- 1 In this chapter, values in euros are converted to US dollars using the exchange rate of 26 April 20 (...)
- 2 For the terminology used in this paper you can refers to European Commission (2015) in the referenc (...)
1Under the national Operational Programme for the implementation of the Youth Employment Initiative (YEI), European Union (EU) countries originally mobilised more than EUR 10 billion (USD 10.68 billion1) to help young people find employment. Italy is the second largest recipient of YEI funds, after Spain. The funds are spent in almost all Italian regions under the coordination of the Ministry of Labour (ML), according to a multilevel governance scheme. The most recent update (1st semester 2021) shows that only 66 per cent of resources programmed for the period 2014‒20 have been spent by the country and that only 57 per cent have been reimbursed by the European Commission. Performance-based EU monitoring shows that in most Member States the figures for the inactive NEET (not in education, employment, or training) implementation process—the number of inactive NEETs that have received YEI offers, the numbers of unemployed that have received an employment offer after participating in the YEI, the long-term unemployed participants who complete the European YG2, and participants in employment (including self-employment) six months after leaving the YG scheme—are generally unsatisfactory, mainly in the countries that have adopted a multilevel governance scheme. This approach, chosen by the majority of Member States (including Italy), is examined in this chapter.
2Multilevel governance of the YG is influenced by many factors, such as adequate inter-institutional coordination and partnerships, the transition from a project to a strategy, regular meetings of the monitoring committees and the establishment of performance monitoring (Rosas, 2017). Analysis of the multilevel scheme adopted by Italy reveals the key factors affecting the inefficiency and poor impact of the YG. This chapter analyses why the same initiative may, in certain areas of the country, provide counterexamples to the overall mapping of the spending of EU funds, due to regional economic and social gaps and unclear multilevel governance, targets and indicators. The methodology used combines the following set of indicators: spending input and output, regional divide proxies, the positive exit of young beneficiaries, outcomes, targets achieved, the penetration rate of actions, and the logical framework approach to detecting problems and finding solutions.
3The chapter demonstrates that national monitoring does not necessarily reveal the limits and causes of the low efficiency (through an input and output set of indicators) and limited impact (through an outcome set of indicators and proxies) of such an initiative. Lack of spending, late spending, low target achievement and the misdirection of resources will be considered as possible direct causes of this low efficiency and low impact of the YG in order to shed light on the effectiveness of measures in facilitating young individuals’ transition into the labour market.
4The chapter is organised as follows: Section 2 sets out the context of the multilevel governance of the YG in Italy. Section 3 analyses the macro-regional and regional input, output and outcome data in order to show how the YG challenges are linked to the development of local youth labour markets. Section 4 further elaborates on the methodological aspects of a multilevel evaluation, building on the logical framework problem tree to help identify the primary causes of the limited impact of the YG scheme, while Section 5 presents key findings and recommendations.
- 3 Council Recommendation of 22 April 2013 on establishing a Youth Guarantee 2013/C 120/01.
- 4 The OECD defines ALMPs as follows: 'Active Labour market programmes include all social expenditure (...)
5At the end of a multiannual preparatory timeline of ‘Youth on the move’ (Escudero and López Mourelo, 2017), the Youth Guarantee (YG) was finally established by the ‘Council Recommendation of 22 April 2013 on establishing a Youth Guarantee’3 with the aim of ensuring that all young people under the age of 25 receive an offer of good-quality employment, continued education, an apprenticeship, or a traineeship within four months of becoming unemployed or leaving formal education. According to REC 2013/C 120/01, ‘[a]n offer of continued education could also encompass quality training programs leading to a recognized vocational qualification’ (The Council of the European Union, 2013, preamble point 5). The YG aims at boosting the active labour market policies (ALMPs4).
6Geared to national, regional, and local circumstances, the YG is based on six axes: (i) building partnership-based approaches, (ii) early intervention and activation, (iii) supportive measures enabling labour market integration, (iv) use of European Union funds, (v) assessment and continuous improvement of the scheme, and (vi) swift implementation (The Council of the European Union, 2013, preamble point 20). This multidimensional approach distinguishes the YG and may drive specific impacts that are not observed in other similar interventions (Escudero and López Mourelo, 2017), and aims at ‘repairing the pre-crisis models of labor markets and education’ (Andor, 2016).
- 5 Art. 9 (8) of Regulation (EU) No 1303/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 Dece (...)
7The starting point for delivering the YG to a young individual should be her or his registration with a public employment service (PES) or employment agency (EA). EU Member States were invited to make the best possible use of the European Social Fund (ESF) and YEI funds—the latter amounting to EUR 8.9 billion (USD 9.5 billion) for the period 2014-20—where applicable to support the set-up and implementation of YG schemes as a policy instrument for combating and preventing youth unemployment and social exclusion. The initial budget was EUR 6.4 billion (USD 6.83 billion). However, given persistently high levels of youth unemployment, the EU increased this budget in 2017, 2019 and 2020 by a total of EUR 2.5 billion (USD 2.67 billion) in additional resources. The YEI is implemented in accordance with ESF rules.and makes reference to EU Thematic Objective (TO) no. 8 of the 2014‒2020 Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF), ‘promoting sustainable and quality employment and supporting Labour mobility5’, and the respective SGG Target 8.6 “by 2020, substantially reduce the proportion of youth non in employment, education or training” (Agenda 2030. 2015) and indicator (.6.1 “proportion of the youth (aged 15-24 years) not in education, employment or training” (UN SDG Website)
8Italy presented its YG Implementation Plan (YGIP) on 23 December 2013, and a progress note was sent to the European Commission in September 2015. The YG was extended to 26 to 29-year-olds and the Centri per l’Impiego (the PES) was appointed as the relevant public authority in charge of establishing and managing the YG scheme and coordinating partnerships across all levels and sectors.
- 6 In accordance with Regulation (EU) No 1303/2013 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 (...)
9Italian PESs are public bodies coordinated by the Regions or by the Autonomous Provinces; they encourage the matching of job opportunities and job supply and promote active labour policies. Since mid-2017 the PESs have been coordinated and managed by the National Agency for Active Labour Policies (ANPAL) in conjunction with the Regions, which coordinate the PESs at the local level. The ANPAL is also the managing authority of the YEI Operational Programme and is responsible for the national YG database, which brings together data collected by the PESs at a local level and the periodical monitoring reports on the Youth Guarantee in Italy.6
10A dedicated website for the YG in Italy allows young individuals not already registered with a PES to sign up to the YG scheme. The scheme offers the following services: information and guidance sessions; vocational training; work placements; apprenticeships for the youngest; traineeships, not limited to the most qualified (graduates); the promotion of self-employment and self-entrepreneurship; transnational and territorial professional mobility opportunities, and a civil service scheme offering the possibility of certifying the acquisition of new skills.
- 7 European commission, C (2014) 4969 final, Brussels, 11.7.2014.
- 8 European commission, C (2017) 8927 Brussels, 18.12.2017.
- 9 European commission, C (2020) 9116 final, Brussels, 10.12.2020.
11The scheme was launched in May 2014 and was originally financed by the National Operational Programme on Youth Employment (ESF/YEI)7 with EUR 1.135 billion (USD 1.217 billion) of EU funds (ESF and YEI) and EUR 378 million (USD 403 million) of national funds to be spent in the period 2014‒15 (Ciampi, 2015). This financial scheme was increased in 20178 to EUR 2.141 billion (USD 2.285 billion) of EU resources with an additional EUR 643 million (USD 686 million) of national resources to finance the Youth Guarantee until 2020. Further reprogramming followed in 2018 and 2020, the last wave occurring in December 2020,9 with the final financial package amounting to EUR 2.181 billion (USD 2.328 billion) of EU resources and EUR 648 million (USD 692 million) of national resources, a total of EUR 2.829 billion (USD 3.023 billion).
- 10 Idem, Tab 4. According to ILO definition. Onboarding is “A process through which new members move f (...)
12The programme’s 2023 target, according to the most recent reprogramming, is to accompany to the labour market 262,040 inactive NEETs and 46,730 under 25s and 25 to 29-year-old NEETs. The impact target is 30 per cent of YG beneficiaries employed within six months of the end of the programme, 80 per cent of the employed beneficiaries maintaining their jobs after onboarding.10
13The monitoring platform of the YG scheme is based on four steps (Toti, 2021) in the following temporal order of the journey of registered people:
14- step A (active): The eligible NEET joins the YG. Membership can be activated both on the National Portal and on the Regional Portals.
- 11 According to Council Recommendation (2020) ‘profiling takes into account the preferences and motiva (...)
15- step P (on board): The NEET goes to the competent service to carry out the activity and onboarding is realised with the signing of the Service Pact (Patto di Servizio) and the profiling11.
16- step T (joining a component of the YG scheme): The NEET starts joining the selected YG scheme. T status remains unchanged throughout the journey through the selected YG scheme until the end of participation (positive exit), or until the occurrence of early interruption (negative exit).
17- step F (Final): status changes to F (Final) upon completion of the activities covered by the last active policy provided in the case of positive exit.
18The YG guidelines clarify that the beneficiary of YG training for job integration should pass from the entry state (step A) to state F 120 days following either the end of the training course or the date of the final examination, if provided for in the implementation of the measure. In the case of job placement within 120 days of the end of the training course, the young individual passes to state F on the date of the activation of the employment relationship. All 16 to 18-year-old beneficiaries of training for reintegration into a curricular process are considered to have reached, positively, the end of the process at the end of the training course. Extracurricular training beneficiaries and those included in civil service initiatives leave the scheme, positively, when their respective work experience ends. Beneficiaries of guidance and support are considered to have successfully reached the end of the process on the commencement date of their fixed-term, temporary, or full employment relationship or their apprenticeship. Finally, the support provided for start-ups or self-employment is considered successful when the support itself ends.
19According to this set of indicators, there are no defined links between the status of ‘F’ and effective entry into the labour market (employed, self-employed, or ‘start-upper’) by the beneficiaries. To inquire into impact of YG on the labour market, we must consider the coverage index (see Section 3) and the employment rate months after the end of the intervention. This latter helps defining the percentage of YG participants employed n months later (normally 1 month, 3 months, or 6 months).
20Before inquiring into the direct causes of the limited efficiency and low impact of the national YG scheme (mentioned above), a focus on monitoring and evaluation most updated reports is required. The key evidence in terms of inputs, outputs, and outcomes of the YG in Italy are, therefore, synthesised in this section.
- 12 The financial input indicators monitored by the EU Cohesiondata database are a) ESIF (European Stru (...)
21The commitment and spending of resources (input data): according to the 2020 annual report of the managing authority of the programme (ANPAL, 2021A), at the end of 2020 the financial input indicator of the ESF/YEI corresponded to a total eligible cost of EUR 1,777,524,198.16 (approximately USD 1,899,000,000), thus to 62.81 per cent of the total programmed allocation of EUR 2,829,877,841.00 (approximately USD 3,024,320,000), with a total of 230,164 interventions in the system and a total final expenditure of EUR 1,527,206,099.52 (approximately USD 1,632,000,000) (53.97 per cent of the programme )12.
22The targets achieved (output data): On 31 December 2020 more than 1.636 million young individuals had registered with the YG programme, just 80 per cent of these having signed a Service Pact (Patto di Servizio) at a PES or EA. In the same period, from the beginning of the scheme until 31 December 2020, more than 747,000 young individuals had been involved in active policy measures, of which over 712,000 (95.4 per cent) concluded an intervention provided by the YG scheme (ANPAL, 2021A).
23Regional divide in outcomesAccording to the European Commission’s most recent Country Report on YG implementation in Italy (European Commission, 2020a), ‘large disparities persist between the North and the South, where caseloads with difficult profiles are more frequent. […] Close monitoring could help to minimise the risk of traineeships being misused as an alternative to employment contracts’. The year before, the European Commission stated, in ‘Conclusions of the Employment Committee’s multilateral surveillance review on the implementation of the Youth Guarantee’ (European Commission, 2019a), that the implementation may be suffering from the high complexity of the system and possibly from difficulties in managing the large number of projects on a local and regional level. ‘In this context, PES capacity needs to be strengthened and a national strategy might be needed’ is the Commission’s key remark (European Commission, 2019a). Differences in labour markets could also be relevant (Agostini and Sacconi, 2019).
24Positive exit and outcomes: Another way to verify positive exit is offered by the index of employment of YG beneficiaries after six months (ANPAL, 2021b; Lion et al., 2021) or eighteen months (Battista, G. di, R. Landi, C. Lion, V. Lupo, S. Pizzuti, K. Santomieri, V. Sciatta and E. Toti ANPAL (2019). This system is not fully reliable since employment status could be the result of other actions not linked to YG exit or to an individual activity of the beneficiary, and the surveys usually include internships, apprenticeships, civic service, subsidised contracts and standard contracts. The index therefore closes with an outcome data, defined as ‘change arising from an intervention, usually in relation to its objectives (e.g., trainees who have found employment)’ (ECA, 2017). In addition, the significant differences registered by the index between the macro areas of the country could be driven by the different conditions of local labour markets. According to the Ministry of Labour, the average employment rate at six months after exit at the first quarter of 2020, considering the cumulative on boarded NEET, is 28.5 per cent. By 3 December 2020, 712,815 young individuals had completed one or more active policies within the YG programme. Of these, 426,014 appeared to be in employment (ANPAL 2021a). The average employment rate of those who had completed at least one measure was 59.8 per cent, with differences in gender and education being considered. The rate is higher for men (62.2 per cent) than for women (57.1 per cent), and in general is higher for those with better employability (low and medium-low profiling). Another relevant outcome data is that 77.1 per cent of those employed had a permanent job or apprenticeship contract, while 19.6 per cent had a short-term contract (ANPAL 2021A).
25Penetration rate, onboarding rate and coverage index: The European Commission YG database (European Commission, 2019b) offers an analysis of the impact of the programme on the country’s NEETs reached by the YG and the positive situation of beneficiaries after exiting from the scheme (positive exits as a proportion of total exits). The percentage of NEETs that registered for the YG (penetration rate) was 12.7 in 2019 (European Commission, 2020c). The onboarding rate is an expression of the number of YG registered NEETs and that of YG onboarded NEETs (ANPAL, 2019). The coverage index refers to the number of young individuals joining the YG scheme—net of those cancelled after taking over for lack of requirements—compared to the number of YG participants onboarded (ANPAL, 2019).
26The counterfactual exercise: The EU counterfactual evaluation (European Commission, 2020b) generally refers to ESF-funded measures targeting the young unemployed and therefore cannot directly be referred to the YG scheme. The evaluation presents four case studies, and the analysis is restricted to individuals around the age 30 threshold, in the 27-33 age interval.
- 13 In order to define Average Treatment Effect and Average Treatment effect on the Treated (TOTI 2021)
27A specific YG counterfactual exercise is, meanwhile, provided by ANPAL (Toti, 2021). The similarity of eligible and non-eligible young individuals (younger and older than 30) is checked by comparing the characteristics of the individuals in these two groups and their distributions. An examination of the status of beneficiaries of the YG scheme onboarding and non-YG beneficiaries13 in the period from January 2016 to December 2016 and employment status 18 months later shows that the comparison at the end of this period is always in favour of YG beneficiaries in the southern regions. In the other regions the impact is relevant after 11‒12 months. The exercise also demonstrates that the positive effect of the YG is appreciable not only in terms of the increased opportunities offered to find a job, but also in terms of the quality of the job opportunity itself. Participation in active policies within the YG produces an increase of around 7.6 percentage points in the employment rate (67.9 per cent for YG beneficiaries versus 60.3 per cent for people not involved in the YG). Positive results are also revealed if over-education in the labour market is considered. Participation in active policies within the YG reduces, by around 2.6 percentage points, the probability of finding an underqualified job (20.3 per cent for YG beneficiaries versus 22.9 per cent for those not involved in the YG). Counterfactual exercises in some pilot areas in France have stated that YG pilot projects have the greatest positive effect on the employment rate, during participation, in the first three months following exit (Ministère du Travail, de l’Emploi, de la Formation professionnelle et du Dialogue social, 2016).
28Qualitative-sociological analysis applied to some pilot programmes reveals that the effects of the YG on the labour market trajectories of beneficiaries are threefold, participants finding a job, beneficiaries continuing to prepare for gainful and productive employment, and disadvantaged youth breaking their path of exclusion (Loison-Leruste et al., 2016).
29Ex ante design evaluation aimed at highlighting prerequisites for the successful functioning of YG programmes has been carried out by some authors (Escudero and López Mourelo, 2015), are the following: the clearness of the eligibility criteria, timing, comprehensive packages, setting of the institutional frameworks, adequate financing of the programme and the mandatory elements of the YG scheme (Escudero and López Mourelo, 2017; Eichhorst and Rinne, 2017). Previous experience with similar instruments will also affect the efficiency of the programme (Pastore, 2015) and its sanctioning (Caliendo and Schmidl, 2016; Van den Berg et al., 2014). Comparative studies at NUT t2 level, mainly on YG governance and the institutional framework, are also available (Dhéret and Roden, 2016).
30Given the puzzle of input, output, and outcome data, the puzzle of different sources of analysis (see for comparison the regional reports, i.e. Veneto Lavoro, 2019; Regione Lazio, 2021; and Agenzia sarda per le politiche attive del lavoro, 2017) and the incomplete disclosure of data at the local level denounced by the European Court of Auditors (ECA, 2017), the research question is how is it possible to detect the low impact of the YG scheme and identify its causes? Further, how can we define the direct causes and the primary causes, which must be removed? To answer the research question, I will use the logical framework (Cracknell, 1989; Gasper, 1997; Gasper, 2000; Bell, 2000) presented in figure 1, which considers as direct causes (i) a lack of spending (unspent resources), (ii) late spending (expenditure delay), (iii) low target achievement, and (iv) the misdirection of resources. The reference to logical framework (‘Log Frame’) is not for monitoring and evaluation purposes (Bakewell and Garbutt, 2005) but to detect the structural causes of the lack of efficiency and impact of the national YG scheme.
31According to the Log Frame, causes (i) and (ii) mainly affect the efficiency of a programme, while causes (iii) and (iv) affect its effectiveness.
Figure 1 The logical framework approach: A standard ESF problem tree.
Note: a version of this schema was presented and discussed by the author during the seminar ‘Planning Europe’s future: The making of the EU Recovery plan, the last AHCD Policy Seminar of the year zooms in on a pioneering EU instrument’, at the Albert Hirschman Centre on Democracy, Geneva, 10 June 2021.
Source: the author.
32To verify the eventual impact of each of the direct causes of the inefficiency and ineffectiveness of the Italian YG scheme, I will first test the effects of the YG programme according to the following set of indicators taken from sources discussed in the previous section (see table 1).
Table 1 Set of indicators
- 14 Nomenclature of territorial units for statistics (nomenclature d'unités territoriales statistiques) (...)
- 15 The analysis is required by the multilevel governance of the programme (National management and reg (...)
|
Direct cause
|
Domain of impact
|
Indicators
|
Level of analysis
|
|
Lack of spending
|
Efficiency
|
Spent vs. decided; spent vs. planned
|
Country level
|
|
Late spending
|
Efficiency
|
Expenditure of the programme vs. average of ESF EU programmes
|
Country level
|
|
Low target achievement
|
Effectiveness
|
Coverage index vs. index of employment
|
NUTS14, macroregional level15
|
|
Misdirection of resources
|
Effectiveness
|
n/for this programme
|
-
|
Source: the author
33The analysis of selected indicators in the next section will be used to identify the key primary causes of the inefficiency/ineffectiveness of the programme from those indicated in the logical framework approach described in figure 1. However, the widespread bottom-up collection of regional YG data on NEETs’ success rate with regard to completing the measures engaged upon, and their subsequent rate of integration into the labour market, are not fully disclosed, as noted above (ECA, 2017).
34The use of input indicators (lack of spending and late spending) and output (target achievement) at the national level does not permit detection of the direct causes of the lack of both efficiency and impact of the national YG scheme.
35The levels of resources planned, decided upon, and spent on the programme, including ESF (EUR 301 million (USD 321.7 million)), YEI (EUR 1.88 million (USD 2 million)) and national (EUR 648 million (USD 693 million)) resources are shown in figure 2.
Figure 2 Total resources in millions of euros.
Sources: Elaboration from European Commission, Cohesion data period covered 30/06/2021 refresh date 11/11/2021.
36As measured on 31 December 2020, the spending performance of the programme was not satisfactory; it had been 54 per cent at the end of 2019 and had only risen to 64 per cent by the end of 2020. It was, however, better than the EU spending average for the same periods—respectively, 52 per cent (2019) and 59 per cent (2020). And since the expiry date for certified expenditures is the end of 2023, the first possible direct cause (unspent funds) can be excluded.
37In figure 3, the interim payments performance of the Italian programme is compared with the equivalent figure EU wide. Considering only interim payments (i.e. the reimbursement of notified eligible expenditures; initial prefinancing and annual prefinancing are not considered), in the period 2014‒20 the Italian YG programme registered a payment performance that was substantially close to the EU average.
Figure 3 Interim payments performance vs. EU YEI performance (in %).
Source: Elaboration from European Commission Open Data Platform cohesion data.
38The late spending (the second possible direct cause) in the most recent period (2020) could mainly be connected with the pandemic of 2020 and the asymmetric generational effect of COVID-19 in the country.
39The graph in figure 4 compares Italian target achievement with EU YEI performance. While the number of Italian beneficiaries unemployed is always 16‒20 points below the average across the period, the percentage of inactive individuals that benefited from the programme is above the average (+16-19 points). Considering that during this period Italy registered the highest numbers of inactive NEETs in the EU, performance could be considered satisfactory. This conclusion must, however, be confirmed by at least a NUT 1 analysis of the performance when data becomes available.
Figure 4 Italian target performance vs. EU YEI performance, 2014‒19.
Source: European Commission Open Data Platform cohesion data.
40A comparison of the number of YG-onboarded NEETs and the total number of YG registrations reveals that there no macro-regional polarisation. A low onboarding rate (for a definition see Section 3) of registered NEETsis evidenced both in some northern regions, such as Lombardy (57.9 per cent), and in southern regions such as Calabria (53.6 per cent). The same is true of high onboarding rates (Emilia-Romagna, 91.3 per cent; Sardinia, 93.4 per cent).
Figure 5 YG rate of onboarded NEETs.
Source: ANPAL (2019).
41Relevant information comes, indeed, if we consider putting in relation the coverage index and the employment rate Since second-level NUT data is not available for all regions, here we consider first-level NUT data. The graph in figure 6 shows the coverage index related to the employment rate of YG at the end of 2019. The employment rate of the southern regions is lower compared to that of the north-eastern regions, at 26.1 points. The YG Coverage index lower 18,6 points.
Figure 6 YG coverage index vs. index of employment 1 month after exit
Source: Elaboration from ANPAL data (ANPAL, 2019).
42The figure shows how the performance of the PESs and EAs (monitored by the coverage index) strongly affects the employment of beneficiaries (the index of employment). A low coverage index figure in the southern regions and the islands corresponds to a low index of employment figure.
43The influence of the coverage index is even more evident if we consider the index of employment registered 1 month after the end of the scheme (27.7 index points of employment difference between the southern regions and the islands and the north-western regions. See figure 7).
Figure 7 Coverage index vs. index of employment 1 month after exit.
Source: Elaboration from ANPAL data (ANPAL, 2019).
44The influence of the coverage index on the employment index is further confirmed by a comparison of regions, such as Veneto and Puglia. Although considerable differences in the local labour markets must also be considered.
Figure 8 Coverage index vs. index of employment, regional comparison
Source: Elaboration from ANPAL data (ANPAL, 2019).
45The multidimensional exercise carried out here shows that an evaluation that focuses on national input and output data does not reveal the real impact of the YG on the country. The examination of such data confirms that the economic management (decided on and spent ESF/YEI resources) of the YG in Italy is closely in line with the EU country average (see table 2, points (i) and (ii)). Based on ‘country level’ monitoring we should conclude that the YG achieved its output targets and that potential direct causes of a lack of spending and of late spending were not particularly relevant to the country’s 2014‒20 experience. The ‘country level’ monitoring, however, does not consider two fundamental aspects of the country’s YG scheme:
46a) The multilevel governance of the YG in Italy gives a key role to regional management and monitoring of the resources employed. The implementation of the YG measures is therefore widely different
47b) The use of resources and measures of the YG scheme are affected mainly by regional labour markets slack.
48If, however, monitoring focuses on first-level NUTS and targets the ratio of the macro-regional coverage index to the respective index of employment, substantial differences become apparent (figure 7 above).
49According to the dashboard in Table 2 the key primary causes of the ineffectiveness of the programme in some regions of the country should therefore be found in the low target achievement domain and mainly involve the limited use of certain output/outcomes indicators, as proposed in figure 9.
Table 2 YG dashboard
Source: the author.
Figure 9 Low target achievement (detail of figure 1).
50The performance of the YG measures is clearly related not only to financial aspects and labour market conditions but also to the efficiency of the multilevel governance of the Italian programme as to be inquired, and the excessive concentration on the relevance of expenditures should be discussed.
51Since the three primary causes of low target achievement, such as the excessive focus on inputs indicators (commitment and expenditures), the incorrect setting of monitoring packages and the lack of data at a regional level should in the future be better assessed, key recommendations could be summarised as follows:
52(i) The first potential primary cause could probably be removed in the 2021‒27 Multiannual Financial Framework (MFF) via a more performance-based approach, such as the one by the National Recovery and Resilience Plan. The second and third potential primary causes could be removed if a standardised, well-balanced set of indicators were seriously considered and implemented. This would guarantee the comparability of regional data and enable the transfer of best practices from one region to another—assuming a similar youth labour market—and would in time increase the impact of the YG if accompanied by a higher level of management skills among PES personnel and the full digitalisation of the public bodies involved in the process.
53(ii) The potential primary causes of low target achievement—such as the excessive focus on input indicators (commitment and expenditures), the incorrect setting of monitoring packages and the lack of data at a regional level—must in the future be better assessed and should be considered for the 2021-27 EU initiatives fighting the NEET phenomenon.
54(iii) The removal of the primary causes of the limited impact of the YG should reveal the relevance of other causes of inefficiency of the YG scheme itself (see figure 1). Attention should therefore mainly be given to some of the primary causes affecting administrative procedures, such as the low level of management skills of PES personnel and the low digitalisation level of the public bodies involved in the process and in the design of the YG scheme (such as the eligibility criteria, the integration of activation measures, and an appropriate institutional frameworks).
55(iv) To better focus on the impact of the YEI multilevel governance approach adopted by most EU Member States, a more granular, performance-based approach to monitoring cannot be left aside. Solutions to boost the future YG scheme implemented within the multilevel governance will be influenced by such a granular platform, and by comparison of possible regional impact.