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British identities and the 2016 European Union referendum: The Greens for a Better Europe and the Labour In for Britain campaigns

Niaz Cary-Pernon
p. 7-28

Résumé

In the rich and varied literature on the referendum on the United Kingdom’s membership of the European Union, the contribution of this paper consists in connecting two categories of campaigners through the concept of national identity. Indeed, this concept sheds light on the study of a multifaceted domestic situation intertwined with collective as well as regional and international questions. Two criteria were applied. The first concerns the status of campaigners: only structures that officially registered with the Electoral Commission were selected. The second selection parameter derived from existing studies. That is why the Labour Party’s and the Green Party’s 2016 European Union campaigns will be explored in a comparative perspective, adopting a comprehensive approach. The main objective is to focus on British identity debates produced in the name of collective actors. Utilizing a constructivist framework, the paper delves into the perceptions of the European Union in the Remain leaflets of the Labour Party and the Green Party. Their leaflets were intended for wide distribution aiming at persuading the electorate about a specific message. As such, their topics had to be easily grasped by a variety of people, also constituting a privileged medium for conveying identity dimensions. Therefore, after establishing the interplay between the territorial strategy and the political identity of these two campaigners in the first part, the construction of interest categories in their leaflets will be studied in order to characterize the partisan factors they expressed. This serves to explore the conception of international relations underlying their argumentation in the third part.

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Introduction

  • 1 Curtice, J., 2017; Youngduek, P. and Yongmin, K., 2018; Tournier-Sol, K., 2017.
  • 2 See, for instance, Renwick, A., et al., 2018.
  • 3 Dennison, J., et al., 2020; Hague, C., 2020; Beasley, R. K., et al., 2021.
  • 4 Iakhnis, E., et al., 2018; Usherwood, S., 2018; Gherghina, S. and O’Malley, D. J., 2019.

1Since the referendum on the United Kingdom’s (UK) membership of the European Union (EU) was held on 23 June 2016, researchers have investigated the causes1, implications and outcomes2 of the Brexit vote. Analysing voting profiles at individual, regional or national level, the studies of the referendum results have shown the existence of various categories of divide explained through economic, emotional, political, socio-demographic and territorial lenses3. Furthermore, academic research has regularly highlighted that attitudes to immigration or self-determination and the questions of populism or Euroscepticism played a key role4.

  • 5 Among others, Hanska, M. and Bauchowitz, S., 2017.
  • 6 Rivière-De Franco, K., 2017.
  • 7 Schnapper, P., 2017 or Alexandre-Collier, A., 2017.
  • 8 Freyssinet, J., 2017; Msaddek, H., 2017.
  • 9 Knapp, A., 2017.
  • 10 Greer, A., 2018; Laffan, B., 2018.
  • 11 For example, Howarth, D. and Quaglia, L., 2017 and Gianfranco, B., et al., 2018.

2More particularly, the EU referendum has been explored by studying Vote Leave and/or Britain Stronger In Europe5, i.e. the two groups that had been officially designated by the Electoral Commission to lead the national organization and promotion of pro- or anti-EU campaign actions. In general, displaying the responsibilities of the British media6 and political elite7 as well as the active participation of trade unions8 and academics9 in debates prior to the referendum emphasizes that the latter covered party politics strategies and impacted the relations between the component parts of the UK10, questioning their position not only within the EU but also in world affairs. Thus, economic, constitutional and legal effects of the Brexit vote have been reviewed in order to assess the future of gradual EU-UK negotiations and decisions11.

  • 12 The question was: “Should the United Kingdom remain a member of the European Union or leave the Eur (...)
  • 13 Gibraltar will not be mentioned in this paper. However, British, Irish and Commonwealth citizens ag (...)

3In the rich and varied literature on Brexit, the contribution of this paper consists in connecting two categories of campaigners through the concept of national identity. Indeed, the question asked in the referendum12 invited voters to adopt an identity perspective: should the British political entity be considered within or without EU institutions? Moreover, British voters lived in a multinational community comprising England, Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales13. The concept of national identity offers a prism through which we may study a multifaceted domestic situation intertwined with collective as well as regional and international questions. Yet, employing this notion is a challenging task, for both nation and identity have spurred renewed attention and definition debates.

  • 14 Berenskoetter, F., 2010; Flockhart, T., 2012.

4Firstly, the concept of identity has occupied the foreground in various research areas including anthropology, philosophy, psychology or social sciences in particular. In the 1990s, it was introduced by constructivists in the academic field of International Relations in which this paper is rooted. Although various constructivist approaches co-exist, the key identity sub-notions selected for the purpose of this paper constitute their common background14. At the ontological level, international relations consist of multiple types of identity. The latter refers to the following question: “What/Who is X?”; at the methodological level, actions are tightly associated with identities and constantly interact with interests leading individuals to behave in a certain way. Here, the question raised corresponds to “What/Who does X want to be?”; at the epistemological level, studying identities is sustained by the idea that reality is a social construction entailing intersubjective and contextually contingent interactions as well as perceptions. Hence the question: “How do actors interact?” Exploring multilayered identities, interests and interconnections lies at the heart of this paper.

  • 15 The following books helped summarize the main aspects of the concept: Guibernau, M., 2007 and Gibbi (...)

5Secondly, in order to conceptualize “nation”15, ethnic- or civic-based research frameworks were initially produced. A civic definition focuses on its development within states understood as political and geographical units. The people living within the boundaries of a state abide by the latter’s laws and the citizenry prevails. By contrast, an ethnic characterization insists on common and/or shared cultural dimensions – such as traditions, language, religion – which permit or encourage the constitution of states by some communities. In both cases, the concepts of nation and state are closely associated, laying emphasis on territorial unity and political sovereignty. However, considering the manifold nature of modern societies, communities and states, researchers have provided explanations taking this reality into account. Ethnic and civic conceptions have thus become ideal-type configurations positioned at either end of the spectrum through which national identity markers can be examined. This paper will adopt this second approach by addressing the following question: what type of identity argumentation was developed in the 2016 referendum campaigns selected?

6Campaigning organizations consisted of more than 700 collective or individual actors. Thus, two criteria were applied. The first concerns the status of campaigners: only structures that officially registered with the Electoral Commission were selected. This certified status represented financial advantages. The second selection parameter derived from existing studies. Since the latter have either focused on the two lead campaigners or examined each component part of the UK separately, this paper adopts a comprehensive approach in order to establish interactions at several levels, especially when the role of specific structures remains to be addressed. That is why the Labour Party’s and the Green Party’s campaigns – The Labour In for Britain and The Greens for a Better Europe respectively – will be explored in a comparative perspective. The main objective of the paper is to focus on British identity debates produced in the name of collective actors. Thus, structural perceptions and not individual agents’ positions will be studied. Furthermore, Northern Irish, Scottish, or Welsh debates are taken into account in order to provide regional factors.

7Drawing on the aforementioned considerations on the notions of national identity and interests, along with the context of referendum campaigning, the primary sources of this paper are composed of leaflets. Indeed, the latter are generally intended for wide distribution aiming at persuading the electorate about a message. As such, their topics have to be easily grasped by a variety of people, also constituting a privileged medium for conveying identity dimensions. Utilizing a constructivist framework, this paper pays particular attention to the in-group/out-group elaboration which encompasses civic as well as ethnic factors. This implies the study of a sense of national “Self” – Britain – or “Selves” – England, Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales – examined through their relationships with the “EU Other”. The aim is to delve into the perceptions of the EU in the leaflets of the Labour Party and the Green Party. Therefore, after establishing the interplay between the territorial strategy and the political identity of these two campaigners in the first part, the construction of interest categories in their leaflets will be studied in order to characterize the partisan factors they expressed. This serves to explore the conception of international relations underlying their argumentation in the third part.

The two campaigners and global or local identity factors

  • 16 Flockhart, T., op. cit., pp. 85-89.

8From the constructivist perspective, identifying actors helps elaborate on how interests can be defined through perceptions of an issue16. Before examining the construction of interests in the 2016 referendum leaflets of the Labour Party and the Green Party in the next section, the following question needs to be addressed: what does the campaigning voice array of these two parties show about their identities? The latter are studied through a global/local dialectic and an in-group/out-group categorization. Analysing the general context of the two political groups’ referendum communication strategies helps evaluate the interests promoted in their leaflets. The actors under study can be first characterized as follows: the Labour Party and the Green Party are partisan groups; they acted within the larger category of British political elites campaigning for the UK to remain in the EU. The argumentation developed in their leaflets mirrored the official, collective line determined by their party organizations. However, while being UK-wide political entities, the Labour Party’s or the Green Party’s Northern Irish, Scottish and Welsh structures manifested specific features. Thus, after studying the multilayered configuration of the two political groups’ positions on the EU, regional identity factors will also be explored in this section.

Campaign configurations

9Firstly, considering the global context of the 2016 referendum, the administrative categorization of pro- or anti-EU campaigners by the Electoral Commission fell into five entities: associations, companies, individuals, political parties and trade unions17. Once the Labour Party and the Green Party officially registered as Remain organizations, dissident voices were expressed by various structures. Indeed, both parties decided to allow their individual members to express their personal opinions and back the Leave camp. The analysis of these external viewpoints helps understand the identity dissension nexus within and between political groups. Green-Leaves – registered as an incorporated association by the Electoral Commission – campaigned against the official argument of the Green Party by advocating a Brexit vote mainly because its members claimed that “the EU was beyond reform”18. On the contrary, as will be explained, the Green Party’s official programme revolved around the necessity for changing the EU. Therefore, the Greens’ official argumentation was also a reaction to the dissident members of the party. The latter’s position was similar to that of the Vote Leave campaign, designated by the Electoral Commission as the lead organization in support of a vote to exit from the EU. The inefficiency of the EU bureaucracy was repeatedly highlighted, concluding that it was impossible to improve its functioning19.

10Opposition to the Labour Party’s pro-EU programme was expressed in a variety of bodies. Indeed, Labour Leave, registered as a company, was closely associated with several Brexit campaigners. For instance, while being a separate legal entity, it supported Vote Leave; it worked closely with the Labour Euro-Safeguards campaign affiliated with the Campaign for an Independent Britain, an umbrella group comprising other individual organizations committed to the UK’s exit from the EU, e.g. the association and industry grassroot pressure group Fishing for Leave or the think-tank Bruges Group; the Campaign for an Independent Britain was, in turn, part of the Leave Alliance which itself was composed of different structures such as Save Britain’s Fish; Labour Leave also participated in the cross-party Better Off Out Campaign of the pressure group Freedom Association. This association was created in 1975 after the UK had entered the European Economic Community. Likewise, the Campaign for an Independent Britain or the Bruges Group had opposed the European integration process from the start of the UK’s membership. Consequently, the Labour Party’s leaflets reacted to criticisms stemming from multiple perspectives including long-standing anti-EU traditions as well as industry interest groups.

  • 20 The Electoral Commission, “Report: 23 June 2016 Referendum on the UK’s membership of the European U (...)
  • 21 Edinburgh and West Lothian Greens, “A Short History of the Scottish Green Party”, <https://www.edin (...)
  • 22 Ibid.
  • 23 Green Party, “Yes to Europe”, Greens for a Better Europe, 2016, p. 1.

11Secondly, the analysis of the geographical approach adopted by the Labour Party and the Green Party shows that they developed distinct strategies. The Greens opted for regionalism, i.e. exhibiting specific attitudes in the component parts of the UK. Two legal entities officially registered with the Electoral Commission20: the Green Party of England and Wales, on the one hand, and the Scottish Green Party, on the other hand. The Scottish Greens refused to be part of any UK-wide campaigning for the Remain vote by stating that they aimed to work with civil society groups at the local level in order to be able to take the specific nature of the Scottish case into account within a pro-EU framework21. This argumentation reflected their active involvement in the devolution referendum in 1997 and their backing of Scotland as an independent country. Their local strategy therefore displays similarities with the Scottish National Party’s (SNP) position, both as the Scottish Government and as a party. However, the Scottish Greens differentiated their local campaigning by claiming that, unlike the SNP, they had always held a “distinctive Green vision”22 of the EU since their objective was to tackle simultaneously regional independence, climate change and environmental issues while reforming economic models23.

12Furthermore, the Scottish Greens’ strategy can be compared to other regional parties’ positioning. During the 2016 referendum, the Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP) in Northern Ireland24 and Plaid Cymru-the Party of Wales25 also considered the EU as an international institution helping them achieve greater local independence, ensuring and even accelerating the devolution process at work in the UK since the late 1990s. Therefore, the Scottish Greens’ programme differed from that of the Green Party of England and Wales because the questions of devolution and independence were tightly connected to the political role played by Scotland in the UK institutions and decision-making process. EU membership was clearly represented as a means to accomplish this goal26, which implies that proclaiming a local identity could lead to disengagement from a national strategy, albeit sharing common pro-EU interests with English and Welsh partners. Hence the Scottish Green Party’s strategy of campaigning as an independent entity displays the importance of being recognized as a small nation within the EU. According to the Scottish Greens, this larger political and socio-economic structure reinforced the local, national and international status of Scotland.

  • 27 For example, Labour Party, “Labour in for Britain: Jobs. Exports. Security.”, Labour In for Britain (...)
  • 28 BBC News, “EU Referendum: Tom Harris to Head Scottish Vote Leave Campaign”, 18 March 2016, <https:/ (...)
  • 29 Labour Leave, “It’s Time to Leave the EU and Join the World”, Labour Leave, 2016, p. 2 or Labour Le (...)

13As regards the Labour Party’s territorial strategy during the 2016 referendum, it consisted in providing a UK-wide pro-EU campaign supported by regional wings. For instance, the arguments put forward by Labour In for Britain resonated with those advanced by the EU supporters of Scottish or Welsh Labour27. However, Labour Leave’s presence in the Scottish referendum campaigning is notable28. It held several meetings in Scotland, arguing that it opposed the EU’s austerity policies and capitalist agenda. This argumentation referred to the situation before the 2016 EU referendum took place. Scottish Labour had shown some signs of decline after the Parliament election in Scotland, becoming the third party of the country, after the SNP and the Conservatives respectively. Labour Leave’s rhetoric precisely revolved around a radical narrative distinguishing itself from the agenda of the Labour Party which, as will be explained, defended EU economic measures29. In Wales, the Labour Party had also lost its political domination. Indeed, it formed a minority administration after winning the elections in May 2016. However, Welsh Labour’s reaction, as a party and as the Welsh Government, differed. It strongly supported continued EU membership, creating an active Labour In for Wales campaign that produced numerous leaflets.

Notable (non-)commitments

  • 30 Berberi, C., op. cit., pp. 5-6.
  • 31 Ibid., p. 7.

14In the context of regional advocacy and activism, an aspect to be considered concerns the distribution of some structures’ absence or one-sided commitment. In Northern Ireland, like Sinn Féin and the Ulster Unionist Party, the Green Party did not register with the Electoral Commission. For all these parties, the decision implied that they did not have a specific budget for supporting their Remain positions. Owing to an official appointment, campaigners could make an effective use of the additional benefits available to them in order to develop their communication strategies, which included access to broadcast media or distributing leaflets. Therefore, the SDLP was the only nationalist political group in Northern Ireland defending a pro-EU vision, which reflected its long-standing support for the UK’s membership30. The party particularly pointed out the effects a Brexit vote could have on the peace process by jeopardizing the official documents regulating the relations between Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland. Indeed, a Leave vote meant that the former would not be part of the EU, which would have called into question the Belfast Agreement signed in 1998 as well as the SDLP’s rhetoric of a united Ireland. More generally, even if they did not hold the same views as regards the Irish question and relations to the EU, the SDLP’s coherent position can be compared to the constant stances of the Democratic Unionist Party or the Traditional Unionist Voice, which, likewise, had never modified their vision of the EU. Both regarded it as undemocratic and unaccountable besides representing a major obstacle to the British Union. A Leave vote led to distancing Northern Ireland from the Republic, which precisely reinforced their unionist visions31.

  • 32 English Democrats, “Time to Put England First!”, The Official Web Page of the Democratic Party of E (...)

15Thus, sketching the broader context in which the Labour Party and the Green Party designed their global/local approaches to the 2016 referendum helps situate them vis-à-vis the nationalist parties of each of the four British nations. No nationalist Irish, Scottish or Welsh party officially sided with the Leave camp whereas Englishness-based in-grouping was only constructed through Leave argumentation via the English democrats or the Newcastle upon Tyne Community First Party. For instance, the English Democrats’ promotion of Leave arguments reflected a binary perception of the EU presented as a threatening structure32. First, it was proclaimed that European integration demeaned British sovereignty in the international system by imposing regulations that had gradually overridden national policies; second, it was considered that, by backing the devolution process, the EU interfered in a domestic question concerning internal, territorial and political cohesion within the UK. In general, it was stated that, far from benefiting from the same privileges, England did not have the same rights in the multinational entity it belonged to. English interests were thus undermined both nationally and internationally.

  • 33 Wyn Jones, R., et al., 2013.
  • 34 Berberi, C., op. cit., p. 5.

16The one-sided presence of nationalist parties corroborates the findings showing that European integration had been increasingly in tension with Englishness and not Britishness33. Irish, Welsh or Scottish political identities incorporated European membership not only as a non-exclusive but also as an enriching marker. Here, a notable aspect lies in the absence of the Irish nationalist party Sinn Féin which did not register with the Electoral Commission, albeit officially backing the Remain side. But Sinn Féin’s position towards the EU had evolved over time34. In the 1980s-1990s, it started favouring European integration. This was a pragmatic approach linked to the elaboration of a new policy for a united Ireland. In general, the Irish case, with political groups campaigning for as well as against the EU, exemplifies the global/local referendum background. Exclusively unionist arguments opposed European and British identities because the roles played by the EU’s and the UK’s institutions were regarded as antagonistic. This mirrored the English Democrats’ out-grouping process, even if the latter’s stance was based on defending Englishness and not Britishness.

17By contrast, a nationalist positioning placed itself within a European regional system by designing a Russian doll strategy: Northern Irish, Scottish and Welsh identities exhibited a set of varying sizes, incorporating local, national and European components respectively. In this context, the local anchoring of the Scottish Green Party’s campaign promotes a specific status for Scotland in the general referendum debates, generating a distinct out-grouping process associated with the question of independence. In Northern Ireland, although the UK’s withdrawal from the EU presented challenges for Irish economic, political and territorial relations, nationalist parties did not provide an officially united front since only the SDLP registered with the Electoral Commission. Welsh Labour and the Welsh Greens, however, opted for a UK-wide strategy combined with a local campaigning programme which mainly consisted in outlining the disastrous economic effects of a Brexit vote in terms of job losses. Thus, the global/local dialectic employed to identify the general characteristics of the 2016 campaigns of the Labour Party and the Green Party shows the interrelations between political identities and regional or national claims. The next part focuses on how these identity configurations framed the construction of interests in both political groups’ leaflets. Regional, specific perceptions will be addressed only if they help decipher a distinct approach.

The construction of interests within the leaflets of the two political groups

18In the campaigning leaflets, a key step to defining interests that could lead voters to select the referendum result, promoted by the Labour Party or the Greens, dealt with issues targeting specific social categories. In this section, the Self/Other nexus will be employed in order to analyse the construction of interests in a comparative perspective.

Social profiles

19First, in the Remain campaigns Labour In for Britain or Greens for a Better Europe, the use of the adjective “British” and territorial references containing the words “Britain” or “the UK” delimit a united national community. This lexical approach corresponds to the administrative nature of the majority of the registered organizations who opted for campaigning in each of the four British nations. Nevertheless, the above-mentioned campaign titles exhibit distinct priorities. Labour focused on the advantages EU membership represented for Britain while the Greens’ approach was reformist. Indeed, the Greens’ emphasis on the possibility of improving European institutions, combined with the absence of any national anchoring in the title of their programme, points to the responsibility British voters should take not only for their own benefit but also for the other EU member states’ future. By contrast, Labour’s approach centres on national boundaries only.

  • 35 Green Party, “Yes to Europe”, op. cit., p. 1.
  • 36 Ibid.

20Then, once the profile of the national “Self” is created in relation to the global perception of the “EU Other”, the UK’s membership is assessed according to its impact on voters’ daily lives. In the Greens for a Better Europe leaflets, the typology of British people targeted derives from their relational and/or professional identities. For instance, it is mentioned that EU membership had offered job opportunities and provided progressive rights to women benefiting from “maternity leaves”35. Furthermore, it is often stated that the British population’s health or the environment in general had been protected owing to the imposition of similar European regulations in the member states. In parallel, arguing that the principle of “fair pay” concerned not only women but also temporary or part-time workers reinforces the idea that the EU had to provide security to “the most deprived” professional categories36. The argument entails, in turn, that the privileges of other structures should be reviewed.

  • 37 Ibid.
  • 38 Green-Leaves, “I’m with Tony”, op. cit., pp. 1-2; Green-Leaves, “I’m with David”, Green Leaves, 201 (...)

21Therefore, when the European Court of Justice rulings are mentioned, the aim is to highlight the progress made regarding women’s rights and to pressure the member states into passing further radical legislation. This explains why the Remain campaign of the Green Party lays emphasis on the necessity for economic reforms in order to achieve redistributive policies aimed at “tackling poverty” and “keeping in check” big corporations37. The goal is to create a more egalitarian society for the British population through their European citizenship. It was precisely the question of improving EU institutions which was a divisive issue within the Green Party. The core argument used by Green-Leaves, a group formed by some of its dissident members promoting a Brexit vote, consisted in developing the idea that the EU could not be reformed. In their leaflets, they repeatedly quoted former Labour Members of Parliament, such as Tony Benn, David Owen or Jeremy Corbyn, proclaiming that the EU held a supranational or federal agenda which operated undemocratically against British interests while favouring big corporations38.

  • 39 Labour Party, “On 23 June You Face a Big Decision About Our Future”, Labour In for Britain, 2016, p (...)

22Likewise, the Labour Party’s campaign employs relational or professional identification markers in order to analyse the EU’s impact. It is recurrently claimed that the UK’s membership had lowered prices for the “households” or “average famil[ies]”, improved the rights at work through “parental leaves” or “paid holidays”, and guaranteed work protections39. However, the Labour In for Britain programme targets large socio-economic categories. Indeed, its focus is on average middle-class families and parents’ rights. Furthermore, the working people’s condition to which the Labour Party’s leaflets often refer is exemplified by the testimonies of an engineer, a nurse, a store manager and workers from British industrial areas expressing their opinions and pointing out the importance of the EU for their careers.

  • 40 Labour Party, “Labour Says Vote Remain”, Labour In for Britain, 2016, p. 1.

23Thus, for Labour, the “EU Other” becomes an economic and industrial partner whose alliance helps Britain achieve a better national status. Social categories are principally portrayed as consumers whose rights within the EU are better served since, for instance, they can enjoy “cheaper holidays”40. In this process, the personification of the UK’s interests via the EU experience of British people lies in sharp contrast to the Green Party’s argumentation. As mentioned previously, the latter is based on the inclusion and identification of British interests with those of the other EU member states through the creation of transnational social entities without referring to socio-economic categories embodied by specific citizens.

Thematic approaches

  • 41 Ibid. and Green Party, “Why Greens Say Yes to Europe”, Greens for a Better Europe, 2016, p. 4.
  • 42 Vote Leave, “The UK and the European Union: The Facts”, Vote Leave, 2016, p. 1.
  • 43 Labour Leave, “Jez EU Can’t”, op. cit., pp. 2-3 or Left Leave, “Lexit: The Left Leave Campaign”, Le (...)

24In the British audience selecting process, the Labour Party’s and the Greens’ Remain campaigning exhibits the presence of a unifying theme. It is reflected in the recurrent idea that the key purpose of the European project after the Second World War was to offer security41. This explains why the EU is constantly represented as the archetype of a peace-building institution, helping to create common interests in order to eradicate hostility in terms of not only economic but also political relations. Thus, the EU embodies the value of cooperation promoted by the democratic peace theory emphasizing that states sharing liberal values are not disposed to wage war against one another. Considering that the association Veterans for Britain was officially committed to promote a Brexit vote, the reference to the EU’s pacifying role was a response and reaction to the Leave camp. For example, Vote Leave regretted that the European project had surpassed its initial economic agenda, essentially revolving around free trade and the single market42. In this case, the development of political integration was regarded as a threat to British sovereignty. Other groups like Labour Leave and the Left Leave Campaign43 underscored the consistency of their anti-EU stance from the inception of the project because they considered that EU institutions had always pursued capitalist and not socialist policies. In general, the Leave side brought to the fore the tensions EU membership had created by minimizing the UK government’s role in domestic and international affairs. This is precisely the vision the Remain campaigns, under study here, tried to refute. In both cases, the British destiny depended on the continuation of its privileged relations with the EU.

  • 44 Labour Party, “Britain Is Better Off in Europe”, Labour In for Britain, 2016, p. 2.
  • 45 Green Party, “Why Greens Say Yes to Europe”, op. cit., p. 11.

25Moreover, the perception of the notion of security by the Labour Party or the Green Party is evolutionary. In their leaflets, they state that, after maintaining peace in a continent that had been torn apart by wars between European nation-states in the first half of the twentieth century, the protection of British citizens from international threats also implied transnational cooperation in other domains once the regional peace had been safeguarded after the Second World War. Indeed, according to Labour’s programme, the modern world was characterized by mobility, which meant that criminals and terrorists could act across national borders44. More particularly for the Greens, peace and transnational contact with the liberal world impacted EU citizens and the rest of the world because they provided the conditions for educating people about democratic values such as human rights45. The peace in Europe therefore becomes part of a global project in which the EU liberal thinking should play a prominent role.

  • 46 Welsh Labour Party, “Labour Says Britain Is Better Off in Europe. Here’s Why…”, Labour In for Brita (...)
  • 47 Labour Party, “Save Our Steel”, op. cit., p. 2.

26However, the Labour Party’s and the Greens’ national campaigns do not address the threat a Brexit vote could represent to the Irish peace settlements, as stated in the SDLP’s leaflets, nor do they deal with Scotland’s independence question. The centrality of this issue justified the existence of the Scottish Greens’ separate campaigning. Yet, both issues, and the Union in general, were directly related to the referendum result. Regarding Wales, besides an identity factor underpinned by the use of the Welsh language, the leaflet texts only highlight economic gains for Wales without any allusion to the devolution process46. For example, it was shown how EU investment had contributed to improving local infrastructure or renovating Welsh parks and colleges. It was also claimed that EU membership offered job opportunities in the steel industry or in other sectors, particularly insisting on the Welsh exports in the single market. More especially, Welsh Labour regarded the EU-Wales partnership as a pragmatic security alliance against the economic power of China whose steel industry represented a competitive force in Europe47. Here, China and not the EU constituted a major threat to Welsh interests.

  • 48 Green Party, “We’re Fairer, Safer, Greener in Europe”, Greens for a Better Europe, 2016, pp. 1-3.
  • 49 Labour Party, Jeremy Corbyn, “Dear Voter”, Labour In for Britain, 2016, pp. 1-2 or Labour Party, La (...)

27Finally, it was mobility rather than immigration that was dealt with in the Labour and Green Parties’ leaflets, albeit each in their own distinct ways. For the Greens48, the freedom of movement is first associated with mobility considered as a general and culturally enriching factor at an individual level. Then, international contact helps create the conditions for spreading democratic values. Here again, the British people become European actors whose personal and citizen duties are embedded in order to construct a better European future. Unlike the Greens, Labour’s agenda49 links the issue of mobility only to its specific advantages for some British communities: EU funding programmes were claimed to enhance students’, workers’, researchers’ and academics’ prospects, ensuring the UK a leading position in the EU and in the world. The insistence on empirical benefits stemming from the UK’s membership and the argumentation that Labour’s values were better served in the EU indicate an underlying defensive strategy: Labour’s objective relies on preserving the existing working rights. Reforming the EU is justified by the idea that new measures should be implemented to create a more favourable context for British workers and consumers.

28The social identification in the Remain campaigns studied in the second section of the paper displays a categorization process featuring British people endowed with individual, family and professional rights. This also creates a duty, i.e. the voters’ responsibility to fight for their interests by choosing to remain in the EU. Nonetheless, the Green Party’s conception of the UK’s membership is not centred on national interests only. The latter derive from those of a global European community whose rights should be preserved by implementing fairer transnational policies. By contrast, the Labour Party’s campaign targets large categories of British voters who can be mainly identified by their professional interests. Labour’s programme also illustrates the values defended through empirical cases, that is, British individuals’ experiences of EU membership. In both campaigns, the “EU Other” provides opportunities to British citizens and improves their prospects. However, according to the Labour Party and the Greens, the European project should be reformulated to achieve further goals. Indeed, even if their perceptions of the EU do not represent a threat to British interests, both programmes point out new challenges which are underpinned by two configuration patterns of international relations.

The core principles of the leaflets

29When appraising the importance of European integration, the Remain mottoes of the Labour Party and the Green Party reflect two distinct principles founding the elaboration of British interests studied in the second section. The aim of this part is to examine the ideas entailed by these principles in a comparative perspective.

Specific or holistic considerations

  • 50 Labour Party, “Save Our Steel”, op. cit.
  • 51 For instance, Wales Stronger In Europe, “More Jobs, Lower Prices”, Britain Stronger In Europe, 2016 (...)
  • 52 Ibid.

30On the one hand, Labour draws the attention to economic power, since “Britain is better off in Europe”. In this process, the embedding of British and European interests reveals the existence of interdependence. National economic interests are dependent on European membership, which precisely lies at the heart of experts’ evaluations. Economists’ or British economic actors’ warnings about the dangers of a Brexit vote are indeed regularly exposed in Labour’s leaflets in order to underline its devastating effects in different areas of the UK50. Moreover, the emphasis on the economic factors of UK-EU relations reflects one of the major campaign dimensions of the pro-EU lead organization, Britain Stronger In Europe51. Both Labour In for Britain and Britain Stronger In Europe employed interdependence arguments and Brexit represented a risk, a “leap in the dark”52. On the other hand, the Greens’ motto, by advocating a “[f]airer, safer, greener” future, points to qualities that promote the values of justice and protection for voters and the(ir) environment. Their programme also addresses issues assessed beyond the context of the 2016 referendum. The latter is directly connected to its impact on future generations. Thus, the Greens’ agenda provides a holistic approach to the European question, attempting to see UK-EU relations through political, social and environmental angles. This approach encourages cooperation through solidarity.

  • 53 Labour Party, “Britain Is Better Off in Europe”, op. cit., p. 2.

31In this regional or national anchoring of British interests, a clearly distinctive feature of the Remain programmes under study pertains to their perceptions of environmental protection. As with criminality and security, this issue is tackled in the Labour Party’s leaflets in order to show that climate change is a cross-border problem, which requires multistate solutions. Compared to the economic arguments examined previously, Labour’s programme offers concrete examples through the testimonies of ordinary British individuals who first define climate change as a dominant problem before highlighting the impact it would have on future generations’ lives53. However, the protection of the environment is viewed traditionally as it is simply added to the list of issues related to EU membership, defending existing means for existing ends. Practical solutions are put forward through current EU institutions. Furthermore, the competitive nature of state relations emphasized by the recurrent use of the comparative structure “better off” in Labour’s leaflets is not conductive to a global approach and a long-term view about humankind’s common future.

  • 54 Green Party, “We’re Fairer, Safer, Greener in Europe”, op. cit., p. 2.
  • 55 Green Party, “Dear Voter”, Greens for a Better Europe, 2016, p. 1 or Green Party, “Why Greens Say Y (...)

32For the Greens, common attitudes and reactions were also necessary. Unsurprisingly for a political group whose identity is tightly associated with ecological thought, cooperation through the creation of shared European institutions and federal laws tackling environmental issues is praised. Nonetheless, the most notable dimension of the Greens’ campaign lies in the constant interaction established between environmental and social, societal and professional questions. This means that environmental topics are not more prioritized than political and economic measures aiming at creating a fairer society. For instance, the relevance of securing a safe environment for people in general is put forward through its impact on their health and working conditions54. In this case, the actions of the European Parliamentary Members of the Green Party alongside their EU partners – e.g. promoting renewable energy, cleaning beaches and rivers or fighting against the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership – are focused on in order to show that it is possible to reform the EU within its bureaucracy55. Moreover, environmentalism aligns itself to a critique of the capitalist system since the Greens condemn the maldistribution of benefits to European citizens.

33With British citizenship being inserted in a larger, European system, the Greens’ leaflets thus focus on how EU membership creates not only a society but also a community of transnational rights and values that can be shared by British people in conjunction with other Europeans. This displays a strategy that is based on the definition of the “British Self” in relation to a friendly “EU Other” whose identity and interests are similar and not competitive or exclusive. British voters are endowed with the duty of participating in the process of reforming this ally’s institutions in collaboration with other European citizens. The main objective consists in rendering the friendly “EU Other” more fraternal. Therefore, unlike Labour who seeks international solutions for British economic problems, the Greens’ environmental issues evoke questions about economic and social relations in the context of collective decision-making. More generally, this raises the question of where the boundaries of political actions should be placed. The regional system of cooperation promoted by the Greens challenges mainstream political and economic institutions. References to a global agenda point out that material development should be curtailed in the interest of preserving the most deprived people. The Greens’ vision underscores a sense of affinity between the people in Britain and the people of other EU states based on shared values and interests.

  • 56 Mason, R., “UK Trade Union Leaders Call on 6 Million Members to Vote Remain”, The Guardian, 6 June (...)

34Labour’s programme, by contrast, deploys a European rhetoric that is centred on an understanding of collective solutions amending, and not substituting, the national political system. Intergovernmental bargains should therefore complete the UK government’s policies. This means that preserving the “British Self” requires the orchestration of intergovernmental links to a more powerful “EU Other” in order to ensure the “Self’s” economic status and industry-specific questions. This approach echoes the influence of the trade union movement which officially decided to fight for the UK to remain. Indeed, in a letter to the Guardian, ten leaders of Britain’s biggest trade unions promoted the idea that working rights legislation for British people would be secured at the EU level56. Maintaining and improving the terms and conditions of employment in the UK thus implied collective bargaining with the representatives of employers in a multistate structure working in solidarity. In short, the Labour Party’s perceptions of UK-EU relations are lodged within a begrudging nexus of interest interdependence and intergovernmental cooperation.

The efficiency of the different approaches

  • 57 Ashcroft, M., “How the United Kingdom Voted on Thursday… and Why?”, Lord Ashcroft Polls, 24 June 20 (...)

35This paper does not aim to provide any teleological explanation for the perceptions of interests in the campaigning of the Labour Party or the Green Party. However, the relevance of their approaches – respectively based on economic interdependence and national interests, on the one hand, and on holistic and transnational conceptions of British and European citizenship, on the other hand – may be assessed through a poll carried out on the referendum day by Lord Ashcroft57. Nearly two thirds of Labour voters and three quarters of the Greens voted to remain. The main arguments advanced by the former to justify their vote pertained to economic and trade risks as well as to the feeling of isolation a Brexit vote would represent. Only 9% of Remain voters showed a strong attachment to the EU and its history, culture and traditions. The Green movement, feminism, social liberalism, multiculturalism, immigration or globalization were perceived as driving forces for good votes in the Remain camp. These results show that the issues developed in the leaflets of the Labour Party or the Greens globally achieved to construct interests that corresponded to the profiles of their electorate. However, Labour’s approach better fitted the overall ranking of factors justifying voters’ decisions. Economic and national interests were the biggest reasons for wanting to remain.

  • 58 Ibid.

36Nevertheless, up to 30% of the referendum voters were labelled as “undecided” and 24% of them said that they would make up their minds in the week before the polling day58. Half of these “undecided” voters even pointed out that they would make their final decision on 23 June 2016. The role played by these groups is therefore notable since the percentage of supporters of Remain and Leave camps was similar. Overall, a small majority thought that the questions of immigration, border controls and national sovereignty were key arguments according to which British interests should be defined in competition, and not in cooperation, with the “EU Other”. Yet, as mentioned in the second section, international mobility was presented as a configuration of the issue of immigration in Labour’s and the Greens’ leaflets. Intergovernmental solutions for cross-border problems were promoted by the Labour Party; and the creation of a closely knit community of European citizens was advocated by the Greens. This did not correspond to the aspirations of a considerable number of British voters in general and of the “undecided” voters in particular.

Conclusion

37The global framing of the UK’s membership of the EU exhibits two distinct approaches in the leaflets selected. The centripetal viewpoint of the Labour Party perceives UK-EU relations almost exclusively through an economic prism based on interdependence. Various EU material contributions to the UK’s world of work are addressed. By highlighting the risks of a Leave vote, the membership becomes a means to maintain working conditions which, in turn, allow the British population to enjoy better personal lives, mainly as consumers. The Labour Party focuses on the functional role played by the EU, which represents a regional system serving the long-term survival of the British economy and status in the world. By contrast, the centrifugal stance of the Green Party derives from a transnational perspective according to which British people’s rights in the UK are continuously examined within a larger society encompassing EU citizens. Social, political and economic considerations of the 2016 referendum are situated beyond the sovereign boundaries of the UK. Therefore, the geographical considerations in the two sets of leaflets can be characterized by the place assigned to the “British Self’s” interests within a friendly “EU Other”.

38The ecocentric/global community distinction is at the heart of the Greens’ programme since environmental questions, radical economic reforms and social collective choices are examined through their mutual interactions. While Labour’s leaflets lay emphasis on various dimensions of the development of EU laws and policies by presenting them as a permanent bargaining process between a group of states and interest groups, the Greens focus on human values and choices in embedded communities. The latter’s civil rights and duties bring to light economic and societal wellbeing and longer-term environmental protection. Advocating a broader perspective of common European interests and values, citizens become agents of change in parallel to European agreements which formally implement specific measures in the member states. Therefore, the Greens’ programme surpasses the political boundaries of economic benefits of Labour’s agenda.

39The local/global dialectic employed in this paper establishes the relations between political identities and regional or national claims in the UK. Yet, the Labour Party’s and the Greens’ campaigns do not deal with the concrete impact of a Brexit vote on the British Union, omitting to address specific factors related to the Irish peace settlements or Scotland’s independence issue. Thus, the 2016 EU referendum campaigning of these two political groups excludes the existence of a multinational reality from the question of European integration. This approach stands in sharp contrast to the strategy adopted by the majority of the British nationalist parties, which generally considered that the EU acted as an ally helping their regions acquire more autonomy.

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Bibliographie

Primary sources

The London School of Economics Digital Library comprises an extensive collection of the 2016 EU referendum leaflets studied in this paper (<https://digital.library.lse.ac.uk/collections/brexit/2016>). The materials selected were completed with documents found on the website of the Scottish Political Archive (<http://www.scottishpoliticalarchive.org.uk/our-collections/>) and with information obtained from UK political websites (<https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-18247131>).

The comparative analysis provided in this paper is based on the leaflets of the following campaigns:

Green Party of England and Wales, Greens for a Better Europe, 2016.

Labour Party, Labour In for Britain, 2016.

Additional primary sources were used to compare the campaigns selected to other Leave or Remain organizations:

Britain Stronger In Europe, Britain Stronger In Europe, 2016.

English Democrats, “Time to Put England First!”, The Official Web Page of the Democratic Party of England, <http://englishdemocraticparty.co.uk>, accessed 16 July 2021.

Green-Leaves, Green Leaves, 2016.

Labour Leave, Labour Leave, 2016.

Labour Party, Labour News, 2016.

Left Leave, “Lexit: The Left Leave Campaign”, Left Leave Campaign, 2016.

Plaid Cymru, “For the Future of Wales”, Wales in Europe, 2016.

Vote Leave, “Official Information About the Referendum on 23 June 2016”, Vote Leave, 2016.

Vote Leave, “The UK and the European Union: The Facts”, Vote Leave, 2016.

Wales Stronger In, “More Jobs, Lower Prices”, Britain Stronger In Europe, 2016.

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Notes

1 Curtice, J., 2017; Youngduek, P. and Yongmin, K., 2018; Tournier-Sol, K., 2017.

2 See, for instance, Renwick, A., et al., 2018.

3 Dennison, J., et al., 2020; Hague, C., 2020; Beasley, R. K., et al., 2021.

4 Iakhnis, E., et al., 2018; Usherwood, S., 2018; Gherghina, S. and O’Malley, D. J., 2019.

5 Among others, Hanska, M. and Bauchowitz, S., 2017.

6 Rivière-De Franco, K., 2017.

7 Schnapper, P., 2017 or Alexandre-Collier, A., 2017.

8 Freyssinet, J., 2017; Msaddek, H., 2017.

9 Knapp, A., 2017.

10 Greer, A., 2018; Laffan, B., 2018.

11 For example, Howarth, D. and Quaglia, L., 2017 and Gianfranco, B., et al., 2018.

12 The question was: “Should the United Kingdom remain a member of the European Union or leave the European Union?”

13 Gibraltar will not be mentioned in this paper. However, British, Irish and Commonwealth citizens aged 18 or over and residing in the UK or Gibraltar were eligible to vote.

14 Berenskoetter, F., 2010; Flockhart, T., 2012.

15 The following books helped summarize the main aspects of the concept: Guibernau, M., 2007 and Gibbins, J., 2014.

16 Flockhart, T., op. cit., pp. 85-89.

17 The Electoral Commission, “EU Referendum”, <https://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/who-we-are-and-what-we-do/elections-and-referendums/past-elections-and-referendums/eu-referendum>, accessed 10 July 2021.

18 For example, Green-Leaves, “I’m with Tony”, Green Leaves, 2016, p. 2.

19 Among others, Vote Leave, “Official Information About the Referendum on 23 June 2016”, Vote Leave, 2016, p. 2.

20 The Electoral Commission, “Report: 23 June 2016 Referendum on the UK’s membership of the European Union”, <https://www.electoralcommission.org.uk/who-we-are-and-what-we-do/elections-and-referendums/past-elections-and-referendums/eu-referendum/report-23-june-2016-referendum-uks-membership-european-union>, accessed 10 July 2021.

21 Edinburgh and West Lothian Greens, “A Short History of the Scottish Green Party”, <https://www.edinburghgreens.org.uk/about-us/a-short-history-of-the-scottish-green-party/>, accessed 10 July 2021.

22 Ibid.

23 Green Party, “Yes to Europe”, Greens for a Better Europe, 2016, p. 1.

24 Berberi, C., 2017.

25 Plaid Cymru, “For the Future of Wales”, Wales in Europe, 2016, p. 3.

26 Scottish Greens, “Independence and Scotland’s Future”, <https://greens.scot/our-future/independence-and-scotland-s-future>, accessed 10 July 2021.

27 For example, Labour Party, “Labour in for Britain: Jobs. Exports. Security.”, Labour In for Britain, 2016, p. 2; Labour Party, “Save Our Steel”, Labour In for Britain, 2016, p. 2; Welsh Labour Party, “Vote Remain 23 June”, Labour In for Britain, 2016, pp. 2-3; and BBC News, “Scottish ‘Better In’ EU Campaign Leaders Appointed”, 10 January 2016, <https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-scotland-scotland-politics-35266663>, accessed 16 July 2021.

28 BBC News, “EU Referendum: Tom Harris to Head Scottish Vote Leave Campaign”, 18 March 2016, <https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-scotland-scotland-politics-35841224>, accessed 16 July 2021.

29 Labour Leave, “It’s Time to Leave the EU and Join the World”, Labour Leave, 2016, p. 2 or Labour Leave, “Jez EU Can’t”, Labour Leave, 2016, pp. 2-4.

30 Berberi, C., op. cit., pp. 5-6.

31 Ibid., p. 7.

32 English Democrats, “Time to Put England First!”, The Official Web Page of the Democratic Party of England, <">Erreur ! Référence de lien hypertexte non valide. and Local Government Association of the English Democrats, “Evidence to Your Inquiry”, 10 March 2016, <https://www.local.gov.uk/sites/default/files/documents/english-democrats-f5f.pdf>, accessed 16 July 2021.

33 Wyn Jones, R., et al., 2013.

34 Berberi, C., op. cit., p. 5.

35 Green Party, “Yes to Europe”, op. cit., p. 1.

36 Ibid.

37 Ibid.

38 Green-Leaves, “I’m with Tony”, op. cit., pp. 1-2; Green-Leaves, “I’m with David”, Green Leaves, 2016, pp. 1-2; Green-Leaves, “I’m with Jenny”, Green Leaves, 2016, pp. 1-2; Green-Leaves, “I’m with the Previous Corbyn”, Green Leaves, 2016, pp. 1-2.

39 Labour Party, “On 23 June You Face a Big Decision About Our Future”, Labour In for Britain, 2016, pp. 1-3.

40 Labour Party, “Labour Says Vote Remain”, Labour In for Britain, 2016, p. 1.

41 Ibid. and Green Party, “Why Greens Say Yes to Europe”, Greens for a Better Europe, 2016, p. 4.

42 Vote Leave, “The UK and the European Union: The Facts”, Vote Leave, 2016, p. 1.

43 Labour Leave, “Jez EU Can’t”, op. cit., pp. 2-3 or Left Leave, “Lexit: The Left Leave Campaign”, Left Leave Campaign, 2016, p. 1.

44 Labour Party, “Britain Is Better Off in Europe”, Labour In for Britain, 2016, p. 2.

45 Green Party, “Why Greens Say Yes to Europe”, op. cit., p. 11.

46 Welsh Labour Party, “Labour Says Britain Is Better Off in Europe. Here’s Why…”, Labour In for Britain, 2016, p. 2.

47 Labour Party, “Save Our Steel”, op. cit., p. 2.

48 Green Party, “We’re Fairer, Safer, Greener in Europe”, Greens for a Better Europe, 2016, pp. 1-3.

49 Labour Party, Jeremy Corbyn, “Dear Voter”, Labour In for Britain, 2016, pp. 1-2 or Labour Party, Labour News, 2016, pp. 1-2.

50 Labour Party, “Save Our Steel”, op. cit.

51 For instance, Wales Stronger In Europe, “More Jobs, Lower Prices”, Britain Stronger In Europe, 2016, p. 2.

52 Ibid.

53 Labour Party, “Britain Is Better Off in Europe”, op. cit., p. 2.

54 Green Party, “We’re Fairer, Safer, Greener in Europe”, op. cit., p. 2.

55 Green Party, “Dear Voter”, Greens for a Better Europe, 2016, p. 1 or Green Party, “Why Greens Say Yes to Europe”, op. cit., p. 8.

56 Mason, R., “UK Trade Union Leaders Call on 6 Million Members to Vote Remain”, The Guardian, 6 June 2016, <https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/jun/05/uk-trade-union-leaders-call-on-6m-members-to-vote-against-brexit>, accessed 16 July 2021.

57 Ashcroft, M., “How the United Kingdom Voted on Thursday… and Why?”, Lord Ashcroft Polls, 24 June 2016, <https://lordashcroftpolls.com/2016/06/how-the-united-kingdom-voted-and-why/>, accessed 19 July 2021.

58 Ibid.

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Niaz Cary-Pernon, « British identities and the 2016 European Union referendum: The Greens for a Better Europe and the Labour In for Britain campaigns »Observatoire de la société britannique, 28 | 2022, 7-28.

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Niaz Cary-Pernon, « British identities and the 2016 European Union referendum: The Greens for a Better Europe and the Labour In for Britain campaigns »Observatoire de la société britannique [En ligne], 28 | 2022, mis en ligne le 01 février 2023, consulté le 28 mars 2023. URL : http://journals.openedition.org/osb/5543 ; DOI : https://doi.org/10.4000/osb.5543

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Niaz Cary-Pernon

Université Paul Valéry Montpellier 3

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