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Asclepius of Tralles’ Infinite Regress Argument Against the Generation of Forms in Aristotle’s Met. Z 8 1033a34-1033b5

Marilù Papandreou
p. 63-88

Abstracts

In Metaphysics Z 8 Aristotle offers an infinite regress argument to deny that forms come to be. Briefly put, the argument states that, if we assume that every time an x composed of matter (m1) and form (f1) comes to be, f1 also comes to be, then there would be infinitely many xs coming to be – for f1 would itself be a compound, if it comes to be, and the same reasoning would in turn apply to it. This argument has great significance in the history of philosophy, for some later thinkers take Aristotle to allow or make room for the creation ex nihilo of forms. However, the only direct Greek engagement with this argument in its proper context is provided by Asclepius of Tralles’ commentary on Book Z. A close study of Asclepius’ interpretation shows that he endorsed the argument on the tacit condition that it refers to the forms αὐτὰ καθαὑτά as different from both Platonic Ideas and enmattered forms. At the same time, however, its elaboration includes alongside forms αὐτὰ καθαὑτά also eternal separate forms and generated forms. His reconstruction also displays a sophisticated toning-down of the potential disagreements between Plato and Aristotle on the conception of pre-existing form which is assumed in the argument. Asclepius’ interpretation offers yet further proof of the commentators’ camouflaged and stratified way of tackling philosophical issues of paramount importance.

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Excerpt

Full text document will be published online on December 2024.

Outline

Introduction
1. The Infinite Regress Argument Against the Generation of Forms in Aristotle
2. Asclepius’ λέξις of the Argument
3. Asclepius’ Original Contribution in the θεωρία of the Argument
3.1. Forms αὐτὰ καθ’ αὑτά
3.2. Eternal Forms
3.3. Enmattered Forms
4. Conclusions

First lines

Introduction

In Metaphysics Z 8 Aristotle offers an infinite regress argument to deny that forms come to be. Briefly put, the argument states that if we assume that every time an x composed of matter (m1) and form (f1) comes to be, f1 also comes to be, there would be infinitely many xs coming to be – for f1 would itself be a compound, if it comes to be, and the same reasoning would in turn apply to it. This argument has great significance in the history of philosophy, for some later thinkers take Aristotle to allow or make room for the creation ex nihilo of forms.

As Sorabji (1983, p. 245) explains, an infinite regress argument is traditionally taken to argue against the beginning of the universe by explaining it without recourse to theological considerations. The argument is often based on the principle that nothing comes out of nothing, or nothing comes to be from what in no way and manner is. For this reason, an infinite regress argument is a major philosophical tool to deny creati...

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References

Bibliographical reference

Marilù Papandreou, Asclepius of Tralles’ Infinite Regress Argument Against the Generation of Forms in Aristotle’s Met. Z 8 1033a34-1033b5Philosophie antique, 23 | 2023, 63-88.

Electronic reference

Marilù Papandreou, Asclepius of Tralles’ Infinite Regress Argument Against the Generation of Forms in Aristotle’s Met. Z 8 1033a34-1033b5Philosophie antique [Online], 23 | 2023, Online since 01 December 2024, connection on 07 October 2024. URL: http://journals.openedition.org/philosant/7546; DOI: https://doi.org/10.4000/philosant.7546

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About the author

Marilù Papandreou

Universitetet i Bergen / Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin

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Copyright

CC-BY-NC-ND-4.0

The text only may be used under licence CC BY-NC-ND 4.0. All other elements (illustrations, imported files) are “All rights reserved”, unless otherwise stated.

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