censuses as since 1904 they have been considered Americans and not immigrants. Yet in 2006, it was estimated that 50.4% of the Puerto Rican population was residing on the US mainland and only 49.6% on the Caribbean islands87. One of the reasons for this was the free circulation between the USA and Puerto Rico since US nationality has been given to Puerto Ricans since 191788. Migration was primarily urban and New York was the preferred destination. Puerto Ricans find employment in industrial and housekeeping sectors as well as in the food service and catering89.

  • 90 Le Texier, Emmanuelle, "Latinos aux Etats-Unis : des citoyens « transfrontières » ?", L’ordinaire L (...)

93Salvadorian migration started in 1970 with a restricted number of workers, but with the civil war (1979-1992), a mass of refugees and economic migrants escaped the ruins of war, and landed in the USA seeking security and livelihood90.

  • 91 Portes, Alejandro, From South of the Border, op. cit.

94Similarly, Cuban migration was shaped around political refugees who had escaped Fidel Castro’s regime. Especially in the 70s, it rose dramatically and concentrated in Florida. According to Alejandro Portes, The Kennedy (1961-1963) and Johnson (1963-1969) administrations attempt to relocate Cubans was unsuccessful due to the resistance of a well-organized politically and economically powerful community91.

  • 92 Grasmuck, Sherry, Pessar, Patricia, Between Two Islands: Dominican International Migration, Berkley (...)

95Dominicans constituted the poorest ethnic minority in the USA. Migration started in the 60s after the collapse of the regime and affected many social stratas of the Dominican society. Yet all migrants were all poorly skilled and educated and were mostly single women seeking a way to settle and reunite with their husbands and children as soon as possible.92

  • 93 Colectivo IOE, Inmigrantes, trabajadores, ciudadanos: Una visión de las migraciones desde España, V (...)

96Following the implementation of stricter border controls after 9/11, Latin American migration to the USA seemed to stop, but had only changed route. At first, illegal migration followed the San Diego path on the US west coast, but later it was forced to push down inland to the less predictable Arizona desert at its border with Mexico. Contemporaneously, the migration flows began to head to Europe in greater numbers. The stricter controls at the border Mexico-United States made overseas immigration a safer route. On the other hand, the economies of European countries, especially Spain and Italy, at the time were in need of low cost, foreign labor to be utilized for maintenance and cleaning sectors. Latin American immigration, especially for women, seemed to have found an attractive destination in Europe93.

  • 94 Castles, Stephen, Miller, Mark, La era de la migración. Movimientos internacionales de población en (...)

97As a consequence of American pressure over the US-Mexican border, Mexico itself sealed the Guatemalan border in order to stop immigration from southern countries. The route to the USA had always been very risky but at the end of the century it had become even harder. Travel costs were proportional to the difficulties and obstacles and in this respect prices rose, for example, from 143 dollars in 2000 up to 1500 dollars in 2006 to cross the US-Mexican border illegally94.

Conclusion

98In this article, an economic explanation of social events was linked to the historical evolution of Latin American migrations within the continent. Contemporary migration toward Europe has been tackled in other papers, because the main focus of this article was to show the basic, underlying factors behind migration processes at the end of the 20th century. The 1980s were characterized by a dramatic economic conjuncture, during which Latin America, as a whole, suffered both an economic and social impasse, which was named the decada perdida (the lost decade).

99The productive structure of Latin America demonstrated its weaknesses while attempting to deal with the globalization of its economy and manage the social costs that had to be paid during the 90s, to narrow the gap between national economies deficits and debts contracted during the crisis.

100At the same time, a slow down of immigration to Europe in the 80s and a rise of regional, trans frontier and international migration within the continent was explained as well as the extensive urbanization process. The economic crisis, which emerged soon after the shift from a productivity based model on importation substitution into a liberal and/or free market economy, seemed to benefit from the migration process existing in the Americas ever since the precolonial era.

101The phenomenon of urbanization of the working class and peasants appeared with all its force. The emptying of the countryside in favor of migration to major urban centers, became a mass phenomenon that has still not seemed to stop. Internal migration spread to neighboring countries that seemed to offer more job opportunities. Regarding immigration within the continent, I showed the importance that the United States held as a place of arrival.

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Notas

1 Martin, Phillip, Michael, Teitelbaum, “El espejismo de los trabajadores huésped mexicanos”, Foreign Affairs, 2, 2002, 1, p. 204-220.

2 Centro de Desarrollo de la Organización para la Cooperación y el Desarrollo Económicos, Perspectivas Económicas de América Latina, Paris, Ediciones OCDE, 2009.

3 Inter alia: Clifford, James, Routes: Travel and Translation in the Late Twentieth Century, Harvard, Harvard University Press, 1997; Cohen, Robin, Global Diasporas Global: An introduction, Washington, D.C., University of Washington Press,1997; Gabaccia, Donna, Italy's Many Diasporas, London, UCL, 2000.

4 Pagnotta, Chiara, Attraversando lo stagno: Storie della migrazione ecuadoriana in Europa tra continuità e cambiamento (1997-2007), Roma, CISU, 2010.

5 CEPAL, Transformación productiva con equidad. La tarea prioritaria de América Latina y el Caribe en los años noventa, Santiago de Chile, Publicación de las Naciones Unidas, 1990. La Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe (Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean, CEPAL) is a regional commission of UN that was founded in 1949 and based in Santiago, Chile. The commission came into being shortly after a socio-political analysis think tank about Latino American countries. During Raul Prebisch’s secretariat (1950-1963) the ideological line was centered on the principle that the governments were responsible for directing economic development based on a hacia adentro strategy in order to foster economic and industrial growth. For a detailed synthesis refer to: Scarzanella, Eugenia, “Borghesie nazionali”,, in Carmagnani, Marcello (ed.), Storia dell’America latina, Firenze, La Nuova Italia Editrice, 1979 p. 26-28.

6 French-Davis, Ricardo, Devlin, Robert, “Il debito estero”, in Cuevas, Alberto (ed.), America latina, vol. 3: Le istituzioni, la politica, l'economia, Roma, Edizioni lavoro, 1998, p. 28-71.

7 ISI model was based on the creation of a national industry with the purpose of subsidizing imports, enforced by high custom duties that unabled foreign industries to be competitive.

8 Nominal Exchange rates determined a overvaluation of Latino American currencies compared to the US dollar

9 Since then, the US dollar lost its intrinsic value – the same occurred to all the other currencies- and it depended on its stock exchange

10 Dabène, Olivier, L’Amérique latine à l’époque contemporaine, Paris, Armand Colin, 2006, p. 192. LIBOR is used to calculate the debt interest rate

11 Jedlicki, Claudio, "De l’affectation de l’importation d’épargne étranger dans le cas des grands débiteurs de l’Amérique Latine", Economie Appliquée, XLI, 1988, 4, p. 875-901.

12 Stiglitz, Joseph, "Le cap des réformes. Vers un nouveau programme pour l’Amérique latine", Revista de la CEPAL, 2005, p. 35-70.

13 Dabène, Olivier, L’Amérique latine à l’époque contemporaine, op. cit., p. 192

14 CEPAL, Transformación productiva con equidad, op. cit.

15 Devlin, Robert, “Le privatizzazioni̕”, in Cuevas, Alberto (ed.), America Latina vol. 3: Le istituzioni, la politica, l'economia, Roma, Edizioni lavoro, 1998, p. 414-465

16 Boisard, Stèphane, “Le général et le néo-libéralisme des Chicago Boys: les deux piliers de la dictature chilienne”, L’Ordinaire latinoaméricain, 193, 2003, p. 43-54.

17 Cit. in Rouquié, Alain, Amérique latine: Introduction à l’Extrême-Occident, Paris, Seuil, 1987.

18 Frenkel, Roberto, “Mondialisation et crises financières en Amérique latine̕”, Revista de la CEPAL, 2005, p. 11-126

19 Started in Thailand and rapidly diffused all over the Far East

20 Ocampo, José Antonio (ed.), Une décennie de développement social an Amérique latine. 1990-1999, Santiago du Chili, CEPAL-IHEAL, 2004.

21 Frenkel, Roberto, "Mondialisation et crises financières en Amérique latine", op. cit.

22 Stiglitz, Joseph, Les cap des reformes, op. cit.

23 Ocampo, José Antonio et al (eds.), Une décennie de développement social an Amérique latine, op. cit.

24 Ibid.

25 Klein, Emilio, Tokman, Victor, "La stratification sociale à l’épreuve de la mondialisation", Revista de la CEPAL, 2005, p. 87-110.

26 Ocampo, José Antonio et al (eds.), Une décennie de développement social an Amérique latine, op. cit.

27 Lochore, Renel Anson, From Europe to New Zealan, Wellington, Reed, 1951; McDonald, John, McDonald, Leatrice “Chain Migration, Etnich Neighborhood Formation and Social Networks”, The Milbank Memorial Fund Quarterly, XLII, 1964, 1, p. 82-96.

28 Between 1850 and 1930 approximately 14 million migrants settled in Latin America

29 Centro Latinoamericano y Caribeño de Demografía (CELADE) – División de Población de la CEPAL, Cuatro temas centrales en torno a la migración internacional, derechos humanos y desarrollo, Santiago de Chile, Publicación de las Naciones Unidas, 2006, p. 73.

30 CEPAL, Migración internacional, derechos humanos y desarrollo en América latina y el Caribe, Montevideo, CEPAL, 2006.

31 Carmagnani, Marcello, L’altro Occidente: L’America Latina dall’invasione europea al nuovo millennio, Torino, Einaudi, 2003, pp. 272-3.

32 Castells, Manuel, La Cuestión urbana, Siglo XXI, México, 1974, p. 49

33 See Quijano, Aníbal, “Dependencia, cambio social y urbanización en América Latina”, in Cardoso, Fernando, América Latina: Ensayos de interpretaciónón sociologico-politica, Santiago del Chile, Editorial Universitaria, 1970, pp. 96-140; Castells, Manuel, la Cuestión urbana, op. cit., p. 49

34 See Quijano, Aníbal, “Dependencia, cambio social y urbanización en Latino-América”, op. cit.

35 See i.e. for Peru: Meneses Rivas, Max, La utopia urbana: El Movimiento de Pobladores en el Perú, Lima, Editorial Brandon Enterprises, 1998.

36 Between 1950 and 1968 they were called barriadas o barrios populares, between 1969 and 1980 they were called pueblos jovénes, and from 1980 onward were called asientamentos humanos marginales, or asientamentos humanos.

37 Marginality concept is an ambiguous one and difficult to be defined. On this point see Num, José, Murmis, Miguel, Marín, Juan Carlos, La marginalidad en América latina, Buenos Aires, Instituto Torcuato di Terra, 1968; Manuel, Castells, La Cuestión urbana, op. cit. One should take into account that marginal population cannot be meant as urban sub proletarian population even if these two categories often coincide. Sometimes for example low-middle class population that cannot afford central town housing costs live in suburbia and at the same time not all poor population live in shanty towns.

38 See also Castelles, Manuel, La Cuestión urbana, op. cit., p. 49

39 Naciones Unidas, Comisión Económica para América latina y el Caribe (CEPAL), Centro de las Naciones Unidad para los asentamientos humanos (Hábitat), De la urbanización acelerada a la consolidación de los asentamientos humanos en América latina y el Caribe: El espacio regional, Santiago de Chile, CEPAL, 2000, p. 21.

40 Quoted. in Davis, Mike, Il pianeta degli slum, Milano, Feltrinelli, 2006, p. 28

41 Naciones Unidas, Comisión Económica para América latina y el Caribe (CEPAL), Centro de las Naciones Unidad para los asentamientos humanos (Hábitat), De la urbanización acelerada a la consolidación de los asentamientos humanos en América latina y el Caribe: El espacio regional, op. cit., p. 9.

42 Naciones Unidas, Comisión Económica para América latina y el Caribe (CEPAL), Centro de las Naciones Unidad para los asentamientos humanos (Hábitat), De la urbanización acelerada a la consolidación de los asentamientos humanos en América latina y el Caribe, op. cit., p. 10.

43 Mike Davis, Il pianeta degli slum, op. cit.

44 Naciones Unidas, Comisión Económica para América latina y el Caribe (CEPAL), Centro de las Naciones Unidad para los asentamientos humanos (Hábitat), De la urbanización acelerada a la consolidación de los asentamientos humanos en América latina y el Caribe, op. cit.

45 CEPAL, “Latin America: urban and rural population and share of urban population by country̕̕”, Boletín Demográfico América Latina: Proyecciones de Población Urbana y Rural. 1970-2025, 76, 2005, p.29.

46 Sassen, Saskia, The global city: New York, London, Tokio, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1991.

47 Sassen, Saskia, The mobility of labor and capital: A study of international investment and labor flow, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1988; Petrillo, Agostino, Villaggi, città, megalopolis, Carocci, Roma, 2006.

48 Caldeira Pires do Rio, Teresa, Cidade de Muros: crime, segregação e cidadania em São Paulo, São Paulo, Edsup, 2000; Davis, Mike, City of Quartz, Excavating the Future in Los Angeles, London, Vintage, 1990; McKenzie, Evan, Privatopia: Homeowner Associations and the Rise of Residential Private Government, New Haven, -London, Yale University Press, 1994.

49 Naciones Unidas, Comisión Económica para América latina y el Caribe (CEPAL), Centro de las Naciones Unidad para los asentamientos humanos (Hábitat), De la urbanización acelerada a la consolidación de los asentamientos humanos en América latina y el Caribe, op. cit., p. 15.

50 Cosio Zavala, Maria Eugenia (ed.), "Dossier: Changements démographiques en Amérique latine̕", Cahiers des Amériques latines, 22, 1996, 2.

51 The maquilladoras were US-owned assembly plants (the majority) which used low cost and tax-exempt local labor because the products would not be marketed in Mexico, but around the rest of the world. They were located in some border cities (Tijuana, Ciudad Juarez), and were built in 1964, with the end of the 'Agreements braceros "(see next paragraph) when a large mass of workers in the border areas found themselves unemployed.

52 Pellegrino, Adele, Migrantes latinoamericanos: síntesis histórica y tendencias recientes, Montevideo, Universidad de la República/Centro Latinoamericano y Caribeño de Demografía (CELADE) de la Comisión Económica para América Latina y el Caribe (CEPAL), 2000.

53 Pellegrino, Adele, La migración internacional en América Latina y el Caribe: tendencias y perfiles de los Migrantes, Santiago de Chile, Centro Latinoamericano y Caribeño de Demografías – Naciones Unidas (CELADE-UN) - Banco Interamericano de Desarrollo (BID), 2003.

54 Villa, Miguel, Martínez Pizarro, Jorge, “Tendencias y patrones de la migración internacional en América Latina y el Caribe”, Notas de Población-Revista de la CEPAL, XXI, 2000, 73, p. 51-100, available at http://www.cepal.cl/publicaciones/xml/2/8852/lcg2124P_2.pdf

55 Ibid.

56 CEPAL, Un examen de la migración internacional en la comunidad andina basados en datos censales, Santiago de Chile, CEPAL, 1999. For more information on this topic see the web-site of CEPAL (Comisión Economica Para América Latina y el Caribe) available at: www.eclac.cl/celade/

57 Martínez, Jorge, “El mapa migratorio de América Latina y el Caribe, las mujeres y el género”, CEPAL-Serie Población y Desarrollo, 44, 2003.

58 Centro Latinoamericano y Caribeño de Demografía (CELADE) – División de Población de la CEPAL, Cuatro temas centrales en torno a la migración internacional, derechos humanos y desarrollo, Santiago de Chile, CEPAL, 2006, p. 82

59 Belbueno, Palacios Patricia, “Feminización de las migraciones: del espacio reproductivo nacional a lo reproductivo internacional”, Aportes andino, 7, 2003, available at http://www.uasb.edu.ec/padh/centro/pdfs7/Patricia%20Balbuena.pdf

60 González Alvarado, Iván, Sánchez, Hilda, Migraciones en América Latina y el Caribe: la visión desde la CIOSL/ORIT, available at www.ilo.org/public/spanish/dialogue/actrav/publ/129/19.pdf p. 3-5.

61 CEPAL, Migración internacional, derechos humanos y desarrollo en América latina y el Caribe, Montevideo, CEPAL, 2006.

62 Martínez, Jorge, El mapa migratorio de América Latina y el Caribe, las mujeres y el género, op. cit.

63 CEPAL, Migración internacional, derechos humanos y desarrollo en América latina y el Caribe, op. cit.

64 Herrera, Gioconda (ed.), Andinamigrante- Boletín del Sistema sobre Información de Migraciones andinas, 1, 2008. The projet “Sistema de Información sobre Migraciones Andinas – SIMA” is part of the program on Sociology of FLACSO-Ecuador: http://www.flacsoandes.org/web/sima.htmliones

65 Many studies have dealt with neighboring migration to Argentina. For an overall picture refer to: Novick, Susana, Migración y Políticas en Argentina: Tres Leyes para un país extenso, in Novick, Susana (ed.), Las migraciones en América Latina, Buenos Aires, Catálogos, 2008, p. 131-152.

66 US Immigration and Naturalization Service, quoted in Castles, Stephen, Miller, Mark, La era de la migración: Movimientos internacionales de población en el mundo moderno, México, Miguel Ángel Porrua, UAZ, Cámara de Diputados LIX Legislatura, Fundación Colosio, Secretaría de Gobernación, Instituto Nacional de Migración, 2004, p. 115.

67 In 1848 the Guadalupe-Hidalgo treaty shifted Texas, Arizona, New México, Wyoming and some parts of California, Colorado and Nevada from Mexico to the USA.

68 Durand, Jorge, Migration mexicaine aux États-Unis, Paris, CNRS, 1996.

69 Ibid.

70 Bracero literally means working hands in English can be translated as worker. Braceros were largely used to augment the labor force in agriculture and when necessary also in heavy industries and infrastructure realization programs..

71 Durand, Jorge, “¿Un acuerdo bilateral o un acuerdo obrero padronal?”, in Durand Jorge (ed), Braceros. Las miradas mexicana y estadounidense, México, Miguel Ángel Porrua, UAZ, Senado de la República LX Legislatura, 2007, pp. 11-30.

72 Ibid.

73 Jorge Durand, Migration mexicaine aux États-Unis, op. cit.

74 Castles, Stephen, Miller, Mark, La era de la migración: Movimientos internacionales de población en el mundo moderno, p. 115.

75 Villa, Miguel, Martínez Pizarro, Jorge, Tendencias y patrones de la migración internacional en América Latina y el Caribe.

76 Loudes Arizpe, Culturas en movimiento, interactividad cultural y proceso globales, México, Universidad Autónoma de México, 2006.

77 Translated wetened, illegal migrants that have crossed Rio Bravo.

78 Centro Latinoamericano y Caribeño de Demografía (CELADE) – División de Población de la CEPAL, Cuatro temas centrales en torno a la migración internacional, derechos humanos y desarrollo, op. cit.

79 Massey, Douglas, Durand, Jorge, Malone, Nolane, Beyond Smoke and Mirrors: Mexican Immigration in an Era of Economic Integration, New York, Russell Sage Foundation, 2002.

80 Centro Latinoamericano y Caribeño de Demografía (CELADE) – División de Población de la CEPAL, Cuatro temas centrales en torno a la migración internacional, derechos humanos y desarrollo, op. cit.

81 United States Census Bureau available at: : http://www.census.gov/population/www/socdemo/hispanic/hispanic_pop_presentation.html

82 The Chicano movement appeared during the 70s. Established by immigrant descendants, it strives to maintain ethnic identity against assimilation in American society. It claims direct ancestry from Aztlan the legendary Atzeque reign extended up to the actual USA territories. The movement is socially transversal and all different social classes are represented from students to workers. Its primary issues are for the right to bilingual education and traditional language preservation.

83 Acosta, Yesenia, de la Cruz Patricia, “The Foreign Born From Latin America and the Caribbean: 2010. American Community Survey Briefs”, United States Census Bureau (2011) available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2011pubs/acsbr10-15.pdf

84 To the detriment of geographical reasons, the U.S. Census of 2010 included Mexico among the Central American States.

85 United States Census Bureau http://www.census.gov/prod/2011pubs/acsbr10-15.pdf

86 Centro Latinoamericano y Caribeño de Demografía (CELADE) – División de Población de la CEPAL, Cuatro temas centrales en torno a la migración internacional, derechos humanos y desarrollo, op. cit., p. 99-100.

87 Duany, Jorge, "La nation dans la diaspora : las multiples répercussions de l’émigration portoricaine aux États-Unis", L’ordinaire Latino-américain, 208-209, 2007/2008, p. 63-92, p. 63.

88 Finalized enrollment during the First World War. Puerto Rico enjoyed the status of Associated Free State.

89 Portes, Alejandro, “From South of the Border: Hispanic Minorities in the United States”, in McLaughlin, Yans (ed.), Immigration Reconsidered: History, sociology and politics, New York, Oxford University Press, 1990, p. 160-184.

90 Le Texier, Emmanuelle, "Latinos aux Etats-Unis : des citoyens « transfrontières » ?", L’ordinaire Latino-américain, 208-209, 2007/2008, p. 11-44.

91 Portes, Alejandro, From South of the Border, op. cit.

92 Grasmuck, Sherry, Pessar, Patricia, Between Two Islands: Dominican International Migration, Berkley-Oxford, University of California Press, 1991.

93 Colectivo IOE, Inmigrantes, trabajadores, ciudadanos: Una visión de las migraciones desde España, Valencia, Universitat de Valencia, 1999; Decimo, Francesca, Quando emigrano le donne: Percorsi e reti femminili della mobilità transnazionale, Bologna, Il Mulino, 2006; Herrera, Gioconda, Carrillo, María Cristina, Torres, Alicia, La migración ecuatoriana: Transnacionalismo, redes, identidades, Quito, FLACSO, 2005; Kofman, Eleonor, Phizacklea, Annie, Raghuram, Parvati, Sales, Rosemary, Gender and international migration in Europe, London, Rutledge, 2000; Lagomarsino, Francesca, Esodi ed approdi di genere: Famiglie transnazionali e nuove migrazioni dall'Ecuador, Milano, ISMU, 2006; Pagnotta, Chiara, Attraversando lo stagno: Storie della migrazione ecuadoriana in Europa tra continuità e cambiamento (1997-2007), Roma, CISU, 2010; Pedone, Claudia, Estrategias migratorias y poder: Tú siempre jalas a los tuyos, Quito, Abya Yala, 2006; Yépez del Castillo, Isabel, Herrera, Gioconda (eds.), Nuevas migraciones latinoamericanas a Europa: Balances y desafíos, Quito, FLACSO Ecuador – OBREAL - Universidad Católica de Lovaina - Universitat de Barcelona, 2007.

94 Castles, Stephen, Miller, Mark, La era de la migración. Movimientos internacionales de población en el mundo moderno.

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Referencia electrónica

Chiara Pagnotta, « Latin American migration within the continent between 1980 and 2000: a historical perspective », Nuevo Mundo Mundos Nuevos [En línea], Cuestiones del tiempo presente, Puesto en línea el 10 septiembre 2014, consultado el 25 febrero 2020. URL : http://journals.openedition.org/nuevomundo/67174 ; DOI : https://doi.org/10.4000/nuevomundo.67174

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Autor

Chiara Pagnotta

Collaborating professor of the Programa de Pós Graduação em História - Universidade do Estado da Santa Catarina (PPGH-UDESC), Brasil.
President of International Association AREIA (2013-2015).
cpagnotta@gmail.com

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