- 1 The policy is an investment policy aiming at improving competitiveness and reduce disparities in th (...)
1The European Social Fund (ESF) is one of five European Structural and Investment Funds (ESIFs) that contribute to the implementation of the Cohesion Policy (CP)—often called “Regional Policy”1—of the European Union (EU) and its Member States. These Funds’ allocation and functioning employ mechanisms developed over several decades, and are strongly connected to the reinforcement of the European Union’s integration.
2The European resources allocated to the CP are a subject of interest for many academics and analysts (Hodges, 1981; Leonardi, 1993, 1995, 2005; Nanetti, 1996; Pollak, 1996; Monti, 2016, 2020; Bachtler and Mendez, 2007; Polverari, 2016), who have provided various perspectives on the finalities of the policy. As noted by Leonardi and Holguin (2016), some scholars consider the CP to be a social and compensatory policy (Hodges, 1981; Pollack, 1995; Allen, 1996), while others maintain that the goal of the CP is to restructure the peripheral and less developed regions of countries in order to complete the single market project (Leonardi, 1993; Leonardi, 1995; Nanetti 1996).
- 2 See, also, the chapter by Lutringer in this thematic volume.
3Leonardi and Holguin (2016) have identified six principles on which the CP is based, one of which is the sound financial management of funds. The expenditure aspect is still heterogeneous across EU Member States (MSs). In some cases, despite a level of expenditure lower than the European average, MSs might still match the parameters of the annual level of certified expenditures according to the n+3 rule.2 In others, MSs might lose the chance of receiving the resources whether the level of expenditures does not achieve the expected financial target. Besides the level of expenditure, there are however multiple factors that contribute to the definition of the dynamic of expenditure. A consideration of both the flow of resources with respect to financial targets and the absorption of EU funds—namely, whether CP funds are organically integrated into the system of investment and whether fund management is performed smoothly—could therefore be equally relevant to an understanding of the modalities that accompany the action of spending. Although this last point has been addressed already in the broader debate on the absorption of European resources at the national and regional levels (European Commission, 1999; Corte dei Conti, 2019, 2021a; 2021b), the anomalous condition of the pandemic provides the opportunity to look at this in a different perspective.
4The experience of Italy is particularly relevant due to the characteristic of the country—one of the six founder members of the European Coal and Steel Community, in which the European Union has its roots. Although Italy has a developed economy, there are obvious socio-economic inequalities at the subnational level. People living in certain Italian regions are exposed to a higher risk of poverty and social exclusion, as shown by European Statistical Office (or, Eurostat) data, Eurostat ranking Italy as the third country above the European average (Eurostat, n.d.). The Constitutional Reform, approved in 2001 in Italy, has established the country as one of the few EU MSs in which regional governments have legislative powers. Further, some authors have noted that the country presents a plurality of policy responses at the regional level and is characterised by a micro-fragmentation that cuts across territories and policy areas in the fields of the labour market and social policy (Kazepov and Barberis, 2017; Giorgi and Pavan, 2021; Giorgi, 2022; Ascoli, 2022). Considering the ESF allocation to each MS, the budget breakdown per country shows that Italy is the MS with the highest budget allocated for the programme cycle 2014‒20, which is the period considered by the analysis presented in this chapter. The CP being based on the principle of co-funding between the EU and Member states, budgets per country correspond to the sum of these shares. In the case of Italy, its budget is the largest, both for EU resources and for the total budget. This chapter situates changes to expenditure management institutionally, and analyses their implications for implementation practices. The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the research questions and the methodology used to process the data collected. Section 3 presents an analysis of the actors involved in the deployment of the ESF in the Italian context, taking into consideration different levels of governance. Section 4 presents the main elements of the documentation analysed and the interviews conducted—including the reprogramming modality—and highlights the socialisation process pre and post the COVID-19 pandemic. Finally, the conclusion remarks on the evolution of institutional components and on how a focus on the socialisation process is fundamental to an understanding of the dynamics of implementation.
5ESIFs and their functional mechanisms have to be seen as parts of a multilevel framework, including European, national and local levels. Here the focus is primarily on the administration, the role of procedures, and the type of actors involved in the implementation of the CP in Italy. Despite the fact that research has been carried out during the period 2020‒21, the implementation of the Operational Programmes (OPs) financed during the 2014‒20 cycle is far from over, since the funding scheme 2014‒20, with its norms and procedures, will remain valid until 2023.
- 3 As reported by Servizio Studi Camera dei Deputati, the Complementary OPs support the Cohesion-relat (...)
6For the programme cycle 2014‒20, Italy has developed 75 Operational Programmes (OPs), 51 of which are financed by the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) and the ESF. The ESF participates in part or fully in the co-financing of 29 of these, 8 being managed at the national level (NOPs) and 21 at the regional level (ROPs). However, the number of plans and programmes concerned with cohesion as an element of policy is higher when national complementary OPs3 are considered (OpenCoesione, 2021; Agenzia per la Coesione Territoriale 2021b).
- 4 ‘With the reprogramming of December 2018, the total resources of the NOP were reduced from EUR 1,32 (...)
7With regard to the OPs activated in the programme cycle, by 31 December 2018 the three had not achieved the level of certified expenditures required for that year; two managed at the central level, the other at the regional level. Excluding the NOP dedicated to ‘Research and Innovation’ (‘Ricerca e innovazione’), co-financed by the ERDF, the other two result co-financed by the ESF. In the case of the NOP ‘Inclusion’ (‘Inclusione’), the expenditures certified were not sufficient to achieve the target.4 In the other case, the ROP ‘Valle d’Aosta’, the expenditure of 1.47 million euros has not been certified.
- 5 ‘I give [so] that you might give.’
- 6 Primarily ‘Systems for Active Employment Policies – IT’ (ESF); ‘Social Inclusion – IT’ (ESF); ‘Gove (...)
8In 2018, the Italian Agency for Territorial Cohesion (Agenzia per la Coesione Territoriale (ACT)) estimated a potential de-commitment that concern the ESF amount to 0.5% of the total resources foreseen in the current programming (Agenzia per la Coesione Territoriale, 2018). The media address the need of clarification on EU funds management and expenditure, mainly to discuss two issues. On the one hand, the ‘do ut des’5 relationship between the EU and MSs, to understand which MSs pay more than they receive in cohesion policy investments, i.e. whether they are net beneficiaries or donors of the European budget. On the other, to report the difficulties encountered in the use of resources, and to raise public awareness of the spending of European funds. As journalists recall, (Gabanelli and Offeddu, 2019), the Italian Court of Auditors has reported that the planning and management capacity of national operators, as well as the performance of the programming cycle, are important to clarify the dynamics among the resources collected and allocated in the CP (Corte dei Conti, 2019). To understand better the nature and functions related to the operators, the author has considered a selection of OPs6 in order to identify the policy architecture in place, with respect to the following research questions:
9Who are the actors that may be considered mid-level implementation bodies that operates in the OPs selected?
10What were the main features that emerge from the dynamic of reprogramming the OPs, which represent the main alteration of expenditure planning?
- 7 Twenty interviewees. For transparency and accessibility themes related to the OpenCoesione portal, (...)
11The analysis presented here is based on information retrieved from reports and from official documents of the European and Italian authorities (European Union, 2013; 2017;2020; Ministero del Lavoro e delle Politiche Sociali, 2021) , but also on the EU Cohesion Data data set (European Commission Cohesion Data, 2021) and on data from OpenCoesione, the accounting authority (Ragioneria Generale dello Stato, Corte dei Conti) and the Italian Ministry of Economy and Finance. Other studies and literature were also consulted, in particular for the analysis of the main actors in the European decentralised management scheme (Milio, 2014; Monti, 2016, Polverari, 2016; Gualini, 2016). To delve into interactions among actors, a set of semi-structured interviews was conducted between July 2020 and March 2021.7 This enabled the gathering of perspectives on and experiences of the coordination and organisation of activities with other actors and/or authorities, mainly on the level where Managing Authorities (MAs) and Intermediate Bodies (IBs) interact. Other observations emerged from the interviews, including regarding reprogramming practices before and after the COVID-19 pandemic. Moving to the second research question—that on reprogramming, an alteration of expenditure schedules agreed at the beginning of the policy cycle—before the COVID-19 pandemic reprogramming was discouraged, or only approved following several controls accepted by the European Commission (EC) in accordance with European Regulation n. 1303/2013. In fact, a recent report from the European Court of Auditors states that reprogramming and adjustments were carried out by the EC and several MSs throughout the programme cycle 2014‒20, already before the COVID-19 pandemic was declared (European Court of Auditors, 2021).
- 8 One factor that emerges from a consultation of the documents is the reduction of the Italian co-fin (...)
12In general, the practice of national resources remodulation which reduce part of the allocation destinated to the programmes jointly financed by the EU and Italian resources towards the so-called national ‘complementary programming’ is acknowledged by the Italian institutions (Camera dei Deputati, 2021). This practice already occurred in the previous programming period (2007‒13), and in the 2014‒20 cycle it has been approved after control by the EC, which verified whether the alteration of the co-financing arrangement intervenes or not on the share allocated by the general scheme regulated the CP, to ensure sufficient resources to achieve the political objectives of the CP.8
- 9 The Coronavirus Response Investment Initiative and the Coronavirus Response Investment Initiative P (...)
13Regarding reprogramming practice in the face of the COVID-19 pandemic, Italy implemented the measures offered by the EC initiatives CRII and CRII+.9 To facilitate monitoring of the activities financed by the thematic reprogramming of OPs, the EC developed the Coronavirus Dashboard, which tracks the response implemented using the ERDF and the ESF. According to the EC, ‘Italy has made major changes to almost all of its programmes, reallocating over €4.5 billion in total, making it the highest amount to be invested in the coronavirus response in the EU’ (European Commission, 2021). It is worthy of note that the platform provides new COVID-19–related indicators to track the use of such funds, even though their use is voluntary or country-based, also because some of the targets concerns very specific national actions that cannot be aggregated at the EU level.
14Re-modulation might respond to difficulties deriving from the programming phase, mainly regarding administrative procedures among national and European levels. This, however, is more evident in the case of the ERDF than in that of the ESF, since the time frame of procurement procedures for investments in infrastructure is longer than the implementation time frame set by the European framework. In the case of the ESF, the question seems to be linked more to the reforms occurring in the labour market and in the field of social policy, in which a multitude of actors are involved, as examined in the following section.
15This section maps the actors involved in the regular programme implementation of the OPs in the frame of multilevel governance in order to identify the diverse natures of the actors involved and the levels at which each operates, and to reconstruct the processes—both formal and informal—that compose the path to the use of funds.
16While the meso-level is often associated with regional authorities, here an enlarged meso-level perspective is adopted, which is more inclusive of other types of actors involved in decentralised management and so in ESF deployment, and considers the meso-level level also as a stage in time that can vary according to which perspective is adopted.
17In an attempt to explain this point, figure 1 illustrates two ways of looking at the multilevel governance system within which the funds are deployed. The figure is inspired by the lecture of several authors on the topic of the spatial configuration of the actors in the ESIF governance (Leonardi, 2005; Milio, 2014; Gualini, 2016) and knowledge gaps (Domorenok et al., 2021)
Figure 1.1 Monolithic view of the multilevel governance system.
Vertical Axis: Intergovernemental relations; Horizontal Axis: Public-Private Relations
Source: Author’s graphic based on definition multilevel governance in Cohesion Policy (Leonardi, 2005b; Milio, 2014).
Figure 1.2 Granular view of the multilevel governance system.
Vertical Axis: Intergovernemental relations; Horizontal Axis: Public-Private Relations
Source: Author’s graphic based on definition multilevel governance in Cohesion Policy (Leonardi, 2005b; Milio, 2014).
18Depicted in the left pane, the monolithic view presents distinct levels, where clear separation is only recognisable on the vertical axis—so, the axis running between national and subnational competence, on the one hand, and European competence, on the other. This view still includes some levels of hierarchy and the central state, since the structure, especially in the case of public bodies, remains predominantly hierarchically ordered at the levels of the single units and departments. The right pane, meanwhile, is more granular, presenting a higher degree of separation. This graphic identifies actors on the horizontal axis—so, on the continuum between the public and the private—and captures how organisations and actors, represented by circles, are connected by channels of communication, represented by lines. The modality, frequency, direction and meaning of communications that take place via these channels contribute to the dynamics of implementation because they connect actors located in their own centre of activity, which are presented in the following paragraphs.
19The EC negotiates and approves the OPs proposed by EU MSs and allocates CP resources in the framework of the European budget co-designed at legislative level by the European Parliament and the Council of the European Union. The EC also monitors the OPs, commits and disburses approved expenditures and checks control systems. For the 2014‒20 cycle, the EC service responsible for the overall management of the Cohesion policy areas is the Directorate-General for Regional and Urban Policy (DG REGIO). Note that the DG Regio and the Directorate-General for Employment, Social Affairs and Inclusion have participated in several fora during this programme cycle, including as advisory participants on the monitoring committees of the NOP ‘Governance and Institutional Capacity’ (‘Governance e Capacità Istituzionale’) (Agenzia per la Coesione Territoriale, 2016).
20Several central institutional entities, national actors, and bodies operate in the fund framework, including the Governing Body, the Minister for Southern Italy and Territorial Cohesion, the Cohesion Policy Department, the Cohesion Action Group, DIPE (the Economic Policy Programming and Coordination Department), and the Inspectorate General for Financial Relations with the European Union, IGRUE (the accounting centre for all EU resources).
21Other national and regional institutions are involved in implementation, including the Managing Authority (MA), Certifying Authority (CA) and Audit Authority (AA), and in certain cases Intermediate Bodies (IBs), which are appointed by the MA that receives the CP funds.
22The institutional governance of cohesion policies for the 2014‒20 cycle was outlined in Article 10 of Decree-Law No. 101 of 2013. The Presidency of the Council of Ministers s entrusted with the oversight of CP, while ACT is involved in programming, coordination, and monitoring activities. The strategic objective of ACT is to provide support for the implementation of the CP, and especially after 2018 ACT has contributed to defining administrative standards and methods of implementation aimed at accelerating the completion of OPs. The monitoring and verification of investments are conducted by two technical evaluation and control units (NUVAP and NUVEC).
23Since the ESF falls into the decentralised management, the EU Regulation allows MSs to identify a public authority, a national or a private institution for the management of the programme for each OP under Art. 123. Comparing the regulation of the 2007‒13 and 2014‒20 cycles, some authors have noted how the MAs would have received an increased number of functions in the implementation of the OPs, as side effect of the purpose to ‘orientate and oversee an effective participatory process in CP formulation and implementation’ (Leonardi and Nanetti, 2011).
24In Italy, the MAs are public authorities at the national and regional levels that establish a first level of effective and proportionate anti-fraud measures, taking into account the risks identified by the AA. There is also the (national) Lead MA (or Leading Partner) of the ESF in Italy, which has a privileged relationship with the EC regarding implementation and is responsible for the overall implementation of the Strategic Intervention for the ESF.
25The certification of expenditure is one of the steps that connect national to European resources, and in this regard the CA certifies expenditures according to Art. 126 of Regulation (EU) no. 1303/2013. It is thus in charge of processing and transmitting payment requests to the EC and certifying that they come from reliable accounting systems. Some administrations can include offices devoted to MA and CA; it is, however, required that the offices have to be separated according to the type of activity.
26The Intermediate Body (IB) is selected by the MA and collaborates with the MA regarding the management of a part of the OPs, after the formal recognition of the EC. To qualify as an IB an entity should be financially sustainable, with its own economic resources or with those conferred on it by the MA. Furthermore, the IB should have the sectorial competencies required by the type of OP(s) it is called on to support. The Italian case provides a variety of IBs, including central, regional, and subregional authorities. In certain cases, IBs are offices within the same ministry, or offices belonging to the structure of another ministry such as the Ministry of Justice – Directorate-General for the Coordination of Cohesion Policies, as is the case for the NOP ‘Inclusion’ (‘Inclusione’); however other national institutions for social care, such as the Istituto Nazionale Previdenza Sociale (INPS) or lNAPP may be assigned the IBs status (ANPAL, 2021). Regional authorities play simultaneously the role of MA for ROP and IBs in NOP as well, while metropolitan cities are IBs in the NOP Metro.
27In a further variation, ANPAL Servizi S.p.A—a private organisation whose sole shareholder is the National Agency for Active Labour Policies (ANPAL)—operates as an Instrumental Body for ANPAL, or in-house service provider, which supports aspects related to the organisation of the public authorities and shares ‘functional relationship’ providing ‘self-produced goods’ and services, so-called in-house awarding (Camera dei Deputati, 2021; Sterpa, 2014).
28In the framework of ESF deployment, a plurality of organisations of diverse natures, mainly private, support the administration in technical assistance for the MA, providing specific services in the coordination, management, evaluation, monitoring, audit and control activities, also because some operative tasks are externalised by regional and central authorities.
- 10 ‘The initial project, approved by the Conference of the Regions on 14 March 1996, was centred on as (...)
29On the other hand, there are thematic associations as Tecnostruttura, which operates as a technical interface with national and European bodies10.
- 11 More on structure and coordination can be retrieved from the Ragioneria Generale dello Stato websit (...)
- 12 According to the Partnership Agreement and monitoring proposal. Territorial Cohesion Agency (2021) (...)
30Currently, there are 23 among regional and interregional co-operation, 4 at national level Any national, regional or local public authority may be an AA.11 At the beginning of the programme cycle, the AA expresses its opinion regarding the appointment of the MA and CA, and during the implementation the task of verifying the operational effectiveness of the management and control systems. The AA monitors projects’ compliance with the relevant national and European regulations. The designation of AA is influenced by the opinion of the General Inspectorate for Financial Relations with the European Union (IGRUE), which also coordinates the AAs.12
31The AA participates ACT’s work in the task force for those issues that have a systemic impact on the implementation of the CP, and the audit report have been considered as documentation in the determinations of the Italian Courts of Auditors, in conjunction with the notes of the Monitoring Committee (MC).
32Within three months of the MS being notified of the EC’s decision with regard to the adoption of an OP, the MS establishes a committee, the MC, in accordance with its institutional, legal and financial framework, in agreement with the MA, to monitor the implementation of the programme. The composition of the MC is driven by the authorities and includes representatives of the competent authorities of the MS as well as of the IB, and representatives of the partners of a socio-economic nature, that are those recognised as such by the authority. The MC’s responsibilities consist in the examination and approval of variations occurring in the OP(s) under its aegis. In internal procedures, however, not much is told on the case in which the components of the MC express negative remarks, in which case ‘the Administration ensures an adequate interlocution on the modification proposals transmitted by the members of the Monitoring Committee both in case of acceptance and in case of negative feedback’ (Comitato di Sorveglianza PON Inclusione, 2015).
33From the literature on the CP, political and administrative organisations are the principal actors considered. Institutions for credits and banks are, however, also part of the political and economic system, and financial instruments13 have been identified as potential tools for implementing measures included in OPs. From the European Semester Report concerning Italy’s performance with regard to ESIF deployment (European Commission, 2020), the difficulties faced by Italy in fund management and implementation may be connected, inter alia, to its capacity of accessing or even to properly select financial instruments, which consist in the selection of technical form in which they should be included in the OPs, which has to take into consideration proximity to local markets.
34While the term ‘beneficiaries’ is often used to indicate a plurality of stakeholders, it is useful to recall the distinction between beneficiaries and recipients. The first term is associated to public or private subjects that are responsible for the activation of the operations from the MA; hence, to individual local authorities and networks of municipalities, but also to companies, associations, and co-operatives that bring added value on specific issues related to territorial and social contexts. The term recipient, meanwhile, refers to those individuals who are the targets of the Policy, such as the unemployed or people in the potential labour force.
35The mapping of the actors shows how, in ESF governance, the intermediate or mid-level is occupied by national, regional and local bodies, which frequently interact in the same policy framework while fulfilling diverse roles (e.g. MA and IB).
36This section presents factors related to the socialisation and the relations among the actors described in the previous section, which may be investigated looking at the instruments used by the administrations for coordinating actions financed from the ESF. OP reprogramming documents and annual implementation reports are the starting point from which to dig into the dynamics of expenditure. In the case of the NOP ‘Inclusion’ (‘Inclusione’),14 but also in other OPs that have achieved their expenditure targets, the main difficulties have arisen due to the considerable delay in the start-up phase of the operational implementation—both from a financial standpoint and in terms of the choice of implementation methods. Another factor of interest is the financial distress or pre-dissolution of the Lead Authority (Capofila) at the local level;15 while yet another is the lack of liquidity to pay the project expenses of beneficiaries, despite the payment of advances.
37The interviews, meanwhile, provided empirical evidence on implementation expenditure elements worthy of reflection, and especially regarding procedural complexity and eligible expenditure. This complexity is also evident in the documents consulted, including the annual implementation report of the NOP ‘SPAO’ (‘Sistemi politiche attive per l’occupazione’), dedicated to active employment policy.
38One of those interviewed noted that, ‘If cohesion policy is not simplified, it will not reduce the gaps, because those who need it the most are those who may know less how to equip themselves to meet the requirements’. However, whether simplification may occur in diverse ways and more than often after an unsustainable degree of complexity, an increase in complexity may not automatically lead to a functional simplification, which presume a rationale that works in an heterogenous context.
39Since 2013, some aspects of the implementation of the CP have been reorganised, in particular to improve its efficiency in identifying crucial data from the local context. In part, computerised recording and storage systems for the data relating to each operation address the need to monitor, evaluate, track financial flows, to support verification and audit activities. The setting up of these systems has posed a challenge from the organisational and operational standpoint given that data on local services for the labour market are still fragmented into non-unified data set.
40The period 2014‒17 was characterised by attempts to reorganise some systemic aspects. These attempts led to a major coordination role at national institutions, despite the fact that, with regard to the CP, the majority of resources are allocated at the regional level. From the interviews, it emerged how during the period 2014‒20 it proved necessary to involve entities as Intermediate Bodies, because, in ESF implementation, whereas the MAs are in charge of expenditure targets, they do not supervise the processes that those targets affect, due to the social nature of the interventions.
41The relation between national and regional authorities is thus characterised by the double role of the regional authorities, which act both as MAs of regional OPs and as IBs (and beneficiaries) of national OPs, especially in the field of employment. It would thus be desirable, in future policy reforms, to explore how these multiple roles have had an impact on how difficulties with regard to the certification of expenditure are recognised and overcome.
42Management competences and expertise are required as much as proximity, which allows interaction with participants in order to identify possible difficulties in filling the application could play a role. The in itinere evaluation report of the NOP SPAO has highlighted the need for coordination and communication among central authorities, financial (and mostly central) operators, the Regions and the network of subjects (Chambers of Commerce, employment centres, etc.) to reduce the vacuum between procedures of the application and implementation process (ANPAL, 2018). This case shows how the participation of beneficiaries and recipients is a strategic element in the design of the measures.
43The institutional receptiveness of the territory in which the projects are implemented is linked to the presence of administrations at the local level, and some interviewees support Regions’ value as IBs based on their proximity, though not so much territorial as in terms of communication.
44A wider consideration of other mid-level implementation bodies that carry out intermediate policy interventions is, however, required. As some authors have noted, in Italy non profit-actors are being functionally integrated by institutional authorities during the ongoing process of labour market reform occurring in the country (Giorgi et al., 2022; Lipari, 2018). Hence, the proximity factor should be reconsidered in the light of this double mediation occurring, between authorities and third sectors bodies, on the one hand, and support providers and citizens, on the other.
45While maintaining the role of partnership, in fact the first phase of reprogramming due to the pandemic was orientated by the provisions adopted at the European level, and symmetrically at the national level between March and February 2020 (e.g. Decree-Laws No. 18 of 17 March 2020 (Decreto Cura Italia) and No. 34 of 19 May 2020 (Decreto Rilancio)).
46In July and August of the same year, in order to implement the interventions, the regional and central administrations holding programmes co-financed by EIS funds and the Ministry for the South and Territorial Cohesion signed a 'Reprogramming Agreement of the Operational Programmes of the Structural Funds 2014-2020' to redirect the resources of the OPs towards measures aimed at counteracting and mitigating the impacts of the COVID-19 emergency (Tecnostruttura, 2021). While the document "Reference Framework for ESF Interventions to be Implemented in Response to Covid 19", that systematised the ESF regulations in light of the updates made following the Covid emergency, was developed by Anpal in collaboration with the MAs of ESF OP at regional and national levels, and the support of Tecnostruttura (Anpal 2020).
- 16 Italy is the only EU country that has developed PRA in the 2014‒20 programme cycle.
- 17 For more on the PRA, phases I and II, see the dedicated Agenzia per la Coesione Territoriale websit (...)
47To deal with a persistent degree of complexity and to satisfy the ex ante conditionality of the programme cycle 2014‒20, both national and regional Italian Administrations have elaborated the Plans for Administrative Capacity (Piani di Rafforzamento Amministrativo (PRA)), which consist in identifying both the targets of improvement and the administration responsible for performing the task for the regional and central authorities. An experience unique in Europe,16 this has drawn attention to how the assessments are carried out within the administrative institutions and has fuelled the critical discussion on whether—and if so, which—connections or implications exist among the middle stages of ESF implementation. From the communication of the PRA activities emerges the cultural aspect of the intervention, in which the first of the two phases foreseen included more of a focus on project quality than on the related spending processes.17 While it is relevant to note the specificity of the PRA interventions on administrations, it would be important to ask how and what kind of cultural spin-offs it has produced in other actors or in the relationship between actors, including for example the MC, IBs and beneficiaries.
48The evolution of the activities of the monitoring and control units has been particularly relevant in the prevention of irregularities, which the Court of Auditors notes have decreased compared to earlier years. However, according to the Judgment on Parity of the General Accounts, the Court has highlighted that whereas there is progress with regard to the financial management of ESI funds, a lack of availability of budget data for several regional bodies persists, in particular for ‘in-house companies’ and for some territorial agencies active in public housing, to which the most significant portion of regional resources is transferred (Corte dei Conti, 2021b).
49The rationalisation process of CP architecture could be due to a large variety of interventions. Some of the interviewees have mentioned reforms initiated already a few decades ago. In this process, some offices have developed new approaches to supporting the administrations. This is the case, for example, with the inspection and control unit NUVEC, which also appears to accompany local Administrations during the critical stages of the project cycle in an attempt to reduce problems in the two initial, most critical phases—namely, the phases of project agreement and design, respectively.
50The pressure to accelerate of problem-solving was crucial in fostering the processes geared towards experience sharing around the critical implementation aspects, as in the case of Q&A forum activated after the COVID-19 pandemic. One interviewee noted that
despite each MA having its own difficulties, a common front was created to manage the emergency and to balance needs and to give support to the programmes on actions aimed at combating COVID-19, at the same time maintaining ordinary management. It was a huge commitment to maintain continuity with the interventions already implemented, and in some cases already implement specific emergency interventions.
51While the reallocation of resources was required to deal with the health emergency of the pandemic, interviewees stated that the rationale for the reorganisation and prioritisation of expenditures was not a result of the pandemic, but was motivated by previous monitoring activities on time-consuming implementation.
52One interviewee commented, ‘The Commission has provided immediate support for the MAs, giving MAs, together with Lead Authorities, support and indications, both regarding reprogramming and regarding the creation of new devices and new actions, and as regards the impacts on (programme) management’. In this context, stakeholders have pushed for changing the procedures in order to swifter the access and use of funds. This endeavour was collectively discussed among the stakeholders. The major change that they advocated was the systematization of greater dialogue and experience sharing among themselves, as well as a swifter access to the national and EU authorities to channel their questions and feedback. All this would serve to , increase the level of communication on the topic of fund implementation. On the regional level, meanwhile, it is important to examine the interactions between the diverse levels of governance in order, in turn, to assess the change and its magnitude of the interactions among other mid-level actors.
53Already prior to COVID-19, Italy had developed an open data platforms for the public monitoring and communication for the ESF and the other funds related to the CP. As noted by the interviewees that operate in the OpenCoesione team:
Indeed, the transition towards a major interest in monitoring has occurred over time also because monitoring has always been the first step for implement transparency; however, it has always been an activity that interested mainly those who managed the Programmes within national level structures. The fact that individual citizens could even become aware of accountable information through the open data platform has meant that monitoring has become increasingly interesting, passing from a mere matter of fulfilment to a tool also for work, for individual beneficiaries.
54Transparency and the smart, reliable communication of data have been increasing in the 2014‒20 cycle. However, effective internal communication remains on the agenda with regard to improvements to the deployment of the ESF. Local authorities and stakeholders have expressed a need for economic resources, but are also concentrating on how to relate to the other members of the Italian administrations in the most efficient way. This observation emerged both from the interviews and from an analysis of a video recording of the thematic session held in 2019 in preparation for the Partnership Agreement 2021‒27, in which the need for EU funds was recalled several times as resources able to foster structural change, provide access to strategic territorial specialisations, and intervene in areas in which ordinary resources are insufficient to deal with social exclusion, the risk of unemployment and school ‘drop-out’ (Agenzia Coesione Territoriale, 2019). With this in mind, any discussion related to ESF resources may been seen as an integral part of institutional socialisation dynamics.
55The experiences of the MAs and mid-level implementation bodies during the COVID-19 pandemic indicate that the socialisation process occurring among administrators depends on the quality of the input that the members of the several administrations may provide to the implementation phase, as well as on an ability to remain in the loop of social interactions, which enables the creation of often invoked continuity.
56The evolution of the programme cycle 2014‒20 seems to be characterised by institutional components that includes socialisation process among the mid-level actors that participate in ESF implementation. What emerges from the interviews on the interactions with the actors is therefore a change both in the practices and in the representations of some of these implementation bodies in one or more stages of OPs implementation.
57Beside the institutional mandate to fulfil the primary role identified in Regulation 1303/2013, the actors involved in the CP have matured a wider view of the ESF, which addresses issues ranging from economic resources and programming activities to the need for structural change.
58Communication between different administrations is going to play a role in our facing the coming challenges of policy meaning–making, in which many collective actors are called upon to participate for the next programme cycle, 2021‒27. The implementation of the National Recovery and Resilience Plan, meanwhile, has been leading to an informed discussion of the architecture design for the expenditure of European resources.
59What emerges from the analysis presented in this chapter, and in particular from the empirical evidence collected, is that the identification of the level of discussion and of the backgrounds of the interlocutors and the modality of communication are crucial. The mid-level implementation bodies may be considered pivotal, because they bring out epitomise both contradictions and good practices in ESF deployment, and provide an indication regarding the evolution of the socialisation processes occurring at the institutional level. However, more can and should be said on the relations between institutions and those belonging to the third sectors, particularly in fragile contexts. The shadow of a dominant selective continuity of interventions, the fragmentation of initiatives, and exposure to extreme events all lead to the question of what kind of relationship between society and institutions Italians expect in the coming years.