• 1 Adaptation of the sentence « Sed quis custodiet ipsos custodes ? », Juvénal, Satires, book 6, lines (...)
• 2 Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State, Harvard University Press, 1957.
• 3 Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait, Glencoe - Illinois, Fre (...)
• 4 Peter D. Feaver, Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight and Civil-Military Relations, Harvard University (...)

1In the late 1980s and during the 1990s, the successive governments of Central European countries implemented several reforms to establish civil and democratic control over the military. Several studies have been made regarding this topic. In his seminal institutional work, Samuel P. Huntington states that “objective control” can allow the civilian authority to maintain control over the military. This “objective control”, in contrast to the “subjective one”, means that civilians determine the objectives but leave it to the military to implement it. Furthermore, the military must accept the boundaries of their professional roles and adopt a professional ethos, which mean a minimal intervention in politics2. In his works, Morris Janowitz agrees with Huntington that there are distinct political and military spheres. However, he developed a theory of convergence in which the aim is not to control the distinction between the two, but to diminish it by infusing the more conservative military world with the more liberal values and norms of the society thanks to conscription and reserve programs. By reducing the difference between the two worlds, the civilian authorities would be able to control the military3. In a different view, Peter D. Feaver explains the civil control over the military thanks to a principal-agent theory. In this perspective, the principal, which is the civilian authority, ensures its superiority over the subordinate, the military, thanks to methods of control for the executive and legislative branches such as inspections, reports, control of the budget or hearings4.

• 5 Interviews with Andrzej Towpik and Jaroslav Šedivý (list of interviews at the end of the article).
• 6 Rachel A. Epstein, « NATO Enlargement and the Spread of Democracy: Evidences and Expectations », Se (...)
• 7 Ibid.
• 8 Alexandra Gheciu, « Security Institutions as Agents of Socialization? NATO and the New Europe », In (...)

2Regarding the specific issue of civil control of the military in Central Europe, some researchers link this theme to joining NATO while others have favored endogenous dynamics. In fact, joining the Atlantic Alliance is conditional upon specific items: respect for democratic and liberal values, civil control over the military embodied in legal norms, starting by Constitutions, security strategies and military forces being able to fulfill the duties of NATO member-state. However, no chapter of the negotiations between NATO and those countries dealt with the establishment of civil and democratic control5. The studies that give this role to NATO are characterized by a certain normativity: they affirm that the reformers in Central Europe had to learn what “true democracy” was. They postulate that the reforms undertaken in the early 1990s were an “early compliance, and even overcompliance, with NATO norms”6. This perspective ignores that NATO standards were first formally defined by the publication of the Enlargement Study in September 1995, which prevented any conformity with the reforms undertaken by the candidate countries in the early 1990s. This perspective also leads to underestimating7, even ignoring endogenous dynamics that allowed the establishment of a democratic framework for the control of the armed forces8.

• 9 Jeffrey Simon, Hungary and NATO: Problems in Civil-Military Relations, New York: Rowman and Littlef (...)
• 10 Several interviewees underlined the quality of Jeffrey Simon's works (interviews with Janusz Onyszk (...)

3Other works consider the establishment of civil and democratic control from the angle of endogenous dynamics. In his three studies on Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic, Jeffrey Simon endeavors to show the formal and institutional aspects leading to the democratic control of the army more than the dynamics of appropriation of norms and practices. Following this understanding of events, he forges an interpretative and comparative framework defining the democratic control of the armed forces9. According to Jeffrey Simon, this can be achieved thanks to: 1) a Constitution or a fundamental law which clearly divides authority and competencies between the President and the government, which is of utmost importance when they are from different political parties; 2) a supervision of the Parliament, which must vote on the military budget and includes a commission in charge of national defense, including competence to control the staff of the Ministry of Defense; 3) a peacetime oversight of general staff though civilian defense ministries; and 4) the restoration of the prestige and responsibility of the army. This common framework facilitates comparison and has the merit of pointing out the essential clauses. These are easily identifiable, apart from the restoration of the prestige of the army, which is subject to less in-depth treatment in his studies. However, this framework does not point out certain elements such as the effects of the communist heritage or the need for a political consensus to avoid having the army play the role of arbiter or act in a praetorian role10.

• 11 Anthony Forster, Timothy Edmunds et Andrew Cottey, « Introduction: The Challenge of Democratic Cont (...)
• 12 Ibid., p. 6.
• 13 Ibid., p. 8.
• 14 Ibid., p. 9.

4The necessary factors to implement democratic control of the civilian over the military are not the same in Anthony Forster, Timothy Edmunds and Andrew Cottey’s works. They first point to the positive and negative legacies of communism. Under this type of regime, the political authorities had certain powers such as that of declaring war and had a political control over the armies. On the other hand, the military had the autonomy to implement the technical aspects of defense policy, which caused a lack of competent personnel after the transition. Finally, the authors note that even if the non-Soviet states of the Warsaw Pact had the similar challenge of restructuring an already existing army, they apprehended it in a different way because they had a divergent experience of communism11. The authors also insist on the need to strictly define what democratic and civil control means. Indeed, democratic control or civilian control are often used interchangeably. However, it is only in the case of democratic control that the army is apolitical and not involved in politics, that defense policy is supervised by civil and democratic authorities, as is the decision on the use of force12. The authors add that the implementation of democratic and civil control must be the subject of a consensus within the political class in order to prevent the politicization of the army or its intervention in a praetorian way13. To build this consensus, a clear division of powers between the three branches of government must be made. Parliament must control the army alongside the executive but also supervise the use made of it by the executive. Finally, civil society, through research institutes, the media and non-governmental organizations, is key to allowing the existence of a debate on defense policy14.

• 15 Ibid., p. 10-14.

5Based on these items, the authors state that the reforms to implement civil and democratic control are influenced by the historical heritage and the political, social and economic context. A so-called weak state prey to social, political, or ethnic divisions or economic recession can succumb to praetorianism, the army declaring itself the guarantor of unity or the interests of a particular class. In terms of external factors, the desire to join a community can influence policies by creating pressure to adapt, while the existence of an external threat can increase the role of the army. Finally, the military culture and the professionalism of the armed forces must be taken into consideration. It means that the armies must accept civil and democratic control as well as new training and working standards15.

• 16 On the transfer of norms and values, see: Pierre Lascoumes and Patrick Le Galès (Eds), Gouverner pa (...)

7To understand how the civil and democratic control was implemented in those three countries, the article will be based on three hypotheses. The first hypothesis considers that NATO played a major role in the dynamics of establishing civilian and democratic control over the military. Indeed, the Central European countries, as candidates for NATO membership, had to comply with the standards promoted by this organization. The second hypothesis posits that NATO did not play a major role in establishing civilian and democratic control over the military. While the Alliance promotes liberal and democratic values and the rule of law, it does not have the tools to enable the transfer of norms and values16. Hence the civil and democratic control over the military was mainly implemented thanks to domestic processes. The third hypothesis concerns the absence of a recent democratic tradition in these countries. In this perspective, the authoritarian communist heritage would have created hindrances to the proper understanding and effective implementation of the principle of civilian and democratic control over the military, leading to tensions between political actors, and between the military and political fields.

• 17 The interviews were conducted in French (Jan Eichler and Karel Kovanda) and Polish (Luboš Dobrovsky (...)
• 18 Samy Cohen, L’art d’interviewer les dirigeants, Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 1999.

10Drawing on a qualitative approach, this paper is based on data from a number of different sources. Semi-structured interviews17 were conducted with actors during fieldwork in Hungary, Poland and the Czech Republic, primarily with members of the administrations who have contributed to the implementation of civil and democratic control over the military. Most of the members of the diplomatic spheres were willing to give interviews because they provide an opportunity to distance themselves from a policy, and to testify that options are possible and have been considered. It is also an opportunity to impose a narrative and not let other points of view prevail. Finally, it can be used as a proof to demonstrate the openness of the elite as well as its transparency18. To balance out these interviews, other sources were used such as governmental/ministerial documents, speeches, and press releases.

• 20 Interviews with Karel Kovanda et Longin Pastusiak.

13However, the principle of civilian control over the military was misunderstood by several political actors. Some believed that having a civilian instead of a military actor as Minister of Defense was enough to achieve this goal20 :

• 23 Dale Herspring, « Refolution in Eastern Europe: The Polish, Czech, Slovak and Hungarian Militaries  (...)
• 24 J. Onyszkiewicz relates an anecdote: during the Soviet-American negotiations on the reduction of ar (...)
• 25 Rudolf Joo, « Le contrôle démocratique des forces armées : l’exemple de la Hongrie », Cahiers de Ch (...)

15The objective was then to abolish the communist party’s control of the armies by dissolving its cells, by abolishing political posts within the army and by prohibiting any political or ideological discrimination against non-communists. This phase was largely supported by the military who felt they were thus freed from ideological constraints23. Finally, a last problem was posed by the weakness of civilian experts in defense and security. The communist elites as well as those from the dissidence had major shortcomings in this area24. The large majority of the civil servants in the new administrations were not chosen on the basis of their quality as specialists in defense policy. Rather, they were administrators or technicians with legal training25. However, during the 1990s, civilian experts gradually emerged: Petr Nečas in the Czech Republic, Rudolf Joó in Hungary, Jerzy Szmajdziński, Bronislaw Komorowski and Janusz Onyszkiewicz in Poland. All occupied positions within the defense commission of their parliaments or as Ministers of Defence.

• 26 Michael Zantovsky, Vaclav Havel, une vie, Paris, Buchet-Chastel, 2014, p. 466.

16The first initiatives to establish civil and democratic control were not made by democratic governments but by the last communist government in Hungary and the transitional government resulting from the Round Table agreements in Poland. In fact, these reforms were introduced even though the Soviet coercive structures, the Warsaw Pact and the COMECON, had not yet been dissolved. It was only in Czechoslovakia that the first reforms were not made by reformist or transitional governments. In fact, the transition was not obtained by negotiation between the communist elite and the democratic opposition, as in Hungary and Poland, but as the result of the Velvet Revolution. After the revolution, the Minister of Defense was a communist, General Miroslav Vacek. He only remained in office for a few months and was sacked after his involvement in Operation ZASAH, a military operation, whose goal was to crush the Velvet Revolution, was discovered. Because of this, a certain mistrust persisted against the army and during the first months of the transition, the question of a possible coup was raised by President Vaclav Havel during daily meetings with his counsellors26.

• 27 J. Simon J., Hungary and NATO, op. cit., p. 8-15 and Z. Barany, Hungary: An Outpost of a Troubled P (...)
• 28 Zoltan Barany, « Hungary : An Outpost on a Troubled Periphery », Ibid. p. 91.
• 29 Jeffrey Simon, Hungary and NATO, op. cit., p. 15.

17In Hungary, the first changes were implemented by the government of Miklós Németh (May 1988-May 1990). The first secretary of the party lost his powers of control over the general staff to the benefit of the Prime Minister. The powers of the National Assembly were increased: it acquired the right to declare war, the state of emergency and to control the defense council, which supervised military operations in times of war. Laws authorizing the creation of trade unions were created in 1991 and 1995. However, these reforms were not made in a democratic state of mind. The goal was to subordinate the general staff to the president. Indeed, the communists had imagined the following scenario: in case of the victory of the democratic opposition in the legislative elections, the army would remain under the control of the Hungarian Communist Party because it was expected that the presidential election would be won by the reformist communist leader Imre Poszgay27. This led to paradoxical situations: a delegation from the ministry and another one from the general staff visited Sweden separately and did not notice each other28. This division of competencies also meant that the Minister of Defense did not have control of the military academies, and therefore of the training of the armies, but dealt above all with social, budgetary and political problems such as relations with Parliament or the housing of military29.

• 30 Ibid., p. 9.

18In Poland, the first reforms were made during the period following the Round Table agreements. It resulted in a division of power between the democratic opposition represented by Solidarność and the reformist branch of the Communist Party. This division of power, summed up by Adam Michnik's formula, "Our government, your president", gave the Communists the functions of ministers of the Interior and of Defense as well as the presidency which fell to General Wojciech Jaruzelski. The Parliament gained control of oversight in defence policies, notably with the formation a specialized commission. A process of depoliticization was also initiated: the National Defense Committee (KOK) was no longer controlled by the first secretary of the Communist party but by the president and was open to the presidents of the two chambers as well as to the ministers30.

• 31 Ibid.,
• 32 A. Capelle-Pogocean et C. Gousseff, « Hongrie », in P. Michel (Dir.), L’Europe médiane au cœur de l (...)
• 33 P. Dunay, « Civil-Military Relations in Hungary: No Big Deal », in A. Forster, T. Edmunds and A. Co (...)
• 34 J. Simon, Hungary and NATO, op. cit., p. 36.

20The first democratic governments continued the reforms initiated by the communist and transitional governments. In Hungary, the democratic opposition won the elections in December 1989. The first non-Communist government was led by the leader of the Hungarian Democratic Forum MDF, József Antall. It deepens the reforms of the previous government. A minister without a portfolio was given the task of supervising the action of the secret services31. The Ministry of Defense was demilitarized and members of the Hungarian Democratic Forum party (MDF) replaced the soldiers who had been in function until then. In fact, demilitarization led to a process of politicization of the ministry32. The powers of the National Assembly were reinforced: it defined the priorities of the army, voted on the budget and the state of emergency33. To carry out these missions, the tools of the Assembly were expanded: a commission and five sub-commissions were created (secret services, budget, social & economic issues, foreign affairs and ombudsman)34. The use of force was made more complex: a majority of two-thirds of the Assembly was now required instead of a simple majority. During Prime Minister József Antall's government (1990-1993), the powers of the president were weakened by a defense law passed in 1993. Its elaboration gave rise to quarrels between the government and the President. The prime minister's argument was that Hungary was constitutionally a parliamentary democracy which meant that the government was responsible for the conduct of all politics, including defence policy, and accountable to the National Assembly. This responsibility implied that the government must therefore have the means to control the army. President Árpád Göncz believed that his position as chief of the armed forces, granted by the Constitution, gave him a role in the conduct of defense policy, particularly in the event of a crisis. The President therefore tried to create his own chain of command by referring directly to the general staff without going through the government. In 1991 the Constitutional Court ruled in favor of the government stating that it was in line with the fact that Hungary was a parliamentary democracy. These points were challenged in the defense law of 1993.

• 35 Interview with Andrzej Karkoszka.
• 36 Simon J., Poland and NATO, op. cit., p. 11 et Latawski P., « Democratic Control of Armed Forces in (...)
• 37 Paul Latawski, « Democratic Control of Armed Forces in Poland: The Interplay of History, Political (...)

21In Poland, the first democratic governments continued the reforms initiated by the Mazowiecki transitional government. A commission restructured the Ministry of Defense35. The military academies, the general staff and the secret services were placed under the control of the Minister and the military secret services were dismantled. In the end, one-third of the secret agents remained in function, while more than a hundred generals as well as all the officers who had participated in the proclamation and application of martial law under General Wojciech Jaruzelski in 1981-1983 were dismissed. The institution responsible for the ideological training of soldiers, the main political department, was dissolved 36. Defence Minister Jan Parys also undertook a new purge. He removed from office many officers associated with the proclamation and enforcement of martial law37. According to Radosław Sikorski, who was then deputy defense minister, it was the most civilized purge ever conducted:

• 39 J. Simon, Poland and NATO, A Study in Civil-Military Relations, op. cit., p. 12

22This period also saw the gradual rise in power of the presidency. In January 1991, a secretariat was added to the KOK, the BBN (Office for National Defence). The latter was financed by the chancellery of the President and not by the Ministry of Defence. Joining this already complex architecture was the National Security Council (RBN), which played an advisory role to the President. President Lech Walesa (1990-1995) wanted the RBN to replace the KOK, a vestige of the communist era, but this modification did not occur until a new Constitution was enforced in 199739. As a result, these three institutions, with ill-defined and overlapping competences, had to coexist and reinforced the role of the President.

• 40 Marie Vlachova et Stefan Sarvas, « Democratic control of Armed Forces in the Czech Republic: A Jour (...)
• 41 Interview with Petr Fleischmann. This trauma is also the reason why the Czech government still refu (...)

23In Czechoslovakia, the most important reforms were implemented by Luboš Dobrovský, a civilian who succeeded General Vacek. The secret services were dismantled and all officers associated with the old regime dismissed. Independent military tribunals were abolished and all cases now fell within the jurisdiction of civilian courts40. The military academies were placed under the supervision of the ministry. The 1992 Constitution stated that the President was chief of the armies and that he appointed the chief of staff and the generals. The Constitution also reinforced the powers of Parliament: it could declare war, the state of emergency, ratify international and peace treaties and participate in drawing up the military budget. He also had a major role in controlling the use of troops. Any troop movement, whether for exercise, cross-border movement or the reception of foreign troops, had to be approved by a vote of both houses. This major role conferred to Parliament was due to the trauma of the Soviet invasion of 1968 which crushed the Prague Spring. The sensitivity on this issue was so strong that the Constitution was only amended in 2001 to facilitate the participation of the NATO exercises41.

• 42 P. Dunay, « Civil-Military Relations in Hungary: No Big Deal », in A. Cottey, T. Edmunds and A. For (...)
• 43 J. Simon, Hungary and NATO, op. cit., p. 36.
• 44 Ibid., p. 26, 35-37 and Rudolf Joó, « Le contrôle démocratique des forces armées. Le cas de la Hong (...)
• 45 J. Simon, Hungary and NATO, op. cit., p. 96.

25In Hungary, the establishment of civil and democratic control was hampered by the militarization of the Ministry of Defence. When the ex-communists came to power after the 1994 elections, the Ministry of Defense was given to Colonel Gyorgy Keleti, former spokesperson of the Communist Defence Ministry. He cancelled some of Prime Minister József Antall’s reforms: he dismissed the civilian staff of the ministry to replace them with military personnel, asked the general staff to tackle the issue of the reforms to implement civil and democratic control, and suspended the decision to put the general staff under the supervision of the ministry42. The general staff thus became the most important institution symbolically and numerically because it had three times more personnel than the ministry43. However, these reforms had side-effects: they prevented the emergence of civilian expertise on defense issues and broke bureaucratic continuity. In addition, they were part of a process of politicization of personnel because the civil servants were changed by each new political majority. Faced with this powerful general staff, the Assembly only played the role of a weak counterweight. Theoretically it had the tools to control the army but in practice it was frequently bypassed. On the one hand, it agreed to the loan of the Taszar base to NATO and the participation of Hungarian troops in SFOR (stabilization force during the wars in ex-Yugoslavia). But on the other hand, it was not informed of the purchase of Belarusian tanks and the participation of the army in a NATO exercise. Moreover, the deputies did not know what type of documents they could consult without breaking a defense secret. Finally, the ministry did not submit a detailed report of the budget to the Assembly because expenditure was not allocated to specific tasks, which made any control impossible44. This budgetary problem was one of the rare cases where NATO intervened directly to ask for a change of law45.

• 46 A. Racz and E.N. Rozsa, « The Democratic Soldier in Hungary », in S. Mannitz (Dir.), Democratic Civ (...)

26However, at the end of the 1990s, the need to train civilians in defense issues was understood by the Hungarian authorities since a program dedicated to civilians was created at the Miklós Zrínyi National Defense University in 199846.

• 47 Ibid., p. 157.
• 48 J. Simon, Hungary and NATO, op. cit., p. 96.

27If the main institutional reforms were made before the entry into NATO, it remained to define the duties of the soldiers. A military code was promulgated in 2004 by a socialist government. It defined the values of the Hungarian soldier (loyalty, courage, strength) and had to be respected by all soldiers, whether active or reservist and by students with a scholarship from the Ministry of Defense47. This text thus oversaw all the reforms aimed at establishing civilian and democratic control over the military. This text was preceded in 2001, under the first Viktor Orbán government, by a decision that put the general staff under the control of the Minister of Defence, as it had been under the Antall cabinet48.

• 49 Interview with Andrzej Olechowski.

29In Poland, the establishment of civilian control over the military came up against a problem of politicization of defense policy. This resulted from the reading of the so-called Little Constitution of 1992. This text was an adaptation of the Communist Constitution adopted in 1952 but it did not provide a clear separation of powers between the two actors of the executive branch, the president and the government. Indeed, the text stated that the government had to obtain the president's agreement to appoint the ministers of Defence, Foreign Affairs and Interior. These prerogatives were reminiscent of the Round Table agreements: they had been given to the president, General Jaruzelski, and were to allow the Communist party to keep control of these key ministries if the democratic opposition was to win the elections. If General Jaruzelski did not read these articles extensively, this was not the case with his successor, President Lech Wałęsa, who wanted to appoint these ministers without the agreement of the government, especially after the 1993 victory of the Left Democratic Alliance (SLD) in the legislative elections: “The Minister for Foreign Affairs was appointed de facto by President. There was the Little Constitution and him, and I was his candidate”49.

• 50 Interviews with Janusz Onyszkiewicz and Andrzej Karkoszka.
• 51 J. Simon, op. cit., p. 48-49.
• 52 Ibid., p. 48-49.
• 53 Krzeczunowicz A., Krok po kroku, op. cit., p. 185.

30In addition, President Wałęsa played the army against government ministers. During an episode called "the Drawsko dinner", he asked soldiers to vote by a show of hands against the Minister of National Defence, Piotr Kołodziejczyk. This episode was followed by “the Rembertów dinner” during which generals publicly criticized the policy of Minister of Defence Janusz Onyszkiewicz50. During the 1995 presidential campaign, a member of the general staff organized a meeting for President Wałęsa in a barracks, and an admiral from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs threatened the soldiers with being deprived of their salaries if they did not vote for him51. A commission of investigation headed by the Deputy-Minister of Defense concluded that political subjects had been discussed but that the unrest in the barracks was under control52. These breaches in the principle of civil and democratic control over the military worried NATO: the Polish ambassador was warned that if the Polish authorities continued to act this way, Poland would not become a member of NATO53.

• 54 J. Simon, , op. cit., p. 33 and 45.

31At the same time, the general staff saw its position strengthen considerably during this tense period due to the cancellation of certain measures taken by the Mazowiecki government (1989-1991). In 1994, President Wałęsa regained control of the military academies and the secret services, which raised fears of a decline in civilian control over the military. The independence of the staff even allowed it to sell 52 troop transport vehicles to Algeria without informing Minister of Defence Kolodziejczyk. This was confirmed in an investigation by the Sejm, but the sale was not canceled54.

• 56 J. Simon, op. cit., p. 33-45.

33The tensions between the different branches of the executive can be explained by several factors. The first was political instability: there were six ministers of national defence between 1992 and 1997 but only one chief of staff. In fact, ministers did not have time to familiarize themselves with military affairs, which reinforced the role of the chief of staff. The tasks of the general staff also increased: it regained control of the military academies and the secret services. It undertook several major initiatives without consulting the minister such as the sale of military vehicles to Algeria56.

• 57 Interview with Andrzej Karkoszka.
• 58 A. Krzeczunowicz, op. cit., p. 173.

35The third factor was the lack of parliamentary control. In the case of the Drawsko dinner, the defense committee investigated but concluded that all the actors were guilty and demanded the resignation of the defense minister 57. The promotions given by President Wałęsa to the officers who had attended the dinner were maintained. During this period, the only institution that tried to guarantee the respect of civil and democratic control over the military was the High Court of Control (NIK), which issued opinions reminding President Wałęsa of his constitutional duties58.

• 59 Interview of general Wielecki, Rzeczpospolita, april 1996.
• 60 J. Simon, Poland and NATO, op. cit., p. 46.
• 61 Ibid., p. 145-154.

37Immediately after the presidential election, the new social-democrat government dismissed all the generals who had attended the Drawsko dinner. The chief of staff was forced to resign because of his ambiguous statements on NATO: he was in favor of membership but feared that it would dilute the Polish identity 59. The law on the chancellery of the Minister of Defense was passed by the Parliament in June 1995 and reaffirmed that the general staff was a branch of the Ministry of Defense and not of the presidential chancellery. The National Defense Academy and the military secret services were again placed under the supervision of the Minister. The latter became responsible for the functioning of the army during times of peace60. The powers of Parliament over the army were developed. A 1996 law stipulated that MEPs could rule on all matters relating to the organization of the armed forces such as the purchase of armaments, the deployment of troops abroad or the reform of conscription. The defense committee also organized hearings to implement the military budget61.

• 62 Constitution of 1997: http://www.sejm.gov.pl/prawo/konst/polski/kon1.htm.
• 63 Website of RBN : https://www.bbn.gov.pl/pl/prezydenta-rp/rada-bezpieczenstwa-nar/rola-rbn/6000,Rada (...)

38The promulgation of a new constitution in 1997 clarified the division of power between the president, the government and parliament. The president was the chief of the armies and could appoint the chief of staff and the Naczelnik (chief of the armies in time of war) with the agreement of the government. Parliament would declare war, state of emergency and sign peace and international treaties. Its consent would be required for sending troops abroad and for any movement of foreign troops on Polish soil62. The National Security Council (RBN), which had existed informally since 1991, was institutionalized63. The RBN replaced the KOK and ensured the submission of the general staff because its chief could not be a member of the council.

• 64 J. Simon, The Czech and Slovak Republics: A Comparative Study in Civil-Military Relations, op. cit. (...)

42This measure, which was intended to increase transparency, was a prerequisite that Prime Minister Klaus had requested before any increase in the military budget. Following this reform, an office within the Ministry of Defence was given responsibility for the acquisition of armaments and to play the role of intermediary between Czech arms dealers, the government and NATO. This creation also followed a huge scandal wherein Prague sold part of its military surplus to several countries including North Korea, who purchased more than three hundred tanks, rocket launchers and artificial bridges64.

• 65 Text of the law : https://www.usoud.cz/fileadmin/user_upload/ustavni_soud_www/Pravni_uprava/AJ/Zako (...)

43A 1998 Constitutional law defines the state of war and state of emergency, and established that both should be supervised by the government and the Parliament. It followed the dramatic floods of the summer of 1997, which demonstrated the need to create an entity capable of coordinating the activity of the emergency services, the army and establishing civil emergency plans. A National Security Council, created informally in 1993, was also institutionalized. Led by the Prime Minister, its members were the President, the ministers of Defence, Foreign Affairs and Economy, the chief of staff and the director of the Central Bank65. In fact, this institution granted pre-eminence to the government. On the eve of joining NATO, the only limit to civil and democratic control was that Parliament could supervise the action of all intelligence services, with the exception of counter-intelligence services (it obtained this right in 2002).

• 66 Vlachova M. and Sarvas S., « Democratic control of the armed forces in the Czech Republic: A journe (...)

44To make these institutional changes effective, the education and training in military academies were overhauled. The theoretical part of the apprenticeship was separated from the military training: the first was done at the Brno Defense University and the second at the Vyskov Military Academy. There were no lectures specifically dedicated to democratic principles because the soldiers were supposed to assimilate them during training and ceremonies, but a new rhetoric was adopted. Based on anti-communist and anti-fascist elements, it presented Euro-Atlantic integration as a return to the interwar period. Laws on the role and ethics of the soldier were adopted before joining NATO. The soldier had to be a Czech citizen, not intervene in the political game, and respect democratic principles. Political parties should not have cells within the armies, and soldiers could not participate in political meetings but had the right to vote and be elected under the independent label. However, trade unions were prohibited66.

• 67 The word “lustration” is borrowed from Greco-Roman Antiquity where it designated a purification cer (...)

45Lustration67 is one of the tools for getting out of communism. It designates a legislative act targeting individuals who held public office during the communist period. Each country defines the scope and methods of application of the lustration law: dismissal of individuals who have held positions, obligation to declare membership or collaboration with the secret services.

• 68 In Poland, there was no lustration law during the 1990s. The law was passed in 1997 and has applied (...)
• 69 Interview with Luboš Dobrovský.
• 70 Interview with Jan Eichler.

47Unlike Hungary and Poland 68, Czech governments passed several lustration laws. The first law was initiated by General Vacek and the process was continued by the first civilian Minister of Defence, Luboš Dobrovský, with the help of a parliamentary commission69. The lustration was not massive: in 1993, 94% of the 61 405 soldiers kept their functions and those who were dismissed were mainly members of the general staff. In fact, as in Hungary, those who did not agree with the new regime and its orientations in terms of defense policy left the army on their own70. To replace the lustrated personnel, Dobrovský instituted a policy aimed at recruiting the soldiers who had been sacked after the Prague Spring:

• 72 J. Simon, NATO and the Czech and Slovak Republics, op. cit., p. 31-33.

49Dobrovský's successor, Antoni Baudyš, continued the policy of lustration. In May 1993 a new examination of 28,000 troops was announced. Its objective was to dismiss all the soldiers who had taken part in the repressions against the Prague Spring and the demonstrations of 1989. This new examination proved the loyalty of the army since only 60 soldiers were dismissed. Yet the successor of Baudyš, Vilem Holan, asked for a new examination. He came up against the opposition of the Defense and Security Committee of the National Assembly, which considered this proposal to be useless and generated tensions72. Indeed, the army had been renewed and the soldiers largely supported the Euro-Atlantic orientations:

• 74 These seminars were organized by the French Institute for Advanced National Defense Studies (IHEDN) (...)

51The analysis of the implementation of civil and democratic control in the first years of regime change leads us to the following conclusion: the reforms were mainly the result of endogenous dynamics and the three countries had to deal with unique situations and challenges. This result confirms the second hypothesis and strongly qualifies the first hypothesis which posits that NATO transferred norms and had a socializing role. In fact, NATO had a role limited to sporadic interventions. There were workshops and seminars funded by Western organizations74 and this helped spread Western ideas about the control of armed forces in democracy, but these models were not literally copied by the new democracies because they did not correspond to their sociological or historical characteristics. The problems encountered by each country and the solutions that were adopted demonstrate that there was no toolbox provided by NATO and that each State built its path according to contexts and configurations.

• 75 « Ustawa dezubekizacyjna: blisko 39 tys. osób z niższymi emeryturami », Rzeczpospolita, October, 1s (...)
• 76 « PiS powraca do dezubekizacji wojska », Gazeta Wyborcza, May, 4 2018.

53However, these reforms are not immutable, as shown by the recent Polish example. Following the arrival of the Law and Justice (PiS) party in power in 2015, a wave of resignations and dismissals has occurred and affected the Polish Armed Forces: more than forty generals and three hundred officers left their posts, including the chief of staff and the chief of the special forces. Lustration, which had not been introduced in the 1990s, gave way to a law of “desubequization” (ustawa dezubekizacyjna), which aims to drastically reduce the retirement pensions of people who have worked for the army, the Ministry of the Interior and the communist security services75. However, the National Assembly's office of analysis issued a nuanced opinion regarding the “desubequization” law because the principle of collective responsibility raises ethical and legal issues76.