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Borsani, D., La special relationship anglo-americana e la guerra delle Falkland, 1982, Firenze : Le Lettere, 2015.
Boyce, D.G., The Falklands War, Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2005.
Burch, M., “The Politics of Persuasion and the Conservative Leadership’s Campaign”, in I. Crewe and M. Harrop (eds.), Political Communications: The General Election Campaign of 1983, Cambridge: CUP, 1986.
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Campbell, J., Margaret Thatcher, vol. II, The Iron Lady, London: Jonathan Cape, 2003.
Carrington, P., Reflect on things past. The memoirs of Lord Carrington, London: Collins, 1988.
Clark, A. Diaries. Into Politics 1972-1982, London: Phoenix, 2000.
Clarke, P., A question of Leadership. Gladstone to Blair, London: Penguin, 1999.
Crewe, I., “How to Win a Landslide without Really Trying: Why the Conservatives Won in 1983”, in A. Ranney (ed.), Britain at the Polls 1983. A Study of the General Election, American Enterprise Institute Book, 1985.
Critchley, J., Westminster Blues. Minor Chords, London: Elm Tree Books, 1985.
Critchley, J., Palace of Varieties. An Insider’s View of Westminster, London: John Murray, 1989.
Donaghy, A., The British Government and the Falkland Islands, 1974-1979, Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2014.
Du Cann, E., Two Lives. The Political and Business Careers of Edward Du Cann, Upton upon Severn: Images Publishing, 1995.
English R., Kenny, M. (eds.), Rethinking the British Decline, Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2000.
Fowler, N., Ministers Decide. A Personal Memoir of the Thatcher Years, London: Chapmans, 1991.
Freedman, L., The Official History of the Falklands campaign, vol. I, The Origins of the Falklands War and vol. II, War and Diplomacy, London: Routledge, 2005.
Haig, A., Caveat. Realism, Reagan, and Foreign Policy, London: Weidenfeld&Nicolson, 1984.
Healey, D., Time of my Life, London: Michael Joseph, 1989.
Heffer, E., Never a Yes Man. The Life and Politics of an Adopted Liverpudlian, London: Verso, 1991.
Henderson, N., Mandarin. The Diaries of an Ambassador 1969-1982, London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1994.
Hennessy, P., Cabinet, Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986.
Hennessy, P., The Prime Minister. The Office and its Holders since 1945, London: Penguin, 2000.
Hennessy, P., “‘War Cabinetry’: the political direction of the Falklands conflict”, in S. Badsey, R. Havers, M. Grove (eds.), The Falklands Conflict Twenty Years on. Lessons for the Future, London-New York: Frank Cass, 2005, p. 131-146.
Himmelweit, H., Humphreys, P., Jaeger, M., How Voters Decide. A Longitudinal Study of Political Attitudes and Voting Extending over Fifteen Years, Milton Keynes: Open University Press, 1985.
House of Commons, Debates, April-May 1982.
Howe, G., Conflict of Loyalty, London: Macmillan, 1994.
Hurd, D., Memoirs, London: Little Brown, 2003.
Jenkins, P., Mrs. Thatcher’s Revolution: the Ending of the Socialist Era, London: Cape, 1987.
Jenkins, S., “The Birth of the Thatcher Factor”, The Times, 31st March 1983.
Jenkins, S., Thatcher and Sons. A Revolution in Three Acts, London: Penguin, 2006.
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Miller, W.L., “There Was no Alternative: the British General Election of 1983”, Parliamentary Affairs, 37 (1984), p. 364-384.
Monaghan, D., The Falklands War. Myth and Countermyth, London: Macmillan, 1998.
Moon, J., Innovative Leadership in Democracy. Policy Change under Thatcher, Aldershot: Dourtmouth, 1993.
Moore, C., Margaret Thatcher. The Authorized Biography, vol. I, Not for Turning, London: Penguin, 2013.
Nott, J., Here Today, Gone Tomorrow. Recollections of an Errant Politician, London: Politico’s, 2002.
Nott, J., “A View from the Centre”, in S. Badsey, R. Havers, M. Grove (eds.), The Falklands Conflict Twenty Years on. Lessons for the Future, London-New York: Frank Cass, 2005, p. 57-63.
Owen, D., Time to Declare, London: Michael Joseph, 1991.
Parkinson, C., Right at the Centre. An Autobiography, London: Weidenfel and Nicholson, 1992.
Prior, J., A Balance of Power, London: Hamish Hamilton, 1986.
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Thatcher, M., The Downing Street Years, London: HarperCollins, 1993.
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Vinen, R., Thatcher’s Britain. The Politics and Social Upheaval of the 1980s, London: Simon&Schuster, 2009.
Whitelaw, W., The William Whitelaw Memoirs, London: Aurum, 1989.
Yorke, E., “‘The Empire strikes back’? The Commonwealth response to the Falklands conflict”, in S. Badsey, R. Havers, M. Grove (eds.), The Falklands Conflict Twenty Years on. Lessons for the Future, London-New York: Frank Cass, 2005., p. 170-192.
Young, H., The Hugo Young Papers. A Journalist’s Notes from the Heart of Politics, Edited by I. Trewin, London: Penguin, 2008.
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Notes
Freedman, L., 2007; Donaghy, A., 2014.
House of Commons, Debates, 3rd April 1982. Alan Clark wrote: «We’ve lost the Falklands […] It’s all over. We’re a Third World country, no good for anything». Clark, A., 2000, p. 310.
According to Julien Critchley, it was the worst speech by Mrs Thatcher ever (Critchley, J., 1985, p. 125). For Kenneth Baker, «she was not at her best» (Baker, K., 1993, p. 67). For Norman Fowler, «her speech went as well as was possible, given that it was being made on the stickiest of sticky Parliament wickets» (Fowler, N., 1991).
Powell concluded his speech as follows: «The Prime Minister, shortly after she came into office, received a soubriquet as the “Iron Lady”. It arose in the context of remarks which she made about defence against the Soviet Union and its allies; but there was no reason to suppose that the right hon. Lady did not welcomed and, indeed, take pride in that description. In the next week or two this House, the nation and the right hon. Lady herself will learn of what metal she is made», House of Commons, Debates, 3rd April 1982, col. 644.
Ray Whitney. It could be of some interest what the Speaker of the House of Commons refers in his memoirs: «During the course of the debate, I saw Mrs. Thatcher’s Parliamentary Private Secretary, Ian Gow, talking to the right-wing Conservative MP Ray Whitney, a former diplomat. It was therefore obvious that the government wanted him to speak in the debate», Thomas, G., 1985, p. 208.
According to David Owen, «at the end of the debate there were few people in the House who believed that both [Nott] and Carrington could stay on. At least one of them, perhaps both, would have to resign» (Owen, D., 1991, p. 547).
Julien Critchley described the atmosphere of the Committee meetings as follows: «The ’22 meets once a week in ‘peacetime’; in times of crisis it can become a theatre of cruelty and of the absurd, offering an element of drama which the Commons’ chamber seems reluctant to provide. The run-of-the-mill weekly meeting is to be avoided. A whip reads out the business of the coming week, the minutes of the last meeting are recited, there may be a listless question or two from a predictable source and that is that. What humour there is can only be of the unconscious kind. But when the party’s dander is up, the ’22 can be every bit as Gothic as its High Victorian surroundings. […] It is on occasions such as these that the worst side of Our Great Party manifests itself. Unleashed, we run the gamut of our emotions: jingoism, anti-semitism, obscurantism, cant and self-righteousness; all play their part. We can, when pushed to do so, flourish our political prejudices like so many captive princes paraded through the streets of Imperial Rome. Why not hold such meetings in the Coliseum?», Critchley, J., 1989, p. 127. According to Critchley the meeting on 3rd April was «the most exciting committee meeting I ever attended […] Mrs. Thatcher had made what was probably her lamest speech in the Chamber, and the party was reeling from shock and indignation. There was to be blood all over the floor», ivi, p. 55. Nott, J., 2002, p. 268 and Clark, A., Diaries, p. 313 provide reports of that meeting in line with Critchley’s one. On the contrary, the account of the chairman of the Committee is more sugar coated. See Du Cann, E., 1995, pp. 213-215.
Thatcher, M., 1993, p. 185. See also Nott, J., 2002; Whitelaw, W., 1989, p. 203; Parkinson, C., 1992, p. 190; Prior, J., 1986, pp. 147-149. The Foreign Secretary himself was well aware that his membership in the House of Lords was a weakness for the Cabinet in that moment: Carrington, P., 1988, pp. 368-372.
Nott, J., 2002, p. 264; Parkinson, C., 1992, p. 190; Howe, G., 1994, p. 245.
Thatcher, M., 1993, p. 184-185.
Benn, T., 1992, p. 203; Healey, D., 1989, p. 496. Foot’s speech was such that the Conservative MP Edward Du Cann could begin his by saying: «the Leader of Opposition spoke for us all» (House of Commons, Debates, 3rd April 1982, col. 642).
For details about the divisions within the Labour Party see Benn, T., 1992, p. 200-232.
See Freedman, L., 2005, vol. II and Boyce, D.G., 2005, p. 39-97.
Nott, J., 2002.
Major, J., 1999, p. 77.
Nott, J., 2005, p. 57-63.
Prior, J., 1986, p. 148; N. Lawson, 1993, p. 126-127.
Prior, J., 1986, p. 148.
Hennessy, P., 2005.
Parkinson, C., 1992, p. 196.
Boyce, D.G., 2005, p. 86.
Mrs Thatcher’s reaction during the meeting of 16th May is paradigmatic. The Fco was trying to convince her to soften the British position in order not to irritate the UN or the US. «The PM veered the whole time towards being uncompromising, so that the rest of us, and in particular the Fco participants, constantly found themselves under attack from her for being wet, ready to sell out, unsupportive of British interests etc. […] Did not people realise that it was the Argentineans who had committed aggression? Did the Foreign Office have no principles? She said that while we were content to be dishonest and consult with dishonest people she was honest. Were the Fco prepared to hand over people who believed in democracy to a dictatorship? She would never abandon the Falkland Islands any more than she would fail to uphold the principle of self-determination which must, indeed, be written into the draft agreement, not just once but several times - though we told her that to do so would make everyone think that we were not serious because the Argentineans would reject it out of hand». Henderson, N., 1994, pp. 461-462.
For the US stance during the crisis, beyond the works by Boyce and Freedman, see also Haig, A., 1984, chapter XIII; Richardson, L., 1996, p. 111-159; Borsani, D., 2015.
Haig telegram to Reagan, 9th April 1982, http://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/109216. James Rentschler’s Falklands Diary, http://www.margaretthatcher.org/archive/arcdocs/Rentschler.pdf, p. 11 describes Pym as «the only British peace party we seem to have in this room».
The meeting on 24th April is vibrantly recalled in the memoirs of both Margaret Thatcher and John Nott.
According to Mrs Thatcher, Francis Pym was «the quintessential old style Tory […] a proud pragmatist and an enemy of ideology», Thatcher, M., 1993, p. 187. For Cecil Parkinson, Pym «and Prime minister were happy to see the minimum of each other», Parkinson, C., 1992, p. 198. For Geoffrey Howe, Pym «and Margaret had often before shown their incompatibility», Howe, G., 1994, p. 247. According to Charles Moore, an «additional reason why Mrs Thatcher felt she had to promote Pym was that he was now the favourite to succeed her as leader», Moore, C., 2013, p. 676.
Hurd, D., 2003.
Parkinson, C., 1992, p. 198: «Francis commanded the respect of the House of Commons and was the right man to rally and reassure the badly shaken conservative parliamentary party and to unite the opposition behind the government’s policies». Francis Pym «did a superb job in the most difficult circumstances. His speeches in the House were balanced and well received», Prior, J., 1986, p. 149. See also Whitelaw, W., 1989, p. 204.
Howe, G., 1994, p. 246: «any other choice would have meant a series of Cabinet upheavals, which was clearly not on».
Hugo, Y., 2008, p. 182-183.
House of Commons, Debates, 6th and 7th April 1982. See also Moore, C., 2013, p. 682-683.
Owen, D., 1991, p. 548.
For Kenneth Baker, the Falklands war suited Margaret Thatcher very well, because it allowed her to fight in her favourite situation: «back to the wall in a tight corner». Baker, K., 1993, p. 72.
Boyce, D.G., 2005, p. 8-60.
From this perspective, the crucial issue in Mrs Thatcher’s view was the UK’s role on the world stage. See Thatcher, M., 1993, p. 192-193 and Haig, A., 1984, p. 267.
Toase, F., 2005, p. 147-169. Moreover the resolution allows the British government to avoid a further involvement of the UN until the beginning of May. Trying «to keep our affairs out of the UN as much as possible» was one of the goal of Mrs Thatcher. See Thatcher, M., 1993, p. 182.
So Eric Heffer during the NEC International Committee meeting on 11th May. See Benn, T., 1992, p. 221. According to Heffer, «there was a dilemma at the heart of the problem. We could not allow a bunch of military fascist thugs to take over the islands and it was right that the Falkland people should be able to live in peace, but neither could we support rampant jingoism and warmongering», Heffer, E., 1991, p. 196.
Hennessy, P., 2005. John Nott recalls that «Whitelaw […] and I, in the early stages, thought ‘Suez, Suez, Suez’ in many of our waking hours», Nott, J., 2002, p. 247.
Yorke, E., 2005, p. 170-192.
Haig, A., 1984, chapter XIII. See also James Rentschler’s Falklands Diary, p. 5: «for all her the rigidity and indignation on Mrs. Thatcher’s side, it is clear that she and her colleagues really do trust us and hope we can pull off some mediatory intervention which can avert hostile engagement of the fleet».
Thatcher, M., 1993, p. 217.
Clarke, P., 1999, p. 306.
In other words, «the way Thatcher rode and exploited her luck is more significant than the fact that she had it, and this was further testament to her distinctive leadership role». Moon, J., 1993, p. 123.
Vinen, R., 2009, p. 75-133.
«People forget how vulnerable Mrs Thatcher was in her first years in office. Thatcherism was vigorously opposed by many backbenchers, senior Cabinet Ministers and much of the Party. True believers were in a minority. Keeping my fellow MPs on side was a hard labour», Du Cann, E., 1995, p. 214. «We must have been the most divided conservative cabinet ever», Prior, J., 1986, p. 134.
Campbell, J., 2003, p. 104-125.
Hennessy, P., 2000, p. 397-436. See also Hennessy, P., 1986.
«The reason why the so-called Falklands Factor was so powerful, and lasted so long, was that it was more than a military victory: it symbolized and reinforced the image of the government, and of Margaret in particular, as tough, resolute and different from previous wishy-washy governments right across the board, not least in economy policy». Lawson, N., 1993, p. 245.
Jenkins, S., «The Birth of the Thatcher Factor», The Times, 31st March 1983.
Taking into account the 1970s and the early 1980s, Himmelweit, H., Humphreys, P., Jaeger, M., 1985, chapters 13 and 14, highlights the rising scepticism of the British voters about the ability of both Labours and Conservatives in tackling the main problems of the UK. The study also stresses that «voters’ attitudes towards the leaders have become increasingly important, even decisive».
The Albert Sloman Library, SDP Archives – Papers of Lord Rodgers, box 33, SDP Research: Final Report (August 1982), p. 9.
Ivi, p. 10.
Ivi, p. 9.
Ivi, p. 20.
Ivi, p. 23.
Ivi, p. 20.
The most complete and convincing study on this aspect is Himmelweit, H., Humphreys, P., Jaeger, M., 1985. See also McAllister, I., Rose, R., 1984 and Crewe, I., 1985, p. 155-196. This study gives more relevance to Foot’s liabilities than to Thatcher’s strengths in order to explain the electoral results. Crewe’s analysis – published even as Why Labour Lost the British Election, «Public Opinion», July, 1983 – is discussed by Miller, W.L., 1984, p. 364-384.
Himmelweit, H., Humphreys, P., Jaeger, M., 1985, p. 220-222; Crewe, I., 1985, p. 160-161; Burch, M., 1986, p. 65-76; Butler, D., Kavanagh, D. (eds.), 1984, p. 288-294.
Crewe, I., 1985 and Himmelweit, H., Humphreys, P., Jaeger, M., 1985, chapter 14.
Jenkins, P., 1987, p. 163. See also Jenkins, S., 2006, p. 74-75. The topic of the Great Britain’s decline is crucial in the British public debate after 1945. For an assessment of the issue see English R., Kenny, M. (eds.), 2000.
King, A., 2002.
Monaghan, D., 1998.
Mrs Thatcher’s speech at Cheltenham on 2nd July 1982 expresses this idea at the best.
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