Editors of the Special Issue

Alexandre Chirat (EconomiX, Université Paris-Nanterre), guest editor

Nathanaël Colin Jaeger (CCDS, American University of Paris)

Camila Orozco Espinel (REGARDS-CRIEG, Université de Reims Champagne-Ardennes), guest editor

Cyril Hédoin (Université de Reims Champagne-Ardennes)

Call for papers

Markets and democracy have constituted, since at least the 19th century, two foundational institutions of Western societies. Both concepts have been widely studied as modes of social organization. As a coordination procedure, the market is the primary means of allocating resources among members of a society and constitutes the fundamental concept of economics. Democracy, as a system of government, also involves a series of collective decision-making procedures, foremost among which is voting. Markets and democracy therefore consist of two modes of coordination, relating to 'tastes' for the market and 'values' for democracy (Arrow 1951). As markets and democracy are two modes of social coordination, they can be competing or complementary: where do private tastes end and public values begin? Is it not possible to have values relating to how individual and collective needs should be met? In short, is the distinction between the democratic and political realm and the economic and private realm self-evident?

Two sets of problems arise. The first set relates to the analogical relationships that can be established between the functioning of the market and the functioning of democracy. More particularly: are these two forms of coordination radically different? Or can we study democracy as a market or consider the market as a democratic space? The second set relates to their relationships—of complementarity or antagonism—as institutions at the foundation of our societies. Does the market undermine democratic institutions, or does it reinforce equality between individuals? Conversely, should democratic institutions limit the expansion of the market?

Throughout the 20th century, several economists, political scientists, and philosophers have mobilized the construction of analogies between the market and democracy to study (positive dimension) or legitimize (normative dimension) their functioning (Chirat 2022). Structural analogies made it possible to model the functioning of democracy (target domain), thought of as a 'political market,' based on the theoretical tools traditionally used to study the functioning of the market (resource domain) (e.g., Schumpeter 1942; Downs 1957; Buchanan and Tullock 1962). Thus, in the market as in democracy, we refer to demand (consumers/citizens), supply (firms/parties), products (goods/platforms), constraints (power to purchase/power to vote), as well as informational issues (advertising/propaganda).

Categorical analogies between the market and democracy have, for their part, made it possible to develop arguments by comparison. For example, using the concept of consumer sovereignty, forged by Hutt during the interwar period (Desmarais-Tremblay 2020), allows, by analogy with the notion of citizen sovereignty, consideration of the situation of the consumer on a market as analogous to that of the citizen in a democracy (Persky 1997; Olsen 2019). In this case, the market and democracy are no longer considered only as coordination procedures. They are also considered as sets of institutions guaranteeing values such as freedom or equality.

Whether they reason by analogy between democracy and the market (competitive, oligopolistic, etc.) or categorically reject such analogy, economists and philosophers are always confronted with the question of relationships (complementarity or conflictuality). Should we organize public affairs through market mechanism, or does the specificity of politics require democratic institutions (Elster 1986)? Some emphasize the complementarity between markets and democracy, as 'inclusive institutions' promoting economic development (e.g., Acemoglu and Robinson 2012). Others assert, on the contrary, that the development of markets and commodification is likely to harm the proper functioning of democratic life (Anderson 1990; Sandel 2013). This being said, understanding the reasons and methods by which various economists (e.g., Arrow, Hayek, Knight, Sen, Smith) and philosophers (e.g., Dewey, Habermas, Rawls, Dworkin, Anderson) have theorized the conceptual and institutional relationships between democracy and the market is of fundamental interest, particularly in the context of an environmental crisis.

The journal Oeconomia will publish a special issue in December 2025 on the topic
“Market(s) and democracy,” following the 7^th International Conference on Economic Philosophy held in Reims (May 28-31, 2024). The expected contributions will address the conference theme from the perspective of the history of economic thought, political philosophy and philosophy of economics, or institutional political economy. This call for submissions is open to all interested researchers, whether or not they presented at the Reims conference.

Procedure and timeline

Researchers who would like to be considered for participation in this special issue of Œconomia should submit their full paper on the submission platform before September 16, 2024 :

https://journals.sfu.ca/oeconomia/index.php/oeconomia/

Referees reports and editors’ decision will be sent by February 3, 2024.

Deadline for submittin revised papers : June 13, 2025

Planned publication December 2025

For further information, please contact the editors of the special issue or send a message to oeconomia@openedition.org.

References

Acemoglu, Daron, and James R. Robinson. 2012. Why Nations Fail: the origins of power, prosperity and poverty. New York: Crown Publishing.

Anderson, Elizabeth. 1990. The Ethical Limitations of the Market. Economics & Philosophy, 6(2): 179-205.

Arrow, Kenneth J. [1951] 1970. Social Choice and Individual Values. New York: John Wiley (second edition).

Desmarais-Tremblay, Maxime. 2020. W.H. Hutt and the Conceptualization of Consumers’ Sovereignty. Oxford Economic Papers, 72(4): 1050-1071.

Downs, Anthony. 1957a. An Economic Theory of Democracy, New York: Harper.

Elster, Jon. 1986. The Market and the Forum: Three Varieties of Democratic Theory. Foundations of Social Choice Theory. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Friedman, Milton. 1962. Capitalism and Freedom. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Olsen, Niklas. 2019. The Sovereign Consumer. Cheltenham: Palgrave Macmillan.

Persky, Joseph. 1997. Retrospectives: Consumer Sovereignty. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 7(1): 183-191.

Sandel, M. J. 2013. Market reasoning as moral reasoning: why economists should re-engage with political philosophy. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 27(4): 121-140.

Schumpeter, Joseph. A. 1942. Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy. New York : Harper.