Navigation – Plan du site

AccueilNuméros28Theresa May and the question of t...

Theresa May and the question of the British Union in the run-up to the first “meaningful vote”

Alma-Pierre Bonnet
p. 29-45

Résumé

On 13 November 2018, after 20 months of intense negotiations, the United Kingdom (UK) finally reached a withdrawal agreement with the European Union. The next step for Theresa May was to persuade Parliament to approve the deal. This was the so-called “meaningful vote” that Parliament had managed to secure in December 2017. Initially scheduled for 11 December 2018, May decided to postpone the vote until 15 January to have more time to convince wavering MPs. When the vote finally took place, the government was heavily defeated.

As the Brexit result revealed deep political divisions between the different parts of the UK, one of Theresa May’s first tasks was to maintain the unity of her country. The safeguard of the British Union was indeed high on May’s agenda, and she made it very clear during her first speech as prime minister when she reminded people that the actual name of her party was the Conservative and Unionist Party. But was she successful? This is what this paper will examine. Through an analysis of her political declarations from 14 November 2018 to 14 January 2019, we will see how she tackled the issue of the Union. This paper therefore aims to study May’s idea of Britishness and to analyze just how detrimental Brexit was to the very notion of “union” within the UK.

Haut de page

Entrées d’index

Haut de page

Texte intégral

Introduction

  • 1 Kavanagh, D., « Preface », Observatoire de la société britannique [En ligne], 21 | 2018. URL: http: (...)
  • 2 Cowley, P., Kavanagh, D., The British General Election of 2017, London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018, p (...)
  • 3 Seldon, A., May at 10, London: Biteback Publishing, 2020, p. 47.

1On 23 June 2016, British voters decided to leave the European Union (EU) by a small margin (51.9%). Brexit, as this event came to be called, created a real political earthquake which plunged British politics into chaos and cost David Cameron, the incumbent Prime Minister, his job. After a shorter than expected Conservative Party leadership election, Theresa May became the second female Prime Minister in British history. She became leader of the Conservative Party, and therefore Prime Minister, as she was the last candidate standing in the leadership election1. This means that she did not have to “face questions about her plans in government”2. She nonetheless seemed to abide by one fundamental principle: the importance of unity, both for her country and her party3. In the first few months of her premiership, she tried to embody this principle. Atkins and Gaffney explain that:

  • 4 Atkins, J., Gaffney, J., “Narrative, persona and performance: The case of Theresa May 2016–2017”, T (...)

Theresa May’s initial success proceeded from her rhetorical construction and performance of a persona founded on the archetypal healer, together with a narrative based on the myth of One Nation4.

  • 5 Schnapper, P., « Brexit, or Theresa May’s Headache », Observatoire de la société britannique [En li (...)

2However, she very soon “turned, in rhetoric at least, into an enthusiastic Brexiter”5 to establish her Brexit credentials – as she had been a Remainer during the 2016 referendum campaign – and this, arguably, damaged her healer persona. If this move might be considered as a party management mistake, it seems interesting to take a step back in order to wonder how she framed the notion of unity and how she tried to use this “healer persona” when it comes to the United Kingdom at large. To do so, this article studies a corpus of speeches delivered in the run-up to the first “meaningful vote”, when May had to convince Parliament that her Brexit deal was in the best interest of the United Kingdom as a whole. Understanding the rhetoric of central power by analysing the way Theresa May handled the notion of unity, and more precisely of the British Union, when she was trying to convince MPs to vote for her deal, will enable us to see whether this concept was an asset, an argument or a liability at this crucial moment in the Brexit crisis.

Context and methodology

Disunited Kingdom

  • 6 Union between England, Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland.
  • 7 BBC News, EU Referendum Results, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/politics/eu_referendum/results (accesse (...)
  • 8 Jones, M., “Wales and the Brexit Vote”, Revue Française de Civilisation Britannique [Online], XXII- (...)
  • 9 Berberi, C., “Northern Ireland: Is Brexit a Threat to the Peace Process and the Soft Irish Border?” (...)
  • 10 Goodwin and Heath define them as “older, working-class, white voters, citizens with few qualificatio (...)
  • 11 Goodhart, D., The Road to Somewhere: The Populist Revolt and the Future of Politics, London: C. Hur (...)

3When the general context is taken into consideration, studying Theresa May’s conception of the British Union6 makes perfect sense. Indeed, in the aftermath of the Brexit referendum, the United Kingdom was marred by disunity, at every level. The very notion of “United Kingdom” could be questioned as there were clear regional discrepancies in the Brexit result. Scotland had overwhelmingly voted to stay in the EU (62%), and so did, to a lesser degree, Northern Ireland (55.8%), when England (53.4%) and Wales (52.5%) had voted to leave7. This situation made negotiating a Brexit deal that pleased all four nations all the harder. Besides, if Scotland clearly expressed its will to remain in the EU, Brexit had unveiled simmering tensions within the other British nations: between, on the one hand, old industrial and mining areas and, on the other, urban centres and regions with a strong Welsh identity in Wales8; divisions along community lines between unionists and nationalists in Northern Ireland9 and between so-called “left-behind” voters10 and those more comfortable with social liberalism and multiculturalism, or, to use David Goodhart’s terminology, between the “Somewheres” and the “Anywheres”11, mainly in England and Wales.

  • 12 Ross, T. and McTague, T., Betting the House, London, Biteback Publishing, 2017, p. 184.
  • 13 Bonnet, A.-P., “The Brexit Spin”, Observatoire de la Société Britannique, n°27, 2021.
  • 14 Savaric, M., “Northern Ireland: Is the Peace Process Really Under Threat?”, Revue Française de Civi (...)
  • 15 Kavanagh, D., “Brexit, the Conservatives and the General Election 2017”, Revue Française de Civilis (...)
  • 16 Among other things, the DUP was adamant, there would never be “any form of border between Northern (...)

4The 2017 general election (GE) reinforced this feeling of uncertainty and disunity in the country, which is ironical, as May had called the election precisely to provide the country with stability and strong leadership12. But May’s poor performance13 annihilated her working majority in Parliament and she now had to rely on the support of the pro-Brexit DUP from Northern Ireland14. This unexpected result increased political instability and undermined her room for manoeuvre15, in particular concerning her handling of the Union, as the DUP seemed uncompromising on Brexit16.

5It is in this context, on 13 November 2018, after 20 months of negotiations, that a Brexit deal was finally reached with the EU. According to Section 13 of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 201817, Theresa May needed to have the deal approved by Parliament, which was referred to as the “meaningful vote”18. If, prima facie, the task seemed difficult, May had been chosen, in the first place, in part, because she was seen as able to bring the country together.

May the healer?

  • 19 Atkins and Gaffney, 2020, op. cit. p. 293.

6In a recent article, Judi Atkins and John Gaffney argue that “a leader usually performs two narratives: one about ‘themselves’, and the other the ‘story’ they purport to tell. The interpellation of these narratives constitutes leadership performance.”19 The narrative about themselves is their perceived construction, or persona, while the “story” is a sequence of events related to the persona performing them and which have to be consistent with the persona so as to enhance the character of the political leader, meet the expectations of the audience and therefore be persuasive.

7Focusing on Theresa May, they contend that she “elaborated and performed a persona based on the mythological archetype of the healer” (p. 294). The context is essential here. As we saw, the Brexit referendum had laid bare deep fractures within both the British society and the Union. As Atkins and Gaffney argue:

The turmoil that followed the result [of the referendum] provided the context for the construction and emergence of a healer figure, who would repair the damage wrought by the tricksters and restore a mythical state of order and harmony (p. 299).

8For that matter, May’s image was instrumental in her success in the Conservative leadership election. Before she entered the race, she was considered as diligent and dutiful. She had been Home Secretary for 6 years, which was seen as evidence of her effectiveness. She had also been described as a “bloody difficult woman” by Ken Clarke, which echoed Margaret Thatcher’s toughness but also her seriousness. May would make the most of those leadership qualities during the campaign. She would present herself as the “antidote to ‘chaos’” and the “unity candidate” and that “by bringing leadership and stability, she alone could heal the wounds inflicted by a bitter referendum campaign”. She made it crystal clear when she claimed, early in the campaign, that “the job now is about uniting the Party, uniting the country – securing the Union – and negotiating the best possible deal for Britain” (p. 298, same for the previous quotes).

  • 20 On the concept of One Nation: Espiet Kilty, R., “What Does It Mean to Be Leader of a ‘One Nation Co (...)
  • 21 May, T., “Statement from the new Prime Minister Theresa May”, Gov.UK, https://www.gov.uk/government (...)

9To drive her point home, she developed a “vision for the country’s future [that] was an evocation of arguably the strongest myth in British political culture – that of One Nation”20 (p. 299). Hence, her government would prioritize what she called the “just about managing” and secure “the Union: the precious, precious bond between England, Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland.”21

  • 22 Schnapper, 2018, op. cit.
  • 23 Bonnet, A-P, op. cit.
  • 24 The Tories planned to give its MPs a free vote on the future of the Hunting Act. Conservative Manif (...)
  • 25 BBC News, “Theresa May: I'm in favour of fox hunting”, 9 May 2017, https://www.bbc.com/news/electio (...)
  • 26 “The value of an individual’s house (over and above £100,000) should be included in the calculation (...)
  • 27 “Payments after death could eat into the inheritance of offspring whose parents were unlucky enough (...)

10However, when she became Prime Minister, she failed to live up to this positive – and successful – start. She quickly sided with the Leavers22 which means that “she sacrificed her image as the healer of the divide within her party and the nation by becoming, performatively, the leading Brexiter” (p. 301). On top of that, her One Nation narrative would be damaged by the 2017 GE. Atkins and Gaffney identify several elements to justify this claim: first, the highly personalised campaign23 meant that she was front and centre, to the detriment of a more collective approach. Plus, the fact that she accused the “enemy without”, that is, Labour, of jeopardizing Brexit – which was clearly wrong as the party had backed the triggering of Article 50 in Parliament – only made the “enemy within”, that is, the ideological divisions within the Tories, all the more visible. The manifesto did not help either. Among other things, the ambiguous position on24, and May’s personal support25 for, foxhunting risked harming the overall image of the party as elitist and unconcerned about animal welfare. In addition, the proposed change in social care26, rapidly labelled “dementia tax”27, and May’s eventual U-turn on the policy, showed that the Tories did not really care about older people and that May’s “Strong and Stable” mantra did not hold water after all.

11If May had effectively developed the archetype of the healer when she became Prime Minister, her early success was soon called into question. In the span of just one year, from her election as Party leader to the 2017 GE, her persona changed from that of a healer, able to unite the country and heal the Brexit wounds, to that of a trickster. Besides, her One Nation narrative soon gave way to the Old Tory narrative, whose derogatory label “Nasty Party”, had been coined, ironically, by May herself back in 2002.

12Her healer persona should have been an asset when she tried to convince Parliament that her Brexit deal would work for everyone and enable the United Kingdom to leave the European Union as one political entity. Unfortunately for her, her political image was damaged, and her healer credentials seriously questioned. It is in this context that she started the parliamentary debate that would define – and terminate – her premiership.

Corpus, Methodology and Theoretical framework

  • 28 As highlighted by Jamet and Rodet: “Corpus linguistics enables researchers to study language based (...)
  • 29 Etymologically, “union” means "’action of joining one thing to another,’ also ‘agreement, accord,’ (...)
  • 30 The idea of union is inherent to the concept of nation: The word [nation] is used in English in a b (...)
  • 31 The idea of union is also important here, as the etymology of “country” shows: Mid-13c., "(one's) n (...)

13This article aims to study Theresa May’s conception of the Union and how she used this notion in the run-up to the first “meaningful vote” in Parliament. To do so, we built a corpus of 21 texts (speeches, statements and one letter to the nation; 24,318 words in total) from the UK’s government website www.gov.uk. We searched for “announcements” by “The Rt Hon Theresa May MP” from 14 November 2018, when May’s cabinet endorsed her Brexit deal, to 14 January 2019, one day before the first “meaningful vote”, with the following keywords: “Brexit” and “deal”. We then uploaded the transcripts to the corpus manager and text analysis software SketchEngine®. So-called “corpus linguistics”28 enabled us to analyse May’s choice of words by using three keywords: “union”29, “national”30 and “country”31. It should be noted that occurrences of related words such as “unity”, “unite” and “nation” were not used in sufficient number (fewer than 3 occurrences each) to be relevant.

  • 32 Charteris-Black, J., Politicians and Rhetoric, London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011, p. 13.
  • 33 Charteris-Black, J., Analysing Political Speeches, London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014, p. 93.
  • 34 We only used occurrences related to the “primary means”. We did not classified occurrences of “Unio (...)
  • 35 As we focus on May’s words, and because we evoked her political image above, we will not deal with (...)

14As we are interested in how May tried to convince MPs to vote for her Brexit deal, we will use, as theoretical framework, an approach to persuasion developed by Jonathan Charteris-Black. He argues that “persuasion refers generally to the use of language by one party to encourage another to accept a point of view.”32 He summarizes it as “being right” and, drawing on Aristotle, suggests “five primary means by which an orator can get audiences to believe that he or she is right: having the right intention (ethos), thinking right (logos), sounding right (pathos), telling the right story and looking right”33. A successful speaker will usually use more than one of these methods. We have classified each occurrence of the above-mentioned keywords34 in one of the first four35 “primary means” elaborated by Charteris-Black and analysed at least one relevant – and representative – example per “primary means”.

15One important element in Charteris-Black’s concept of persuasion is metaphor, and more particularly “conceptual metaphor”. Drawing on Lakoff and Johnson’s seminal work Metaphors we Live By, he explains:

  • 36 Charteris-Black, 2011, op. cit., p. 45.

The mind is inherently embodied, thought is mostly unconscious and abstract concepts are largely metaphorical […] Because thought has evolved out of the sensory, motor and neural systems, metaphorical expressions originate in underlying (or conceptual) metaphors that originate in human bodily and neural experiences of space, movement, containment, etc36.

  • 37 LOVE IS A JOURNEY (“we are at a crossroads in our relationship”) or POLITICS IS WAR (“we will defea (...)
  • 38 Charteris-Black, 2014, op. cit., p. 210.
  • 39 Charteris-Black, 2011, op. cit., p. 22.

16Because they are so entrenched in our minds, Charteris-Black stresses the psychological importance of conceptual metaphors when it comes to persuading. As they evoke concrete elements and everyday (bodily) experience to deal with abstract concepts37, they are instrumental in creating and framing ideologies, that is, “coherent sets of ideas and beliefs that provide an organised and systematic representation of the world”38, which are reinforced by political myths, that is, “stories that provide explanations of all the things for which explanations are felt to be necessary.”39 As we saw, Theresa May utilized the political myth of One Nation to convince British people that she would be able to heal the Brexit wounds of the country. We will now analyse the way she attempted to persuade Parliament that her deal was in the best interest of all four nations of the United Kingdom.

Key findings and discussion

17The following table records the occurrences of three keywords (“union”, “national” and “country”) and classifies them according to their “primary means” use. “Thinking right” stands out, which seems to suggest that Theresa May wanted her persuasion to be based on rationality. For that matter, “national” was very often used and almost systematically associated with “interest”. “Union”, quite surprisingly, was not the first choice of word for May. “Country”, on the other hand, ranks within the top 10 of May’s favourite nouns. It seems therefore that May tried to be both rational and pragmatic, focusing on neutral terms, such as “national” and “country” rather than words with a more emotional dimension, such as “union”. We will now see if the findings vindicate this early claim.

Primary Means

-------

Keywords

Having the right intentions

Thinking right

Sounding right

Telling the right story

Total

Union

2

6

5

1

14

National

5

13

1

2

21

Country

4

8

3

7

22

Total

11

27

9

10

 

Having the right intentions

  • 40 Charteris-Black, 2014, op. cit., p. 94.

18Establishing one’s moral character, or ethos, is a prerequisite for any would-be communicator. Ethical integrity is essential to gain trust. As audiences “can only ever be persuaded by someone they respect”40, public speakers have to show their expertise and wisdom and demonstrate that they prioritize the interests of the public over their own. Only then can they be seen as having the right intentions, and therefore have the full attention of the listeners.

19May’s ethos seems to correspond to Charteris-Black’s definition of a persuasive leader. From the very beginning, she says that the Union is more important than party politics or personal ambition:

My approach throughout has been to put the national interest first. Not a partisan interest. And certainly not my own political interest (15 November 2018).

20She goes even further and takes it to heart to make it personal:

But I believe with every fibre of my being that the course I have set out is the right one for our country and all our people. From the very beginning, I have known what I wanted to deliver for the British people to honour their vote in the referendum (15 November).

  • 41 David Judge explains: “the essence of trustee theory is remarkably simple - representatives should (...)

21This deal, as far as the Union is concerned, is of paramount importance to May. The Union is therefore key to establishing her leadership as a selfless politician who thinks of the common good before her personal interest. However, she also intends to show that her role is not that of a mere delegate. She seems to promote the trustee model of representation, as elaborated by Edmund Burke41, in that being a leader means taking unpopular and difficult decisions, for the greater good:

Mr Speaker, the Brexit talks are about acting in the national interest - and that means making what I believe to be the right choices, not the easy ones […] As Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, I have a responsibility to people in every part of our country and I intend to honour that promise (15 November 2018).

  • 42 Ridge-Newman A. “‘Strong and Stable’ to ‘Weak and Wobbly’: The Conservative Election Campaign”. In: (...)

22Talking about the Union allows May to depict herself as a sound and mature leader that people can trust. This is in line with her dutiful and diligent persona. We might nonetheless argue that this positive image was not really in tune with the reality of the political context. As explained above, May’s image had been damaged by the 2017 GE in which her “strong and stable” slogan had been derided into “weak and wobbly.”42 Besides, her decision to postpone the meaningful vote, initially scheduled for 11 December 2018, until 15 January 2019, for fear of a heavy defeat, dealt a serious blow to her image as a commanding leader. It should be noted that May’s use of the Union to establish her ethos is mainly found before the postponement, which seems to suggest that after that, she no longer deemed this “personal” approach as efficient.

Thinking right

  • 43 Kövecses, Z., Metaphor. A Practical Introduction, Oxford & New York: Oxford University Press, 2002, (...)

23Charteris-Black argues that rational arguments are inherently persuasive, this means that politicians have to show that their policies are based on rationality. Logical transitions and relevant examples are necessary. Metaphors can be useful. As they apply what is familiar to new topics, they can “frame arguments in a way that is favourable to the case being proposed by the speaker”. For that matter, the highlighting/ hiding dimension of metaphors is particularly relevant. As Kövesce notices: “when a concept has several aspects (which is normally the case) and the metaphor focuses on one (or maybe two or three aspect(s)), the other aspects of the concept will remain hidden, that is, out of focus.”43

24May developed two main lines of arguments. The first one, which is also the most prevalent and found in almost all transcripts, seems to contradict her “trustee” approach. Indeed, she argues that her deal is the best because it respects the democratic will of the people, i.e., the referendum result:

I am in absolutely no doubt that this deal is the right one. It honours the result of the referendum. It protects jobs, security and our Union. But it also represents the very best deal that is actually negotiable with the EU (10 December 2018).

25Theresa May, and MPs, are no longer trustees but mere delegates: they have to vote for the deal because it represents the will of the people. With this argument, May significantly reduces the power of the House of Commons and depicts it as a mere validating body. We might also argue that May’s claim, that the deal respects the will of the Union, is quite fallacious, in that it seems to hide the fact that both Scotland and Northern Ireland voted to remain in the EU. May therefore seems to adopt an “English” perspective, voluntarily – or not – ignoring the democratic voice of half of the constituent countries of the UK. This, in effect, makes her argumentation somewhat null and void.

26Her second argument presents a “choice” between certainty and stability with the deal, or chaos and division without it:

But the choice was this deal, which enables us to take back control and to build a brighter future for our country, or going back to square one with more division, more uncertainty and a failure to deliver on the referendum (14 November 2018).

  • 44 Jamet, D., et Terry, A., “What Makes Metaphors Manipulative Tools?”, ELAD-SILDA [En ligne], 5 | 202 (...)

27Notice the construction metaphor44 “build a better future” which enables May to present herself as the builder of a better world. The idea of construction leaves no real option: either the creation of solid bases or the risk of destruction and, if you read between the lines, the dislocation of the United Kingdom. The Union is used as a political tool to justify the validation of the deal. This argument amounts to an implicit threat, which arguably, creates an emotional response from the audience.

Sounding right

  • 45 Charteris-Black, 2011, op. cit., p. 15.
  • 46 Bonnet, A.-P., op. cit.

28Charteris-Black defines “sounding right” as “the ability to engage emotionally with an audience through empathy, humour or arousing feelings such as fear or hate.”45 Emotions are essential to create a personal connection with the audience. During the 2017 GE, May had failed to establish this personal and emotional link with the voters. As she was uncomfortable with the presidential strategy devised by her campaign team, she stuck firmly to her campaign script, repeating over and over the same slogans, and was unable to be spontaneous, which made her look robotic, and she was soon nicknamed “Maybot”46. This was in clear contradiction with the healer persona that proved so useful during the Conservative leadership election and that could have been a real asset to deal with the question of the Union. Unfortunately for her, May seems to have continued with the 2017 robotic attitude.

29Emotions do not rank high in her plead to convince MPs, at least until 10 December 2018, when she had to postpone the vote. In what could be equated to a mirror pattern, after this fateful date, she dropped the ethos element attached to the Union and focused on pathos. In relation to the second line of arguments analysed above, May uses fear, and more precisely fear of division, as an emotional tool. She made it very clear on the last day before the first meaningful vote:

To those who think we should reject this deal in favour of no deal, because we cannot get every assurance we want, I ask what would a no deal Brexit do to strengthen the hand of those campaigning for Scottish independence - or indeed those demanding a border poll in Northern Ireland? Surely this is the real threat to our Union […] With no deal we would have: no Implementation Period, no security partnership, no guarantees for UK citizens overseas, and no certainty for businesses and workers like those I met in Stoke this morning. And we would see changes to everyday life in Northern Ireland that would put the future of our Union at risk (14 January 2019).

30Tension is heightened by negatively connoted words such as “reject”, “threat”, “at risk” and repetition of the word “no”. More than that, May explicitly expresses her fear to see the Union broken if the deal is not validated. We can argue that May’s choice of emotions concerning her handling of the Union was probably not the best. Drawing on her healer persona, a more rational choice would have been to focus on reconciliation (which she did, only once, in her “Letter to the Nation”, on 24 November 2018) to show that her deal would heal the Brexit wounds. This failure would damage her ability to create a coherent – and trustworthy – story to tell.

Telling the right story

  • 47 Charteris-Black, 2011, op. cit., p. 15.
  • 48 Charteris Black, 2014, op. cit., p. 95.
  • 49 Jowett, G., and O’Donnell, V., Propaganda and Persuasion, London: Sage, 1992, pp. 25-26.

31Charteris-Black explains that, in order to convince, a leader needs to create “mental representations that influence the audiences’ ways of understanding situations”. Those mental representations have to fit with the audience’s “existing beliefs, attitudes and values”47 as well as the audience’s “assumption about how the world works.”48 Jowett and O’Donnell argue that “the persuader is a voice from without speaking the language of the audiences’ voice within.”49 Metaphors, once again, can be quite useful, thanks to their ideological and myth-forming effect.

  • 50 Espiet-Kilty, 2020, op. cit.

32If Theresa May somewhat failed to draw on her healer persona to evoke some emotional response from the audience, she did use some element of the One Nation myth, which was so useful during her leadership campaign, to talk about the Union. One Nation is understood here as a rhetorical device, whose appeal, in the Conservative Party, comes from the fact that “for the majority, One Nation is just a vague notion that is appealing only because of its positive undertones of unity and ‘being all in it together’.”50 May depicts the United Kingdom as one political – and human – entity. This constitutes the bulk of her “story” and the mental representation she wants to convey:

Mr Speaker, I believe our national interest is clear. The British people want us to get on with a deal that honours the referendum and allows us to come together again as a country, whichever way we voted. This is that deal. A deal that delivers for the British people (26 November 2018).

33More than that, the UK is actually a family:

[The deal] protects the integrity of our United Kingdom, meeting our commitments in Northern Ireland and delivering for the whole UK family, including our Overseas Territories and the Crown Dependencies (26 November 2018).

34This personification enables May to stress the invisible – and supposedly natural – links between the four nations of the UK and the overseas territories. Depicting the UK as family entails a positive narrative that everyone can understand: there might be disagreements between members of a family but the love that unites everyone is stronger than temporary differences of opinion. Personification is also useful in that it allows May to use orientational metaphors to talk about the future, as she did during the G20 Summit in Buenos Aires:

The Brexit deal we have agreed sets a path for the UK to a brighter future. The announcement of a new Trade Envoy for Argentina and progress in transitioning our trade agreement with Chile show that we are already taking significant steps to boost trade in fast-growing new markets (30 November 2018).

35Thanks to May’s Brexit deal, the UK, as one, will be able to step into a brand-new world of opportunities:

For the first time in more than four decades the UK will have an independent trade policy, playing an active role on the global stage as we take up our seat at the WTO in April 2019 […] This deal sets a path for the UK to a brighter future has been affirmed by the discussions I have had on trade over the past two days (1 December 2018).

36Alongside personifications and orientational metaphors, the One Nation myth also allows the use of construction metaphors, which shows that the UK as a whole is set to build itself a better future, outside the EU:

But of course, that does not just mean delivering Brexit. It means working across all areas – building a stronger economy, improving public services, tackling social injustices – to make this a country that truly works for everyone, a country where nowhere and nobody is left behind (10 December 2018).

37Metaphors enable May to create a world view according to which the UK is a Union that goes beyond mere political and economic bonds. It is a family, and as such, it will pull together and come out of the Brexit crisis more united than ever. This conception of the Union seems to ignore, once again, the political reality of the situation, in particular Scotland’s will of emancipation, or Northern Ireland’s concerns about the border with the Republic of Ireland.

Conclusion

38This article aimed to analyse Theresa May’s conception of the Union in the run-up to the first meaningful vote. We have demonstrated how relevant this topic was, as the Union was high on May’s political agenda and was one key element in her argumentation to convince MPs to vote for her Brexit deal. It was indeed a recurrent theme that was used in all the categories defined by Jonathan Charteris-Black to evaluate the persuasion of a leader. More than that, it was, supposedly, one defining trait of May’s premiership, and she made it clear very early on. So, it was fair to assume that she would use the Union to drive her point home. She did, but it did not work.

39She utilized the Union to establish her ethos as a selfless leader whose only preoccupation is the wellbeing of her people and the continuity of the British nation. Placing the Union above any other political or personal consideration made sense, but it was refuted by May’s decision to postpone the vote, for fear of a heavy defeat, which damaged her image as a strong and commanding leader. The Union was also used as an argument to explain why her deal was the best that could be reached: it would respect the will of the people and avoid the chaos of a no-deal Brexit. However, these arguments overlooked the fact that Scotland had overwhelmingly voted to remain in the EU and that any Brexit deal was bound to dissatisfy people north of the border. As regards pathos, May did not display many emotions except fear of division and chaos. This, arguably, was a mistake, as the general situation, and the eventual vote, could have been a moment of reconciliation in Britain. It is impossible to say how much of an effect a more compassionate attitude would have had, but it could have given May more leverage. Nonetheless, it is also important to remember that her hands were somewhat tied, as she had to rely on the DUP to have a majority in Parliament, and therefore, she had to adopt a firm position on Brexit.

40May’s conception of the Union seems to posit that the UK is one single entity whose common destiny, like members of a family, will forever link the four constituent nations composing it. At a time when demands for independence run high in Scotland, May’s attitude ignores the specificity of the nations of the UK. She claims to be speaking in the name of the UK as a whole but her Brexit deal, inherently, only respects the will of the English people, and to a lesser extent, that of the Welsh. To further explore the family metaphor, it is as if England represented the parents, those who make the decisions, when Scotland and Northern Ireland are belittled and considered as (turbulent) children. They have no say at this crucial moment, and they have to follow the instructions of their parents for the greater good of the UK family.

  • 51 Bonnet, A.-P., “Theresa May et l’échec du « meaningful vote » : approche argumentative”, Anglophoni (...)

41May, therefore, seems to adopt an English perspective on a British problem, which could only exacerbate tensions and disunity in Parliament and in the country at large. Ironically, it is precisely one element in relation to the Union, the so-called “backstop” to prevent a hard border between the two parts of the island of Ireland, that would be instrumental in May’s eventual failure to get her deal approved by Parliament51, and which would mark the end of her premiership. If May was walking on eggshells concerning the Union, her successor, Boris Johnson, having an overall majority in Parliament and a very different political image, did not pay as much attention to this tricky issue.

Haut de page

Bibliographie

Asthana, A. and Elgot, J., “Theresa May ditches manifesto plan with 'dementia tax' U-turn”, The Guardian, 22 May 2017.

Atkins, J., Gaffney, J., “Narrative, persona and performance: The case of Theresa May 2016–2017”, The British Journal of Politics and International Relations, 2020, Vol. 22(2) 293–308.

Bale T. and Webb P., “’We didn’t see it coming’: The Conservatives”. In: Tonge J., Leston-Bandeira C. and Wilks-Heeg S. (eds) Britain Votes 2017, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018.

BBC News, “Theresa May: I'm in favour of fox hunting”, 9 May 2017, https://www.bbc.com/news/election-2017-39861011.

BBC News, EU Referendum Results, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/politics/eu_referendum/results.

Berberi, C., “Northern Ireland: Is Brexit a Threat to the Peace Process and the Soft Irish Border?”, Revue Française de Civilisation Britannique [Online], XXII-2 | 2017. URL: http://journals.openedition.org/rfcb/1370; DOI: https://doi.org/10.4000/rfcb.1370.

Bonnet, A.-P., “The Brexit Spin”, Observatoire de la société britannique, n°27, 2021.

Bonnet, A.-P., “Theresa May et l’échec du « meaningful vote » : approche argumentative”, Anglophonia [Online], 29 | 2020.

Charteris-Black, J., Analysing Political Speeches, London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014.

Charteris-Black, J., Politicians and Rhetoric, London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011.

Cowley, P., Kavanagh, D., The British General Election of 2017, London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018.

Espiet Kilty, R., “What Does It Mean to Be Leader of a ‘One Nation Conservative Government’? The Case of Boris Johnson”, Revue Française de Civilisation Britannique [Online], XXV-3 | 2020, URL: http://journals.openedition.org/rfcb/5862; DOI: https://doi.org/10.4000/rfcb.5862.

Goodhart, D., The Road to Somewhere: The Populist Revolt and the Future of Politics, London: C. Hurst & Co, 2017.

Goodwin, M., Heath, O., “The 2016 Referendum, Brexit and the Left Behind: An Aggregate-level Analysis of the Result”, The Political Quarterly, 87 (3), 2016.

Jamet, D. and Rodet, P., “How is Brexit Linguistically-Constructed? A Corpus Linguistic Analysis of Speeches by David Cameron, Theresa May and Boris Johnson”, Observatoire de la société britannique, N°27– 2021.

Jamet, D., et Terry, A., “What Makes Metaphors Manipulative Tools?”, ELAD-SILDA [En ligne], 5 | 2020, URL: https://publications-prairial.fr/elad-silda/index.php?id=884.

Jones, M., “Wales and the Brexit Vote”, Revue Française de Civilisation Britannique [Online], XXII-2 | 2017, connection on 10 June 2021. URL: http://journals.openedition.org/rfcb/1387; DOI: https://doi.org/10.4000/rfcb.1387.

Jowett, G., and O’Donnell, V., Propaganda and Persuasion, London: Sage, 1992.

Judge, D., “Representation in Westminster in the 1990s: The ghost of Edmund burke”, The Journal of Legislative Studies, Volume 5, 1999 - Issue 1.

Kavanagh, D., “Brexit, the Conservatives and the General Election 2017”, Revue Française de Civilisation Britannique [Online], XXIII-2 | 2018. URL: http://journals.openedition.org/rfcb/2085; DOI: https://doi.org/10.4000/rfcb.2085.

Kavanagh, D., « Preface », Observatoire de la société britannique [En ligne], 21 | 2018. URL: http://journals.openedition.org/osb/2040 ; DOI : https://doi.org/10.4000/osb.2040.

Kövecses, Z., Metaphor. A Practical Introduction, Oxford & New York: Oxford University Press, 2002.

May, T., “Statement from the new Prime Minister Theresa May”, Gov.UK, https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/statement-from-the-new-prime-minister-theresa-may.

Ridge-Newman A. “‘Strong and Stable’ to ‘Weak and Wobbly’: The Conservative Election Campaign”. In: Wring D., Mortimore R., Atkinson S. (eds) Political Communication in Britain, London, Palgrave Macmillan, 2019.

Ross, T. and McTague, T., Betting the House, London, Biteback Publishing, 2017.

Savaric, M., “Northern Ireland: Is the Peace Process Really Under Threat?”, Revue Française de Civilisation Britannique [Online], XXIII-2 | 2018. URL: http://journals.openedition.org/rfcb/1997; DOI: https://doi.org/10.4000/rfcb.1997.

Schnapper, P., « Brexit, or Theresa May’s Headache », Observatoire de la société britannique [En ligne], 21 | 2018. URL : http://journals.openedition.org/osb/2048 ; DOI : https://doi.org/10.4000/osb.2048.

Seldon, A., May at 10, London: Biteback Publishing, 2020.

Haut de page

Notes

1 Kavanagh, D., « Preface », Observatoire de la société britannique [En ligne], 21 | 2018. URL: http://journals.openedition.org/osb/2040 ; DOI : https://doi.org/10.4000/osb.2040 (accessed on 3 June 2021).

2 Cowley, P., Kavanagh, D., The British General Election of 2017, London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018, p. 46.

3 Seldon, A., May at 10, London: Biteback Publishing, 2020, p. 47.

4 Atkins, J., Gaffney, J., “Narrative, persona and performance: The case of Theresa May 2016–2017”, The British Journal of Politics and International Relations, 2020, Vol. 22(2) 293–308, p. 293.

5 Schnapper, P., « Brexit, or Theresa May’s Headache », Observatoire de la société britannique [En ligne], 21 | 2018. URL : http://journals.openedition.org/osb/2048 ; DOI : https://doi.org/10.4000/osb.2048 (accessed on 3 June 2021).

6 Union between England, Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland.

7 BBC News, EU Referendum Results, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/politics/eu_referendum/results (accessed on 10 June 2021).

8 Jones, M., “Wales and the Brexit Vote”, Revue Française de Civilisation Britannique [Online], XXII-2 | 2017, connection on 10 June 2021. URL: http://journals.openedition.org/rfcb/1387 ; DOI: https://doi.org/10.4000/rfcb.1387.

9 Berberi, C., “Northern Ireland: Is Brexit a Threat to the Peace Process and the Soft Irish Border?”, Revue Française de Civilisation Britannique [Online], XXII-2 | 2017, connection on 10 June 2021. URL: http://journals.openedition.org/rfcb/1370 ; DOI: https://doi.org/10.4000/rfcb.1370.

10 Goodwin and Heath define them as “older, working-class, white voters, citizens with few qualifications, who live on low incomes and lack the skills that are required to adapt and prosper amid the modern, post-industrial economy” in Goodwin, M., Heath, O., “The 2016 Referendum, Brexit and the Left Behind: An Aggregate-level Analysis of the Result”, The Political Quarterly, 87 (3), 2016, p. 325.

11 Goodhart, D., The Road to Somewhere: The Populist Revolt and the Future of Politics, London: C. Hurst & Co, 2017.

12 Ross, T. and McTague, T., Betting the House, London, Biteback Publishing, 2017, p. 184.

13 Bonnet, A.-P., “The Brexit Spin”, Observatoire de la Société Britannique, n°27, 2021.

14 Savaric, M., “Northern Ireland: Is the Peace Process Really Under Threat?”, Revue Française de Civilisation Britannique [Online], XXIII-2 | 2018, connection on 10 June 2021. URL: http://journals.openedition.org/rfcb/1997 ; DOI: https://doi.org/10.4000/rfcb.1997.

15 Kavanagh, D., “Brexit, the Conservatives and the General Election 2017”, Revue Française de Civilisation Britannique [Online], XXIII-2 | 2018, connection on 10 June 2021. URL: http://journals.openedition.org/rfcb/2085 ; DOI: https://doi.org/10.4000/rfcb.2085.

16 Among other things, the DUP was adamant, there would never be “any form of border between Northern Ireland and the rest of the UK”. Seldon, 2020, op.cit., p. 271.

17 European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018, legislation.gov.uk, https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2018/16/section/13/enacted (accessed 10 June 2021).

18 The ‘meaningful vote’: A user’s guide, Parliament.UK, https://commonslibrary.parliament.uk/the-meaningful-vote-a-users-guide/ (accessed 10 June 2021).

19 Atkins and Gaffney, 2020, op. cit. p. 293.

20 On the concept of One Nation: Espiet Kilty, R., “What Does It Mean to Be Leader of a ‘One Nation Conservative Government’? The Case of Boris Johnson”, Revue Française de Civilisation Britannique [Online], XXV-3 | 2020, URL: http://journals.openedition.org/rfcb/5862; DOI: https://doi.org/10.4000/rfcb.5862 (accessed on 7 June 2021).

21 May, T., “Statement from the new Prime Minister Theresa May”, Gov.UK, https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/statement-from-the-new-prime-minister-theresa-may (accessed on 7 June 2021).

22 Schnapper, 2018, op. cit.

23 Bonnet, A-P, op. cit.

24 The Tories planned to give its MPs a free vote on the future of the Hunting Act. Conservative Manifesto, p. 26, http://ucrel.lancs.ac.uk/wmatrix/ukmanifestos2017/localpdf/Conservatives.pdf (accessed 13 June 2021).

25 BBC News, “Theresa May: I'm in favour of fox hunting”, 9 May 2017, https://www.bbc.com/news/election-2017-39861011 (accessed 13 June 2021).

26 “The value of an individual’s house (over and above £100,000) should be included in the calculation of assets used to determine their contribution to the bill for their social care”. Bale T. and Webb P., “’We didn’t see it coming’: The Conservatives”. In: Tonge J., Leston-Bandeira C. and Wilks-Heeg S. (eds) Britain Votes 2017, Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 51.

27 “Payments after death could eat into the inheritance of offspring whose parents were unlucky enough to suffer from a condition – like dementia – in which reliance on social care is inevitable”. Asthana, A. and Elgot, J., “Theresa May ditches manifesto plan with 'dementia tax' U-turn”, The Guardian, 22 May 2017.

28 As highlighted by Jamet and Rodet: “Corpus linguistics enables researchers to study language based on authentic excerpts of language use. The aim of a corpus-based analysis is thus to collect a set of data representative of a specific type of language in order to study a particular linguistic phenomenon” in “How is Brexit Linguistically-Constructed? A Corpus Linguistic Analysis of Speeches by David Cameron, Theresa May and Boris Johnson”, Observatoire de la société britannique, N°27– 2021.

29 Etymologically, “union” means "’action of joining one thing to another,’ also ‘agreement, accord,’ also ‘state of matrimony,’ from Anglo-French unioun, Old French union (12c.), from Late Latin unionem ‘oneness, unity, a uniting,’ also ‘one, unique’ and later: ‘action of uniting into one political body’, Etymonline, https://www.etymonline.com/search?q=union.

30 The idea of union is inherent to the concept of nation: The word [nation] is used in English in a broad sense, "a race of people an aggregation of persons of the same ethnic family and speaking the same language," and also in the narrower sense, "a political society composed of a government and subjects or citizens and constituting a political unit. Etymonline, https://www.etymonline.com/search?q=nation.

31 The idea of union is also important here, as the etymology of “country” shows: Mid-13c., "(one's) native land;" c. 1300, "any geographic area," sometimes with implications of political organization. Etymonline, https://www.etymonline.com/search?q=country.

32 Charteris-Black, J., Politicians and Rhetoric, London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011, p. 13.

33 Charteris-Black, J., Analysing Political Speeches, London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014, p. 93.

34 We only used occurrences related to the “primary means”. We did not classified occurrences of “Union” when May talks about the “European Union” or “country” when she talks about “third countries”.

35 As we focus on May’s words, and because we evoked her political image above, we will not deal with “looking right”.

36 Charteris-Black, 2011, op. cit., p. 45.

37 LOVE IS A JOURNEY (“we are at a crossroads in our relationship”) or POLITICS IS WAR (“we will defeat our opponents”) are two examples of conceptual metaphors.

38 Charteris-Black, 2014, op. cit., p. 210.

39 Charteris-Black, 2011, op. cit., p. 22.

40 Charteris-Black, 2014, op. cit., p. 94.

41 David Judge explains: “the essence of trustee theory is remarkably simple - representatives should use their independent judgement in reaching decisions and should not be bound, therefore, by instructions from their electors.” In Judge, D., “Representation in Westminster in the 1990s: The ghost of Edmund burke”, The Journal of Legislative Studies , Volume 5, 1999 - Issue 1, p. 13.

42 Ridge-Newman A. “‘Strong and Stable’ to ‘Weak and Wobbly’: The Conservative Election Campaign”. In: Wring D., Mortimore R., Atkinson S. (eds) Political Communication in Britain, London, Palgrave Macmillan, 2019.

43 Kövecses, Z., Metaphor. A Practical Introduction, Oxford & New York: Oxford University Press, 2002, p. 80.

44 Jamet, D., et Terry, A., “What Makes Metaphors Manipulative Tools?”, ELAD-SILDA [En ligne], 5 | 2020URL : https://publications-prairial.fr/elad-silda/index.php?id=884 (accessed on 12 June 2021).

45 Charteris-Black, 2011, op. cit., p. 15.

46 Bonnet, A.-P., op. cit.

47 Charteris-Black, 2011, op. cit., p. 15.

48 Charteris Black, 2014, op. cit., p. 95.

49 Jowett, G., and O’Donnell, V., Propaganda and Persuasion, London: Sage, 1992, pp. 25-26.

50 Espiet-Kilty, 2020, op. cit.

51 Bonnet, A.-P., “Theresa May et l’échec du « meaningful vote » : approche argumentative”, Anglophonia [Online], 29 | 2020, Online since 20 October 2020, connection on 17 December 2021. URL: http://journals.openedition.org/anglophonia/3216 ; DOI: https://doi.org/10.4000/anglophonia.3216.

Haut de page

Pour citer cet article

Référence papier

Alma-Pierre Bonnet, « Theresa May and the question of the British Union in the run-up to the first “meaningful vote” »Observatoire de la société britannique, 28 | 2022, 29-45.

Référence électronique

Alma-Pierre Bonnet, « Theresa May and the question of the British Union in the run-up to the first “meaningful vote” »Observatoire de la société britannique [En ligne], 28 | 2022, mis en ligne le 01 février 2023, consulté le 27 mars 2023. URL : http://journals.openedition.org/osb/5559 ; DOI : https://doi.org/10.4000/osb.5559

Haut de page

Auteur

Alma-Pierre Bonnet

Institut d’Etudes Politiques Lyon

Articles du même auteur

Haut de page

Droits d’auteur

Tous droits réservés

Haut de page
  • Logo Université de Toulon
  • Logo Laboratoire Babel
  • OpenEdition Journals
Rechercher dans OpenEdition Search

Vous allez être redirigé vers OpenEdition Search