1A refreshing study of the Soviet-Afghan War that eschews emphasis on political affairs, Professor Emeritus Yaacov Ro’i of Tel Aviv University has written a book that focuses on the war’s impact on the home front, where it “served as a catalyst for the developments that led to the collapse of the Soviet Union” (p. 7). The primary aspects he highlights are how ethnic unrest blended with antiwar sentiment; how the veterans (known as afgantsy) returned to Soviet youth enamoured with Western culture as opposed to Soviet values; and how the burden of war exposed corruption in “both the armed forces and civilian life.” As a result, Ro’i argues, “the long-term domestic impact of the Soviet-Afghan War was infinitely more far-reaching than its international implications” (p. 306).

2At the core of Ro’i’s work are three separate surveys he conducted in 1992-93 in 11 of 15 countries of the former Soviet Union (FSU), with those omitted - the Baltic republics and Georgia - accounting for 5% of afgantsy (p. 5). Respondents were gathered from afgantsy via clubs established after the war; from a sampling of citizens across the FSU; and from Soviet immigrants in Israel who resided in the USSR during the war. The results shed light on topics that have been touched upon only briefly in Western scholarship. For example, in his survey of citizens, 56.41% of Central Asians felt that Moscow “needed to intervene” in Afghanistan early on in the war, and their support remained a strong 30.77% at the war’s end. In contrast, Russian citizens’ support for the war peaked at 31.15% and dropped to 14.29% in 1989 (p. 169). These numbers challenge the persistent generalisation that the war was one of Russian imperialism that led Central Asians to question the notion of Soviet Islam. To the contrary, “members of traditionally Muslim ethnicities turned to Islam in the void that the erosion of the Soviet belief system created,” just as Russians and Ukrainians did with the Orthodox Church (p. 277).

3Respondents’ opposition to the Soviet-Afghan War is also striking. When asked “Do you think there was real danger to the USSR’s southern border in 1979?” 31% of civilians answered, “I never thought so.” Contrary to the impression that only dissidents such as Andrei Sakharov saw through propaganda, one-third of respondents rejected the state’s justification for war and this should not be disregarded for their lack of public protest. Conversely, another 31% of respondents did believe that Afghanistan’s civil war threatened to cross into the Soviet Union, 10% of whom “did not believe this then, but now I do” (p. 170). This is indicative of how, in 1992-93, citizens of newly independent countries were divided over historicization of the conflict: East Europeans disavowed it as a purely “Soviet” war, while others saw new justification given the rise of the Taliban and outbreak of the Tajikistani Civil War - the latter of which, 77% of afgantsy respondents felt was affected by the Soviet-Afghan War (p. 277).

4Also valuable is Ro’i’s decision to revisit public political statements on the war. Despite the swift imposition of a state narrative on the media, Soviet society was rife with “scraps of information” about the war by February 1980 (p. 20). As a result, Politburo members addressed public interest in the war during speeches for the election to the Supreme Soviet of Russia due to take place in March. Particularly choice in his words was Iurii Andropov, who stated to a crowd that the deployment of troops was “a step that was not simple for us… [but] necessary in order to protect the interests of our homeland” (italics added, p. 100). While the threat of U.S. imperialism remained prerequisite rhetoric throughout the war, Andropov’s emphasis on national security rather than fraternal aid provided based on a Treaty of Friendship was significant. The nuance between local dialogue and nationwide statements is worth revisiting in studies of the Cold War.

5Indeed, the turning point of nationwide interest in the Soviet-Afghan War was the Komsomol’skaia pravda article “Dolg” (Duty), published in February 1984. A detailed account of the hardship faced by a paralyzed afganets, it was “a detonator that drew attention not only to Afghanistan but also to… blatant faults in the system” (pp. 141-42). In prior studies, a one-sentence summary of “Dolg” was sufficient. In contrast, Ro’i devotes four pages’ analysis to its ramifications for local Communist Party members and its impact on popular opinion toward political reform. The latter is accentuated in a survey question posed to the afgantsy: “Did you take part in public activity after returning home?” Positive responses of “I participated in mass-cultural activity” (e.g., met with school pupils) and “I became politically active” were highest for those who returned in 1983-84, preceding General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev’s unveiling of a “bleeding wound” in 1986 (p. 237). How did the afgantsy’s notions of “mass cultural activity” and being “politically active” evolve in the 1980s, and which did Gorbachev choose to frame as a product of glasnost? These are fascinating questions worth exploring.

6Some will no doubt highlight the lack of new archival research as a shortcoming to this book. I would argue that Ro’i’s collection of data outweighs the benefit of archival documents on the Soviet-Afghan War available at this time, which generally mirror the years of 1979-82 and 1986-89. Ro’i in fact addresses this very gap as a single phase of the war (“The search for victory, 1982-1986”) in his study (p. 28). There will of course be differing interpretations of what the statistics he gathered imply, but this is only healthy for renewed debate on the war. Further analysis of how the afgantsy participated in polarised organisations ranging from Pamyat’ (Memory) the Sakharov Union of Democratic Afghan War Veterans(!) would have been fascinating to this reader, but such quibbles are a matter of one’s research interests (p. 295). Overall, Ro’i has produced a comprehensive social history of the Soviet-Afghan War that should be required reading on the conflict.