‘I take it as axiomatic that large and complex modern societies are never united over goals or ends; and that, if their rulers pretend otherwise, they are deceiving themselves or their listeners. Modern liberal democracies are, in Michael Oakeshott’s language, nomocratic, not teleocratic: they are held together by common rules, not by shared purposes.’
David Marquand, ‘How united is the modern United Kingdom’, in Alexander Grant & Keith J. Stringer (eds.), Uniting the Kingdom?
The Making of British History, London: Routledge, 1995, p. 277
1Recent polling suggests that the electoral ground has shifted in Scotland: it seems that Brexit has had an impact on the political behaviour of some who voted to remain in the Union in the September 2014 independence referendum. Psephologist Sir John Curtice (professor of politics at Strathclyde University), who, up until recently, cautioned against reading too much into a possible link between the two issues, now agrees. For example, speaking on the 26 January 2020 Sunday Politics Scotland programme, he explained that polls in 2019 had shown that the gap between “Yes” and “No” to Scottish independence had been closing due to an increase in support for independence from “Remainers” in Scotland.
2The figures, however, may not tell the whole story. Indeed, is it not a fact that the Scottish National Party (SNP) and certain pro-independence supporters were thinking of holding a second independence referendum even before September 2014, and again just after the Brexit vote, from mid-2016, while, obviously, few pro-Union Scots had by then switched to “Yes” for good? In other words, is Brexit a direct cause of what is happening (if it is happening) or rather a vote cleverly exploited by the SNP with a view to calling for a second referendum? Or both?
- 1 See ITV news website/Osborne, Rob (National Correspondent - ITV Wales), “Beyond 2020: Will Wales ho (...)
3As for Wales, though a leave-nation by a margin of around 5 per cent in 2016, it has also seen a pro-independence surge of late. Nevertheless, what this is the sign of is relatively hard to ascertain, despite the claim, in early 2020, by Plaid Cymru leader Adam Price, who has put Wales breaking away from the UK and remaining in the EU at the centre of his party’s agenda, that a referendum on Welsh independence would be held before 2030.1
4Thus, my focus below shall be on the figures for Scotland, but also on what some have called the ‘neverendum’; I shall then address the following issues:
5- certain things current Scottish First Minister Nicola Sturgeon has said concerning democracy and self-determination (especially in her 19 December 2019 speech) and on what they imply from a political and constitutional point of view;
6- why referendums – although they are customarily considered the quintessence of democracy – are, at bottom, quite problematic (as evidenced by the Brexit “saga”);
7- and, finally, the rather specific situation in Wales.
- 2 See Gall, Gregor, “Comment: referendum won’t end independence debate” – The Scotsman, 10 October 20 (...)
- 3 See Macnab, Scott, “Scottish independence: ‘Another vote if No wins’” – The Scotsman, 5 December 20 (...)
8To a large extent, the 2014 referendum was only the beginning. There was talk, even at the time, of (sooner or later) holding another referendum in Scotland. Almost a year before it actually took place, certain supporters of Scottish independence were already building an interesting scenario whereby, if the Yes side was defeated, the momentum for separation had to be kept alive, a situation referred to as the “neverendum”. At least a third of the electorate (and preferably 40 per cent) needed to vote Yes to reach that goal.2 In a question-and-answer session in Dundee in early December 2013, Nicola Sturgeon herself said that another independence referendum could be held within 15 years if a majority of Scots decided to vote No.3 In the event, of course, 44.7 per cent of the Scottish electorate plumped for her party’s goal, a real godsend for the SNP.
9There are other reasons why the thirst for more of the same could not be slaked. In the words of a Scottish Nationalist:
- 4 Kerevan, George, “No vote nae threat to London elite” – The Scotsman, 27 September 2013
Of course, a No vote will not extinguish Scottish national identity, which is based on unique institutions, a separate culture, and different community values from the rest of the UK.4
10On the day following the 2014 referendum vote, Scottish journalist Bill Jamieson summed it all up quite graphically:
- 5 Jamieson, Bill, “18 September is just the beginning” – The Scotsman, 19 September 2013
This is not the end of our relentless obsession with constitutional politics. For there can never be an end. 00:00[…] Now consider the aftermath of a No vote. Once the sense of anti-climax subsides, there will be a marked reluctance to return to status quo ante. […] Constitutional politics will quickly resume. Is it likely – likely at all – that the SNP will fold its tent, declare Game Over and shuffle off to the Glen of Tranquillity Retirement Home? Think again. La lutte continue.5
- 6 See BBC News website, “EU Referendum: Impact of Brexit on Scots economy debated”, 20 June 2016 (htt (...)
11It is no coincidence that, on 20 June 2016, three days before the referendum on EU membership was held throughout the UK, during a BBC Scotland debate before a studio audience in Glasgow with Kezia Dugdale (then leader of Scottish Labour), Lord Forsyth (a former Conservative Secretary of State for Scotland) and Jim Sillars (a former deputy leader of the SNP), SNP MP Joanna Cherry predicted that if Scotland voted to remain in the EU while the UK as a whole voted to leave, it would lead to a “groundswell of support” for a second referendum on independence.6 In short, she postulated – years before it somehow began to happen – that one was going to lead to the other.
- 7 See Scotland’s Right to Choose – Putting Scotland’s Future in Scotland’s Hands, Edinburgh: The Scot (...)
- 8 See BBC News website, “Scottish independence: Sturgeon requests powers for referendum”, 19 December (...)
12Quite interestingly, too, on 19 December 2019, Nicola Sturgeon announced that she had formally written to Prime Minister Boris Johnson to be given the powers to legally stage another referendum under section 30 of the 1998 Scotland Act (as had happened ahead of the 2014 referendum) to put its legality beyond doubt, and that the SNP were also publishing a 38-page document7 containing her arguments and the relevant draft legislation to transfer those powers.8 By then, however, as the Scotland correspondent of The Guardian wrote:
- 9 Brooks, Libby, “Sturgeon demands independence referendum powers be devolved” – The Guardian, 19 Dec (...)
despite Westminster’s chaotic handling of Brexit and Johnson’s unpopularity among Scottish voters, the expected long-term boost to support for independence has not materialised, with polls showing support averaging at around 48%.9
13And in a YouGov poll which had surveyed 1,002 Scottish adults from 3 December to 6 December 2019,
- 10 See Gant, James, “Support for Scottish independence plummets to 44% as electorate shift towards No (...)
A total of 56 per cent of respondents […] said they would vote No in a future independence referendum, with 44 per cent voting Yes.10
14Brexit, therefore, can be seen not so much as a cause but as a pretext used to further an aspiration and an objective that the SNP have never given up on and, in fact, can never give up on.
The ground may have shifted, but only recently and not decisively
15On 30 January 2020, i.e. one day before Brexit officially happened, YouGov published a new survey of 1,039 Scots aged 16+ looking at how the political landscape had changed in Scotland. It showed that “the “Yes” vote leads “No” by 51% to 49%, our first Yes lead since early 2015.” Importantly, the survey went on to point out that there was “a net movement towards “Yes”.” Indeed,
Over one in five (21%) of those who voted Remain in 2016 but No in the independence referendum have now shifted over to Yes. […] On the other side, three in ten (30%) of those who voted Leave in the referendum and Yes in 2014, now say they will vote No. However, [...] the former group is more than twice as big as the latter.
16The survey also insisted that
- 11 See Curtis, Chris, “Scottish independence: Yes leads as Remainers increasingly back splitting with (...)
it is clear that Brexit does put additional argument into the nationalist artillery, with 34% of Scots, and 46% of indie swing voters, picking “Scotland would be able to stay in the European Union” as one of the main advantages of independence.11
17The Holyrood.com political news website went (literally) one better just a few days afterwards by pointing out that
- 12 See Davidson, Jenni, “Third poll finds increased support for independence” – Holyrood.com, 4 Februa (...)
A Panelbase poll for Scot Goes Pop, a pro-independence blog, taken between 28 and 31 January puts Yes in the lead on 52 per cent, with No on 48 per cent. This is an increase of five percentage points for independence and a drop of five percentage points in support for the union since the last Panelbase poll on 6 December.12
18Crucially, these polls, along with another one by Survation, were the first polls in a row indicating a Yes majority since mid-2016 (bar two polls in February-March 2017 and July-August 2019). As John Curtice explained in The National newspaper:
- 13 Quoted by nation.cymru, « Support for Welsh independence up 5% in new YouGov poll”, 3 February 2020 (...)
Now that Brexit has happened it looks as though a few more Remain voters have switched sides – adding to the evidence that the pursuit of Brexit is serving to undermine the foundations of support for Union.13
- 14 Quoted in Carrell, Severin, “Scottish independence surveys ‘show Brexit has put union at risk’” – T (...)
- 15 Quoted in Smith, Oli, “Sturgeon crisis: polling guru John Curtice says SNP independence support may (...)
19Nonetheless, he also pointed out that “There is no guarantee that the trend will continue”.14 To him, indeed, the jump in support could be tied to the Scottish First Minister’s handling of the Covid-19 crisis, which fuelled independence even further.15
- 16 See Duffy, Elle, “More than half of Scots in favour of Scottish independence in new Panelbase poll” (...)
20But it soon seemed that, for once, J. Curtice had got it all wrong. In mid-2020, another poll by Panelbase put support for independence at 52 per cent again, with the survey suggesting that 20 per cent of No voters from the 2014 referendum had swapped their votes and now supported independence.16 In fact, by early November 2020, no fewer than eleven polls in a row had shown that a majority of Scots were now in favour of independence. Better still, between then and mid-April 2021, 23 polls out of a total of 31 showed a majority for Yes, which could sometimes be very substantial, e.g. in January 2021, when the Savanta ComRes/The Scotsman poll found a 13-point difference between Yes (51 per cent) and No (38 per cent).
- 17 Mcilkenny, Stephen, “Latest Scottish independence poll is first in 22 to not give Yes a lead” – The (...)
- 18 See Matchett, Conor, “Worst polling for Yes since 2019 as SNP support continues to drop, poll shows (...)
21And then, unexpectedly, the trend went into reverse. By late February 2021 already, the Yes surge was clearly past its peak (with the first poll in 9 months giving No a 1 per cent lead),17 while a late-April 2021 poll by Savanta ComRes for The Scotsman had support for Yes at its lowest level (46 per cent, with “don’t knows” excluded) since just before the December 2019 general election, which saw Boris Johnson and the Conservatives storm to power.18 In fact, over mid-April 2021-early August 2021, 13 out of 17 polls put No ahead (by a margin of up to 8 points in e.g. late April-early May), with only one (in late April) giving Yes the lead.
22Thus, the surge for Yes (and the subsequent drop in support for independence) may have had to do with a reaction (not necessarily long-term, as suggested by J. Curtice) to the fact Brexit had by mid-2021 been set in stone in the wake of B. Johnson’s election. Interestingly, the same, somehow, actually happened over a relatively short period of time after the 2014 referendum on Scottish independence (from late October 2014 to mid-March 2015), when it was obvious Scotland would not be independent in the short term, with no fewer than 5 polls (out of a total of 9) in favour of Yes by a margin of 1 to 5 points.
- 19 See Keating, Michael, “Why Scotland’s election result is unlikely to hasten a referendum” – The Gua (...)
23Besides, the May 2021 Scottish election results tend to confirm that the impact of Brexit upon the level of appetite for independence has been a mixed bag rather than something decisive; pro-independence parties won 50.1 per cent of the vote in the regional lists and 49 per cent of the constituency vote.19 All in all, with Michael Keating (professor of politics at the University of Aberdeen), one might reach the conclusion that
The polarisation of Scottish politics around the constitutional issue is exacerbated by Brexit. While unionists and nationalists backed remain by substantial majorities in 2016, since then there has been a move of remainers towards independence, while a smaller number of leavers have moved in the opposite direction.
24But he is very probably right, too, when he goes on to qualify his own statement:
For the nationalists, the difficulty is that there is no clear majority for independence and no guarantee that they would win a referendum. They have a grievance, that Scotland was taken out of the European Union when 62% of Scots voted remain. Yet Brexit has made independence more difficult because, with Scotland in the EU and the rest of the UK out, there would be a hard border between the two. This undercuts the prospectus of 2014, which assumed that both countries would be within the European single market and customs union.20
25Brexit has thus made a difference, as it were, both ways, and therefore it might well be that, all things considered, it has made relatively little difference (for the foreseeable future).
26However that may be, as we are now going to see, we are on far safer ground when dealing with the SNP’s rhetoric; that has certainly not changed.
27In the 12 December 2019 general election, on an increased turnout of 68.1 per cent (up 1.6 per cent from 2017), the SNP won 48 seats (+ 13 seats), their vote share going up by 8.1 points. The Conservatives were on 25.1 per cent (down 3.5 points) and lost 6 seats (down 7 seats compared to 2017).21 That is why, one week later, as already pointed out (see 1/a), N. Sturgeon felt justified in writing to the Prime Minister to obtain the relevant powers to organise a second referendum on independence. The logic of her argument was, as emphasised in the document published on that occasion (see 1/a too), as follows:
- 22 See “Introduction” (by N. Sturgeon), in Scotland’s Right to Choose, pp. 1 & 16
There has been a significant and material change in circumstances since the 2014 referendum […]. This material change arises from both the prospect of leaving the EU without popular support in Scotland, and from what events since 2016 have demonstrated about Scotland’s position in the UK and the ability of devolved institutions within the UK to protect Scotland’s interests.22
28These arguments were at the forefront of the speech she made to mark the occasion.23 But early on, having raised the question of the democratic deficit affecting Scotland because of Brexit, she also said: “At the heart of these questions is a belief held by almost everyone in Scotland that we are a nation”. On that basis, she further explained that “as a nation, our future, whatever we choose that to be [i.e. “stay part of the Westminster Union” or leave it], must be in the hands of the people who live here.” That is ultimately why she went on to say:
So today, I urge people in Scotland, regardless of our differing views on independence, to rally round the case for Scotland’s right to choose, our right to self-determination.
29But here is the crux of the matter: there was a clear tendency in the speech to fold the part over the whole (albeit in various subtle ways), i.e. to shift from “We” (in the SNP, on the “Yes” side of the argument) to “We in Scotland” (i.e. 100 per cent of the Scottish electorate), including those who do not want a referendum and/or are likely to vote “No” again. Indeed, it seems that N. Sturgeon (as was done repeatedly back in the early 2010s – more about this below) conflates two notions that cannot objectively be collapsed into each other, as her use of the pronoun “We” alongside the phrase “self-determination” clearly indicates.
30On the day following her party’s victory in Scotland, N. Sturgeon had made another speech, a speech in which she kept folding the SNP over the whole of the Scottish electorate. Not only did she emphasise the fact that they had won “an incredible 80% of seats in Scotland” (a far more robust figure, obviously, than the party’s actual [and far from bad, of course] vote share of 45 per cent), but she also reached the conclusion that it was “an overwhelming endorsement of our campaign and message.” (my italics) This was quite a disingenuous statement to make as 55 per cent of Scots had in fact rejected her party.
31But she went on regardless. The SNP’s victory had been that of the “majority”: “It is clear that the kind of future desired by the majority in Scotland is different to that chosen by the rest of the UK.” And then the majority became the whole (as if, again, everyone in Scotland had actually voted SNP): “To the people of Scotland I want to say thank-you. Thank-you for the overwhelming victory you gave the SNP last night.” (my italics)
- 24 Quoted in Davidson, Peter, “Nicola Sturgeon’s speech in full as she launches legal bid for fresh Sc (...)
32Having paved the way for what she had had in mind all along, namely the defence of national togetherness, N. Sturgeon eventually said: “This is not simply a demand that I or the SNP are making” (when clearly it was), before ending on a note that sums up her performative tour de force: “The people of Scotland have spoken – it is time to decide our own future.”24
33As a matter of fact, N. Sturgeon’s message was even clearer when she spoke on the BBC’s Andrew Marr Show in mid-December. She said:
- 25 Quoted in Brooks, Libby, “Nicola Sturgeon says Scotland ‘cannot be imprisoned in the UK’” – The Obs (...)
You cannot hold Scotland in the union against its will. You cannot just lock us in a cupboard and turn the key and hope everything goes away. If the United Kingdom is to continue then it can only be by consent. […] Scotland cannot be imprisoned in the UK against its will.25
34First, there is “Scotland”; then, there is, again, a shift from it to “us”, which suggests Scotland can only be understood as a unit, as a body that has no salient internal divisions. And Scotland, to make good measure, is presented as some kind of “super individual” since it has a “will” (mentioned twice).
- 26 Scotland’s Future – Your Guide to an Independent Scotland, Edinburgh: The Scottish Government, Nove (...)
35All in all, then, little has changed since the last referendum campaign: at the time too, the part was equated with the whole. For example, from the very first page of the SNP’s 2013 pro-independence publication, Scotland’s Future – Your guide to an Independent Scotland,26 the same sort of performative language was used, with the same characteristic shift from the SNP to “Scotland”/“We”. On page i of the document (which consists of just 236 words), the latter term comes up ten times while “our” does five times. Time and time again (see e.g. pp. viii, 3, 40 and 541), the document overlooks the crucial fact that an independent Scotland can only be delivered by a majority, not by the whole of the people of Scotland.
36Above all, it seems to me that this is the sign that the SNP (and Plaid Cymru, and Brexiters, for that matter) have (at the very least) a big theoretical problem, to which we now turn.
37Self-determination (or the right for a region/nation to opt out of a state) is associated with the notion of justice. Thus, the United Nations sees it as the most important of human rights (see “Declaration 2787 [XXVI]”, adopted on 6 December 1971).
- 27 On this, see Wolff, Stefan, 2003, pp. 23-24
38The main difficulty with the idea of self-determination, however, is the fact that the word “self” is usually taken for granted. But who is the “self” (i.e. the entity to which the right to self-determination is granted) that is going to decide the future political status of the nation? One, indeed, needs to answer the question: what constitutes “our self”, or “our people” (singular), or “our nation”?, before one can possibly adhere to the concept and practice of self-determination.27 If, as we have seen, and will see again below, the “nation” (i.e. both its nature and what that should mean in terms of its future) is contested terrain, then the “national self”, or “our people”, either encapsulates equally valid, but different, definitions, or just does not exist.
- 28 See Mortimer, Edward, “Introduction”, in Mortimer, Edward (ed.), 1999, p. xiii. United Nations prac (...)
39Thus, it is very probable that self-determination, when the principle is applied, boils down in fact to the will of the majority (i.e. the largest, electorally mightiest, part of the “self”). Put differently, self-determination always affects more than just the (interests of the) seceding “people”.28 Or, in a Scottish context, one may say that, as things stand, there will be no determination of the future by the Scottish “self” (i.e. of 100 per cent of Scots), but only the determination of the kind of future the majority want.
40Being unaware of the difference amounts to folding the first term over the second, and in effect to saying that majorities “speak” for everyone, that majorities are “the people”, i.e. 100 per cent of the citizens. In short, to conflate the two notions amounts to defending nothing but the right(s) of (the) majority/-ies, which is hardly democratic.
41This is nevertheless familiar territory for N. Sturgeon and all nationalists (whether Scottish or otherwise). Thus, in late 2012 already, talking to a Glasgow audience of business and civic leaders about the fact that national unity would be necessary in order to get the best post-independence deal, she said:
- 29 Quoted in Macnab, Scott, “Scottish independence: Sturgeon calls for ‘Team Scotland” consensus if pu (...)
Each of us will have argued our case strongly and passionately. But when the people of Scotland have spoken, we will emerge from it as one united nation. We will be team Scotland […].29
42The statement inevitably leads us to the next and final point: if the above arguments are valid, then referendums can never be truly democratic exercises. Referendums are different from general elections to the extent that they normally happen once only. The majority that wins the referendum gets what it wants and that is the end of the story. After the referendum, those who have lost have in fact been utterly and completely dispossessed. True democracy, indeed, rests on two legs. It is grounded not just on the principle that the majority is always right, but on both that principle and the organisation of elections on a regular basis so that the consequences of political defeat are temporary and the minority is not disenfranchised permanently.
43Peripheral nationalists in the UK should know that referendums have their limits. If their declarations over the last five years are anything to go by, the least that one may say is that the Brexit referendum has been a galling experience for them. But can one denounce the tyranny of the (English) majority in the case of Brexit and at the same time fail to see that, to a large extent, the problem is an inherent feature of referendums wherever they are held?
44But the problem (to begin with for the SNP) may well eventually prove to be not just theoretical. Far from it.
45In January 2017, research was carried out by YouGov into how Scottish voters on both sides of the independence debate saw their opponents. Here are some of the key findings:
Those who wanted to stay in the UK were more likely to call into question the judgement of their opponents than vice versa. The second most common response from unionists (16%) is that Scots who want to leave the UK are ignorant or misguided, whilst a further 7% believe them to be outright “stupid”. [...] Other factors that those who wanted to stay in the UK suspect encouraged people to vote for independence include the belief that they are motivated by anti-English bigotry[/racism] [in fourth place at 9%], nationalism, or some form of rose-tinted romanticism [5%].
46Another prominent factor was “SNP propaganda/lies”: 11% (third most common choice).
47Conversely,
For those who want to see an independent Scotland, one factor stands head and shoulders above the rest [38 percent] in explaining why people voted No in 2014: fear.
48“Media/government/unionist propaganda” came second (12 percent), while “Ignorance” came fifth (4 percent).
49But it is the conclusion that, I believe, is the most interesting element in the survey; it reads:
- 30 See YouGov/Matthew Smith, “Why the other half vote: Scottish independence edition”, 21 March 2017 ((...)
As with Brexit and the US general election, it looks like any second Scottish independence referendum campaign would be fought with the mistrust that is characterising modern politics.30
50This is in fact just the tip of the iceberg of all manner of divisions that currently characterise (and have for a few decades now characterised) Scotland. As we are now going to see, contrary to the SNP’s claims, and against all mathematical logic (since 62 per cent of Scots voted to “remain”), Brexit does not seem to have united Scotland, which is probably divided politically and regionally like never before.
- 31 See YouGov – “Our Scottish Future Survey Results” (Sample Size: 2587 Scottish Adults / Fieldwork: 7 (...)
51Between 7 and 14 February 2020 (just as polls were beginning to show that Yes was now in front), YouGov asked almost 2,600 Scots the following question: “Generally speaking, do you think Scotland is heading in the right or wrong direction?” 35 per cent answered “Right direction” (64 per cent in that group had voted Yes in 2014; moreover, it comprised 68 per cent of all SNP respondents, but only 22 per cent of Labour ones and just 7 per cent of Conservative ones). 37 per cent answered “Wrong direction” (57 per cent in that group had voted No in 2014; it contained 10 per cent of all SNP respondents, but 79 per cent of Conservative ones, 47 per cent of Labour voters and 63 per cent of all the Liberal Democrats).31
52Logically, there was the same split of opinions over the second question: “If another Scottish Independence Referendum were held today, how would you vote?” A breakdown of the figures given above (Yes – 45 per cent / No – 46 per cent / see above) shows that the first group comprises 89 per cent of all pro-SNP respondents while the second group consists of 95 per cent of all the Conservative respondents, the figures for Labour voters and for supporters of the Liberal Democrats being 66 per cent and 85 per cent respectively.32
53The following page of the survey is more interesting still. The breakdown this time is done regionally. In six of Scotland’s eight regions (i.e. North East Scotland, Highlands & Islands, South Scotland, West Scotland, Central Scotland, Mid-Lothian & Fife, Lothians and Glasgow), majorities of between 5 per cent (Lothians) and 18 per cent (South of Scotland) of respondents chose “No”. The only “Yes” region was Glasgow (52 per cent as against 35 per cent), while in North East Scotland respondents were evenly split between “Yes” and “No”.33 Furthermore, and rather worryingly, 57 per cent of all respondents answered either that “Scotland has some divisions” (36 per cent), or that “Scotland is deeply divided” (21 per cent). No fewer than 28 per cent of the South of Scotland respondents agreed with the latter statement.34
54The next question was “Who is responsible for these divisions?” 50 per cent of all respondents said it was the “SNP”, 49 per cent “Nicola Sturgeon”, 41 per cent “The prospect of a second Independence Referendum”, 35 per cent “Nationalists”. Characteristically, 83 per cent of Conservative respondents chose the “SNP” answer, like 76 per cent of Liberal Democrats voters and 56 per cent of Labour ones. The figures were similar for “Nicola Sturgeon”. Except in Mid-Lothian & Fife and in Glasgow, majorities of between 6 and 28 percentage points chose “SNP” in all the other six regions of Scotland.35 Besides, in their answer to the equally interesting question: “How has division in Scottish society and politics over Brexit and Independence affected you?”, as many as 34 per cent of all respondents agreed with the following statement: “I am less likely to talk about my political views with strangers, colleagues, or acquaintances”.36
55To another question: “Which of the following comes closest to your view?”, a majority of respondents (46 per cent) answered that “The divisions in Scotland on independence and Brexit will last for a generation, and may never be healed” while only 30 per cent believed that “division is nothing new”. A breakdown of the first group shows that 65 per cent of all Conservative respondents and of all supporters of the Liberal Democrats agreed, the figure for Labour voters being 52 per cent.37 Unsurprisingly, 50 per cent of respondents in the South of Scotland and in Central Scotland, and 56 per cent of those in the West of Scotland concurred with them.38
56To yet another question, namely: “How long do you think it will take for Scotland to overcome the divisions caused by the Brexit and Independence debates?”, 47 per cent of respondents said: “We will always be divided on these issues”; 22 per cent (the second highest percentage) chose the following answer: “Not for ten years or more”. Furthermore, to the question: “Should the Scottish Parliament be able to unilaterally call a referendum on independence?”, 51 per cent answered: “No – it’s right that a referendum has to be called in conjunction with the UK Parliament”.39
57The final question was: “If there is a second Independence Referendum, when should it be held?” While 17 per cent of respondents said “Within the next twenty years”, as many as 27 per cent simply answered: “Never”. A breakdown of the figures for these two answers shows that 88 per cent of all Conservative voters, 52 per cent of Labour ones and 66 per cent of all Liberal Democrats chose either one of these two answers.40 Lastly, “Never” was chosen by 35 per cent of respondents in the South of Scotland, 33 per cent in the West of Scotland and 34 per cent in Central Scotland.41
- 42 See BBC News website, “Election results 2019: Analysis in maps and charts”, 13 December 2019 (https (...)
58As regards the above regional divisions, the YouGov survey merely confirmed what the 2019 general election had shown. Despite reduced majorities in two of them, the Conservatives held on to their three large constituencies closest to the border with England (where opposition to independence tends to be highest – see above): Berwickshire, Roxburgh & Selkirk (48.4 per cent / down 5.4 points), Dumfriesshire Clydesdale & Tweeddale (46 per cent / down 3.4 points), Dumfries & Galloway (44.1 per cent / up 0.8 point). The SNP did quite well in all three (with an increase of between 6 and 8.6 points), but they topped the 40 per cent mark in one only (Dumfries & Galloway), while the Liberal Democrats improved their score too. The situation was rather similar for the three parties in the North East of Scotland, where the Conservatives managed to hold Moray, Banff & Buchan (with an increased majority) and Aberdeenshire West & Kincardine where they held off a fierce SNP challenge.42
- 43 On this, see Treanor, P., “Structures of Nationalism”, in Sociological Research Online, March 1997, (...)
59In the event of a second referendum taking place in not too distant a future, Scotland may well vote for independence. But the overall victory margin, as things currently stand, would not be huge. The SNP would then find themselves in a rather extraordinary situation: they would be pulling Scotland out of the Union against the wishes of a majority of voters in many local authorities, becoming overnight the latter’s “hegemonic state”,43 which is exactly the kind of situation the SNP themselves have for years been denouncing at UK-level (before Brexit and, quite vocally, since).
60Indeed, 28 local authorities (out of 32) chose to stay in the Union in 2014 with hefty majorities. To take but a few examples: from Shetland and Orkney to the North East to the Scottish Borders, 10 of them saw majorities (sometimes well) in excess of 60 per cent for staying in the Union (with five more between 55 per cent and 60 per cent – e.g. Aberdeen). On the basis of the figures we currently have, in a second referendum, their majorities could (and probably would) be dented, but they would hardly be overturned.
61One final point: another problem for the SNP has to do with the fact that these local authorities are not scattered evenly throughout Scotland; as we have seen, they are concentrated in specific areas (north, east and south especially). And the opposite is true: support for independence was highest in 2014 (and still is) in the Dundee area and in and around Glasgow. In other words, Scotland is also divided by the geography of independence.
- 44 See Kelly, Michael, “Tongue in cheek dream of a passport to Govan” – The Scotsman, 15 November 2012
62Of course, one should not jump to the conclusion that Scotland, post-independence, might fracture. But, surely, the geographical polarisation can only whet the appetite of those who believe in remaining part of the UK (so strongly as the SNP believe in leaving it), and might, therefore, be keen on upholding a separation-within-separation scenario. By late 2012, just as pro-independence supporters were starting to hope for a “neverendum”, not only were the Liberal Democrats representing Orkney and Shetland already talking about making these islands enclaves of the UK if Scotland decided to secede, but Scottish Labour MP and Chair of the Commons Select Committee on Scottish Affairs Ian Davidson was also arguing that if, Scotland-wide, a majority chose independence, those constituencies that had voted No should be allowed to remain part of the UK.44
- 45 See “The Anglo-Scottish border: a border like no other”, forthcoming (Cycnos, Vol. 37/1, 2021)
63As I have tried to show elsewhere,45 two Scottish regions (the Scottish Borders and Dumfries and Galloway), due to their proximity to northern England (not just geographical, but, crucially, cultural and socio-economic) qualify here as perfect candidates. Witness the relentless thirst of their councils since at least the early 2000s for working closely together with councils across the border on a number of issues (transport, tourism, economic development, forestry, and so on) despite the growing chasm between the two sides in terms of legislation due to devolution. Let alone the fact that many locals – whether Scottish or English – have had a hard time trying to come to terms with the logic of Scottish independence as public services have long catered for what is essentially a cross-border population.
64And before I am accused of unacademic thinking, I believe we should bear in mind that what we are talking about is not just the kind of polarity or animosity that is part and parcel of political life or general elections. In the case of independence, the stakes are a lot higher, as explained above. First, the visions, pro and anti, are utterly non-negotiable as no compromise whatsoever is possible. Second, if you resort to holding a referendum to address the dilemma (which, again, can only be a one-off and as such is bound to exclude the losing side), the result is a potent mix of, on the one hand, extremely high expectations and, on the other, make-or-break politics.
65It is therefore my contention that the divisions that characterise Scottish society politically and constitutionally should not be treated lightly. I do accept that journalist B. Taylor’s statement regarding the logic of N. Sturgeon and the SNP’s approach is valid. He wrote:
- 46 See BBC News website/Taylor, Brian, “Scottish independence: How Nicola Sturgeon was ‘cheeky with hi (...)
Ms Sturgeon relies on one fundamental point […]. The fundamental point is that Scotland is a nation, with a full right of self-determination. She rightly notes that has formed a key part of decades of constitutional debate in Scotland.46
66But, importantly, there is room, too, for making the case that a complementary approach is inherently necessary, for both circumstantial and structural reasons. It can indeed be argued, as we have seen, that Scotland is in fact two nations in one because, as D. Torrance has written,
- 47 Torrance, David, “Scotland’s Progressive Dilemma”, in The Political Quarterly, Vol. 88, 2017, p. 52
The 1707 parliamentary union between Scotland and England created not only a multinational state but a constitutional palimpsest under which all Scots could not help but possess a dual identity.47
- 48 See “2021 election results: latest from local, Scottish and Welsh votes” – The Guardian, 9 May 2021 (...)
67And this makes all the difference, as witnessed by the May 2021 Scottish election. As usual, the Conservative vote was particularly robust in the south of Scotland (on turnouts of around 65 per cent): 47 per cent in Galloway and Dumfries West, 47.7 per cent in Dumfriesshire and 51.5 per cent in Ettrick, Roxburgh & Berwickshire. But the SNP always came second, with 39.9 per cent, 37.7 per cent and 32.5 per cent respectively.48 Crucially, there was significant evidence of unionist voters acting strategically in many parts of Scotland. As has been explained:
- 49 Brooks, Libby, “While Salmond tanked, pro-unionist tactical voting made its mark in Scotland” – The (...)
Pro-unionist tactical voting had a significant effect in some key marginal constituencies, with Scottish Labour’s deputy leader Jackie Baillie increasing what had been the smallest majority in Scotland, thanks to Liberal Democrat supporters [...]. Turnout also soared as a consequence, exceeding 70% in some constituencies, well above the national average of 55% in 2016, upturning fears that Covid might keep voters at home.49
68In fact, Jackie Baillie had secured her constituency by a majority of just 109 votes in 2016, with the SNP’s Gail Robertson receiving 13,413 votes and Labour gaining 13,522. In 2021, she won 17,825 votes, her majority over her SNP opponent increasing to 1,483. Likewise, in the Eastwood constituency (where the turnout was 76.2 per cent) Conservative candidate Jackson Carlaw was reelected with an increased majority (+ 6.2 per cent), at the expense of Labour, whose support plummeted (- 14.8 per cent), while the SNP candidate also saw his share of the vote rise (+ 5.6 per cent).
69In short, as M. Keating has written:
- 50 Keating, Michael, “Why Scotland’s election result is unlikely to hasten a referendum” – The Guardia (...)
There is strong evidence of tactical voting in the constituencies, as unionists plump for whichever candidate appears more likely to the [sic] beat the nationalists. So many unionists in Edinburgh Southern and Dumbarton go for Labour. In Edinburgh Western and North East Fife they go for the Liberal Democrats. In southern Scotland and Aberdeenshire they are attracted to the Conservatives.50
70It seems to me that this situation unequivocally shows that the rift between the pro-Union electorate and the pro-independence one (in essence, a marked opposition between two visions of the future and therefore two visions of Scotland itself) has become entrenched, and that there is, as there has been for some time now, an increasing alignment between who you vote for and your stance on independence.
71As we are now going to see, Wales is a rather tough nut to crack for both similar and different reasons.
72In mid-September 2019, following a series of rallies by the independence movement “All Under One Banner Cymru” in Cardiff, Merthyr Tydfil and Caernarfon (where 10,000 people marched), yet another poll by YouGov, based on the survey of 1,039 Welsh voters, found that 24 per cent would have voted for an independent Wales if there had been “a referendum tomorrow” (while 52.5 per cent would have voted the other way). The figure was a significant rise from two earlier polls: a poll for Sky in December 2018, which found that 8 per cent wanted Wales to leave the UK, and an ICM poll, conducted for BBC Wales in February 2019, which showed that only 7 per cent said they backed the idea of Welsh independence.
73In the above-mentioned YouGov survey, the following scenario was also put to the voters: “if the UK left the EU but Wales had the option to become an independent state within the latter, what would you do?” 33 per cent of the respondents said they would then support Welsh independence. Interestingly, detailed results showed that these respondents comprised 44 per cent of Labour voters (with 38 per cent of them against), and 55 per cent of Liberal Democrat voters, i.e. more than Plaid Cymru voters (51 per cent of whom were for independence). Besides, of those who had voted “Remain” in the 2016 referendum on EU membership, 55 per cent said they would back an independent Wales in the EU. Last but not least, 42 per cent of those aged 18 to 24 (as against 35 per cent) agreed.
- 51 See Hayward, Will, “Opposition to independence for Wales falls to its lowest-ever level”, WalesOnli (...)
- 52 Quoted in Shipton, Martin, “Support for Welsh independence soars in new poll by YouGov for Plaid Cy (...)
74In short, in sharp contrast to a 2014 YouGov poll which showed that 70 per cent of Welsh voters supported the Union, and to the 65 per cent who still supported it after the 2016 EU referendum, most of the polls in 2019 put “No” at around 57 per cent, with some polls even putting it at between 52 and 54 per cent.51 It is then hardly surprising that Plaid Cymru leader Adam Price called the figures “sensational”.52
75A few weeks later, speaking in north Wales at his party’s campaign launch, he duly put Wales breaking away from the UK and remaining in the EU as an independent country at the centre of Plaid Cymru’s campaign. Among other, similar things, he said:
- 53 See Morris, Steven, “Plaid Cymru: election could spark push for Welsh independence” – The Guardian, (...)
This is the election in which Wales will begin to find its voice as a nation. It will start as a whisper, a still, small voice in the darkness, but it will end with a chorus. Speaking with one voice […]. Now is our time.53
- 54 See Hale, Adam, “Coronavirus has boosted support for Welsh independence, Plaid Cymru leader claims” (...)
- 55 See Morris, Steven, “Plaid Cymru sets out possible roadmap for Welsh independence” – The Guardian, (...)
76Eventually, in mid-2020, Plaid Cymru tabled a motion in the Welsh Parliament to debate whether Welsh ministers should be given the right to call a referendum on independence (permission is currently needed from Westminster).54 And in September 2020, the party actually launched what it called a “landmark” report setting out a possible roadmap towards independence.55
- 56 See Hayward, Will, “Opposition to independence for Wales falls to its lowest-ever level” – WalesOnl (...)
77Last but not least, in early March 2021, Plaid Cymru politicians and supporters welcomed an exclusive St David’s Day poll from YouGov for the WalesOnline news website showing that just 50 per cent of Welsh people (the lowest-ever figure) said they would definitely oppose independence in a national vote. Moreover, while support for independence remained at 25 per cent (with Remain voters more likely to vote for independence, and the highest levels of support in the Cardiff region [34 per cent] and the lowest in north of Wales [17 per cent]), the proportion answering “don’t know” was now 14 per cent.56
78But things are probably not so straightforward.
79First, let’s take a look at the December 2019 general election results. On a turnout (66.6 per cent) that was lower than that of 2017 by 2 points, which is not much, the election was a success for the Welsh Conservatives, who clearly defended a pro-Brexit, unionist manifesto.57 They took seats from Labour across north Wales, as well as Bridgend in the south. They now have 14 seats out of the 40 Welsh seats (up 6 compared to 2017). Besides, their share of the vote was 36.1 per cent (their best-ever result since at least 1922), i.e. a net gain of 2.5 per cent compared to 2017 (which had already been a good result – 33.6 per cent, their best-ever at the time). Moreover, the Brexit Party in Wales was on 5.4 per cent, up 3.4 points on UKIP’s 2017 election result. So much so that the overall gain for clearly pro-Brexit political formations was 5.9 per cent. Conversely, Plaid Cymru’s share of the vote was 9.9 per cent, i.e. a loss of 0.5 per cent compared to 2017.58
80The breakdown of figures by constituency is very instructive in that it shows even more clearly that the Conservatives’ agenda is up the street of an increasing number of Welsh people all over Wales. The Welsh Conservatives held the 8 constituencies they already controlled (with increased majorities and with over 50 per cent of the vote, except in two of them): Preseli Pembrokeshire (50.4 per cent / + 7 points), Carmarthenshire West Pembrokeshire South (52.7 per cent / + 5.9), Vale of Glamorgan (49.8 per cent / + 2.3), Brecon & Radnorshire (53.1 per cent / + 4.6), Monmouth (52.1 per cent / - 1), Montgomeryshire (58.5 per cent / + 6.7), Clwyd West (50.7 per cent / + 2.7), and Aberconwy (46.1 per cent / + 1.5).
81Interestingly, they gained Vale of Clwyd from Labour (46.4 per cent / + 2.3), and generally made gains in North Wales mainly due to Labour voters switching to Conservative. Besides, there was further progress in terms of vote share in South Wales: Newport East & West, Islwyn, Torfaen, Caerphilly, Pontypridd, Ogmore, Aberavon, Rhondda, Cynon Valley, Merthyr Tydfil, Rhymney, Blaenau Gwent, and so on (from + 0.8 per cent in Torfaen to + 5.7 per cent in Rhondda).
- 59 See BBC News website, “Election results 2019: Analysis in maps and charts”, 13 December 2019
82The Conservatives also increased their share of the vote in three of Plaid Cymru’s four strongholds (except for Arfon). In Dwyfor Meiryonnidd, Plaid Cymru’s share went up by 3.2 per cent when that of the Conservatives increased by 3.3 per cent. In Ceredigion, the figures were respectively: + 8.7 per cent and + 3.8 per cent. In Carmarthen East & Dinefwr, Plaid Cymru was down 0.4 per cent, but the Tories were up 8.2 per cent.59
- 60 See ITV News website, “Poll puts Labour on course to lose Senedd seats in 2021 election”, 29 Januar (...)
83Furthermore, according to a late January 2020 ITV - Cymru Wales and Cardiff University poll (sample size: 1037), the Conservatives were projected to be on course for a major breakthrough at the 2021 Welsh Parliament election. 35 per cent of the respondents supported them for the constituency vote (up 4 points) – their highest ever reported vote intention. They were ahead of Labour and Plaid Cymru by 2 points and 16 points respectively. Professor of political science Roger Awan-Scully (Cardiff University) thus hit the nail on the head when he said: “if nothing else, the last few years in politics should have taught us to take nothing for granted.”60
- 61 See Wales Senedd Election 2021 (a poster), Centre for Welsh Politics and Society, 2021.
84In the event, the Conservatives did well, though not so well as suggested; they came second (behind Labour), securing 26.1 per cent of the constituency vote (+ 5 points) and 25.1 per cent of the regional one (+ 6.3); Plaid Cymru came third, on 20.3 (- 2) and 20.7 (- 0.1) per cent respectively.61
85In fact, by late 2019-early 2020, there were signs that the mood within Plaid Cymru circles had probably been a little too optimistic. From October 2019 the joint ITV Cymru Wales/Cardiff University Welsh Barometer Poll asked the following question:
If there was a referendum tomorrow on Wales becoming an independent country and this was the question, how would you vote? Should Wales be an independent country?
86The results for January 2020 were: 21 per cent for (down 3 points from the mid-September 2019 poll – see above) and 56 per cent against (up 3.5 points).
- 62 See ITV news website, “How much support is there for Welsh independence?”, 4 February 2020 (https:/ (...)
87Another question was asked regarding devolution, including options for giving the Senedd (or Welsh Parliament) more or fewer powers, or abolishing it all together. No fewer than 17 per cent of respondents said that there should be no devolved government in Wales; 8 per cent said that the Senedd should have fewer powers, and 24 per cent that things should be left as they were (which gives a total of 49 per cent of respondents clearly not in tune with the above declarations by Plaid Cymru’s leader – again, see above). Conversely, and worryingly for the pro-independence movement, 18 per cent only said that Wales should be granted more powers, and just 14 per cent expressed their desire to see Wales go for a clean break with the UK.62
- 63 See ITV news website/Osborne, Rob, “Beyond 2020: Will Wales hold a referendum on independence?”, 4 (...)
88On the day the findings of the survey were published on the ITV News website, another ITV News report pointed in the same direction. YouGov indeed had just asked a sample of Welsh voters for their thoughts, if Wales became independent, on the head of state, the currency and NATO membership (which Adam Price has said an independent Wales would not be part of). Each time, the status quo was the preferred option. Thus, most people favoured keeping the Queen (46 per cent, as against 29 per cent); 68 per cent wanted to keep the pound, with only 12 per cent favouring a Welsh currency, and just 7 per cent the euro; lastly, 63 per cent (as against 9 per cent) wanted membership of NATO.63
- 64 Quoted by nation.cymru, “Support for Welsh independence up 5% in new YouGov poll”, 3 February 2020
89One is therefore at a loss to understand why, responding to the poll, Siôn Jobbins (Chair of the YesCymru campaign for Welsh independence, which organised marches in 2019 [see above], and ramped up its campaign further in 2020 with marches in Wrexham [mid-April], Tredegar [early June] or Swansea [early September]), described it as a solid foundation from which to build.64
- 65 For the 1997-2003 figures, see Bryant, Christopher G. A., 2006, p. 151.
- 66 See Hale, Adam, “Coronavirus has boosted support for Welsh independence, Plaid Cymru leader claims” (...)
90The truth of the matter sems to be that if there has been any change especially as far as independence is concerned, it has been rather slow. Almost a generation ago, over 1997-2003, support for independence was almost constant with about 14 per cent of respondents choosing that future for Wales. Put differently, one may say that, at the present rate of increase (compared to 2003), support for Welsh independence is unlikely to make it a distinct possibility before another half century has elapsed. Over 1997-2003, too, support for a parliament (with its additional powers) almost doubled (19.6 to 37.8 per cent) while rejection of an elected body was almost halved (39.5 to 21.2 per cent).65 Yet, the figures for 2019-20 (see above) show, again, that, in the intervening years, the balance between the two options has not been radically altered either. And certainly not to the extent that meaningful constitutional change has become imminent. An illustration of this is the fact that the June 2020 Welsh barometer poll revealed not only that 25 per cent of voters supported independence (as already pointed out), but also that there was another 25 per cent of them who were in favour of abolishing the Welsh Parliament.66
91As already suggested, the basics of all of the above also apply to the Wales-EU relationship. True, back in early September 2018, a poll of almost 1,000 people across Wales found that 51 per cent of Welsh voters now wanted to remain in the EU. Polling expert Peter Kellner, a former President of YouGov, explained at the time that
The shift has been driven by Labour voters, where the swing to Remain is six per cent, double the average for all Welsh voters. In the referendum two years ago, Labour supporters voted 66-34 per cent for Remain. This has now widened to 72-28 per cent.67
- 68 See Senedd Research, “How did Wales vote? 2019 European election results”, 4 June 2019 (https://sen (...)
92In the 2019 European elections, however, which saw the turnout increase to 37.3 per cent (up from 31.5 per cent in 2014), the Brexit Party (32.5 per cent of the vote) won in 19 of the 22 council areas while UKIP received 3.3 per cent of the vote; Plaid Cymru came second (19.6 per cent – up 4.3 points), Labour third (15.3 per cent – down 12.8) and the Liberal Democrats fourth (13.6 per cent – up 9.7). The Conservatives came in fifth place with 6.5 per cent of the vote (down 10.9).68 All in all, then, voters choosing pro-Brexit formations accounted for 42.3 per cent (down 2.7 points). But if the pro-Brexit voters who chose to vote for other parties (however small their number each time – see just below for figures) are factored in, it is likely that one reaches the 50 per cent mark.
- 69 See YouGov, “Welsh Barometer Survey Results” (Sample Size: 1009 Adults in Wales / Fieldwork: 20-23 (...)
- 70 SeeITV News website, “Poll finds that Wales is still divided over Brexit”, 31 January 2020 (https:/ (...)
93In early 2020, a YouGov survey found that Wales was still rather evenly split or slightly pro-Brexit. To the question: “To what extent do you support or oppose the UK leaving the EU on 31st January 2020?”, 42 per cent answered “Support” and 41 per cent “Oppose”. Among the former group, pro-Labour and pro-Plaid Cymru respondents accounted for 13 per cent of all Labour respondents and 15 per cent of all Plaid Cymru respondents.69 Characteristically, on the basis of those same figures, an ITV report reached the following conclusion: “Just like in the 2016 referendum, there’s a narrow lead for leaving the EU.”70
- 71 Quoted in Williamson, David, “Independence demands could soar if UK votes to quit the EU” – WalesOn (...)
94In other words, Wales seems to be no more pro-EU than when Plaid Cymru MP Jonathan Edwards, toying in 2012 with the idea that England could vote to quit the EU and Wales could vote to remain, said: “Wales is a Europhile country – there’s no doubt about that.”71
95I would then suggest that, on balance, making the case that Wales has turned a corner as regards independence and/or Brexit is rather premature. It seems far more realistic to say that Wales is arguably more polarised than in the recent past. All in all, then, a difference of degree, hardly one of kind.
96One of the big redefining factors of British politics over the last half century has most certainly been the nation, both as a basis for collective narratives and as a tool for understanding UK countries and their mutual relationships, and those between the UK and Europe. From a strictly academic point of view, however, the focus on the nation is fraught with difficulties. As Raphael Samuel explained in the mid-1990s:
- 72 Samuel, Raphael, “Four Nations History” (editorial – History Workshop Journal, no. 40, Autumn 1995) (...)
A ‘four nations’ history of Britain widens the scope of scholarly inquiry. It puts in question some of our more cocksure generalizations […]. A ‘four nations’ history encourages us to think more geographically […]. Yet a ‘four nations’ history produces as many problems as it resolves. Being polycentric it has no natural heartland or consecutive narrative. Like any field of study it has its silences and its exclusions. […] It leaves unresolved fundamental questions as to what history should be about. The state? Civil society? Organized religion? [etc.]72
97If anything, Brexit basically illustrates R. Samuel’s caveat. Put differently, one may say that one of the key lessons of Brexit is that it is a clear indication that our focus should also be on (for want of a better phrase) difference within difference, i.e. not just on Scotland, or Wales, versus England (and vice versa), but also on Scotland versus Scotland, and Wales versus Wales, as Brexit has divided both the UK and its component “nations”.
98The second major lesson is that supporters of independence in Wales and Scotland complain about Brexit (and, I would say, rightly so to a large extent), but – incredibly – they have not learned from its basic nature: like all referendums, it has been (and will remain) structurally divisive. So a third lesson is probably that referendums had better be left alone and replaced with other, less binary, less antagonistic “national conversations”.