• 1 Regarding this concept, see Section 2.

3A different approach, rather than appealing to morality and value judgments, focuses on the “convenience” of inclusion: in fact, exclusions and inequalities – even before they are unjust – are a social problem, because they threaten social stability, undermine trust (especially in institutions), create far-reaching problems that need to be addressed by policies (for example, mass migration), and so on. Moreover, exclusion not only hinders people (the “excluded”), but also both organisations (restrictions on the freedom to profess one’s beliefs limit the success and hinder the functioning of religious organisations; exclusion from the possibility of studying and strong inequalities between pupils create problems for the education system; poverty implies the impossibility of buying goods, and thus limits the circulation of money; etc.), and functional subsystems¹ (for example, restrictions on freedom of expression limit the possibilities for “development” of the arts and the possibilities of communication for the media; in the face of blatant exclusions, the courts have to deal with prosecutions that could otherwise have been avoided; families have to deal with the dissatisfaction of their members, etc.).

• 2 The adoption of this perspective does not aim to reduce the importance of the moral or ethical ones

4However, moving to a different level of analysis – not better, simply different² – inclusion could be conceived as a problem constitutively linked to the form of differentiation in modern society or, in other words, as a semantic correlate of the structure of society (Luhmann, 2005). In a society without a top and without a fixed hierarchy, free from the constraints of pre-modern societies, without a pre-established source of legitimacy (divine or temporal), inclusion is, in principle, not precluded for anyone (Luhmann, 1984a). This means that each functional system determines its own specific criteria for inclusion/exclusion on the basis of its specific (structural) characteristics. Thus, a person cannot vote if he or she is under the minimum age, nor can he or she stand for election if he or she is serving a criminal sentence; everyone has the right of access to education, but not the right to attend a particular course of study if he or she has not already completed a previous degree; everyone can freely buy and sell goods, but only if he or she has enough money, etc.

• 3 Only politics produces collectively binding decisions; only the legal system can decide on conflict (...)
• 4 The term refers to the conceptual heritage of society, that is, the whole set of ideas, values, pri (...)
• 5 For example, does it still make sense to give prominence to the concept of “social class”, when cla (...)

5Such an approach does not minimise the importance of inclusiveness, but allows for an observation that seeks to capture the dynamics of the relationship between the essential characteristics of social systems (which allow for their highly specialised and exclusive functioning within society³) and their thematisation in communication, that is, their description. The assumption is the circularity in the relationship between the structure and the semantics of society (Luhmann, 1983): as the structure changes, so do the conditions that determine communication within it, hence semantics⁴ (under the pain of “losing grip” on reality⁵).

• 6 If, for example, the debate on the problem of women’s exclusion from the labour market lasts long e (...)

6Similarly, semantic shifts depend on how communication takes place (as long as everyone is allowed to express themselves; if there are no barriers to debate, and then new issues or unprecedented meanings have the possibility to emerge) and in turn determine the orientation of communication towards certain issues (rather than to others), thus influencing (and possibly stimulating) the structures of society itself⁶. In this sense, the code of inclusion/exclusion is crucial and constitutes the criterion for the “participation” of individuals – or rather persons (Luhmann, 1995b) – in the various functional subsystems.

• 7 This is the normal social situation in which it is necessary to limit the horizon of possible behav (...)

7Then claims of inclusion are not a surprising phenomenon, but an essential feature of modern society. Precisely because each system can only include in its own way, the individual becomes relevant only to the extent that he or she is able to take part in the communication of a particular system. Inclusion is therefore the inclusion of the person – conceived as a construct that takes into account of the human being only in terms of what could be referred to communication – which makes it possible to deal with the problem of the double contingency (Parsons, Shils, 1951)⁷. In other words, the “normality” of the problem of inclusion is a constant and essential feature of modern society, since this society (unlike pre-modern ones) is structurally and functionally differentiated. In order to continue to function, each subsystem must “discriminate” (regulate communication), and this is done precisely by reference to the person.

• 8 Social subsystems are differentiated on the basis of their specific code. For example, the economy (...)

8In this sense, inclusion is not a value per se: it does not respond to moral or ethical demands, but it is exclusively structured on the basis of specific codes⁸, that make it possible to maintain a highly differentiated, complex, polycontextual (meaning the coexistence of multiple codes) society, in which participation (or action in the broadest sense) is (in principle) guaranteed to all – which was not the case in pre-modern societies.

• 9 This happened first and foremost thanks to the writing and printing press – and to the development (...)

9At the same time, modern society can also be described as typically Western, in the sense that it is the result of a process that took shape in the ancient world (Greece and Rome) and then old European historical context; a process that produced a specific kind of knowledge⁹ (and therefore also certain values). A knowledge that imposed itself (sometimes violently) precisely in the Moderne Age, which is understood as an epoch marking a historical rupture due to a series of structural changes (including the expansion of large-scale trade, the development of positive law, the establishment of the modern state, the scientific method, and the means of dissemination, etc.). This process thus continued in Europe and the United States, which presented themselves as the so-called “developed” world, the “leader” of the entire globe, imposing their own (precisely Western) ideas about temporality, history, the organisation of power, etc.

• 10 That is, the «global cultural flows that can be called (a) ethnoscapes, (b) mediascapes, (c) techno (...)
• 11 There is not enough space here to give due attention to the role of technologies and media in the d (...)

21This society is also highly interconnected not only at the level of its functional systems, but also at the level of global cultural flows (Appadurai, 1996)¹⁰. It is therefore increasingly difficult to identify sharp divisions between cultures, types of knowledge, and lifestyles – one need only think of the cultural references of the younger generations, which tend to be largely shared across the globe¹¹.

• 12 Already in antiquity and the Middle Ages, the antiqui/moderni distinction served «to distribute pra (...)
• 13 On the relationship between social and temporal structures in modern society, and in particular the (...)

22But what exactly does modern society mean? In this sense, it should be noted that the semantics associated with modernity and modernisation point to an evolving state of affairs and then imply future changes and achievements. Modern (from the Latin modernus, a derivative of the adverb modo, meaning “now”, “recently”¹²) indicates what is new and closer to the present time. Consequently, by defining itself as modern, society identifies itself «with the help of a differentiation from the past […] identifies itself in a temporal dimension», in the sense of a «constant creation of otherness» (Luhmann, 1998, 3). Hence a process of accelerated transformations (at the socio-political, techno-scientific, and industrial levels, but also in the rhythms of the individuals’ daily existence), with the gradual imposition of a strong orientation towards the future and the expansion of the «horizon of expectation» associated with this «new time» (Neuzeit) (Koselleck, 2004)¹³.

• 14 And also in the sign of a utopian project guided by science and the rationalisation of political ac (...)
• 15 «“Progress” is the first genuinely historical concept which reduced the temporal difference between (...)
• 16 Especially after the Second World War, when “development” came to mean market orientation (economy) (...)
• 17 The sociological literature on this matter, especially from a critical perspective, is so abundant (...)
• 18 The multiplicity of possible descriptions concerns not only individuals and organisations, but also (...)
• 19 In this sense, metaphors such as “liquidity” are confusing: it would mean that society is without f (...)

25In fact, the specific characteristics of postmodernity remain uncertain: probably because if modernity consisted of a positive connotation, indicating confidence in the future, conceived as the time when present expectations would be realised¹⁴ (and also if “modernisation” is used to indicate “progress”¹⁵ or “development”¹⁶, i.e. an improvement over the present), such optimism now seems to have waned. Uncertainty and disorientation now dominate¹⁷, and contingency (the possibility of deciding differently, an open horizon of possibilities) and complexity (the fact that there are more possibilities than can be realised) are usually described in negative terms. But is this sufficient to distinguish between modern and postmodern? If modern society is a society that describes itself as different from the previous one on the basis of a temporal caesura, a boundary, a clear separation from the past, modernity is also distinguished by the lack of a predetermined order, a universally valid common reference – precisely because of polycontexturality (the plurality of its codes) and contingency. It is no longer possible to describe society in a unique way that is accepted by all¹⁸. Modern society therefore «cannot abide a final word, and therefore it cannot abide authority» (Luhmann, 1998, 18), but this does not mean that it is disordered, unstable, without a form or without a structure¹⁹. In the same way, the novelty of postmodernity can hardly be reduced to the “End of Grand Narratives”, while clearer form of differentiation of the social structure does not seem to be realised. Instead, what could indicate a real break between modernity and postmodernity, is a change in attitudes towards the future, since today a shift from the «future as a promise» to the «future as a threat» (Benasayag, Schmit, 2003) is self-evident. A similar shift is taking place with regard to the past, which is being questionned for its “sins”. But there too, the question is whether this is a structural or semantics shift.

• 20 It is not by chance that one can identify some interesting adaptations and redefinitions of traditi (...)

27At the same time, the idea of modernisation – whether it is conceived as a political project or a conceptual paradigm – has shown all its inadequacies from various perspectives. From a “logical” point of view, if the future is unpredictable (because it is open-ended and not predetermined), it would be “positive” or “negative” and would in fact represent a “regression” to the past (the ongoing wars in Europe and the Middle East are only a glaring example of this). Moreover, some undeniable regional differences (primarily political and legal ones²⁰) persist in world society. Nevertheless and above all, history is full of attempts to “impose” modernisation: this is an expression of the strongly ideological use of this concept. In other words, modernisation is an ideal defended by a party that considers itself “better” and more “advanced” or “developed”. This reveals a hierarchical – i.e. inferior – conception of the “other”, i.e. everything that is not European or North American. It is precisely this aspect that is being strongly contested today by a number of protest movements, currents of thought and orientations that manifest a certain kind of claims to inclusion.

• 21 See Luhmann (1984b); Baraldi (2019); Corsi (2000); Esposito (2021).

28The fact that the tradition on which modern (self-describing) society is based is called “Western” should not be considered of second importance. Both descriptions (as “modern” and as “Western”) are self-descriptions made possible by society’s ability to observe itself (to reflect upon itself) through its communicative operations, and to distinguish itself from its environment. Thus society can cope with complexity and contingency by producing a representation of its own identity and unity and by orienting communication²¹.

• 22 In fact, by positing the distinction, the observer already places himself on one of the sides. It i (...)

29In this way, by defining its own tradition as Western, modern society defines its own identity, and establishes a difference between itself and the other(s): for example, through the West/Orient distinction. Moreover, the content of each side has to be specified from time to time, depending on the point of view of the observer using such a distinction – and the propensity to take into account the perspectives of others will also depend on it (Esposito, 1993, 349-350)²².

• 23 It is not possible here to review a whole tradition (most notably Durkheim and Parsons) that has de (...)

33This term can be used to describe different ways of conceiving the individual, that emerged in different moments of modernity. If the Italian Renaissance (XIV-XVI centuries) promoted the idea of individual unicity and the need for personal freedom, the XVII century paved the way to the natural freedom of human beings – in opposition to the traditional limits imposed by class, corporation, religion and the “artificial” inequalities they implied. Then, the XIX century presented the idea of the personal and unique interiority of each individual was presented as the basis for his or her self-determination. For each different concept of freedom there are corresponding forms of individualism – of equality and of difference (ibidem)²³.

• 24 On this, see also Luhmann (1981).

37With the rise of the modern state and liberalism – with its ideals and values such as democracy, capitalism and so on – natural law gives way to positive law: that is, a law created by the state, but autonomous and independent of other powers; separate from both religion and morality; and subject to change. While ancient law was characterised by duties (obligations), the modern law (and this is very clear starting from the French and American Declarations of the XVIII century) is characterised by rights – which are mainly subjective rights²⁴ that can be claimed by individuals. Through them, the individual becomes a “subject of law”, guaranteed against the arbitrariness of state action and entitled to advance claims (of inclusion).

• 25 The use of the term apparatus refers to Foucault (1994), albeit in part departing from it, and refe (...)
• 26 See also Luhmann (1989a).

38In this sense, Western modernity has made possible the emergence of a semantic complex centred on three terms: individual, subject, person – which could be defined as an individual-subject-person apparatus²⁵. It configures the human being in the society (at the same time) as indivisible and unique (but in this, similar to everyone else), endowed with an intrinsic dignity, that makes him/her different from things and animals (Esposito, 2014) (individual); subject to the law but also sovereign over him or herself (subject); entitled to participate in the various social contexts (as person). This apparatus shows that modern individuality is nothing but a product of modernity itself – or, but there is no difference, that freedom, equality and dignity, above and more than values and rights, are (social) preconditions of (functionally differentiated) society itself: they represent the conditions for the open and non-discriminatory “participation” of the human being in society – that is, for inclusion. This implies the paradox of (modern) individuality: individuals have to find their own motivation by themselves (in their individuality) and always have to make decisions, being «the product of their own activity» (Luhmann, 1993, 76). Moreover, it means that the possibility to be a unique individual is only given in the (modern) society (Corsi, 2015, 196)²⁶.

• 27 In fact, the self-identification of individuals depends on claims (Luhmann, 1984a).

42Expectations represent the «form of orientation» (forms for the constitution of meaning) by which individuals take contingency into account and anticipate their own action (Luhmann, 1995a, 269). In this way, they formulate desires, imagine future scenarios and construct possible alternatives to be pursued. When expectations become particularly relevant in terms of their possible satisfaction, to the point of endangering individuality²⁷ – that is, when the satisfaction is so important that negative outcomes are seen as problematic – then expectations become claims. They are “condensations” of expectations whose outcome is particularly relevant to personalisation (self-determination, autonomy, uniqueness). This means that personal involvement is so strong that it is experienced in the form of emotions (ivi, 270).

• 28 Conflicts are a resource for society insofar as they represent a “surprise” or something new in con (...)
• 29 And also the highly problematic awareness related on the one hand, that one could always have chose (...)

43However, the legitimacy of the possibility of expressing claims must be reconcilated with the fact that (obviously) not every claim can be fulfilled (due to the lack of available “positions”, excessive competition, ineradicable conflicts within society²⁸, etc.). At the same time, the impossibility of renouncing to make choices – i.e., the obligation to make choices to be able to build one’s individual career over the course of entire existence (to choose a profession, a religion or a belief system, a political orientation, specific lifestyles, cultural and social references, etc.)²⁹ –, in turn implies the inevitability of developing expectations, some of which will turn into claims.

• 30 Including the possibility of claiming them in court.

45All this leads to an increasingly evident tendency: the «claims inflation» [Anspruchinflation] (Luhmann, 1984), i.e. the increase of claims – both in quantitative terms (more rights³⁰, guaranties, access to resources and benefits of the Welfare State, that is, inclusion in a broader sense) and qualitative terms (for the benefit of an increasing number of people).

• 31 On this, see Luhmann (1997b).
• 32 On crisis and critics, see Koselleck (2012).
• 33 Here the case of George Floyd is a shocking example. About the function of protest in world society (...)

49The fact that modern society tends both to produce blame and to blame itself is not surprising (Corsi, 2000, 364). This is due to the fact that each observer (systems, organisations, psychic systems) is different from the others, and therefore observes in a different way. At the same time, each observation is realised within the society: there is no communication outside the society, i.e. in its external environment (Luhmann, 1997b). In this case, observations that are communicated would stimulate the communication process (utterance, information, understanding)³¹ and could produce some effects. This allows society to alarm itself by communicating and describing “crisis situations”, that require action and decisions (Luhmann, 1984b). Criticism and protest then serve the same function: they aim at change³². They express claims, which, when they reach a certain “critical mass”, become the subject of public debate (although individual cases can also attract a great deal of attention, usually in the form of scandals³³). Protest is particularly interesting because it produces observations of society against society itself, without producing decisions but reacting against the consequences of decisions made by others (or simply fearing them).

• 34 It is not by chance that a gradual process of «sensitisation» (Flasspöhler, 2021) would today lead (...)

56In short, individuals – at the mercy of an excess of possibilities that is difficult to manage, together with the adaptation to the differentiated inclusion criteria of functional systems – tend to seek the anchorage and security that they need to be included in membership, while the importance of their own affectivity represents their own more “authentic” specificity. In this sense, psychological, emotional and existential malaise – i.e. symptoms of a widespread difficulty in coordinating affectivity and cognition by “tuning” them to the external environment (Baraldi, 1999) are now gaining in importance: they generate expectations which, when legitimised as claims, further feed the inflationary spiral³⁴.

• 35 In turn, modern individualism is reflected on the social dimension in the comparison between indivi (...)

58In other words, the typically modern tendency towards change (novelty, progress, evolution, etc.) – which reflects individualism on the temporal dimension³⁵ – tends today to become less important, or at least to evolve in the direction of an increasing emphasis on both affectivity – where previously the emphasis was on the cognitive (and also normative) dimension – and protection from traumatic change.

• 37 Just one example: the “trigger warning” in US publishing.

60These trends can be seen in various phenomena reported daily in the media, such as: the «culture wars» (Furedi, 2022) and identity politics; the so-called politically correct (Ricolfi, Mastrocola, 2022), cancel culture, and wokeism (which – in attempt to define it without making value judgements – could be defined as a “tendency” or “sensibility”); the above-mentioned sensitivities³⁷; the fierce criticism of “evils” considered to be foundations or structural features of the West, such as “patriarchy”, “(structural) racism”, environmental exploitation (especially in relation to the so-called “ecological crisis”). These historical culpabilities would explain many cases of discrimination and violence (such as domestic and gender violence) as well as many events in which the necessary selection that systems and organisations have to make (e.g. in the education systems or in the labour market) is suspected of discrimination and abuse, i.e. could be the result of an arbitrary exercise of power aimed at reproducing itself.

• 38 A warning is needed here: we do not claim to be exhaustive and also both the trends mentioned above (...)

61A few brief remarks at the peculiarities of some of these phenomena would make it possible both to present some examples of the four trends mentioned, and to trace their hypothetical common roots (the critical attitude towards the West and its tradition) and tensions (the emphasis on the emotions, affections and also values)³⁸.

• 39 See Bernstein (2005) on the different approaches and definitions of this issue.
• 40 «Identity politics reduces the views of an individual to the common traits of a group. In some inst (...)
• 41 About the use of this category as Totalbegriff, see again Koselleck (2004).

63The term «identity politics» refers to cases where political views and actions are based on identity characteristics (such as ethnicity, religion, gender or sexual orientation, etc.) shared by a reference group that claims to be representative³⁹. Critics of this attitude argue that it subordinates individual ideas and values – i.e. autonomy and freedom of thought – to those of the reference group⁴⁰. Identity politics would then be based on a mechanism of “reducing” individual personalities to specific “models”. In this way, group identity run the risk of being highly restrictive, also considering itself “morally superior” to any other affiliation – including the universalist idea of «humanity»⁴¹ (Furedi, 2019, 2020b).

• 42 The «slogan “the personal is political” means that politics is in essence personal, which is to say (...)
• 43 «The rhetoric of the ‘personal is political’ and the attachment of the term ‘political’ to the emot (...)

64Moreover, identity politics would trigger «culture wars» between discriminated and subaltern categories on the one hand, and the rest of society on the other. According to Furedi, underlying identity movements are underpinned by the belief that «the personal is political»⁴², i.e. the idea that individual political recognition and even personal esteem – necessary for self-affirmation – are political issues, whose legitimation depends on group identity and is essentially expressed through the language of feelings⁴³.

• 44 It is common here to speak of the “white, European, heterosexual, macho man”.

65Such an attitude would contain some implicit assumptions: that to understand the world you have to look at identity categories, such as race, gender, and sexual orientation; that universalist values are only traps, that blind us and perpetuate injustices – justified by “rulers” who have imposed themselves through violence in the history⁴⁴; and that “political progress” depends on rejecting universal values and neutral rules and believing that the way individuals treat each other and the way the state treats individuals depends only on the group or community in which one is born (Mounk, 2023).

• 45 For example, the claims for a «more inclusive» language (for example through the use of feminine de (...)
• 46 There are many other paradoxes in this regard: how can one be sure not to offend the sensibilities (...)
• 47 Political correctness is then seen as «a communicative style that performs the abstract equality of (...)

66If identity politics reflects two of the above tendencies – points (a) and (c) –, so does political correctness – points (b) and (c). It expresses claims about how to treat others. First, in terms of language⁴⁵. In reality, political correctness is about communication. It is a form – an attitude and an imperative to which one must conform in order not to offend the sensibilities of others, and thus to protect them not only from possible abuse and discrimination, but also from any possible threat to one’s own self-representation. It is then an instrument for the protection of the personal sphere. The paradox is obvious⁴⁶: political correctness disregards the concrete specificity of others (values, personal history, character, etc.). What’s more, it should be applied generally – i.e. always and in every situation –, because everyone has the right to be protected from possible abuse and everyone’s sensitivities should be taken into account – point (c). Again, this should be especially true when referring to certain categories (deserving of protection). In this way, political correctness could become «an intangible weapon in the hands of minorities, whatever they may be, in the context of an asymmetrical war with majorities, whatever they may be» (Ronchi, 2021)⁴⁷.

• 48 Or even better, «a post-Christian secular civil religion», derived from the combination of German « (...)
• 49 Compared to the general case, it is assumed here that membership itself implies a high sensitivity (...)

67The word Wokeism is derived from the English verb “to be awake”, and refers to an “awakening” that allows for a clear view of the world, free from the fallacies and deceptions produced by the Western cultural tradition. Those who embrace it see this as a positive attitude – if not a moral one, and hope for its potentially disruptive consequences on a large scale. For its detractors, on the other hand, it consists of an ideological and myopic view of history – point (d) – if not even in a form of extremism. In this sense, it could be considered as a new «civil religion» (Moeller, D’Ambrosio, 2021)⁴⁸. Such an attitude would make it possible to recognise the evil done by Western civilisation in the past, and this awareness should lead in the present to the protection of historically oppressed and exploited categories from further abuse and discrimination – points (a) and (b) –, with special emphasis to the emotional-affective dimension⁴⁹ – point (c).

• 50 This attribution – which is, of course, always highly arbitrary – runs the risk of adhering to a ki (...)

68Moreover, the recognition of the guilts to be atoned for, would imply the loss of the right to express oneself on certain subjects and in certain contexts (or sometimes in general) if one does not belong to the category in question – and even more so if one is considered (or considers oneself to be) as a member of the category of “oppressors”⁵⁰.

• 51 Consequently, there are controversies about whether works of art should be preserved as symbols of (...)

69From such an approach, it is also possible to move in the direction of a re-evaluation of individual historical figures (on the basis of the mistakes they are said to have made, or on the bases of their behaviors and attitudes – they were misogynists, racists, homophobes, etc. – no longer acceptable today)⁵¹, as well as of certain states and nations or the West as a whole: this is the so-called cancel culture.

• 52 The most radical critics may think that the West can no longer propose values, but that it only has (...)

71The first consideration concerns the prominent role that morality plays today. This can be seen in the critique of the West (understood both as a system of knowledge and as a system of power) – which would impose a reconsideration of its history and its “sins”, and even a permanent process of “atonement” or “purification”⁵² –, as well as in the judgement of individual behavior and intentions, depending on the consideration of the category to which one belongs.

• 53 Moreover, the attempts to give subaltern categories a privileged position could, paradoxically, lea (...)

72The second point: the importance attached to group membership could trigger a process of indefinite proliferation of categories worthy of special protection. This tendency would be very difficult to manage, especially (and above all) for the institutions. Another negative effect could be what could be called “competitive victimhood”, in which the actors involved see themselves exclusively as “victims” or, on the other hand, as “perpetrators” (Ricolfi, 2021)⁵³.

• 54 This is true for art in general: classics in particular are at risk of being judged negatively – ev (...)
• 55 Similarly, the right to be forgotten is also at stake: the claim to “re-evaluate” the past can also (...)

73Another implication concerns temporality. The past (and this also concerns collective and social memory) – in addition to claims of revaluation and distancing from tradition and historical heritage on the basis of moral judgement – is often seen as no longer relevant or as an obstacle to the construction of the future, because it is considered structurally inadequate in the present (Furedi, 2020a)⁵⁴. On the other hand, the present and the future tend to be seen as sources of potential danger: in this sense, the dimension of conflict prevention dimension plays a prominent role. The prevention of possible “traumas” to individual sensitivities and, more generally, to tensions in the relational or social dimension, could sometimes lead to the adoption of severe restrictions on freedom of expression, or to the sanctioning – again through moralisation – of freedom of thought⁵⁵. If “problematic” or potentially “offensive” or even excessively “sensitive” contents represent a potential threat for individuals, it is also true that attempts to prevent it (through restrictions, limitations and sanctions) could also lead to excessive restrictions on individual freedom. Moreover, this could also lead to restrictions on the future, since freedom of thought itself provides the ability to imagine possible solutions and strategies to face challenges.

• 58 The Law is the society’s the «immune system», that intervenes when normative expectations are not m (...)

75The legitimation of the affective dimension and the claims it makes is particularly relevant in that it seems to reveal a substantial change in the form of individualism. In addition to group or community membership, individuality (i.e. the process of identity and personality construction) seems to be increasingly characterised by the strengthening of individual immunity to the environment (everything “external” to it: other individuals, organisations, social systems, and so on). In this sense, the protection from potential traumas and abuses that threaten the emotional and psychological equilibrium of the individual would reveal not only that the “pressure” for immunity seems to prevail over the attachment to the community (Esposito, 2014, 85), but, above all, that the “immunity logic” as a specific form of modernisation, is gradually spreading beyond the normative and legal domain⁵⁸, explicitly directed towards the protection of affectivity (which is constitutively unstable, resistant to adaptation, fragile with regard to disappointments), increasingly challenged by contingency.

• 59 Even postcolonial and decolonial critique (in and out of academia) is an internal “product” of the (...)

76If this analysis is correct, the claims that challenge the modern-Western tradition from within⁵⁹ and promote a different conception of individualism, would represent a specific mode of response to complexity and contingency. This response – through claims – occurs at different levels:

• 60 Here the term “resonance” is used in a slightly different sense that Rosa’s (2019), since we point (...)
• 61 For example, by publicly declaring one’s psychological-emotional discomfort, without being ashamed (...)

77In this case, the claims would not only challenge the Western tradition, but also attempt to “resemanticise” some of its heritage (concepts such as the individual, inclusion, immunity, but also equality, and consequently merit and so on), and lay the foundations for corresponding changes in the structural elements of society (criteria and possibilities for inclusion) – thus operating at the normative and cognitive levels. However, it is the insistence on the affective dimension that represents the most innovative and radical character of modern claims. In fact, claims draw society’s attention on the sensitivity of individuals: a kind of “resonance capacity”⁶⁰ – elaborated through the modulation of cognitivity and affectivity –, which constitutes an inviolable domain of the individual and which can be legitimately claimed – even when it implies the recognition of individual fragility or weakness⁶¹.

• 62 Sociology itself is constitutively a Western “product”: it arose out of an attempt to produce a (sc (...)

78This implies challenges for contemporary society and its modern Western organisations and systems: in particular for institutions (first and foremost the political system and Welfare State) but also for science – including sociology⁶².

• 63 It could even happen on a purely formal level, for example by discouraging those – in a typically W (...)

79However, an excessive moralisation of claims (i.e. of communication) is itself a problem. Indeed, in modern society morality has a kind of “alarm function”, drawing attention to particularly serious problems arising from the structures of society and its form of differentiation (Luhmann, 1997b, 404). Moral communication then points out to situations that cannot be easily resolved through political debate and on which there is no consensus. In this way, by clearly distinguishing good from evil, morality provides guidance for resolving conflicts. However, when morality goes too far, when it outlines excessively rigid positions and extends itself indiscriminately into the various spheres of social life, it runs the risk of fuelling and radicalising conflicts. In other words, radical claims with a strongly moral character tend to be exclusionary, because they point to an excessive “immunity” that exacerbates the conflicts⁶³.

• 64 One could ask, for example, to what extent it is appropriate and convenient for universities to be (...)

80Moreover, moralisation often tends to “confuse” the cognitive, normative and affective⁶⁴ dimensions of claims (with particular emphasis on the latter). As a result, there is a risk of reducing the temporal horizons further to the present (not allowing for alternatives to what is considered good or right today and then irrevocably condemning the past) and thus making it difficult to “imagine” the future.

• 65 Our emphasis.

86In this sense, pursuing an «ethics of contingency» could help to avoid fundamentalism, rather than the risk of obscurantism. Renouncing the pretension of being “critical” or fighting for “emancipation”, it would instead be a different modality of reflection, capable of offering suggestions and motivating to action (Mascareño, 2019, 2). Nevertheless, it would refrain from “condemning” or judging in a rigid way. It would carry out, on the fact dimension, an observation «of the conditions under which an observation is produced, and then determine how to observe who is observing»⁶⁵. It would allow «intervention in the conflicts between observers» (social dimension) and between «the simultaneity and sequentiality of their observations» (temporal dimension) (ivi, 10). Through the «cognitisation» of individual life plans’ – that is, the expansion of individual possible choices, to the detriment of normative expectations – and the «broadening of the institutional systemic framework called to respond to expectations», this kind of ethics would both increase and reduce contingency: on the one hand, by increasing the options from which individuals could benefit in order to realise their goals, and on the other, by extending the responsiveness and the selectivity of systems (ivi, 11). In other words, such an ethic is pluralistic, because the position one takes are not considered necessary, while other positions are respected because they are not considered impossible: it does not impose either necessity nor impossibility. Nor does it prevent claims that deny contingency itself, but only that these claims would generate imposition and limits for others (Mascareño, 2024).