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A legal-philosophical interpretation of the American Declaration of Independence. An Italian philosophy of law perspective

La Déclaration d’indépendance des États-Unis : une lecture juridique et philosophique selon la tradition italienne de la philosophie du droit
La Declaración de Independencia de los Estados Unidos: una lectura jurídica y filosófica según la tradición italiana de la filosofía del derecho
A Declaração de Independência dos Estados Unidos: uma leitura jurídica e filosófica segundo a tradição italiana da filosofia do direito
Marialuisa Innocenzi

Résumés

Cette contribution doit beaucoup au projet America 2026, qui a permis à l'auteure d'entreprende un projet de recherche totalement nouveau, centré sur l'un des moments les plus fondamentaux de l'époque moderne: la Révolution américaine.
Inspiré par la philosophie du droit, cet article entreprend une enquête herméneutique sur les liens entre le droit, la liberté et la justice au sein du contexte révolutionnaire qui a abouti à la création des États-Unis d’Amérique. La révolution est comprise ici comme une forme historique située de rébellion, ce qui amène à interpréter le mouvement révolutionnaire états-unien comme une affirmation et une reconnaissance de principes juridiques universels, en particulier la liberté, la justice et l’égalité. L’article s’appuie également sur une analyse textuelle de la Déclaration d’Indépendance et des écrits de certains penseurs politiques italiens consacrés à la Révolution de 1776. Ainsi, notre étude montre l’interdépendance du savoir juridique et historique.
Un bref passage en italien a pour but de proposer un cadre interprétatif pour la réception de la Révolution américaine au sein du monde intellectuel italien, afin d’enrichir la perspective théorique globale offerte par cet article.
Le but de cette approche interdisciplinaire est de contribuer à la réflexion juriprudentielle, en insistant sur l'importance du contexte historique dans notre interprétation des phénomènes politico-légaux fondamentaux.

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I/ Introduction

1On July 4, 2026, the United States of America will celebrate the 250th of their Declaration of Independence. On this anniversary, the America 2026 program offers an opportunity to foster a multi-faceted dialogue on the American colonial rebellion, its Atlantic and hemispheric impact, and its enduring resonance in the history of modernity and contemporary democracies. At the conference “America 2026 New Perspectives on Constitutions in the Era of Revolutions”, which I had the pleasure and honor to attend, I presented my research on the political and legal realities of America and the memory of the Revolution, without claiming to have possessed comprehensive knowledge of American revolutionary historiography. The purpose of this contribution is to examine certain key historical events that shaped the 18th century, with the aim of exploring – from the perspective of legal philosophy, the only one legitimately accessible to someone who, like the author, is neither a historian nor a literary scholar – the deeper reasons behind the rebellion and the a priori principles upon which the American Declaration of Independence is founded.

2This contribution does not claim to offer a comprehensive historical or literary critique. Readers seeking a fully philological or historiographically exhaustive analysis may not find all the answers they are looking for in these pages. Rather, the aim is to underscore the value of engaging with diverse disciplinary perspectives and to suggest that openness to a plurality of forms of knowledge – whether legal, historical, or otherwise – can promote fruitful dialogue and mutual enrichment.

3During my Ph.D. in Theory of Legal Systems at the Department of Legal Sciences at Sapienza University of Rome (from 2015 to 2018), I conducted research on legal issues within the works of Jean-Jacques Rousseau, engaging primarily with legal scholars and philosophers of law. However, as my study progressed, it required further exploration of certain historical issues. I delved into the events surrounding the French Revolution to investigate how it influenced the sociopolitical landscape of Italy and to understand its impact on the European legal system of that era.

4“America 2026” offered me the opportunity to embark on a new research journey, shifting my focus to another great revolution. To present the outcomes of this study, I positioned myself – metaphorically – at the intersection of the legal and historical fields, with the aim of exploring the connection between law, liberty, and justice within the revolutionary framework that ultimately led to the birth of the United States of America. My objective with this comparison is to strengthen the critical perspective of the jurist on revolutionary phenomena, in order to reach an interpretation of the Declaration of Independence that is fully aware of the historical events that shaped it. I approach the revolutionary scenario with caution, and I begin this discussion with a question: What impact did the revolutionary movement of the American colonies have on universal legal principles?

II/ Opening reflections on the concept of Revolution

5Starting from the analysis of the concept of revolution, it can be observed that, historically, each rebellion presented itself as a “script” outlining the ways in which revolutionary action should unfold (Baker, Edelstein). The reading of the essay titled Scripting Revolution. A Historical Approach to the Comparative Study of Revolutions has been a fundamental guide in my study of revolutions, particularly the American Revolution. The comparative study of revolutions offered in the book stands in contrast to the traditional approach, which, without resorting to comparison, presents a more “individualizing” study of revolutions as distinct and separate events. The comparative approach allows the historian to highlight differences, similarities and oppositions, and while it runs the risk of not providing merely a description of events but rather proposing a solution between two opposing alternatives (such as good and evil, true and false), it also offers the jurist a speculative framework for understanding how the social and political context of a given historical moment has influenced and permeated the contingent legal order. I then carefully analyzed the protean character of the revolutions, understood here as a historical process through which a radical change in the political and legal structures of a society is brought about.

6A premise is necessary here. The term revolution is commonly used to refer to an action carried out by social groups, classes, or entire populations who, feeling themselves in a subordinate social position and/or unrepresented by political institutions, take action to overthrow the government and establish a new social and legal order. Consider, for example, the Dutch Revolution (1566–81) aimed at gaining independence from Spain; the two English revolutions of the 17th century (1628–60 and 1688–89) which marked the end of monarchical absolutism in England; the American Revolution (1776) which led to the birth of the United States of America, and the French Revolution (1789–99), which stands as the quintessential model of the modern revolution. These revolutionary movements shaped the last five centuries of history, confirming the idea revolutions always represented intermediary moments between two historical periods: each revolution was a watershed between two eras.

7Emerging from the conceptualization of revolution as a watershed moment – or as a transitional interlude – is a scholarly trajectory that emphasizes the adaptive character of revolutionary movements in relation to their specific sociopolitical contexts. These movements do not merely react to preexisting conditions; rather, they actively reshape the structures within which they operate. The inherently protean nature of revolutionary phenomena is, in this sense, a reflection of the contingent and mutable character of insurrection itself. For example, some revolutions are marked by rapid and uncompromising violence; others unfold more gradually, often with comparatively less bloodshed. While certain movements are driven by a commitment to the defense of universal rights and liberties, others are animated by radicalized religious ideologies or doctrinal imperatives.

8In the past, the term revolution was also used to refer to harmless workers’ uprisings, carried out to accelerate processes that would lead to the dismantling of despotic regimes. The revolutionary script constitutes the framework within which a situation is defined and a narrative is projected. From this narrative emerge various situations, the positioning of the subject, and potential actions by other subjects who operate within the same framework.

9On the basis of these considerations, it becomes clear that every revolutionary process necessarily entails: a) the construction of a political and symbolic “stage”; b) the identification of the actors involved in the revolutionary dynamic; and c) the possibility of selecting among multiple courses of action to be pursued and developed.

10This framework also characterizes the American revolutionary scene:

  1. The main stage is set by the colonial population rebelling against the mother country.

  2. The primary actors in this scene are the colonists fighting against the British, supported by the French and the Spanish.

  3. The protest of the colonists and the struggle for independence define the main course of action undertaken by the revolutionary movement to claim the universal rights of individuals.

11Assuming that this very stage likewise characterized, among others, the American revolutionary experience, the following points emerge:

  1. The colonial population’s desire to declare independence from the British Crown constituted a genuine act of political self‑assertion.

  2. The struggle undertaken by the colonists in defense of liberty and equality was shaped by – and in turn reshaped – the sociopolitical context in which it unfolded.

12As is well known, initially, the war did not turn in favor of the American colonies. The “continental army” could not compete with British forces. George Washington was aware that the colonies were inferior in numbers and supplies; for this reason, Washington opted for a defensive strategy, using sabotage techniques aimed at weakening the British strength. However, it was only the French military involvement in the American War of Independence that managed to turn the course of the conflict. In fact, the war began to turn in favor of the American colonies only with the military support of France (Van Ruymbeke).

13This shift in the course of the conflict confirms the protean nature of the American Revolution, which adapted itself to the historical context in which it unfolded. In 1776, with the Declaration of Independence, the thirteen colonies succeeded in asserting their sovereignty vis-à-vis the British Empire, though without having yet fully secured its effective realization.

14Beyond the institutional and geopolitical transformations, however, lies a more elusive yet essential aspect of the revolutionary process: the premise that both informed and legitimized the struggle itself, a premise firmly grounded in the popular will to assert and reclaim rights understood as universal principles of liberty, justice, and equality, all of which were perceived as inalienable and unjustly denied.

15It is possible to describe the revolutionary spirit of the colonies with a quote from Bruno Romano – one of Italy’s foremost figures in the philosophy of law – who stated that “where inequality prevails, the desire for justice becomes a claim for equality” (Romano 2014, 287). This significant reference to Romano’s reflection, although it may initially appear disconnected from the historical analysis of the revolutionary context examined in this paragraph, proves in fact essential for clarifying how the foundational premise of the American colonies’ revolutionary spirit can be traced back to a profound demand for justice.

16In Romano’s words, one discerns a conceptual convergence between the desire for justice and the claim for equality – an association that reveals a fundamental normative principle of legal philosophy: the intrinsic link between justice and equality, both conceived as indispensable preconditions of any legal order governed by the general principles of law. This formulation resonates with the colonial demand for the recognition of universal rights, highlighting how the revolutionary movement was not merely a political shift, but a genuine juridical claim grounded in the pursuit of social treatment inspired by equality and in the rectification of systemic injustices.

17In this sense, Romano’s reflection provides a valuable conceptual framework for interpreting the revolution as an expression of legal consciousness aimed at reconciling the realities of inequality with the universalist ideals of liberty, justice, and equality.

18One might ask whether the “desire for liberty” asserted during the American Revolution ultimately laid the groundwork for the establishment of a legal system oriented toward the recognition of the principles of liberty, justice, and equality, thereby creating the essential conditions for the acknowledgment of the rule of law. By shifting the focus from the legal-philosophical foundations identified in the revolutionary spirit to the concrete outcomes historically achieved through the revolutionary movements, it has been possible – within the scope of the present reflections – to interpret the colonial population’s act of claiming rights in response to conditions of inequality as a preliminary step toward a broader process of dismantling a despotic regime.

19This reading ties back to the opening discussion in this section, particularly concerning the idea of the revolutionary script as the framework through which a situation is defined and a narrative projected. Through an interpretative approach aimed at drawing the attention of legal philosophers to the concrete measures by which the colonists sought to obtain recognition of legal principles, it seems possible to formulate an affirmative response to the question of whether the desire for justice can be regarded as the constitutive basis of a legal system committed to freedom and justice.

20The social conditions of inequality denounced by the colonial population inevitably draw the attention of the present author, who approaches the historical question of the revolutionary struggle as the only possible form of freedom through which the colonists were able to demand recognition of universal and unconditional legal principles. These principles – conceived as intrinsically normative and grounded in the ideals of justice, liberty, and equality – came to constitute the conceptual and institutional foundations of a legal system which, in the view of the present author, should not be confined to the domains of political theory or political sociology alone, but must also be placed at the centre of a broader dialogue concerning the a priori conditions for the construction of a universally recognized juridical order.

21In this sense, the revolutionary experience is to be understood as a claim to universal rights even prior to a claim to personal or civil rights: a manifestation of the subjective will for recognition, whereby men and women affirmed themselves as bearers of universal and unconditional rights.

22As a conclusion to this initial reflection on the concept of revolution – and on how, according to the interpretative framework adopted here, revolutionary movements may be understood as acts of claiming universal rights (namely liberty, justice, and equality) – a brief reference to an Italian jurist appears particularly meaningful, despite its brevity.

23During his years of study, Paolo Grossi, also one of the most influential historians of law in Italy (President of the Constitutional Court from 2016 to 2018), explored how revolutions influence the process of forming a legal system. Grossi describes the United States Declaration of Independence as one of the most emblematic documents of legal modernity, as it proclaims the political autonomy of a nation. Furthermore, it establishes a new paradigm of law based on the principle of equality and the inalienable rights of the individual. In his book Mitologie giuridiche della modernità, Grossi asserts:

  • 1 This is my translation of the original Italian passage.

“great political revolutions, such as the American one, represented moments of rupture with the past, introducing new conceptions of law and sovereignty that contributed to shaping modern legal thought”.1 (Grossi 88.)

24In particular, in examining the influence of the Enlightenment on legal transformations, Grossi focuses on the ideas that inspired the Declaration of Independence, asserting that Enlightenment thought provided “the philosophical foundations for many of the political revolutions of the eighteenth century”. The principles of liberty, equality, and the affirmation of natural rights, central to the American Declaration of Independence, are – according to Grossi’s study – a direct reflection of Enlightenment theories. Grossi wrote:

The popular sovereignty asserted decisively by the American Revolution represents one of the most significant turning points in the history of law. The principle that power resides in the people, rather than in a monarch, has redefined the foundations of legal and political legitimacy (Grossi 201‑205).

25Through this reflection by Grossi, it becomes possible to meaningfully synthesize the acts of popular sovereignty claims, decisively brought to the “stage” during the American Revolution, as forming the common thread of an event that profoundly shaped American history, demonstrating, even long ago, that only through the will of the people, and not through the absolute power of a monarch, can the foundations of a state governed by the rule of law be established, endowed with both legal and political legitimacy.

III/ The Declaration of Independence between Legality and Justice

26In the awareness that legal and historical knowledge are mutually illuminating, the preceding reflections on the connection between the colonists’ demand for liberty – expressed through the revolutionary movements – and the idea of revolution as a form of rebellion that historically follows a “script,” outlining the distinctive features of revolutionary action, offer an opportunity to further explore two key issues.

  1. On the one hand, a textual legal analysis of the Declaration of Independence will be presented, aimed at highlighting the elements already identified in the previous section concerning universal rights;

  2. on the other, a brief discussionin Italianwill address the concept of the legitimacy of revolution, not as a systematic treatment, but rather as a reflection on the idea of revolutionary action, which is often misinterpreted as a violent struggle for domination.

1/ Textual analysis of the Resolution on Independence

  • 2 The first resolution on American Independence, known as the Lee Resolution, was proposed by Richard (...)

27On June 7, 1776, Congress adopted the resolution on Independence proposed by the Virginia delegate Richard H. Lee. At that time, a committee was immediately formed to draft a Declaration of Independence, consisting of John Adams, Benjamin Franklin, Robert Livingston, Roger Sherman, and Thomas Jefferson.2 The text of the Declaration was mostly written by Thomas Jefferson to formally explain the reasons why, on July 2, Congress had expressed its intent to declare the independence of the United States from Great Britain, a year after the outbreak of the American War of Independence.

28Only on July 4 Congress declared the independence of the thirteen colonies, which had by then become free and autonomous states (New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Connecticut, Rhode Island, New York, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia).

29The Declaration begins with the following words:

When in the Course of human events, it becomes necessary for one people to dissolve the political bands which have connected them with another, and to assume among the powers of the earth, the separate and equal station to which the Laws of Nature and of Nature’s God entitle them, a decent respect to the opinions of mankind requires that they should declare the causes which impel them to the separation.
We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable Rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of Happiness.

30The reference to the liberal philosophy of John Locke (particularly his theories on tolerance and the separation of powers) is evident from the opening paragraphs of the Declaration, in the affirmation of the natural rights of men. The invocation of citizens’ inalienable rights and the legitimacy of revolution, established from the preamble, reveals the influence of Enlightenment and natural law thought on the formation of the revolutionary so-called Founding Fathers. At the time of drafting the Declaration, Jefferson drew significant inspiration from the thought of Cesare Beccaria (1738–94), emphasizing how the American colonists were, at that time, aware of being heirs to a social, political, and intellectual tradition that England had forgotten, even to the point of renouncing it. With the Declaration, Congress sought to establish a new form of government that could guarantee liberty and equality to the people, expressing disapproval of monarchical absolutism. The assembly was unable to achieve the goal of defining a new form of government, which, instead, would be established with the adoption of the United States Constitution in July 1788.

31According to Italian constitutionalists, the 1787 Federal Constitution is a model of rigid legal formalism, designed to ensure the continuity of the founding principles that had inspired the Declaration of Independence. The American Constitution represents one of the first and most advanced experiences of modern democracy, recognized for its ability to combine liberty and justice through a system of government based on checks and balances. Indeed, the Constitution was conceived as a legal instrument to ensure a balance of powers, aimed both at preventing centralization and at averting forms of authoritarianism.

32But let us return to the Declaration of Independence. In the second part, within the body of the text, the Declaration presents a list of the injustices and usurpations committed by King George III, along with specific accusations regarding the tyrannical form of governance imposed.

Such has been the patient sufferance of these Colonies; and such is now the necessity which constrains them to alter their former Systems of Government. The history of the present King of Great Britain is a history of repeated injuries and usurpations, all having in direct object the establishment of an absolute Tyranny over these States. To prove this, let Facts be submitted to a candid world.
He has refused his Assent to Laws, the most wholesome and necessary for the public good.

33The text concludes with a formal request for autonomy, absolving the thirteen colonies of any allegiance to the British crown:

We, therefore, the Representatives of the united States of America, in General Congress, Assembled, appealing to the Supreme Judge of the world for the rectitude of our intentions, do, in the Name, and by Authority of the good People of these Colonies, solemnly publish and declare, That these United Colonies are, and of Right ought to be Free and Independent States; that they are Absolved from all Allegiance to the British Crown, and that all political connection between them and the State of Great Britain, is and ought to be totally dissolved; and that as Free and Independent States, they have full Power to levy War, conclude Peace, contract Alliances, establish Commerce, and to do all other Acts and Things which Independent States may of right do. And for the support of this Declaration, with a firm reliance on the protection of divine Providence, we mutually pledge to each other our Lives, our Fortunes and our sacred Honor (United States 1776).

34These passages emphasize a significant shift in the intended audience of the Declaration of Independence from specific communities within the British Empire to “a candid world” at large. Central to its assertion was the idea that the United Colonies were no longer part of the British Empire but should be recognized as equal members of the “Powers of the Earth” as independent states. The Declaration highlights that, in the two years preceding its adoption, Congress had already been exercising the powers of an independent authority. It had negotiated with British representatives, appointed agents to represent its interests abroad, and communicated with foreign powers to secure critical support for the revolutionary cause.

35For the Declaration’s supporters, the document was not about creating independence but about recognizing and formalizing, through a public proclamation, a reality that already existed (Armitage 2007, 33). This textual analysis of the American Declaration of Independence shows that with The Unanimous Declaration of the Thirteen United States of America, Congress: a) formalized the departure of the thirteen American colonies from the British Empire, b) established the birth of the United States of America, c) transformed the nature of the colonial revolt, turning it into a true war against Great Britain. The claim of individual rights and the defense of the right to revolution led George Washington’s Continental Army to victory over King George III’s forces.

36It is worth briefly recalling the demographic dynamics of the eighteenth century. Continental British America was in a state of constant demographic flux. For scholars, it is significant to note that free and indentured immigrants arrived from Germany and the British Isles, enslaved Africans were brought from the Caribbean and Africa, and the latter were forced to endure daily forms of slavery. White settlers were drawn by religious freedom, the opportunity to settle, and the chance to cultivate land for themselves, often rejecting those in political authority. Their continuous migration pushed the frontier (zones of intense interaction) with Native Americans further westward, triggering migrations among native groups. This reconstruction highlights how, by the mid-eighteenth century, the lives of Native Americans and white settlers were intertwined in countless ways (Klooster 11). Native Americans adopted European goods, incorporating linen, wool, and cotton into their clothing, while white pioneers led lives deeply influenced by Native practices. Although their lifestyles often had much in common, their interests were fundamentally incompatible. Native groups sought to remain on their ancestral lands, while settlers aimed to transform those lands into pastures or grain fields (ibid.). This brief illustration of the social landscape of the time underscores how constant change influenced the legal demands and claims advanced by settlers.

37From this initial engagement with historical issues, I developed the idea that the study of the history and political reality of a particular social context enables the jurist to grasp the true consequences of a revolutionary movement, especially when it is aimed at asserting the recognition of the general principles of law. From these reflections it is possible to understand that the Declaration was never an utopian rational theorization to which institutions had to conform, but rather a first democratic achievement. By asserting the principle that sovereign power belongs to the people and not to the monarch, the colonists redefined the foundations of the legal and political legitimacy of the colonies, thereby also legitimizing the use of force.

38Can this process of democratization – essential for the pursuit of justice, understood here as the search for what is just, and for the recognition of the inalienable rights of human beings – be justified by the use of force and revolutionary forms of rebellion? Indeed, the colonies imposed their power on the British Empire with cunning and tactics, yet without sparing the use of force. This aspect raises further questions in the mind of the jurist: is it just to guarantee liberty and equality through imposition? Is the imposition of a law obtained through violence and the shedding of blood legitimate? Should not the general principles of law – liberty, justice, and equality – be intrinsically linked to those of democracy and peace?

39These questions compel scholars to delve into the problem of evil, here interpreted as the core of injustice, which calls for a discussion of the consequences produced by violent actions, even when directed at the protection of human rights. In particular, the jurist and the philosopher of law are called upon to pause, critically, on issues related to the recognition of general legal principles, which become the starting point for problematizing the theme of rights. In places where the minimal conditions for initiating a peaceful resolution of conflicts are still lacking, solutions are still being sought that can ensure the recognition of rights and guarantee dignity for human beings.

40The search for the conditions to establish a just legal system, oriented towards universal principles, demands certain considerations on the possible developments of the process of democratization within the political and social dimensions of the colonies. In this perspective, a philosophical-legal discussion should continue through the analysis of the two earliest moments in the genealogy of law: relation and legal claim, which offer very current speculative insights, especially when the scholar addresses issues related to the assertion of rights. These are claims that, as history teaches us, are enacted during revolutionary movements. The American Revolution represents the most significant testimony of this. In conclusion, the text of the Declaration of Independence presents the speculative elements that allow the scholar to trace the stages of the progressive development of fundamental individual rights in America. These elements enable the reconstruction and presentation of the primordial legal experience of the United States.

41In tracing, albeit briefly, the history of human rights claims, one crosses territories inhabited by the American colonies. Here, the revolutionaries and intellectuals of the time, illuminated by Enlightenment and natural law principles, saw the attainment of self-governance as the only legitimate solution to ensure equality and liberty for the colonial population, even at the cost of having to employ force and violence. Observing the sociopolitical landscape of the American coasts, one senses the urgency of the colonists to redefine the identity principle of a people now threatened by an “absolute power” that generated discrimination (even through the imposition of economically disadvantageous conditions for colonial minorities). These reflections describe a revolutionary framework in which the general will of the colonial population becomes the legal foundation of the future United States of America. I use this expression to invoke Rousseau’s terminology. One could not have more profoundly etched the idea of legality as a safeguard of the right not to suffer harm, the right not to be despised, and to become the object of violence. In light of these reflections, it is not misleading to believe that, initially, the colonists intended to claim justice and peace in order to grant the conquered territories a social condition that ensured equality in rights and dignity.

42One of the main roles of the historian is to serve as a critical conscience for the jurist, questioning uncritical beliefs, relativizing absolute certainties, and raising doubts about commonly held convictions that have been transmitted and accepted without proper cultural verification. The scholar focuses on the principle of legality and the certainty of law, raising a critical question regarding unjust laws and their capacity to impact a community. In this context, a key reference is made to Piero Calamandrei, who emphasizes the fundamental importance of respecting “the rights of liberty”, asserting that laws, even if duly enacted, cannot suppress the claim to liberty. Liberty, understood in its various forms – including freedom of thought, expression, press, and religion – represents some of the inviolable content of the principle of equality. As Bruno Romano, in alignment with Calamandrei, reminds us, these are “irreplaceable expressions of human personality” that cannot be diminished without, in effect, eliminating liberty itself. Laws may regulate many aspects of life, but they cannot, under any circumstances, infringe upon these “intangible rights” (Romano 2016, 14).

43I would like to conclude this discussion with the words of Calamandrei (Italian politician, jurist, and lawyer 1889-1956) quoted in an unpublished text from his lecture on January 21, 1940, concerning the boundaries between politics and legal science, the “free law” of totalitarian regimes, and the Roman legal tradition. Calamandrei asks:

What is the law – that of the victor or that of the vanquished, that of those who wish to maintain their own laws, or that of those who wish to establish a new order in place of the laws that have been overthrown?

44Borrowing these words, I conclude this philosophical-legal reflection on the outcomes of the American Revolution, aware that a legal interpretation of a text (such as the Declaration of Independence) cannot ignore a historical analysis of the different cultures, languages, and traditions: it is these that influence the definition of a legal system and the establishment of mechanisms for the protection of universal and unconditional rights.

2/ Il concetto di rivoluzione tra storia e filosofia del diritto: un approccio interpretativo

45Come già osservato nelle pagine iniziali, questo studio nasce dalla stesura di una relazione presentata alla conferenza “America 2026: New Perspectives on Constitutions in the Era of Revolution”, tenutasi presso l’Université Toulouse Jean Jaurès nel novembre 2024. Inserito nell’ambito delle iniziative “America 2026”, l’evento è stato caratterizzato da forme di commemorazione e rappresentazione della Rivoluzione americana, con particolare attenzione al momento fondativo della storia politica e giuridica degli Stati Uniti d’America. La ricorrenza del 250esimo anniversario della Dichiarazione di Indipendenza segna un passaggio cruciale nella genealogia dei moti rivoluzionari moderni offrendo, allo studioso, l’occasione per una più attenta riflessione sul concetto di rivoluzione e per una lettura critica delle trasformazioni sociali da questa prodotte.

46Per comprendere appieno la portata di tale fenomeno, è necessario ricostruire un breve itinerario storico che metta in luce la funzione di rottura radicale e di transizione che accomuna, pur nella loro eterogeneità, numerose esperienze rivoluzionarie. Sono stati richiamati alcuni snodi storici esemplari come la rivoluzione dei Paesi Bassi che caratterizza il processo di emancipazione dall’impero spagnolo, le due rivoluzioni inglesi del xvii secolo che determinano la progressiva erosione del potere assoluto della monarchia, e la rivoluzione francese del 1789, la quale continua a rappresentare, sul piano teorico e simbolico, il paradigma rivoluzionario per eccellenza nella modernità politica.

47Questi eventi, pur diversamente collocati nel tempo e nello spazio, costituiscono autentici spartiacque nella storia occidentale, segnando il passaggio da forme di autorità consolidate al riconoscimento di nuove strutture di legittimazione politica e giuridica.

48È opportuno precisare che quanto precede non intende orientare una dissertazione di diritto comparato né proporsi come una ricostruzione sistematica di storia del diritto: lo scopo è quello di richiamare alcuni riferimenti filosofico-giuridici per offrire una cornice concettuale utile a una più accurata comprensione del fenomeno rivoluzionario.

49Si avvia, dunque, un excursus interpretativo finalizzato non tanto a una classificazione descrittiva degli eventi, quanto alla chiarificazione delle modalità attraverso cui i processi rivoluzionari (e la volontà generale) incidono sulle strutture normative e istituzionali, aprendo così spazi di riflessione attorno ai temi della giustizia e della legalità.

50Come si è osservato in precedenza, ogni rivoluzione si radica nel contesto in cui ha origine e manifesta una morfologia propria, spesso determinata da variabili sociali, culturali e istituzionali. Da ciò deriva la dimensione intrinsecamente proteiforme del fenomeno rivoluzionario che, talvolta, si presenta rapido e violento, talaltra graduale e non necessariamente conflittuale (Baker, Edelstein).

51In effetti, nel linguaggio storiografico più recente, la nozione di “rivoluzione” è stata estesa anche a processi di mobilitazione meno traumatici – come movimenti operai o forme di proteste studentesche – nonché a quelle dinamiche che hanno determinato il crollo dei regimi autoritari nel secondo Novecento.

52Queste considerazioni lasciano emergere, con particolare chiarezza, come i fenomeni rivoluzionari non si siano sviluppati sempre secondo uno schema uniforme, ma possono assumere forme e dinamiche profondamente influenzate dai contesti storico-sociali nei quali si radicano. Le rivoluzioni – in quanto processi storici di rottura e rifondazione dell’ordine politico e giuridico – presentano configurazioni molteplici: alcune si caratterizzano per la rapidità e la violenza dello scontro istituzionale, alcune invece seguono traiettorie più lente, graduali e meno conflittuali, altre si alimentano di ideologie universalistiche, altre ancora sono mosse da rivendicazioni religiose, economiche o di tipo identitario.

53La Rivoluzione americana, la cui natura eversiva è stata per lungo tempo oggetto di dibattito, è un esempio paradigmatico di questa complessità, basti pensare che, alle volte, è stata definita come un evento non-rivoluzionario, in contrapposizione alle ‘ribellioni’ europee settecentesche, poiché non caratterizzata da un sovvertimento radicale e sistemico dell’ordine sociale esistente (Bonazzi).

54A differenza della Rivoluzione francese mossa da una volontà popolare diretta a trasformare i fondamenti dell’autorità e della sovranità, la Rivoluzione americana, infatti, è stata a lungo considerata espressione di una élite coloniale che, pur opponendosi alla metropoli, si mostrò capace di contenere le istanze più radicali provenienti dalle classi subalterne (Bonazzi).

55In tale quadro, la Dichiarazione d’Indipendenza del 1776 assume un significato giuridico e politico che va ben oltre la semplice rottura con la realtà britannica, configurandosi così come un atto fondativo, nel quale si condensano categorie normative che, ripercorrendo la prospettiva speculativa lockiana, rimandano al rapporto tra individuo, potere e diritti naturali.

56Per comprendere pienamente l’immaginario politico e simbolico che la promessa rivoluzionaria delle colonie avrebbe, in un secondo momento, alimentato, è necessario risalire alle origini dell’esperienza coloniale angloamericana. In tal senso, risultano particolarmente significativi i due episodi fondativi richiamati da Bonazzi con riguardo alla costituzione dell’insediamento di Jamestown in Virginia (1607) e l’arrivo dei Padri Pellegrini a Cape-Cod, nel Massachusetts (1620). Tali event segnano, secondo questa ricostruzione, i momenti centrali di una narrazione storica che vede l’individuo impegnato in un atto di separazione, non tanto in chiave antitetica rispetto alla madrepatria britannica, quanto piuttosto come prosecuzione delle dinamiche interne all’Inghilterra del periodo elisabettiano.

57Questi passaggi descrivono la “scena” d’origine nella quale si proietta l’immagine di un’umanità in cerca di emancipazione da vincoli religiosi, economici e sociali, ancora radicata nella cultura giuridica, religiosa e politica dell’Inghilterra d’inizio Seicento. La tensione tra continuità e rottura con il Vecchio Mondo, tra conservazione e innovazione, rappresenta dunque una chiave interpretativa imprescindibile per comprendere come l’identità politica e poi giuridica delle colonie si sia andata strutturando molto prima del 1776. Il riferimento esplicito al diritto alla vita, alla libertà e alla ricerca della felicità lascia emergere i tratti propri della tradizione del giusnaturalismo razionalista, secondo cui l’accordo politico ha validità solo nella misura in cui garantisce la tutela dei diritti inalienabili dei consociati.

58Quando tale patto viene violato, i governati non solo hanno il diritto ma il dovere di resistere all’oppressione, ed è in questa concezione che si radica la legittimità della rivoluzione come atto politico – da intendersi come il tentativo per il riconoscimento di una legalità giusta – e non semplicemente come insorgenza.

59In questa direzione, la Rivoluzione americana può essere considerata non solo un evento fondativo ‘interno’, ma anche un potente catalizzatore di trasformazioni transnazionali. La sua portata ideologica e istituzionale è stata proiettata ben oltre i confini delle Tredici Colonie, alimentando il dibattito politico-filosofico europeo e contribuendo a definire un nuovo orizzonte teorico per i futuri movimenti rivoluzionari, in primis quello francese del 1789.

60Nel contesto italiano, la ricezione della Rivoluzione americana si inscrive in una più ampia dinamica di circolazione transnazionale delle idee riformatrici e dei principi illuministici che contraddistinsero la seconda metà del xviii secolo. Si pensi ad alcuni ambienti intellettuali italiani in cui il pensiero politico statunitense viene recepito come una conferma delle potenzialità emancipative insite nella trasformazione dei rapporti tra governanti e governati, in linea con una visione progressiva e razionalistica della storia. Appare opportuno precisare al lettore che l’obiettivo di questo contributo non è quello di intervenire direttamente nel dibattito storiografico specialistico sulla Rivoluzione americana, né tantomeno proporre una disamina esaustiva della sua ricezione in Italia. L’approccio adottato schiude ad una prospettiva contestuale e interpretativa orientata a problematizzare i presupposti teorici e normativi della nozione di rivoluzione, al di là di ogni intento ricostruttivo in senso storico-comparativo, ciò al fine di inquadrare, con maggiore precisione, l’orizzonte teorico entro cui si sviluppa l’ipotesi filosofico-giuridica alla base del presente lavoro, secondo cui ogni autentico processo rivoluzionario dovrebbe essere inteso non come forma di legittimazione della violenza, ma come atto libero di rivendicazione orientato al riconoscimento della giustizia e dell’uguaglianza, fondamenti irrinunciabili di uno Stato di diritto.

61L’istanza rivoluzionaria americana – secondo quanto emerge dalla più significativa ricostruzione di Venturi – si radica in un tessuto culturale permeato dal bisogno di conciliare ragione e libertà, giustizia e istituzioni, dove il confronto con l’esperienza delle colonie americane si traduce, secondo questa linea speculativa, in un rafforzamento delle istanze riformatrici interne agli Stati (Venturi). Non si è trattato dunque di un’adesione ideologica acritica, bensì di un’elaborazione intellettuale attenta e selettiva, in cui l’esperienza americana diventa la lente di ingrandimento per riflettere sulle possibilità e sui limiti del cambiamento socio-politico in un contesto profondamente diverso da quello atlantico.

62Sebbene la Rivoluzione americana non abbia dato origine a un regime democratico pienamente inclusivo – poiché le élite coloniali sono riuscite a circoscrivere il potere politico e militare delle classi subalterne –, questa ha determinato la nascita di uno Stato liberale ispirato ai principi illuministici, basato sul consenso e sul riconoscimento di diritti civili e politici, seppure limitati a una parte della popolazione. Tale processo può essere interpretato come l’avvio della modernità politica occidentale, con le sue conquiste e le sue contraddizioni.

63Nel panorama storiografico italiano, i moti rivoluzionari americani hanno assunto significati molteplici, riflettendo le trasformazioni culturali e politiche dell’epoca in cui venivano letti, tanto che alcune coordinate della ricezione italiana dimostrano proprio come la ribellione sia stata interpretata in rapporto ai paradigmi di emancipazione, rappresentanza e ordine politico propri del contesto statale in cui si concretizzano.

64Infatti, se in alcune narrazioni (Botta) la rivoluzione si configura come un archetipo esemplare, capace di ispirare – in chiave politica e morale – le future generazioni impegnate nei processi di unificazione e liberazione del continente europeo e dell’Italia (ibid.), in altre viene proposta – attraverso un approccio metodologico critico – una problematizzazione degli esiti della rivoluzione che mette in luce come l’ordine politico raggiunto appariva plasmato da una élite capace di neutralizzare le istanze sociali più radicali e di limitare l’inclusività del nuovo sistema costituzionale (Bonazzi).

65Questo confronto tra una visione più celebrativa e teleologica e una più critica e strutturale, qui solo accennato, lascia cogliere come l’evoluzione della riflessione storiografica italiana sulla Rivoluzione americana da mito fondativo si trasforma, progressivamente, in oggetto di analisi comparativa e transnazionale.

66Per il giurista-filosofo questo passaggio rappresenta una preziosa occasione per riflettere sul plesso potere-legittimità, e sul rapporto tra ordine costituito e ordine giuridico orientato alla giustizia.

67Ne deriva che la Rivoluzione americana se, da un lato, può essere descritta come una cesura epocale, dall’altro rappresenta l’esito di un più articolato processo di costruzione politico-giuridica radicato in un contesto coloniale già permeato da forme preliminari di autogoverno.

68È questa complessa stratificazione storico-giuridica e simbolica che conferisce alla Rivoluzione americana una valenza paradigmatica, sebbene caratterizzata da una peculiare eccentricità, all’interno del più ampio contesto delle rivoluzioni.

69In conclusione, questa analisi comparativa e interdisciplinare delle esperienze rivoluzionarie consente di evidenziare come il concetto di ribellione debba essere inteso non soltanto come un evento storico isolato, ma come un processo complesso, plurale e dinamico caratterizzato da una profonda interazione tra trasformazioni socio-politiche e ridefinizioni normative. L’orizzonte politico-sociale entro cui si articolano le tensioni tra aspirazioni di libertà e rivendicazioni di uguaglianza configura lo spazio entro cui istituire forme di legittimazione e consolidazione degli ordinamenti post‑rivoluzionari.

70Una simile esperienza rivoluzionaria, lungi dall’essere univoca o monolitica, si presenta invece come un fenomeno proteiforme che riflette le specificità storiche, culturali e sociali di ogni contesto.

71Quella americana, pur caratterizzata da limiti intrinseci nella sua capacità di garantire una piena inclusività democratica, ha rappresentato un momento paradigmatico nella genesi degli Stati liberali, fondati sull’ideale illuministico del consenso politico e sul progressivo riconoscimento dei diritti civili e politici.

72Alla luce di tali riflessioni, si coglie che uno studio delle forme rivoluzionarie in chiave giuridico-filosofica invita ad avviare una dialettica tra continuità e rottura, tra legittimazione e conflitto, tra legalità e giustizia, sottolineando come la giuridicità non sia mero strumento di ordine sociale, ma spazio dialogico di “negoziazione” e ricerca di senso attorno ai principi generali del diritto.

IV/ Concluding Reflections

73In addressing the question of what impact the American revolutionary movement had on universal legal principles, this study has sought to advance a historically informed and critically engaged interpretation of the Declaration of Independence. By situating the Declaration within its specific sociopolitical and intellectual context, and by examining its normative claims through a dual hermeneutic and legal-philosophical lens, this inquiry underscores the necessity of integrating legal exegesis with historical consciousness.

74This analysis intends to establish that the Declaration of Independence cannot be merely construed as a foundational document enshrining the fundamental rights of the citizen. Rather, it must be interpreted as a historically contingent articulation of universal legal principles – liberty, equality, and justice – asserted forcefully within the revolutionary context from which it emerged.

75In this light, the American Revolution – often mythologized as the origin of modern constitutional democracy – should not be regarded as a straightforward exemplification of democratic ideals, but rather as a revealing instance of the social complexities and internal contradictions inherent in revolutionary legal discourse. It is precisely through the interplay between the invocation of rights, even in their natural law formulation, and the selective application of those rights within a sociopolitical order marked by exclusion and entrenched hierarchies, that one can begin to affirm and recognize the a priori foundations of the rule of law.

76Through the juxtaposition of a more celebratory reading of the Declaration and a more structural and critical approach, this work cautiously positions itself within a broader historiographical discourse – particularly within the field of Italian scholarship – that has progressively shifted focus from viewing the American Revolution as a mythical origin to treating it as an object of philosophical and legal analysis. This methodological reorientation enables a more nuanced understanding of how revolutionary movements engage with, reinterpret, and ultimately reshape the language and logic of legal universality.

77The concept of revolution – discussed here as a form of rebellion distinct from a mere violent seizure of power – calls attention to the complex relationship between constituted authority and the ideals of justice that frequently challenge it. For the legal philosopher, this enduring tension offers fertile ground for reflecting on the nexus between the lawful and the just, between right and wrong, and for considering the role of legal systems not as static guarantors of state order, but as evolving structures that, however imperfectly, appear oriented toward the realization of a non-authoritarian conception of legality.

78This research has sought to underscore the fundamental premise that bodies of knowledge – and more specifically, legal knowledge – cannot be disentangled from historical understanding. The formation and interpretation of legal texts, particularly those enshrining human rights, are inextricably embedded within the cultural, linguistic, and ideological contexts in which they originate and operate. As such, the Declaration of Independence emerges not merely as a legal-political document, but as a site of ongoing interpretive contestation – one that continues to inform and shape contemporary debates surrounding law, legality, and justice.

79By embracing this interpretive openness, the intention is to draw attention to the dynamic and perpetually unfinished nature of philosophical inquiry: not to arrive at definitive certainties, but to remain critically attuned to the evolving contours of meaning, particularly as they relate to the notion of human dignity.

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Notes

1 This is my translation of the original Italian passage.

2 The first resolution on American Independence, known as the Lee Resolution, was proposed by Richard Henry Lee on June 7, 1776, during the Second Continental Congress. While its vote was postponed on June 11 to allow state consultations, a committee – comprising Jefferson, Adams, Franklin, Sherman, and Livingston – was tasked that same day with drafting the Declaration of Independence.

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Marialuisa Innocenzi, « A legal-philosophical interpretation of the American Declaration of Independence. An Italian philosophy of law perspective »L’Ordinaire des Amériques [En ligne], 234 | 2025, mis en ligne le 01 décembre 2025, consulté le 15 février 2026. URL : http://journals.openedition.org/orda/12184 ; DOI : https://doi.org/10.4000/15kn9

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