Environmental Degradation and Dredging in the Havana Bay (1820-1850)
Résumés
La nouvelle dynamique de l’économie cubaine à partir des dernières décennies du XVIIIe siècle entraîna d’importants changements économiques, sociaux et environnementaux dans la baie de La Havane. Aux marges de l’histoire urbaine, la gestion des déchets, la croissance de la population et son influence sur la dégradation de l’environnement de la baie de La Havane ont été peu étudiées. Cet article analyse la dégradation environnementale de la baie de La Havane et la mise en œuvre de projets de conservation pendant la première moitié du XIXe siècle. La reconstruction de l’histoire environnementale de La Havane permet également de réévaluer son histoire politique. Dans le cas présent, on peut observer comment les transformations socio-environnementales du port havanais influencèrent la construction de l’État colonial. La recherche de solutions aux problèmes environnementaux créa des connexions importantes entre les institutions politiques, économiques et scientifiques. Cet article étudie, précisément, comment ces connexions ont contribué à la création de nouvelles formes d’administration étatique.
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This article represents part of the academic work required by the Master’s Degree in Interdisciplinary Studies on Cuba, Latin America, and the Caribbean that was awarded the author by the University of Havana in May 2015.
Texte intégral
- 1 Manuel Moreno Fraginals, El Ingenio, Barcelona, Crítica, 2001.
- 2 Gloria García, “El auge de la sociedad esclavista en Cuba” in Historia de Cuba. La colonia: evoluci (...)
- 3 Reinaldo Funes, De bosques a los cañaverales. Una historia ambiental de Cuba 1492-1926, La Habana, (...)
- 4 Arturo Sorhegui, “Puerto de la Habana: De principal enclave del comercio indiano, a cabecera de una (...)
- 5 The environmental history of the Havana Port was reconstructed using primary sources held at the Na (...)
1The revitalization of the Cuban economy that started in the waning decades of the 18th century marked an important milestone in the economic, social, and environmental evolution of the Havana Bay. The development of the plantation economy and the opening of international markets spurred the commercial activity that passed through the port of Havana. Studies on the socio-environmental changes occasioned by this increase and the effects of those changes, for both the area’s human inhabitants and the surrounding ecosystem, are uncommon. Important facets of an integrated urban history, such as waste management, population growth, and their role in the environmental degradation of the bay have been the subject of little research. The Cuban historiography does include, however, important work by Manuel Moreno Fraginals1, Gloria García2, Reinaldo Funes3, and Arturo Sorhegui4; references that have opened a path for the study of these themes.5
2This article analyses the progressive environmental damage of the Havana port and the implementation of conservation projects by the colonial authorities and major economic actors during the first half of the 19th century. Reconstructing the environmental history of Havana and, in particular, its port enables us to reevaluate the political history as it currently stands. In this case, we observe how the socio-environmental transformations of the capital’s port influenced the construction of the colonial state and to decipher how, in the search for solutions to environmental problems, connection developed between various colonial political, economic, and scientific institutions. Accordingly, one of the analytic lines of the article examines how the relationships among the colonial authorities contributed to the creation of new forms of state administration that are reflected in the “Clean Port Committee.” Another line of investigation will focus on the transfer of knowledge between the state and nascent scientific community in Cuba, institutionally represented by the High Command of the Navy, the Havana Royal Arsenal, and the Royal Corps of Engineers. The role of knowledge transfer in the imperial setting is equally pertinent with regards the dredging of the Havana port. Looking specifically at technologies, the article analyzes technological transfer across imperial boundaries and the advantages afforded by the space for technological access in the Spanish Empire. The analysis of the transition to new forms of energy is particularly important, for the transition had begun to affect navigation and the plantation economy as early as the end of the 18th century and would be rapidly applied to dredging.
3All of these questions guide our analysis of the history of Havana and its port from the environmental perspective. Although the ecological problems described in this paper do not represent “environmental” concerns in current parlance of the relevant actors at the time, they do represent an important element in the reconstruction of relationships as the state, science, and local administration that developed concurrently in 19th century Havana.
Early 19th Century Havana: Commerce, population growth, and environmental degradation
- 6 Alexander V. Humbodt, Ensayo político sobre la Isla de Cuba, Fundación Fernando Ortiz, La Havane, 1 (...)
“The view of Havana from the port’s entrance is one of the most cheerful and picturesque scenes that can be enjoyed along the equinoctial coast of the Americas north of the Equator […] The European […] attempts to contemplate the fortifications that cap the rocks to the eastern side of the port, that landlocked conch of sea surrounded by villages and country manors, those prodigiously tall palm trees, and that city half covered by a forest of ships and masts”6
- 7 Arturo Sorhegui, “Puerto de la Habana: De principal enclave del comercio indiano, a cabecera de una (...)
4With these words the naturalist Alexander von Humboldt portrayed the lively commercial ambience that characterized the port of Havana in the early 19th century. As the mercantile activity increased, the port was modernized. The public wharfs were enlarged until they covered the entire central section of the Bay. Loading, unloading, and warehousing activities expanded towards the eastern end of the port where specialized piers and warehouses were built. Private dry docks were also opened to respond to the demand for ship repair services7.
- 8 For more information consult: “Cuadro estadístico de la Isla de la Siempre Fiel Isla de Cuba corres (...)
5Demographics also played an important role in the socio-environmental transformation of Havana Bay. The censuses of 1827 and 1841 reveal a significant increase in the population, which went from 96,903 to 129,994 inhabitants.8 The city quickly expanded beyond its walls, with the fastest development outside the walls occurring past the eastern end of the docks in zones such as Jesús María, Regla, and Casa Blanca. This was the area where the loading, unloading, and large merchandise warehouses were increasingly concentrated, creating a labor market that, in turn, attracted more and more settlements.
6The number of temporary visitors also increased with the growing mercantile activity. The confluence of hundreds of travelers, sailors, and soldiers from the Spanish Army raised the demand on infrastructure for lodging, provisioning, and also entertainment in the surrounding areas.
7Poor waste management in the overpopulated city worsened the sanitary and environmental conditions in Havana. Several chronicles by businessmen and travelers draw attention to the majestic appearance of the buildings and constant flow of vendors and luxurious carriages in the streets in contrast with the utter lack of hygiene and powerful, fetid odors. Waste from the local businesses, slaughterhouses, fish stalls, and private residences was typically dumped over the docks into the sea or simply into the street. Rubbish accumulated in even the busiest intersections, forming heaps of considerable height. When it rained, great puddles would form, making carriage traffic dangerous. The volume of administrative documentation containing information about waste management in Havana is in fact considerable. It forms part of the basis for the diagnosis issued by different colonial institutions regarding the city’s health standards. One document from a Havana municipal inspector in 1826 illustrates the situation in these terms:
- 9 “Expediente relativo a la proliferación de basureros en la Ciudad de La Habana,” National Archive o (...)
[…] the trash heaps in every street that appear every day are so numerous that, on days when the rain is heavy, they are swept down, and so much accumulates outside every house that the water cannot carry it all to the sea, such that it especially clogs up the street where the current is weak, and for that reason after a large downpour the bogs that block traffic can be seen.9
8There were carts that moved waste to areas beyond the city, but not enough of them. The Havana municipal government attempted to resolve the problem several times, contracting private services and issuing regulations for street disposal of household waste. The shortages in terms of both personnel and supplies that would be necessary to implement an efficient garbage removal system, however, remained an obstacle to the problem’s solution.
- 10 Translated from the original Spanish terms: Ayuntamiento, the Sociedad Económica de Amigos del País(...)
- 11 José Antonio Saco, Papeles sobre Cuba, Ministerio de Educación, La Habana, 1960, I.
9The poor state of the roads and streets represented another of Havana’s principal urban dilemmas. It was a matter of constant concern for inhabitants and visitors, not to mention Town Hall, the Economic Society of Friends of the Country, the Royal Consulate, or the Development Junta10 that on various occasions incentivized the production and publication of memoires. One of the most important of the latter was that of José Antonio Saco, whose prizewinning memoire was published in the 1830s. In it Saco analyzed the paving policies and techniques of England and France in order to advance solutions for improving the throughways of Cuba that were adapted to the Island’s conditions11.
10The solution ultimately involved finding the necessary but inexistent resources to pave the city. As it was, the streets were embanked with a rudimentary shell of poor quality composed of wooden shards, stones, and sediment. They made transportation difficult and were susceptible to cave-ins, pooling water, and waste build-ups. The streets of the capital became so clogged and sullied that Robert Francis Johnson, an officer in the British Navy, qualified it as “the city that is death’s festival.” In his work Letters from the Havana, published in London in 1821, he wrote:
- 12 Robert Francis Jameson, Letters from the Havana: During the Year 1820, Printed by J. Miller, 1821, (...)
A multitude of narrow streets open to your eye, each contributing to the congress of smells, by their want of sewers and paving, the holes, worn in the ground by wheels and horses, being carefully filled up with offal12.
- 13 The miasma theory maintained that miasmas – fumes invisible to the human eye – emanated from putref (...)
11This and similar judgments reflected the miasmatic theory for the transmission of illnesses that identified the public health conditions in Havana as the fundamental source of epidemic risk.13
- 14 The tendency to eliminate swamps by draining them continued until the end of the 20th century. The (...)
- 15 Leda Menendez y José Manuel Guzmán (ed.), Ecosistema de manglar en el archipiélago cubano. Estudios (...)
12All these factors worked against the proper operation of the port, for most of the city’s waste, along with rubbish produced on ships, found its way to the bottom of the bay. Deforestation along much of the coastline worsened the situation. These natural barriers were considerably reduced by the installation of new population centers, commercial warehouses, repair facilities, and loading docks. The mangroves that had lined one end and part of the eastern side of the port were gradually destroyed by the unbridled development. Mangrove wood was good for making charcoal and building homes, and the leaves were useful in tanning hide. The abundance of tanneries and charcoal pits in the Jesús María neighborhood is no coincidence. At the same time, ignorance of the aquatic plant’s environmental value, coupled with the disinterest of the scientific community, led to the mismanagement of the mangrove ecosystem. Mangroves proliferated in swampy or semi flooded coastal zones that were considered unhealthy, so colonial legislation usually sought to eliminate them through draining.14 One method of draining considered effective involved dumping solid waste into flooded areas to solidify them. This practice caused great harm to the mangroves. It was not known that the circulation of water around their roots and trunks was an essential part of their life cycle. Cutting off the circulation occasioned by flooding, together with other causes, led to their gradual disappearance15.
13The combined effect of all these elements was the spread of muddy bogs along the coast that were unhealthy and made navigation more difficult. Beyond the health risks posed by such environmental contamination in the port, what worried the colonial authorities most was the danger that silt would render the port itself unusable.
14In the mid-18th century, Lieutenant General Rodrigo de Torres of the Spanish Navy carried out a survey of the bay in which it was revealed that the port was now ten meters shallower in the most commercial areas and had lost 400 meters of surface area to accumulated sediment along the shore. In the 1850s, José María Gómez Colón offered an explanation of the natural and anthropogenic causes for the port’s siltation. Although he stated disagreement with the figures that had been published the century before, which he believed were excessively exaggerated, Gómez Colón insisted that the coastal obstruction process was accelerating. Among the consequences this would have for commerce in Havana, he noted higher import and export costs because smaller boats would become necessary to shuttle merchandise between the ships and the docks.
15Although the calculations of how much depth and coastline had been lost were sometimes contradictory in the sources from the period, their authors agreed that the depth of the bay had changed and that coastal areas had been lost due to a combination of natural and manmade causes. The figures and discrepancies aside, concern that the port may be rendered unusable motivated the search for solutions to rehabilitate and maintain the harbor.
The Dredging Projects of the Clean Port Committee (1823-1832)
16As the environmental conditions of the Havana Bay worsened and the bay became noticeably shallower, concern for restoration increased. Although the primary interest had economic roots, conservation and rehabilitation projects were contemplated that revealed an interest in ecological conservation as well. Among the most recurrent ideas found in the memoires and project proposals was the use of dredging and pontoons to extract the sludge and other waste deposited on the seafloor and coastline.
- 16 José María de la Torre, Lo que fuimos y lo que somos o La Habana antigua y moderna, Imprenta De Spe (...)
17According to José María de la Torre, at least six pontoon boats had been devoted to cleaning the port since the administration of Felipe Fondesviela y Ondiano (1771-1777). Unfortunately, no other evidence of dredging projects in the 18th century has been found16.
18In August 1821, Vicente María Rodríguez, a counselor of the Royal Consulate of Agriculture, Industry, and Commerce, presented a motion to the presidency of the consulate’s Junta claiming the need to construct two pontoon boats to dredge several parts of the Havana Bay. The proposal called for a combination of initiatives to dredge the bay, pave the city, and strengthen control and police surveillance of waste dumping in the zones adjacent to the coast. A few months were spent verifying the costs and characteristics of an animal-drawn pontoon boat in operation in Matanzas Bay. According to a report sent to the consulate board by Tomás Gener, who was in charge of the pontoon boat in Matanzas, the patent-holder of the machine that had been brought from the United States was J. Culbers of Baltimore. The animal-powered pontoon boat was equipped with a shovel that could extract 15 tons of sludge per hour in water between 0.6 and 12 meters deep. Upon examining the report, the Havana Arsenal’s chief engineer, Honorato de Bouyon concluded that investing in a similar boat for dredging the Havana Bay would be unwise because of the characteristics of the capital’s port were different and required dredging at greater depths and in windier conditions.
- 17 “Oficio dirigido al Ayuntamiento de La Habana por Rafael Morales, vecino de Jesús María, a nombre d (...)
19After this proposal was discarded, the Royal Consulate and Royal Arsenal combined efforts at the start of 1822 in a new initiative to clean the bay. Using funds from the Royal Consulate and the old pontoon boat that belonged to the Arsenal, dredging began in some of the bay’s most affected areas. In addition, garbage removal measures were implemented in the city. It was determined that the waste produced in areas adjacent to the coast would be deposited in Los Uveros, a location that was far from populated areas where no risk of sediment spilling into the bay was posed. This action provoked adverse responses in some of the city’s outlying neighborhoods, however, because the cost of waste removal increased when those contracted to do it raised their fees to reflect the greater distance they now had to travel. In the part of María Jesús known as El Manglar, a group of inhabitants complained to the municipal authorities of Havana and the colonial authorities of the island (la Capitanía General). Mostly poor, they argued that they lacked the means to bear the high cost of private garbage collection contractors or to perform the labor themselves. Moreover, they alleged, the practice of dumping waste in the distant mangrove swamps was customary and that far “from this practice having caused harm, it has been an efficient means of draining swampland to make solid ground on which many houses have been built.”17 Despite the complaints, the Constitutional Mayor of Havana, José Gaytan, kept in place the measures imposing fines for those caught committing infractions by police.
- 18 “Expediente relativo al establecimiento de un pontón en el puerto de La Habana proveniente de Norte (...)
20Still, despite the enormous sum spent on the project, this attempt to implement dredging was unsuccessful, and work on it ceased in mid-1823. The Royal Consulate then looked to bring in private initiative and made a public announcement authorizing anyone with the means and disposition to dredge the bay to do so. In parallel, the consulate board initiated new negotiations in the United States for the purchase of an animal-drawn pontoon. Contact was established with John Eveleth, a machinist and inventor from New York, with the aim of determining the cost of a dredger of his invention meeting the characteristics desired.18
21The design of the pontoon boat desired was more complex than the one used in Matanzas, though the dimensions were similar. It was drawn by four horses and was equipped with iron ingots that anchored it firmly to the seabed during the dredging process that, in addition, involved eight shovels, enabling it to extract 40 tons of sludge per hour at a depth reaching 28 meters. These qualities made the machine much more efficient than the one employed in Matanzas, but its major problem lie precisely in its complexity. Cuba lacked technicians with the necessary knowledge and experience to put such technology into use. Moreover, the machine was not without defects. In its operating manual, the depth to which it could be employed was not specified, nor was the force necessary to operate the machine with a one-ton shovel in the air. Regardless, the consular junta decided to propose negotiating a contract along certain terms with the New York firm. Among the conditions was the delivery of the pontoon boat to Havana at the seller’s expense, together with a crew of men and the finest American horses. Once delivered, the pontoon boat would carry out a series of trial runs for three months in order to verify that it operated well at 8 meters of depth. To do so, it would have to extract approximately 20,000 tons of sludge, to be measured by an operator named by the Royal Consulate. If the conditions were met at the trial period’s term, the machinist would be paid 16,000 pesos, double the amount requested by John Eveleth, to cover the costs of purchase, delivery, and equipment, along with the price of the horses and salaries of the crew.
22Although the New York inventor accepted the conditions, and even expressed interest in traveling to Havana to examine personally the port with an aim to adjust his invention to its conditions, this attempt was also unsuccessful. Negotiations froze in early 1826 when communication with John Eveleth was lost. Yet interest in the project remained, and discussion with the Royal Consulate continued with the aim of finding alternative solutions for the port’s deteriorating condition. The idea of building two pontoon boats in the Arsenal was considered but then abandoned for lack of the necessary specialized technological experience, raw materials, and financing. Moreover, as long as emergency measures were not taken to pave the streets, investing vast large sums to build such a machine on the island made no sense. The project managers concluded that the work should be carried out in unison by several colonial institutions, above all the Havana municipal government (el Ayuntamiento de la Habana), the Superintendant of the Interior (la Intendencia General de Hacienda), and the Island High Captaincy (la Capitanía General de la Isla).
- 19 “Expediente relativo a la importancia del empedrado de las calles de La Habana en la conservación y (...)
- 20 “Oficio a los señores Prior y Cónsules del Real Consulado de la Habana por el Gobernador y Capitán (...)
23Captain General Vives was approached in order to explain the urgency of dredging the city’s port. The situation had become so serious that “with 25 to 30 years the entry would be closed to first order warships and prevent overseas trading ships from mooring at the quays with so much stility [sic] that trade would be taken out.”19 Two Navy officials, Lorenzo José Noriega and Juan Bautista Topete, put together a detailed report alerting General Vives to the loss of nearly half a meter of depth in the Bajo de San Telmo area and almost two meters around the docks at Regla, based on measures carried out in 1823. His interest piqued, General Vives attended the next meeting of the Consular Junta where not only was discussed the implementation of dredging pontoons but also the need to reinitiate the proposal, submitted years earlier, to pave and light the city’s streets. Paving involved additional complications. The municipal government approved a paving plan submitted by the engineer Arsenio Lacarriere Latour and sent it to the Spanish government in 1826, where it was rejected by the metropolis, which considered the allocation of such large sums inopportune.20
24In the framework of these discussions, Vives called for the creation of a special commission that he called the “Clean Port Committee,” (CLP), comprised of representatives from the primary institutions interested in the subject: the Superintendente General de Hacienda Claudio Martínez de Pinillos; Juan Bautista Topete of Marine Command; the councilman Andrés Zayas of the Havana municipal government; the Síndico Procurador General Narciso García de Mora and the Síndico José Pizarro y Gardín; the Earl of Fernandina and Prior of the Royal Consulate José María Herrera; and Antonio María de la Torres y Cárdenas who served as Secretario de Actas.
25The Committee’s priority was determining the amount necessary to purchase a steam-powered pontoon boat that, this time, would be built in Europe. Accordingly, it was stipulated:
- 21 “Expediente relativo a las labores de saneamiento y conservación de la Bahía de La Habana,” ANC, Fo (...)
That the Royal Consulate take it upon itself immediately, and without delay, to have a steam-powered pontoon with four sluice and shuttle boats equipped in the same way and with the same dimensions as the pontoon of Málaga, constructed in England and brought to Havana.21
26Around this time, communication with the New York suppliers was reestablished. It was the nephew of the inventor John Eveleth who expressed interest via the Earl of Villanueva in reopening negotiations under the same terms and conditions as before. The Cubans thus had to choose between the two technologies and locations from which to bring the dredging pontoon. In addition to weighing the relative advantages of each, the project managers were also very attentive to the need to minimize cost.
- 22 “Expediente relativo al establecimiento de un pontón de vapor en el puerto de La Habana,” ANC, RC a (...)
27The matter was discussed at several meetings of the CLP, the town hall, and the chamber of business in 1828 and 1829. A new dredging project was even introduced by the trader Joaquín de Arrieta, who offered to take responsibility for dredging Havana Bay. His proposal was turned down by the Navy Outpost Junta (the Junta del Apostadero) and the Royal Consulate itself because the compensation Arrieta requested in return for his services was very high. In the end, a decision was made to proceed with the English manufacturer because of the instability manifest in the negotiations with the North Americans. The English dredger was also steam-powered, which gave it an advantage over the North American animal-powered one. Utilizing new steam technology would improve the efficiency and speed with which the bay could be cleaned in comparison with the previous project proposals. The project was sent to Spain and approved by royal decrees in 1828 and 1829.22
28The Royal Consulate appointed two commissioners to carry out the negotiations, Francisco Fesser and Juan José Mariátegui, who made contact with the English manufacturers through Enrique Ituder, a businessman who lived between Havana and London. Once again, however, problems arose that set back the process of obtaining a dredger. On one side, the English refused to undertake any negotiations whatsoever outside of London and, in addition, they asked for an advance payment before starting the machine’s construction. On the Cuban side, financing was the problem. Because of the changes requested in order to improve the machine’s power, the price had increased to 80,000 pesos. Before the modification, the cost was to be shared by the Royal Consulate (34,322 pesos and 6.5 reals) and the Superintendent of the Interior (Intendencia de la Hacienda – 25,677 pesos). The Marine Command and the Havana municipal government would cover the rest of the costs, such as the salaries of the employees and sailors and supplies for the slave laborers.
29The consular junta gave the members of the CLP the responsibility for contacting the relevant people in Málaga to obtain information about the pricing, manufacture, and power of the dredger that operated in their port, and so they reached out to Toribio del Valle, who was in charge of the Málaga port dredging operation. He reported that although the machine at his disposal was much more expensive than the North American one (the total reached 60,000 pesos), it could operate at greater depth and was more effective. After examining the report’s details and the plans of the pontoon, the CLP calculated that the dredger could deepen the most important commercial channels by almost 20 meters in under 2 years. Yet the CLP decided to ask the London manufacturers for an even more powerful dredger. They requested a pontoon for Havana that could operate at more than 12 meters of depth and extract between 100 and 150 tons of sludge per work hour.
30A little over a year after the initial agreement with the English manufacturer, the situation had changed. The representatives of the Royal Consulate refused to provide more money than originally agreed and, in fact, were not even sure they could furnish the sum promised. The amount originally stipulated was to come from a fund in the control of the Superintendent of the Interior that ceased to exist when the Superintendent appropriated 50,500 pesos as compensation for overdue fiscal debts. The corporation thus refused to take on additional debt to obtain more money, arguing that its income was already committed to repayments for various creditors. On top of these difficulties, there had been no news from the English suppliers. The negotiations stalled when no company expressed willingness to sign an agreement outside of England and even less to sign any agreement without an advance cash payment.
31Towards the middle of 1831, new conversations were initiated in New York for the purchase of a steam-powered dredger at the end of which the new commissioner, Juan José Martínez, finally managed to obtain a signed contract. It was signed in Baltimore in June 1831 by Andrés Pastrallo, a businessman recommended by the Spanish consulate in New York, the builder James Beackman, and the machinists Watchinan and Bratt. The contract stipulated that the dredger, hoppers, and longboats would be totally built in Baltimore and brought to Havana for testing before the final payment of 91,000 pesos was made to the manufacturers. The main vessel would weigh 270 tons and measure more than 300 meters in length and almost 30 meters in draft. The carpentry of all the vessels would employ the finest woods available in the New York shipyards, a combination of white oak (quercus alba), Mexican yellow pine (pinus oocarpa), and white pine (pinus stobus). The metal parts were to be made of copper instead of iron to better resist the effects of prolonged exposure to saltwater.
- 23 On the effect of deforestation and the environmental impact of the sugar industry, see Reinaldo Fun (...)
32In parallel to the purchase of the steam dredger, a series of other measures was adopted that may include the most revolutionary aspects of the process that is the object of this study. In general, these measures were meant to detain the displacement of sediment into the bay and were organically incorporated into the official state discourse that promoted, from an urbanist perspective, the modernization of the city, and, from a hygienist perspective, improved public health management. The paving of the roads and reorganization of waste management thus took on new meaning within the project’s framework. Studies on the primary waterways and networks, both natural and artificial, carried out by the Engineering Corps at the request of the CLP were also influential. The engineers did not merely identify the waterways that “contaminated” the bay; they proposed concrete measures to stop the flow of sediment based on their scientific and technical knowledge. The subject of deforestation, which hitherto had only preoccupied naturalists,23 became one of the primary axes around which debates over the project turned. What is more interesting than the proposals to replant the forests is how the knowledge regarding the cultivation of plants then available was applied to impede erosion and prevent landslides. According to the dispositions prepared for the CLP, wildcane (Gynerium sagittatum), turtlegrass (Thalassia testudinum), and citrus trees were the most advisable plants for the purpose. In addition, cutting down mangroves was prohibited. Although this was also meant to preserve the remaining forest barrier on the coastline, the measure is not only interesting because it represents the first time such an ecosystem was protected, but also because it conflicted with the hygienist discourse influenced by miasmatic theory. If, on one side, it was in the interest of the colonial government to preserve the mangroves to attenuate the degradation of the bay, on the other side, the Royal Order was still in force that not only authorized but required the draining of swamps and wetlands, the natural habitat of the mangroves, because of the health risks they were thought to pose. During the CLP’s discussions, a drainage project was even introduced by the engineer Honorato Bouyon. Yet the ultimate motives of these measures, despite their conservationist overtones, were not ecological but rather economic. Nevertheless, in analyzing them it becomes apparent that the people overseeing them were to some degree aware of the environmental causes of the port’s degradation and took concrete action to address those environmental problems.
33After a ten-year mandate, Dionisio Vives left Havana in 1832. Although he had probably devoted more attention to restoring the harbor than any other Captain General, Vives did not see his aspirations materialize. Still, he cleared the path for future negotiations and established the institutional foundations for the conservation of the bay by creating the CLP. A few months after his departure, on May 30, 1832, the steam-powered dredger christened Cristina docked in Havana. The vessel was ceremoniously received in the port by the city’s highest authorities. Chronicles from the time attest to the confidence in the technology acquired and the high expectations it created for the urban poles future commercial development.
Miguel Tacón and the Restoration of the Port (1833 – 1838)
34The negotiations for the purchase of a dredger had finally succeeded. In September 1833 the pontoon dredger Cristina was in operation, although the dredging was delayed for a few months because of technical problems. Built in winter at temperatures that were relatively much lower than those encountered in Cuba, shortly after the dredger went into operation, the wood contracted and leaks sprung in various locations. In addition, the hopper for expelling the mud was ineffective in the shallow waters that were of primary concern because its sluice gates were designed to operate vertically, which significantly slowed the dredging. To solve the problem, the experts at the Royal Arsenal thought of building a tugboat with four punts that would be more practical for removing the sludge. The tugboat would need a high powered steam engine to pull the four barges loaded with sediment in deep water as well as in waters of less than a meter deep. This equipment would cost an additional 40,000 pesos and several ideas for obtaining the money were considered. Funds were scarce, notably because of the recent purchase of the pontoon dredger. Selling some of the sluices was pondered, as was fixing one with a steam engine so it would work as a tug.
- 24 “Expediente relativo a la compra de un remolcador de vapor y sus bateas en Estados Unidos,” ANC, RC (...)
35After several proposals were presented to the Junta for Promoting Agriculture, Industry, and Commerce, which replaced the Royal Consulate at the beginning of the 1830s, a decision was made to contract Scull Storey, a company in the United States whose bid was the lowest and whose guarantees were highest, to build a steam tugboat and barges. The total cost, including delivery, reached 5000 pesos for a tugboat and barges that would be able to haul 55 tons of sludge. The contract was made public, not only for approval of the purchase but for future auditing and control. This enabled the Junta to proceed without obtaining new funds for the acquisition of the equipment. Moreover, the task of establishing the price of each ton of mud transported and determining the location where it would be deposited remained under the Junta’s supervision. Two of the sluice gates from Cristina were also put up for sale in order to establish a fund for future needs related to the dredging operation.24
36In the middle of 1834, the new Governor and Captain General Miguel Tacón arrived in Cuba. Internal reorganization, public works, and general hygiene were areas that Tacón gave special attention. Changes in the coordination of the authorities in charge of the dredging of the Havana Bay, however, took place during this period. The Captain General’s office lost the leading role it had acquired under Dionisio Vives’ mandate. Claudio Martinez de Pinillos directed the project from his position as Superintendent of the Interior, favoring the importation of machinery from the United States. Although the dredging operations remained to a degree outside the reach of Tacón’s policies of centralization as a result of the constant conflicts with the Intendancy for political and economic control of the capital, the Captain General was not completely absent. For example, some of the labor associated with the dredging was carried out by prisoners sent from the new prison the Captain General built. He also intervened on occasion to privilege the restoration at private docks that belonged to people in his entourage and sent trusted envoys to verify the work commissioned by the Junta for Development and the Superintendent. In addition, his actions involving the reorganization of the waste removal system, reconfiguration of marketplaces, paving of streets, and other projects related to public health, all affected in one way or another the conservation of Havana’s port.
37The power dynamics within the CLP also began to change. When the pontoon arrived in Havana, Angel Laborde, the representative of the Marine Command, was put in charge of receiving the ship and other vessels that comprised the dredging equipment even though their administration was assigned to the Intendancy. Laborde played a leading role in the CLP during the first three years of the dredging operation. With Pinillos serving as intermediary, the Marine Command only sought assistance from the Junta for Development in economic matters, and in practice oversaw the dredging alone. The first discrepancies surfaced at this time. The main disagreements between the Junta for Development and the Marine Command were caused by the purchase by the latter of accessories to improve the dredger’s performance, purchases that were clearly under the Superintendent’s purview. After a series of clashes, the Marine Command was sidelined from the project’s management in the middle of 1835. Its sailors and technicians continued to work under the management of the CLP, only now commissioners from the Junta for Development had the last word. Similarly, the project continued to rely on the advice of Juan Bautista Topete, who had replaced Angel Laborde. Dredging ceased until the conflict was resolved. Cristina was moored at one of the warehouses in the eastern side of the port until the end of 1836, when the steam-powered tugboat christened Cuba arrived in Havana.
- 25 The documents consulted reflect the hostile tone of these conflicts and the personal disputes among (...)
- 26 Mention of the publication of the dredging results from 1836, 1837, and 1838 appears in several rep (...)
- 27 “Resultados del dragado de La Bahía de La Habana en varios de sus puntos,” ANC, RC and JF Collectio (...)
- 28 “Expediente relativo a las quejas de José Pizarro y Gardín por la publicación de los resultados de (...)
38It was amid a climate of political tension25 that work restarted with the arrival of the Cuba tug. In the early years, the restoration efforts primarily concentrated on the public and state-owned docks, although some private projects were also carried out. Despite the disagreements and constant quarrels over control of the dredging, the first results of the operations were finally published in the Havana press in 1838.26 The Junta for Development went to great effort to publicize its successes in cleaning up the bay as soon as the operation was fully in its charge. Similarly, the new members of the CLP, José Tozar and Ramón Salazar, sought to emphasize the committee’s improved results in comparison with those obtained two years earlier. According the CLP’s report, 120,150 tons of sludge were extracted from the seafloor in 1837.27 In addition, a detailed account of the expenses incurred in relation to the pontoon boat was published to prove they were justified. Notwithstanding, the report’s publication provoked adverse reactions from former CLP members. Jose Pizarro y Gardín rebuked the CLP for the way the results were compared, for they made it seem that the dredging operation had been less productive in the years prior to 1837, when he headed the CLP. In his defense, Pizarro pointed to several technical problems and labor shortages that he had faced from June 1835 through the end of 1836. If the comparison was made on the basis of days the dredging was in operation, the dredging was actually both proportionally more productive and much less expensive during his term than in the period reported in 1837. Despite such complaints, the Junta for Development did not question the results produced by the new CLP, limiting itself to pacifying the heated spirits in the municipal administration by thanking them once again for their valuable public service.28
- 29 “Resultados del dragado de la Bahía de La Habana en varios de sus puntos,” ANC, RC and JF Collectio (...)
- 30 “Expediente relativo a los lugares donde deben arrojarse los sedimentos extraídos de la Bahía de La (...)
- 31 “Resultados del dragado de la Bahía de La Habana en varios de sus puntos,” ANC, RC and JF Collectio (...)
39The docks with the highest commercial use received priority for cleaning. Along the coastline adjacent to the Arsenal, the steam dredger pulled up a large amount of wood that was still usable despite the prolonged period during which it had been submerged. As for the sediment and other unusable material that was pulled up, it was either to be dumped in the ocean at a distance no closer than 3 kilometers to the north/northeastern leeward side of the Havana Bay or deposited upon the banks of the parts of the harbor already silted up in order to solidify them. These measures were meant to prevent the sediment from being carried back into the port by the sea currents.29 In mid-1839, different problems limited the dredging. The steam tugboat spent some time out of commission while maintenance was performed on it. During that period, the sludge was carried away from the dredger by privately owned vessels contracted by the Junta for Development. Several documents indicate that those boats violated the measures by dumping the sludge in the area around the Castillo del Moro and the Batería de los Doce Apóstoles in early morning hours, taking advantage of the darkness to avoid being seen.30 Financial problems also affected the dredging. The CLP levied a daily tax of 6 pesos on all the vessels registered at every wharf in order to cover the dredging costs. The regulation caused problems in some wharfs where some registered ship owners refused to pay, alleging that they had contributed slave labor. Merchant and military vessels were also charged a docking fee of two reals per day, which drew complaints, particularly from English vessels.31
- 32 “Real Orden aprobando la prórroga solicitada por Carlos Drake para ocuparse de la limpia del puerto (...)
- 33 “Real Orden aprobando la prórroga solicitada por Carlos Drake para ocuparse de la limpia del puerto (...)
40The dredging operations continued through the 1840s and 1850s, albeit in the hands of private businessmen. Auctioning off the contract for port maintenance to private entrepreneurs was discussed by the Junta for Development in early 1837. The corporation’s funding suffered from the constant repairs the equipment required. Moreover, the lack of operators qualified to operate the machinery led to the idea of contracting some foreign operation with greater experience to carry out the work. With these discussions, a stage in the dredging of the Havana Bay ended. The colonial institutions that had begun the efforts to dredge the bay in early 1821 left the work, after more than fifteen years, in the hands of private operators. Their management role would still continue through the CLP, whose function would be regulating and verifying the sediment extraction and determining the areas to be prioritized for dredging. If the restoration of the Havana Bay had become an unprofitable enterprise for the colonial state, for businessmen like Carlos Drake del Castillo, it was a lucrative one. The earnings he took in as contractor for the maintenance of the port rose to between 40,000 and 50,000 pesos per year, depending on the quantity of sludge extracted. Drake del Castillo maintained this charge until 1850s, requesting extensions on occasion that were approved by royal decree in 184632 and 1850.33 His administration was not exempt of contradictions and his relationships to the Spanish crown enabled him to mediate confrontations with the state authorities on the island. At the end of the 1850s, however, jurisdiction for the administration of the dredging, along with other public services passed definitively from the Junta for Development to the Office of Public Works.
Final Considerations
41By the end of the first half of the 19th century, various dredging and environmental conservation projects were implemented in Havana Bay and its port. The port restoration project of greatest interest was implemented during the Vives administration. Although no dredger ever actually operated in the port while negotiations alternated between North American and English suppliers during his mandate, the period was very important because for the first time, a state administrative agency, the Clean Port Commission, was creating, linking the primary colonial institutions in order to deliberate, take decisions, and seek funding to dredge and conserve the part. Moreover, the measures taken in parallel to the purchase of the pontoon dredger possessed conservationist aspects with regards the environment, which made them revolutionary for the time. Two examples are the prohibition on cutting mangroves and the reforestation of areas along the coast. Although these motives behind these measures were not ecological, but rather economic – whose true importance remains to be evaluated – the measures still represent a transcendental moment in the preservation of the port’s ecosystems. Similarly, during the administration of Miguel Tacón, much advance was made in reorganizing the city’s waste management system. It was also at this time that the details regarding the amount of sludge extracted and renovation of the primary sites affected were first published.
42Several colonial institutions stand out in terms of advocating the conservation of the bay and renovation of the Havana Port. Among them are the Royal Consulate and the Superintendant of the Interior. Most of the money invested in the enterprise came from the coffers of these two promoters of the primary dredging initiatives, although some funds were also obtained through the auction of public contracts, taxes such as dock dues whose revenues were used by the municipal authorities for paving projects as well as the purchase of the dredger, and even contributions from major landowners, such as Esteban Arumy for the purchase of pontoons and dredgers.
43The technological aspect in the analysis of these dredging projects is especially interesting. The first projects undertaken in the early decades of the 19th century involved animal-driven machines, but in the 1830s steam-powered pontoons attracted most of the attention. The use of steam technology made possible a much more powerful dredging barge, leading to greater work speed and efficiency. The dredging project thus reflects the transition in energy source that was already underway in sea navigation and the plantation economy. The two sources of advanced technology at the time were understood to be the United States and England. On several occasions the project managers argued over which of the two suppliers should be chosen. In the end, the relative proximity, affordable pricing, and higher quality guarantees meant that the United States became the primary supplier of dredging technology.
44The initiatives to modernize the port’s most important docks and the city’s waste removal, as well as the technology used for dredging, continued through the second half of the 19th century. In 1854 a project emerged for the acquisition of another steam machine for the extraction of accumulated sediment on the bay’s floor. In 1878 councilman José Argumosa presented a project to the Havana municipal authorities for the construction of a waste removal canal for the bay. It was meant to solve the problem of silt runoff, which remained a concern, and that of stagnant water, still thought to be the cause of diseases such as yellow fever. Furthermore, in 1888 Juan Garcia Villaraza sought authorization from the High Junta for Health to take responsibility for dredging the bay using his own resources. His proposal was to sell the sediment extracted from the bay and donate part of the revenue to the relevant authorities. These proposals indicate that the siltation of the Havana Bay remained a problem and concern until the end of the 19th century. Future inhabitants of Havana would inherit a port marked by centuries of human exploitation. Despite the efforts undertaken, the environmental damage has proven irreversible.
Notes
1 Manuel Moreno Fraginals, El Ingenio, Barcelona, Crítica, 2001.
2 Gloria García, “El auge de la sociedad esclavista en Cuba” in Historia de Cuba. La colonia: evolución socioeconómica y formación nacional, de los orígenes hasta 1867, La Habana, Pueblo y Educación, 2002, p. 225-313.
3 Reinaldo Funes, De bosques a los cañaverales. Una historia ambiental de Cuba 1492-1926, La Habana, Ciencias Sociales, 2008.
4 Arturo Sorhegui, “Puerto de la Habana: De principal enclave del comercio indiano, a cabecera de una economía de plantación”, Revista Honda, n° 26, 2009, p. 1-25.
5 The environmental history of the Havana Port was reconstructed using primary sources held at the National Archive of the Republic of Cuba.
6 Alexander V. Humbodt, Ensayo político sobre la Isla de Cuba, Fundación Fernando Ortiz, La Havane, 1998, p. 6.
7 Arturo Sorhegui, “Puerto de la Habana: De principal enclave del comercio indiano, a cabecera de una economía de plantación”, Revista Honda, 26, 2009, p. 1-25.
8 For more information consult: “Cuadro estadístico de la Isla de la Siempre Fiel Isla de Cuba correspondiente al año 1827”, Viudas de Aragoza y Soler, La Habana, 1829, and “Cuadro estadístico de la Isla de la Siempre Fiel Isla de Cuba correspondiente al año 1846”, Imprenta del Gobierno y Capitanía General, La Habana, 1847.
9 “Expediente relativo a la proliferación de basureros en la Ciudad de La Habana,” National Archive of Cuba (hereinafter referred to by its Spanish acroynym, ANC), Superior Civil Government Fund (hereinafter GSC), bundle 11, number 570, 1826.
10 Translated from the original Spanish terms: Ayuntamiento, the Sociedad Económica de Amigos del País, the Real Consulado (similar to a chamber of commerce in North America), and the Junta de Fomento.
11 José Antonio Saco, Papeles sobre Cuba, Ministerio de Educación, La Habana, 1960, I.
12 Robert Francis Jameson, Letters from the Havana: During the Year 1820, Printed by J. Miller, 1821, p. 60.
13 The miasma theory maintained that miasmas – fumes invisible to the human eye – emanated from putrefied water, cadavers, waste, bad odors, etc., spreading contagious diseases; cf. Alain Corbin, Le miasme et la jonquille : L’odorat et l’imaginaire social aux XVIIIe et XIXe siècles, Éditions Flammarion, Saint-Amand-Montrond, 2008.
14 The tendency to eliminate swamps by draining them continued until the end of the 20th century. The purpose was to make the drained land suitable for agriculture or residential zones; cf. José Antionio Cosculluela, Cuatro años en la Ciénaga de Zapata, E.C.A.G., La Habana, 1965, et S. Perejrest, Los pantanos de Cuba y su importancia para el aumento de la producción agrícola y fortalecimiento de la economía del país, S/E, La Habana, 1962.
15 Leda Menendez y José Manuel Guzmán (ed.), Ecosistema de manglar en el archipiélago cubano. Estudios y experiencias enfocados a su gestión, Editorial Academia, La Habana, 2006.
16 José María de la Torre, Lo que fuimos y lo que somos o La Habana antigua y moderna, Imprenta De Spencer & Compañia O Reilly, La Habana, 1857, p. 15.
17 “Oficio dirigido al Ayuntamiento de La Habana por Rafael Morales, vecino de Jesús María, a nombre de los vecinos de El Manglar,” ANC, GSC, Bundle 880, No. 29,667, 1822.
18 “Expediente relativo al establecimiento de un pontón en el puerto de La Habana proveniente de Norteamérica,” ANC, RC and JF Collection, Bundle 105, No. 4522, 1824.
19 “Expediente relativo a la importancia del empedrado de las calles de La Habana en la conservación y saneamiento de la bahía,” ANC, GSC, Bundle 1309, Number 50,853, 1826.
20 “Oficio a los señores Prior y Cónsules del Real Consulado de la Habana por el Gobernador y Capitán General de la Isla de Cuba, Dionisio Vives,” ANC, RC and JF Collection, Bundle 105 No. 4525, 1827.
21 “Expediente relativo a las labores de saneamiento y conservación de la Bahía de La Habana,” ANC, Fondo GSC, Bundle 1269 No. 49870, 1828.
22 “Expediente relativo al establecimiento de un pontón de vapor en el puerto de La Habana,” ANC, RC and JF Collection, Legajo 105, No. 4527, 1828-1830.
23 On the effect of deforestation and the environmental impact of the sugar industry, see Reinaldo Funes Monzote, De bosques a los cañaverales. Una historia ambiental de Cuba 1492-1926, Ciencias Sociales, La Havane, 2008.
24 “Expediente relativo a la compra de un remolcador de vapor y sus bateas en Estados Unidos,” ANC, RC and JF Collection, Bundle 105, No. 4532, 1834.
25 The documents consulted reflect the hostile tone of these conflicts and the personal disputes among the primary figures from the various institutions involved in the dredging operation.
26 Mention of the publication of the dredging results from 1836, 1837, and 1838 appears in several reports. However, only the 1837 results, which were published in February 1838, have been found. “Resultados del dragado de La Bahía de La Habana en varios de sus puntos,” ANC, RC and JF Collection, Bundle 106, No. 4567, 1838.
27 “Resultados del dragado de La Bahía de La Habana en varios de sus puntos,” ANC, RC and JF Collection, Bundle 106, No. 4567, 1838.
28 “Expediente relativo a las quejas de José Pizarro y Gardín por la publicación de los resultados de la limpia del puerto,” ANC, RC y JF, Bundle 106, No. 4770, 1837-1838.
29 “Resultados del dragado de la Bahía de La Habana en varios de sus puntos,” ANC, RC and JF Collection, Bundle 106, No. 4567, 1838.
30 “Expediente relativo a los lugares donde deben arrojarse los sedimentos extraídos de la Bahía de La Habana,” ANC, RC and JF Collection, Bundle 106, No. 4577, 1839.
31 “Resultados del dragado de la Bahía de La Habana en varios de sus puntos,” ANC, RC and JF Collection, Bundle 106, No. 4566, 1838.
32 “Real Orden aprobando la prórroga solicitada por Carlos Drake para ocuparse de la limpia del puerto de La Habana,” ANC, Reales Órdenes y Cédulas Collection (hereafter the RO and C Collection), Bundle 156, No. 514, 1846.
33 “Real Orden aprobando la prórroga solicitada por Carlos Drake para ocuparse de la limpia del puerto de La Habana,” ANC, RO and C Collection, Bundle 151, No. 207, 1850.
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Claudia Martínez Herrera, « Environmental Degradation and Dredging in the Havana Bay (1820-1850) », Nuevo Mundo Mundos Nuevos [En ligne], Débats, mis en ligne le 11 décembre 2019, consulté le 11 novembre 2024. URL : http://journals.openedition.org/nuevomundo/78018 ; DOI : https://doi.org/10.4000/nuevomundo.78018
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