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Citizen participation in public security policies in Africa: a comparative analysis of the examples of Burkina Faso and Niger

Abdoul Karim Saidou
This article is a translation of:
La participation citoyenne dans les politiques publiques de sécurité en Afrique : analyse comparative des exemples du Burkina Faso et du Niger

Abstract

The article analyses citizen participation in public security policies in Niger and Burkina Faso. It shows that citizen involvement in security governance has been shaped by the dynamics of political regimes and the relations of the latter with the international sphere. As an instrument of political regulation, citizen participation thus appears as a privileged site for the observation of power struggles and the establishment of public action in states receiving aid. The analysis proves very fruitful from the point of view of the logics of extraversion that characterizes public action in Africa.

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1. Introduction

1The analysis of public policies being pursued ‘elsewhere’, and more particularly in Africa, continues to generate epistemological debates (Artigas 2014; Darbon et al. 2019; Eboko 2015). While ‘ever since the end of the 1990s, the analysis of public policies has entailed a proliferation of studies across the African continent’ (Darbon et al., 2019, 4), some authors still call for caution, arguing for example that the fragility of states receiving aid prohibits the very use of the concept of public policy (Lavigne Delville, 2018, 54-56). These reservations are related to the debate on the ‘exportability of concepts’ (Gazibo and Thiriot, 2009) and do not call into question the existence of public policies in Africa, despite their internationalized and multi-stakeholder character (Lavigne Delville, 2018, 68). Moreover, as noted by Patrick Hassenteufel (2019, 452), the states in the Global South ‘[...] are subject to the same type of globalized financial flows as OECD countries when it comes to the instruments and guidelines of public policies in particular, and, as in Western countries, state actors are no longer systematically at the heart of public action.’

  • 1 On the factors behind the security crisis, particularly the phenomenon of radicalization, see the U (...)

2This branch of political science provides an innovative perspective on African politics (Darbon and Crouzel, 2009) because it allows us to go beyond the ‘conception of the state as an enterprise of domination characterized by its efforts to impose an overall political order, replacing it with a perspective centred on its outcomes [...]’ (Enguéléguélé, 2008, 8). The analysis of African cases yields invaluable heuristic results in that it makes it possible to ‘question the tools, the procedures, the methods and the results of the sub-discipline by bringing them to bear on new situations in order to provide a more detailed analysis of public policies’ (Darbon and Provini, 2018, 10). This article contributes to these reflections by examining the case of citizen participation in public security policies in Niger and Burkina Faso. Since the Libyan crisis of 2011, these two Sahelian countries have been facing the most serious challenge in their history (Institut Free Afrik, 2018; CNESS 2018; Maiga, 2017; Loada and Romaniuk, 2014).1

  • 2 In Burkina Faso, for example, these calls for self-defence have been increasing across the country (...)
  • 3  The forums were held in Burkina from 24-26 October 2017 and in Niger from 6-8 December 2017.
  • 4 The concept of paradigm, introduced into public policies by Peter Hall (1993), is part of the analy (...)
  • 5 Some political thinkers believe that state and society are not differentiated in Africa (Chabal and (...)

3The scale of the security crisis has led citizens to launch self-defence initiatives.2 This crisis has also opened a window of opportunity for security policy reform (Deltenre, 2013; ICG, 2017; Bryden and N’Diaye, 2011; OIF, 2010; Tisseron, 2015). Thus, these two states initiated security policy reform based on participation. National consultations, the so-called ‘National Security Forum’, were held in 2017 (ISS, 2017; Pillerin, 2017).3 As a result, the question of security, a matter traditionally monopolized by the state, was no longer a taboo subject. The choice of this citizen-based approach seems to indicate a change in the establishment of security policies,4 given the centrality of civil society in this process. Civil society – a concept whose use is highly controversial in Africa5 – is here perceived in its broad conception, i.e. as encompassing all the organized actors existing outside the state sphere (Auer 1999; Lavigne Delville, 2015; Gibbon, 1998; Otayek, 2009).

4The transitions of the 1990s have accelerated the construction of a public space that tends to become gradually differentiated from society, making possible the emergence of a civil society (Gazibo, 2007; Loada, 1996). From this point of view, the existence of a civil society, of actors acting in its name and positioning themselves as a counter-power, is a tangible fact (Loada, 1999). In this sense, citizen participation is understood as the involvement of civil society, on its own initiative or that of the state, in the development or implementation of security policies. These policies are approached holistically, i.e. they take into account defence and homeland security (Balzacq, 2016; Collins, 2016; Chihan, 2016; Bauer and Soullez, 2011). Citizen participation in security policies is part of the right to participation, ‘[...] a right consecrated both in the international legal order and in the domestic legal order’ (CGD and IDDH, 2012, 37).

  • 6 Sherry R. Arnstein (1969) distinguishes three types of participation: non-participation, symbolic p (...)

5In Africa, this political right was introduced in a limited form by the colonial system before being gradually expanded in the late 1940s (Jaffrelot, 2000, 25-32; Loada and Ibriga, 2007). In the aftermath of independence, most African regimes put an end to this pluralism created by the colonial system (Bayart et al., 2019). However, some of these regimes maintained a ‘symbolic’ participation (Danda, 2013, 58):6 ‘[...] citizen participation took shape in authoritarian systems and served the propaganda of the regimes in power’ (Tidjani Alou, 2012a, 115). These forms of participation almost disappeared with the third wave of democratization (Huntington, 1993), at a time when ‘Africa [was] returning to pluralism and the competitive systems it had abandoned or curbed in the process of political liberalization’ (CGD and DIHR, 2012, 10).

  • 7  We put this term in quotation marks because of its normative character and its ambiguous scientifi (...)

6New forms of citizen participation have become commonplace with democratisation and structural adjustment programmes (Fresia and Lavigne Delville, 2018; Ake, 2003, 128-136; Fukuyama, 2004, 17-31). It has been an international injunction in countries receiving aid in the context of policies of ‘good governance’ (Kazancigil, 2002; Mény, 1994; Loada, 2001; Tidjani Alou, 2001). The notion of governance that has been spread across Africa by international financial institutions is presented as a vector of change (Hermet, 2005; Dubois, 2009; Marks et al., 1996): ‘this new way of doing things fits [...] into a logic of “good governance” where resources are managed and allocated to solve collective problems by promoting participation, transparency, the rule of law and equity’ (Gaudin, 2007, 95).7

  • 8 See also World Bank (1997), Loada (2001, 44), Cairney (2012, 157).

7While ‘good governance’ has not put an end to neo-patrimonialism (Bach and Gazibo, 2011), it has boosted citizen participation (Gazibo, 2017), even if security is one of the domains most resistant to these changes (Bangoura, 2010; Sampana, 2015). As a result, the security forums in Niger and Burkina Faso seem to be triggering a renewal of citizen participation, which also lies at the heart of debates in the old democracies, where it appears as a reaction to ‘democratic fatigue’ (Reybrouck, 2014) or, more generally, to the crisis of minimalist democracy (Schumpeter, 1942). Citizen participation is based on participatory democracy (Boisvert and Brodeur, 2010), which ‘[...] involves all the processes by which the citizen is involved in the exercise of political power before, during and after the adoption of legal norms’ (Robbe, 2005, 14). This is described as a ‘new political modernity’ in which ‘the authority of science and progress, state supervision of society and the legitimacy of elected officials are today being, if not dethroned, at least clearly relativized’ (Gaudin, 2007, 51).8

  • 9 According to Jacques Chevallier ‘Participatory democracy cannot be considered as a substitute for r (...)

8Without replacing representative democracy,9 participatory democracy, from which ‘good governance’ proceeds, reconfigures relations between the state and civil society. Public administration in Africa is ‘under the watchful eye of civil society’ (Loada, 2001, 31). Such a change complicates the nature of public action (Cairney, 2012, 154-174; Lascoumes and Le Galès, 2012, 107-109): ‘over the last few decades, the development of public policies has become an increasingly collective process on which many different private and public actors collaborate’ (Boisvert and Brodeur, 2010, 90). ‘Good governance’ has triggered a ‘de-monopolization’ of security as a sovereign function (Roché 2004; Chevallier 2011).

  • 10 Some writers find this point of view exaggerated and show that the state remains, in spite of all, (...)
  • 11 This is the model of security reform developed by the United Nations in post-conflict countries. Th (...)
  • 12 The history of the importation of community policing into Burkina Faso shows the importance of loca (...)
  • 13 We will see later that the organization of the security forum does not obey the same logic in the t (...)

9As Kadidiatou Ali Gazibo (2017, 85) points out, ‘in this configuration, the state loses its monopoly as peace “maker” and becomes one of many actors’.10 In the 1990s, the spread of the concept of human security problematized the involvement of citizens in security (Ganascia, 2012). This concept indicates a paradigmatic change (Hall, 1993), with security ceasing to be state-centred and now focusing on the citizen. The Anglo-Saxon model of community policing and security sector reform (SSR)11 had the same effect on security theory (Saidou, 2019). The transfer of these concepts that have been constructed elsewhere obeys a twofold imperative: to respond to insecurity by effective policies and to attract international aid (Fresia and Lavigne Delville, 2018).12 In official discourse, the security forums in Niger and Burkina Faso in 2017 drew on these models. While, in practice, the use of these models departs in some respects from the logics observed in Western countries, the fact remains that it opens new prospects for setting up citizen participation.13

10While linked to security as a substantive policy, citizen participation is here analysed as a constituent element in a policy-making process. It thus falls under institutional policies, i.e. ‘all decisions and public activities aimed at guaranteeing and improving the functioning of the state apparatus’ (Knoepfel et al., 2016, 115). This represents a change in the fabric of public action (Boussaguet, 2019; Aldrin et al., 2016). In this respect, the most recent studies insist on the importance of taking the long term into account (Pierson, 2004; Hoffler et al., 2010) and highlight the many timeframes involved, allowing us to go beyond ‘the dichotomy of “marginal change versus radical change” that has become commonplace in the analysis of public action’ (Palier and Surel, 2010, 397).

  • 14  Such an approach is based on a historical perspective that authors such as Charles Tilly (2011, 52 (...)

11This article draws on this approach, specifically the problematic proposed by Bruno Palier and his colleagues, which takes into account the long term and uses a comparative analysis (Palier and Surel, 2010). Such a position calls for a sequential approach, isolating the different timeframes of change (Palier and Surel, 2010, 391; Cairney 2012, 41-43).14 The problematic is attentive to the paradigm of extraversion, which insists on ‘the creation and capture of a rent generated by dependency and which functions as a historical matrix of inequality, political centralization and social struggle [...]’ (Bayart, 2000, 222). In short, it is a question of questioning the domestic and exogenous determinants of citizen participation in security policies.

  • 15 According to Giovani Sartori (1994, 22-23), ‘the important thing is to remember that comparing mean (...)

12More generally, this research is part of the comparative analysis of public policies (Hassenteufel, 2019; Gazibo and Jenson, 2015), notably binary comparison, aimed at clarifying differences and similarities between cases presenting ‘fundamental analogies’ (Gazibo 2002, 427-449).15 Adopting a longitudinal approach (Coman et al., 2016, 39), the article examines citizen participation in security from the perspective of long, medium and short timeframes (Palier and Surel, 2010, 394; Fontaine and Hassenteufel, 2002, 11; Cairney, 2012, 32-34), from 1960-2019. It thus focuses on an agenda-setting process, i.e. the process by which private problems attain the status of a collective problem (Garraud, 1990; Kingdon, 2003; Cobb and Elder, 1983; Maillard and Kübler, 2015; Lascoumes and Le Galès, 2012, 68). It is the ‘first product that the analyst must study when he empirically approaches the cycle of a public policy’ (Knoepfel et al., 2016, 137).

13The analysis first shows that citizen participation was ‘granted’ and used as an instrument in the consolidation of populist regimes from the 1960s to the end of the 1980s. It then shows the importance of ‘good governance’ in the institutionalisation of citizen participation, underpinned by a logic of the reappropriation of dependency. Finally, the article highlights how – faced with the security crisis – citizen participation becomes, via different mechanisms, a tool for legitimizing political regimes.

2. The ‘granting’ of participation under populist regimes

14A long-term analysis shows that the involvement of civil society in security policies was a practice favoured by authoritarian regimes. This participation was ‘granted’ and channelled by the rulers according to a logic of extraversion. Putting it on the agenda is the result of a dual logic in which political competitors are neutralised and political regimes are legitimated.

2.1 The neutralization of political competitors

15Populism has left its mark on several African regimes of various ideological persuasions (Chazan et al., 1999; Young, 1982). This populism is characterized by the leaders’ ambition to free their citizens from the grip of dominant social forces. According to Mamoudou Gazibo, it involves ‘[...] the discourse of the powers which emphasize the “people” and “development at the base” and which claim to be building “democracy” and “happiness for the people”’ (Gazibo, 2006, 99). Populism adopted a militarist stance in Niger under President Diori Hamani (1960-1974) and under the Sankarist revolution in Burkina Faso (1983-87). In the Burkinabe context, populism was a form of resistance against ‘imperialism’, whereas in the case of Niger, the use of this ideological reference had a conservative aim, the objective being to maintain cooperation with France.

16In Niger, the desire to neutralize the main opposition party, the Union of Popular Forces for Democracy and Progress/Sawaba founded by Djibo Bakary, led to the ‘constitution of a private militia, armed and structured like the national army’ (Mahamane, 2008, 46). In response to the armed struggle launched by Sawaba, the ruling party, the Nigerien Progressive Party/African Democratic Rally (PPN/RDA) created within its youth section the ‘Young Pioneers’ trained in the military arts by Israelis (Salifou, 2010, 133). The youths were initially called upon to create ‘vigilance brigades’ against the Sawaba commandos (Salifou, 2010, 136).

  • 16  Moreover, President Diori did not consider the army to be a priority. On 18 June 1960, the governm (...)

17Consisting of the best elements in the ‘Young Pioneers’, the party’s militia took part in parades on national holidays (Salifou, 2010, 133; Mahamane, 2008, 77).16 Nigerien populism thus led to conservative violence. This strategy was dictated by the international alliances of the ruling party and can thus be examined under the lens of extraversion (Bayart, 2000). Expelling the Sawaba from the country was part of the anti-communist struggle. Opting for a militia rather than a powerful army was the result of a desire to avoid the emergence of a military elite, that was deemed dangerous for the regime. Moreover, in 1961 Niger had concluded a defence agreement with France, making France the guarantor of its external security (Berghezan, 2016).

  • 17 In addition, the Compaoré regime would create the vigilance brigades composed of civilians and resp (...)
  • 18   Since 2018, faced with the terrorist challenge, calls have been increasingly heard in Burkina Fas (...)

18In Burkina Faso, when Captain Thomas Sankara came to power on 4 August 1983, the Revolutionary Defence Committees (CDRs) were set up with quite similar objectives. Primarily composed of young people, the CDRs’ mission was to support the regime’s action and its ‘anti-imperialist’ orientation (Kyelem de Tambéla, 2012, 130-134; Jaffré, 1989, 189-190). The CDRs were replaced after the end of the Sankarist regime in 1987 by the Revolutionary Committees (CR) under the regime of Blaise Compaoré.17 With the reversal of this regime’s diplomatic position in the 1990s, the populist strategy was abandoned.18

  • 19   Interview with Thomas Dakouré, Ouagadougou, 4 April 2018.
  • 20 For more details, see Kyelem de Tambéla (2012, 130-154).

19In both Niger and Burkina Faso, citizen participation in security policies was a response to political insecurity. It aimed to maintain the regime in power and to neutralize its competitors. These experiments also both involved arming citizens and assigning them to security tasks usually reserved for professionals (police, military, etc.).19 However, the CDRs’ missions were more diverse20 than those of the PPN/RDA militia. Indeed, while the CDRs were mobilized for the security of the Sankarist regime, they intervened in various sectors such as health and the environment. Moreover, in Niger, the ideological frame of reference was more localized because the creation of the PPN/RDA militia was linked to an endogenous populism.

  • 21 The term Samariya ‘which in Hausa refers to youth (samari: “young people”) refers to the traditiona (...)
  • 22 Djibo Bakary did not define himself as a communist due to his Muslim faith, and always defended the (...)

20Early on, the PPN/RDA had relied on traditional structures, the Samariya, to establish its political base,21 the idea being ‘... to lead, eventually, to the emergence of a peasant power, henceforth incorporated into a decentralized, participatory and dynamic system’ (Idrissa, 2008, 165-165). The aim was to free the peasants from the grip of the traditional chieftaincy (Walraven, 2017, 68). This citizen participation was therefore paradoxical in that it aimed at social transformation while drawing on the logics of the land. The ‘tactical’ alliance between the Nigerien RDA and the French Communist Party probably explains this paradox, illustrating the effect of external logics on actors’ strategies.22 Under the Sankara regime, these logics of extraversion were clearly observable, as the CDR model was inspired by the communist ideology imported by the student movement (Guissou, 1995, 178). Populism had a ‘civil’ side which resulted in consultative practices.

2.2 The logic of legitimization of authoritarianism

  • 23  This was the political approach of President Diori, and it did not meet with unanimous support wit (...)

21In addition to participatory practices dictated by donors in the context of ‘good governance’, other forms of participation have been observed over time. These followed pragmatic imperatives rather than the desire to attract international aid. In Niger, in the early 1960s, President Diori initiated a policy of ‘human promotion and rural activity’ inspired by the experience of Mamadou Dia in Senegal (Lavigne Delville, 2015, 40).23 He developed the Triennial Development Programme (1961-1963) and the Broad Options of the decennial outlook ‘which would serve as a framework for all other development programmes that the government would implement from 1964 to 1974’ (Salifou, 2010, 97). Civil society was consulted, even though ‘in reality, participation was often considered only when the final plans had been decided on’ (Danda, 2013, 61).

  • 24  On the process of setting up the Development Corporation, see Sanoussi Jackou (2000, 90-129). As M (...)

22The regime of General Seyni Kountché (1974-1987), who undertook to break with the legacy of Diori Hamani, paradoxically followed in his footsteps – a continuity that stemmed from General Kountché’s diplomatic strategy in favour of non-alignment. The international sphere was thus a resource for the military regime and a variable that shaped its relationship to civil society. Indeed, under this regime the populist model grew in sophistication with the project of the Development Society (Ake, 2000, 54-46; Zakari, 2016, 27-33). It consisted in involving all segments of society in the governance of the country.24 According to Sanoussi Jackou (2000, 98), this is an ‘ideology of authenticity, Africanity, specificity and Nigerienity’, even if the country remains a big consumer of international aid.

  • 25 Giant billboards were installed in Niamey with messages such as ‘security is priceless’, and ‘there (...)

23Young people are one of the pillars of the Development Society project, via the Samariya. According to Kimba Idrissa, ‘the organizational scheme in Samariya is far from original. Djibo Bakary, the leader of the Sawaba party, was the designer and the initiator of this mode of governance under colonization’ (Idrissa, 2008, 197). Kountché’s plan for society, which Pearl Robinson (1992) describes as a ‘neo-traditional corporatism’, thus stems from this heritage (Idrissa, 2008, 198). If, with Kountché, ‘state security became the central axis of national politics’,25 the regime refrained from entrusting military tasks to civilians (Malam Issa, 2008, 142).

24Indeed, the Samariya were involved in intelligence gathering. A veritable police state was set up in which citizens’ actions were monitored (Salifou, 2010, 238). At no time did the regime involve civilians in the conventional security tasks of the police and the military. As much as the military perceived civilians as allies, they distrusted them, preferring to confine them to strictly circumscribed tasks. Moreover, ‘the participation sought through the development society did not concern the political sphere, but was limited exclusively to the economic and social domain’ (Maidoka, 2008, 223). In addition, unlike the Sankarist regime that distinguished itself by a politicization of the ‘masses’, the Kountché regime remained pragmatic and hostile to ideological discourse. Nevertheless, the two regimes had distinguished themselves by their recourse to citizen participation in public action.

  • 26 See also MEF (2015, 12-15).

25With this in mind, in 1984 the CNR launched the People’s Development Programme, of which security was one of the major priorities (Guissou, 1995, 124).26 In Burkina Faso, populism dated back to the revolutionary period, while under the presidency of Maurice Yaméogo (1960-66). This impulse appeared only sporadically, as when on 28 July 1964, the latter instituted by decree the election of traditional chiefs by the inhabitants, to weaken the chieftaincy (Palm, 2017, 82). Under the presidency of General Sangoulé Lamizana (1966-1980), civil society was involved in the development of public policies, without the regime falling into populism.

  • 27 There was no real economic and social development plan before the arrival of the army. A five-year (...)
  • 28 On the concept of ‘benchmark’ (référentiel), see Pierre Muller (2000).

26An economic ‘framework plan’ was adopted for the period 1967-70.27 A national planning commission was set up, with branches at the local level and including civil society (Lamizana, 1999, 142). The regime did not opt for the militarization of civil society, apart from the partial mobilization of reservists during the border conflict between Burkina Faso and Mali between 1974 and 1975 (Lamizana, 1999, 317). The turn of the 1990s marked the emergence of ‘good governance’, which would affect public security initiatives.28

3. The importation of ‘good governance’ or the instrumentalization of dependency

27The analysis of medium timeframes highlights the instrumentalisation of dependency through the reappropriation of ‘good governance’. This institutional policy, in which ‘external constraints were used as an instrument’ (Bayart, 2000, 224) by political actors, induced, depending on the case, crisis participation or, at other times, a routine participation.

3.1 Crisis participation

  • 29 In a book published under the editorship of Alain Edouard Traoré, minister of communication at the (...)

28A new form of participation became commonplace in response to socio-political crises (Van de Walle, 2009, 135-163). This crisis manifested in two ways: either, much against their will, leaders resorted to citizen participation in order to resorb crises, or civil society took over the task of guaranteeing security in the face of state failure. The first (and predominant) modality was part of a strategy of conserving power through the reappropriation of ‘good governance’. It played an unseen role in the legitimization of citizen participation. This regulatory strategy was used whenever a crisis threatened the stability of the regimes in question. For example, the Compaoré regime opened a dialogue with civil society following the assassination of the journalist Norbert Zongo in 1998 (Loada, 1999) and the mutinies of 2011 (Traoré, 2012).29 The mobilizations that characterized the transitions in the 1990s and afterwards were part of this crisis participation (Gazibo, 2006, 179-187). In most cases, security policies were addressed without being top priorities. For the most part, the debates focused on political reforms and transitional justice.

  • 30 This reform was one of the pillars of the peace accords signed on 15 April 1995 between the rebels (...)

29In Niger, the crises that led to the creation of political dialogue frameworks were linked to coups and armed rebellions (Zakari, 2016, 79-112). The army relied on the Arab and Fulani self-defence groups to fight Toubou and Tuareg rebels (Saidou, 2015). These rebellions also accelerated decentralization in Niger, a major reform for the implantation of citizen participation (Hagberg, 2009):30 ‘participation seems to be omnipresent in the programmes and pretexts discursively developed to support the need to decentralize’ (Danda, 2013, 53). Mamoudou Gazibo (2007) shows how, in the 2000s, faced with a strong civil society, Niger switched to a sort of co-management to tackle the security crisis and mining issues.

30In addition, during the transitions resulting from the coups in Niger, the army always relied on citizen participation to legitimize itself (Saidou, 2018a). Citizen participation served to reassure national actors, as well as donors and regional organizations, of the military’s willingness to carry out an inclusive transition. During the 2010 military transition, a Basic Texts Committee composed of civilian experts was tasked with drafting the Constitution. The proposed text was then submitted to a wider body, the National Advisory Council (Gazibo, 2012). However, this citizen participation was monitored by the army despite its inclusiveness (Tidjani Alou, 2014).

  • 31 The Collège des Sages was a commission composed of figures of moral authority; it was created by th (...)
  • 32   The term Koglweogo (in the Mooré language) literally means ‘protecting the bush’ (Burkina Faso, 2 (...)

31Crisis participation concerned security issues. For example, in Burkina Faso, civil society focused on the organization of presidential security, as evidenced by the reports of the Collège des Sages31 in 1999 and the Commission for National Reconciliation and Reforms (CRNR) in 2015. Another example is the symposiums organized in Niger in 1999 and 2010 by the military transition regimes on the role of the army in democracy (Dodo Boukary, 2005). When crisis participation results from the initiative of civil society, it lays bare the weaknesses of the state (Imorou, 2017) due to the emergence of ‘security from below’ (Bayart et al., 2019, 111-131; Gazibo, 2017, 94-97). This explains the proliferation of self-defence groups such as Koglweogo in Burkina Faso and the Yambanga in Niger (Gansonré, 2017; Quidelleur, 2017).32

  • 33 This reconfiguration of the security sector is analyzed in the French case by Sébastian Roché (2004 (...)
  • 34  A reform of community policing was adopted with the decree 2016-1052 of 14 November 2016, laying d (...)

32Faced with ‘inefficient, demotivated and discredited’ security forces (Abdelkarder, 2013, 38), citizens took over their own security, leading to a ‘de-monopolisation’ of the latter33 (Abdelkader, 2013, Olivier de Sardan et al., 2010, 14-15). The proliferation of private security companies and the regulation of road traffic by ordinary citizens in large cities also fell under this logic (Abdou, 2016). In Burkina Faso, to channel this citizen participation, the government launched community policing with a first action plan implemented for the period 2005-2009 (Saidou, 2019).34 Rather than a rejection of the state, the action of the ‘people from below’ reflected a ‘state demand’ that was inadequately satisfied (Bayart et al., 2019, 135). Along with the crisis participation, a routine participation emerged.

3.2 Routine participation

  • 35 Augustin Loada emphasizes that its spread ‘unquestionably renewed the policies of administrative co (...)

33The transitions of the 1990s boosted citizen participation (Bayart et al., 2019, 122; Olivier de Sardan, 2015, 9-49). ‘Good governance’ was promoted by specific international and transnational ‘entrepreneurs’ (Lavigne Delville, 2018, Otayek, 2002). This transfer of public policy resulted in institutional reforms (Tidjani Alou, 2012b; Cairney 2012, 244-243; Darbon and Crouzel, 2009, 87-89).35 Since then, government ‘was no longer the monopoly of the state and the ruling elites’ (Gazibo, 2007, 17). In Niger, for example, ‘participation rose in significance as the country became more democratic’ (Danda, 2013, 53). The role of civil society increased in all sectoral policies (Coulibaly, 2013), leading to an erosion of the state’s monopoly (Chevallier, 2011).

  • 36 The United Nations encouraged these changes. For example, Security Council Resolution 2250 of 9 Dec (...)
  • 37 It was adopted by Decree No. 2005-459/PRES/PM/MFPRE of 31 August 2005 on the adoption of the nation (...)

34The principles of participation, accountability and transparency became ubiquitous in discourses and practices, including in the security sector.36 Civil society was called upon to participate at all stages of the public action cycle (Lavigne Delville, 2015; Gazibo, 2007), increasing its role as a counter-power (Loada, 2001, 31). Citizen participation thus became institutionalized. While this ‘good governance’ came from the desire to attract the rent of international aid, it found fertile ground with the legacy of populism (Mayaki, 2018, 95-97; Benequista and Gavanta, 2012; Darbon, 2009). In Burkina Faso, President Compaoré built his hegemony by capitalizing on the Sankarist heritage in the field of citizen participation (Loada, 2010). In 1998, Burkina Faso adopted a plan to promote good governance (Loada, 2001, 43), and in 2005 a good governance policy (Burkina Faso, 2005).37 Niger adopted a state modernization policy in 2013 (HCME, 2013), resulting from a process that began in the 1990s.

  • 38 This was Decree No. 2011-296/PRES/PM/MEF/MATD of 13 May 2011 on the creation, different roles, orga (...)
  • 39 This process was intended to improve the quality of the development benchmark adopted in 2002, the (...)
  • 40 The PNDES and the PDES cover the periods 2016-2020 and 2017-2021 respectively.

35In 2011, Burkina Faso created a formal framework for consultation between the state and civil society.38 As an integral part of development policies, security was taken under the aegis of civil society, which had become a legitimate stakeholder in public action. Security was discussed in the different phases of the elaboration, implementation, and evaluation of sectoral policies. It is in this sense that, in Niger, the revision of the Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS)39 launched in 2005 resulted in a participatory exercise (Tidjani Alou, 2014, 143-146). In Burkina Faso, ever since the adoption of the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) in 2000, and later the 2011-2015 Accelerated Growth and Sustainable Development Strategy (SCADD), civil society has played a part alongside the political-administrative authorities in carrying out the annual reviews established for this purpose (MEF, 2015, 24-28). This approach has continued with current policies – the National Economic and Social Development Plan (PNDES) in Burkina Faso and the Economic and Social Development Plan (PDES) in Niger.40

  • 41 In both cases, the actors involved come from different spheres: ministries, civil society, youth or (...)
  • 42 Created in 1994 under the name ‘High Commission for the Restoration of Peace’, this institution was (...)

36Several public policy networks in the security sector have been created. In Burkina Faso, for example, there are the two security reform processes launched since 2018, one on the strategy to prevent and combat violent extremism, and the other on national security policy.41 The example of the actions of the High Authority for Peacebuilding in Niger is another illustration of how the state tries to co-manage security with citizens.42 If these forms of participation can be analysed as a form of ‘legitimizing bureaucratic activity’ (Danda, 2013, 116), they make citizen involvement in public security-related action more common. This participation has increased with terrorist violence in the Sahel.

4. The transfer of public policy in the context of the fight against terrorism

37Analysis in a short timeframe perspective shows that citizen participation in security obeys a logic of the re-appropriation of an international model. This extraverted participation is reflected through different logics. In Niger, the ruling party anticipates matters by including citizen participation in its political offer, while in Burkina Faso, it is the intensity of the security crisis that is leading the authorities to resort to it.

4.1 Citizen participation as a reflection of the programmatic crisis

  • 43 On the importance of the perimeter of a social problem, see Knoepfel et al. (2016, 146).

38Since President Roch Marc Christian Kaboré came to power at the end of 2015, the use of citizen participation has been consolidated, as evidenced by the constitutional reform (Saidou, 2018b). The explanation for this political move lies not only in the erosion of state authority, accelerated by the 2014 uprising, but also and above all in the programmatic weakness of the ruling party. Given the intensity of the security crisis, the Kaboré regime sought its salvation in ‘good governance’. Since the 15 January 2016 terrorist attack in the Burkinabe capital, insecurity has become a ‘borderless’ threat.43 The use of citizen participation through the organization of the 2017 Security Forum has been accelerated by the existence of international opportunities.

  • 44 The EU is financing, in partnership with Belgium, a project to support the reinforcement of interna (...)
  • 45 Examples include the Centre for Democratic Governance (CGD) and the Free Afrik Institute, which are (...)
  • 46 G5 Sahel has launched networks of local actors called ‘platforms’, one for young people, the other (...)

39In fact, the action of external partners has been decisive in this shift towards collaboration with civil society. The European Union (EU) provided substantial technical and financial support for the organization of the forum.44 Other international actors such as the United Nations have offered their expertise and financial support towards security reform. These international and transnational actors also fund security programmes for the benefit of civil society.45 Actors in Burkinabe civil society launched an RSS platform on 31 January 2019.46 These national actors act as ‘international brokers’ (Dezalay, 2004) through their dual role as local and transnational agents. In essence, the organization of the security forum, in line with a citizen-centred approach, reflects President Kaboré’s inability to initiate far-reaching reforms. This programmatic weakness explains why the forum has not put an end to the quasi inertia that characterizes security governance (Institut Free Afrik, 2018).

  • 47 Interview with Thomas Dakouré, Ouagadougou, 4 April 2018.
  • 48 A commission was set up on 17 June 2019 to develop a national security policy. See Decree No. 2018- (...)
  • 49 The strategic plan (PSR 2018-2022) adopted by the Council of Ministers on 24 October 2017.
  • 50 On the coherence of public policies, see Savard (2010: 309-335); Maillard and Kübler, (2015: 11).

40Several burning questions remained unanswered at the end of the forum.47 The function of the forum was to identify avenues for global reform. It was not, as in Niger, part of the implementation of a vision previously defined by political leaders. Despite this programmatic paucity, the government initiated the development of the national security policy according to the SSR model.48 This process builds on other reforms already under way, such as the development of a strategy to prevent and combat violent extremism, the adoption of a strategic plan for the reform of the armed forces,49 and community policing (Saidou, 2019). The committed approach poses a problem of coherence, which testifies to a lack of any overall vision when it comes to security measures.50

  • 51 Interview in Niamey with Abdoulaye Igodoé, 17 September 2018.
  • 52 See Decree No. 2017-760/PRN/MISP/D/ACR of 29 September 2017 adopting the document of the National S (...)

41This inconsistency is the result of the extraversion of public policies, in this case the tendency of the state to favour international aid. The same logic is observed in Niger, where an internal security strategy was adopted in September 2017 with the support of the EU and the United Nations,51 whereas, according to the government’s initial plan, this strategy was meant to flow from the defence and security policies being developed.52 The key role of international actors in security reform thus highlights the importance of dependency in creating public policies (Hassenteufel, 2019). More concretely, the security forum in Burkina Faso shows how the international sphere can be a factor of resilience for a regime with weak programmatic capacities. The international offer is presented as a political resource to meet the security challenge and consolidate the legitimacy of the regime, thus fitting into a logic of extraversion. Here, citizen participation camouflages the programmatic deficit of the leaders.

42The strategies of Burkinabe transfer entrepreneurs are based on the desire to attract international aid, but also to consolidate their legitimacy, which has been eroded by the security crisis. This concrete case of a transferred model shows that, beyond the logic of incentives that scholarly studies highlight in terms of diffusion or convergence (Hassenteufel, 2019, 464-474), the logic of political legitimization appears as a decisive determinant. If public action appears to be the result of a transfer (Delpeuch, 2008), it has been ‘domesticated’ in accordance with the logic and interests of the national importers, thus confirming the results of several studies showing that ‘[...] transfers of public actions mean flexible and varying transactions, negotiations and adjustments’ (Darbon and Provini, 2018, 19). This is confirmed by the case of Niger where citizen participation was implemented beforehand.

4.2 The transfer of the participatory model: a strategy of programmatic anticipation

  • 53  See the statement by Colonel Barthélémy Simporé at the national security forum in Burkina Faso (Si (...)

43Unlike Burkina Faso, Niger seems to have a ‘sovereignist’ strategy, less subject to the prescriptions of external partners, and based on programmatic anticipation. In fact, President Mahamadou Issoufou has adopted the international model of participatory security reform disseminated in Africa by international actors such as the Swiss-based Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF).53 With the security crisis, the SSR model has been widely disseminated in the Sahel states (Bryden and N’Diaye, 2011; OIF, 2010). A comparative analysis of President Kaboré’s and President Issoufou’s programmes in the area of security shows a striking contrast. President Kaboré’s vague commitments contrast with those of President Issoufou’s, which are relatively well-developed and concrete (Kaboré 2015; Issoufou 2016).

  • 54 PDES 2017-2021 is ‘the first five-year plan for the operationalization of the Niger 2035 Sustainabl (...)
  • 55 See the key elements of the 2017-21 PDES, particularly in its sub-programme 9.1 on improving the se (...)

44President Issoufou’s security vision, described in his ‘Renaissance Programme Act II’, illustrates the appropriation of the RSS: ‘the redefinition and implementation of a national security policy taking into account the political, economic, psychological and military dimensions’ (Issoufou, 2016, 6). The PDES54 resulting from this programme provides details on the strategy; it provides for ‘the development of the National Defence and Security Policy (NSDS) that will take into account the risks and threats from inside and outside the country’ and ‘the development of actions of analysis, research and support for decision-making’.55

  • 56 As Damien Deltenre points out, the policies initiated by President Issoufou from 2011 reveal a long (...)
  • 57 The CNESS was created by Decree No. 2015-013/PRN of 16 January 2015 and is attached to the civil ca (...)
  • 58 The Burkinabe government adopted a decree in the Council of Ministers on 11 October 2019 establishi (...)

45The strategic framework for security governance defined by the PDES provides details on sectoral policies such as the defence strategy, border management strategy, and so on. In Niger, the aim was to deepen the vision already set out by the ruling party, while in Burkina Faso, it is the forum that has triggered the development of this vision.56 Niger has entrusted the elaboration of the security policy to the National Centre for Strategic and Security Studies (CNESS).57 It is in this regard that this centre organized the security forum, while the Burkinabe forum was organised by an ad hoc committee chaired by the Minister of Security.58

  • 59 The forum registered 120 participants in Niger as against some 600 in Burkina Faso. See Ministère d (...)
  • 60 These are mainly experts from the EU-funded PARSIB project, UN experts, the director of the Police (...)

46The CNESS has been the main linchpin of the forum and is in charge of security reform in general,59 while in Burkina Faso, the experts of the EU-funded project for the support of internal security in Burkina Faso (PARSIB)60 played a leading role in the organization of the forum. Moreover, Niger did not allow the participation of foreign experts in its forum, which it financed entirely, while in Burkina Faso, a substantial part of the budget was financed by the EU. However, this is not a ‘sovereignist’ strategy on the part of Niger, as this is one of the most committed states in international cooperation on security, evident by the presence of foreign forces on its soil (Berghezan, 2016).

  • 61 The CNESS recently published a study on radicalization factors (CNESS, 2018).
  • 62 These include Abdul Azizou Garda, PhD student in Political Science and Adviser at the Ministry of F (...)
  • 63 Interview with Abdoul Azizou Garba and Mohamed Abdou, Niamey, 2 May 2018.

47Niger’s specificity lies in programmatic anticipation, that is to say the fact that President Issoufou has included citizen participation in security reform in his political offer (Garraud, 1990), capitalizing on the experience of his first term (Issoufou, 2011). He benefited from the expertise of the CNESS, which took part in the development of the PDES (République du Niger, 2017).61 In Burkina Faso, on the other hand, President Kaboré inherited a security apparatus in crisis, whose ability to anticipate had been eroded. The role of the CNESS illustrates the structuring effect of institutions in public action, something which neo-institutionalism insists on (Lecours, 2002). During the first term of President Issoufou, a group of researchers and senior officials initiated the revitalization of the Cell of Prospective Studies and Analysis (CEPA) of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.62 Rather than strengthening the CEPA, the process resulted in the creation of the CNESS,63 attached to the presidency of the Republic.

  • 64 He was promoted in 2018 as Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff. The current director of the CNESS is (...)
  • 65 As evidenced by the neo-institutional approach, one of the characteristics of institutional rules i (...)
  • 66  This is evidenced by several conventions signed with international organizations and several activ (...)
  • 67 ECOWAS, 2016, ECOWAS Policy Framework for Governance and Security Sector Reform, http://www.ecowas. (...)
  • 68 For example, on the basis of a model defined in 2018 by the G5 Sahel, member states have initiated (...)

48Its first director, General Ibra Boulama Issa64 was at his appointment Chief of Staff of the President of the Republic. This explains the rapid rise of the CNESS in the security architecture despite the fact that it had been created only recently.65 Its participatory approach to security reform is not the result of a desire for political autonomy, as was the case with the Sankarist regime. If in its beginnings the CNESS did seek this outcome, it is gradually opening up to international cooperation.66 Niger does not escape the logic of extraversion that characterizes public action in states receiving aid. Moreover, a process of ‘transnational harmonization’ (Hassenteufel, 2019) can be seen with the security policy of regional organizations such as the Economic Community of West African states (ECOWAS)67 and G5 Sahel (Diarra, 2016).68

5. Conclusion

49The analysis of citizen participation in security policies makes it possible to observe over time a process of change in the creation of public action. While being extraverted, citizen participation has taken on different meanings as political regimes and the strategies of the ruling elites change. This confirms the idea that ‘[...] the creation of public action is not a matter of convergence and mimicry alone’ (Darbon and Provini, 2018, 19). At the cognitive level, citizen participation in security policies has historically been driven by three paradigmatic logics. There was first a populist logic, which lasted until the end of the 1980s. This model of participation served to neutralize the opposition and legitimize the regimes in power. In Niger, this populist strategy has been marked by its historical constancy. From the 1960s, it continued unabated until the end of the 1980s. On the other hand, in Burkina Faso, it was not until the Sankarist regime in the 1980s that this model emerged.

50From the 1990s onwards, there was the transfer of ‘good governance’, as constructed by Western ‘epistemic communities’ (Haas, 1989) and re-appropriated by local actors. A set of reforms implemented mainly since the 2000s accelerated the anchoring of citizen participation. Finally, there is the paradigm of the SSR in the context of the fight against terrorism, as part of a short timeframe. The 2017 security forums, which resulted from this logic, increased the intensity of citizen participation in security policies. This development did not, however, change the extravert nature of these policies, as shown by French tutelage over the G5 Sahel, which has downgraded ECOWAS in the management of regional security (Yabi, 2017). Indeed, paradigms shaping security policies are still being developed in the international arena, to which few civil society actors have access. As heavy consumers of international aid, the African state and its civil society seem doomed to remain large-scale importers of foreign models, which they are content to ‘domesticate’ in line with their interests.

  • 69 On the historical approach in the political sciences, see Klein and Marmor (2011) and Tilly (2011).

51These facts highlight the very close link between foreign policy, public action and the dynamics of the regimes involved (Alden and Aran, 2017, 63-86), for citizen participation in security management has almost always been shaped by the relations between states and the international sphere. Since the 1960s, it has served to consolidate political regimes by using the international sphere as a resource, and has almost never been thought of in terms of its intrinsic value. We can thus agree with Jean-François Bayart that ‘the governance of Saharo-Western Africa is produced “from the bottom” as well as “from the top”, and according to an ancestral logic of extraversion’ (Bayart et al., 2019, 100). In the epistemological field, the analysis of the trajectory of these two countries highlights the centrality of the historical dimension in the study of public action.69 This detour through history corroborates the heuristic potential of an approach that combines the long-term view with a comparative vision, an approach already deeply rooted in the work of the ‘founding fathers’ of the social sciences (Gazibo, 2018, 17-52).

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Notes

1 On the factors behind the security crisis, particularly the phenomenon of radicalization, see the UNDP study (2017).

2 In Burkina Faso, for example, these calls for self-defence have been increasing across the country since 2018. In 2019, citizens launched a popular resistance movement in the city of Kongoussi. These initiatives are supported by citizens loyal to the ideals of former President Thomas Sankara. A reflection on the theme of popular resistance was launched at the commemoration of Sankara’s assassination in October 2019.

3  The forums were held in Burkina from 24-26 October 2017 and in Niger from 6-8 December 2017.

4 The concept of paradigm, introduced into public policies by Peter Hall (1993), is part of the analysis of public policies from the point of view of the ideas they enshrine (Maillard and Kübler, 2015, 170).

5 Some political thinkers believe that state and society are not differentiated in Africa (Chabal and Daloz, 1999, 34; Badie, 1992, 116-121; Diamond, 1994, 5-17).

6 Sherry R. Arnstein (1969) distinguishes three types of participation: non-participation, symbolic participation and real participation.

7  We put this term in quotation marks because of its normative character and its ambiguous scientific status in political science. See Guy Hermet (2005).

8 See also World Bank (1997), Loada (2001, 44), Cairney (2012, 157).

9 According to Jacques Chevallier ‘Participatory democracy cannot be considered as a substitute for representative democracy: it is not an alternative model. Participatory mechanisms are grafted onto representative mechanisms; they do not undermine the power of the representatives’ (Chevalier, 2005, 219).

10 Some writers find this point of view exaggerated and show that the state remains, in spite of all, the master of the game. They include B. Guy Peters and Jon Pierre (2006, 219): ‘The state and its institutions have been changing, but they remain viable actors in making and implementing policy, and in governance taken generally’.

11 This is the model of security reform developed by the United Nations in post-conflict countries. This model draws on the paradigm of human security and favours a participatory approach. See Bryden and N’Diaye (2011).

12 The history of the importation of community policing into Burkina Faso shows the importance of local actors as importers. Police officers, after a 1993 study tour to Canada, took over this model and worked towards its adoption through small-step reforms. The case of Thomas Dakouré, Comptroller General of Police – now retired – and one of the most influential actors, speaks volumes about this situation. See Saidou (2019, 105-108).

13 We will see later that the organization of the security forum does not obey the same logic in the two countries.

14  Such an approach is based on a historical perspective that authors such as Charles Tilly (2011, 521-540) consider indispensable for political science.

15 According to Giovani Sartori (1994, 22-23), ‘the important thing is to remember that comparing means finding both similarities and differences with respect to a criterion’.

16  Moreover, President Diori did not consider the army to be a priority. On 18 June 1960, the government set out the guidelines for development and did not mention the army (Mahamane, 2008, 53).

17 In addition, the Compaoré regime would create the vigilance brigades composed of civilians and responsible for taking part in security tasks in cities. See Oulon (2018, 65-67).

18   Since 2018, faced with the terrorist challenge, calls have been increasingly heard in Burkina Faso for a return to popular resistance inspired by the experience of the Sankarist regime. See the interview given by Pierre Ouédraogo (2019), head of the CDR under the Sankarist regime, to Radio France International (RFI), http://www.rfi.fr/emission/20191015-burkina-contre-jihadistes-resistance-populaire-sankara-pierre-ouedraogo (accessed on 20 October 2019). In October 2019, in the city of Kongoussi, citizens announced the creation of a ‘Bam resistance movement’.

19   Interview with Thomas Dakouré, Ouagadougou, 4 April 2018.

20 For more details, see Kyelem de Tambéla (2012, 130-154).

21 The term Samariya ‘which in Hausa refers to youth (samari: “young people”) refers to the traditional youth associations in which young men and women were organized, separately, into groups for activity, entertainment and collective work’ (Walraven, 2017, 68). See also Bakary (1992, 94-97).

22 Djibo Bakary did not define himself as a communist due to his Muslim faith, and always defended the idea that the alliance with the communists was simply ‘tactical’ (Walraven, 2017, 87).

23  This was the political approach of President Diori, and it did not meet with unanimous support within his party; some members saw that it entailed the risk that the emergence of a peasant power would threaten party hegemony (Lavigne Delville, 2015, 40).

24  On the process of setting up the Development Corporation, see Sanoussi Jackou (2000, 90-129). As Mamoudou Gazibo and Céline Thiriot (2009, 29-31) show, African culture has been one of the instruments for legitimizing African authoritarianism.

25 Giant billboards were installed in Niamey with messages such as ‘security is priceless’, and ‘there is no development without security’ (Malam Issa, 2008, 142).

26 See also MEF (2015, 12-15).

27 There was no real economic and social development plan before the arrival of the army. A five-year plan for 1963-1967 had been rejected, and a two-year interim plan (1966-1967) had been poorly implemented (Lamizana, 1999, 141).

28 On the concept of ‘benchmark’ (référentiel), see Pierre Muller (2000).

29 In a book published under the editorship of Alain Edouard Traoré, minister of communication at the time, the government retraced the sequences of the crisis and set out the various measures introduced as solutions (Traoré, 2012).

30 This reform was one of the pillars of the peace accords signed on 15 April 1995 between the rebels and the government (Saidou, 2014).

31 The Collège des Sages was a commission composed of figures of moral authority; it was created by the government during the crisis following the murder of the journalist Norbert Zongo (Collège des Sages, 1999, 6).

32   The term Koglweogo (in the Mooré language) literally means ‘protecting the bush’ (Burkina Faso, 2010, 18). The term Yambanga comes from the Hausa language, and roughly means ‘vigilantes’.

33 This reconfiguration of the security sector is analyzed in the French case by Sébastian Roché (2004).

34  A reform of community policing was adopted with the decree 2016-1052 of 14 November 2016, laying down the modalities whereby populations could play a part in the implementation of community policing.

35 Augustin Loada emphasizes that its spread ‘unquestionably renewed the policies of administrative cooperation and marked the emergence of new suppliers of institutional models in a space hitherto turned almost exclusively towards the model of the former metropolis’ (Loada, 2001, 43).

36 The United Nations encouraged these changes. For example, Security Council Resolution 2250 of 9 December 2015 on youth, peace and security recognized the central role of youth in peace and security and recommended that states make them strategic partners (Simpson, 2018).

37 It was adopted by Decree No. 2005-459/PRES/PM/MFPRE of 31 August 2005 on the adoption of the national policy of good governance for the period 2005-2015. It was assessed in 2015 and a new policy was adopted for the period 2017-2026.

38 This was Decree No. 2011-296/PRES/PM/MEF/MATD of 13 May 2011 on the creation, different roles, organizations and functioning of a framework of consultation between the state and NGOs/development associations.

39 This process was intended to improve the quality of the development benchmark adopted in 2002, the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP).

40 The PNDES and the PDES cover the periods 2016-2020 and 2017-2021 respectively.

41 In both cases, the actors involved come from different spheres: ministries, civil society, youth organizations, lecturer-researchers, technical and financial partners, etc. See, for example, the composition of the steering committee for the strategy to prevent and combat violent extremism (MATD, 2018).

42 Created in 1994 under the name ‘High Commission for the Restoration of Peace’, this institution was responsible for the implementation of peace agreements signed between the government and Tuareg and Toubou rebels. In recent years, its missions have changed: it is mainly involved in conflict prevention through dialogue with local populations.

43 On the importance of the perimeter of a social problem, see Knoepfel et al. (2016, 146).

44 The EU is financing, in partnership with Belgium, a project to support the reinforcement of internal security in Burkina Faso (PARSIB), adopted in 2016. The same process can be found with the ECAP Sahel Niger mission, funded by the EU; this mission supported the development of the National Strategy for Internal Security in 2017.

45 Examples include the Centre for Democratic Governance (CGD) and the Free Afrik Institute, which are supported by various Western partners.

46 G5 Sahel has launched networks of local actors called ‘platforms’, one for young people, the other for women, aimed at supporting their actions in the region.

47 Interview with Thomas Dakouré, Ouagadougou, 4 April 2018.

48 A commission was set up on 17 June 2019 to develop a national security policy. See Decree No. 2018-1161 of 19 December 2018 on the creation, composition, powers and functioning of a National Security and Defence Policy Development Committee.

49 The strategic plan (PSR 2018-2022) adopted by the Council of Ministers on 24 October 2017.

50 On the coherence of public policies, see Savard (2010: 309-335); Maillard and Kübler, (2015: 11).

51 Interview in Niamey with Abdoulaye Igodoé, 17 September 2018.

52 See Decree No. 2017-760/PRN/MISP/D/ACR of 29 September 2017 adopting the document of the National Strategy for Internal Security. In November 2018, Niger also launched, with the support of USAID, the process of elaborating the national strategy for the prevention of radicalization and the fight against violent extremism.

53  See the statement by Colonel Barthélémy Simporé at the national security forum in Burkina Faso (Simporé, 2017).

54 PDES 2017-2021 is ‘the first five-year plan for the operationalization of the Niger 2035 Sustainable Development and Inclusive Growth Strategy (SDDCI) adopted by the Government on 9 May 2017’ (PDES 2017-2021).

55 See the key elements of the 2017-21 PDES, particularly in its sub-programme 9.1 on improving the security governance strategic framework (République du Niger, 2017, 140).

56 As Damien Deltenre points out, the policies initiated by President Issoufou from 2011 reveal a long-term vision (Deltenre, 2013, 18).

57 The CNESS was created by Decree No. 2015-013/PRN of 16 January 2015 and is attached to the civil cabinet of the President of the Republic. The development of the national defence and security policy is part of its 2017-19 strategic action plan.

58 The Burkinabe government adopted a decree in the Council of Ministers on 11 October 2019 establishing a national centre for strategic studies in defence and security. A centre with the same name was launched in 2016 by Colonel Auguste Denise Barry, former minister of security under the transitional regime of 2015. The activities of this centre were halted by the arrest of its founder on 29 December 2017, accused of destabilizing the Kaboré regime.

59 The forum registered 120 participants in Niger as against some 600 in Burkina Faso. See Ministère de la Sécurité (MS, 2018, 8).

60 These are mainly experts from the EU-funded PARSIB project, UN experts, the director of the Police Academy and a few lecturer-researchers, including the present author.

61 The CNESS recently published a study on radicalization factors (CNESS, 2018).

62 These include Abdul Azizou Garda, PhD student in Political Science and Adviser at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Dr Hassane Souley, a senior official from the same ministry, Dr Mohamed Abdoulaye, the Minister’s Chief of Staff, Fr. Mahaman Tidjani Alou and Dr Illa Ahmet, both lecturer-researchers and advisers to the President of the Republic.

63 Interview with Abdoul Azizou Garba and Mohamed Abdou, Niamey, 2 May 2018.

64 He was promoted in 2018 as Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff. The current director of the CNESS is Colonel Seidou Magagi Mahamadou.

65 As evidenced by the neo-institutional approach, one of the characteristics of institutional rules is to provide unequal access to decision-making arenas (Knoepfel et al., 2016, 102).

66  This is evidenced by several conventions signed with international organizations and several activities jointly organized with foundations such as the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung (KAS).

67 ECOWAS, 2016, ECOWAS Policy Framework for Governance and Security Sector Reform, http://www.ecowas.int/wp-content/uploads/2018/08/ecowas-policy-framework-on-ssrg-french-adopted.pdf (accessed on 12 January 2019).

68 For example, on the basis of a model defined in 2018 by the G5 Sahel, member states have initiated a process of developing national strategies for preventing and combating violent extremism.

69 On the historical approach in the political sciences, see Klein and Marmor (2011) and Tilly (2011).

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Cite this article

Electronic reference

Abdoul Karim Saidou, « Citizen participation in public security policies in Africa: a comparative analysis of the examples of Burkina Faso and Niger », International Development Policy | Revue internationale de politique de développement [Online], 11.1 | 2019, Online since 27 November 2019, connection on 24 February 2020. URL : http://journals.openedition.org/poldev/3216 ; DOI : https://doi.org/10.4000/poldev.3216

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About the author

Abdoul Karim Saidou

Abdoul Karim Saidou teaches political science at the University of Ouagadougou 2 (Burkina Faso).

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International Development Policy is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International License.

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