• 2 The pact included the Liberal Democrats, Plaid Cymru and the Greens and it was set up by former Con (...)
• 3 Payne, A. 2019; Chapell, E., 2019.
• 4 “I mean that’s the good thing that’s come out of that, and we’re all from different backgrounds, di (...)

1The Brexit referendum revealed the social, economic and political crises that Britain has been enduring for decades. Given the prevailing tension and faced with such injustice, remainers decided to set up local grassroots groups to keep the UK in the EU. Not only have the referendum and its consequences challenged the traditional British political landscape but also the essence of the UK itself: a union, running the risk of splitting up with on the one hand the Scottish National Party (SNP) demanding a second referendum on Scottish independence and on the other hand, in order to respect the Belfast Agreement (1998), the Withdrawal Agreement placing checks on the Irish Sea, paradoxically creating a boarder within the UK. The current crisis between the electorate and politics could not be more visible therefore, as it challenges the concepts of identity and belonging amongst pro-Europeans. In the aftermath of the referendum, activists joined forces and came under the same umbrella group: People’s Vote (PV), which campaigned for a final say on the deal London and Brussels would agree on. However, the short-lived Change UK party and the pro-remain pact, “Unite to Remain” (UTR)2 failed to topple the Conservatives despite auspicious results in the 2019 local and European Parliament elections. Tactical voting, which covered 60 seats across England and Wales, did not suffice to counterbalance Labour’s ambiguity on Brexit. Consequently, Boris Johnson won the general election with an 80-seat majority, although some anti-Brexit campaigners did warn UTR against such tactics, as they feared the coalition could have the opposite effect, i.e. giving additional seats to the Tories3. Brexit has undoubtedly brought people together, people who would have never met in other circumstances4, but it has also strengthened their determination to assert themselves as Europeans. Despite the amateurism of the movement, pro-EU activism is palpable through solidarity, voluntary action, friendship, sympathy, collaboration, cooperation, mutual aid, support, commitment and willingness. Being a member of a pro-European group gives them the identity they seem to have lost with Brexit, as the European Union embodies values, beliefs and the security they cannot find in their country anymore. Collective action epitomises an alternative or an extension of politics for remainers who can no longer identify with Labour. Once apolitical, staunch EU supporters took an active part in politics through cross-party grassroots organisations as it appeared to be the only way to undo the referendum. How did the grassroots build a (new) identity through local groups and protest? To what extent did Brexit trigger collective action to keep the UK in Europe? What were their strategies, organisation and tactics? What links did pro-EU activists forge to defend democracy riddled with shams since the EU referendum campaign?

• 5 My research is based on three phases of fieldwork in the UK (Bristol, Liverpool and London) and on (...)

2It will be the aim of this article to respond to these questions on the basis of the field research carried out from September 2017 to October 2019 in the UK and continental Europe amongst pro-European groups and individuals5. First, we will explain how the outcome of the Brexit referendum psychologically impacted EU supporters, thus leading to an identity crisis. We shall also shed light on the reasons why they mobilised only after the referendum results. Secondly, we will explore how the grassroots as well as politicians tried to reassert a European identity through mobilisation and new political formations. Finally, this article will focus on the functioning of the campaign led by both local and national groups and how it might explain their failure to beat the Conservatives in the 2019 general election.

• 6 Remigi, E. et al., 2017.
• 7 “The emotional effect on all of us is clear, we feel betrayed by the government and let down by a p (...)
• 8 Richard Ashcroft and Mark Bevir explain that the nature of Brexit is plural, that “[c]onflicts over (...)
• 9 “Anchors of one form of identity – Europeanness – which an individual had assumed signalled the sam (...)

3As suggested above, Brexit triggered an identity crisis amongst British people. The loss of British remainers was twofold: they lost the European identity they had purportedly acquired some forty years before, but they were also deprived of a sense of belonging: as of 31 January 2020, they ceased being citizens of the EU. “Sad, disappointed, worried, angry and betrayed” 6– that’s how at least 48% of British citizens, 784,900 Britons living in the EU27 and 2.9 million Europeans who have made the UK their home have been feeling since 23 June 2016. “Disaster” was the word they chose to describe the UK leaving the EU, thereby highlighting the emotional impact triggering a sense of loss and bewilderment7. When adding a European dimension to cultural and national identity, hybrid by essence8, it renders the whole concept of self-identification even more inchoate as, for EU proponents, Europe was an integral part of who they were9:

• 11 Amongst British expatriates living in the Bordeaux area (France).
• 12 Capera, J., 2020.
• 13 European Semester of Psychology, 2018.
• 14 According to YouGov’s latest figures, on the five stages of grief only one-third of remainers have (...)
• 15 “This is a short-term support service offering prospective clients up to six sessions with a qualif (...)
• 16 “This energy and solidarity of the Remain Fellowship has been a tremendous joy and succour to me, I (...)
• 17 Remigi, E. and Metz. B., 2020.
• 18 Remigi, E. et al., 2017, p. 13.
• 19 May, T. 2016. 

4Whilst waiting for their French passport some admitted feeling “stateless” and even completely rejected their British identity11, feeling ashamed and put off, but particularly at odds and dumbstruck with the UK’s decision to leave the EU. A French expatriate who has lived in the UK for 30 years and who was granted British citizenship in 2020 confessed in an interview: “I have resigned myself to it. It’s made me feel foreign again, it’s made me feel not British again, even though now I’m actually a citizen. It’s been a blessing for me because I’ve a met a lot of people through the campaigning activities that we’ve done, whom I wouldn’t have met otherwise”12. Furthermore, the British Psychological Society, a charity organisation, calculated the impact of Brexit on mental health. On 8 June 2018, Prof. Van Deurzen and Dr. De Cruz interviewed 1,300 remainers and concluded13 that people “feel devastated, angry, depressed, betrayed and ashamed, nearly two years after the referendum”- even identifying the phenomenon as “Brexit depression”14. They decided to set up a free-online platform: the Emotional Support Service for Europeans meant to provide therapeutic sessions to the ones in need15. For some remainers, “the vote has struck at the core of their identity and continues to dominate their everyday experience”, indeed “they feel as if they lost their identity and their human rights” and “working with pro-European groups has been particularly beneficial for many”. Grassroots organisations like the3million have been campaigning to preserve EU citizens’ rights in the UK and being a member of the3million was lifesaving for some Europeans living in Britain. Belonging to an anti-Brexit grassroots group was the only way out for some pro-Europeans - it gave them a purpose- militating was to anti-Brexiteers a remedy against depression16. What’s more, the In Limbo project tells the story of “5 million citizens who have built their lives on their rights to Freedom of Movement and are now at risk of losing everything in the Brexit shambles”17. One of the testimonies particularly struck me when someone from Spain declared: “I, citizen of Europe, my wings clipped, my dreams shattered, my freedom chained, the result of a mad Referendum in which I wasn’t allowed a voice. I feel rather lost, I no longer belong”18. EU citizens felt like they were treated like ‘bargaining chips’ and second-class citizens by the British government – a feeling reinforced when in 2016 former Prime minister Theresa May declared: “But if you believe you’re a citizen of the world, you’re a citizen of nowhere. You don’t understand what the very word ‘citizenship’ means”19.

• 20 “The problem of the crisis of values is accompanied by the problem of European identity. It is diff (...)
• 21 “European identity constitutes the product of action and experience, as opposed to birthplace, ethn (...)
• 22 “The criteria and rights can all be changed. The Windrush scandal obviously crystallised our concer (...)
• 23 “[European] identity is enacted as a cultural trait, as a political device and as a reactive proces (...)

5With a crisis of values comes a crisis of identity20, an identity made formally possible when the Maastricht Treaty introduced European citizenship in 1993. However, to the question: “Have you always felt pro-European?” none of the interviewees mentioned the treaty as a defining moment. Even though interviewees’ definitions of “being European” remain elusive, they revolve around concepts and values (peace, tolerance, shared-heritage, freedom, prosperity, friendship, unity, togetherness, diversity, openness etc.) and are not associated with places or physical institutions. Most of them have always felt pro-European and describe Europe as something intrinsically linked to their lives (family, work, studies, travelling etc.). Indeed, how one sees Europe is idiosyncratic and respondents’ interpretations of Europe come from their personal relationship and interactions with it21. Confusion and uncertainty set in and EU proponents fear that their rights might no longer be protected in case of a no-deal Brexit, some recalling the Windrush scandal, which was everything but reassuring.22 Activists are determined to preserve these rights and are particularly worried about minorities who have been protected so far against discrimination by the Charter of Fundamental Rights hence the cross-cutting identity groups (women, LGBT, ethnic minorities etc.). Despite a majority not participating in the Stronger In campaign, remainers do not want to forfeit European values and loyally defend freedom, Human rights, rule of law, democracy, equality and human dignity23.

• 24 “… consciousness [refers] to the interpretive frameworks that emerge from a group’s struggle to def (...)
• 25 Leslie, E., 2018.
• 26 Nat Cen Social Research, 2016; The film Brexit: the Uncivil War gives one angle of how the Leave ca (...)

6On 12 October 2015 when Britain Stronger In Europe was launched by David Cameron’s Conservative government to promote the UK’s EU membership, the advocacy group preferred a top-down organisation and did not collaborate with local groups. Stronger In decided to fight the battle alone and hamstrung the grassroots who had to wait until after the referendum to start to truly emerge on the political scene. In September 2016 Stronger In became Open Britain (OB) and favoured a ‘soft’ sort of Brexit. The grassroots, who had been campaigning ardently for a second referendum, perceived it as a betrayal. As pointed out, oddly enough, amongst the community the majority of activists did not participate in the Stronger In campaign out of complacency. One may argue that since the 2016 referendum, pro-Europeans have developed a conscience24. Although Eurosceptism has dominated the British political landscape since the 1980s, pro-Europeans, who have always felt that way, reacted only after Brexit happened. It made them aware that they had to resist the status quo and stand up for their rights. Evelyne Leslie, Chair of Stockport for Europe confessed: “if you could turn the clock back, I think a lot of us would really have campaigned much harder… We didn’t know what we were up against”25. Polls predicted a victory for remain whilst the leave camp, led by the political strategist Dominic Cummings26, was gambling on provoking an emotional reaction in Britain. Why did the Stronger In campaign lose its battle against Vote Leave? The pro-EU narrative was just not convincing enough and Brenda Ashton, chair of Liverpool for Europe, explained it perfectly:

• 28 “My personal discrimination/racism experiences happened mainly at my previous workplace. Just after (...)
• 29 “Until a year before the Referendum I was considering myself EU citizen. But it started to change. (...)
• 30 Brexit Brits Abroad; for the purpose of brevity, we will not develop further on Britons living in t (...)

7Regarding the 2.9 million European residents living in the UK, the situation is somewhat similar, although they very much suffer from xenophobia and racism28. They were not allowed a vote in the referendum and if considered illegal, they have to return to their home country which they might not even feel a part of as a lot of them have made the UK their home for decades29. Brits who have lived abroad for more than 15 years, accused of voting with their feet, could not vote in the EU referendum either, they are all disenfranchised, citizens of nowhere, outsiders. To secure British citizens’ rights on the other side of the Channel, grassroots organisations were also set up in Europe showing the large dimension of the movement. Britain for Europe has international groups such as Bremain in Spain and Remain in France Together, which oversee the protection of British nationals’ rights in the EU27. Finally, Brexit Brits Abroad, a research project led by Dr Michaela Benson since 2017, provides information and data about “freedom of movement, citizenship and Brexit in the lives of British citizens resident in the EU27”30. To what extent have anti-Brexit grassroots organisations managed to build a new identity from the Brexit ashes? Four years later, activists of all ages, social and economic backgrounds are still united to rejoin the EU and protect their rights.

• 31 Making an inventory of all the groups and organisations remains intricate in light of the amateuris (...)
• 32 “Collective identity is seen as a spur to action because one values the potential gain to the group (...)
• 33 “If identities play a critical role in mobilizing and sustaining participation, they also help expl (...)
• 34 “‘Moral shocks’, often the first step toward recruitment into social movements, occur when an unexp (...)
• 35 “The ‘strength’ of an identity, even a cognitively vague one, comes from its emotional side”, Goodw (...)
• 36 Ibid.
• 37 The European Movement UK (EMUK) was established after World War Two but Hilary Arrowsmith who worke (...)

8Since 2016 a myriad of anti-Brexit organisations has emerged, protesting against the referendum results at a local level31. EU identity was not the kernel of the referendum campaign, but it certainly became that of the remain camp. The concept of collective identity is pivotal. Activists lost a part of their identity that they managed to retrieve thanks to Europe32 and resisting Brexit is how pro-Europe activists claimed their common identity. Pro-European groups are non-politically affiliated independent organisations. They are volunteer campaigning groups who enjoy cross-party political support. Rebelling against the political status quo created special bonds between them. Jasper and Polletta explain that collective identity survives through engagement and unity as maintaining a European identity is crucial to the existence of the movement33. Some have always felt pro-European; for others, the victory of the leave vote triggered a “moral shock” 34questioning identity therefore which leads us to believe that feeling or being European does not require one to be a member of a pro-EU group but solely a sense of belonging, an identity mostly driven by emotions35. Indeed, the outcome of the Brexit referendum sparked a sort of awakening as they realised what they were actually losing thereby “[t]he prospect of unexpected and sudden changes in one’s surroundings can arouse feelings of dread and anger. The former can paralyze, but the latter can become the basis for mobilization. Activists work hard to create moral outrage and anger and to provide a target against which these can be vented”36. Besides, Jasper associates moral shocks with suddenness like death or an accident, hence a sense of mourning amongst the community. One may argue that the victory of Leave on referendum day served as a spur towards grassroots activism,37 as participants had never been involved in politics before.

• 38 “… the actions taken by insurgents and the tactical choices they make represent a critically import (...)
• 39 The ‘Let us be Heard’ march which took place on 19 October 2019 might have gathered a million anti- (...)
• 40 “We see two mechanisms for recruitment: through existing organizations and networks, and through mo (...)
• 41 They consist in home-made cardboard placards on which activists write questions about Brexit and as (...)
• 42 Andrews, M., 2018.
• 43 Jasper J.M., Poulsen J. D., 1995.

9All groups are affiliated with a national organisation, thus creating a strong network across the UK. They favour a horizontal hierarchy, yet their amateurism is not bereft of structure. Committee members (chair, co-chair, head of campaigning, digital manager, treasurer etc.) lead the group’s activities and for almost four years tried to mobilise remainers and persuade soft leavers that Brexit had to be stopped. Their objectives were to inform people, support remainers but more importantly to give them the tools to take action38. They organised information meetings, weekly street stalls, local and national marches39, action days, canvassing and also encouraged supporters to lobby their MPs, to write to local media, to sign petitions, to leaflet anti-Brexit messages and to donate money. Mobilizing and recruiting potential members amongst their constituents but also retaining actual members has been a challenge given the volatility of Brexit. How were members recruited40? Weekly street stalls were the opportunity to talk to passers-by, to answer people’s fears and concerns about Brexit and to collect some data. It enabled activists to get an authentic picture of the situation, to orientate the campaign more effectively (short questionnaire or ‘Brexitometers’41) and to report to national groups42. Acting locally is of paramount importance, Snow and Benford “implicitly assume that people are being recruited through personal networks of those who share underlying worldviews”43 echoing what Mike Galsworthy explained to me:

• 45 “What resonates with people […] is about family, friends, people in your workplace, people you know (...)
• 46 The extent use of social media did help to rally remainers even though opinions differ on that subj (...)
• 47 People’s Vote, 2020; The organisation originated in Camden, North London and was launched on 15 Apr (...)
• 48 Münchau, W., 2019.
• 49 Smith, M., 2020.
• 50 Poll based on 1526 people from 2 to 20 January 2020.
• 51 For the purpose of brevity, I shall not elaborate on this aspect of the pro-EU campaign. I shall on (...)
• 52 72% of the LGBT community supported People’s Vote, along with Ethnic Minorities for a People’s Vote (...)
• 53 These groups closed down in 2019 after PV's scandal.

10Indeed, people are more receptive to friends, family or colleagues than the media or mainstream politics45. Four years after the referendum, local groups managed to form a strong movement by being systematic, strategic and consistent thanks to solidarity. Social media46 and tools like Brexitometers helped the campaign to grow and increased its visibility. In 2018, People’s Vote, a grassroots campaign of “more than 700,000 campaign supporters, 20,000 activists, and over a million followers on social media” attempted to coordinate the movement47. PV's impact must not be overlooked, “to its credit, the People’s Vote campaign at least started to nurture a sense of Europeanness among those who attended its marches”48. When referring to YouGov’s latest figures, on 29 January 2020 70% of remainers had not reached acceptance and were still fighting49. Indeed, according to the national campaign group Open Britain 75% of pro-EU activists still wanted to campaign against Brexit in January 202050, which could confirm the hypothesis that despite the crushing victory of the Conservatives, the movement may continue. Pro-Europeans tried to fill in the gap left by Brexit which came to mar the image they had of democracy. The grassroots also campaigned for the preservation of their existing rights such as the freedom to work, travel, settle and study in the EU but also to ensure EU citizens will not be considered as illegal residents. As a result, the pro-European movement revealed the existence of cross-cutting identities: in July/August 2018 PV set up branches51 such as Women for a People’s vote, LGBT+ for a People’s Vote52 and Ethnic Minorities for a People’s Vote, thus reflecting the diversity of British society53. Besides, the Brexit negotiations carried out under Theresa May’s premiership deeply divided British politics. Indeed, some politicians were particularly keen to defend EU membership and resigned altogether from their respective parties.

• 54 Alexandre-Collier, A., 2020; Curtice, J., 2018.
• 55 Independent campaigning organisations such as the Electoral Reform Society (ERS) or Make Vote Matte (...)
• 56 Cutts, D., et al., 2020.
• 57 Cutts, D., et al., 2019.
• 58 “… although Brexit has reconfigured the geographical base of electoral support for the main parties (...)

11Brexit bias has partly superseded party identity and also wiped out the long-standing dyadic nature of UK politics (Labour/Conservative and left/right), as Agnès Alexandre-Collier explains: “Brexit has realigned British politics around two enduring camps (remainers/leavers), triggering new political identities”54. Pro-European activists accused the system of being broken and have been militating for electoral reform through proportional representation.55 Furthermore, new parties (Change UK and the Brexit Party) emerged after the Brexit referendum transforming “a once stable two-party system […] into a four-party race”56. In their article, Cutts et al. analyse the 2019 European Parliament (EP) elections57. The Liberal Democrats, who, unlike Labour, took a radical position on Brexit by deciding to revoke Article 50, came second with 20.3% of the vote and this was interpreted as auspicious for the 2019 general election. Contrary to the two main parties, which performed poorly, pro-remain parties scored well, gathering a total of 24 seats. Cutts et al. formulate two hypotheses behind the results: leavers were either tired of the May government’s incapacity to leave on 29 March 2019 or remainers seized this opportunity to make their voices heard. Where did it go wrong? The 2019 general election embodied hope for the remain community who campaigned ardently to stop the nine-year conservative domination by promoting tactical voting. We also know that the 2019 general election was not only shaped by Brexit but by long-term factors and that 2019 does not necessarily echo a critical turning point in British politics58.

• 59 Change UK “indicated a willingness to make a difference within their party and to try and prevent t (...)
• 60 “Labour sought to ‘own’ a more moderate position by backing a ‘People’s Vote’ which would include a (...)
• 61 Clarke, J., 2019.
• 62 Weaver, M., 2019.
• 63 “Given the limitation of our electoral system, there would be nothing worse than the emergence of t (...)
• 64 Snowdon, P., 2019.
• 65 “Unite to Remain” became “Unite to Reform” after the 2019 general election.
• 66 Amongst them were 10 pro-remain Labour seats –Meadowcroft, T., 2019.
• 67 “Nationally, the Conservatives gained a majority by winning seats primarily from Labour, who suppor (...)
• 68 The alliance was “successful in only nine of the sixty seats, and this included only one gain (Rich (...)
• 69 Winston Churchill in 1911 already warned the country that the FPTP system was detrimental to politi (...)

12Change UK tried to reshape politics by answering what they thought were Britons’ main concerns under the slogan: “Politics is broken. Let’s change it”. Conservative mavericks rejected the hard-line Theresa May was taking on Brexit and eschewed the party’s shift to the right of the political spectrum59 while some Labour MPs were dissatisfied with J. Corbyn’s ‘leftist’ line and indignation at antisemitism allegations. One could assume that Change UK embodied hope for the pro-European community who could no longer identify with Labour policies, as Jeremy Corbyn would not clearly stand for a second referendum60. However, remainers’ feelings were rather mixed towards the new party. The “gang of eleven” took a centrist approach to British politics and advocated for a people’s vote on Brexit and campaigned to remain in the European Union. Amongst the party’s 11 priorities, avoiding a no-deal Brexit was on top of the list and when on 29 March 2019 former Prime minister Theresa May decided to postpone Brexit, the group took a leap and registered as Change UK- the Independent Group in order to stand for the 2019 European elections scheduled to take place in May. Change UK gained the support from the centrist independent Renew party led by Julie Girling as they did not succeed in securing seats in the 2019 local elections. The alliance was temporary as James Clarke, deputy leader, underlined in our interview: “We entered into an alliance with them for the EU elections and that was partially successful, partially unsuccessful but there’s no urgent plans to merge with them, particularly given the split that they’ve currently experienced”61. Renew disagreed mostly on the top-down political structure of Change UK which was against their grassroots’ ideology. As a result, Heidi Allen was rather pessimistic about EP elections and decided to “take a step further”. She proposed a coalition with the Liberal Democrats, whilst Chuka Umunna was of the opinion that a “pact” would be more “sensible”62 just like the SDP allied with the Liberals at the 1983 and 1987 general elections63. When the Liberal Democrats came third in the UK’s local elections there was no consensus amongst Change UK. According to Umunna and Allen, the Liberal Democrats’ success was seen as an opportunity to reinforce centre politics through a possible alliance with the pro-EU party. However, Berger, Shuker and Smith stood by their convictions that politics needed a fresh start and that Change UK should keep its stance as an independent reformist entity with the perspective that it would grow into a powerful party for “disillusioned MPs”. Gapes, Ryan, Shuker, Soubry and Leslie saw an alliance with the Liberal Democrats as a paradox given it had always been seen as a rival. The party organised a meeting on 4 June 2019 and Allen, Berger, Smith, Umunna, Shuker and Wollaston decided to break away from it concluding that “[w]hat had begun in the spirit of friendship and co-operation ended in acrimony and division”64. Consequently, Allen set up “Unite to Remain”65, “a cross-party initiative to help anti-Brexit candidates maximise their chances in parliamentary elections, regardless of party”. The electoral pact or “the most significant electoral pact since 1918” comprised Plaid Cymru, The Liberal Democrats and the Green Party. Despite covering 60 seats66 in England (49) and Wales (11), the coalition struggled to form a strong remain alliance (even Jo Swinson, former Liberal Democrat leader, lost her seat in East Dunbartonshire). Opinions differed especially with Labour67 and the alliance could not measure up to Boris Johnson’s Conservative party, which won with a hefty majority68. Indeed, Britain’s first-past-the-post system69 is disadvantageous for third parties and political pacts like UTR constitute the only alternative to broken politics:

• 71 “… the emergence of tactical voting websites risks muddying the waters further for electors seeking (...)
• 72 Sabbagh, D., 2019.
• 73 “We need an economy that increases opportunity and reduces poverty. It must close the gaps between (...)
• 74 “Johnson went further than May, combining strong support for Brexit with socially conservative mess (...)

13However, such political strategy has its limits and can sometimes deliver unwanted results. According to Nicholls and Hayton, the 2019 general election was more coordinated than ever before, and coordination happened to be an issue as UTR suffered a considerable defeat71. According to the grassroots, the fact that Labour and the Liberal Democrats refused to work together clearly helped the Conservatives to win. Indeed, people voted for policies (Brexit/second referendum) instead of parties hence the salience of a strong pro-Europe coalition campaigning for a continued membership. On the bright side, “the Change UK breakaway had one other important effect: prompting Labour’s leadership to finally back a second referendum”72 in order to stymie Tories’ hard Brexit. Unfortunately, another people’s vote was not supported by a majority of Labour MPs. A question remains, now that anti-Brexit political formations have exposed the social, economic and political malaise in Britain73, has it helped make these issues inescapable even for a pro-Brexit government with a big majority in Parliament? The 2019 Conservative and Unionist party manifestos set the tone very assertively: “Get Brexit done”. The phrase repeated 24 times made every leaver see eye to eye but also appealed to Labour working-class heartlands who had felt disconnected from their party74.

• 76 Scientists for EU, InFacts, Healthier In the EU, Britain for Europe, Open Britain, OFOC, the Europe (...)
• 77 Groups count up to 500, 000 supporters.
• 78 Roberts, D., 2018.
• 79 The organisation was set up in February 2018.
• 80 Grice. A., 2018.
• 81 Manson R. and Syal, R., 2019.
• 82 “We are appalled by the recent actions of Roland Rudd as chair of Open Britain. The intimidation of (...)

15One may wonder whether the movement is limited to a specific moment in time. Or whether the movement’s impact has shaped something more lasting? Despite the impediments, activists have managed to maintain the movement. As pointed out, one of the main coordinating actors of the remain campaign was People’s Vote. In the Spring of 2018, all national groups76, with the exception of Best for Britain, decided to work together in the Millbank Tower in London, a place not left to chance as major political campaigns of 1997 (Labour) and 2010 (Conservative) happened there. The idea was to create an atmosphere of collaboration and solidarity but above all an attempt to coordinate the anti-Brexit campaign77 effectively with one single goal: to get a “people’s vote” on the Brexit deal78. Under the umbrella group called the Grassroots Coordinating Group79 (GCG) the remain coalition attempted to give a voice to those asking for a soft Brexit and indeed, possibly, a second referendum. As a result, their strategy was to lobby MPs, focusing more particularly on Labour so they could get support in Parliament for a “meaningful vote” on the exit deal80. Unexpectedly, the umbrella alliance signed its death warrant when the organisation “imploded” in October 201981. Less than two months before the general election, PV was no longer the movement’s coordinating body, due to internal tensions with OB’s chair Rolland Rudd (also self-proclaimed chair of PV) who used his title to reorganise PV by dismissing some of its staff82. Power struggle or opposite ideologies? Abuse of power or dysfunctional campaign? The wrangling seems to be a mix of the two rattling the smooth operation of the campaign.

• 83 Schwartz M. and Paul, S., 1992.
• 84 Richard Wilson founded Leeds for Europe in 2017 and was appointed vice chair of the European Moveme (...)
• 85 Grassroots for Europe, 2020 (c).

16In the aftermath of the 2019 general election, pro-Europeans decided that it was time to review the situation on Brexit: Boris Johnson had just been elected Prime minister and the UK was about to legally leave the EU. A change of objectives was required as campaigning to stay in the EU no longer made sense. The pro-EU campaign being unencumbered can easily change tactics83. Therefore, on 25 January 2020 Grassroots for Europe (GfE) organised a pro-EU international conference in Central Hall, Westminster. GfE, chaired by Richard Wilson84, was formed in September 2018 by activists from pro-EU campaign groups located across various parts of the UK. The GfE network, which now numbers more than 220 local groups, has until now remained largely informal, reacting rapidly to emerging developments, and creatively supportive of its member groups. The event gathered “450 local activists, representing over 200 groups, who travelled from across the UK and beyond to take part”85. The aim of such an event was to set the next step forward as its title “Where Now for Remain?” suggested. Learning from their mistakes, the grassroots are getting ready for the 2024 general election and are working together for a “Rejoin” campaign.

• 87 Bremain in Spain, 2020.
• 88 Grassroots for Europe, 2020 (a).
• 89 Woodcock, A., 2020.
• 90 Ibid.

18Richard Wilson reiterated the importance of collaboration and asked, “key national groupings to put past disagreements aside and come together to agree a coordinated and cooperative campaign”87. Mike Galsworthy added that he does not think that had there been another referendum Remain would have won it because they “didn’t actually have enough infrastructure in place and tested messaging in place that was redolent to those key demographics that [they] need to be working on now”88. Holding the government to account is the ultimate motivation, the Tories have to take responsibility for their actions. The EM have set a Brexit watch to “gather evidence of how EU withdrawal is affecting communities around the country, with the aim of making the government and the Leave campaign take responsibility for the consequences of their policies”89. Indeed, local authorities have been encouraged to constitute impact assessments about the consequences “Brexit has on jobs, communities and livelihoods and to encourage supporters to lobby MPs of all parties for closer engagement with Europe”90. For anti-Brexit activists, EU membership is more than an ideological fight, it is a civilizational fight.

• 91 YouGov, Jan. 2020.
• 92 Schnapper, P. and Avril, E., 2019, p. 64.

192018 might be considered as the heyday of the pro-EU movement as January polls suggested that the country was shifting towards a second referendum. Indeed, from October 2017 an increase in support of Remain could be observed; people realised that voting for Brexit was wrong, peaking at 50% at the end of 2019 against 43% pondering it was the right thing to do91. However, this must be interpreted with care, as akin to the pre-referendum polls, which predicted the victory of Remain, there is always a margin of error, as Pauline Schnapper and Emmanuelle Avril underline92. Unfortunately, the pro-European coalition dislocated due to internal disagreement over the cost of the management of local groups. Ultimately, the remain cause seemed like a two-tier campaign, as national groups were sending different messages to the grassroots and the lack of consensus severely hurt the campaign:

• 95 @JoeBiden, 2020.
• 96 March for Change, a campaigning organisation in collaboration with the grassroots, has launched a p (...)

23Getting the US Democrats on their side is also part of their objectives. Joe Biden’s election has been seen very positively for the campaign. Indeed, on 16 September 2020, the then US candidate of Irish descent declared in a tweet: “We can’t allow the Good Friday Agreement that brought peace to Northern Ireland to become a casualty of Brexit”, thus supporting pro-EU activists95. Moreover, they seem intent on preventing Boris Johnson from stopping Parliament scrutinising all policies, so that the impact of Brexit does not go unnoticed. As of January 2021, the COVID crisis has undoubtedly hit the campaign. Not only have activists had to find new ways to keep the movement going (notably through using online tools such as Zoom to conduct group meetings), but they also have had to reassess their objectives, taking them away from their primary battle: condemning the Conservative government’s handling of the pandemic, for example96. One may wonder how this will affect the movement. Campaigners will make the case for trade and economic effects and will find local businesses that have been and will be impacted. Their strategy hinges on lobbying conservative backbenchers and “red-wall” Tory MPs who rely on the support of local businesses. Indeed, the dire economic consequences that Brexit is very likely to bring to their constituencies may be the leverage the movement needs to achieve its goal.