1The sociological relevance of Vilfredo Pareto’s Transformation of Democracy is closely related to its editorial background: in 1921 Pareto collected four long articles in a volume already published by the «Rivista di Milano» journal between June and December 1920. Published by Corbaccio, The Transformation of Democracy has to be interpreted as a collection of journalistic writings fuelled by some of the most pressing issues of that time. The author investigates the political and social balances that were desperately sought in Europe after the end of World War I (Zingarelli, 1967; Marchianò, 2016).
2Thanks to their journalistic flair – already enhanced in The Virtuist Myth and Immoral Literature (1914) – these writings boast a high communicative efficacy, since Pareto refers to specific case studies in line with the Treatise on General Sociology (1916). The Transformation of Democracy was anticipated by another book, Facts and Theories, inspired by the geo-political emergency that the Peace Conference of Versailles (1919-1920) tried to solve. A few months earlier Max Weber (1919) had dwelt on the relationship between science, politics and democratization, thus providing an authoritative interpretation of that complex scenario. The dialectic between norms and facts is a prelude to the analysis of research issues inspiring The Transformation of Democracy, as well as the study of logic and non-logic acts and the analysis of residues and derivations. Pareto criticizes the various forms of demagogical plutocracy and parliamentarianism’s distortions, taking into account the radicalization of socialism (Busino, 1982).
3These and other cornerstones of Pareto’s sociology are probed in line with the complex situation post World War I. In the articles published in the «Rivista di Milano», Pareto investigates the rise of the Fasces of Combat, the diffusion of socialism, the engagement of revolutionary trade unionism, the Fiume Endeavor, the plight of irredentist territories. He develops a scientific method pivoted on features intertwining history, philosophy, economy, literature, politics and religion, and his main task is to foresee the effects of current contradictions. In the background are the centripetal and centrifugal forces inspiring institutional structures and determining the persistence of aggregates: «These sentiments are the cement which binds human societies» (Pareto, 1921, 42).
4A century after its first appearance, Pareto’s book may help us reflect on the limits of liberal democracy, corruption, forms of power in the hands of the few. In this account, Pareto interprets these social and civil distortions not as degenerative events but as significant pillars of democracy, in times of the growing influence of the masses (Losurdo, 1999). The crumbling of central authority, the plutocratic cycle and social sentiments are the three epistemological cornerstones inspiring The Transformation of Democracy, whose sociological insights achieve new scientific meanings in the light of the effects of globalization and digital complexity. Relations between power, politics and communication are not free from new forms of elitist concentration, in spite of the innovative typologies of participative and liberal democracy featured in the second half of the twentieth century (Federici, 1991; Busino, 2000).
5Pareto journalistically denounces a number of distortive phenomena emerging in that delicate historical phase, especially in Italy. As Powers points out, «events in Italy and the rest of the world were confirming Pareto’s contradictions. Common people began to view World War I as an adventure that benefited the rich at the expense of the working class» (Powers, 1984, 17). While consumerism started to fuel new forms of social living, mass unemployment loomed over the country. Popular support for the Socialist Party in the 1919 elections was the consequence of mass uncertainty later exploited by Fascism, also thanks to the national government’s incapacity to manage the situation (Barbieri, 2003, 47-85). This aspect is highlighted by an attentive reader of Pareto’s works, Karl Mannheim, who defined Fascism as «activistic and irrational. It couples itself, by preference, with the irrationalist philosophies and political theories of the most modern period. It is especially Bergson, Sorel, and Pareto who, after suitable modification of course, have been incorporated into its Weltanschaung» (Mannheim, 1929, 119).
6Before the rise of fascism, the upper class fluctuated between the desire to soothe the woes of desperate workers and the risk of social revolution. Violence, fear and tensions were the natural consequences of this social and political mayhem skillfully exploited by Fascism (Susca, 2010). As Powers (1984, 17) emphasizes, «Pareto wrote his final series of articles in this context». While Maffei Pantaleoni was taking office in Fiume as Finance Minister of the Carnaro Regency, Pareto was concluding the last articles for publication in The Transformation of Democracy, as reported in the long letter written on November 22, 1920: «What are you doing in Fiume? Are you the Finance Minister of the new State? You have a tough nut to crack!» (Pareto, 1960, 270). Then he informs Pantaleoni of the publication of two new books, The Transformation of Democracy (1921) and Facts and Norms (1920): «I am about to publish two books, in which I collected some articles supplied with an appendix. In these appendixes I pour all those reflections that I could not include in the articles… because no newspaper would have printed it» (ivi, 272).
7While loyal to his communicative conscience, Pareto is ironic about the censorship that would strike him in the case of any harsh criticism towards the Italian government and the other political actors involved in that strategic conjuncture. He needs freedom to analyze social, political and economic facts in line with his theories, starting from those concerning the dialectics between residues and derivations, logic and non-logic actions. Nonetheless, cohesion to facts would not exclude the social impacts of myth, whose power played a significant role in Fiume, where Pantaleoni had to cope with d’Annunzio’s political short-sightedness and poetical symbolist myths. Pantaleoni decided to quit that bloody military action a few days earlier. In a letter Pareto had reminded him to be cautious: «you are fire-walking» (January 16, 1921) (ivi, 276).
8Thanks to the Carnaro Charter, written by the poet and revolutionary trade unionist Alceste De Ambris, the democratic experience in Fiume can be seen as the attempt to counterbalance (political) non-logic and (mythical) logic actions, destined inevitably to collide, as Pareto had already foreshadowed: «I wish you could achieve better results, but I doubt it» (November 22, 1920) (Pareto, 1960, 271). Facts matter, especially in politics, despite the eternal power of myth in human acts (Magnani, 1996).
9Social scientists have to analyze facts, without roaming in the «boundless space of imagination» (Pareto, 1921, 52) and without underestimating the power of myths and creeds in human actions. This is what Pareto seems to highlight in The Transformation of Democracy with recourse to Vico’s philosophy and his theory of historical courses.
10Basically, the four articles forming The Transformation of Democracy can be seen as the journalistic appendix of the Treatise on General Sociology, as Pareto explains to Pantaleoni soon after his arrival in Fiume, underlining that «the objective truth has several parts» and, consequently, every newspaper may be interested in one or more sides of such truths. While investigating the whirlwind socio-economic shifts emerging in Europe, Russia and America, Pareto strives to interpret those objective truths in line with a solid sociological conviction: social life is ruled by alternating residues and derivations founded on the perpetual dialectics between logic and non-logic actions (Federici, 2016). The social scientist has to probe reality through the analysis of facts reflecting social tendencies and economic dynamics. Nevertheless, history teaches us that human beings are often influenced by irrational motivations shrouded by rationality (Pollini, 1984; Conti, 2017).
11In the first chapter of The Transformation of Democracy, Pareto summarizes a significant section of his Treatise, focusing on the non-logic impulses engendering logic actions: «We have to study the substance of events. We must assess how events have been viewed by people and discern the patterns of reasoning to which those events have given rise» (Pareto, 1921, 26). The substance of events stems from the causes and factors that shape social life, in accordance with the never ending effort to make irrationality coherent to the rational paradigms of social behavior. Through the analysis of past societies, Pareto oversteps the dichotomy between instinct and reason and develops a more sophisticated sociological theory inspired by the relationship between facts and myths. This appears truer when we consider that facts are spawned by individual and collective needs often satisfied by irrational impulses: «Sentiments and interests are the most constant and therefore the most important elements constituting the substance of phenomena» (ibidem).
12The main task of social science is to understand how sentiments and interests are counterbalanced, especially because social equilibrium resides in the alchemic intertwining of rationality and irrationality (Rabot, 1984). Soon after the conclusion of World War I this equilibrium starts to weaken, and the alternation between residues and derivations shows new social dynamics. Residues match sentiments, whereas derivations are the «products of thought» (ibidem) allowing us to analyze the origins of social facts: «interpretation of facts is determined by sentiments, desires, prejudices, and interests which often unknowingly motivate action».
13Undoubtedly, facts are spawned by the perpetual wavering of reason between sentimental impulses and logic pressures. Such fluctuation may lead to social facts, as long as human endeavors are directed to individual and collective purposes. According to Pareto, the shaping of social facts is influenced by both residues and derivations, since prejudices, creeds, beliefs, myths, legends and superstitions cannot be underestimated. These products of thought gain social relevance, even though «none of these factors has any bearing on logical-experimental science» (ibidem). The study of facts can be hampered by the non-logical dimension of residues, whose logical codification into derivations will never suppress their non-logical bedrock (Mongardini, 1973, 233-306).
14Derivations are “highly variable” but can be classified so as to find some constant recurrences. Metaphysics and law cannot formulate universal rules: «history never really recurs. Infinite combinations can arise from the elements of human action, and history only chronicles such combinations» (Pareto, 1921, 26). History is the reign of human contradictions wavering between majesty and degradation. Notwithstanding this craving for objectivity, history cannot set aside the influence of myths and legends, as Vico clearly states in his Scienza nuova in line with his critique of «metropolitan society, ancient and modern» (Naddeo, 2011, 145). Seemingly, Pareto boasts a historical sensitivity allowing a deduction of laws from the observation of facts from the past. In this account, the only universal law is that history never recurs:
Social order is never perfectly still; it is in perpetual motion. But metamorphosis can occur at different speeds. It can be observed in ancient times in Sparta as well as in Athens, and in modern times in China as well as in England. The difference is that change can occur at a slow pace in Sparta or China, or motion can proceed quickly as in Athens or England. Moreover, such differences can characterize the same country at different points in time. For instance, Italy has experienced perpetual motion from the legendary times of Romulus until the present, but the process of change is more intense some years than others (Pareto, 1921, 26-27).
15The more civil progress and technology advance, the faster social change. History cannot therefore be interpreted as a linear civilizing process, as Vico himself highlighted in his masterpiece about the making of anti-modernity (Lilla, 1993). Perpetual motion from the age of gods to the age of men hints at the unpredictable development of human civilization that can be inspected only considering the equivalence between truth and fact: the expression “verum ipsum factum” elaborated by Vico in De antiquissima italorum sapientia is a real philosophic manifesto, already internalized by Pareto in writing his Treatise.
16The inspection of facts implies the study of legends, beliefs and myths, whose social impact is not limited to the symbolic sphere. Myths shape social structures and religions are more than the opium of the people: the search for a personal God carried out by Ulrich Beck (2008) can be considered one of the most successful attempts to explain rationally the instinctual needs of men and their search for transcendental interlocution. Once again, sentiments have the power to inspire actions and facts, in line with the social power that creeds and prophecies have gained in the unfolding of history. The coming of Christ marks the dawn of a new age for Christians, on a par with the Hegira for Muslims, the French Revolution for democracy supporters and Lenin’s revolution for Communists. Pareto cleverly underlines that «events correspond to the peaks on a continuous curve» (Pareto, 1921, 27) and facts happen regardless of their rational or irrational premises.
17Therefore, only facts matter to the social scientist who should consider the inextricable nexus between logic and non-logic actions spawning human deeds: «Reasoning from the peak downward, there was a Christianity before Christ, an Islam before Mohammed, a “democracy” before the French revolution and a Bolshevism before Lenin’s revolution» (ibidem). Believers in great personalities and their mystic aura contributed to change the course of history, regardless of their allegedly illogical faith:
It is useful to distance oneself from precast beliefs and examine events in this way, for detachment is indispensable in experimental science, but questioning faith very often impedes action. Although skepticism spawns theorizing, faith motivates people into the action that practical life requires. Ideals can be absurd and yet very useful for a society. We will have to frequently remind ourselves of this because the fact is easily neglected. Maintaining a distinction between what is good for experimental science and what is good for society is fundamental (ibidem).
18This kind of distinction has an epistemological background dealing with the eternal struggle between imagination and reality. What is real, and what is imaginary? The «contemporary politics of imagination» seems to be fuelled by our “modernity at large” (Appadurai, 1996, 145). As long as facts are fuelled by human actions, imagination will keep on influencing human beings as to their beliefs and sentiments. Pareto is deeply convinced that rationalism is not sufficient to elucidate great historical events, particularly wars. Non-believers may theorize and believers may act. At first glance, history is paved with facts springing from the convergence of ideals and actions.
19Thus, the entanglement between residues and derivation determines the social relevance of both individual and collective initiatives having the power to endow theory with practical substance (Padua, 2009; Garzia, 2006). Pareto applies his logic-experimental approach to social facts, thus rebutting any kind of intellectual disapproval: «Rationalism, as one of the intellectual “religions”, reinforces the position that there should not be a distinction between theory and practice, a distinction between what is logically possible and faith in the impossible or fantastic, or a distinction between real goals and ideal goals» (Pareto, 1921, 28). Essentially, social scientists should not be influenced by their sentiments: for a writer is inclined to look not for «what is and nothing else, but for what ought to be in order to fit in with his religious, moral, patriotic, humanitarian, or other sentiments» (Pareto, 1916, 1737).
20In The Transformation of Democracy Pareto reaffirms the scientific tasks of social scientists whose epistemological endeavor resides in the analytic investigation of facts. Thus sociology cannot be the science of the possible since possibilities are neither visible nor tangible: «So be it, but I study what is and not what “should be”» (Pareto, 1921, 28). The distinction between facts and norms is more than a theoretical insight, as «the persistence of aggregates» highlights in historical evolutions. The tendency to store traditions is one of the most important issues for the social scientist to investigate since residues must be considered in their wide social impact. This is an aspect attentively explained by Powers: «Cyclical movement is inexorable largely because people perceive and respond to events in terms of sentiments, or deep-seated evaluative standards» (Powers, 1984, 18).
21The metaphor of cyclical movement echoes Vico’s philosophy of historical courses and recourses and is thoroughly considered by Pareto. Vico’s merit lies in his metaphysical approach to philology which he developed as a science of the culture of knowledge: myths and legends have always played a central role in human civilizations, starting from the first attempts to shape language in line with a poetical effort. The Neapolitan philosopher probed social oscillations in accordance with a theoretical framework inspired not only by his anti-Cartesianism, but also by the analysis of sentiments and myths interpreted as social engines: «no one before Michelet seems to have had an inkling that Vico had opened a window to a new realm of thought» (Berlin, 1979, 150).
22Human history teaches us that knowledge and language are expressions of power. Knowledge is a social privilege that sooner or later will be corroded by obsolescence. This consistently applies to sociology, chemistry, physics and economics, as long as scientific progress is shared by the masses. This is why social life has to be investigated in accordance with the dynamics of oscillations fostered by facts and not by intentions:
A concept of economic oscillation can be found in the biblical story about seven fat cows and seven skinny cows, as well as in Clement Juglar’s work on economic crises. But the approximation of these theories to reality is inadequate. The concept of oscillation in the character of society as a whole can be found in the approximations of Vico’s metaphysical theory, in Ferrari’s theory, or in modern logical-experimental science (Pareto, 1921, 29).
23In these few lines Pareto summarizes an important section of chapter XII of his Treatise, focused on the «general forms of society». More specifically, he deals with the rhythm and movements of societies as theorized by certain relevant thinkers in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. By quoting the economist Clément Juglar, philosopher Giambattista Vico and politician Giuseppe Ferrari, he aims to demonstrate that it is not possible to approach social fluctuations with a normative or metaphysical approach. He states in paragraph no. 2282 of the Treatise: «In attempting to solve the problem as to the relations between movements in population and economic conditions, economists tried to discover at least the indices of such solutions» (Pareto, 1916, 1625).
24In agricultural countries harvest size and wheat prices represented unreliable economic indicators, inevitably subjected to unpredictable natural events. Pareto hints at Professor Marshall’s decision to adopt the wheat price as a common index in England, at least until that country became a «predominantly manufacturing country». Starting from that change of economic paradigm and clinging to “real capitalism” (Tuozzolo, 2018), indicators were sought in the movements of international trade: «Clement Juglar noted, in studying economic depressions, that several other indices agree, and it is that agreement which goes farthest towards showing the general trend in an economic development» (Pareto, 1916, 1625). In such an uncertain scenario, economists should not theorize general laws and common norms: «Under Pareto’s scheme, if economists wish to consider the effect of a taste on the well-being of the individual or society by considering the utility of a logical economic act, non-logical considerations must be introduced» (Cunningham Wood, McLure, 1999, 10-11).
25Likewise, any metaphysical attempt to analyze social oscillations is bound to fail since facts rarely respect cyclical dynamics. In paragraph 2330 of the Treatise Pareto deals with Giambattista Vico and Giuseppe Ferrari, whom he investigates soon after criticizing Plato’s vision of the «perfect city», assuming that «of all the ancient historians Polybius comes closest to experimental reality in his investigations. He is a worthy predecessor of Machiavelli» (Pareto, 1916, 1682). Experimental facts have nothing to do with «the fiction of imagination», and the celebration of Machiavelli’s genius «heralds the construction of a sociological theory able to systematize the laws of social act, in accordance with the inference of virtual movements from the observation of real events» (Lombardinilo, 2017, 129).
26Since their first appearance on earth, men have had some conception of a «rhythmical, periodic, oscillatory, undulating movement in natural phenomena, social phenomena included» (Pareto, 1916, 1678). The observation of alternating seasons and the moon’s phases has always fed the perception of a metamorphic dimension of natural and social life, as Lucretius and Ovid sang in ancient Rome. Still nowadays, «the theorizing of metamorphosis requires the metamorphosis of theorizing» (Beck, 2016, 70).
27Vico’s philosophical insights are also pivoted on the circles of significations molded by human beings through the collective use of the language: «Thought is extremely volatile, like the wind, first here then almost immediately far off; it too is powerful and violent, like that natural element, and again, it too is transparent most of the time but may also carry clouds and darken the sky» (Castoriadis, 1999, 26). Thought may support the study of the human world or the understanding of that «messianic rhetoric» inspiring old imperialisms (Sloterdijk, 2007, 107). The oscillations of thought reflect the undulations of human civilizations, inasmuch as language can shape the informal complexity of psychic activities.
28Through the exploitation of his logic-experimental mindset, Pareto clings to social facts and their factual patterns. In this account, the pitfalls of Vico’s philosophical theory stem from his metaphysical flair and historical perspective, as Pareto points out in paragraph 2330 of his Treatise. Summarizing Vico’s theory of recourses (ricorsi) in book IV of La scienza nuova, Pareto highlights the difference between Aristotle and Plato as residing in their different metaphysical approach to human life. Sociology ought to analyze all facts that can be gauged through observation. This is why metaphysics can hardly aid social scientists in studying the possible rules of human recourses, despite Vico’s attempts to elaborate a philosophical theory founded on myths, legends and religions:
Many writers have worked on that common background (it has its experimental element) of unbroken oscillations. Vico’s theory of “recursals” (ricorsi), primarily metaphysical in character, oversteps the limits of reality almost as far as Plato’s theory. For that matter, he confesses that his work reaches the same conclusions as Plato’s. Vico still has admirers today, and probably will continue to have so long as the great stream of metaphysics that has come down across the ages flows on in its course (Pareto, 1916, 1683-1684).
29In spite of his metaphysical perspective, Vico was intelligently aware of the social conflicts afflicting Naples in the eighteenth century, and his foray into social theory was «his composition of a history of the failed Neapolitan revolt of 1701, known as the Coniuratio principum Neapolitanorum» (Naddeo, 2011, 4). That revolt underlined the obsolescence of Spanish civic citizenship and municipality. Not infrequently, overstepping the bounds of reality is the only way open to those who cannot criticize Power since their career depends on the Establishment.
30The metaphysics of neither Plato nor Vico can help us understand the complexity of conflicts and the clash between the democratic plutocracy and the proletarian party. Poverty and unemployment could not wait for the benefits announced by the League of Nations. This is why Pareto can state that «now myths and prophecies are being renewed» (Pareto, 1921, 30), since some said that the «League will bring peace and joy to the world. Still other people believe that Bolshevism will bring that same peace and joy to the world» (ibidem).
31The Russian Revolution and the occupation of Fiume show that myths and collective sentiments can inspire people’s political actions, especially when charisma is dependent on the hunger for power. Karl Mannheim highlights this aspect in Ideology and Utopia (1929), also referring to Pareto’s elitist theory. In chapter II of The Transformation of Democracy, «The Crumbling of Central Authority», Pareto wonders whether «one should avoid the risk of generalizing beyond the boundaries of present experience and roaming in imaginary space» (ivi, 33). The scientist ought to follow Newton’s model, inasmuch as he limits his research to the consequences of the principle of gravitation. Newton’s methodological teaching still holds: «it is important to be able to restrict one’s own research» (ibidem).
32At the time when Newton was dealing with the principle of investigation, Vico was elaborating his metaphysical thought on the theory of recourses. Pareto seconds his theorizing of historical oscillations, but he does not approve of the idea of regular occurrences within those oscillations. This can be observed in the recurrence of feudalisms: «Vico’s theory of the recurrence of lord and vassal relationships is accurate» (ivi, 37-38). Events must be investigated not imaginatively but concretely, without drifting from the experimental field. Oscillations may occur in human history, but without any regular frequency and uniformity. Nonetheless, Vico’s Scienza nuova can be considered a significant attempt to tether myths and social facts, in line with the poetic power of language. In that regard McLuhan summarized: «For Vico all history is contemporary or simultaneous, a fact given, Joyce would add, by virtue of language itself, the simultaneous storehouse of all experience» (McLuhan, 1962, 283).
33Prophetically, Pareto realized that sentiments play a central role in social structure, inasmuch as residues can be considered the engine of many aspects of daily life. But the sociologist has to cope with facts and not with symbols and emblems, even though they are fundamental for an understanding of the growth of religions and beliefs. Language can give shape to thoughts only when they can be expressed in words (Berger, Luckmann, 1966, 49-61). Likewise, facts can be analyzed only when they happen, regardless of any hypothetical presence of oscillations and recurrences: «But we are approaching the border between what is probable and what is merely possible. Let us be careful not to cross this boundary. Let us also avoid the danger of moving beyond the fields of possibility, and roaming into the boundless space of imagination» (Pareto, 1921, 52).
34«Experience teaches us that ideas are often the consequences of facts» (ivi, 44). Pareto’s adherence to factual phenomenology is linked to the political and economic uncertainty that European countries experience soon after World War I (Somaini, 2017, 67-73). Pareto knows that only facts provide the necessary cornerstone to interpret the course of events, even though he is unaware of the incumbent rise of totalitarianisms. Facts are not always supported by rationality. The collective radicalization of myths deploys the irrational background of social undertakings, insofar as myths may be considered a collective exchange of beliefs and creeds. By underpinning that «ideas are often the consequences of facts», Pareto seems to echo Vico’s Degnità no. LIV (La scienza nuova), «The order of ideas must follow the order of things» (Vico, 1744, 70). In George Sorel’s Étude sur Vico (1896), Pareto finds the proper sociological investigation into the power of myths. Seemingly, the path of human civilization is paved both with ideas and facts that are closely connected, as ideas inspire facts and can conversely be influenced by social events: «Like Machiavelli and Marx, Sorel is regarded by Pareto as one of the few sages who have approached the study of social fact without prejudice but in a scientific spirit, leaving all empty talk to preachers and politicians» (Bobbio, 1972, 197).
35Max Weber highlights this in his conference Science as a Vocation delivered on November 7, 1917, the year of Weber’s death when Pareto was finishing the articles later collected in The Transformation of Democracy. In that famous conference Weber encouraged university professors not to pose as prophets or demagogues and to concentrate on facts and social phenomena (Jäger, Wiskind, 1991). Surprisingly, Weber seems to anticipate Pareto’s plea for a scientific approach of academics within the wider framework of democratization, in times of uncertainty following the end of World War I: «If you speak about democracy at a public meeting there is no need to make a secret of your personal point of view. On the contrary, you have to take one side or the other explicitly; that is your damned duty» (Weber, 1919, 20).
36Weber’s anti-academic speech intermingles with social reflection on democracy. Professors, scholars, scientists have to deal with facts, especially when scientific issues have a political background. The analysis of democratic organizations should also focus on non-democratic political systems: «But the genuine teacher will take good care not to use his position at the lectern to promote any particular point of view, whether explicitly or by suggestion. For this latter tactic is, of course, the most treacherous approach when it is done in the guise of “allowing the facts to speak for themselves”» (ibidem). Rationalization, intellectualization, disenchantment are the keystones of such a sociological effort (Vaccarini, 2013).
37Nevertheless, imagination, myths and symbols keep on influencing social undertakings within their collective dimension. This is why academics and teachers should better consider that science cannot be pursued by so called scholars who rarely conceive science as a vocation: «Science today is a profession practiced in specialist disciplines in the service of reflection on the self and the knowledge of relationships between facts and not a gift of grace on the part of seers and prophets dispensing sacred goods and revelations» (Weber, 1919, 27). Scientists ought to analyze facts and their social evidence, although the process of rationalization does not exclude those social theologies that have influenced society for so many centuries. This means that the sociologist has to decode facts impersonally, trying to remove the irrational veils shrouding human actions: « Academic prophecies can only ever produce fanatical facts, but never a genuine community» (ivi, 30).
38The sacrifice of intellect and the surrender to intellectual integrity are two fundamental requirements for scientists, who cannot shirk their epistemological endeavor. Weber quotes Tolstoy’s question, «what then shall we do and how shall we organize our lives?» (ivi, 27). The fear of the future can be contrasted only through the observation of facts and social oscillations, as Pareto would highlight later on in The Transformation of Democracy. The ultimate challenge of the twentieth century is democracy, as rationalization and disenchantment may have fostered the «crumbling of central authorities». Both Weber and Pareto analyzed the transformation of democracy from an academic perspective. Weber harshly criticizes the lecture courses attracting large numbers of students, pointing out that «democracy is all very well in its rightful place» (ivi, 6) and recalling that an academic career is generally based on «plutocratic premises» (ivi, 2). His academic position does not prevent him from noting the advantages of being part of the wealthy class, thus underlining «the increasing democratization of politics and society» (Müller, 2020, 160).
39From Pareto’s point of view, society’s leaders would do better to conceal their privileges which weigh unfairly on the population. This error, sooner or later to be debunked, is likely to cause rebellion among the under-privileged: «They will not be restrained by honeyed words of the mawkish lectures of slovenly talkers. Such talkers profess Tolstoyan theories, knowingly or unknowingly, and encourage people to resign themselves to the “inevitable”, to believe in the “divinity” of workers, to “transform themselves in order to avoid destruction”. This actually means killing oneself in order to avoid being killed» (Pareto, 1921, 47).
40As well as referring to Weber’s conference, Pareto mentions Tolstoy and evokes his vision of an equitable utopian world. Once again, he remarks that science has to investigate reality and not imagination. The dichotomy between plutocracy and democracy inspires Chapter 3 of Pareto’s The Transformation of Democracy, «The plutocratic cycle». He intelligently realizes that in that historical phase plutocrats were able to use social and economic hardships to exploit power and wealth: «Speaking in a rather vague and loose way, the growing power of wealthy speculators might be viewed as a “plutocratic” tendency while the growing power of wage earners might be viewed as a “democratic” tendency» (ivi, 55). Hence the perspective of a “partial alloy” between these two classes legitimated by a corporative mutual interest:
Even though the interests of speculators and workers do not correspond completely, it happens that certain members of both classes find it profitable to operate in the same way – to impose themselves upon the state and use it to exploit the remaining social classes. It also follows that plutocrats are able to forge an effective union because they are astute and can deceive the masses by manipulating public sentiment. This gives rise to the widely observed phenomenon of demagogic plutocracy (ibidem).
41Cunning and deception are instrumental derivations capable of manipulating the masses, as Scipio Sighele (1903) had already underlined referring to the “intelligence of crowds”. Public opinion and public sentiment may be forged through the practice of authority, also thanks to the wise use of newspapers. This is why Pareto dwells on the importance of sentiments and opinions: «However, it is the aggregation of public sentiments, rather than the opinions of any single individual, which influence social and economic events in a nation. Social equilibrium responds to aggregate shifts in sentiment which can only be studied quantitatively» (Pareto, 1921, 63). Accordingly, quality and quantity of facts can be gauged through the analysis of opinions and sentiments that may persuade the «psychology of crowds» (Susca, 2005, 87-95). Elitism matches the myth of authority as power is managed by those aristocracies invested with plutocratic resources (Meyer, 1974).
42The rise of twentieth century totalitarianisms can be interpreted as a momentary suspension of democratic development, as Karl Mannheim writes in Ideology and Utopia also thanks to Pareto’s influence, together with Alfred and Max Weber’s legacy. Mannheim’s cultural sociology attentively focuses on the irrational elements shaping human actions, since culture may be interpreted as a particular variation of that human complexity already probed by Pareto and Sorel. As Brigitte Berger (1967, 265) observes, «a utilization of the Paretian approach may lead to a theoretically more comprehensive conception of the sociology of culture». This aspect has long been underrated: «however, compared with the attention showered on the theories of Marx and Weber, or on Schumpeter’s competitive theory of democracy (“democratic elitism”), Pareto’s theory has received short shrift» (Highley, Pakuski, 2012, 112).
43In Ideology and Utopia Mannheim dwells on the «sentimental ties» and the process of «dialectical transformation» building revolutionary movements. Unlike Pareto, Mannheim uses the idea of “transformation” to investigate the historical relevance of irrational impulses through the lens of political organizations: «All this dialectical thinking begins by rationalizing what seemed to the historical-conservative groups totally irrational; it does not, however, go so far in its rationalizing tendency as to yield a totally static picture of what is in process of becoming» (Mannheim, 1929, 118). In the background is the criticism of intellectualism that should not be considered «legitimate in all situations» (ibidem). Pareto’s distinction between residues and derivations is reformulated by Mannheim in line with the contemporary fluctuations of rationalism and irrationalism. Retrospectively, Marxist thought appears as «the attempt to rationalize the irrational», whereas Fascism “has its own conception of the relations of theory and practice” (ivi, 119). From a sociological perspective «Pareto, of course, approached the problem with different assumptions from Mannheim: the scientific ideal of his time, which he transferred uncritically to social phenomena, misled him into constructing sociology according to the pattern of “heavenly mechanics”» (Barth, 2021, 186).
44From different perspectives, both Marxism and Fascism showed the central role played by myths and symbols in the construction of collective persuasion, insofar as political approval requires authority and power. This is why «ideological and mythological aspect» (Mannheim, 1929, 122) is closely related, especially if we take into account the growth of the «superior person» in modern ages (Gonzales, 2007). History can be interpreted as an infinite course of oscillations nourished by myths, fictions, legends, symbols and creeds. Needless to say, illusions are frequently shrouded by the ambiguous veil of rationality. Mannheim emphasizes the activistic and mythological background of Fascism:
The superior person, the leader, knows that all political and historical ideas are myths. He himself is entirely emancipated from them, but he values them – and this is the obverse side of his attitude – because they are “derivations” (in Pareto’s sense) which stimulate enthusiastic feelings and set in motion irrational “residues” in men, and are the only forces that lead to political activity. This is a translation into practice of what Sorel and Pareto formulated in their theories of the myth and which resulted in their theory of the élites and advance guards (Mannheim, 1929, 122-123).
45Thirty years after the publication of The Transformations of Democracy, Mannheim applies Pareto’s theory of residues and derivations to some of the most relevant political facts of the first half of the twentieth century, thus strengthening his progressive epistemological effort: «Through his sociology of knowledge, Mannheim attempts a social-scientific way of encountering and partly transcending the irrational elements in all thought bearing on social constitution» (Kettler, Meja, 1995, 4). He can thus investigate the sociological reliability of Pareto’s insights with particular reference to the cult of the leader and the rise of demagogic plutocracy. The fluctuation between norms and facts, centrifugal and centripetal forces, myths and sentiments can be investigated from a sociological point of view, since social events loom over human beings as the result of rational and irrational impulses (Maniscalco, 1994; Riccioni, 2016).
46Fundamentally, derivations are the products of thought while residues pose as individual and collective sentiments. In this account, Pareto dwells on that «general pattern of oscillation» that can still help us investigate our globalized complexity: «This pattern arises from man’s own nature. We are regulated and governed by agents divided into two groups: one preferring to rule primarily through consensus and the other preferring to rule primarily through the use of force. The social order consequently fluctuates between these two poles» (Pareto, 1921, 56).
47Social order is produced by the cult of consensus and management of logic and non-logic actions. Facts are the result of political social counterbalancing. This is what Pareto observed in the second part of 1920. Pareto was aware of the bad times looming over the Western world, as he aptly wrote to Pantaleoni on November 22, 1920: «We are going through a world crisis and an Italian crisis. Don’t deceive yourself, it will not be over by February. It will last longer» (Pareto, 1960, 272). Political facts would later confirm Pareto’s prediction since he was prophetically aware of the «limits of reality».
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