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Partie I. La scène nationale : enjeux politiques, identitaires et économiques

Johnson and ‘Let’s keep Brexit done’: the instrumental use of the UK’s policy on Europe in Conservative Party management

Luca Augé
p. 55-79

Résumé

The election of Boris Johnson as Leader of the Conservative Party in July 2019 radically changed both intra-party dynamics and the UK’s policy on Europe. Johnson, more than any of his predecessors, focused on Brexit to restructure his party, win a General Election and conduct government affairs. This article explores the premiership of Boris Johnson by looking at the intertwining of internal Conservative Party considerations and the process of leaving the EU. It focuses on five chronological periods using Jim Bulpitt’s statecraft model. The article argues that Brexit and intra-party management dynamics became interrelated in Johnson’s efforts to control the Conservative Party and stabilise his government. It vows to contribute to the understanding of the Brexit process and its instrumental use by the Conservative Party in government by focusing on the party management dimension.

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Boris Johnson
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Introduction

  • 1 Boris Johnson, ‘Boris Johnson’s First Speech as Prime Minister: 24 July 2019’ (GOV.UK, 2019), https (...)
  • 2 Matthew Weaver, ‘Rising Tory Anger at Cummings’ Role in “purge” of Brexit Rebels’, The Guardian, 20 (...)

1In his first speech as Prime Minister, Boris Johnson set a clear tone by warning that “the doubters, the doomsters, the gloomsters – they are going to get it wrong again”.1 A few months earlier, his predecessor’s Brexit deal was rejected three times by the House of Commons and his party suffered an electoral defeat at the European elections arriving fifth. The Conservative Party after nine years in office seemed unable to appeal to its electoral base, enact the result of the 2016 referendum and be the party of government it liked to portray itself as. During the Summer 2019 leadership contest, Conservative MPs and members longed for a leader that could reverse these trends and would depart from Theresa May’s more cautious style. Johnson gladly presented himself as this boldly optimistic candidate and his can-do spirit proved successful in overturning the party’s misfortunes. Within months of being elected leader, Johnson led his party to an 80-seat majority at the 2019 General Election and managed to complete Brexit after years of complications. In parallel, he removed from the party 21 MPs that had rebelled against his Brexit agenda and appointed former members of the Leave campaign to his team.2 These different developments that defined Johnson’s premiership were intrinsically linked to the process of Brexit and its assimilation by the Conservative Party.

2Given its political, economic, social and constitutional implications, Brexit has been a defining feature for British politics and the UK as an entity since the 2016 referendum. For the governing Conservative Party, it proved equally to be a transformative process influencing its ideology, membership and leadership. Brexit became a project for successive Conservative governments and for the Conservative Party, who was historically divided on the issue of Europe. Brexit was particularly instrumental in ending these divisions as shown during the mandate of Johnson from 2019 to 2022. During this period, finalising the process of leaving the European Union (EU) became a statecraft leitmotiv for Johnson’s party leadership influencing his capacity to govern, win elections and sideline the opposition.

3This article vows to contribute to the understanding of the Brexit process and its use by the Conservative Party in government by focusing on the party management dimension. It builds on Bulpitt’s statecraft theory and analyses intra-party dynamics through the lens of the UK’s policy on Europe during five key moments in Boris Johnson’s premiership. After an initial theoretical and methodological section, the article reviews the Summer 2019 Conservative leadership contest, the pre-election parliamentary deadlock, the December 2019 General Election, the Brexit transition period in 2020 and the remaining time until Johnson’s resignation in July 2022. It concludes that Brexit was at the centre of Johnson’s statecraft and instrumental in his internal management of the Conservative Party. The article hopes to highlight the degree to which party management considerations and setting the UK’s policy on Europe were interrelated during the Johnson premiership and the extent to which Brexit became an instrument in addition to a policy goal.

Defining Conservative Party Management

  • 3 Jim Bulpitt, ‘The Discipline of the New Democracy: Mrs Thatcher’s Domestic Statecraft’, Political S (...)

4In his seminal article, Jim Bulpitt theorised that democratic leaders are characterised by statecraft, which he defined as “the art of winning elections and achieving some necessary of governing competence in office”.3 He explained that statecraft conceptually relies on four dimensions: party management, a winning electoral strategy, political argument hegemony and a governing competence. Bulpitt understood these dimensions more as ideal-types that represent a goal to achieve and can successfully achieved by the respective statecraft to varying degrees. The four dimensions are interlinked and party management can be seen as an important starting point. A coherently managed party united around a leader is essential to win elections, dominate the political debate with specific arguments and ultimately conduct government affairs. The party management dimension is especially central in parliamentary democracies where Prime Ministers are chosen by Members of Parliament, making it, in Bulpitt’s words, a “continuous problem for party leaders” as they need to navigate the complex intra-party dynamics.

  • 4 Robert Saunders, ‘“Let Them Eat Cake”: Conservatism in the Age of Boris Johnson’, Renewal, 2022, ht (...)

5Bulpitt theorised statecraft in the British context of the 1980s and the tenure of Conservative Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher. He analysed her use of monetary policy to install her statecraft in the different dimensions such as party management through the removal of internal opposition. Although his premiership ended abruptly, Johnson likewise used the Brexit policy to establish his statecraft by asserting his leadership, uniting his party, winning the 2019 General Election and completing Brexit. This arguably makes him one of the most impactful and consequential Conservative leaders since Thatcher.4 The parallels between Thatcher’s use of monetary policy and Johnson’s use of Brexit allow for the application of the statecraft theory. It also makes Bulpitt’s original analysis an interesting example of a policy-centred interpretation of the theory.

  • 5 Tim Bale, Sacred Cows and Common Sense: The Symbolic Statecraft and Political Culture of the Britis (...)
  • 6 James Buller and Toby S. James, ‘Statecraft and the Assessment of National Political Leaders: The C (...)
  • 7 Richard Hayton, ‘Conservative Party Statecraft and the Politics of Coalition’, Parliamentary Affair (...)
  • 8 Chris Byrne, Nick Randall, and Kevin Theakston, ‘Theresa May’s Disjunctive Premiership: Choice and (...)
  • 9 Samuel Marlow-Stevens and Richard Hayton, ‘A Rhetorical Political Analysis of Theresa May’s Statecr (...)
  • 10 Andrew Gamble, ‘Austerity as Statecraft’, Parliamentary Affairs 68, no. 1 (1 January 2015): 42–57.
  • 11 Joe Devanny and Philip A. Berry, ‘The Conservative Party and DFID: Party Statecraft and Development (...)
  • 12 Richard Hayton, ‘Conservative Party Statecraft and the Johnson Government’, The Political Quarterly (...)

6Since its first application, the statecraft theory has largely been used in the literature for the Conservative Party with only a few works focusing on the Labour Party under Harold Wilson and Tony Blair.5 6The initial formulation of the theory for a Conservative context and the prevalence of Conservative premierships in British politics explain the absence of statecraft in relation to other political parties. Since the return to office of the Conservative Party in 2010, the statecraft theory has found a renewed appeal with several broad studies on the premierships of David Cameron and later Theresa May.7 89Other publications applied the theory to a policy agenda such as austerity or international development.10 11These streams of work tend to use statecraft to discuss leadership without linking it to a specific policy or a policy without linking it to a specific leadership. Richard Hayton recently conducted a short analysis of Johnson’s premiership, where he used Bulpitt’s conceptualisation to focus on the work on statecraft by Andrew Gamble.12 He focused on Johnson specifically, but did not expand on the theoretical application of statecraft and covered multiple policy areas. Bulpitt’s theory instead functions best as a performative theory when used similarly to its original application by analysing statecraft through a targeted policy by a given leader.

  • 13 Jonathan Bradbury, ‘Jim Bulpitt’s Territory and Power in the United Kingdom and Interpreting Politi (...)
  • 14 Toby S. James, ‘Neo-Statecraft Theory, Historical Institutionalism and Institutional Change’, Gover (...)
  • 15 Devanny and Berry, ‘The Conservative Party and DFID’.
  • 16 Tim Bale, Sacred Cows and Common Sense: The Symbolic Statecraft and Political Culture of the Britis (...)

7The revival of statecraft simultaneously initiated a wider discussion over its epistemological foundations. Contrary to Bulpitt, who focused little on this aspect, many linked the theory to historical institutionalism for its focus on critical junctures and human-made structures in the long term.13 14A few also criticised statecraft theory for exaggerating the leverage of single government leaders, making electoral victories a goal in themselves and implying that every action creates or is bound by a path-dependency logic.15 Such shortcomings can appear in the original theory, but their potential impact depends on the context and manner with which statecraft is used. As described by Tim Bale, it should rather be used and understood as “a skeleton with bare bones that need to be filled with some flesh”.16 This makes statecraft a framework flexible enough to be complemented by external theoretical or methodological inputs and open enough to be applied to a specific case study.

  • 17 David Butler and Uwe W. Kitzinger, The 1975 Referendum (London: Macmillan, 1976).
  • 18 David Baker, Andrew Gamble, and Steve Ludlam, ‘Whips or Scorpions? The Maastricht Vote and the Cons (...)
  • 19 Tim Bale, The Conservative Party: From Thatcher to Cameron (Cambridge: Polity, 2010).
  • 20 Agnès Alexandre‐Collier, ‘From Rebellion to Extinction: Where Have All the Tory Remainer MPs Gone?’ (...)
  • 21 Tim Bale, The Conservative Party after Brexit: Turmoil and Transformation (Cambridge, UK ; Hoboken, (...)
  • 22 Robert Saunders, ‘How Do We Write the History of Brexit?’, The Political Quarterly (2023), 1-7.

8Growing divisions around European integration within the Conservative Party have made it a central case study in the literature on Euroscepticism in the UK. The party evolved from an initially enthusiastic approach up until the 1970s to more a polarised intra-party debate following the premiership of Thatcher and exacerbated tensions from the return to office in 2010.17 1819Far from ending the matter, the 2016 referendum and the Brexit vote pushed the Conservative Party further into an open conflict on Europe.20 Divisions crystallised during Johnson’s premiership with the party eventually positioning itself as the new party of Brexit after the 2019 General Election.21 The different publications on this topic showed the centrality of party management and intra-party dynamics throughout the last few decades. As such, statecraft offers an applicable theoretical framework to analyse the effects of Brexit on the Conservative Party. In particular the period of Johnson as Prime Minister was characterised by high-level Conservative politicians that followed electoral considerations of delivering Brexit and made consequential decisions for the future of the UK, which fits the epistemological approach of statecraft.22 This article will analyse the policy of Brexit as implemented during the premiership of Johnson with a focus on party management as this topic constitutes an interesting case study and makes statecraft a suited theoretical framework.

Becoming (almost) everyone’s favourite

  • 23 Matthew Smith, ‘Boris Johnson Holds Commanding Lead among Tory Members’, YouGov, 2019, https://youg (...)

9A week before the 2019 European elections, the Conservative Party was in a precarious position. Months of difficult Brexit negotiations and inconclusive parliamentary votes had left the party divided as well as undermined Conservative Prime Minister Theresa May. Some insiders were openly starting to contemplate the possibility of a leadership election and a favourite was rapidly emerging. In an opinion poll conducted at the time, Conservative members saw Boris Johnson as the best placed to be the next party leader with 64% of respondents believing him to be a good leader and 70% able to win an election.23 Almost 3 years of political tribulations led members to look for a leader capable to stabilise the party by finalising Brexit and make it electorally strong. Before any resignation announcement from May or leadership contest launch, Johnson was considered a top contender amongst party members showcasing a successful positioning as credible Conservative Party member, politician and possible leader. This successful party management was coupled with his supposed ability to govern competently as well as win elections, which are two other statecraft dimensions. The 2019 Conservative leadership contest without having started was already featuring essential statecraft elements in relation to Brexit with Johnson seemingly best placed to fulfil them.

  • 24 Jim Waterson, ‘Pro-Boris Johnson Campaign Launched by Guido Fawkes Blogger’, The Guardian, 2019, ht (...)
  • 25 Tom Newton Dunn, ‘I Back Boris: Donald Trump Wades into Tory Leadership Race Saying Boris Johnson W (...)
  • 26 Boris Johnson, ‘Please Check out My Campaign Launch Video. Time to Deliver Brexit and Unite Our Fan (...)

10After the Conservative Party’s fifth place at the European elections, May announced on 24 May 2019 her intention to resign once a new leader would have been chosen. Other candidates immediately followed suit and confirmed their candidacy within the next days except for Johnson. His belated declaration created a frenzy around his persona with an online support campaign being launched and even US President Donald Trump breaking diplomatic protocol to declare his preference for Johnson.24 25When Johnson eventually launched his leadership bid on 3 June 2019, he was benefitting from a strong momentum amongst members and supporters of the Conservative Party. To reinforce his strong position within the party, he focused his campaign on Brexit as the pressing issue of the moment and repeatedly pledged to complete the EU exit by 31 October 2019 “deal or no deal”.26 Other promises were formulated, but they were all made dependent first on the completion of Brexit. By doing so, Johnson completed his statecraft by defining and linking it to recognisable flagship policy. This enabled him to be identified as a potentially convincing leader with a capacity to control the party, win elections, stand against the opposition and focus on completing the conundrum of Brexit.

Table 1: Leadership candidate by number and 2016 vote of endorsing MPs (10 June 2019)

Leadership candidates

Number of

endorsing MPs

2016 vote of endorsing MPs

Leave

Remain

Undeclared

Boris Johnson

66

42 (64%)

24 (36%)

/

Jeremy Hunt

35

3 (9%)

32 (91%)

/

Michael Gove

32

8 (25%)

22 (69%)

2 (6%)

Dominic Raab

23

20 (87%)

3 (13%)

/

Sajid Javid

18

4 (22%)

14 (78%)

/

Matt Hancock

15

/

13 (87%)

2 (13%)

Mark Harper

6

3 (50%)

3 (50%)

/

Esther McVey

5

3 (60%)

2 (40%)

/

Rory Stewart

5

/

5 (100%)

/

Andrea Leadsom

3

3 (100%)

/

/

Sources: MPs websites and social media, ConservativeHome, BBC, FT.com, The Guardian, The Independent, Daily Express, Politico, Politics.co.uk, local newspapers, LeaveMeansLeave.eu, Tim Carr, Iain Dale and Robert Waller, The Politicos Guide to the New House of Commons 2017: Profiles of the New MPs and Analysis of the 2017 General Election Results (London: Biteback Publishing), 2017.

11Johnson’s leading position in the contest made it difficult for the other 9 candidates to stand out. In comparison, they either lacked being a household name or having a flagship policy and sometimes both.27 Brexit in particular proved to be a differentiating factor. Whereas most other candidates oscillated between a preference for either leaving the EU with or without a deal, Johnson was the only to focus instead on a date. This helped him to depart from the binary deal or no deal choice that tended to reflect the Remain and Leave cleavage from the 2016 referendum. It allowed him to reach across the Brexit divide by focusing more on a deadline and to gather support from both sides of the debate. Table 1 reports the number and 2016 referendum vote of MPs endorsing the different candidates on the day on which nominations closed. The numbers reveal the profile of the MPs backing the ten official candidates. Johnson was the candidate with the most endorsements with a total of 66 MPs with 64% of those having supported Leave and 36% Remain in 2016. In comparison, Jeremy Hunt as second-best placed candidate and future finalist against Johnson received 31 endorsements with almost all of them having voted Remain. Other candidates like Andrea Leadsom and Dominic Raab had a higher share of Leave MPs, but much smaller endorsements numbers and little to none Remain MPs. Johnson was able to attract the support from most Conservative and most Leave voting MPs while keeping many Remain voting MPs. This showcases a skilful navigation of the Conservative Party and its ideological divisions. Through this party management based on a unique Brexit policy, Johnson was able to orientate his statecraft towards securing a potential victory in the 2019 Conservative leadership contest.

  • 28 YouGov, ‘YouGov Survey Results’, YouGov, 2019, https://docs.cdn.yougov.com/4hcjqxi3xm/InternalResul (...)
  • 29 Karine Tournier-Sol, ‘From UKIP to the Brexit Party: The Politicization of European Integration and (...)
  • 30 Michael Savage, ‘Brexit Party Tops Westminster Election Poll for First Time’, The Guardian, 2019, h (...)
  • 31 Rowena Mason and Jessica Elgot, ‘Boris Johnson: Tories Must Deliver Brexit or Face Extinction’, The (...)

12The cross-faction support constructed in the early stages of the leadership contest enabled Johnson to position himself as a unifying leader of an otherwise divided Conservative Party with the ability to prioritise the completion of Brexit. Opinion polls during the campaign showed that Conservative members shared this priority with a majority of them seeing Brexit as the main policy concern and being ready to leave without a deal if a satisfying one could not be negotiated.28 The feeling of urgency was partly caused by the dissatisfaction of voters for the delay on Brexit and the window of opportunity this created for rival opposition parties. The Conservative Party was competing on its left against the main opposition Labour Party of Jeremy Corbyn and on its right against the Brexit Party of Nigel Farage, who had already won the European Elections and hoped to win over disillusioned Conservative voters.29 This threat became particularly real when a poll placed the Conservative Party at 17% in third position behind the Brexit Party at 26% and the Labour Party at 22%.30 The 2019 leadership contest was not only about finding a leader for Conservative MPs and members, but also about maintaining the party’s standing in government. In Bulpitt’s terms, the Conservative Party was looking for a new dynamic statecraft able to keep the party united, win the next elections, conduct government affairs and sideline opposition parties. Johnson positioned himself during this moment of rupture as the only candidate able to deliver Brexit and prevent “the potential extinction of this great party”.31 He directly worked upon being the best placed to possess and implement the statecraft needed by the Conservative Party.

  • 32 Chris Curtis, ‘Boris Johnson Holds His 48 Point Lead in the Conservative Leadership Election’, YouG (...)

13In the successive voting rounds, Conservative MPs gradually eliminated candidates until only Johnson and Hunt were left. Five former contenders expressed support for Johnson, while Stewart was the sole joining Hunt. These endorsements underlined Johnson’s position as a Leave-leaning and unifying candidate against a mainly Remain-leaning Hunt. Johnson’s strong position continued to increase with membership polls repeatedly putting him in the first place against Hunt.32 On 23 July 2019, the leadership contest officially ended with the membership voting at 66% for Johnson to become the new Leader of the Conservative Party. Three years after his first attempt in 2016, he managed this time to run a successful internal campaign where he quickly became identified both as the main Brexit candidate and a rallying figure with support from MPs of all sides. Johnson successfully navigated internal dynamics and displayed an effective party management. He was able to project his leadership around a flagship Brexit policy as a credible statecraft alternative. Johnson’s victory made Brexit not only a tool for party management and internal election winning, but a central feature in his statecraft as new Conservative Party Leader and Prime Minister.

Taking over the executive, fighting the legislative

  • 33 Nicholas Allen, ‘Those Who Wear the Crown Wield the Knife: The Brutality of Recent Takeover Reshuff (...)

14Johnson’s victory in the leadership contest initiated the institutional phase of his statecraft both as Leader of the Conservative Party and Prime Minister. On his first day at Downing Street, he immediately started forming his government and announced several nominations. These appointments usually reward close allies or sometimes also influential rivals and are supposed to install a united governing. In Johnson’s case, government unity was achieved through an almost complete renewal of the top office holders with over half of May’s Cabinet either being sacked or accepting to resign. Most of the departing were Remain supporters like Hunt and were replaced by Brexit supporters. The extent of the reshuffle made it the most wide-ranging by a takeover Prime Minister since Anthony Eden in 1955.33 Apart from Sajid Javid as Chancellor, former Vote Leave campaign members were appointed to the most senior roles in government with Priti Patel as Home Secretary, Dominic Raab as Foreign Secretary and Dominic Cummings as Downing Street Chief Adviser. Rather than uniting the different wings of the party as he had done during the leadership contest, Johnson made Brexit supporters the backbone of his government. He put them at the centre of the UK’s policy-making to showcase his prioritisation of Brexit. This directly marginalised Conservative opponents to Johnson’s Brexit policy and threatened his governing competence by focusing more on ideology than expertise. As much as the new Cabinet was a government of Brexit unity, it simultaneously represented a statecraft gamble for the party management and governing competence dimensions.

  • 34 10 Downing Street, ‘Prime Minister Boris Johnson Hosts People’s PMQs 14/8/19’, Video platform, YouT (...)
  • 35 Rowena Mason, ‘Brexit: Leaked Papers Predict Food Shortages and Port Delays’, The Guardian, 2019, h (...)

15The shared belief in Brexit allowed for a strong Cabinet discipline on the issue. All ministers backed Johnson’s Brexit policy of leaving by 31 October 2019 with or without a deal. Contrary to previous governments, the cohesiveness of the Cabinet made an EU exit more probable than at any moment since the proceedings were initiated. Johnson’s focus on the Brexit faction to create a united Cabinet had simultaneously frustrated his party management with opponents to his Brexit policy lining up against him. Most of these Conservative MPs were former Remain voters and threatened to block any legislation that could make no deal possible, even by working with opposition parties. In party management terms, this was risky as tensions between the Conservative government and backbench MPs disturbed the premierships of David Cameron and Theresa May. However, whereas his predecessors opted more for appeasement, Johnson chose radical and direct conflict. He accused his opponents of “a terrible kind of collaboration” with the EU to stop Brexit and made them responsible for leaking no deal preparations.34 35Such confrontational party management strategy proved another statecraft gamble as Johnson’s parliamentary majority was already thin and theoretically ever Conservative MP was needed to implement his Brexit promise.

  • 36 Andrew Sparrow, ‘Jeremy Corbyn Says He Will Try to “politically Stop” Prorogation with Legislation (...)
  • 37 Agnès Alexandre‐Collier, ‘From Rebellion to Extinction: Where Have All the Tory Remainer MPs Gone?’ (...)

16The announcement in late August 2019 of a prorogation of Parliament for five weeks was meant to open a way forward. For Johnson, the prorogation would have closed Parliament until a few days before the 31 October deadline and given MPs a few days to discuss a potential new Brexit deal. For his opponents, the prorogation was designed to prevent any government scrutiny until the last minute and force MPs to accept any Brexit deal in order to prevent no deal. Despite prorogation being an executive prerogative, the decision created a massive outcry both from within the Conservative Party and from opposition parties.36 The move equally showed a failure in Johnson’s party management as it represented an admission that he lacked control over Conservative MPs to pursue his Brexit policy. On 3 September 2019, a few days before prorogation, 21 Conservative MPs voted with the opposition to take control of the parliamentary agenda. Johnson reacted to this significant blow to his authority by removing their whip including to some big names like Churchill’s grandson Nicholas Soames or former ministers Philip Hammond and Dominic Grieve. Removing the whip is a frequent disciplinary measure usually followed by a reinstalment and still most of the 21 Conservative MPs did not get the whip back at all.37 Johnson’s decision was supposed to signal the price of rebellion to other potential candidates as well as highlight that he was determined to implement his Brexit policy and that he remained the ultimate decision-maker in his party.

17Only a few days after the start of the prorogation, the Supreme Court ruled that the decision had been unlawful and that Parliament had to immediately reconvene. The ruling was a setback for Johnson and his Brexit policy. He was forced to return to a divided Conservative Party and Parliament, where his government did not have a majority anymore and effectively could not pass legislation on its own. Despite negotiating a new Brexit deal with the EU, a majority of MPs, including the whipless Conservative MPs, refused to have a vote and instead forced Johnson to ask for a Brexit extension until 31 January 2020.38 The new Brexit deadline meant the end of his flagship policy and created a political deadlock. Johnson was leading a Cabinet of loyalists determined to rapidly complete Brexit that did not have a majority in a Parliament which had forced him to give up on his leadership election promise. It created a significant statecraft blow by stopping his policy-making ability and ultimately his premiership. The adoption of a confrontational party management gave Johnson a united Cabinet, but deepened divisions within the Conservative Party leaving the government powerless in Parliament.

  • 39 BBC, ‘Parliament Suspension: Angry Commons Exchanges as MPs Return to Work’, BBC, 2019, https://www (...)

18Stripped of other options, Johnson and his Cabinet resorted to calls for an early election. They targeted MPs and made their opponents responsible for the parliamentary deadlock. Aggressive language was used with Conservative frontbenchers calling the House of Commons “dead” and MPs “traitors” for having blocked Johnson’s Brexit policy.39 The government had to try three times before finally achieving the required majority to call for a general election. Despite leading a divided party, the prospect of an imminent election created a rallying factor amongst Conservative MPs and members. The whole Conservative machinery focused on making this election about giving Johnson as leader the necessary backing in the party, government and electorate. After months of Brexit divides and a blocked Parliament, a new campaign allowed Johnson to introduce a different party management directed towards electoral victory. As before, he made Brexit and his newly negotiated deal the central mobilising factor to style himself as the only able to end the ongoing political deadlock.

Making Brexit the 2019 Conservative Party electoral mantra

  • 40 Channel 4 News, ‘Boris Johnson Launches Conservative Party Election Campaign’, Video platform, YouT (...)
  • 41 Conservative Party, ‘The Conservative and Unionist Party Manifesto 2019’, 2019, https://www.conserv (...)
  • 42 Interviews conducted with Conservative MPs in Spring and Autumn 2023 and Winter 2023/2024.
  • 43 Louise Thompson, ‘From Minority Government to Parliamentary Stalemate: Why Election 2019 Was Needed (...)

19At the campaign launch on 6 November 2019, Johnson urged voters to renew Parliament by electing a Conservative majority as the current MPs were “incapable of digestive function as an anaconda that has swallowed a tapir” and refused to “get Brexit done”.40 These last three words were quickly turned into the defining slogan of the Conservative campaign. Completing Brexit was continuously repeated and written on every campaign material as it had been for Johnson’s leadership bid. Similarly, the Conservative manifesto made several policy pledges from NHS funding to net zero and income tax explicitly dependent on the need to first complete Brexit.41 Just as Brexit made Johnson a rallying figure in the leadership contest, the Conservative campaign wanted to win over Leave and Remain voters by presenting Johnson’s Brexit policy as easily implementable and allowing for other urgent issues to be addressed. The new deal negotiated with the EU made it practically possible to present a Conservative majority as immediately able to complete Brexit. Support for the deal was even a requirement for all 635 Conservative candidates with some of them being personally contacted to ensure their agreement.42 Candidates were more generally selected based on their Brexit stance with several of the whipless MPs standing as independents against more pro-Brexit candidates endorsed by the party.43 In the hope to win the 2019 General Election, Johnson largely directed his statecraft again on Brexit and used it to ensure party cohesion during the campaign as well as project the governability of a future parliamentary Conservative Party.

  • 44 Robert Ford et al., ‘The Man Who Wasn’t There: Labour Under Corbyn’, in The British General Electio (...)
  • 45 Labour Party, ‘Labour Party Manifesto 2019’, 2019, https://labour.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2019/11 (...)
  • 46 IPSOS, ‘When It Comes to Brexit, What Do You Think the Government’s Priority Should Be?’, 2019, htt (...)

20Like in the 2017 election, the Conservative Party was not alone in focusing on Brexit and each party approached the issue differently. The Labour Party was struggling to accommodate its generally older working-class Leave voters and younger urban Remain voters.44 As a compromise, it pledged during the 2019 campaign to negotiate a new Brexit deal with the EU and organise a second referendum with the option to stop Brexit.45 The Liberal Democrats and the Green Party proposed to cancel Brexit altogether, while the Brexit Party advocated for an immediate departure from the EU without a deal. The Brexit policies of the smaller parties broadly reflected the Brexit cleavage with Remain voters being targeted more by left-wing parties and Leave voters by right-wing parties. The two main parties instead tried to please their traditional voters on Brexit, while simultaneously attracting the opposite side. The Conservative Party pledged to complete Brexit and guaranteed to do so in an orderly fashion with a deal. The Labour Party kept both options to cancel Brexit or to complete it with a different deal. Polls showed that the electorate tended to prefer completing Brexit and doing so with a deal, which made the Conservative proposal the most electorally relevant.46 This strengthened the position of the Conservative Party that already appeared united around leaving the EU with a deal thanks to Johnson’s effective electoral party management.

  • 47 John Curtice, ‘General Election 2019: How Popular Are the Party Leaders?’, BBC, 2019, https://www.b (...)
  • 48 Dominic Wring and Stephen Ward, ‘From Bad to Worse? The Media and the 2019 Election Campaign’, Parl (...)

21The ability of the Conservative campaign to differentiate itself from other parties was as much helped by its Brexit policy as by the charismatic figure of Johnson. A longstanding media figure, he was easily identifiable by the British public and a relatively popular politician, especially compared to the more divisive Labour Party Leader Jeremy Corbyn.47 Johnson frequently appeared in media stunts like when he drove a blue ‘Get Brexit Done’ JCB digger into a foam wall displaying the word gridlock or with his blue campaign bus echoing the infamous 2016 red Leave campaign bus. Coupled with a highly effective social media campaign, Johnson and his Brexit slogan became a dominant theme of the election overshadowing much of the other campaigns.48 As predicted by several polls, the Conservative Party eventually was able to secure an electoral victory on 12 December 2019 winning 365 seats and around 44% of votes, making it the highest number of seats since 1987 and highest share of vote since 1979. Several Northern English constituencies that had been Labour for decades, sometimes a century, even switched to the Conservative Party. Johnson’s focus on Brexit helped to produce a dynamic campaign that proved successful in electorally securing him an ample parliamentary majority.

  • 49 Robert Ford et al., ‘Rebuilding the Ship at Sea: The Conservatives’, in The British General Electio (...)

22The 2019 General Election campaign gave Johnson the opportunity to bolster his statecraft. He used a rally-round-the-flag strategy to bring his party in line with his plan of leaving the EU with his newly negotiated deal. By securing the unity of his party around his persona and Brexit policy, Johnson was able to conduct a powerful electoral campaign helped by an impactful slogan and effective media stunts. The groundwork laid by the 2017 campaign and the dislike for Corbyn equally played a role in making a Conservative victory possible.49 Johnson’s ability to create an effective party management directly enabled him to win the 2019 General Election. Parliamentary dominance additionally paved the way for a potential fulfilment of the other statecraft dimensions of governing competence and political argument hegemony through a large governing majority. The 2019 Conservative electoral win reinforced Johnson’s statecraft by directly giving the democratic legitimacy of an electoral win and the impetus to finally complete Brexit.

From one deal to another

  • 50 Jacob Jarvis, ‘Boris Johnson Hails New Parliament as “a Vast Improvement” and Vows Not to Waste Tim (...)

23The opening of Parliament on 17 December 2019 marked a turning point in Johnson’s premiership. After chaotic first months, he stood before a renewed House of Commons where most MPs belonged to his party and where his government had a comfortable working majority. Opposition parties sat in reduced numbers with both the leaders of the Labour Party and Liberal Democrats announcing their resignation after their respective electoral defeats. In his first speech to the new Parliament, Johnson acknowledged this new favourable environment calling it “a vast improvement” and “one of the best Parliaments this country has ever produced”.50 The 2019 victory confirmed Johnson’s successful management of the Conservative Party shown by the election of a relatively homogenous cohort of MPs. He could rely on a party of Brexit loyalists and his statecraft effectively underwent an upturn. Johnson controlled Parliament, which enabled him a governing competence through smooth policy-making and political argument hegemony through Conservative narratives prevailing against a diminished opposition.

24Johnson applied his improved statecraft in the first days of the new Parliament and introduced in the Commons his Brexit deal, on which the 2019 Conservative manifesto had extensively relied. After years of difficult negotiations and intense debates, the deal was rapidly passed with a majority of 124 including the vote of some Labour MPs and paved the way for the UK to leave the EU on 31 January 2020. This represented a consequential statecraft victory for Johnson, particularly compared to his predecessors who had stumbled on the issue of Brexit. It highlighted the governing capacity of the Conservative government as well as its intention to enact Johnson’s Brexit leadership contest promise, electoral campaign pledge and the Conservative Party’s commitment to implement the 2016 referendum result. Even if a major one, the passing of the Brexit deal still constituted only a stage in the Brexit process. As part of the Brexit agreement, the UK entered a transition period to last until 31 December 2020 in which membership of existing EU security and economic structures such as the Single Market continued. The period was meant to allow both negotiating teams to create a new framework for UK-EU relations leading some to believe that 11 months would not suffice. Johnson rejected this idea and refused any extension to the transition period.

  • 51 10 Downing Street, ‘Prime Minister Boris Johnson’s New Year’s Message’, Video platform, YouTube, 20 (...)
  • 52 BBC, ‘Coronavirus: Boris Johnson Moved to Intensive Care as Symptoms Worsen’, BBC, 2019, https://ww (...)
  • 53 Luca Augé, ‘British Euroscepticism: Lessons from the Covid-19 Pandemic’, Researching Brexit Graduat (...)
  • 54 James Kane, ‘Covid Vaccine Decisions Have Little to Do with Brexit’, Institute for Government, 2020 (...)

25Following the 2019 General Election, Johnson was eager to quickly complete Brexit in order to “unleash Britain’s potential” and implement the various policy pledges made during the campaign.51 He preferred to reject any extension to the transition period and prepare the announced post-Brexit period as signalled by the appointment of Rishi Sunak as new Chancellor. Instead, the first wave of Covid-19 and the decision to lockdown halted any planned preparations. The transition period negotiations were impacted with travel restrictions making the initial rounds in London and Brussels physically impossible. Johnson’s Covid-19 management strategy was also criticised for reacting too late and his admission to intensive care for a few days further shifted the focus onto his capacity to lead the country.52 Despite the health emergency, Brexit considerations continued to play a role with the Conservative government eagerly wanting to use the crisis to show supposed benefits of leaving the EU. At the start of the pandemic, the UK refused to join an EU ventilator procurement scheme on the grounds that it now was an “independent nation”, even if the opposite would have been legally possible as an autonomous decision by the government.53 A similar situation arose around Covid-19 vaccines with Johnson and his government repeating the incorrect claim that the fast rollout was made possible by Brexit.54 Be it to divert attention from potential domestic mismanagements or by actual legal misinterpretation, Brexit remained part of Johnson’s statecraft narrative during the Covid-19 pandemic.

  • 55 BBC, ‘Northern Ireland Secretary Admits New Bill Will “Break International Law”’, BBC, 2020, https: (...)
  • 56 Interviews conducted with Conservative MPs in Spring and Autumn 2023 and Winter 2023/2024.

26The UK-EU negotiations restarted in the Summer 2020 and were almost immediately halted again with the publication by the Johnson government of the Internal Market Bill. The bill aimed at preventing trade barriers between UK nations contained provisions in breach of the Brexit deal agreed months earlier. By admission of Northern Ireland Secretary Brandon Lewis, the proposal would “break international law in a very specific and limited way” causing an outcry by the EU, opposition parties and even some Conservative MPs.55 Several voices within the Conservative Party disagreed with the scope of the bill, but believed it a necessary evil to create some leverage for the UK in the negotiations with the EU.56 Even if the controversial provisions were later dropped, the relative absence of public discontent from Conservative MPs on the Internal Market Bill highlighted the influence of Johnson’s statecraft. As leader of a party keen on law and order, he could introduce a text breaching international legal commitments without causing much opposition inside his party. Johnson’s control over the Conservative Party was such that the majority of Conservative MPs accepted to let him create a precedent and negotiate an internationally agreement in bad faith.

  • 57 Interviews conducted with Conservative MPs in Spring and Autumn 2023 and Winter 2023/2024.

27The turbulent UK-EU negotiations ended a few days before the 31 December 2020 deadline with both sides agreeing the Trade and Cooperation Agreement (TCA). Up until then, the negotiations had remained largely secretive with only limited announcements filtering through and much of the work being centralised in the Cabinet Office. Parliamentary scrutiny was kept to a minimum with MPs and in particular Conservative MPs largely remaining absent of the process. The publication of the TCA text around Christmas limited both the time and will for a wide-ranging debate within the Conservative Party or Parliament on the precise scope of the agreement. Johnson and his government benefitted from this situation to introduce the TCA to Parliament on 30 December 2020 and having both chambers adopt the deal within the same day. Following years of painful debates, the Brexit process had just been completed by Johnson in a matter of hours without much scrutiny or debate. The quiet passing of the TCA revealed the willingness of an exhausted Conservative Party to have a “ceasefire” on the issue of Brexit with MPs ready to finally close the matter.57 For Johnson’s party management, this lack of detailed engagement with the TCA was as much the lasting effect of the 2019 electoral victory as the product of his insistence to have his party let him freely negotiate with the EU. His successful statecraft allowed him to fulfil his promise to complete Brexit by keeping his party in check and working around the silent opposition parties.

The difficult path to ‘Let’s keep Brexit done’

  • 58 Boris Johnson, ‘Prime Minister’s Opening Statement to the House of Commons on the UK-EU Deal: 30 De (...)

28The end of the Brexit process coincided with the decrease in Covid-19 infections. By mid-2021, most of the UK population was vaccinated bringing the pandemic closer to an end. Politically, Johnson aimed to project a vision for a post-Brexit and post-Covid Britain pledging on the day of the TCA’s passing to “let’s keep Brexit done”.58 This new motto resembled the previously used “Take Back Control” of the 2016 Leave campaign and “Get Brexit Done” used by the 2019 Conservative campaign with the difference of being more aimed to his own party and government. The end of Brexit and the Covid-19 pandemic involved a return to a certain normality and the end of a rally-round-the-flag effect, especially in political terms. By launching this new slogan, Johnson wanted to maintain the unity of the Conservative Party and stay on the statecraft course that made Brexit possible. “Let’s Keep Brexit Done” can be understood as a direct attempt by Johnson to make his premiership about delivering on the various promises made for after the completion of Brexit to Conservative MPs, members and voters.

  • 59 Tim Bale, ‘Rebels with a Cause: Backbench Groups in the Parliamentary Conservative Party’, Hansard (...)
  • 60 Interviews conducted with Conservative MPs in Spring and Autumn 2023 and Winter 2023/2024.

29However, Conservative MPs did not wait for this new pledge to work towards the course of action that they had envisioned throughout the Brexit process and believed could finally be implemented. Several single-issue groups were created within the parliamentary Conservative Party after the 2019 General Election and modelled on the European Research Group, which had become an effective intra-party counterweight during the Brexit process.59 Except for the Covid Recovery Group, all these groups made specific policy demands in relation to a post-Brexit Britain. The Net Zero Scrutiny Group wanted the UK to diverge from the EU’s climate agenda. The Northern Research Group asked for the government to pursue the promised post-Brexit investments in the North of England. The Common Sense Group wanted to use Brexit as a starting point for more Conservative policies. Finally, the China Research Group considered China as the new geopolitical threat similarly to how some saw the EU before Brexit. The creation of these groups indicated the motivation of Conservative MPs to achieve these goals as well as the feeling that the Conservative leadership was not prioritising them enough.60 For Johnson’s statecraft, it signalled a degree of failing party management given the rise in factionalism and failing governing competence since promises were not effectively implemented.

  • 61 Mary O’Connor, ‘Ukraine War: Boris Johnson Sparks Fury after Comparison to Brexit’, The Guardian, 2 (...)

30The impression that Johnson’s statecraft had lost its raison d’être after the completion of Brexit was also highlighted by the eagerness with which the Prime Minister personally involved himself in the conflict between Ukraine and Russia. He travelled several times to the country to meet with Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy and agreed to numerous weapons deliveries. As much as the UK’s help was welcomed by Ukraine, the conflict equally served a domestic agenda. Johnson repeatedly claimed the UK was leading the world in its support to Ukraine compared to a slower European decision-making and even juxtaposed leaving the EU to the struggle for freedom of the Ukrainians.61 Such arguments revealed an understanding of the conflict to a certain degree as a potential opportunity for the UK to profile itself globally after Brexit just as the government did during the pandemic. Johnson’s personal involvement in the UK’s support for Ukraine signalled both a certain longing for a new historical task and a wider attempt to recalibrate his statecraft after Brexit.

  • 62 Alistair Smout and Kylie Maclellan, ‘Factbox: The Many Scandals of Boris Johnson’s Premiership’, Re (...)
  • 63 Luke Harding, Jessica Elgot, and Andrew Sparrow, ‘Accusations of Lying Pile up against Boris Johnso (...)
  • 64 ‘Pro-Johnson Memo Circulating through the Chief Whip amongst Conservative MPs on the Day of the Vot (...)

31Before a recalibration could potentially succeed, Johnson’s statecraft started to gradually crumble in light of the many political scandals he became involved in. Throughout 2021 and 2022, various media outlets revealed scandals of sexual, financial and criminal nature linked to Johnson or other Conservative Party members.62 This included sexual misconduct cases amongst Conservative MPs, donations received by the Prime Minister to refurbish 10 Downing Street and illegal gatherings during Covid-19 lockdowns nicknamed partygate by the press. In all these cases, Johnson’s character and passive reaction were as much the reasons for the outcry as the nature of the scandals themselves. He was accused of lacking probity, lying to protect himself and being careless with government affairs.63 Johnson’s party management initially remained effective with Conservative Party members mostly supporting and defending their leader. However, the growing pressure from constituency parties and the wider public led MPs to demands for a vote of no confidence in Johnson. To counter the growing rebellion, Johnson’s allies repeated his statecraft successes, including the completion of Brexit. A memo sent out by the Conservative whip office emphasised Johnson’s essential role in getting Brexit done and being “the Conservative Party’s most proven and thoroughly tested election winner”.64 As many times before at a crucial time, Johnson resorted to Brexit in order to legitimise his statecraft and try to re-establish his party management.

  • 65 Tim Durrant, ‘Ministerial Resignations Outside Reshuffles by Prime Minister, 1979 to June 2023’, In (...)

32Despite Johnson winning on 6 June 2022 by 63 votes, the no confidence vote failed to prevent the discontent within the Conservative Party and unease spread to the government. Presumptive leadership contenders Chancellor Rishi Sunak and Health Secretary Rishi Sunak resigned on 5 July 2022 followed by more than 170 government and party officials making it the highest number of resignations since 1979.65 The wave of departures was such that Johnson practically found himself without a government with many Conservative MPs unwilling to take up the vacant positions. In statecraft terms, this represented the ultimate blow to Johnson’s credibility and capacity to lead. With intra-party opposition, a defaulting government and a critical public opinion, he was unable to stay on as Prime Minister. He gave in to his party’s demands and announced his resignation which took effect on 6 September 2022. After more than 3 years in office, the premiership of Johnson ended almost as abruptly as it had started. The difficulty to renew his statecraft after Brexit and a series of scandals weakened his control over the Conservative Party forcing him to resign. As for Johnson’s predecessors, party management on Brexit proved again to be the make or break of yet another Conservative leader’s statecraft.

Conclusion

33From his election as Leader of the Conservative Party to his resignation as Prime Minister, Boris Johnson used Brexit as the enabling policy to establish and maintain his leadership. He became leader at a time when British politics was struggling to effectively implement the 2016 Brexit referendum and when his party was longing for a decisive leader. His reliance on Brexit helped him win the 2019 Conservative leadership contest and appoint a Cabinet of loyalists. Intra-party opposition to his Brexit policy, nevertheless, remained and forced Johnson to actively remove discordant voices including several high-profile Conservative MPs. Such radical party management techniques proved essential in winning a historic result in the 2019 General Election. Through this victory, Johnson established control over his party, Parliament and government allowing him to finalise the Brexit process. Party management was crucial in establishing and stabilising Johnson’s position as Prime Minister.

34The subsequent completion of Brexit and the rise of new challenges such as Covid-19 or the war in Ukraine forced Johnson to find a new essence to his statecraft. Factions within the Conservative Party indicated that most MPs wanted the leadership to implement the various promises made for the post-Brexit period. Johnson failed to respond to these demands in policy-making terms, which constituted his first fatal party management error. His reliance on the Conservative Party to support him during the series of scandals he faced was the second fatal party management error with Conservative MPs and members turning on him as they saw him more as a liability than a leader. Johnson’s lack of party management directly impacted the other statecraft dimensions as it left him without the capacity to govern, to win future elections as party leader and engage in political debates without making him the topic of discussion. Interestingly, his downfall shows that statecraft is not only determined by policy, but that ethics also plays a role and that supporters can turn on a leader seen as toxic for the image of the party or government.

35In both his statecraft successes and failures, Brexit played a defining role in Johnson’s premiership. The issue helped him to unite his party to win the 2019 leadership election and subsequent General Election. In turn, this enabled him to complete Brexit after years of political deadlock in the UK. For this result alone, Johnson’s party management will constitute a lasting legacy. It set precedents with lasting whip removals and attempted prorogations that might legitimise similarly radical measures by future party. Johnson’s Brexit remains the current status quo for UK-EU relations and Europe stopped being a divisive issue within the Conservative Party after having split the party for decades. Lastly, the end of Johnson’s premiership showed that, just as for his successors and predecessors, intra-party divisions seem to always come and bite until the Conservative Party Leader is forced to resign. On this point, even the statecraft aura of the completion of Brexit did not seem to be enough of a protection.

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Notes

1 Boris Johnson, ‘Boris Johnson’s First Speech as Prime Minister: 24 July 2019’ (GOV.UK, 2019), https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/boris-johnsons-first-speech-as-prime-minister-24-july-2019

2 Matthew Weaver, ‘Rising Tory Anger at Cummings’ Role in “purge” of Brexit Rebels’, The Guardian, 2019, https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2019/sep/05/conservatives-rising-anger-at-cummings-role-in-purge-of-brexit-rebels

3 Jim Bulpitt, ‘The Discipline of the New Democracy: Mrs Thatcher’s Domestic Statecraft’, Political Studies 34, no. 1 (March 1986): 21.

4 Robert Saunders, ‘“Let Them Eat Cake”: Conservatism in the Age of Boris Johnson’, Renewal, 2022, https://renewal.org.uk/archive/vol-30-2022/conservatism-in-the-age-of-boris-johnson/

5 Tim Bale, Sacred Cows and Common Sense: The Symbolic Statecraft and Political Culture of the British Labour Party (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1999).

6 James Buller and Toby S. James, ‘Statecraft and the Assessment of National Political Leaders: The Case of New Labour and Tony Blair’, The British Journal of Politics & International Relations 14 (2012): 534–555.

7 Richard Hayton, ‘Conservative Party Statecraft and the Politics of Coalition’, Parliamentary Affairs, no. 67 (2014): 6–24.

8 Chris Byrne, Nick Randall, and Kevin Theakston, ‘Theresa May’s Disjunctive Premiership: Choice and Constraint in Political Time’, The British Journal of Politics and International Relations 23, no. 4 (November 2021): 699–716.

9 Samuel Marlow-Stevens and Richard Hayton, ‘A Rhetorical Political Analysis of Theresa May’s Statecraft on Brexit’, Parliamentary Affairs 74, no. 4 (9 September 2021): 871-889.

10 Andrew Gamble, ‘Austerity as Statecraft’, Parliamentary Affairs 68, no. 1 (1 January 2015): 42–57.

11 Joe Devanny and Philip A. Berry, ‘The Conservative Party and DFID: Party Statecraft and Development Policy since 1997’, Contemporary British History 36, no. 1 (2021): 86–123.

12 Richard Hayton, ‘Conservative Party Statecraft and the Johnson Government’, The Political Quarterly 92, no. 3 (July 2021): 412–419.

13 Jonathan Bradbury, ‘Jim Bulpitt’s Territory and Power in the United Kingdom and Interpreting Political Development: Bringing the State and Temporal Analysis Back In’, Government and Opposition 45, no. 3 (2010): 318–344.

14 Toby S. James, ‘Neo-Statecraft Theory, Historical Institutionalism and Institutional Change’, Government and Opposition 51, no. 1 (January 2016): 84–110.

15 Devanny and Berry, ‘The Conservative Party and DFID’.

16 Tim Bale, Sacred Cows and Common Sense: The Symbolic Statecraft and Political Culture of the British Labour Party (Aldershot: Ashgate, 1999): 15.

17 David Butler and Uwe W. Kitzinger, The 1975 Referendum (London: Macmillan, 1976).

18 David Baker, Andrew Gamble, and Steve Ludlam, ‘Whips or Scorpions? The Maastricht Vote and the Conservative Party’, Parliamentary Affairs 46, no. 2 (April 1993): 151–166.

19 Tim Bale, The Conservative Party: From Thatcher to Cameron (Cambridge: Polity, 2010).

20 Agnès Alexandre‐Collier, ‘From Rebellion to Extinction: Where Have All the Tory Remainer MPs Gone?’, The Political Quarterly 91, no. 1 (January 2020): 24–30.

21 Tim Bale, The Conservative Party after Brexit: Turmoil and Transformation (Cambridge, UK ; Hoboken, NJ: Polity Press, 2023).

22 Robert Saunders, ‘How Do We Write the History of Brexit?’, The Political Quarterly (2023), 1-7.

23 Matthew Smith, ‘Boris Johnson Holds Commanding Lead among Tory Members’, YouGov, 2019, https://yougov.co.uk/topics/politics/articles-reports/2019/05/17/boris-johnson-holds-commanding-lead-among-tory-mem

24 Jim Waterson, ‘Pro-Boris Johnson Campaign Launched by Guido Fawkes Blogger’, The Guardian, 2019, https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2019/may/28/pro-boris-johnson-campaign-launched-by-guido-fawkes-blogger

25 Tom Newton Dunn, ‘I Back Boris: Donald Trump Wades into Tory Leadership Race Saying Boris Johnson Would Do a “Very Good Job”’, The Sun, 2019, https://www.thesun.co.uk/news/9196164/donald-trump-boris-johnson-prime-minister-uk-visit/

26 Boris Johnson, ‘Please Check out My Campaign Launch Video. Time to Deliver Brexit and Unite Our Fantastic Country. I Hope You Will Support Me > @BackBoris #BackBoris’, Twitter, 2019, https://twitter.com/BorisJohnson/status/1135463459045466112?s=20

27 BBC, ‘Tory Leadership: Final 10 Contenders Named in Race to No 10’, BBC, 2019, https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-48584011

28 YouGov, ‘YouGov Survey Results’, YouGov, 2019, https://docs.cdn.yougov.com/4hcjqxi3xm/InternalResults_190618_ConMembers_Brexit_w.pdf

29 Karine Tournier-Sol, ‘From UKIP to the Brexit Party: The Politicization of European Integration and Disruptive Impact on National and European Arenas’, Journal of Contemporary European Studies 29, no. 3 (3 July 2021): 380–390.

30 Michael Savage, ‘Brexit Party Tops Westminster Election Poll for First Time’, The Guardian, 2019, https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2019/jun/01/brexit-party-nigel-farage-lead-opinion-poll-conservatives-opinium

31 Rowena Mason and Jessica Elgot, ‘Boris Johnson: Tories Must Deliver Brexit or Face Extinction’, The Guardian, 2019, https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2019/jun/04/boris-johnson-tories-must-deliver-brexit-or-face-extinction

32 Chris Curtis, ‘Boris Johnson Holds His 48 Point Lead in the Conservative Leadership Election’, YouGov, 2019, https://yougov.co.uk/topics/politics/articles-reports/2019/07/06/boris-johnson-holds-his-48-point-lead-conservative

33 Nicholas Allen, ‘Those Who Wear the Crown Wield the Knife: The Brutality of Recent Takeover Reshuffles’, The Political Quarterly 94, no. 1 (January 2023): 36–44.

34 10 Downing Street, ‘Prime Minister Boris Johnson Hosts People’s PMQs 14/8/19’, Video platform, YouTube, 2019, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Lg01im2yuJM

35 Rowena Mason, ‘Brexit: Leaked Papers Predict Food Shortages and Port Delays’, The Guardian, 2019, https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2019/aug/18/brexit-leaked-papers-predict-food-shortages-and-port-delays-operation-yellowhammer

36 Andrew Sparrow, ‘Jeremy Corbyn Says He Will Try to “politically Stop” Prorogation with Legislation – as It Happened’, The Guardian, 2019, https://www.theguardian.com/politics/live/2019/aug/29/backlash-after-boris-johnson-prorogues-parliament-ahead-of-brexit-live-news

37 Agnès Alexandre‐Collier, ‘From Rebellion to Extinction: Where Have All the Tory Remainer MPs Gone?’, The Political Quarterly 91, no. 1 (January 2020): 24–30.

38 BBC, ‘Brexit: PM Sends Letter to Brussels Seeking Further Delay’, BBC, 2019, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-50112924

39 BBC, ‘Parliament Suspension: Angry Commons Exchanges as MPs Return to Work’, BBC, 2019, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-49826524

40 Channel 4 News, ‘Boris Johnson Launches Conservative Party Election Campaign’, Video platform, YouTube, 2019, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1Lb_8rk6tyE

41 Conservative Party, ‘The Conservative and Unionist Party Manifesto 2019’, 2019, https://www.conservatives.com/our-plan/conservative-party-manifesto-2019

42 Interviews conducted with Conservative MPs in Spring and Autumn 2023 and Winter 2023/2024.

43 Louise Thompson, ‘From Minority Government to Parliamentary Stalemate: Why Election 2019 Was Needed to Break the Brexit Logjam’, Parliamentary Affairs 73, no. Supplement 1 (2020): 48–64.

44 Robert Ford et al., ‘The Man Who Wasn’t There: Labour Under Corbyn’, in The British General Election of 2019 (Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2021).

45 Labour Party, ‘Labour Party Manifesto 2019’, 2019, https://labour.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/Real-Change-Labour-Manifesto-2019.pdf

46 IPSOS, ‘When It Comes to Brexit, What Do You Think the Government’s Priority Should Be?’, 2019, https://yougov.co.uk/topics/politics/survey-results/daily/2019/10/29/60c8e/1

47 John Curtice, ‘General Election 2019: How Popular Are the Party Leaders?’, BBC, 2019, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/election-2019-50403154

48 Dominic Wring and Stephen Ward, ‘From Bad to Worse? The Media and the 2019 Election Campaign’, Parliamentary Affairs 73, no. Supplement 1 (1 September 2020): 272–287.

49 Robert Ford et al., ‘Rebuilding the Ship at Sea: The Conservatives’, in The British General Election of 2019 (Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2021), 69–106.

50 Jacob Jarvis, ‘Boris Johnson Hails New Parliament as “a Vast Improvement” and Vows Not to Waste Time as MPs Return to Commons’, The Evening Standard, 2019, https://www.standard.co.uk/news/politics/boris-johnson-new-parliament-westminster-house-of-commons-brexit-a4316051.html

51 10 Downing Street, ‘Prime Minister Boris Johnson’s New Year’s Message’, Video platform, YouTube, 2019, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fwYTklNu0xQ

52 BBC, ‘Coronavirus: Boris Johnson Moved to Intensive Care as Symptoms Worsen’, BBC, 2019, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-52192604

53 Luca Augé, ‘British Euroscepticism: Lessons from the Covid-19 Pandemic’, Researching Brexit Graduate Network (blog), 2020, https://researchingbrexit.wordpress.com/2020/04/29/british-euroscepticism-lessons-from-the-covid-19-pandemic/

54 James Kane, ‘Covid Vaccine Decisions Have Little to Do with Brexit’, Institute for Government, 2020, https://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/article/comment/covid-vaccine-decisions-have-little-do-brexit

55 BBC, ‘Northern Ireland Secretary Admits New Bill Will “Break International Law”’, BBC, 2020, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-politics-54073836

56 Interviews conducted with Conservative MPs in Spring and Autumn 2023 and Winter 2023/2024.

57 Interviews conducted with Conservative MPs in Spring and Autumn 2023 and Winter 2023/2024.

58 Boris Johnson, ‘Prime Minister’s Opening Statement to the House of Commons on the UK-EU Deal: 30 December 2020’ (GOV.UK, 2020), https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/prime-ministers-opening-statement-to-the-house-of-commons-on-the-uk-eu-deal-30-december-2020

59 Tim Bale, ‘Rebels with a Cause: Backbench Groups in the Parliamentary Conservative Party’, Hansard Society (blog), 2023, https://www.hansardsociety.org.uk/blog/rebels-with-a-cause-backbench-groups-in-the-parliamentary-conservative-party

60 Interviews conducted with Conservative MPs in Spring and Autumn 2023 and Winter 2023/2024.

61 Mary O’Connor, ‘Ukraine War: Boris Johnson Sparks Fury after Comparison to Brexit’, The Guardian, 2022, https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-60809454

62 Alistair Smout and Kylie Maclellan, ‘Factbox: The Many Scandals of Boris Johnson’s Premiership’, Reuters, 2022, https://www.reuters.com/world/uk/many-scandals-boris-johnsons-premiership-2022-07-06/

63 Luke Harding, Jessica Elgot, and Andrew Sparrow, ‘Accusations of Lying Pile up against Boris Johnson. Does It Matter?’, The Guardian, 2021, https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2021/apr/30/accusations-of-lying-pile-up-against-boris-johnson-does-it-matter

64 ‘Pro-Johnson Memo Circulating through the Chief Whip amongst Conservative MPs on the Day of the Vote of No Confidence’, 2022, https://www.thenational.scot/news/20188968.see-briefing-notes-tory-mps-circulating-johnson/

65 Tim Durrant, ‘Ministerial Resignations Outside Reshuffles by Prime Minister, 1979 to June 2023’, Institute for Government, 2023, https://www.instituteforgovernment.org.uk/data-visualisation/ministerial-resignations-outside-reshuffles-prime-minister

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Luca Augé, « Johnson and ‘Let’s keep Brexit done’: the instrumental use of the UK’s policy on Europe in Conservative Party management »Observatoire de la société britannique, 31 | 2024, 55-79.

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Luca Augé, « Johnson and ‘Let’s keep Brexit done’: the instrumental use of the UK’s policy on Europe in Conservative Party management »Observatoire de la société britannique [En ligne], 31 | 2024, mis en ligne le 01 juillet 2024, consulté le 07 novembre 2024. URL : http://journals.openedition.org/osb/6226 ; DOI : https://doi.org/10.4000/12ar0

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Luca Augé

Doctorant en civilisation britannique à l’Université Sorbonne Nouvelle

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