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2. Living together in a Union of four nations

Immigration challenges to Scotland after Brexit

Wafa El Fekih Said
p. 79-102

Résumé

The negotiations regarding the withdrawal of the UK from the European Union have raised a number of questions relating to the future relationship between the UK and the EU. The impact of Brexit on Scotland will be considerable in economic terms and in terms of employment in the case of a ‘no deal’ with the EU. Britain’s withdrawal from the EU has also had an impact on the Scottish constitutional debate: the referendum results have revived the independence debate and led to calls for more devolved powers on immigration. Taking into consideration the restrictive orientation of the British Conservative-led government on immigration, the Scottish government is faced with questions on how to deal with immigration after Brexit. Brexit raises both challenges and opportunities for decision-makers in Scotland as relates to policies dedicated to immigrants in the context of the nation-building project. Using official government reports on immigration and Brexit as well as election manifestos, the following paper discusses the evolution and orientation of immigration in Scotland after leaving the EU and the resulting challenges and opportunities for the decision-makers in terms of the nation-building project in Scotland.

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Introduction

1The negotiations regarding the withdrawal of the UK from the European Union have raised a number of questions related to future policy coordination. Policies affected include border-controls, immigration, trade arrangements, security, and the situation of European residents in the UK as well as that of Britons living across Europe. The future relationship between the UK and the EU will be defined by the outcome of current negotiations and the final Withdrawal Agreement.

  • 1 Bell, D., 2018, online.
  • 2 Boswell, C., Bell, D., Copus, A., Kay, R., & Kulu, H., 2019, p. 3.
  • 3 Boswell, C., Bell, D., Copus, A., Kay, R., & Kulu, H., 2019, p. 5.
  • 4 Boswell, C., Bell, D., Copus, A., Kay, R., & Kulu, H., 2019, p. 6.
  • 5 House of Commons, 2016, p. 5.

2Within the UK, new tensions are likely to emerge between Holyrood (the Scottish Parliament) and Westminster (the British Parliament) on the negotiations of the terms of Brexit by the UK government. The impact of Brexit on Scotland will be far from negligible on the economy and employment in the case of a ‘no deal’ with the EU1. As far as immigration is concerned, the ‘no-deal’ option may have an important impact in terms of employment: the European workforce constitutes an important input to Scotland2, and a significant contribution in terms of tax revenues3. Moreover, migration from the EU has had a considerable effect on Scotland’s population thanks to the Free Movement of European citizens ensured by membership with the EU4. Indeed, until recently, the country had suffered from a demographic deficit due to uninterrupted flows of emigration. Moreover, Scotland’s population has a slower growth rate, mainly due to lower levels of net immigration and fertility compared to the rest of the UK5, a situation which has created much concern among the political actors in Scotland. The decline of migration from the EU could have a greater long-term impact in Scotland than in the rest of the UK. 

3Britain’s withdrawal from the EU has also had an impact on the Scottish constitutional debate. The EU referendum results, on 23rd June 2016, revived the Scottish independence debate and led to calls for more devolved powers on immigration. Taking into consideration the restrictive orientation of current Conservative-led government on immigration, the Scottish government is faced with a number of challenges on how to deal with immigration after Brexit. However, Brexit could also raise new opportunities for decision-makers in Scotland in the context of the nation-building project.

4The following paper discusses the orientation of immigration in the UK after leaving the EU and the resulting challenges and opportunities Brexit raises for the decision-makers in Scotland in terms of the nation-building project. This paper mainly relies on official government reports on immigration and Brexit and on election manifestos in order to cover the different policy initiatives and strategies initiated by the last two British and Scottish governments, the former being Conservative-led and the latter SNP-led. The first part of this paper examines the key immigration-related challenges facing Scotland in a post-Brexit context. The management of immigration and diversity by successive Conservative governments since the beginning of Brexit negotiations will be also explored. The last part of this paper will examine the Scottish government’s response to these new measures.

The key challenges for Scottish decision-makers concerning immigration after Brexit

  • 6 Conservative Party Manifesto, 2015, p. 29.

5The Scottish and British governments are confronted with a number of challenges when dealing with the impact of Brexit on immigration from Europe. Indeed, the UK government’s approach towards immigration is intended to further limit immigration to the ‘tens of thousands’6, a situation which creates more disenchantment at the level of Scotland.

6Different works have attempted to analyse the immediate as well as the long-term impacts of Brexit on immigration to the UK. Wadsworth et al. have focused on the negative impact of the end of Free Movement on the economy. They summarise the situation as follows :

  • 7 Wadsworth, J., Dhingra, S., Ottaviano, G. & Van Reenen, J., 2016, p. 16.

We cannot be precise about the size of the losses from restricting immigration following a Brexit. ... At the national level, falls in EU immigration are likely to lead to lower living standards for the UK-born. This is partly because immigrants help to reduce the deficit: they are more likely to work and pay tax and less likely to use public services as they are younger and better educated than the UK-born. It is also partly due to the positive effects of EU immigrants on productivity.7

7Thus, according to Wadsworth et al., the profile of potential immigrants from Europe provides net advantages to the UK as they are less likely to use public services while at the same time contributing to the economy.

  • 8 Boswell, C., Bell, D., Copus, A., Kay, R., & Kulu, H., 2019, p. 5.
  • 9 Boswell, C., Bell, D., Copus, A., Kay, R., & Kulu, H., 2019, p. 6.
  • 10 Boswell, C., Bell, D., Copus, A., Kay, R., & Kulu, H., 2019, p. 6.
  • 11 Boswell, C., Bell, D., Copus, A., Kay, R., & Kulu, H., 2019, pp. 16-18.
  • 12 Boswell, C., Bell, D., Copus, A., Kay, R., & Kulu, H., 2019, p. 8.

8Another report, based on the projections of the Immigration White Paper, has explored the fiscal and economic as well as demographic implications of less migration from the EU and the possible impact of these measures on Scotland. According to the report, EU migrants to Scotland are typically young and economically active and thus can contribute more through tax revenues than they consume by way of public services8. In addition, reduced EU migration would lead to a gradually declining and rapidly ageing working-age population9. The report also draws attention to the fact that the population of Scotland has increased largely thanks to migration rather than by natural change10. These aspects reflect the importance of the demographic dimension in the Brexit formula. The report also acknowledges that, over the past decade, an estimated 45% of migrants to Scotland have come from Europe, making a consistent contribution to the workforce in Scotland with an average age between 20 and 2911. Taking into consideration all these factors, proposals to end Free Movement and restrict immigration would seriously disrupt current patterns of mobility and settlement across Scotland12.

  • 13 Portes, J., 2016, p. R17.
  • 14 Portes, J., 2016, pp. R19-R20.
  • 15 Portes, J., 2016, p. R14.

9Jonathan Portes has also investigated the possible repercussions of Brexit on immigration. He affirms that EU migration is both driven by, and plays an important role in the developments of the UK labour market. Portes draws attention to the fact that the debate over the new immigration system in the UK is ‘entirely vacuous’13 as it relies mainly on the same criteria-based framework as the points-based system already in place. In addition, a restrictive policy that aims to reduce migration to the government’s target of ‘tens of thousands’ would have significant economic consequences, according to Portes14. Portes shows the importance of EU migrants in the UK workforce, with essentially all the net increase in employment being accounted for by foreign-born workers in the last quarter of 201615.

  • 16 Vargas-Silva, C., Fernández-Reino, M., 2019, p. 3.
  • 17 Vargas-Silva, C., Fernández-Reino, M., 2019, p. 3.
  • 18 Portes, J., 2016, p.15.

10In addition, it is estimated that there are approximately 3.6 million EU nationals currently resident in the UK, making up 5.5% of the UK population according to ONS data16. EU-born migrants make up around 39% of the total immigrant population in the UK17, making the impact of this population more important. Portes draws attention to the post-Brexit status of EEA nationals, which will be dependent on the withdrawal negotiations, a decision that will also have an impact on the status of UK nationals resident in other EU countries18.

  • 19 Scottish Government, 2019, p. 19.
  • 20 Scottish Government, 2019, p. 27.
  • 21 Scottish Government, 2019, p. 27.
  • 22 As part of the EU, European nationals used to have a preferential treatment compared to non-EU nati (...)

11A separate, but related issue is the extent to which the new immigration system is primarily directed at reducing overall immigration levels, and whether in this restrictive approach it is taking into consideration the possible repercussions of such measures on the economy and population of Scotland. Thus, one of the main challenges facing the Scottish government today revolves around the ongoing negotiations between the British government and the EU. A ‘no-deal’ arrangement means the end of Free Movement which can result in different repercussions at the level of inward migration in Scotland and thus will have an impact on Scotland’s workforce and on Scotland’s population19. The Scottish government has expressed fears of disruptions that could occur in the recruitment process, especially in sectors employing significant numbers of EU citizens such as the health and social care sectors20. In addition, according to the Scottish government, EU citizens are likely to be discouraged to stay in Scotland by new immigration rules21, putting at risk the settlement of a sizeable number of EU migrants living in Scotland who despite being granted the possibility to apply for settlement in the UK may be discouraged to stay in Scotland by the new measures. Similarly, EU citizens planning to migrate to the UK have to apply through the points-based system, the same as non-EU nationals22.

  • 23 Scottish Government, 2019, p. 26.

12Another important dimension that decision-makers have to take into consideration is the impact of Brexit on Scottish universities and the likelihood of there being a drop in the number of European students if there is no deal with the EU on immigration. In fact, the visa system proposed by the UK government of a three year non-renewable visa under the ‘Euro Temporary Leave to remain’ has been criticized for its inadequacy with the four-year degree courses offered by Scottish universities23. This form of visa requires any European resident in the UK looking to stay in the country to apply for ‘Euro Temporary Leave to remain’ (ETLR). The ETLR allows applicants to stay in the UK for 36 months and despite being a temporary measure until the new points-based system is in place, the ETLY may discourage potential students to choose Scottish universities.

  • 24 The post-study work visa allowed international students to stay and work in the UK for 2 years afte (...)
  • 25 The call for the reinstatement of the Post-study work visa for international graduates in 2020/21 w (...)

13Another challenging measure for Scottish and British universities has been the end of the Post-study work visa24 in 2012 under the Conservative-Liberal Democratic coalition government. The Post-study work route has been described by the main parties in Scotland as a positive and necessary measure to encourage graduates from Scottish universities to settle in Scotland25.

  • 26 Scottish Government, 2019, p. 3.
  • 27 Scottish Government, 2019c, online.
  • 28 Scottish Government, 2019c, online.
  • 29 Scottish Government, 2019c, online.

14In relation to Scotland, the British government has been criticized for excluding the Scottish government from decision-making26. Several measures have been proposed by the Scottish government in terms of immigration including the devolution of immigration and the creation of a ‘Scottish visa’ with fewer requirements than the conventional visa system. A regional approach to immigration was also proposed as a means to populate the rural and most affected areas by population decline. Furthermore, the new context born of the Brexit referendum resulted in calls for more powers and gave more weight to the nationalist cause in Scotland, thus threatening the union of the UK. In an attempt to draw attention to the specific needs of the constituent parts of the UK, the First Ministers of Wales and of Scotland have officially called for ruling out a ‘no-deal’ option to Brexit in a joint publication27. In this statement, the First Ministers of Scotland and Wales reminded of the relationship between and roles of the UK and devolved governments, and the basis of their mutual engagement28. They thus called for negotiation and agreement as ‘the only possible basis for successful joint working’29. However, the First Ministers’ request was categorically rejected by British Prime Minister Boris Johnson. The attitude of the Conservative government towards negotiation with the Scottish government raises questions on whether it would be prepared to make concessions in terms of reserved powers in order to preserve the unity of the country in the likelihood of a second independence referendum for Scotland and accept the Scottish government’s calls for the introduction of a ‘regional’ approach to immigration policy or to grant the Scottish government some power over migration to Scotland.

British governments’ proposals on post-Brexit immigration

  • 30 Carl, N., 2018, p. 4
  • 31 Grierson, J., 2018, online

15The UK’s departure from the EU is likely to usher in important changes to immigration policy. In fact, immigration has been at the heart of the debate on the Brexit referendum with the Leave campaign calling for regaining control over borders thanks to Brexit30. More immigration concerns have been voiced since the UK’s decision to leave the EU in 201631, putting more pressure on the Conservative government for its future plans on immigration.

  • 32 Partos, R., Bale, T., 2015, p. 170
  • 33 Tier 1 category in the UK’s points-based system refers to high-value migrants and Tier 2 category t (...)
  • 34 Hutton, J., 2017, p. 38
  • 35 Hutton, J., 2017, p. 39

16Before the Brexit referendum, successive Conservative governments under David Cameron had pursued a tough line on immigration. It was even claimed that ‘in practice, immigration policy under the Conservatives in recent years has been remarkably restrictive, hard-line and, at times, both hyperbolic and hyperactive’32. This position has been a key feature of the British immigration strategy since the ascent of the Conservative Party to power in 2010. For example, one of the main actions of the Conservative – Liberal Democratic coalition government led by David Cameron consisted in putting more restrictions on immigration through imposing a system of quotas to limit the number of immigrants — reducing immigration from Tiers 1 and 233. Another important restrictive measure was the decision to end the Post-study work visa which allowed foreign graduates in British universities to stay and work in the UK for up to two years after completing their studies. Under the leadership of David Cameron, the Conservative government also imposed English language requirements for applicants intending to join their spouses, and introduced a minimum income threshold for spousal migration in 201234. In addition, the government increased the probationary period for spouses to claim indefinite leave to remain35. Initially set to two years, the minimum period of residence was increased to five years. This measure together with the language and income requirements clearly aimed at further controlling immigration.

  • 36 Conservative Party Manifesto, 2015, p. 29.

17Under the leadership of Theresa May, more restrictive immigration measures were promoted. The Prime Minister repeatedly voiced her intention to reduce the number of immigrants to the UK and recalled the Conservative Party’s target to cut annual net migration to the ‘tens of thousands’ when she was Home Secretary36. The ambitious targets of those successive Conservative governments were reflected in the decision to leave the EU and end Free Movement as a means to control immigration from the EU.

  • 37 Office for National Statistics, 2020, online.
  • 38 Carl, N., 2018, p. 4.
  • 39 Carl, N., 2018, p. 4.

18Despite not being able to fulfil its target, with an estimated 677,000 people moving to the UK in 201937, the Conservative Party continues to present the ultraliberal strategy of the EU in relation to Free Movement as the main reason for such high numbers, a position strongly shared by the Leave campaign voters38 according to a research report funded by the Economic and Social Research Council’s ‘the UK in a Changing Europe’ initiative. In the same report, to ‘regain control over immigration’ is stated as the main reason for the decision to vote Leave39.

  • 40 Migration Observatory, 2016, online.
  • 41 Migration observatory, 2016, online.

19Following the success of the Brexit referendum, new measures are expected to be implemented to deal with immigration from Europe. In a pre-referendum article the Migration Observatory stressed the ‘enormous uncertainty’ about the policies envisaged for EU citizens seeking to move to the UK40. The article exposed the different options that the UK could pursue to regulate immigration from EU countries including the extension of existing non-EU immigration rules to European migrants or the application of an ‘Australian-style points-based system’, similar to the existing immigration system. The article also drew attention to the situation of EU citizens already living in the UK, and to Britons overseas and stressed the need to negotiate the terms of the UK-EU relationship especially in terms of free movement of people41.

  • 42 Home Office, 2018, p. 1.

20The Conservative government’s plans on immigration were first formulated and presented to the British Parliament in a White Paper entitled The Future Relationship between the United Kingdom and the European Union, published on 12th July 2018. ‘Ending free movement’ was set as one of the main decisions in the Prime Minister’s foreword42. According to the White Paper, Brexit would mean regaining control over borders. It states:

  • 43 Home Office, 2018, p. 32.

In future it will be for the UK Government and Parliament to determine the domestic immigration rules that will apply. Free movement of people will end as the UK leaves the EU. The Immigration Bill will bring EU migration under UK law, enabling the UK to set out its future immigration system in domestic legislation.43

  • 44 Home Office, 2018, p. 6.
  • 45 Home Office, 2018, p. 32.
  • 46 Home Office, 2018, p. 32.
  • 47 Home Office, 2018, p. 32.
  • 48 Home Office, 2018, p. 32.
  • 49 Home Office, 2018, p. 32.
  • 50 Home Office, 2018, p. 41.
  • 51 Home Office, 2018, p. 9.

21Here, the Home Office referred to ‘putting in place a new immigration system’44, without providing more specification on the type of immigration system envisaged for EU migrants. The post-Brexit immigration system was thought to be ‘a system that works for all parts of the UK’45. The new system would mainly rely on the Migration Advisory Committee (MAC) to establish information on EU patterns of migration46. According to the White Paper, the Conservative government was seemingly planning to pursue a similar immigration strategy for all migrants, whether from the EU or not, affirming that ‘the UK’s future immigration arrangements will set out how those from the EU and elsewhere can apply to come and work in the UK’47. In addition, the immigration system envisaged in the White Paper was to be based on selective immigration ‘to continue to attract the brightest and best, from the EU and elsewhere’48. Reducing migration was still cited as one of the government’s main objectives49. The White Paper also provided information on the status of current EU workers in the UK stating that existing workers’ rights enjoyed under EU law would continue to be available in UK law on the day of withdrawal50. The Conservative government also advocated the establishment of a new framework that would facilitate the movement of UK and EU citizens to each other’s countries51. The proposal can be seen as a reaffirmation of the Conservative Party’s pledges on a selective immigration policy orientation through the implementation of one immigration system for all EU and non-EU nationals without further clarification whether there would be specific provisions favouring migration from the EU.

  • 52 Home Office, 2018b, p. 12.
  • 53 Home Office, 2018b, p. 12.

22Another proposal on immigration was set out in the December 2018 White Paper on The UK’s Future Skills-Based Immigration System. The proposal draws on prior recommendations from the Migration Advisory Committee (MAC) and provides more detailed information on the future, post-Brexit immigration system. Key proposals of the new immigration plan include the implementation of a unified UK immigration system that will apply to EU and non-EU migrants alike52, the implementation of a visa system for short-term visitors from Europe53, and the application of new measures to sort out the situation of the already settled European population. Such measures reinforce the Conservative Party’s pledge on strengthening borders and reducing immigration. It is also worth noting that, in this White Paper, the government explicitly expresses its willingness to negotiate with the EU to allow for more flexibility in the movement of workers to and from the UK. The government proposals on immigration are summarized in the following passage from the foreword of Home Secretary Sajid Javid:

  • 54 Home Office, 2018b, p. 5.

Our intention is clear though: a future system that supports the UK’s economy and public services, one that is user and business friendly, but also delivers control over who can come to the UK and on what terms, supporting investment in the UK’s skills and productivity.54

  • 55 Home Office, 2018b, p. 3.
  • 56 Home Office, 2018b, p. 3.
  • 57 Home Office, 2002, p. 9.

23More importantly, the new system proposed by the Conservative government is going to be based on selective immigration, reflecting a continuation of the same strategy. According to Theresa May, the new post-Brexit immigration system would be ‘a system where it is workers’ skills that matter, not which country they come from’, ‘a single system that welcomes talent, hard work, and the skills we need as a country’55. The Prime Minister also called for a system to ‘attract the brightest and best to a United Kingdom’56. This position recalls the ‘managed’ immigration strategy of the Blair-led governments57, formulated in the White Paper Secure Borders, Safe Haven, published on 7th February 2002. These proposals were consolidated in 2008 with the establishment of the points-based system, still in place in the UK.

  • 58 Home Office, 2018b, p. 8.
  • 59 Home Office, 2018b, p. 24.

24The White Paper also brings to the forefront the diversity and different needs of the four constituent parts of the UK stating : ‘Our future system will work for the whole of the UK – for Scotland, Wales, Northern Ireland and all parts of England’58. It draws attention to the importance of unifying and preserving the relationship between all parts of the UK59. The diversity of the UK is emphasized by the Conservative government from a unitary perspective in order to counter the nationalist rhetoric that is particularly strong in Scotland.

  • 60 Home Office, 2018b, p. 8.
  • 61 Home Office, 2018b, p. 8.
  • 62 Home Office, 2018b, p. 15.

25To achieve unity within diversity, it is necessary to ‘create strong borders’ and ‘control the numbers and type of people coming to live and work here’60. In addition, skilled migration will be prioritized. According to the White Paper, ‘the future system will apply in the same way to all nationalities – EU and non-EU citizens alike – except where there are objective grounds to differentiate’61. For those intending to settle permanently in the UK, a single immigration system is planned for both EU and non-EU nationals (based on a points-based system), thus allowing for more selective immigration relying on a ‘skilled’ and ‘highly skilled’ workforce62.

  • 63 Home Office, 2018b, p. 9.
  • 64 Home Office, 2018b, p. 9.
  • 65 Home Office, 2018b, p. 9.
  • 66 Home Office, 2018b, p. 10.

26The government’s proposal also makes provisions for the already settled European population, setting an ‘Implementation Period’ which can be considered as a transition period for EU residents in the UK to sort out their status63. During this period, an ‘EU Settlement Scheme’ will be implemented. According to the White Paper, the EU Settlement Scheme ‘gives EU citizens already here, and also those who arrive in the UK during the Implementation Period, the opportunity to secure their future residence in the UK’64. Thus, the EU Settlement Scheme will be more of a ‘phased approach’ to allow EU residents in the UK to request permanent settlement65. According to the British government, these provisions are meant for EU citizens who have been living in the UK continuously for five years. For those who have been in the UK for less than five years, a pre-settled status is granted until they reach the five-year residency period. This process is described as ‘easy’ 66and allows EU nationals to permanently settle in the UK and have access to healthcare, pensions and other benefits.

  • 67 Home Office, 2018b, p. 13.

27The White Paper also proposes cooperation with the EU especially in terms of facilitating mobility and fighting illegal immigration. It promotes working ‘with the EU, Turkey and other countries to tackle illegal migration to Europe from Africa and the Middle East’67. In terms of mobility with Europe, the Conservative-led government proposes a ‘future mobility partnership’ to facilitate the movement of European nationals to the UK. The government also envisages a ‘generous entitlement’ for tourists to stay up to six months with an entitlement to work during that period.

  • 68 Home Office, 2018b, p. 17.

28As far as international students are concerned, they will generally need to obtain permission before they travel to the UK 68according to the immigration White Paper. A six-month-long Post-study option is to be granted to all master’s and bachelor’s students studying at an institution with degree awarding powers and one year is to be granted for PhD graduates.

29Overall, the White Paper provides more precision on its plans towards migrants from the EU in comparison with earlier proposals. The government’s strategy lies on the principle of reciprocity with the EU by offering more flexible options for EU residents in the UK in exchange for a similar treatment for Britons living across Europe.

  • 69 Conservative and Unionist Party Manifesto, 2019, p. 20.
  • 70 Conservative and Unionist Party Manifesto, 2019, p. 20.
  • 71 Conservative and Unionist Party Manifesto, 2019, p. 20.
  • 72 Conservative and Unionist Party Manifesto, 2019, p. 20.
  • 73 Conservative and Unionist Party Manifesto, 2019, p. 22.
  • 74 Conservative and Unionist Party Manifesto, 2019, p. 21.
  • 75 Conservative and Unionist Party Manifesto, 2019, p. 22.
  • 76 Conservative and Unionist Party Manifesto, 2019, p. 23.
  • 77 Conservative and Unionist Party Manifesto, 2019, p. 23.
  • 78 Conservative and Unionist Party Manifesto, 2019, p. 20.

30Similar proposals were formulated in the Conservative Party’s 2019 election manifesto. The party pledged ‘to fix’ the immigration system in the UK 69with the target of ‘attracting the best and the brightest’70. The party set the end of Free Movement and controlling borders as the only means to attract the best, and called for ‘a firmer and fairer Australian-style points-based immigration system’71. The same manifesto provided information on different forms of visas formulated to suit specific immigration needs including the ‘NHS visa’, intended for qualified doctors, nurses and allied health professionals72, the ‘student visa’ and the ‘start-up visa’73. In addition to having a job offer, the new points-based system also prioritized a number of criteria for potential immigrants such as having a good grasp of English language, being law abiding citizens, and having a good education and good qualifications74. In addition, the party promoted diversity and pledged to fight discrimination and racism75. Moreover, in one section of the manifesto entitled ‘Contributing to our country’ , the Conservative Party pledged to require EU residents to stay in the UK for a minimum of five years before making claims to benefits and accessing public services76. The party stressed the importance of such a principle, referring to it as ‘natural justice’77. All these measures are intended to ‘get Brexit done, unleash Britain’s future’ as mentioned in the title of the manifesto. The Conservative Party’s manifesto for the 2019 general election reflects a continuation of earlier Conservative governments in terms of immigration policy with a focus on the final objective of ‘attracting the best and the brightest’78. The manifesto also shows a stricter position towards migration from the EU in comparison with the White Paper The UK’s Future Skills-Based Immigration System, reflecting Boris Johnson’s hard-line stance on Brexit.

  • 79 The Conservative Party’s position on migration from the EU that resulted in the decision to hold th (...)

31Since the Brexit campaign and the referendum, the Conservative governments have attempted to formulate a new immigration strategy that is primarily dedicated to EU migrants79. This immigration system is intended to control and limit migration to the UK within the government strategy to reduce the number of migrants to the tens of thousands. The government’s immigration plans are also oriented towards a selective strategy, focusing primarily on a skilled and highly-skilled workforce.

32The different proposals on the handling of migration from the EU and on the status of the already settled EU nationals are crystallized in the government’s two main proposals. However, despite being committed to an approach to immigration that is intended to work for the whole of the UK, no specific provisions are mentioned in relation to Scotland in the government’s two main proposals. This situation has resulted in growing disenchantment on the part of decision-makers in Scotland leading to calls for a second referendum on Scottish independence.

The Scottish government’s responses to Brexit and to the Conservatives’ latest immigration plans

33After the devolution settlement, immigration, security, citizenship and asylum remained part of the British government’s prerogatives whereas the Scottish government gained power over areas such as education, housing, and health. The devolution of power has resulted in diverging views on immigration with the Scottish governments encouraging migration to Scotland, at the same time as different British governments were moving towards stricter and more selective immigration.

34With 62% of votes in favour of remaining, the Scottish electorate clearly expressed the intention to stay within the European Union, giving the Scottish government more legitimacy to contest the British government’s decisions and to question the unitary aspect of British politics. Scottish decision-makers have also repeatedly voiced their discontent over Brexit and over its repercussions in Scotland.

  • 80 Sturgeon, N., 2018, online.

35The SNP in government has repeatedly voiced the need for an immigration strategy tailored to Scotland’s needs, criticizing the British government’s proposed measures on several occasions. For instance, in a speech at the annual SNP conference, the Scottish First Minister and SNP party leader Nicola Sturgeon drew attention to the need to transfer immigration powers to the Scottish government, stating: ‘it is time for powers over migration to come to Scotland’80.

  • 81 Sturgeon, N., 2018, online.
  • 82 Sturgeon, N., 2018, online.

36In the same speech, the First Minister also sent a clear message to migrants, stating ‘you are welcome and we want you to stay’81. She also promoted the inclusiveness of Scotland (using the pronoun ‘we’) and made reference to the refugees who are settled in Scotland as part of the ‘we’ that makes up Scotland. She ended her speech by describing Scotland as ‘open, welcoming, caring, progressive, and pioneering’82.

37A similar approach, stressing the inclusive aspect of Scotland, can also be found in an open letter from the Scottish First Minister to EU residents in Scotland. In the open letter, Nicola Sturgeon reassured EU residents of the Scottish government’s commitment to assist them in their settlement process. The First Minister also insisted on the inclusiveness and welcoming nature of Scottish society stating:

  • 83 Sturgeon, N., 2019, online.

Although immigration is a reserved issue, as a nation, Scotland has a long history of welcoming people of all nationalities, and while the Scottish Government unfortunately does not have the power to simply grant the right to remain for those that seek it, we do want all those who have made their lives here to be able to stay.83

  • 84 Scottish Government, 2019, p. 2.
  • 85 Scottish Government, 2019, p. 1.

38The Scottish government has continuously restated this position, voicing disenchantment with the UK Government’s handling of Brexit as ‘an utterly wrong-headed approach’84. In a report entitled Scottish Government Overview of ‘No Deal’ Preparations, the SNP government expressed its apprehension towards a ‘No deal’, considered as a ‘significant threat to Scotland’s wellbeing’85. The Scottish government emphasized its lack of power over immigration and its disenchantment with the British Conservative government’s handling of the Brexit referendum. These arguments can also be seen as serving the interests of the SNP in power as it is consolidating the party’s call for independence as the best constitutional option for Scotland.

  • 86 Scottish Government, 2019, p. 1.
  • 87 Scottish Government, 2019, p. 1.
  • 88 Scottish Government, 2019, p. 2.
  • 89 Scottish Government, 2019, p. 2.

39Taking into consideration its lack of power over immigration and Brexit, the Scottish government has recently published its recommendations and future plans in the aftermath of Brexit. These plans mainly consist in mitigating the potential impact of a ‘No deal’ with the priority of protecting ‘Scotland’s place in the EU’86. In the same report, the Scottish government has repeatedly expressed its rejection of Brexit and of the ‘No deal’ position adopted by the UK government. It officially declared that it was ‘vehemently’ opposed to Brexit and warned of the negative impact of leaving with no deal87. The Scottish government also released details of its own ‘No deal’ planning. One of the first actions of the government was to create a ‘Ministerial Group on EU Exit Readiness’ chaired by the First Minister and the Deputy First Minister88. In addition, the range of actions undertaken by the Scottish government include: ‘providing online information and support in areas of concern to the public such as the rights of EU citizens after Brexit89. Thus, the Scottish Government clearly expressed its commitment and willingness to negotiate with the British government in order to safeguard the interests of Scotland. Proposed Mitigating actions include maintaining and promoting the ‘Stay in Scotland’ campaign, pressing for changes for the EU Settlement Scheme, intended to safeguard the rights of EU citizens, and making provisions for Scottish domiciled EU students.

40One of the Scottish government’s main initiatives has been the ‘Stay in Scotland’ campaign, initiated to encourage EU citizens to take the necessary steps to ensure their settled status in the UK. The Scottish government considers the campaign as a means to encourage EU nationals to settle in Scotland and to appreciate their contribution to Scottish society. The government clearly affirms that:

  • 90 Scottish Government, 2019b, p. 6.

The Scottish Government believes Scotland is richer for our diversity and EU nationals make a valuable contribution to our society, our population and our economy , which is why the Scottish Government is making every effort to ensure EU citizens feel welcome and valued.90

  • 91 Scottish Government, 2019d, online.

41The new ‘Stay in Scotland’ package consists of different forms of assistance to EU citizens in Scotland such as £250,000 for community-based support across Scotland, a support and advice service for EU citizens and a toolkit for employers. In her announcement of the ‘Stay in Scotland’ campaign , the First Minister recalled the Scottish government’s commitment to diversity and to EU citizens’ rights, stating: ‘you are welcome here, you contribute to this country’s diversity and richness and we will do everything we can to help you to stay’91.

  • 92 Scotland is Open, 2019, online.
  • 93 Scottish Government, 2019, pp. 8-9.

42Another campaign initiated by the Scottish government in order to attract migration from EU is ‘Scotland is Open’, a marketing campaign aimed at encouraging EU citizens to stay in Scotland. The overall message broadcast in this campaign conveys inclusiveness and acceptance. It directly addresses EU citizens stating: ‘Europe, let’s continue our love affair’ and clearly shows acceptance as stated in the following example ‘Our arms are open. Our minds are open’92. On different occasions, the Scottish government voiced its disenchantment with Brexit and its repercussions on migration from the EU, especially in the event of a no deal with EU. Future delays at borders and the possible impact on workforce in Scotland were stated as the main problems emanating from a no deal with the EU93.

  • 94 Scottish Government, 2020, p. 4.
  • 95 Scottish Government, 2020, p. 4.

43More recently, on 27 January 2020, the Scottish government published a policy paper entitled Migration: Helping Scotland Prosper. It sets out options for a tailored approach to immigration for Scotland within the context of the broader UK immigration system. In the foreword of this paper, the First Minister draws attention to the importance of immigration to Scotland, reminding readers of the demographic challenge and the Scottish government’s accountability in this respect94. The impact of Brexit on Scotland’s demography was described as ‘disastrous’ and would ‘risk acute labour shortages’95.

  • 96 Scottish Government, 2020, p. 5.
  • 97 Scottish Government, 2020, p. 5.
  • 98 Scottish Government, 2020, p. 5.
  • 99 Scottish Government, 2020, p. 7.
  • 100 Scottish Government, 2020, p. 12.
  • 101 Scottish Government, 2020, p. 13.

44In the same document, Fiona Hyslop, Cabinet Secretary for Culture, Tourism and External Affairs, further emphasizes this dimension, announcing from the beginning of her statement: ‘We are a nation which has been shaped by migration’96. In the same statement, Fiona Hyslop draws attention to the demographic crisis in Scotland using projections and statistics on the population of Scotland and refers to the existing cross-party consensus on the benefits of immigration97. She also recalls the reasons why devolution was introduced, mentioning the need for specific solutions for Scotland98. In the policy paper, the Scottish government stresses the need for a ‘tailored’ approach to immigration for Scotland based on its ‘distinct demographic and geographical needs’99. It also outlines possible solutions and proposes a form of ‘Scottish visa’ to allow for more flexibility to meet Scotland’s needs100. The UK Government is encouraged to remove the tight restrictions in force across the rest of the UK, including application fees, a salary threshold and the employer sponsorship required by the Home Office101.

  • 102 Scottish Government, 2020, p. 12.
  • 103 Scottish Government,2020, p. 38.
  • 104 Gower, M., Holland, S., Lalic, M., & Jap, B., 2020, online.

45Another option proposed in this policy paper on migration is to create ‘an additional visa with a more specific focus on ensuring settlement by migrants in remote and rural areas’102. The Australian and Canadian case studies are used as examples for ‘regional’ migration and the policy paper draws attention to the different measures that encourage migrants to live and work in rural areas103. However, despite receiving cross-party consensus, the Scottish Government proposals were dismissed by the British Prime Minister who contended that Scotland’s future immigration needs would be catered for by the new UK-wide points-based system that the government intends to introduce from January 2021104.

46Despite having no power over immigration and refugee-related questions, the main political actors in Scotland have continuously addressed issues related to immigration and proposed immigration plans related to Scotland in election manifestos. For example, in the 2017 election manifestos, the main parties in Scotland presented their respective plans for an immigration system dedicated to Scotland after Brexit.

  • 105 Scottish Conservative Party Manifesto, 2017, p. 23.
  • 106 Scottish Conservative Party Manifesto, 2017, p. 23.
  • 107 Scottish Conservative Party Manifesto, 2017, p. 52.
  • 108 Scottish Conservative Party Manifesto, 2017, p. 23.
  • 109 Scottish Conservative Party Manifesto, 2017, p. 52.

47The Scottish Conservatives, following the same position as the ruling Conservative Party, advocated an immigration system that takes into account the specific needs of Scotland105. This was to be performed through the MAC recommendations, described by the party as ‘independent’ in order to draw attention to the non-involvement of the Conservative government in the elaboration of the Shortage Occupation Lists106. The party also called for a ‘controlled’ and ‘sustainable’ migration and drew attention to the high level of immigration and its negative repercussions on society107. The Scottish Conservatives also took into consideration the impact of skilled migration on British workforce and proposed doubling the Immigration Skills Charge (a fee paid by companies employing migrant workers) from £1,000 to £2,000108. Other restrictive measures proposed by the party included increasing the earnings’ thresholds for people wishing to sponsor migrants for family visas and the toughening of visa requirements for students109. The Scottish Conservatives also maintained a tough stance towards students’ migration.

  • 110 Scottish Labour Party Manifesto, 2017, p. 32.
  • 111 Scottish Labour Party Manifesto, 2017, p. 32.
  • 112 Scottish Labour Party Manifesto, 2017, p. 28.
  • 113 Scottish Labour Party Manifesto, 2017, p. 31.

48Comparatively, the Scottish Labour Party adopted a different approach to immigration, calling for a ‘fair’ and ‘reasonable’ management of migration110. The party’s stance on migration has marked a change from earlier manifestos and the party clearly stated that it will not ‘scapegoat’ immigrants111 in reference to the Tories’ position on immigration. In addition, the Scottish Labour Party insisted on granting reciprocal rights for EU nationals living in the UK112. The party also stressed the importance of migrants to the Scottish economy and Scottish Labour and pledged to make Scotland’s voice heard in future immigration strategies113.

  • 114 Scottish Liberal Democratic Party Manifesto, 2017, p. 46.
  • 115 Scottish Liberal Democratic Party Manifesto, 2017, p. 51.
  • 116 Scottish Liberal Democratic Party Manifesto, 2017, p. 52.
  • 117 Scottish Liberal Democratic Party Manifesto, 2017, p. 7.

49A similar position on immigration was adopted by the Scottish Liberal Democrats who condemned the ‘toxic rhetoric’ on immigration and immigrants114. The Scottish Liberal Democrats called for an immigration system that was administered ‘fairly’ and ‘efficiently’ with the same commitment as the Scottish Labour Party for strict border controls and high-skilled immigration115. Other strategies included the reinstatement of the Post-study work visa and the establishment of a Migrant Impact Fund to facilitate the integration of newcomers116. In relation to EU nationals, the Scottish Liberal Democrats called for the protection of the rights of EU nationals and the simplification of the registration process and the requirements for EU nationals to obtain permanent residence and citizenship117. The Scottish Liberal Democrats presented a more flexible immigration strategy than the Scottish Conservatives, by facilitating immigration and settlement for EU nationals and at the same time calling for a stricter more selective immigration system.

  • 118 Scottish National Party Manifesto, 2017, p. 4.
  • 119 Scottish National Party Manifesto, 2017, p. 27.
  • 120 Scottish National Party Manifesto, 2017, p. 28.
  • 121 Scottish National Party Manifesto, 2017, p. 18.
  • 122 Scottish National Party Manifesto, 2017, p. 14.

50In its 2017 election manifesto, the SNP called for a ‘fairer’ immigration policy118 and drew attention to the need for the devolution of powers over immigration in order for it to be adapted to Scotland’s specific needs119. Aside from this objective, the SNP called for the reinstatement of the Post-study work visa120, using the term ‘talent’ to describe students121. The SNP focused on the situation of EU nationals and proposed granting straightforward access to residence as a solution to Brexit122. The vision of the party can be summarized in the following passage:

  • 123 Scottish National Party Manifesto, 2017, p. 27.

Our vision of Scotland is one of an open country that looks outwards, and encourages the best and brightest from Europe, and around the world, to make Scotland their home.123

  • 124 Scottish Affairs Committee, 2011, p. 43.

51Thus, the main parties in Scotland have joined in their call for an immigration system that takes into consideration Scotland’s needs especially in a post-Brexit context. One of the main questions that received cross-party consensus has been the reinstatement of the Post-study work visa as a solution to face the repercussions of Brexit in terms of migration to Scotland. Student work visas are seen positively in Scotland as they can contribute to the Scottish economy by encouraging students to enrol in Scottish universities in addition to providing a younger immigration input to the population of Scotland124.

52Calling for a ‘fair’ immigration system, the main parties in Scotland have joined in promoting a more selective immigration policy that privileges highly skilled immigrants. A more flexible treatment of EU nationals is promoted by the SNP, Scottish Labour and the Scottish Liberal Democrats, reflecting more openness to negotiation with the EU than the Scottish Conservative Party.

  • 125 Scottish Government, 2019, p. 4.

53Since the success of the Brexit referendum, Scottish decision-makers have repeatedly voiced their concerns on the repercussions of the end of Free Movement on the Scottish population and economy. The main parties in Scotland have joined in affirming the positive contribution of EU migrants to the Scottish economy and in the call to reinstate the Post-study work visa to encourage the settlement of foreign graduates in Scotland. Other requests emanating from the SNP in government include the decentralisation of some aspects of the immigration system and setting criteria for a new international migration route to start to meet Scotland's most acute needs. The Scottish government also calls for a ‘tailored’ approach for Scotland within the UK immigration system125 in order to be able to propose immigration strategies that are adequate to Scotland’s needs.

Conclusion

  • 126 Javid, S., cited in Grierson, J., & Walker, P., 2018, online.

54The debate on Brexit has resulted in a number of challenges for the Scottish government, especially in terms of the end of Free Movement which has consistently been of benefit to the Scottish economy and to Scottish demography. The British government’s latest immigration plans in relation to immigration from the EU can also pose challenges to the Scottish government. After leaving the EU, the United Kingdom will have more control over its immigration system. From the Conservatives’ perspective, Brexit can be seen as ‘a unique opportunity to reshape our immigration system for the future’126. However, immigration has become a real political issue in the wider debate about Scotland’s independence and its future place in Europe, especially when the majority of Scots voted to stay.

55As immigration and asylum are reserved matters, Scotland does not have the power to decide on these issues, except through the MPs sent to British Parliament. However, the Scottish government has been attempting to pressure the British government on immigration and to work its own strategies in order to attract newcomers and guarantee the rights of the already settled EU migrants. This diverging aspect of the responses of Scottish decision-makers to immigration and Brexit pose a number of challenges to the British government especially in relation to keeping the UK united, in addition to the possible repercussions of the end of Free Movement on the UK as a whole.

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Notes

1 Bell, D., 2018, online.

2 Boswell, C., Bell, D., Copus, A., Kay, R., & Kulu, H., 2019, p. 3.

3 Boswell, C., Bell, D., Copus, A., Kay, R., & Kulu, H., 2019, p. 5.

4 Boswell, C., Bell, D., Copus, A., Kay, R., & Kulu, H., 2019, p. 6.

5 House of Commons, 2016, p. 5.

6 Conservative Party Manifesto, 2015, p. 29.

7 Wadsworth, J., Dhingra, S., Ottaviano, G. & Van Reenen, J., 2016, p. 16.

8 Boswell, C., Bell, D., Copus, A., Kay, R., & Kulu, H., 2019, p. 5.

9 Boswell, C., Bell, D., Copus, A., Kay, R., & Kulu, H., 2019, p. 6.

10 Boswell, C., Bell, D., Copus, A., Kay, R., & Kulu, H., 2019, p. 6.

11 Boswell, C., Bell, D., Copus, A., Kay, R., & Kulu, H., 2019, pp. 16-18.

12 Boswell, C., Bell, D., Copus, A., Kay, R., & Kulu, H., 2019, p. 8.

13 Portes, J., 2016, p. R17.

14 Portes, J., 2016, pp. R19-R20.

15 Portes, J., 2016, p. R14.

16 Vargas-Silva, C., Fernández-Reino, M., 2019, p. 3.

17 Vargas-Silva, C., Fernández-Reino, M., 2019, p. 3.

18 Portes, J., 2016, p.15.

19 Scottish Government, 2019, p. 19.

20 Scottish Government, 2019, p. 27.

21 Scottish Government, 2019, p. 27.

22 As part of the EU, European nationals used to have a preferential treatment compared to non-EU nationals in terms of migration and settlement in the UK. The new measures after the implementation of Brexit may discourage EU migrants from staying in the UK.

23 Scottish Government, 2019, p. 26.

24 The post-study work visa allowed international students to stay and work in the UK for 2 years after graduation.

25 The call for the reinstatement of the Post-study work visa for international graduates in 2020/21 was granted by the Boris Johnson’s government in an official announcement in September 2019.

26 Scottish Government, 2019, p. 3.

27 Scottish Government, 2019c, online.

28 Scottish Government, 2019c, online.

29 Scottish Government, 2019c, online.

30 Carl, N., 2018, p. 4

31 Grierson, J., 2018, online

32 Partos, R., Bale, T., 2015, p. 170

33 Tier 1 category in the UK’s points-based system refers to high-value migrants and Tier 2 category to skilled migrants. It is also worth noting that the Tier 3 immigration route for unskilled workers has been suspended (UK Government, online).

34 Hutton, J., 2017, p. 38

35 Hutton, J., 2017, p. 39

36 Conservative Party Manifesto, 2015, p. 29.

37 Office for National Statistics, 2020, online.

38 Carl, N., 2018, p. 4.

39 Carl, N., 2018, p. 4.

40 Migration Observatory, 2016, online.

41 Migration observatory, 2016, online.

42 Home Office, 2018, p. 1.

43 Home Office, 2018, p. 32.

44 Home Office, 2018, p. 6.

45 Home Office, 2018, p. 32.

46 Home Office, 2018, p. 32.

47 Home Office, 2018, p. 32.

48 Home Office, 2018, p. 32.

49 Home Office, 2018, p. 32.

50 Home Office, 2018, p. 41.

51 Home Office, 2018, p. 9.

52 Home Office, 2018b, p. 12.

53 Home Office, 2018b, p. 12.

54 Home Office, 2018b, p. 5.

55 Home Office, 2018b, p. 3.

56 Home Office, 2018b, p. 3.

57 Home Office, 2002, p. 9.

58 Home Office, 2018b, p. 8.

59 Home Office, 2018b, p. 24.

60 Home Office, 2018b, p. 8.

61 Home Office, 2018b, p. 8.

62 Home Office, 2018b, p. 15.

63 Home Office, 2018b, p. 9.

64 Home Office, 2018b, p. 9.

65 Home Office, 2018b, p. 9.

66 Home Office, 2018b, p. 10.

67 Home Office, 2018b, p. 13.

68 Home Office, 2018b, p. 17.

69 Conservative and Unionist Party Manifesto, 2019, p. 20.

70 Conservative and Unionist Party Manifesto, 2019, p. 20.

71 Conservative and Unionist Party Manifesto, 2019, p. 20.

72 Conservative and Unionist Party Manifesto, 2019, p. 20.

73 Conservative and Unionist Party Manifesto, 2019, p. 22.

74 Conservative and Unionist Party Manifesto, 2019, p. 21.

75 Conservative and Unionist Party Manifesto, 2019, p. 22.

76 Conservative and Unionist Party Manifesto, 2019, p. 23.

77 Conservative and Unionist Party Manifesto, 2019, p. 23.

78 Conservative and Unionist Party Manifesto, 2019, p. 20.

79 The Conservative Party’s position on migration from the EU that resulted in the decision to hold the Brexit referendum in 2016 was preceded by a growing public disenchantment with the EU and the rise in popularity of UKIP. The political climate in the UK created a number of divisions within the Conservative Party that, together with the economic situation in the UK and the politics of austerity initiated by the coalition government, accentuated the tensions and hostility towards the EU and contributed to the decision to hold a referendum on Brexit.

80 Sturgeon, N., 2018, online.

81 Sturgeon, N., 2018, online.

82 Sturgeon, N., 2018, online.

83 Sturgeon, N., 2019, online.

84 Scottish Government, 2019, p. 2.

85 Scottish Government, 2019, p. 1.

86 Scottish Government, 2019, p. 1.

87 Scottish Government, 2019, p. 1.

88 Scottish Government, 2019, p. 2.

89 Scottish Government, 2019, p. 2.

90 Scottish Government, 2019b, p. 6.

91 Scottish Government, 2019d, online.

92 Scotland is Open, 2019, online.

93 Scottish Government, 2019, pp. 8-9.

94 Scottish Government, 2020, p. 4.

95 Scottish Government, 2020, p. 4.

96 Scottish Government, 2020, p. 5.

97 Scottish Government, 2020, p. 5.

98 Scottish Government, 2020, p. 5.

99 Scottish Government, 2020, p. 7.

100 Scottish Government, 2020, p. 12.

101 Scottish Government, 2020, p. 13.

102 Scottish Government, 2020, p. 12.

103 Scottish Government,2020, p. 38.

104 Gower, M., Holland, S., Lalic, M., & Jap, B., 2020, online.

105 Scottish Conservative Party Manifesto, 2017, p. 23.

106 Scottish Conservative Party Manifesto, 2017, p. 23.

107 Scottish Conservative Party Manifesto, 2017, p. 52.

108 Scottish Conservative Party Manifesto, 2017, p. 23.

109 Scottish Conservative Party Manifesto, 2017, p. 52.

110 Scottish Labour Party Manifesto, 2017, p. 32.

111 Scottish Labour Party Manifesto, 2017, p. 32.

112 Scottish Labour Party Manifesto, 2017, p. 28.

113 Scottish Labour Party Manifesto, 2017, p. 31.

114 Scottish Liberal Democratic Party Manifesto, 2017, p. 46.

115 Scottish Liberal Democratic Party Manifesto, 2017, p. 51.

116 Scottish Liberal Democratic Party Manifesto, 2017, p. 52.

117 Scottish Liberal Democratic Party Manifesto, 2017, p. 7.

118 Scottish National Party Manifesto, 2017, p. 4.

119 Scottish National Party Manifesto, 2017, p. 27.

120 Scottish National Party Manifesto, 2017, p. 28.

121 Scottish National Party Manifesto, 2017, p. 18.

122 Scottish National Party Manifesto, 2017, p. 14.

123 Scottish National Party Manifesto, 2017, p. 27.

124 Scottish Affairs Committee, 2011, p. 43.

125 Scottish Government, 2019, p. 4.

126 Javid, S., cited in Grierson, J., & Walker, P., 2018, online.

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Référence papier

Wafa El Fekih Said, « Immigration challenges to Scotland after Brexit », Observatoire de la société britannique, 26 | 2021, 79-102.

Référence électronique

Wafa El Fekih Said, « Immigration challenges to Scotland after Brexit », Observatoire de la société britannique [En ligne], 26 | 2021, mis en ligne le 01 janvier 2022, consulté le 17 janvier 2022. URL : http://journals.openedition.org/osb/5044 ; DOI : https://doi.org/10.4000/osb.5044

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Auteur

Wafa El Fekih Said

Docteure en civilisation britannique et enseignante contractuelle au Lycée des Arènes, Toulouse

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Observatoire de la société britannique

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