Simplex sigillum veri.
Ludwig Wittgenstein [Wien, 1889 – Cambridge (Great Britain), 1951]

“Alle Wahrheit ist einfach”. –
Ist das nicht zwiefach eine Lüge?
“All truth is simple”. –
Is this not a double lie?
Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche [Röcken, 1844 – Weimar, 1900]

0. De Dicto Truth vs. De Re Truth

0.1. Question: Of What Entities the Adjective ‘True’ Is Predicated?

1The question is ancient:

• 2  It is not inconvenient here to remind that not every word [verbum] is a name [nomen]: “Non omne ve (...)

Τί ἐστιν ἀλήθεια;
Quid est veritas?2

Quid est veritas?

3I will ask a new question:

Of what entities the adjective ‘true’ is predicated?
(What are the entities of which ‘true’ is predicated?)

0.2. Answer to the Question: The Adjective ‘True’ Is Predicated Both De Dicto and De Re

4Here is my answer. The adjective ‘true’ is predicated of heterogeneous, categorically different entities: ‘true’ is predicated

1. not only (and specifically) of dicta, of linguistic entities, of sentences,
2. but also (generically) of any entity, be it a linguistic or a non-linguistic entity.

5Two examples:

1. ‘true’ is predicated of a dictum (of a linguistic entity, of a sentence [enunciato, Satz, énoncé, zdanie]) when one asserts that the sentence ‘Snow is white’ is true (that it is a true sentence);
2. ‘true’ is predicated of a non-linguistic entity (and more precisely of a number) when one asserts that √ˉ2 is not a true number.

6To put it differently: ‘true’ can be predicated

1. both, in specie, of a dictum (of a sentence [enunciato, Satz, énoncé, zdanie]),4
2. and, in genere, of a res.

7Here is my terminological proposal.

1. For ‘true’ as a predicate of a dictum I suggested the term ‘de dicto true’.5
2. For ‘true’ as a predicate of a res I suggested the term ‘de re true’.6

8Accordingly:

1. for the truth that is predicated of a dictum I suggested the term ‘de dicto truth’;7
2. for the truth that is predicated of a res I suggested the term ‘de re truth’.

9The first part (§ 1.) of this essay (Three Paradigms for a Philosophy of the True) is devoted to de dicto truth; the second part (§ 2.) is devoted to de re truth.

1. De Dicto Truth (Apophantic Truth)

1.0. Introduction

10The present § 1. is devoted to de dicto truth

1.1. The Concept of De Dicto Truth (Apophantic Truth)

11‘De dicto true’ is a predicate which is specific of a dictum (of a λεκτόν lektón). De dicto truth is the truth that is specific of dicta (of λεκτά lektá): more precisely, of sentences [enunciati, Sätze, énoncés, zdania].

12A sentence [enunciato, Satz, énoncé, zdanie] is de dicto true if, and only if, it is in a correspondence-relation with the state-of-affairs [stato-di-cose, Sachverhalt, état-de-choses, stan rzeczy] it is about.

1.2. Three Examples of De Dicto Truth

14The adjective ‘true’ means “de dicto true” in the three following examples:

1. “The mathematical sentence ‘3 is a prime number’ is a true sentence”.
2. “The chromatic sentence ‘Snow is white’ is true if, and only if, snow is white”.
3. ‘The heliocentric theory is true’.

1.3. An Anomalous Phenomenon: Thetic De Dicto Truth

15A provocative, paradoxical case of de dicto truth is the case of thetic de dicto truth. I dub thetic truth [verità thetica, thetische Wahrheit, verité thétique, prawda tetyczna] the truth (the de dicto truth) of a sentence that is produced by the thetic utterance [enunciazione thetica, thetische Äußerung, énonciation thétique, wypowiedź tetycna] of that sentence. Four examples of thetic truth: the truth of the four following sentences

1. “Σὺ εἶ Πέτρος” “Tu es Petrus”;10
2. “La difesa della patria è sacro dovere del cittadino”
   a)   “The defense of the Fatherland is the sacred duty of every citizen”11;
3. (“Stolica˛ Rzeczypospolitej Polskiej iest Warszawa” “Warsaw shall be the capital of the Republic of Poland”;12
4. ‘Given a line and a point outside it there is exactly one line through the given point which lies in the plane of the given line and point so that the two lines do not meet’.

1.4. The Twofold Connection Between De Dicto Truth and the Linguistic Nature of an Entity in Bertrand Russell

16The thesis according to which ‘true’ is a predicate specific to linguistic entities is documented in the two following passages by Bertrand Russell [Bertrand Arthur William Russell, 3rd Earl Russell: Trellech, 1872 - Penrhyndeudraeth, 1970]:

1. “A proposition is anything that is true or that is false”.13
2. “We mean by ‘proposition’ primarily a form of words which expresses what is either true or false”.

17As can be seen, in Russell the connection between de dicto truth and the linguistic nature of an entity is twofold:

1. de dicto truth is a predicate of linguistic entities (of “forms of words”),
2. the possibility of de dicto truth (the possibility in which the Aristotelian apophantic nature of an entity consists) is constitutive of the very concept of proposition.

2. De Re Truth

2.0. Introduction

18The foregoing § 1. was devoted to de dicto truth; the present § 2. is devoted to de re truth.

2.1. De Re Truth: The Generic Concept [Gattungsbegriff]

19In contemporary analytic philosophy, de dicto truth is privileged: ‘true’ is mainly investigated as a predicate of sentences [enunciati, Sätze, énoncés, zdania].

20However, it is false that ‘true’ exclusively means “de dicto true”; it is false that ‘true’ exclusively befits dicta, sentences.

21On the contrary: the adjective ‘true’ has also other meanings: other meanings according to which it can be predicated of entities that are not sentences [enunciati, Sätze, énoncés, zdania]. It is the phenomenon of de re truth (Sachwahrheit).

2.1.1. Eight Examples of De Re Truth

22The term ‘true’ means “de re true” in the eight following examples:

1. ‘An unfalsifiable theory is not a true theory’.14
2. ‘An uncontradictable theory is not a true theory’.15
3. ‘According to Rudolf Carnap, metaphysical problems are not true problems: they are merely Scheinprobleme [apparent problems, pseudo-problems]’.16
4. ‘A question that in principle does not admit an answer is not a true question’.
5. ‘A rhetorical question is not a true question’.
6. ‘Only fulfillable obligations are true obligations’.
7. ‘A testimony given for oneself is not a true testimony’.17
8. ‘An invalid norm is not a true norm’.18

2.1.2. Three Anomalous Phenomena: The Truth of Norms, the Truth of Questions, the Truth of Names

2.1.2.0. Introduction

2.1.2.1. First Anomalous Phenomenon: The Truth of Norms

242.1.2.1.1. Firstly, it is ‘de re true’ that can be predicated of norms [norme, Normen, norms, normy], that is, anapophantic semiotic entities, i.e., semiotic entities of which ‘de dicto true’ cannot be predicated.

25Four examples:

1. ‘An invalid norm is not a true norm’.
2. ‘An unjust norm is not a true norm’.
3. ‘An inefficacious norm is not a true norm’.
4. ‘Unwritten customs are very laws’.20

262.1.2.1.2. The four aforementioned theses in terms of ‘de re true’ [‘eidologisch-wahr’] (‘An invalid norm is not a true norm’; ‘An unjust norm is not a true norm’; ‘An inefficacious norm is not a true norm’; ‘Unwritten customs are very laws’) are respectively documented in Hans Kelsen, Maximilien de Robespierre, Novalis, Thomas Hobbes.

1. “Eine nicht-geltende Norm ist keine Norm”. “A non-valid norm is not a norm [ist keine Norm]”. (Hans Kelsen)
2. “Toute loi qui viole les droits imprescriptibles de l’homme, est essentiellement injuste et tyrannique; elle n’est point une loi”. “Every law that violates the imprescriptible rights of man is essentially unjust and tyrannical: it is not a law [n’est point une loi]”. (Maximilien de Robespierre)
3. “Ein Gesetz ist seinem Begriffe nach, wirksam. Ein unwirksames Gesetz ist kein Gesetz”. “A law is effective [wirksam] by virtue of its own eîdos [εἶδος] (by virtue of the eîdos [εἶδος] of a law) [seinem Begriffe nach]. An ineffective law [ein unwirksames Gesetz] is not a law [ist kein Gesetz]”. (Novalis [Friedrich Leopold von Hardenberg])
4. “Unwritten customs are very laws”. (Thomas Hobbes)

2.1.2.2 Second Anomalous Phenomenon: The Truth of Questions

27Secondly, it is ‘de re true’ that can be predicated of questions [domande, Fragen, questions, pytania]. (Questions, just like norms, are semiotic entities of which ‘de dicto true’ cannot be predicated.)

28Two examples:

1. ‘A question that in principle admits of no answer is not a true question’.
2. ‘A rhetorical question [domanda retorica, rhetorische Frage, question rhétorique, pytanie retoryczne] is not a true question’.

2.1.2.3. Third Anomalous Phenomenon: The Truth of Names

29Thirdly, it is ‘de re true’ that can be predicated of names [nomi, Namen, noms, nazwy].

30Four examples:

1. ‘Novalis’ true name is ‘Georg Friedrich Philipp (vel Leopold) Freiherr von Hardenberg’’.
2. ‘Mozart’s true second name is not ‘Amadeus’, it is ‘Gottlieb’’.21
3. ‘Tarski’s true surname is ‘Tajtelbaum’’.
4. “All Adelasters are provisional names, to be abandoned as soon as the true names of the plants so called can be ascertained”.22

2.1.3. A Paradoxical Phenomenon: The Truth of the Truth

31Paradoxically, ‘true’ can be predicated of the truth [verità, Wahrheit, verité, prawda] itself.

32Three examples, in three different languages: English, German, Arabic. In these examples ‘true’ <or its synonym ‘very’> with the meaning of “de re true” is predicated of the truth itself (“very truth”, “true truth”).

1. ‘True’ is predicated of truth in an English-speaking author: Nathaniel Hawthorne. In Hawthorne appears the expression: ‘the very truth’.
2. ‘True’ is predicated of truth [Wharheit] in a German-speaking author: Friedrich Hölderlin. In Hölderlin appears the expression: ‘die wahrste Wahrheit’, ‘the truest truth’.
3. ‘True’ is predicated of truth [haqq] in a Jewish Arab-speaking author: Ya‘qūb [Abū Yūsuf Ya‘qūb] al‑Qirqisānī. In Ya‘qūb al‑Qirqisānī appears the expression: ‘haqq haqīqī’, ‘true truth’.23

“Verloren sei uns der Tag, wo nicht ein Mal getanzt wurde!
Und falsch heiße jede Wahrheit, bei der es nicht ein Gelächter gab!”
“We should consider every day lost on which we have not danced at least once.
And we should call every truth [Wahrheit] false [falsch] which was not accompanied by at least one laugh!”

2.2. De Re Truth: Two Species (Eidological Truth, Idiological Truth)

34In the course of my research, I have distinguished two species of de re truth:

1. eidological truth [verità eidologica, eidologische Wahrheit, verité eidologique, prawda eidologiczna];
2. idiological truth [verità idiologica, idiologische Wahrheit, verité idiologique, prawda idiologiczna].

35To the first species of de re truth, eidological truth, is devoted § 2.2.1.; to the second species of de re truth, idiological truth, is devoted § 2.2.2.

2.2.1. The First Species of De Re Truth: Eidological De Re Truth

2.2.1.1. The Concept of Eidological Truth

36In § 1.1. I have introduced the concept of de dicto truth. I now turn to the concept of eidological truth [verità eidologica, eidologische Wahrheit, verité eidologique, prawda eidologiczna].

37‘Eidologically-true’ [‘eidologisch-wahr’] (unlike ‘de dicto true’, see § 1.) is not specifically predicated of sentences: it generically applies to any entity.

38Definition of eidological truth: An entity x is an eidologically-true y if, and only if, x corresponds to the eîdos [εἶδος] of y.

2.2.1.2 Seven Examples of Eidological Truth

39The term ‘true’ <or its synonym ‘very’> means “eidologically-true” in the following seven examples:

1. ‘A theory that cannot be falsified is not a true theory.’25
2. ‘A theory that cannot be contradicted is not a true theory.’
3. ‘Astrology (unlike astronomy) is not a true science (it is a false science).’26
4. ‘White is not a true colour.’
5. ‘Irrational numbers are not true numbers.’
6. ‘Unwritten customs are very laws.’27
7. ‘Nur das ist die wahrste Wahrheit, in der auch der Irrtum zur Wahrheit wird.’28 ‘Only that is the truest truth [die wahrste Wahrheit], in which even error becomes truth [Wahrheit].’

2.2.1.3. Relationship Between Eidological Truth and De Dicto Truth (Apophantic Truth)

40I now raise a question: What is the relationship between eidologically-true and de dicto true? (What is the relationship between eidological truth and de dicto truth?)

41I answer the question. Like de dicto truth, also eidological truth (§ 2.1.) is correspondence, Entsprechung.

42The difference between de dicto truth and eidological truth lies in the point of reference of the correspondence relation:

1. de dicto truth is correspondence of a sentence [enunciato, Satz, énoncé, zdanie] to a state-of-affairs [stato-di-cose, Sachverhalt, état-de-choses, stan rzeczy]; and precisely, correspondence of a sentence to the state-of-affairs on which that sentence relates;
2. eidological truth is correspondence of an entity to an eîdos [εἶδος]: an x is an eidologically-true y if, and only if, x corresponds to the eîdos [εἶδος] of y. (An example: A member of the teaching staff of a University is an eidologically-true university professor if, and only if, he corresponds to the eîdos [εἶδος] of the university professor.)

43The distinction between de dicto truth and eidological truth has been introduced in Amedeo Giovanni Conte, Deontica aristotelica (1992), through a simple juxtaposition.

1. On the one hand, when one says: ‘The etymologies made by Plato in the dialogue Cratylus are not true etymologies’ one denies that those Platonic etymologies correspond to the eîdos [εἶδος] of etymology: one therefore denies their eidological truth.
2. On the other hand, when one says: ‘The etymology of étymos [ἔτυμος] documented in Johann Baptist Hofmann is not true’, one denies the correspondence of that etymology to reality: one, therefore, denies its de dicto truth.

44In both examples the adjective ‘true’ is referred to the substantive ‘etymology’. However, the adjective ‘true’ has not the same meaning in the two sentences:

1. in the first of the two examples (in the example of the etymologies made by Plato in the Cratylus: ‘The etymologies made by Plato in the dialogue Cratylus are not true etymologies’), ‘true’ means “eidologically-true” [“eidologisch-wahr”];
2. in the second of the two examples (in the example of the etymology of étymos [ἔτυμος] mentioned by Johann Baptist Hofmann: ‘The etymology of étymos [ἔτυμος] documented in Johann Baptist Hofmann is not true’), ‘true’ means “de dicto true”.

2.2.2. The Second Species of De Re Truth: Idiological De Re Truth

2.2.2.1. The concept of idiological truth

48The difference between eidological truth and idiological truth can be formulated as follows:

1. eidological truth [eidologische Wahrheit] is correspondence of an entity to an eîdos [εἶδος];
2. idiological truth [idiologische Wahrheit] is identity to (identity with) an ídion [ἴδιον], to an individual entity.

2.2.2.2. Four Examples of Idiological Truth

49Here are four examples of idiological truth.

1. ‘The true name of Novalis is ‘Friedrich Leopold von Hardenberg’.’
2. ‘Erik the Red32 is the true discoverer of America.’
3. ‘The true cause of Napoleone’s death was not poisoning but cancer.’
4. ‘Alfred Tarski’s true surname is ‘Tajtelbaum’.’

2.2.2.3. Exemplifying the Difference Between Eidological Truth and Idiological Truth

50What is the relationship between the two species of de re truth (eidological truth and idiological truth)?

51Eidological truth [verità eidologica, eidologische Wahrheit, verité eidologique, prawda eidologiczna] consists in a correspondence relationship to an eîdos [εἶδος]; idiological truth [verità idiologica, idiologische Wahrheit, verité idiologique, prawda idiologiczna] consists not in a relationship of correspondence, but rather in a relationship of identity.

52I will clarify the difference between eidological truth and idiological truth by comparing the terms of the following two pairs of examples.

2.2.2.3.1. First Pair of Examples

vs.

54‘The true cause of Napoleone’s death was not poisoning but cancer.’

55In both sentences occurs the phrase ‘true cause’. But the adjective ‘true’ does not have the same meaning in the two sentences:

1. in the first of the two sentences (‘Aristotle’s ‘causa formalis’ is not a true cause’), ‘true’ has an eidological meaning (“eidologically-true” [“eidologisch-wahr]);
2. in the second of the two sentences (‘The true cause of Napoleone’s death was not poisoning but cancer’), ‘true’ has an idiological meaning (“idiologically-true” [“idiologisch-wahr”]);

2.2.2.3.2. Second Pair of Examples

vs.

57‘Alfred Tarski’s true surname is ‘Tajtelbaum.’

58In both examples occurs the phrase ‘true surname’. But the adjective ‘true’ does not have the same meaning in the two examples:

1. in the first of the two sentences (‘A surname consisting of only one letter is not a true surname.’), ‘true’ means “eidologically-true” meaning [“eidologisch-wahr];
2. in the second of the two sentences (‘Alfred Tarski’s true surname is ‘Tajtelbaum’’), ‘true’ means idiologically-true [idiologisch-wahr];

2.2.2.4. Testing My Differentiation of the Concepts of Eidological Truth and Idiological Truth

59The difference between eidological truth (§ 2.2.1.) and idiological truth (§ 2.2.2.) explains why there is no inconsistency in the following example (concerning the history of geographical explorations):

‘Erik the Red [Eiríkr Rauði] is the true discoverer of America, but his discovery was not a true discovery; instead, a true discovery is the one made by Christopher Columbus’.

60There is no inconsistency, because in this example ‘true’ (that occurs three times) has two meanings: in particular:

1. ‘true’ means “idiologically-true” in the first of the three occurrences;
2. ‘true’ means “eidologically-true” in the second and the third occurrences.

3. Tres Vidi. Unity and Trinity in the Philosophy of the True

18:1 The Lord [Biblia hebraica: YHWH; Septuaginta: ὁ θεός; Vulgata: Dominus] appeared to Abraham by the oak of Mamre […].

18:2 Looking up, he saw three men [Biblia hebraica: š^elōšāh ^anāšîm; Septuaginta: τρεῖς ἄνδρες; Vulgata: tres viri] standing near him. […]

18:3 [h]e ran to greet them; and […] he said: “Sir [Biblia hebraica: Ădōnāj; Septuaginta:Κύριε; Vulgata: Domine], if it please you, do not go on past [non passar oltre] your [il tuo]servant.

18:4 “Let [Lasciate] some water be brought, that you may bathe your [lavatevi] feet, and then rest [riposatevi] […].”

18:5 “Now that you have come [voi siete passati] to your [vostro] servant […]; and afterward you may go on [continuerete] your [vostro] way.”

18:9 “Where is your wife Sarah?” they [essi] asked him. “There in the tent,” he replied.

18:10 One of them [E l’altro] said: “I will return to you about this time next year, and Sarah will then have a son.”

Tres vidi et unum adoravit.

613.1. Tres vidi. Three are the phenomena that I have seen (correlatively, three are the species concepts [concetti di specie] that I have distinguished within the genus concept [concetto di genere, Gattungsbegriff]: truth):

1. first species: de dicto truth;
2. second species: eidological truth;
3. third species: idiological truth.

623.2. Tres vidi. But (I will say, exemplifying Augustine of Hippo, De trinitate, 2:4) unum adoravi: the concept of truth [verità, Wahrheit, vérité, prawda] in general, the concept of truth tout court (without any qualifications).

 

633.3. Tres vidi. But one is the truth. And one is the truth (the de dicto truth) of any discourse on truth (“Veritas veritatis non est adversa”: Peter Abelard).

64One is the truth; but triune is the philosophy of the truth, a philosophy that is articulated into three philosophies:

1. the philosophy of de dicto truth;
2. the philosophy of eidological truth;
3. the philosophy of idiological truth.

65The Roman historian Publius Cornelius Tacitus [c. AD 57 – c. 120] writes:

• 37  Publius Cornelius Tacitus, Historiae, 5.9. English translation in Complete Works of Tacitus, trans (...)

Romanorum primus Cn. Pompeius Iudaeos domuit templumque iure victoriae ingressus est; inde volgatum nulla intus deum effigie vacuam sedem et inania arcana.
Cneius Pompeius was the first of our countrymen to subdue the Jews. Availing himself of the right of conquest, he entered the temple. Thus, it became commonly known that the place stood empty with no similitude of gods within, and that the shrine had nothing to reveal.37

1. empty, as still is the eye of the hurricane;
2. empty, as desert of images is the blind spot on the retina;39
3. empty, as dark is the heart of a flame.