Mental Models, Model-theoretic Semantics, and the Psychosemantic Conception of Truth
Notes de l’auteur
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to Shira Elqayam, School of Psychology, University of Plymouth, Drake circus, Plymouth, PL8 4AA, UK, e-mail: selqayam@plymouth.ac.uk.
This article is partially based on discussions from a Ph.D. dissertation approved by the senate of Tel-Aviv University. I thank Shulamith Kreitler for her inspiring guidance of the dissertation and her comments on it. I also thank Jonathan Evans and Simon Handley for many enlightening discussions.
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Shira Elqayam, « Mental Models, Model-theoretic Semantics, and the Psychosemantic Conception of Truth », Philosophia Scientiæ, 9-2 | 2005, 259-278.
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Shira Elqayam, « Mental Models, Model-theoretic Semantics, and the Psychosemantic Conception of Truth », Philosophia Scientiæ [En ligne], 9-2 | 2005, mis en ligne le 15 juin 2011, consulté le 05 juillet 2022. URL : http://journals.openedition.org/philosophiascientiae/544 ; DOI : https://doi.org/10.4000/philosophiascientiae.544
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