1An article published by «The Economist» in 2023 opened with the title: «Western values are steadily diverging from the rest of the world’s». The author, commenting on data from the latest World Values Survey, emphasized that Western values were increasingly becoming a minority compared to those prevailing in the rest of the world. Indeed, according to the cultural map developed by Inglehart and Welzel (2005), «there are two major dimensions of cross-cultural variation in the world: traditional values versus secular-rational values and survival values versus self-expression values». In relation to these four dimensions, so-called “Western values” would be a minority even within Europe, concentrated in Anglo-Saxon and Northern European countries, alongside a vast area of Catholic and Orthodox Europe. The rest of the world – Africa, Latin America, the Far East – would, according to the map, move within a sphere dominated by traditional values and survival values.
2This is not the place to analyse the theoretical and methodological foundations of the World Values Survey (Alemán, Woods, 2015); nor is it possible to delve into the much more complex relationship between Catholic/Orthodox Europe and “Western values,” or, in general, the interrelationships between the different dimensions considered in identity construction processes from a postmodern perspective.
3In the European context, the gap with Western values has turned into an internal opposition between the European Union and Europe as a whole. Through the actions of the European Union, the so-called “emancipative values” of the Enlightenment tradition have become an integral part of the European identity, as enshrined in article 2 of the Treaty of Lisbon. This has generated an internal confrontation that has fuelled the many forms of cultural claims that have underpinned nationalisms and sovereignisms in Central and Eastern Europe. Moreover, this internal conflict has encouraged the rise of identity-based political parties and the adoption of policies that lead to the dismantling of the rule of law, as the Commission’s Rule of Law Reports over the past five years have shown.
4The result is an overlap between what we might call the “two Europes,” which, while playing out at a cultural level, ultimately has implications at the political level, but above all for the future development of the integration process.
5Sociology, through the work of Max Weber, has made a significant contribution to defining the key features of modern Western culture, to the point of contributing to the ideal-type construction of modernity, from which subsequent critiques and alternative interpretations have developed. Indeed, it is from Weber that the idea that modernity is identified with the West begins to take hold, and that in classifying societies as modern or traditional, the latter, must adopt the Western economic, political, and social model in order to become modern (Cotesta, 2010). For Weber (1988), the process of rationalization constitutes the defining feature of Western modernity, although, at the same time, it is in the West that this process has reached its highest level.
6The philosophical foundations of this path go back to the dawn of modernity, encompassing the Protestant Reformation, the birth of modern science, and ultimately finding their fullest expression in the cultural climate that, paved the way for the Enlightenment in England and France. By the end of the 18th century, the idea that what had seemed to be a cultural trait specific to certain European countries, and through processes of migration, to the “New World” emerging overseas, had come to be identified with modern Western culture as a whole, and that this cultural model had taken on a universal paradigmatic value. This is the reflection with which Weber (2008) opens the “Preliminary Observations,” that precedes The Sociology of Religion.
7A product of modern European civilization, studying any problem of universal history, is bound to ask himself to what combination of circumstances the fact should be attributed that in Western civilization, and in Western civilization only, cultural phenomena have appeared which (as we like to think) lie in a line of development having universal significance and value (Weber, 2008, 99).
8Art, science, the modern state, and capitalism are all products of Western culture and the process of rationalization that it introduced with modernity. At the level of values, we witness the progressive affirmation of universalism-oriented values, which have been translated into a series of civil, political, and social achievements that still form the foundation of Western societies today.
9In this context, it is not possible to trace the key features of modernity without risking oversimplification. Suffice it to say that modern Western culture finds its founding principles in individualism and rationalism. These, in turn, have given rise to phenomena that, despite their diversity, can be traced back to them: the critique of tradition, the role of science, the processes of democratization, capitalism and the emergence of the market economy, the process of industrialization, the structural differentiation and functional specialization of spheres of social life, and social mobility are all epiphenomena of a cultural model that places the autonomy of the individual and the rationality of action at the centre of social and political processes.
10The Enlightenment represents the culmination of these long-term processes, leading to the sharing of common values based on equality, human dignity, liberty, the rule of law, and tolerance, which have come to be regarded as achievements of the whole of humanity. Their spread has led to the establishment of societal models in which the free self-determination of the individual prevails over ascribed affiliations; where the rational order of reality takes shape in law, politics, economic organization, and the state; where science replaces religion – and earlier, magic – as the form of knowledge about reality.
11The result is a dichotomy between «modern societies» and «traditional societies», that has long underpinned theories of modernization (Martinelli, 1998) and reflects the idea that the decline of the West involves the reintegration of cultural identities into the history of the contemporary world (Huntington, 1993, 1996). On this basis, the foundational categories of many disciplines – community and society, tradition and modernity, industrial and agrarian societies, development and underdevelopment – have been established and have long influenced the analysis of social and political phenomena on a global scale.
12These are rigid dichotomies that do not take into account the diversity that the process of rationalization presents, nor the different degrees of internal adherence to which Weber himself refers to. In fact, there is an increasing distance between those immersed in rational techniques and orders from their rational basis, which remains hidden from them, just as the meaning of the shaman’s magical procedures remains hidden from the savage (Weber, 1958).
13In reality, the emergence of modern Western culture is marked by a path that is less linear than it might initially appear. There have been setbacks that, at different times, have challenged the project of modernity. An Anti-Enlightenment tradition developed alongside the rise of the Enlightenment (Sternhell, 2010); various artistic movements challenged the rationalism of Western art; and finally, when modern Western culture came into contact with societies that had not been involved in its development – except through the colonial project – the model itself went into crisis (Martinelli, 2005, 2008). Critics, including those who later revisited Weber, stressed the “Eurocentric” nature of a cultural model that viewed Western modernity in a universalistic way. They emphasized the underlying imperialism that led the West (which increasingly identified with the Anglo-Saxon and American versions) to set itself up as a model for the rest of the world, according to a dichotomous opposition between “the West and the rest,” from which emerged the need to “provincialize Europe” and diminish its centrality in the world (Chakrabarty, 2000).
14Theories have emerged that see the trajectory followed by modern Western society itself as marked by various national variants (Dumont, 1983; D’Andrea, 2007), but above all, they distance themselves from the idea of a single, universal modernity. Eisenstadt’s notion of «multiple modernities» is providing increasingly apt in describing the diversity of contemporary social and cultural processes and in explaining the history of modernity. Modernity was born in the West, but as it spread to other parts of the world, it gave rise to different forms of modern civilization (Eisenstadt, 1993, 1999, 2000, 2003), some of which reproduce the original ideal type, but most of which modify and adapt it to different contexts. This aspect only partially negates the Weberian perspective, since Weber himself, in defining the characteristic features of modern Western society, noted that these traits are not exclusive to this part of the world but have reached their extreme manifestation in this context, thus acquiring universal value.
15These criticisms do not leave the original core of modern thought unscathed; it, too, is forced to confront them, even on the internal front. The values of modern Western society are not only been challenged in their universalistic scope but are also experiencing a crisis within Europe itself, as the continent finds itself fragmented and weakened in the face of global challenges. The “open society” that modernity gave birth to is proving to be weak and unable to withstand criticism except by reaffirming the universality of a value system that many see as non-negotiable. This trajectory, which some interpret as a form of capitulation, raises inescapable questions about Europe’s role in the world: How can the cosmopolitan vocation of the values inherited from the Enlightenment be safeguarded without risking its confusion with a hegemonic function?
16The European continent has been most affected by the criticism of the values of modern Western culture, largely because of the colonial past of many of its countries, but also because of the existence of internal divisions that have never been reconciled. Contemporary Europe inherits an internal division that runs along the North/South and East/West axis, rooted in religious, cultural, and political factors, on which the division created in the 20th century by the Cold War was grafted.
17In this context, the creation of the European Community, and later the European Union, redefined the space of common belonging, starting from the presumed identification between Europe and the European Union. This process not only raises objective difficulties at the level of culture and identity (and even geography) in defining Europe’s borders, but also affects the way European citizens perceive the supranational reality and the role of its institutions.
18The heritage of universalist values, inherited from the Enlightenment, has been taken up by the institutions of the European Union as a foundation for building a collective identity, capable of underpinning a hypothetical European people. As will be emphasized later, this results in a common cosmopolitan identity, which over the years has fostered the idea that unification projects since 1950 have considered Western Europe as the entire Europe (Crainz, 2023). Common expressions such as “entering Europe,” referring to the process of enlargement to other states, have contributed to the creation of an overlap that on the one hand recovers a common dimension, and on the other denies the existence of fractures and variants within European culture. From this perspective, the European Union seeks to present itself as the world’s first (or perhaps last) bastion of the universalist values of modernity, and to base its identity on these values.
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19Even the adoption of the motto “unity in diversity” risks being reductive with respect to the complexity on which it is based1. As Delanty (2018, XI-XII) assesses:
20The notion of unity in diversity, while appealing in itself, fails to capture the fact that the units in question interact with each other and, as they do so, they undergo change. My central analytical argument is that the specificity of the European dimension of culture is in the entanglement of these cultures. The cultures of Europe are not separated but have been shaped in close interaction with each other and with the non-European world. Furthermore, Europe is not only shaped by its nations but also by relations with the rest of the world. Nations are not therefore unique, exceptional, or fundamentally different from each other. The outcome of such intermingling is a multiplicity of ideas of Europe that serve as shared cultural reference points. The plurality of Europe is reflected in the plurality of Europe and should not also be mistaken for divisions.
21The motto also takes for granted the existence of European citizens and their ability to participate in public debate and act as a single body. An attempt to overcome this thesis is the notion of democracy introduced by Kalypso Nikolaïdis: «The idea of European demoicracy is seductively simple: a Union of peoples who govern together, but not as one. However much shared κράτος or power to govern, we must contend with the plurality of δήμοι; but also crucially, however many demoi, we need a common kratos to define and deliver, through mutually agreed disciplines, the responsibilities we owe to one another» (Nikolaïdis, 2013, 351-352).
22However, the process of constructing a common European identity is deeply rooted and evolves in tandem with the progress of integration and the debate on citizenship (Delanty, 1995, 1997, 2002).
23The European institutions have repeatedly tried to contribute to the definition of a European identity. Starting with the Declaration on European Identity, signed by the nine Foreign Ministers in Copenhagen on 14 December 1973, the emphasis was on the diversity of cultures within the framework of a common European civilisation. In an attempt to define the content of European identity, it was stated:
24The Nine wish to ensure that the cherished values of their legal, political and moral order are respected, and to preserve the rich variety of their national cultures. Sharing as they do the same attitudes to life, based on a determination to build a society which measures up to the needs of the individual, they are determined to defend the principles of representative democracy, of the rule of law, of social justice – which is the ultimate goal of economic progress – and of respect for human rights. All of these are fundamental elements of the European Identity.
25In these terms, the issue of European identity is closely related to that of Europe’s founding “values” or “principles” and to Europe’s role in the world and its foreign policy, to which the Declaration devotes considerable attention.
26The reference to “common values” appears for the first time in the Maastricht Treaty which refers to the «defence of the common values, fundamental interests and independence of the Union» (Article J.1). Article 128 states that: «The Community shall contribute to the flowering of the cultures of the Member States, while respecting their national and regional diversity and at the same time bringing the common cultural heritage to the fore».
27In the wake of the Treaty of Maastricht, the Treaty of Nice refers to the closer cooperation aiming «at safeguarding the values and serving the interests of the Union as a whole by asserting its identity as a coherent force on the international scene» (article 27/a). A further institutional step forward was the approval by the Nice European Council of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union, which entered into force with the Treaty of Lisbon.
28The reference to common values becomes more explicit in the Treaty of Lisbon. In the Preamble, the introductory formula is better defined, with the addition of a paragraph «drawing inspiration from the cultural, religious and humanist inheritance of Europe, from which have developed the universal values of the inviolable and inalienable rights of the human person, freedom, democracy, equality and the rule of law».
29But it is in article 2 that the reference to the Union’s founding values takes centre stage:
30The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities. These values are common to the Member States in a society in which pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between women and men prevail.
31In this way, the values enshrined in article 2 define not only the cultural identity of Europe, but also the constitutional identity of a legal system that considers these values to be common and indispensable for a given society (Cavaggion, 2023).
32In addition to article 2, the reference to values in the Treaty of Lisbon is explicitly present in article 7 (concerning the procedures to be followed in the event of a «clear risk of a serious breach by a Member State of the values referred to in article 2») and in articles 3, 8, 13, 21, 32, 42, 49 (the latter concerning the accession of a new Member State).
33The Commission chaired by Ursula von der Leyen took a step forward in defining European values, making them part of the European agenda, through a new formulation of the European identity in terms of a “European way of life” (Tidey, 2019). Indeed, in choosing the composition of the past Commission, the President has in fact entrusted the Commissioner for Migration Policy and Vice-President of the Commission, Margaritis Schinas, with the task of promoting the “European Way of Life”.
34The protection of the “European way of life” also returns in the Commission’s Six Priorities Policy Paper 2019-2024, which was presented in July 2019. Finally, in a tweet on 12 September 2019, President von der Leyen returned to the topic, identifying the content of the concept of the “European way of life” in article 2 of the Treaty of Lisbon.
35In this way, European values are configured as a principle of conditionality, contributing to the process of building the Union’s identity as a “community of shared values,” which defines the way in which the Union positions itself on the international stage (Akaliyski, 2019; Toggenburg, Grimheden, 2016; Oshri et al., 2016), but also internally. The European Union increasingly presents itself as a “value entrepreneur”, whenever the political goal of the Union is not only to promote economic integration, but also to shape European society (Gerhards, 2007, 2010).
36There is thus a contrast between the “emancipative values” of the European Union, which in turn have their roots in the Enlightenment and in Western culture, and the values of European society, which are much more differentiated and adapted to the political cultures of the member states (Coman, Leconte, 2019).
37In defining European identity, European institutions have indeed favoured the “cosmopolitan paradigm,” which is an integral part of a broader «process of building a cosmopolitan citizenship at the global level based on human rights» (Cotesta, 2011; Beck, Grande, 2006; Pendenza, 2017). The question remains: what will become of this legacy in the context of what has been called the post-human rights era? Indeed, the attempt to redefine the notion of sovereignty on the basis of the culture of human rights is currently forced to confront the frequent manifestations of sovereigntism and nationalism and their authoritarian degenerations.
38With regards to relations with non-EU countries, in particular with the Eastern neighbours, the emergence of a kind of “clash of civilizations” is hypothesized (Akaliyski, Welzel, 2020). This element was strongly expressed in the State of the Union address by President von der Leyen on September 14, 2022, about six months after the Russian invasion of Ukraine. She assesses: «This is not only a war unleashed by Russia against Ukraine. This is a war on our energy, a war on our economy, a war on our values and a war on our future. This is about autocracy against democracy. And I stand here with the conviction that with courage and solidarity, Putin will fail and Europe will prevail».
39The political developments in Poland and Hungary over the past decade are the most evident manifestation of this latent conflict within the EU, specifically challenging the value of the «rule of law» (Merdzanovic, Nicolaidis, 2021), but also extending to the values of freedom, equality «in a society in which pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity, and equality between women and men prevail» (article 2).
40Since 2015, the European Commission has kept the governments of Poland and Hungary under scrutiny, repeatedly intervening with recommendations and seeking dialogue with the institutions of both countries. In 2017, the European Commission opened a procedure against Poland under article 7 of the Treaty of Lisbon, which deals with case of «a clear risk of a serious breach by a Member State of the values referred to in article 2». The procedure was supported by the European Parliament in a resolution in March 2018, and the Parliament also initiated the same procedure against Hungary in September 2018. In particular, Hungary was cited for violations of the rule of law, the rights and freedoms of LGBTIQ persons, and children’s rights; with regards to Poland, reference was made to the legislation adopted in the country on the renewal of the Supreme Court, the ordinary courts, and the National Council of the Judiciary.
41To monitor compliance with European values, in particular the rule of law, the European Commission will publish an annual Rule of Law Report from 2020. From 2021, the EU budget will have an additional layer of protection in cases where violations of the rule of law principles affect or risk affecting the EU’s financial interests. This is due to a general conditionality regime for the protection of the EU budget, also known as the “conditionality regulation,” which entered into force in January 2021 (EU 2020). This principle provoked protests from Poland and Hungary, which were directly affected and subsequently filed a complaint with the European Court of Justice, which was rejected.
42More recently, in a resolution adopted in April 2024, Members of the European Parliament expressed strong concern about the further erosion of democracy, the rule of law, and fundamental rights in Hungary, in particular through the recently adopted “National Sovereignty Protection Package,” which has been compared to Russia’s “Foreign Agents Law.”
43The centrality accorded by the European institutions to the values set out in article 2 has prompted an internal reflection on the extent to which they are shared by European citizens. In fact, the events that have taken place over the last decade have in fact called into question the rootedness of European values even within the Member States, giving rise to a latent conflict that pits EU values against European values.
44The desire to deepen knowledge about the real roots of European values among citizens is at the basis of a survey conducted by the Special Eurobarometer 508, Values and Identities of EU citizens (European Commission, 2021b). The survey is part of a wider international debate on the role of values and identities in political processes (Castells, 2003). Also in 2021, the European Commission sponsored a report for decision-makers on the role of values and identities in the political process (European Commission, 2021a).
45The data collected in the Eurobarometer survey are grouped into three sections: a) Personal values of European citizens, b) Identities of EU citizens and EU citizens and c) Attitudes towards European Union values.
46In terms of the theoretical underpinnings of the survey and the methodology used, the survey draws on the established global literature on values studies, first and foremost the World Values Survey and the associated cultural map by Inglehart and Welzel (2005). The data collected is in fact grouped into four overarching values: conservation values, openness to change values, self-enhancement values, and self-transcendence values.
47The three sections into which the survey is divided aim to highlight points of contact and discrepancies between the different value references of European citizens and the way in which these affect the process of identity construction; at the same time, they help to understand the multi-faceted nature of the process of constructing a European identity. A general reading reveals a first question: to what extent do the values contained in article 2 contribute to the process of constructing the identity of European citizens? How do the three dimensions underlying the survey relate to each other?
48With regard to the personal values of the European citizens, the respondents are asked to identify themselves, with a series of human behaviours on a scale from 1 to 6 (“Now we will briefly describe some different people. Using a scale from 1 to 6, please tell me how much these people are or are not like you”). They state that they put importance on being in charge of one’s own life decisions (78%); on taking care on close ones (78%); on the ability and freedom to form one’s own opinions and views (73%); on feeling safe and secure (72%); caring for nature (71%), and the availability, worldwide, of equal opportunities for all (70%) (European Commission, 2021b).
49The Eurobarometer interpretation traces the value of “taking care on close ones” back to the more general Anglo-Saxon notion of “benevolence,” which in turn can be traced back to the category of self-transcendence values, which also includes “to take care for nature” (71%), “equal opportunities in life” (70%), “understanding different people” (64%).
50“Taking care of close ones” can also mean a closing yourself off within your own circle to the considerable exclusion of those who are alien to you. “Taking care on close ones” could refer to one’s own family, one’s own nation, to those who are closest to one, effectively excluding strangers, foreigners, people who think differently, in line with the category of conservation values.
51The structural variables – age, gender, place of residence, social class, educational attainment, professional status – show in some cases significant differences, while in others they give homogeneous results. In particular, “taking care on those who are close to me” reaches 80% among people aged over 55 years and with a left-wing political orientation, while it does not show significant variations for the other variables.
52The values of European citizens therefore seem to oscillate between the need to close off “inner circle” and the need to claim autonomy in the choices they make about their own lives. Equality of opportunities moves to a global level (70%) and the readiness to understand different people falls to 64%.
53The next section, “How people identify themselves”, focuses on the values on which European citizens construct their identity. It is in this section that the first aporias appear, suggesting the existence of “two Europes”.
54In this case, respondents identify family (81%), nationality (73%) and gender (72%) as the three main elements on which European citizens build their identity; being European (56%), political orientation (54%) and religion or beliefs (53%) come at the bottom of the list. Societies characterised by a long-term process of secularisation and a significant disaffection with politics find in the family and in the country of origin a reference point that can hardly be traced back to an adherence to values of self-transcendence. From this point of view, we are a long way from a cosmopolitan model of identity, in favour of a primary sense of belonging, linked to family models or to the nation.
55Here the data for individual countries are interesting: Portugal (94%), Spain (93%) and Hungary (90%) have the highest percentages of identification with the family; Poland with gender (80%) and Greece and Malta with nationality (80%). Identification with the family is higher than 80% in 12 countries; in addition to those mentioned above, there are 9 others, spread evenly across the Union: Slovakia (88%), Bulgaria (86%), Denmark (86%), Austria (86%), Italy (84%), Cyprus (83%), Germany (82%), Latvia (82%).
56The previous two sections introduced us to the everyday universe of European citizens, their values and the processes through which they construct their identity. The last section examines “the attitudes of European citizens towards European values”, included in article 2 of the Treaty of Lisbon. A greater effort is required here, both in terms of the methodology used in the survey, and in terms of the respondents, who are put in the position of being confronted with the ways in which European values materialise in their daily practices, both at a social and institutional level.
57Here too, the measurement tool of scales was used, in which respondents were asked to rank themselves in relation to a list of principles that could be important for our societies and that are an emanation of article 2.
58From this point of view, it is not so much an abstract definition of the values contained in Article 2 that is decisive, but rather an operational concept that allows the principles to be broken down into their constituent elements.
59Independence of the judiciary (82%), equality before the law and the right to a fair trial (82%), and freedom of conscience (freedom of thought, expression and religion) (81%) are the three values preferred by the respondents. The differences between the various countries are significant in place: the principle that “the law should treat everyone equally and everyone should have the right to a fair trial by an independent court” reaches 94% support in Denmark, but falls to 70% in Italy.
60On the other hand, there are two issues on which European citizens are strongly divided: the right to political asylum (66%) and opposition to the death penalty (57%). On the latter issue, support is below 50% in nine Member States: Belgium (46%), Bulgaria (36%), Czech Republic (32%), Estonia (38%), France (46%), Latvia (44%), Lithuania (43%), Romania (46%), Slovenia (36%), Slovakia (34%). The low percentages of opposition to the death penalty are a sign of a gradual shift towards what we have already described as the “post-human rights era”; in this case, however, the signal is coming not from contemporary “illiberal democracies” (Zakaria, 1997) but from the heart of Europe.
61Further analysis would be needed to explore what appears to be a cultural divide within Europe, which highlights the growing need for the European Union and its institutions to address the cultural dimension of the integration process, even before the economic and political dimensions. What we might call the “two Europes” – the Europe of the citizens and the Europe of the institutions – face each other from a distance, always failing to find a composition. European society is more uniform than one might think at first glance, with little difference between the young (15-24) and the adult generation (over 55). The data paint a controversial picture of a continent that, on paper, shows a high degree of adherence to certain European values, but in reality is closed in on itself: family, nationality and gender, as the elements from which the respondents construct their identity, evoke a reference to traditional values that have little in common with those identified by the European institutions.
62The attempt to construct a collective European identity on the basis of the values enshrined in Article 2 therefore seems destined to clash with the characteristics of European society, which seems less divided on these issues than one might have imagined. The European utopia based on a cosmopolitan world order and a culture of human rights is coming up against the many particularisms that run through it, leading to a “cultural backlash” that is at the root of the rise of various forms of populism, sovereignism and nationalism (Norris, Inglehart, 2019).
63The data provided by the survey are probably not sufficient on their own to support the thesis of a “new obscurantism”, but at the same time there are signs on the social and political front that warrant attention. Further insights may come from the comparative analysis of data from the European Values Survey, which monitors changes in the values of European society (Halman et al., 2022).
64With regard to the values of article 2, particular attention has been paid to monitoring European citizens” support for the rule of law (Special Eurobarometer, 2019; 2024). Also on the subject of the rule of law, further information can be found in the Rule of Law Reports (2020-2024), which are themselves part of a wider “Rule of Law Mechanism” set up by the European Commission to defend European democracy.
65The challenges from “illiberal democracies” come not only from outside, but also from within the European Union, as the results of the last European elections, marked by the growth of far right parties, have shown. The signals coming from European society are confirmed by the political slogans of the parties that capture this widespread feeling. In the midst of the electoral campaign, the leader of Fratelli d’Italia, Giorgia Meloni, repeatedly declared: «God, Country, Family is a Mazzinian motto that does not clash with modernity. It is a defence of one’s identity, which is an identity of our society, it is a European identity».
66In defence of the traditional values of the Hungarian homeland, in an ideal opposition between Hungary and the West and its values, Prime Minister Viktor Orbán has also spoken out, as can be seen from some passages of his speech on the 176th anniversary of the Hungarian Revolution and War of Independence of 1848-49 (15 March 2024):
67In the Western world today, millions of people think and live as if they have come from nowhere and are going nowhere. This is why they have no regard – and are convinced that they should have no regard – for anything or anyone: they start wars; they destroy worlds; they redraw the borders of countries; like locusts, they consume everything; they scorn the dead and deny the rights of those yet to be born. We Hungarians live differently, and want to live differently. We come from somewhere, and we are going somewhere […] The greatest thing that can happen to us is to be born Hungarian. In the Western world it is imagined that people are just who they are unto themselves: only their free choice determines what states they become citizens of, they decide whether they will be boys or girls, family is whatever they invent for themselves, and the homeland is merely a field of operation. We Hungarians do not believe in all that; we know that if you stand alone in the world you are not free, but lonely […] This will be a watershed year. At the beginning of the year we were alone; by the end of the year we will be the majority in the Western world. Great opportunities are opening up to us. Ahead of us is a sovereigntist turn in America and Europe. Normality can be restored in both Europe and America, and we can usher in a great new era for Western nations, in which everyone can find their own way forward2.
68Can we speak of “new faces of obscurantism” in European societies? Probably yes, and this is a trend that needs to be carefully monitored. As stated in the European Commission Report, Values and Identities. A policymaker’s guide, «For most of the 20th century, policies and politics in Europe (and the USA) have been viewed primarily through the lens of the left-right divide related to socio-economic interests. This divide defined the major political fault lines and policy choices. Today, by contrast, individual values, attitudes and identities predict political behaviour better than traditional class affiliations. People today are more prone to express their own preferences, feelings, ideas, and abilities, and finding meaning in their own uniqueness» (European Commission, 2021a, 23). At the same time, «the shift in values has been accompanied in many countries by the rise of polarisation, Identity politics and populism, questioning the conventional political establishment and sometimes the entire concept of the EU» (ivi, 25).
69In this perspective, dialogue seems to be the only value capable of holding others together, a negotiation based on the recognition of the fragmentary nature of individual experiences and the risk of extreme positions on identity and values that are often considered non-negotiable. The European identity, which must necessarily be open to realities other than the original nucleus, tends not to dialogue with them but to incorporate them by assimilation, without taking into account that the very process of extending its borders entails a redefinition not only of the political-institutional but also of the cultural aspects of the original project.
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