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Scientific Republics – Knowledge, engineering, society and state building in Latin America 1790–1870 – Coord. Annick Lempérière
Natalia Sobrevilla Perea

Artillery, engineering and mathematics: statecraft and the scientific knowledge of military men, from the Bourbons to the creation of the Peruvian State (1770-1840)

Artillerie, ingénierie et mathématiques : l’art de gouverner et la connaissance sciencifico-militaire, des Bourbons à la création de l’État péruvien (1770-1840)
Artillería, ingeniería y matemáticas: el arte de gobernar y el conocimiento científico militar, desde los Borbones a la creación del Estado Peruano (1770-1840)
[11/06/2019]

Résumés

La guerre et sa préparation ont souvent conduit à des développements technologiques. Cet article interroge l’interaction entre science et gouvernement, et montre comment, dans les dernières décennies de la période coloniale, les ingénieurs formés dans les académies militaires de la Péninsule ont joué un rôle crucial dans la création et la diffusion de connaissance dans les Amériques. Il porte donc son attention sur la manière dont la connaissance scientifique des militaires était utilisée pendant les guerres d’indépendance et il conclut en se demandant comment les républiques indépendantes nouvellement établies se sont voulues les émules de leurs prédécesseurs bourboniens dans leur usage de la science et de la technologie, mais ont rencontré des difficultés en raison de la rareté de personnel bien formé.

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Texte intégral

I would like to thank José Ignacio López Soria and José Ragas for their help accessing material for this article, as well as the detailed comments provided by Annick Lempérière.

Introduction

  • 1 James C. Scott, Seeing like a State, How certain Schemes to improve the Human Condition have failed (...)
  • 2 Martine Galland-Seguela, “Las condiciones materiales de la vida privada de los ingenieros militares (...)
  • 3 Academies were limited to training officers in artillery, engineering and mathematics and thus crea (...)

1Imbued by the ideas of the enlightenment, Bourbon modernisers understood that for government to be effective it needed to be underpinned by knowledge. They were following what James C. Scott has described as the process of “rationalising and standardising what was a social hieroglyph into a legible and administratively more convenient format.”1 The new administrators considered that territory could only be controlled and defended by gathering and deploying expertise. In this context the study of engineering and mathematics thrived because of its links to improvements in the use of artillery and construction.2 Disciplines that aided the defence of territory, such as cartography and architecture, especially with reference to fortification, were also considered central.3 Several viceroys and senior administrators who played an important role in governing the American territories in this period, were trained as military engineers, and it was precisely, men like this, who were placed in the positions to react to the challenge posed by the monarchical crisis of 1808. Military engineers led the defence of the crown and confronted those seeking independence in America, but in spite of their superior training, these men were ultimately defeated. Following on this experience, the newly independent governments, set upon the demise of the Hispanic Monarchy, attempted to use scientific knowledge to establish the state structures they sought to establish emulating the Bourbons. They were, however, hampered in their efforts by the lack of trained personnel.

  • 4 For an assessment of the Reforms, including the military one see Adrian Pearce, The Origins of the (...)
  • 5 On the Viceroy that took control see Víctor Peralta Ruiz, “El Virrey Abascal y el Espacio de Poder (...)

2In the first section of this article I look at the way in which the training of military engineers developed in Spain during the Bourbon period, and how these men were deployed to the American viceroyalties where their knowledge of artillery, mathematics, cartography, and architecture, amongst others disciplines, was employed in an attempt to improve governance. The crown sought to consolidate its control by gaining a better understanding of the places where it attempted to exercise power. In the late eighteenth century, these academy trained engineers oversaw the drive to create a more militarised society by establishing militias, brought on by the Bourbon Reforms.4 It was men with this training who held positions of power in Peru when the monarchical crisis of 1808 erupted and who were tasked to take the lead when the wars of independence broke out in the Americas.5 It was in this context that the military trained engineers, who had rolled out the Bourbon reforms at a time of peace, utilised many of the skills they had honed in the academy.

  • 6 On Pezuela see Natalia Sobrevilla Perea, “Introducción crítica al Compendio de los sucesos ocurrido (...)

3The second section of this study focuses on the cases of Joaquín de la Pezuela and Francisco Xavier de Mendizábal, two trained engineers who came to South America at the very beginning of the nineteenth century to work in the construction of important commissions such as the gunpowder factory in Lima, and the fort of San Carlos of Pisco.6 In times of peace both used their military scientific knowledge to ensure the crown was better able to control the territory, and during war they played a crucial role in attempting to use their training as engineers in the defence of the crown. Pezuela rose in the ranks to command the loyalist armies in the southern Andes, while Mendizábal accompanied him as a cartographer and recorded the main battles in maps and sketches. In spite of the effective way in which they took advantage of the scientific knowledge acquired in the academy and honed during peace and at the battlefield, and which was far superior to the one their enemies possessed, they were unable to obtain victory.

4The concluding part looks at how a younger generation of men, who had learned their skills in the battlefield, took over the offices of state after independence. Although they lacked the preparation brought by the officers who had studied in the peninsula, such as Pezuela and Mendizábal, they had plenty of practical experience acquired on the field. Just as scientific knowledge was not enough to succeed in war, and did not make the difference between success and failure, it was not possible for the new independent governments to emulate their Bourbon predecessors because they did not have enough academy-trained experts to take over key roles.

The military scientific knowledge in the Bourbon period

  • 7 Armando Alberola Romá and Jesus Pradells Nadal, “Un Cuerpo de Élite en el Ejército de la España del (...)
  • 8 Andújar Castillo, “La educación de los militares en España”, p. 35.
  • 9 Antonio La Fuente and José Luis Peset, “Las Academias Militares y la inversión en ciencia en la Esp (...)
  • 10 Pedro Luengo, “Military Engineering in Eighteenth-Century Havana and Manila: The Experience of the (...)

5The Bourbon military reforms sought to establish a more technical approach to the military, and imbued with the enlightened passion for knowledge they sought to garner it for practical purposes.7 This was part of a wider current of thought, which privileged the development of sciences considered auxiliary to the military. Among them was the artillery, which was heavily dependent on engineering and mathematics.8 Education at the newly established military academies of the Bourbon era brought these areas of study to the centre of training.9 Technology and its proper use was considered to be extremely important, as the emphasis was on defence and the building of fortifications was considered especially relevant.10 This was done in tandem with the development of an organised militia, creating a cadre of extremely trained military engineers to work alongside other officers who led an increasingly militarised society. This interest in technical expertise was complemented by the notion that all men should participate in defence of the viceroyalty.

  • 11 José Ignacio López Soria, “Relaciones entre la ingeniería militar y la ingeniería civil en el Perú (...)
  • 12 José Ragas, “El discreto encanto de la milicia. Ejército y Sociedad en el Perú Borbónico” in Joseph (...)
  • 13 Gonzalez de Leon, Fernando. (1997). "Doctors of the Military Discipline": Technical Expertise and t (...)
  • 14 Alonso Muñoz Cosme, “Drawing Instruments, Engineering Methods and Representation Systems in Sixteen (...)

6José Ignacio López Soria has pointed out that the importance of military engineering had been recognised much earlier than the Bourbons, at least since the reign of Felipe II.11 As José Ragas has shown, in 1614, Pantero Pantera published in Lima a text explaining “artillerymen had to know arithmetic”.12 The experience of war had been part of the colonial project from the very beginning of the Hispanic Monarchy, even going back to the Reconquista, and this grew in importance in the years of conflict in Flanders when most texts on military thought in Europe were published in Spain and the Spanish Low Countries.13 In fact, science had been linked to the art of war and military knowledge since the beginning of the expansion of the Hispanic Monarchy.14 But with the arrival of the Bourbons military knowledge was no longer limited to the protection of territory becoming a central instrument for government, moving away from just being important for military matters, and becoming the basis from which to develop ideas of statecraft.

  • 15 Gloria A. Franco Rubio, “Militares ilustrados y practicas de sociabilidad” in Revista de Historia M (...)
  • 16 Cámara Muñoz, ed., Los ingenieros militares de la monarquía hispánica
  • 17 Franco Rubio, “Militares ilustrados y practicas de sociabilidad”, p. 45-56.
  • 18 For more details on the career of Jorge Próspero de Verboom (1665-1744) see López Soria, “Relacione (...)

7The Bourbon reforms reached their apogee under the reign of Carlos III, and it was then that the study of war was transformed from being an art to a science.15 Rationalism and the enlightened thought underpinned these ideas. So practical concerns such as defence and fortification were based on modern notions of science and technology. From the beginning of the eighteenth century, building plans were based on the knowledge of engineering and mathematics.16 This was the case with the construction of new forts and castles to complement those that dated from the reign of Felipe II. The sixteenth century fortifications were modernised, reformed and reconstructed, as new thought was given to naval defence, that combined heavily protected points and a large territory defended by militias. Military engineers, however, were not limited to the construction of fortifications, they also built roads, drainage systems and dominated civil architecture, in fact they increased their participation in all areas of expertise, particularly in learned societies.17 In 1711, Felipe V created the Military Engineer Corps under the command of the Marquis of Verboom. Nearly a decade later, in 1720, this Flemish engineer established in Barcelona the “Royal Academy of Military fortifications”.18

  • 19 López Soria, “Relaciones entre la ingeniería militar y la ingeniería civil”, p. 273.
  • 20 Ann Twinam has noted that in the Council of Indies the reforms resulted in it being “more competent (...)

8Verboom had studied in Brussels, from where he brought the programme he implemented in Barcelona. It consisted of a four-year degree of incremental difficulty. The first year began with the basics of arithmetic, practical geometry, and trigonometry. It was followed by a second dedicated to artillery, fortifications, the attack and defence of positions, tactics and the movement of armies. Third-year students learned mechanics, hydraulics, construction and civil architecture. In the final year, studies included drawing, civil and military building projects, and cartography. These were enriched with lessons on the regulation of actual works, project development and budgeting.19 Every year these subjects were complemented with studies of geography and cartography that increased yearly in complexity. The military engineers who played a central role in Bourbon reform project were trained in these schools and therefore had a high level of technical knowledge. A detailed understanding of science was considered to be crucial to the kind of modern government the Bourbons aimed to take to their overseas empire, so they could improve the way their colonial dependencies were run.20 At the same time, these moves helped develop science in viceroyalties such as Peru.

  • 21 A detailed description of the whole collection and copies of the military constructions projects he (...)
  • 22 Copies of these images can be found in the article by Rodríguez Camilloni, “Manuel de Amat y Junyen (...)

9Viceroy Manuel Amat y Junyent, who was in Peru between 1761 and 1776, provides an example of how trained military officers were sent to improve colonial administration. Born in Barcelona in 1704, he joined the army when he was eleven years old, to train as an engineer in a military academy. Even though we do not know for certain if this was in the one Verboom founded in 1720, when Amat was only sixteen, this is quite possible. Not only because it was located in the city of his birth, but also because the plans and drawings he produced during his time in Lima show he had received professional training as an engineer with much attention to drawing, as taught in Verboom’s academy.21 The sketches produced by the viceroy combine civil architecture, such as the plans to remodel the palace of the vicereine, and church known as the Navona at the Alameda de los Descalzos, with military projects mainly fortifications along the Pacific. Some of the drawings in his collection, now held in Barcelona, were drawn by him, others by a number of engineers and draughtsmen who worked under his supervision. The collection shows how important architectural creation was for this military-trained viceroy and how the spaces he sought to develop allowed him a place from where to exercise statecraft. In 1767, he sent copies of his drawings to Spain and in 1771 he completed several projects, including the palace, the bullring and the remodelling of the fortress of Real Felipe. The collection in Barcelona also includes a drawing of the military parade in the viceroy’s palace.22 This is particularly relevant as it shows how the public, civil architecture was to be connected to the military practice of parading of the recently created militias.

Figure 1 – Lima, Escenas del Palacio de los Virreyes, 1771, Ms. 400 Biblioteca Central de Cataluña

  • 23 See Puntual relación de las operaciones executadas en la Plaza Mayor de la Ciudad de los Reyes, . . (...)
  • 24 Ramón, “Bourbon manoeuvres in the plaza”, p. 636.
  • 25 This appeared in the Drama de dos palanganas veterano y bisoño, see Ramón, “Bourbon manoeuvres in t (...)

10Only a couple of years after preparing this drawing, a very special parade took place when the viceroy received the Order of Saint Genaro in 1773. A simulacrum was organised in the city’s main plaza where soldiers captured the fountain that had been turned into a double crowned fortified building for the occasion.23 According to contemporary reports the troops remained in the market square for three months disrupting the normal flow of activity to such extent that one of the vendors asked for a discount of his rent.24 Large part of the criticism was in the way in which the new viceroy wanted to change the character of the urban space militarising the area where the market had taken place for a very long time and turning it into a Plaza de Armas transforming it from a civilian to a military space. Members of the elite feared the training that took place every Sunday because many of the militia members who were learning to parade and handle firearms, were blacks, mulattoes and Indians, all considered to be dangerous.25

  • 26 Quoted in Ragas, “El discreto encanto de la milicia”, p. 217.
  • 27 Campbell, The Military and Society, p. 27.
  • 28 I want to thank José Ragas for these details, see Ragas, “El discreto encanto de la milicia”, p. 21 (...)

11The attention Amat paid to this endeavour did not distract him from also ensuring the dissemination of engineering and architectural knowledge in Peru. In 1766, he had the cadets in Callao trained in hydraulics, mechanics, artillery and fortification by attending mathematic classes at Universidad San Marcos.26 Luis Godin, the Frenchman in charge of building military establishments in Peru taught these classes. Godin was one of the skilled foreign specialists brought to cover for the lack of locally trained personnel.27 Some important texts were published in Lima during Amat’s tenure. This was the case of Josef Vásquez’s Treaty of Artillery and Bombardment for the instruction of artillerymen published in 1765 in the Gaceta de Lima. Pedro Antonio Bracho Bustamante, sergeant major in the Artillery Brigade of the Company of Grenadiers and later commander of the Artillery Company at Callao was in charge of making this possible.28 So even as a militia that trained only on Sundays was created, resources and effort were still provided to the training of officers with technical knowledge of engineering. The idea was clearly to establish a separation between trained officers, who had knowledge of science and were in charge of leading the militias.

  • 29 For more details on this period see Campbell, The Military and Society. For a recent study of the u (...)
  • 30 These reductions can be clearly seen in the Guia de Forasteros, Lima: Imprenta de los Niños Expósit (...)
  • 31 Ramón, “Bourbon manoeuvres in the plaza”, p. 638.

12The viceroys that came after Amat also came from the military, but as they were not engineers or architects they did not devote as much time or effort to construction as their predecessor had. During the reign of Carlos III, the development of militias continued which was of crucial importance during the period in administration of Manuel de Guirior, the Navy officer from Navarre who was in charge of defending the viceroyalty during the Tupac Amaru uprising in 1780.29 He was replaced by Agustín de Jauregui, an experienced military officer also from Navarre who took charge of the Indian rebellion. When it was nearly under control he ceded his position to Teodoro de Croix, a Flemish noble with much experience in colonial and Indian wars in New Spain, who oversaw the continued efforts to organise the militia. In contrast to Amat, the aim was no longer to have as many members as possible, but to have more and better control over the men.30 Croix also devoted his attention to improving fortifications along the coast, and reorganising the neighbourhoods of Lima.31 The main aim was to control the public space, discipline men and provide training to those in charge of leading the militias.

  • 32 Tim Fanning, Paisanos: The Irish and the Liberation of Latin America, Notre Dame: Indiana, 2018, ch (...)
  • 33 Ramón, “Bourbon manoeuvres in the plaza”, p. 640-41.
  • 34 On the colonial militias see Natalia Sobrevilla Perea, “Colored by the past. The Birth of the Armed (...)
  • 35 Ramón, “Bourbon manoeuvres in the plaza”, p. 641-42.

13This interest in the development of militias continued during the reign of Carlos IV with viceroys Francisco Gil de Taboada y Lemos, a naval officer from Galicia, and Irish-born trader turned draughtsman Ambrose O’Higgings.32 He had started his career late and proved his ability as Governor of Chile, where he dedicated his efforts to road construction and building drainage systems to reduce flooding. In Lima he attempted to move the market to smaller plazas and leave the central one just for military manoeuvres, but failed due to the opposition of the city council.33 The militarisation of the Peruvian viceroyalty reached its apogee between 1801 and 1806, under the stewardship of his replacement, Gabriel de Aviles.34 A Catalan noble who had joined the cavalry at the age of 17, he had a long and distinguished career in America, having combatted against Tupac Amaru, the Araucanians and gained governing expertise as governor of Chile and viceroy of the Rio de la Plata. It was he who finally managed to move the market away from the main plaza and ensure its use was changed to a Plaza de Armas, which was cleaned and repaved in 1804.35

  • 36 López Soria, “Relaciones entre la ingeniería militar y la ingeniería civil”, Fp. 275-276.

14Aviles worked tirelessly on military reform, particularly in supervising the training of militias and in ensuring the viceroyalty had the appropriate number of professional personnel. This coincided with the creation of two very important corps under the aegis of royal favourite Manuel Godoy. In 1801, the “Royal Engineer Corps of Spain and the Indies” and a year later, the Corps of “Sappers and Miners” (Zapadores y Minadores) in Alcalá de Henares. By 1805 the military engineers had been reorganised and were recognised as fully-fledged members of army, with all the same rights.36 Under the stewardship of Aviles, the Bourbon modernisation project of building and defence continued. Two military engineers who played a crucial role in the final years of the monarchy and in the wars of independence arrived in Peru in this period, Francisco Xavier Mendizábal and Joaquin de la Pezuela. The former in 1793 to build the Fort of San Carlos in Pisco and the latter in 1804 to build a gunpowder factory in Lima.

The last Bourbon military engineers in Peru

  • 37 López Soria, “Relaciones entre la ingeniería militar y la ingeniería civil”, p. 274.

15As López Soria has shown, in the second half of the eighteenth century, military engineers revitalised many areas of knowledge and science and used them in an attempt to consolidate their control. This continued into the nineteenth century, when many Bourbon era engineers came of age, as was the case with Pezuela and Mendizábal who like other trained military engineers were sent to the American territories to put this knowledge into practice and support the Bourbon statecraft project. Upon their arrival they worked building fortifications, on urbanism projects, cartography, civil architecture, geodetic surveys, public works, including roads, watering canals, and shipping canals as well as ports. Military engineers were also in charge of constructing prominent buildings such as customs houses, mint houses, governor palaces, jailhouses, hospitals, cathedrals, and churches amongst others.37 Mendizábal and Pezuela intervened in some of these areas and both wrote detailed reports to accompany their constructions.

  • 38 For more biographical details see, Natalia Sobrevilla Perea, “Introducción crítica al Compendio de (...)
  • 39 Joaquín de la Pezuela, Descripción de la Fabrica de Pólvora de Lima, dated 1811, Manuscript held at (...)

16Born in 1761, Joaquín de la Pezuela was an accomplished artilleryman and nobleman from Cantabria who arrived in Peru with a background very similar to Amat’s. Trained in the Military Academy in Segovia he had served at the siege of Gibraltar between 1779 and 1783.38 He directed the building of the Lima gunpowder factory in 1806 and a couple of years after it opened its success was such, that its product was exported from Lima to the Peninsula during the Spanish war against the French. According to his report detailing the whole process of construction, the building followed the 1802 Ordenanzas and all the most up-to-date knowledge of gunpowder production available.39 The text is accompanied by detailed drawings and sketches of the machinery specially built under Pezuela’s supervision. It also provides details on how to work the machines, and prepare gunpowder, starting with where to procure the supplies of sulphates and nitrates, and how to mix them to achieve the best possible results.

Figure 2 – Pezuela, Descripción de la Fabrica de Pólvora de Lima, 1811

17Pezuela’s volume shows that he did not just dedicate his effort to the design, construction and organisation of the factory, but that he also spent some time preparing a detailed illustrated report to accompany his creation. He begins by noting how there had previously been another factory, but that it was of no use and that it was important to learn from this failed experience. The report pays much attention to the supply of water, which is crucial in a desert area such as Lima, and is the reason why a water tank and a canal were built. Amongst the most interesting elements in Pezuela’s manuscript are the sketches and illustrations that accompany it.

Figure 3 – Pezuela, Descripción de la Fabrica de Pólvora de Lima, 1811

18The report on the construction process with its instructions on how to make the gunpowder, showed off the finished product while at the same time was helpful to those who would use it in the future. There are illustrations of all the machines used in the process and an explanation of how to use each one of them. Reports, such as this elegant one produced by Pezuela, as well as the ones Amat had sent to Spain, several decades before, are an example of the role trained engineers played in the Bourbon state-building project. Both Amat’s illustrations and Pezuela’s report on the gunpowder factory were manuscripts, clearly not for mass consumption, but primarily intended to be used by other experts.

  • 40 For biographical detail see, Ramón Gutiérrez, "Francisco Xavier Mendizábal. El último ingeniero esp (...)
  • 41 Gutiérrez, "Francisco Xavier Mendizábal, p. 5.

19Francisco Xavier Mendizábal was slightly younger than Pezuela, and arrived in Peru some years before. A Basque born in San Sebastián in 1765, he had enrolled as a cadet in Cantabria when he was only 16. By 1787, at the age of 22, he was appointed to the post of assistant engineer. Mendizábal had studied at the Royal Academy of Mathematics in Barcelona, completing his training in fortification and architecture.40 In 1793 he was sent to Peru and was mainly engaged in military edification. He was in charge of building the fortress of San Carlos in Pisco, which was finished in 1807.41 Mendizábal was then entrusted with strengthening Lima’s walls. Later he went to work in the mines of Huantajaya and Tarapacá to study if there was a way to provide them with water. In 1809 he was appointed Intendant of the Villa de Huancavelica, the main centre for the production of mercury. Mendizábal remained in this post until 1811 when he returned to Lima to work in strengthening the walls of the Castles of the Real Felipe at Callao. Similarly to Pezuela he had been tasked with completing important works that made the best possible use of his abilities as an engineer.

  • 42 Francisco Javier Mendizábal Guerra de la América del Sur. 1809-1824. Buenos Aires: Academia Naciona (...)

20Mendizábal was also a highly qualified cartographer and illustrator, as is evident in the work he produced when describing the mining regions near the port of Iquique where he travelled to ascertain whether it was possible to provide them with water. Mendizábal therefore combined his activities as military engineer with those of a civilian nature. The areas in which he was most proficient were cartography and drawing as can be seen from the many maps, sketches and illustrations he made kept at the National Collection in Madrid.42

Figure 4 – In Jorge Hidalgo Lehuedé Historia Andina de Chile, p. 355.

  • 43 Francisco Xavier Mendizábal and Manuel Miguel de León, “Plano topográfico de las inmediaciones de l (...)
  • 44 Gutiérrez, "Francisco Xavier Mendizábal, p. 8.

21His cartographical abilities were also evident in the plans he produced in April 1807 to accompany the “Military Description of the area included in the Topographical plan raised around the city of Lima”.43 As researcher Ramón Gutiérrez has shown, this is an excellent piece of cartography, considering what was produced in this region of South America, which unlike Mexico did not have a developed map making tradition at the time. The plan includes both principal and secondary roads, it details how the rural territory was parcelled, ample information on settlements, as well as nautical and topographic measurements.44 The aim was to prepare Lima’s defence by sea, as the assumption was that Britain was the enemy. British domination of the oceans was reinforced in 1805 after victory at Trafalgar, and in 1806 and 1807 they briefly invaded Montevideo and Buenos Aires. In 1806 they unsuccessfully attempted to disembark at La Guaira, with the support of Venezuelan Francisco de Miranda. It was clear at this time that attention in defence had to be paid to ports, to resist possible British attacks.

  • 45 Campbell, The Military and Society in Colonial Peru, p. 34.

22It was precisely to support this plan of defence that Pezuela and Mendizábal had been sent to Peru, where their initial experience was very similar. They both participated directly in the Bourbon project that sought to increase the defence of its territories by employing trained experts to buttress its governing systems. Mendizábal combined military and civilian projects building fortifications in Pisco and Lima, and providing support to the mining industry, while Pezuela, who arrived later, was only tasked with organising the gunpowder factory, and soon enough was forced to join the war effort. Both had worked with the aim of defending the viceroyalty against their long-standing rival, Britain, who due to Spain’s alliance with Napoleon, posed the greatest threat. The forts built and reinforced by Mendizábal on the Pacific coast, and the procurement of gunpowder without having to depend on it being sent by sea are examples of how most of the attention continued to be paid to the defence of the coast.45

23This changed drastically once the monarchical crisis was set in motion in 1808, with the abdications at Bayonne and the strong reaction against the French invasion of the peninsula. The main consequence was that in Spanish America traditional plans for naval defence against the British, who were now their main allies, had to be rethought. But also because to a very large degree the war that broke up in 1809 and 1810 was fought between different jurisdictions in America, rather than against external enemies. In this region, this meant, at least initially, that the conflict was less about defending ports and more about fighting in the highlands. During the wars of independence, Mendizábal and Pezuela put the ‘military science’ they had learnt in the academy to practical use, the former by drawing maps and preparing the areas where battles were fought and the latter with his knowledge of artillery techniques, and expertise in the use of mobile canon.

  • 46 See, Sobrevilla Perea, “Luchando por ‘la patria’.

24The viceroy of Lima reacted against the first Juntas established in the Audiencia de Charcas by sending an expedition from the city of Cuzco with the aim of finishing with the Junta. José Manuel de Goyeneche, a recently returned creole from Arequipa, organised the local militias into a semblance of an army, similar to the one he had known in the Peninsula. This was the start of a war which in this far-flung region of the Hispanic Monarchy lasted until 1825 when the Wars of Independence finally came to a close.46 Military engineers such as Mendizábal and Pezuela played an important role from 1813 onwards and due to their academic training, left accounts of their activities and experiences. These reports with detailed illustrations, maps and sketches have tended to be overlooked because historiography, both in America and in the Peninsula, has paid very little attention to those who defended the King. The reports, maps and sketches they produced, however, provide us with a chance to understand how they saw the conflict and the way in which they attempted to put into practice the military knowledge they had learnt in the military academies they had attended.

  • 47 Gutiérrez, "Francisco Xavier Mendizábal”, p. 8.

25Mendizábal and Pezuela were called into action after the creoles under Goyeneche were defeated and capitulated after the Battle of Salta in 1812. Although these campaigns were very different to what they had experienced during their first years in Peru, this was what they had trained for it while at the military academy. After the defeat, Abascal sent a contingent of peninsular officers to Upper Peru led by Pezuela and Mendizábal as the main engineer. Ramón Gutierréz has shown that Pezuela had wanted to take volunteer engineer Casimiro Valdés instead, but was forced by the viceroy to take Mendizábal.47 From 1813 onwards Pezuela and Mendizábal worked together in the campaigns against the Junta of Buenos Aires. It was in this context that they had the opportunity to put into practise the many skills they acquired in the military academy and that had not been of use at times of peace.

  • 48 Mendizábal, Guerra de la América del Sur. 1809-1824, p. 27-55.
  • 49 Gutiérrez, "Francisco Xavier Mendizábal”, p. 54.

26Mendizábal showed his expertise as a cartographer by drawing detailed plans of battles, even those he had not personally attended, between 1809 and 1813. He also prepared an in-depth report of the wars including descriptions of the battles of Guaqui, Machaca, Tucumán and Salta; these have been comprehensively published by Ramón Gutiérrez in Buenos Aires in 1997.48 According to the Argentine researcher, the report was based on the officers’ testimonies Mendizábal had heard while attending the War Junta de Guerra organised by Goyeneche in Oruro in March 1813. The Junta then decided to delay the attack of Potosí until Pezuela arrived. Meanwhile steps were taken to strengthen fortification at Oruro.49 It was no coincidence that Mendizábal was an expert in military fortification as these military academy trained peninsular officers sought to put into practice what they had been taught. As a tool to support their campaigns they produced scientific knowledge on the space where the war was taking place.

27Pezuela wrote the Compendio de los sucesos ocurridos en el Ejército del Perú y sus provincias (1813-1816) where he described his experiences in Upper Peru in great detail. This volume allows the reader to understand the ways in which war was waged in these regions and how the men defending the King sought to maintain control in an increasingly difficult environment. Pezuela explains his way of working in the following manner:

  • 50 Pezuela, Compendio, p. 21.

I organised the battle in the afternoon plan calling at my same level Marshal de Camp don Juan Ramírez my second in command; Mayor General Brigadier don Miguel Tacón; and Artillery and Engineer Commanders don Casimiro Valdéz and don Francisco Xavier Mendizábal; as well as all the Line and Light Corps; I informed them all of the time, formation, march road, direction and displays that had to be executed the following day, I gave each of them a paper with a sketch and the position for each corp.50

28The detailed narrative with which he depicts his time there is accompanied by a series of illustrations, maps, and sketches. Although there is no conclusive evidence on whether the maps in Pezuela’s work were done by Mendizábal, it is possible to infer that this was the case by comparing them with those in the collection in Madrid, republished by Gutierrez. Both men had a highly developed aesthetic, which was surely part of their training, they used watercolour expertly and paid much attention to presentation and composition. The maps were produced to make decisions on the position of troops and pieces of artillery, so more than beautiful they were meant to be useful, presenting the movement of the armies in great detail and showing much command of cartography. The maps and illustrations are accompanied by extensive explanations and are part of the apparatus of knowledge produced following the patterns learned in the academy.

  • 51 Mendizábal, Guerra de la América del Sur. 1809-1824, p. 98-99, 108, 119.

29These images, sketches, plans, maps and reports with their undoubted utilitarian raison d’être are proof that these wars were, at this time, in the hands of men who had been trained to work in to sustain a state structure underpinned by the creation of knowledge, but that due to the circumstances they had to use their expertise to try to win the war against those seeking independence. War provided a privileged context from where to extend this technical expertise. And although the training a new generation of men would receive in the field was not as polished as the one imparted at a Military Academy, it was geared towards a practical application of the ‘science of war’. During these campaigns a new generation of artillerymen, engineers and mathematicians were educated in the battlefield. They began as assistants, learning how to make mathematical calculations to fire cannon, they provided measurements for cartographic sketches of all exercises and followed a more traditional pattern of apprenticeship. The result was that while they might have not had the training to produce the same level of scientific knowledge with maps, sketches, illustrations and reports, they gained crucial practical experience and how to relate to the environment in which they were fighting, measure it and understand it.51

  • 52 Gutiérrez, "Francisco Xavier Mendizábal”, p. 19.
  • 53 Natalia Sobrevilla Perea, “From Europe to the Americas and Back: Becoming Los Ayacuchos” European H (...)

30In October 1816, after several years of success in battle, Pezuela was promoted to the post of viceroy and left for Lima. Mendizábal continued his career as an engineer under the command of José de la Serna, an artilleryman recently arrived from the peninsula where he had seen much action against the French. Just as his predecessor the newly arrived commander had trained in the Academy in Segovia, but had gained most of his experience during war and not in the production of scientific knowledge. Mendizábal remained in Upper Peru until he was called back to the coast to repair the damage the fort of Pisco suffered after the attacks sustained from Lord Thomas Cochrane’s fleet in 1819.52 With the repeated defeats in the Andes, those seeking independence had changed their strategy and attacked Chile in 1817, defeating the loyalists a year later. This resulted in an immediate change in the war in Peru, as now the coast was vulnerable to attack, and the defences put up to repel the British had to be used. In 1821, with San Martín practically knocking at the city’s door, Pezuela was deposed in an uprising led by officers recently arrived from the peninsula who trusted La Serna more than him.53 Pezuela left Peru some months later while Mendizábal continued to fight in these later campaigns.

  • 54 Gutiérrez, "Francisco Xavier Mendizábal”, p. 20.
  • 55 Mendizábal, Guerra de la América del Sur. 1809-1824, p. 100-101.
  • 56 See for example his Manifiesto en que el virrey del Perú Don Joaquín de la Pezuela refiere el hecho (...)

31During his reminder of time in Peru, Mendizábal relocated to Cuzco when those supporting the King abandoned the city of Lima because they could no longer defend it. By 1823 Mendizábal reached Río de Janeiro where he wrote his last piece of work devoted to his time in the continent: “Itineraries and Descriptions of several roads, towns and cities in South America.”54 Here he described in great detail his experiences in the continent and his work can be seen as an exercise in synthesis. Although he does not dedicate much space to describe his practice as an engineer, it is evident that his narrative is interested in establishing the importance of the kind of cartographical knowledge he produced.55 Pezuela, on the other hand, did not write any more documents that can be described as ‘scientific’. Instead he focused his energies to defend the position he took when he was ousted as a viceroy in Lima in 1821. This happened to a great extent because the army officers who had arrived more recently from the peninsula did not trust his actions, and most of them did not share with him the training in the academy.56 As his main expertise was in artillery, Pezuela was unable to contribute with his expertise once he left the battlefield.

32The scientific knowledge of these trained officers who travelled to America to carry out technical assignments was crucial to set them up in positions of power, creating a distinction between them and the members of the militia they had been tasked with creating. Although there was a difference between these engineers and the naval, and cavalry officers, who tended not to share their knowledge of artillery, cartography and architecture, both kinds of officers were charged with leading militias. The scientific knowledge of these academy-trained engineers and military men, however, was at the basis of their engagement in the exercise of statecraft. Artillery was particularly important as it needed knowledge of engineering and mathematics, an example of how it was seen as useful was in the building of a gunpowder factory in Lima.

  • 57 For more on this process see Sobrevilla Perea “From Europe to the Andes and back”, p. 472–488.

33The experiences of these two military engineers in Peru show how the Bourbon project of state organisation was channelled through practical applications of military engineering. Once war began they adapted to new realities and put their skills into practice. They actively participated in the main campaigns, but at the end, to win wars, technical knowledge was not enough. Pezuela was deposed by a faction of officers who had arrived from the Peninsula after the Napoleonic wars, who tended to be more interested in the experience of warfare, and in particular guerrillas, than in techniques learnt in the academy.57 Defeat in the Andes came more out of exhaustion and from adverse international conditions, rather than solely due to the success of those fighting for independence. Military engineers played, however, an important role in these wars, the artillery and cartographical abilities of Pezuela and Mendizábal, although planned to ensure the control of the territory in peace time and to prevent British coastal attacks, was particularly useful in the kind of intense war fought in the southern Andes where the knowledge of the terrain was crucial. It was, however, not enough and in spite of holding the upper hand in terms of knowledge, the military engineers were defeated. During the campaigns younger men were trained in how to use some of these tools, and even though the level of training was not comparable to the one acquired in the academy it did establish a point of continuity from the colonial to the independent period.

Military “scientific knowledge” and the building of the nation

  • 58 See Marisa Vannini De Gerulewicz. José Mires, patriota español maestro del mariscal Sucre: las cien (...)
  • 59 López Soria, “Relaciones entre la ingeniería militar y la ingeniería civil”, p. 278.
  • 60 López Soria, “Relaciones entre la ingeniería militar y la ingeniería civil”, p. 277-278.

34During the wars of independence, engineers trained in the peninsula such as Mendizábal and Pezuela, remained loyal to the King. Amongst those who fought for liberation there were some who had begun their training as military engineers as the wars broke out, and had received some schooling, particularly in mathematics before embarking in a military career in the search for independence. An important example is Venezuelan General Antonio José de Sucre, who had begun his training in military engineering at the school of José Mires in Caracas.58 In 1822 in an attempt to organise the newly formed state, José de San Martín put forward a decree regulating military engineering in Peru. One of the most important issues that came up was that the Military Engineering Corps was to be in charge of creating the blueprints for all the public buildings and had the duty to keep them in deposit.59 As López Soria shows, this decree was adapted from the royal ordinance of 1803 and it remained in the statute books until at least 1834.60 The legacy of the Spanish monarchical system in the new independent republic is therefore very clear.

  • 61 Manuel de Mendiburu, Memorias de Mendiburu (manuscript) Archivo del Instituto Riva Agüero.

35Military engineering continued to be central to the exercise of statecraft even in the very precarious initial years of the republic. This was especially the case in execution of public works. Towards mid-century, engineering slowly became professionalised. Foreign experts arrived and new capacities were developed fuelled by the guano bonanza. In the first years after independence, military knowledge was useful to the development of the first structures of government. As can be seen by the legislation they put in place, the initial Peruvian administrations attempted to follow a pattern established by the Bourbons that gave military men with some knowledge of engineering a central role in the creation of the state. As the republic emerged, these men, who had received at least some training, were tasked with building fortifications and designing roads. Manuel de Mendiburu is an example of such transition from the colonial to the republican period. He had gained some experience building bridges under Bourbon trained military engineers, in a process of apprenticeship such as the ones provided by Pezuela and Mendizábal in the battlefield. Although Mendiburu was not a fully trained military engineer and did not have the same level of expertise he had enough basic training to become an operator, having begun his career studying mathematics at the School of Medicine of San Fernando at the end of the colonial period.61.

  • 62 For some biographic background see Natalia Sobrevilla Perea, “The Enduring power of Patronage in Pe (...)

36Mendiburu later picked up more engineering skills as an army officer, but is today better known for his work as a historian and politician, who wrote the most important collection of biographies of prominent men from the colony and early republic. After his initial training in mathematics Mendiburu became an amanuensis, a post he kept until 1820 when he joined the military. He remained in the institution for the rest of his life, serving in many different capacities during his long and distinguished career. He was a road builder, a prefect, a deputy in Congress, and a minister of several portfolios, including that of war, serving under several administrations.62 His technical knowledge was particularly useful as part of a new generation that used it in the incipient process of building a state. Even if the level of training of men, such as Mendiburu, who might have studied some of the basics, but not a whole degree in military engineering in a prestigious academy at the level of the ones trained during the Bourbon period such as Amat, Pezuela and Mendizábal, the role they played building the new state should not be sub-estimated.

37López Soria has shown that at least until mid-century, with the arrival of European professionals to create engineering schools, the subject in Peru was completely dominated by military engineers. At present very little in known of these men, as only a few played an important role in politics or left work that has been of interest to researchers. My hypothesis is that lacking a training such as the one received by those who studied in the Bourbon academies, these engineers did not have the possibility to dedicate their time to cartography, topography or the writing of long and detailed reports that showcased their understanding of the terrain where they operated. In spite of this, members of the military with some engineering training continued to play a central role, mainly in the construction of roads and fortifications.

38Geographical knowledge, on the other hand, which had also been dominated by military engineers during the Bourbon period, was developed in the second half of the nineteenth century by a new generation of learned men who were not members of the military. An example of this is Mariano Felipe Paz Soldán, who was born in 1821 and became the father of modern Geography in Peru. Engineering, on the other hand, developed as a learned science and its linkages with the military were severed in this period when there was a distinct attempt to promote professionalization. Although in the initial years of the republic there had been a distinct desire to maintain the structure by which military engineers were in charge of the building of the infrastructure of the incipient state as had been the case in the Bourbon period, the lack of trained personnel and the changes brought to the economy by the guano trade thwarted these plans. The close relationship between the artillery and engineering and mathematics ended in the latter part of the nineteenth century when a new generation of men born with independence came of age.

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Notes

1 James C. Scott, Seeing like a State, How certain Schemes to improve the Human Condition have failed. New Haven, Yale University Press, 1998, p. 3.

2 Martine Galland-Seguela, “Las condiciones materiales de la vida privada de los ingenieros militares en España durante el siglo XVIII”, Scripta Nova, 2004, vol VIII, n° 179. Alicia Cámara Muñoz, ed., Los ingenieros militares de la monarquía hispánica en los siglos XVII y XVIII, Madrid: Ministerio de Defensa, 2005.

3 Academies were limited to training officers in artillery, engineering and mathematics and thus created elite corps, while the majority of officers received some training in their own regiments. This included some knowledge of arithmetic, geometry, and geography but tended to be rudimentary. See Francisco Andújar Castillo, “La educación de los militares en España del siglo XVIII”, Chronica Nova, 19 (1991) 31-55.

4 For an assessment of the Reforms, including the military one see Adrian Pearce, The Origins of the Bourbon Reform in Spanish South America, 1700-1763, London: Palgrave, 2014

5 On the Viceroy that took control see Víctor Peralta Ruiz, “El Virrey Abascal y el Espacio de Poder en el Perú (1806-1816) Un Balance Historiográfico” in Revista de Indias, 2006, vol. LXVI, n° 236, p. 165-194.

6 On Pezuela see Natalia Sobrevilla Perea, “Introducción crítica al Compendio de los sucesos ocurridos en el Ejército del Perú y sus provincias (1813-1816), del General Joaquín de la Pezuela”, Santiago, Bicentenario, 2011 and on Mendizábal, Ramón Gutiérrez, "Francisco Xavier Mendizábal. El último ingeniero español" en Construyendo el Perú. Aporte de ingenieros y arquitectos. Lima, UNI, 2000

7 Armando Alberola Romá and Jesus Pradells Nadal, “Un Cuerpo de Élite en el Ejército de la España del siglo XVIII: los Ingnieros Militares”

8 Andújar Castillo, “La educación de los militares en España”, p. 35.

9 Antonio La Fuente and José Luis Peset, “Las Academias Militares y la inversión en ciencia en la España ilustrada (1750-1760), Dynamis 2 (1982), p. 193-209.

10 Pedro Luengo, “Military Engineering in Eighteenth-Century Havana and Manila: The Experience of the Seven Years War” in War in History, 2017 vol. 24. 1, p. 4-27.

11 José Ignacio López Soria, “Relaciones entre la ingeniería militar y la ingeniería civil en el Perú del siglo XIX” in Quipu, Revista Latinoamericana de Historia de las Ciencias y la Tecnología, vol. 15, n° 3, 2013, p. 271-283.

12 José Ragas, “El discreto encanto de la milicia. Ejército y Sociedad en el Perú Borbónico” in Joseph Dager Alva y Carlos Pardo-Figueroa Thays (eds.), El Virrey Amat y su tiempo. Lima, Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú, 2004, p. 209.

13 Gonzalez de Leon, Fernando. (1997). "Doctors of the Military Discipline": Technical Expertise and the Paradigm of the Spanish Soldier in the Early Modern Period. Sixteenth Century Journal. 27. 61.

14 Alonso Muñoz Cosme, “Drawing Instruments, Engineering Methods and Representation Systems in Sixteenth- through Eighteenth Century Design” in Alicia Camara Muñoz ed. Draughtsman Engineers Serving the Spanish Monarchy in the Sixteenth to Eighteentg Centuries Madrid: Fundación Juanelo Turriano, 2016, p. 17-44.

15 Gloria A. Franco Rubio, “Militares ilustrados y practicas de sociabilidad” in Revista de Historia Moderna, N. 2 (2004) “Ejércitos en la Edad Moderna”, p. 7-86.

16 Cámara Muñoz, ed., Los ingenieros militares de la monarquía hispánica

17 Franco Rubio, “Militares ilustrados y practicas de sociabilidad”, p. 45-56.

18 For more details on the career of Jorge Próspero de Verboom (1665-1744) see López Soria, “Relaciones entre la ingeniería militar y la ingeniería civil”, p. 273. On the Academy itself see La Fuente and Peset, “Las Academias Militares”, p. 196-198.

19 López Soria, “Relaciones entre la ingeniería militar y la ingeniería civil”, p. 273.

20 Ann Twinam has noted that in the Council of Indies the reforms resulted in it being “more competent, but less efficient”, Purchasing Whiteness. Pardos, Mulatos and the Quest for Social Mobility in the Spanish Indies Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2015, p. 75.

21 A detailed description of the whole collection and copies of the military constructions projects held at the Biblioteca de Cataluña, Barcelona MS. 400 are included in Vicente Rodríguez Casado and Florentino Pérez Embid, Construcciones militares del virrey Amat, Sevilla, Escuela de Estudios Hispanoamericanos, 1949, p. 22, 177-236.

22 Copies of these images can be found in the article by Rodríguez Camilloni, “Manuel de Amat y Junyent y la Navona de Lima”, un ejemplo de diseño urbano barroco del siglo XVIII en el virreinato del Perú” in Anales del Instituto de Investigaciones estéticas, 74-75, Mexico, 1999, p. 147-176, p. 150-152.

23 See Puntual relación de las operaciones executadas en la Plaza Mayor de la Ciudad de los Reyes, . . . en el sitio, ataque, defensa y rendición de una fortaleza, construida en su centro; con arreglo, y proporciones á la architectura militar (Lima, c. 1773) quoted in Gabriel Ramón, “Bourbon manoeuvres in the plaza: shifting urban models in late colonial Lima”, Urban History, 44, 4 (2017): 622-646, p. 635.

24 Ramón, “Bourbon manoeuvres in the plaza”, p. 636.

25 This appeared in the Drama de dos palanganas veterano y bisoño, see Ramón, “Bourbon manoeuvres in the plaza”, p. 636.

26 Quoted in Ragas, “El discreto encanto de la milicia”, p. 217.

27 Campbell, The Military and Society, p. 27.

28 I want to thank José Ragas for these details, see Ragas, “El discreto encanto de la milicia”, p. 219.

29 For more details on this period see Campbell, The Military and Society. For a recent study of the uprising see Charles Walker The Tupac Amaru Rebellion, Cambridge Mass, Harvard University Press, 2014.

30 These reductions can be clearly seen in the Guia de Forasteros, Lima: Imprenta de los Niños Expósitos, 1802, p. 104.

31 Ramón, “Bourbon manoeuvres in the plaza”, p. 638.

32 Tim Fanning, Paisanos: The Irish and the Liberation of Latin America, Notre Dame: Indiana, 2018, chapter 4, “The King of Peru”.

33 Ramón, “Bourbon manoeuvres in the plaza”, p. 640-41.

34 On the colonial militias see Natalia Sobrevilla Perea, “Colored by the past. The Birth of the Armed Forces in Republican Peru” Estudios Interdisciplinarios de America Latina, Tel Aviv vol. 22, n. 1, July, p. 57-79.

35 Ramón, “Bourbon manoeuvres in the plaza”, p. 641-42.

36 López Soria, “Relaciones entre la ingeniería militar y la ingeniería civil”, Fp. 275-276.

37 López Soria, “Relaciones entre la ingeniería militar y la ingeniería civil”, p. 274.

38 For more biographical details see, Natalia Sobrevilla Perea, “Introducción crítica al Compendio de los sucesos ocurridos en el Ejército del Perú y sus provincias (1813-1816), del General Joaquín de la Pezuela”, Santiago, Bicentenario, 2011, p. XI a XL.

39 Joaquín de la Pezuela, Descripción de la Fabrica de Pólvora de Lima, dated 1811, Manuscript held at the Biblioteca Menéndez Pelayo in Santander Spain.

40 For biographical detail see, Ramón Gutiérrez, "Francisco Xavier Mendizábal. El último ingeniero español" en Construyendo el Perú. Aporte de ingenieros y arquitectos. Lima, UNI, 2000.

41 Gutiérrez, "Francisco Xavier Mendizábal, p. 5.

42 Francisco Javier Mendizábal Guerra de la América del Sur. 1809-1824. Buenos Aires: Academia Nacional de Historia, 1997, includes a listing of all the maps held at the collection in Madrid.

43 Francisco Xavier Mendizábal and Manuel Miguel de León, “Plano topográfico de las inmediaciones de la Ciudad de Lima...”, Archivo General Militar de Madrid, PER-2/6, 1807. Referenced in Isaac D. Sáenz “El Damero en discussión Prácticas espaciales y cartografía urbana en Lima tardo virreinal” Terra Brasilis (Nova Série) Historia de la Cartografía, 4, 2015.

44 Gutiérrez, "Francisco Xavier Mendizábal, p. 8.

45 Campbell, The Military and Society in Colonial Peru, p. 34.

46 See, Sobrevilla Perea, “Luchando por ‘la patria’.

47 Gutiérrez, "Francisco Xavier Mendizábal”, p. 8.

48 Mendizábal, Guerra de la América del Sur. 1809-1824, p. 27-55.

49 Gutiérrez, "Francisco Xavier Mendizábal”, p. 54.

50 Pezuela, Compendio, p. 21.

51 Mendizábal, Guerra de la América del Sur. 1809-1824, p. 98-99, 108, 119.

52 Gutiérrez, "Francisco Xavier Mendizábal”, p. 19.

53 Natalia Sobrevilla Perea, “From Europe to the Americas and Back: Becoming Los Ayacuchos” European Historical Quarterly, Volume 41 Issue 3, July 2011, p. 472-488.

54 Gutiérrez, "Francisco Xavier Mendizábal”, p. 20.

55 Mendizábal, Guerra de la América del Sur. 1809-1824, p. 100-101.

56 See for example his Manifiesto en que el virrey del Perú Don Joaquín de la Pezuela refiere el hecho y circunstancias de su separación del mando; demuestra la falsedad, malicia é impostura de las atroces imputaciones contenidas en el oficio de intimación de 29 de enero de los jefes del ejército de Lima, autores de la conspiración, y anuncia las causas de este acontecimiento. Madrid: Núñez de Vargas, 1821.

57 For more on this process see Sobrevilla Perea “From Europe to the Andes and back”, p. 472–488.

58 See Marisa Vannini De Gerulewicz. José Mires, patriota español maestro del mariscal Sucre: las ciencias matemáticas al servicio de la independencia americana. Encuentro de Latinoamericanistas Españoles (12. 2006. Santander): Viejas y nuevas alianzas entre América Latina y España, 2006, s.l., Spain. CEEIB, p.1307-1320. <halshs-00104193>

59 López Soria, “Relaciones entre la ingeniería militar y la ingeniería civil”, p. 278.

60 López Soria, “Relaciones entre la ingeniería militar y la ingeniería civil”, p. 277-278.

61 Manuel de Mendiburu, Memorias de Mendiburu (manuscript) Archivo del Instituto Riva Agüero.

62 For some biographic background see Natalia Sobrevilla Perea, “The Enduring power of Patronage in Peruvian elections: Quispicanchis 1860” The Americas, vol. 67, 1, p. 31-55

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Table des illustrations

Légende Figure 1 – Lima, Escenas del Palacio de los Virreyes, 1771, Ms. 400 Biblioteca Central de Cataluña
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Légende Figure 2 – Pezuela, Descripción de la Fabrica de Pólvora de Lima, 1811
URL http://journals.openedition.org/nuevomundo/docannexe/image/75772/img-2.png
Fichier image/, 751k
Légende Figure 3 – Pezuela, Descripción de la Fabrica de Pólvora de Lima, 1811
URL http://journals.openedition.org/nuevomundo/docannexe/image/75772/img-3.png
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Légende Figure 4 – In Jorge Hidalgo Lehuedé Historia Andina de Chile, p. 355.
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Natalia Sobrevilla Perea, « Artillery, engineering and mathematics: statecraft and the scientific knowledge of military men, from the Bourbons to the creation of the Peruvian State (1770-1840) », Nuevo Mundo Mundos Nuevos [En ligne], Débats, mis en ligne le 11 juin 2019, consulté le 18 septembre 2019. URL : http://journals.openedition.org/nuevomundo/75772 ; DOI : 10.4000/nuevomundo.75772

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Auteur

Natalia Sobrevilla Perea

University of Kent

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