1Although the West has often seen itself as the spearhead of modernity and universal values through the vast Enlightenment movement, many of its peoples (in Europe and North America) now seem to be turning their backs on the idea of progress and appear to consider it as an outdated 20th century notion. Indeed, this exhausted notion now seems to evoke a time when social and technological progress was associated with intellectual and even psychological fulfilment on the one hand, equal opportunities for upward social mobility and the integration of the working classes and ethnic minorities on the other, and advances in civil rights, democracy and full citizenship on the third.
2What is most striking is the convergence, in Europe and in the United States, of phenomena as diverse as the following four:
3Firstly, at the political level, Brexit (Calhoun, 2017) and the rise of populism and sovereignism (Anselmi, 2017; Martinelli, 2018; Langman, 2020), with the success of many national far-right parties, some of them inspired by neo-fascism and neo-Nazism (Moffitt, 2016; Crothers, 2019; Mudde, 2019). As Arjun Appadurai (2017) stated: “European liberal democracy is on the verge of a dangerous crisis. Democracy fatigue has arrived in Europe and is visible from Sweden to Italy and from France to Hungary. In Europe too, elections are becoming ways to say ‘no’ to liberal democracy”. Some old democracies are now turning into deeply divided democracies, democracies at risk or even “illiberal democracies” (Runciman, 2018; Levitsky and Ziblatt, 2018) led by strongmen or outright autocrats – not to mention the treat posed by anti-democracies (Russie, Turkey, Iran…) characterized by the paramilitarization of power and the brutalization of societies (Bozarslan, 2021).
4Secondly, at the level of national cohesion and the possibility of a renewed social pact (Pendenza, 2024), the resurgence of anti-Semitism, the rise of Islamophobia, and the rejection of solidarity and hospitality towards migrants. Our global world, which seemed so open not so long ago, now seems to be succumbing to the temptation of identity politics and ‘exclusionary nationalism’ (Mounk, 2018, 199). A Manichean vision is emerging that separates ‘them’ (the Other, which includes all those who are different from us regardless of cultural distance) from ‘us’ (a local, ethnic, religious, or national shared identity). This division has become the discursive matrix that justifies hostility and violence (Bauman, 2016). This vision is inextricably linked to the rewriting of the national narratives and the erasure of controversial and painful historical legacies and memories (especially in illiberal democracies: Bozarslan, 2021). This can lead to the rise of revisionism and negationism specially in relation to the Shoah (Zimmerman, 2000; Della Pergola and Staetsky, 2020). It is also undeniable that this tendency to question democratic hope (Foa and Mounk, 2016), this fatigue with democracy and this aversion to the other are intertwined with the escalating disparities and the unprecedented increase in social inequalities in Western countries. As early as the work of Alexis de Tocqueville (2000) and Émile Durkheim (1933), it was established that the relationship between democratic social bonds and social equality is inseparable; the former is supposed to create the conditions for the latter, while progress towards the latter is supposed to be a condition for the creation of the former (Gradstein and Milanovic, 2004; Turchin, 2023).
5Thirdly, at the geopolitical level, the change in the pillars of the world order born after the Second World War, with its set of multilateral institutions based on the narrative of the search for peace, on the one hand, and the end of the enthusiasm and belief in a new liberal and democratic world order after the end of the Cold War, on the other. The unexpected and tragic return of war on European soil, the return of imperialist projects (Russia, China, USA) are undeniable proof of the questioning of peace as the supreme value in the management of international relations. The global landscape in which local facts stand out has never been so open/connected/interdependent and at the same time conflictual/divided/fragmented. While there is a unification under the aegis of a global capitalist infrastructure and the transnational circulation of ideas, cultural products and the imaginary, there is also a concomitant sharp division in terms of ideology, values and politics (Cicchelli, 2019).
6And last but not least, at the level of values and beliefs, the dismantling of a movement towards more freedom and liberty, cultural liberalism, and tolerance (Matonti, 2021) has a strong negative impact on the battle for the inclusion of minorities and the empowerment of citizens.
7These four trends are reflected in the deep divisions of public opinion, political affiliation, electoral choices, and generational differences within Western societies. However, the extent and intensity of these phenomena may vary from one country to another. The rise of anti-Enlightenment and anti-modern thought is worrying (Sternhell, 2009), and one might wonder whether we are witnessing a powerful swing of the pendulum in relation to the hopes embodied by the decolonization, civil rights, feminist and pacifist movements of previous generations (Eisenstadt, 2003). The return of anti-Enlightenment ideas has been accompanied by anger, resentment, and fear (Cicchelli and Mesure, 2020; Cicchelli and Octobre, 2022). Contrary to the optimistic predictions of Francis Fukuyama and others who anticipated the emergence of a definitively open, free, and peaceful world after the fall of the Berlin Wall, the contemporary era has proved to be rather gloomy. Some authors have argued that this period is better characterized by the concept of uncertainty (Beck, 1999), and even a ‘great regression’ (Geiselberger, 2017). In order to describe this context, some authors have highlighted the shift in the temporal regime that has occurred in recent decades. Whether they use the term “rétrovolutions” (Amselle, 2010) or “retrotopias” (Bauman, 2017), they highlight that contemporary societies share a strong attraction to the past, whether real or fantasized, This fascination has led to a shift in collective beliefs, with a transition from a sense of optimism and progress toward a more nostalgic and dystopian perspective: In this sense, the solution to our collective fortunes and individual destinies alike entails a return to the status quo ante.
8Value systems are increasingly being questioned, giving rise to previously unthinkable intellectual currents that are gradually gaining influence. One such current is the Dark Enlightenment, a term introduced by philosopher Nick Land (2012; 2022) to describe a counter-Enlightenment movement that critiques the foundational assumptions of modernity, liberalism, and progressive politics. Proponents of this movement argue that the Enlightenment’s emphasis on rationalism, individualism, and democracy has precipitated societal stagnation and disorder. Adherents of the Dark Enlightenment reject egalitarian ideals in favor of a return to hierarchical structures, authority, and traditionalism, and often express skepticism regarding the future of liberal democracy, advocating instead for more authoritarian forms of governance, based on the belief that technological and social progress should be steered by elites rather than achieved through mass participation. This ideology intersects with various forms of neo-reactionary thought, which critique the perceived failures of contemporary democratic institutions. Scholars such as as Guillaume Faye (2011), Nick Land (2012; 2022) and figures like Mencius Moldbug (2017) have provided foundational texts for this movement, drawing from diverse intellectual traditions, including the works of Spengler, and broader reactionary political theory (Tait, 2019).
9These thinkers, while employing the vocabulary of the Enlightenment, construct an ideological system that fundamentally opposes its core principles, rejecting the notion of equality in political rights or capacities. This rejection of democratic egalitarianism has led to the rise of neo-reactionary movements that refuse progressive policies and call for a return to more traditional political systems, including monarchies or aristocracies. These movements argue that modernity, driven by liberalism and democracy, has eroded cultural and social values, advocating instead for systems that preserve tradition, uphold elite authority, and resist what they perceive as the degeneration caused by mass democracy. Dark Enlightenment thinkers often embrace the idea that societal progress can only be achieved through the application of specialized knowledge and technological expertise, reflecting a distrust of the general public’s ability to make informed decisions, especially in a democratic context. Additionally, many proponents reject multiculturalism and globalism, viewing these forces as detrimental to national identity and social cohesion. Instead, they advocate for nationalism or even ethnonationalism, asserting that societies should be homogeneous in culture and values to maintain stability. This often translates into support for anti-immigration policies and more isolationist or protectionist stances.
10As we reflect on these developments, one might ask: have we already entered the era prophesied nearly 15 years ago by Nick Land? Therefore, this special section of «Quaderni di Sociologia» is dedicated to exploring a theme that is in line with the spirit of our zeitgeist and that we believe we can comprehend with the concept of new faces of obscurantism. In fact, the future, despised for its unpredictability, unreliability, and unmanageability, is now being criticized and classified as one of society’s “liabilities.” At the same time, the past is being re-evaluated rightly or wrongly, as an era characterized by the absence of constraints on choice, the effectiveness of action, and the realization of aspirations. In essence, it seems that the dominant narratives of the Enlightenment, modernity (particularly exemplified by the Trente Glorieuses), and the post-World War II economic expansion have lost their widespread acceptance. In the context of a contemporary society where the discourse of modernity has lost much of its influence and where disillusioned, anti-intellectual, and apocalyptic attitudes dominate public discourse, the question arises of whether the narrative of Enlightened modernity has any relevance. Is it possible that we are now living with a narrative characterized by the glorification of roots, the return of the nation, and the revenge of religions (Martinelli, 2005)? How should we tell the story of the today’s world, which was promised the hopes, certainties, and optimism of a protective society and Welfare States committed to the socialization of risks but seems to be receiving the exact opposite? Will we experience a more unequal, more divided, more closed world? How can equality and education for all be improved? How to understand these anti-Enlightenment tendencies in the face of the strengthening of the progressive global struggle against patriarchy, racism, and Western hegemony, especially among the younger generations? How can a new type of citizenship be created that allows for a more direct, just, inclusive, and effective democracy? What is the fate of cosmopolitanism in this context?
11This section is an extension of the above inquiries into the various manifestations of new obscurantism that have emerged in Western societies. It does so through four papers that explore new theoretical and methodological frontiers in the field. In the following papers, it is as if the great narratives of the Enlightenment and the modernity of the Trente Glorieuses no longer represent a consensus, and that we have to live with a chiaroscuro narrative.
12In his paper, Alon Helled addresses the new obscurantism by targeting and discussing the crisis in which the narrative of enlightened Zionism finds itself. This narrative sought a perfect synthesis of Judaism, democratic civil emancipation, and the acquisition of sovereignty. It enabled the creation of the Jewish and democratic state that later materialized in Israel’s independence in 1948. This narrative is currently being challenged by the rise of neo-Messianic Jewish nationalism, which scholars have identified as a contributing factor to the changing ideological landscape of Israeli society. The convergence of this development with the escalating political extremism of religious settlers in the West Bank and the swing of the democratic pendulum towards ultra-Orthodox Jewish particularism has been interpreted as a portent of incipient obscurantism, that threatens to disrupt the established Western-style democracy. A new and disturbing trend is marked by a cultural paradigm shift, indicating a shift towards the political hegemony of idealistic messianism. This phenomenon manifests itself as both violent anarchy and obscurantism in terms of social structure and goals. This provides a tangible basis for the previously unaddressed aspects of the State of Israel, signifying an ideological seizure by certain factions that exemplifies the obscurantist element of Jewish mysticism and has profound ramifications for Israeli politics. The assertion of political sovereignty over the West Bank and East Jerusalem is a prime example of this phenomenon.
13The actions in question are deeply rooted in the obscurantist rhetoric of Jewish messianism and are permeated by nationalist and supremacist colonialism. This creates “a dangerous combination of fearful paranoia and a sense of omnipotence.” The author notes that these facts stand in stark contrast to the pro-Enlightenment premises that originally guided the Zionist project of uniting the Jewish people under a single political sovereignty. Israel’s legal-political trajectory has been marked by constant oscillations between progress and regression, democracy and messianism. This phenomenon represents a dialectical contradiction of the national habitus, which at the same time explains the inability to resolve the conflict with the Arabs. In this vision, any move towards universal integration is seen as a renunciation of Jewishness. Conversely, any further development of Jewish particularism is interpreted as a retreat from civilizing cooperation, anchored in the democratic process of citizenship development.
14Maria Cristina Marchetti’s paper uses empirical evidence to demonstrate the emergence of various forms of cultural claims in the context of nationalisms and sovereignisms in Central and Eastern Europe. This phenomenon has led to the proliferation of identity-based political parties and the adoption of a growing number of policies that undermine the rule of law. This trend has been revealed by the reports on the rule of law in the countries of the Union prepared by the European Commission in recent years. This phenomenon can be interpreted as a clear attack on the heritage of universalist values inherited from the Enlightenment and taken by the EU institutions as the basis for the construction of a collective identity and a hypothetical European people. The question of what might happen to Europe, to its heritage in the context of an attempt at redefinition based on the frequent manifestations of sovereignisms and nationalism as well as their authoritarian degenerations, is therefore one that the author also asks herself. To answer this question, she draws on the data from the Special Eurobarometer on the Values and Identities of EU Citizens (2021), which aimed to deepen existing knowledge of the roots of values among European citizens. The Special Report aims to shed light on how the values contained in Article 2 of the Lisbon Treaty, which serve as the foundation of the EU, contribute to the identity-building process of Europeans. According to the author, there has been a gradual shift among European citizens towards a “post-human rights era”. This shift is characterized by closures that were once typical of Eastern European countries and are now also present in contemporary liberal democracies in the heart of Europe. This development contributes to a controversial image of Europe. While there is still a strong commitment to European values, cracks are appearing in the foundations of these values, which delineate narrow boundaries such as family, nationality, and gender.
15In his paper, Matteo Finco focuses on what he considers to be the paradox inherent in modernity, namely that it functions as a structural semantic apparatus that, at the same time as it creates the conditions for the formulation of expectations and claims (of already established rights or social problems that have not yet been taken into account by politics and the legal system) in order to develop or “realize” them, also risks inflating these claims due to their great number or the exorbitant number of groups/categories that demand their benefits. Precisely because of the insolvency of claims, this situation threatens to undermine and delegitimize the very constitutive pillars of Western modernity. According to Finco, the delegitimization of the promises of modernity is due to the nature of these claims, which are increasingly identity-based. These claims are directed more at the protection of marginalized or excluded communities, if not also aimed at the prevention of abuse and injustice against them, than at the protection of the individuality and dignity of the person. There has been a shift from demands that are characteristic of modernity—demands for freedom and equal access to resources, essentially demands for “inclusion”—to demands that are mor concerned with satisfying emotions associated with the defense of unprotected and careless belonging.
16However, the author argues that this does not represent a real subordination of the principles that legitimize the individual to those that legitimize membership of groups or categories. Rather, it is a semantic shift within modernity, the consequences of which may prove unpredictable. Indeed, Finco is keen to point out that the concomitant increase in the importance of the affective and collective element of the claim in relation to the cognitive and singular element in no way undermines the individual character of the claim. Indeed, the latter, in representing the collective instance of the subject, tends in fact to remain anchored in an emotionality that is itself an expression of the more ‘authentic’ specificity of the unique individual. In other words, although the demand for more individual rights tends to become less important, being replaced by the demand for more security and protection for one’s own social group, it nevertheless remains mediated by elements that distinguish the need for community and aim to affirm the individual self through affectivity and emotionality. Moreover, the various cases reported in the article effectively illustrate these theses, as well as giving evidence of the possible risks that such a transformation may entail in terms of an increase in destabilizing demands, such as those for: atonement, the elimination of cultures, the indefinite proliferation of categories worthy of special protection, the crushing of the present, new memorials at the expense of old ones, the questioning of the idea of universalism, and many others.
17Finally, Emanuela Dal Zotto and Chiara Marchetti’s contribution is based on the belief that inclusive experiences, such as those implemented by Community Matching and Inclusive Universities, can lead to socially innovative and original practices. These practices have the potential to transform even the host environments and to counteract the rise of obscurantism. This process takes place as host communities, walking alongside and building relationships with refugees, gradually come to recognize their and promote their integration. In this paper, the analysis of these experiences goes beyond noting the presence of social innovation practices. It also highlights their contrast with the national context, which is increasingly characterized by the emergence of new faces of obscurantism. They appear as a potential indicators of new forms of citizenship, which the authors praise not primarily in terms of their formal aspects or as the positive outcome of a process of reception and integration, but rather as the empirical expression of what they believe should be the meaning attributed to the concept of “asylum”. With regard to the cases studied, both the Community Matching and Inclusive Universities for Refugees experiences stand out as unique and highly atypical in the context of refugee integration and support activities. The Community Matching initiative has undoubtedly facilitated the integration of refugees into urban communities and promoted a more accepting attitude among Italian citizens towards issues of racism and discrimination. Similarly, the Inclusive Universities program has effectively promoted the recognition of the right to education for applicants and beneficiaries of international protection, thereby fostering a culture of inclusiveness within higher education institutions. Both seek to counter the darkness of a scenario that indicates a tendency to criminalize migrants, manifested itself in border violence and exclusion within states. Both are glimmers of light, innovative practices, examples of how, despite the closure imposed by national policies, there is still room for interventions dedicated to integration.
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