Narratives in General, Narratology in Particular (and a few other Considerations about the state of the Academic World in our Liberal Societies)

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EDITOR'S NOTE

This English translation has not been published in printed form/Cette traduction anglaise n'a pas été publiée sous forme imprimée.

1 I am responding to Raphaël Baroni's invitation (2016) in Questions de Communication to reflect on and share ideas with all those interested in narratives and their analysis. Readers will notice immediately from the title of my work that I have changed the order of Raphaël Baroni's preoccupations. This is because, and I feel it is better to say it from the outset - hoping that readers will not see it as a reason to stop reading my article - I am not a narratologist and have never paid allegiance to this paradigm. But that is no reason not to discuss with narratologists! I would like to start by thanking Raphaël Baroni for accepting Béatrice Fleury and Jacques Walter's invitation, just as I am aware that he has long demonstrated his interest in many works not directly related to narratology (mine included).

2 I will start by analyzing Raphaël Baroni's observations, most of which I agree with. Above all, however, and I imagine that this will provoke some discussion, I would like to place this observation in the context of a wider and much more disturbing crisis, that of a cultural and political crisis with its concomitant characteristics, of a world that is dying, whereas new values and ideas take time to emerge, to be adopted by
political activists and producers of culture, and therefore to become consensual alternative proposals (1). Obviously, stating that one is not a narratologist involves explaining why one has adopted such a stance, and describing the stumbling blocks that led to this choice (2). Along the way, although opposing the fact that I am not a narratologist, I will affirm the meaning of my research on narratives, as well as its link with more encompassing pragma-enunciative issues: firstly, the relations between narratives and reasoning, especially indirect reasoning which uses enunciative effacement, when narratives develop arguments but without using the classical forms of reasoning; secondly, the relations between narratives and the issues of integrating enunciation and taking responsibility for it, which have repercussions on how intentions are expressed (by the author and text) and grasped (by readers), and on the intertwined questions of meaning and interpretation. These are linguistic issues at the intersection between the paradigms of enunciation, pragmatics, and reasoning and those of new rhetoric, textual linguistics, and discourse analysis (3). However, as these questions are not the exclusive domain of linguists, and as it is in the interest of both sides to reflect on the subjects they have in common (i.e. the narrative), as well as on the methods and theories that contribute to them, I will outline some perspectives for continuing the dialogue, focusing more on scientific discussion than institutional concerns (4).

Academic findings and their ideological and political backgrounds

Let us first agree on the findings. In order to do so, I will discuss both negative and positive findings, distinguishing for each one the academic and political aspects. For, unlike Raphaël Baroni, I will not restrict myself to the academic field and in doing so will defend a number of clear-cut positions, in keeping with the spirit of the "Exchanges" feature of Questions de communication.

Negative findings

To say that "the field of application" of narratology "has never seemed so wide" whereas narrative theory "appears to be dying" (Baroni, 2016: 219) is a paradox that is perfectly true. In fact, on one hand, narrative theory has scarcely evolved since the late 1970s, and narratologists have barely drawn on work outside narratology to renew their models. More seriously, this ossification seems to me to be driven by a conservative ideological entrenchment that is unfortunately not limited to political life or to intellectual debate. The stigmatizing of the “demon of theory”, in France in institutions where, on the contrary, we might have expected them to proclaim the role of theories in understanding the world loud and clear, has produced its effects: a lot of work that is lifeless, monotone, lacking in dynamism, without perspective, and bathed in the illusion that the endless hunt for a new corpus to exploit makes it useless to reflect on theoretical models and methods.

The assertion that the "toolbox" of narratology, i.e. its structural matrices, has been questioned because of its formalism (ibid.: 220-221) is worthy of discussion. Accusations against formalism are quite often typical of unfounded debates, always aimed at the formalism of others, blind to their own practices. However, it must be determined
whether formalism is to be criticized because the "tools", i.e. the concepts and/or methods, are wrong or whether they are wrongly applied by those who consider texts as pretexts for vague labelling. In the first instance, the fault is that of the tools and in the second that of the user, which is not at all the same thing. Both hypotheses are in fact relevant, but with different levels of responsibility: some tools have proved deficient (especially those related to focalization; I will come back to this later), but it is far from true for all of them. We also need to incriminate the shortcomings of the works that used these techniques without trying to shed new light on the narratives, which is what they were originally supposed to do, nor trying to improve those aspects of the theoretical framework in which it has proved to be deficient. Responsibility today therefore lies much less with the pioneers than with those who use a theory without improving it - not to mention those who think they can do without it!

This is why I reject distrust of formalism, even though, as Maurice Merleau-Ponty wrote a long time ago (1960: 124), the labelling of forms without any other perspective is of no interest. Categories and concepts cannot be dispensed with. Of course, as Henri Meschonnic (1970: 7) said, it is best if they emerge from practice, seek to take account of the texts of which they are akin to measuring instruments. It is no longer a question of formalism here, but of formalization. If the accusation against formalism conceals the aim of criticizing all formalization, then we are faced with an unacceptable trend, because formalization, by definition, cannot be considered to be vain or useless, since it is the basis of a scientific approach, including in the field of the human sciences. Of course, formalizations should evolve, and researchers should not ignore their lineage. But to reject them is to demonstrate deluded self-importance... And though I do not have much use for certain descriptive, overly theorized works, I believe just as firmly that it is possible to use linguistic concepts to say something new about literary works, as I have tried to do about Renaud Camus, Annie Ernaux, biblical texts in Homo narrans, or, subsequently, about the Gospel According to John, Charlotte Delbo, Léon Bloy, Jean Giono, and Emmanuel Carrère. I therefore much prefer it when models and theories are criticized than when they are systematically shunned, which encourages (or brings about) an omnipotent status for representations, widespread relativism, and approximations, testifying to the abdication of intellectual construction based on truths that have been attested (even if only temporarily) and subjected to criticism, and to having abandoned the ambition to construct integrative models with robust theoretical foundations.

This is where I diverge: I doubt, in view of the above, that the "usefulness" of narratology is so "obvious". The empire of narratology seems to me as fragile as the clay-footed giants whose misfortunes have been recounted in countless tales... We may wonder whether the tangible but little theorized narrative turn (that we have just evoked) should be interpreted as a victory for the explanatory power of narrative or, on the contrary, as evidence of a concept so all-encompassing that its use in science is a passing trend, indeed an easy way out. Without doubt both these two answers are partially true (and there may be others) but posing the question in these terms is interesting in that it does not credit narratives, and in particular the scientific disciplines which analyze them, with an automatic scientific endorsement. Indeed, it is worth discussing the scientific basis of some of the psycho-social functions attributed to narratives and the way they are exploited in academia and the media. With respect to questionable methods, I would like to mention the facile uses of the concept of 'storytelling' applied to the political field: as if, for example, electoral victories only
rewarded those who tell a story, a great national narrative. Come on, did Nicolas Sarkozy and Donald Trump win in 2007 and in 2016 respectively because they told a great story? If so, it’s the first I’ve heard of it! Because appealing to a "France that gets up early" or chanting "Make America Great Again" is not sufficient to ensure a great narrative, while at the same time building a campaign based on oversimplification, exclusion, and hatred, all the things that are exactly the antipode of the "synthesis of the heterogeneous", to quote Paul Ricoeur (1983). As if these politicians had not told populist or made-up stories that served their own purposes: but there is a big difference between these stories and a story that embraces the common adventure of a people that wishes to share a common future together, an extension of their past history. Nor is it enough to appeal to our ancestors (to go back as far as the Gauls even) to write a national novel, if the roots invoked exclude a great many from this desire for a shared future. In short, invoking ‘storytelling’ in any context (and, above all – how perspicacious can you be! - once the die has been cast) is of limited relevance, even if only considering it to be a political communication strategy. All the more so since this approach from the angle of political communication, noticeable in the full title of Christian Salmon’s book (Storytelling. La Machine à fabriquer des histoires et à formatater les esprits (The story-making and brainwashing machine), 2007), suggests a negative, axiological reading, nolens volens (like it or not), of the concept.

However, the notion of "great narrative" (which is another way of saying 'storytelling') is more complex and substantial if we consider some of its uses, as in the following remarks by Gilles Kepel (2016: 47-48) on the jihadist attacks that have struck France since Charlie Hebdo. Indeed, the concept, even if written in inverted commas, is an attempt at a holistic explanation, a synthesis of very heterogeneous elements, that sums up what motivates jihadists to take action, while at the same time giving society the means to act on the phenomenon holistically - and all this "without brainwashing"!

"While violent social phenomena always have their own logic, often but not always linked to the living conditions of marginalized populations but also stemming from the fragile psychological structure of individuals, the fact nevertheless remains that ideology gives awareness of action and determines its forms, just as it defines the boundaries of the community we belong to and that of our enemies, indeed regulates, in the cases reviewed, even the methods of extermination of the latter. This is why it is imperative to be lucid about the motivations of the jihadist doctrine, even if it can only materialize when objective conditions allow it to flourish, such as indoctrination inside prisons, the rise of social networks or the widespread use of smartphones as vectors for preaching. This explains the gap between the online publication in 2005 of the texts mentioned above and their implementation in the middle of the following decade by activists, the first of whom was Mohamed Merah in 2012.

No doubt other narratives have played a role in constructing the "great narrative" of contemporary French Jihadism, such as the legacy of the Algerian War, helping to shed light on the retro-colonial nature of hatred. It is not incidental that the children of the Ozar-Hatorah school were massacred by Merah on the day of the fiftieth anniversary of the Evian Agreements of 19 March 1962, nor that, in his family's subconscious, France was particularly abhorred. Added to this is the never-ending unresolved issue of the Arab-Israeli conflict, constantly fanning the flames of "anti-Zionism", one of jihadists' preferred means of calling for the extermination of all Jews".

Gilles Kepel's example shows that we can use the concept in another way, integrating explanations into narrative frames that relate to both the past and the future. In addition,
several great narratives can co-exist, but we need to be able to construct them, understand them, and then make them evolve: in doing so, we are pushing language to its limits if it is not relayed by action. A more scientific study of the matter is therefore needed, one which does not reduce storytelling to a pseudo-theoretical dressing-up of communication strategies, and in particular a real political-scientific study of whether those who won and those who lost did so or not with "great stories". We might also wonder whether storytelling should focus solely on electoral struggles or include an analysis of the physical exercise of power, that is to say past electoral victories 4.

In addition to the lack of theoretical concern, care and uncertainty, there is also a lack of interdisciplinarity. These damaging shortfalls cannot be mentioned without evoking the fact that university disciplinary segmentation has been accompanied by an entrenchment of identity-based ideologies (ethnic, nationalist, cultural, religious or otherwise), which are not conducive to the interdisciplinary approaches that everyone raves about but that very few put into practice, or if so, at their own risk. The time is long gone when Roman Jakobson (1963: 248), in closing his Essays on General Linguistics, could say:

"If there are still critics who doubt the proficiency of linguistics with respect to poetry, I think, that apart from myself, they must have taken the poetic incompetence of a few narrow-minded linguists for a fundamental failure of linguistic science itself. Each of us here, however, has definitively understood that both linguists who are insensible to the function of poetry and literary scholars who are indifferent to the problems and ignorant of linguistic methods, are blatant anachronisms".

It is hard to believe but blatant anachronisms are flourishing (in language sciences as well as literary sciences), combining punctiliousness here, and fascination for marginal trends and contempt for norms there, with in addition scientific reductionism worthy of merit, spurred on by a tendency to over-specialize. The latter is no doubt inevitable but should encourage us to invent teaching programs with broad perspectives and possible links between the sub-fields of a given discipline and other related disciplines. And yet anachronism is what we are facing.

Let us add that this situation, which not only concerns the members of the 9th department of the National Board of Universities (CNU) in France (French language and literature), is more serious than what the tenuous position of narratologists reveals about the state of any given discipline. In fact, this could be said of most of the paradigms that have played a major role at one time or another, and which one might think should be represented in the departments of language and literature: I am thinking, for example, of genetic editing, work on which is important for publishing reliable texts as methodically as possible, and because of the questions it raises about what constitutes a text or piece of writing, about authoriality, and about the role of the reader in these processes. The same could be said of hermeneutics specialists, literary sociology approaches and so on. Not that these approaches have totally disappeared, but they are rarely found in teaching programs, which are based on very classical literary history, with a breakdown by century, a phenomenon compounded by the 'agrégation' (the French competitive examination for civil service in the French public education system) which is based on one author per century. It is no doubt not unfounded to impose an historical framework, but other complementary conceptual and methodological frameworks could also be imagined, ones based on setting problems based on literary texts and the concept of the author, on the basis, in
particular, of the research paradigms mentioned above, not to mention other conceptual gateways such as genre, style, etc. My conclusion is therefore more severe than that of Raphaël Baroni: because the difficulties facing narratology affect the disciplines in departments 7 to 15 of the French National Board of Universities (CNU) and, in particular, the 9th department, as well as the departments of French literature and language, which primarily teach narratology.

It seems to me that we underestimate the destructive cultural effects of a global crisis. The failure of political models on the left (of social transformation or prudent reformism) as well as on the right (whether liberal or authoritarian), faced with the challenges of all kinds of globalization (financial, industrial, technological, cultural), with the loss of shared points of reference and common values, and with ecological challenges, has led to the discrediting of national and transnational political institutions. This has been given a powerful voice by the rise in populism, the triumph of simplistic ideas and the mistrust of theoretical intelligence. The situation of universities everywhere in the world with their so-called race for excellence, their managerial style of functioning, and their contempt for dynamic research (Rabatel, 2015a), simply reproduces in both teaching and research a rivalry that we are dismayed to see many giving way to, thus encouraging an entrenchment of identity-based ideologies (ethnic, nationalist, cultural, religious or otherwise), which do not only exist in the political sphere. I can easily imagine what reservations these abrupt and elliptical statements might arouse but this "strange defeat" really does deserve to be analyzed in all its facets, free from any amalgamations or teleological or retrospective illusions. I certainly do not mean to say that there is a causal link between all these phenomena, particularly since they concern very different spheres. What I would like to point out is that all these partially autonomous negative phenomena produce, given the duration of the crisis, cumulative effects – thus accentuating the impact of each individual factor - indeed a systemic effect that makes sectoral public interventions inoperative (except at the fringes).

Positive practices to reinforce

Many things are going wrong, of course, and not only in narratology, but there are also reasons for hope. I agree with Raphaël Baroni about the importance (anthropological, cognitive, and socio-political... I shall come back to this later) of the fundamental dimension of narratives, what he calls homo fabulator, or what I have named (well after others) homo narrans. Except that, unlike my predecessors, I insist on the fact that every narrative must be analyzed in terms of the points of view (POV) that it stages and confronts: those of the characters, those of the narrator, constructed by the narration itself, those of the author, in projections or para-/peri-textual comments, or even those of the readers (whether these readers be implied by the text or the author or real). I also share the idea that narratology, which historically has been focused on literary texts, would benefit from examining works that analyze non-literary narratives, be they media narratives, life stories, etc. My thinking has furthermore been enriched by the analysis of narratives in didactic interactions, and by the entanglement of the latter with fundamental argument-based objectives. This detour has enabled me to see the argument-based strategies used in literary and religious texts given the lack of any forms of syllogistic argumentation. (Rabatel, 2004; 2008a).
Similarly, I hail the growing importance of work on ethics and empathy, to which I myself am very attached. It is a significant research current, although we should not be under any illusions about the small number of these studies or the lack of transpositions that should be made more often in the fields of literature and linguistics (Rabatel, 2013; 2015b; 2016). For many works discuss empathy without exploring the concept in more depth or showing what the texts reveal about it, how they exploit it in language via the question of POV, and what narratives might contribute to the theory of empathy. As for the development of narrative sociology, narrative theology, and narrative historiography, the dominant tendency is that of an instrumentation of relatively basic narratological tools. But this does not produce interesting insights about narratives or the disciplines in question, unlike the debates historians had in the 1980s. And yet there is a lot to be said about elements of proof, the idea of biography, and the use of attested documents for the benefit of narratology. Similarly, the work devoted to the importance of narration in the (re)construction of identities in professional situations (professional memoirs or accreditations to conduct research), whether it be cure or care, does not seem to lead (as far as I am aware) to any substantial theoretical outcomes. In short, the empire is in place—but it is a particularly fragile empire because leaderless—making me more inclined to invoke the reign of an expansionist empiricism.

However, we must avoid the temptation to focus only on narration, just as others are tempted to focus only on argumentation. This opposition between narration and argumentation is all the more debatable since, as shown by the work of Jean-Marc Ferry, there is a continuum between the two, and argumentation is most likely the offspring of narrative reasoning. As Marie-Laure Florea and myself (2011: 22-23) pointed out in the introduction to the chapter in Questions de Communication on discourse about death:

"Identity is more than just narrative identity (Ricoeur, 1983, Charaudeau, 1997). As Jean-Marc Ferry points out, in addition to the founding role of narration, which is the primary construction of identity, other registers come into play. Hence, interpretation plays a role "when the narrative is understood from the point of view of edification" (Ferry, 1991: 112), when the thought process goes beyond the contingent framework of action to explain what is. Ferry then suggests a third stage, namely argumentation, which he defines as the process of working out and explaining particular phenomena using different logical frameworks aimed at elaborating reasons to act that apply to all, not only to those who have been the authors or witnesses of such events, events that have been related then interpreted... This is why argumentation is itself grasped due to the need for a fourth dimension that completes the dynamic process of identity construction, referred to by Ferry as reconstruction. Reconstruction aims to justify argumentation by taking into account other good reasons, situating them, and contextualizing them, in order to avoid intolerant ideological excesses, without at the same time succumbing to relativism. It is indeed all these different dimensions that interact in the emotional and rational construction of identities, a construction focused on action, itself charged with emotion and reason".

To conclude this section, I would say without doubt that I have taken a more radical stance than Raphaël Baroni, and that my remarks are more encompassing, more directly political, but it seemed to me that the debate did not gain anything by being restricted solely to a university level. I imagine it will provoke some annoyance, but perhaps it will also open up a debate that integrates this dimension. Otherwise it will fall short of its objective, for it is difficult to autonomize these debates if we limit them.
to the academic field(s) alone. Indeed, intellectual debates on theories and how they are taught have, in France at least, had political repercussions and, conversely, political debates have fueled theoretical antagonisms, both in terms of the content and the format of the debates. As if everything had to be reduced to a killing game, allowing only the victory of one camp over another, with the backlash being history standing still and science dispensing with cumulative processes, a phenomenon that is heightened when academic divisions and fashion encourage an entrenchment of narrow-minded identity-based ideologies (ethnic, nationalist, cultural, religious or otherwise).

My divergences with narratology

18 Raphaël Baroni has on several occasions wondered, despite the value of my research for narratology, why I do not identify with this paradigm. I therefore feel I need to clarify my differences with it, which I will do here, before outlining in the following section the linguistic meaning of my work, and its anthropological and political background.

19 My reasons for disagreeing are primarily theoretical and methodological. In 2010, at the invitation of John Pier and Francis Berthelot, I published a text entitled "Pour une narratologie énonciative ou pour une analyse énonciative des phénomènes narratifs? (Enunciative narratology or an enunciative analysis of narrative phenomena?)" (Rabatel, 2010). The title was very explicit, for although it questioned the possibility of belonging to narratology, it did so by specifying it from the outset as enunciative narratology (all things said not a very popular concept), before rejecting such a lineage. Linguists who have taken an interest in narratives have often done so from the linguistic angle of voices or polyphony (Danon-Boileau, 1982; Rivara, 2000), and more rarely through the general analysis of the linguistic construction of the world, i.e. referencing. More often than not, their contributions have been limited by their acceptance of the Genettian framework of focalizations (Genette, 1972; 1983). However, I reject the idea of enunciative narratology, because I refuse the theoretical frameworks of narratology of the 1960s and mid-1970s, which are essentially the consequence of a structuralist influence in which priority is given to deep structures and less emphasis put on the texts with respect to construction of the discourse. Taking this as the starting point, and making the assumption that voices and POVs were central issues, I tried to problematize the concept of POV, which led to me distancing myself from Genettian focalizations which in my opinion are at the heart of the system. I am of course aware that narratology has taken many other turns - including in terms of non-communicative approaches, which I also reject (Rabatel, 2011a) - but the bottom line is that narratological studies typologize from afar without confronting the materiality of the texts. As I am opposed to generalities and approximate metaphors, I maintain my position. I will not elaborate at length on my differences with Genettian narratology, but I cannot help but evoke them briefly:

- I regret the lack of distinction between the speaker, i.e. the source of the voices expressed or being expressed (Rabatel, 2011b: 15-17) and the enunciator, i.e. the source of the POVs, who can take account of wordless sentences (Ducrot, 1984; Banfield, 1982), as well the instances of narration. I realize that this question is also a subject of debate in language sciences, and that my position draws valuable support from literary works, since the scale of the text raises different questions from those in the text itself. This is an example of how linguistics
would also benefit from using their techniques to tackle new objects, and how too many
linguists make the mistake of neglecting literary works.

• I reject the fragility of the instances on which the three focalizations are based, as they lack
substantial enunciative analysis. Because there are only two instances: the first speaker/enunciator and the second speaker/enunciator, which means there is no instance for a
fantastical external focalization, one that mistakes focalization from the outside with
external focalization (Rabatel, 1997b: 89, 102; 1998).

• I disagree with the non-existence of the narrator’s POV, an idea put forward by Gérard
Genette, who, it is true, gives three different definitions of zero focalization, and differs on
more than just one point with the thesis of narratorial omniscience (Rabatel, 2010). I also
disagree with the - by definition - limited perspective of the characters in a text, at the cost
of basic ontological and phenomenological considerations about perception, in relation to
the phenomenon of restriction of the field and the nature of restriction, in particular the
assertion that a character cannot be privy to the thoughts of the other characters (Rabatel,
1997a: 239-269).

• I criticize the underestimation of the linguistic construction of what is "seen", which alone
makes it possible to determine on the basis of textual data who sees, feels, thinks, speaks, acts.
These semantic subsets of the centers of perspective need to be analyzed in detail; which for
me has led to the identification of different types of POV (Rabatel, 2008a) that vary
depending on the nature of the phenomena analyzed and the texts they emerge from:
  ◦ In the foreground, embryonic POV: perceptions, thoughts, actions taken as a whole;
  ◦ In the background, represented POV: perceptions (and thoughts inferred from or based on
these perceptions) and/or actions deployed;
  ◦ Asserted POV: thoughts and words (disconnected from perceptions) of secondary
enunciators in reported/represented speech or in direct comments by the primary
speaker/enunciator, in this case the homo- or hetero-diegetic narrator.

• I also regret the lack of anthropological background to theories on focalization, versus the
horizon I am trying to give to POV and empathy, e.g.:
  ◦ on the question of the continuum from pre-reflexivity to reflexivity, i.e. from the sensory
to the intelligible, via what can be sensed, thought, and said, this continuum being itself
part of a wider continuum from perception to action;
  ◦ regarding the political and ethical horizon of empathy - when combined with an altruistic
conception of sympathy (Nussbaum, 2012: 202-203) -; indeed, empathy does not only
function at an individual or inter-individual level, it can also be between individuals and
groups (Morin, 1999: 51-52; Nussbaum, 2010: 37-38, 61; 1995: 190-191): I will come back to
this in the next section.

These differences on the issue of focalizations have not made me forget Gérard
Genette’s many other contributions, in particular, to stay within the bounds of
narratology, the distinction between history, storytelling and narration. But although
narration is about putting into words, it must be said that it is more concerned with the
major structural blocks of storytelling, for example, isochronies or anisochronies; even
frequency is approached structurally; it is not at all analyzed in terms of language at a
contextual, textual level (Rabatel, 2008a: 305-321). These distinctions are undoubtedly
relevant, but they would benefit from being completed by the repertoire of linguistic
markers that implement them, a repertoire that is not limited to the study of
statements but takes account of the text as a whole, for example through the following
phenomena: coherence, cohesion, argument structuring, universe construction,
represented discourse, emotions, POV phenomena, and how POV change, their intrications, etc.

21 For the same reasons, I had similar misgivings about Algirdas Julien Greimas and semiotics. As I explained, I abandoned a thesis I was planning to do with him (Rabatel, 2015c: 328-329). Then, at the invitation of the semioticians, on the occasion of the centenary of Greimas' birth, I reconsidered my differences with his approach to enunciation and with those of other semioticians (Greimas, Courtés, 1979; 1986; Fontanille, 1998); Fontanille, Zilberberg, 1998), which ultimately have the same foundations as my criticism of narratology, namely a persistent underestimation of surface phenomena and discourse, due to a fascination with deep structures (Rabatel, available soon). In other words, at the heart of my disagreements are the great modelers of the late 1960s and early 1970s (Structural Semantics dates from 1966, Figures III from 1972). Many fundamental works have emerged since then, for example those of Paul Ricoeur (1983, 1884, 1985) or Jean-Marc Ferry (1991), who have profoundly nourished my thoughts on narratives, even though they are not narratologists.

22 On the other hand, my reluctance towards narratology has been fuelled by the negative effects of how it has been taught: the narrative turning point, like the enunciative moment (indeed like all analytical modes), have spread by relying on a little-questioned doxa, limiting analysis to the quinary scheme of the story or its actantial scheme (without, moreover, pondering the question as to why several schemes are possible). I can but share the observations and reservations expressed by Raphaël Baroni (2016: 226), for example on the occasion of the Narratives Matters conference in 2014...

23 But there's more to it. Raphaël Baroni (2016: 228) regrets that the authors of the works that have contributed most to the evolution of the theoretical frameworks of narratology are not acknowledged as such:

“These theorists are rarely perceived by the public as narratologists in the strict sense of the word, and sometimes even they themselves are reluctant to assume this identity. In particular, it is worth mentioning the considerable contribution of many linguists who have developed narrative theory within language sciences, including Jean-Michel Adam, Françoise Revaz, Alain Rabatel and Dominique Maingueneau. Moreover, John Pier (2011) states that in France, contemporary narratology has very much shifted towards discourse analysis.”

24 For my part, I would gladly reverse the roles, regretting that these works are not perceived by narratologists (with some exceptions) as crucial to the enrichment of narratological theoretical frameworks. As far as I am concerned, these missed opportunities are one more reason why I do not recognize myself in such a paradigm. But, the disappointments aside, what fundamentally matters is the difference in scientific project. Thus, to answer Raphael Baroni’s question (2016: 229), "will a linguist, a comparatist or a specialist in journalism, who is inclined to do "narratology", acknowledge their identity as a "narratologist", or at least accept that one of the facets of their complex identities as researchers is linked to this discipline?". I would like to say that that is not my theoretical framework, and that if my work relates to narratives, then I have analyzed them as an enunciative linguist. Indeed, as a researcher, I define myself less by the objects I work on than by a theoretical framework and methodology: neither of which fall under narratology. I would like to add one last important point: my refusal to be catalogued as a narratologist has as much to do with the differences I have just mentioned with narratology as with those I
have with my own discipline. Indeed, at the start of my career\textsuperscript{12}, it was trying enough being a linguist working on literary texts, without being a narratologist too...

### A translinguistic pragmatic-enunciative framework

Having set out my differences, I would now like to define the theoretical meaning of my approach, leaving narratology aside - but coming back to it at the end. From the very beginning of my work on "la problématisation sémiolo-linguistique de la notion de point de vue (semio-linguistic problematization of the concept of point of view)" (the title of my thesis), that is to say on narrative focalizations in narratives, I had the impression that I was touching on a crucial question for linguistics regarding the expression of subjectivity. Not only through its traditional forms - "indexical markers of the formal apparatus of enunciation" as Émile Benveniste said, and other markers outside this formal apparatus - but also through markers in the third person that can be found from the construction of referencing. I have already recounted the extension of my thoughts (Rabatel, 2015c: 341-345); I now take the liberty of referring readers back to it, thus enabling them to understand why the question of POV has been extended considerably to include other types of text than narratives: explanations, information, and argumentations. Hence my publications on media, religious, philosophical, and didactic corpuses. Concomittantly, the points I have been investigating have themselves evolved, with an essential place given to forms of enunciative erasure and the resulting argumentative effects, following on from Jean-Blaise Grize's work (1990, 2002) on natural inferential logic. This broadening out has been accompanied by a reflection on enunciative concepts, which in my view are essential when it comes to analyzing statements (Rabatel, 2012) as well as the enunciative responsibility of texts (Rabatel, 2008b; Rabatel, Chauvin-Vileno, 2006). These concepts question speakers about their choices, their strategies, and the importance of enunciative positionings with respect to quotations and reformulations: they are crucial when studying academic, biblical, philosophical, and media texts (aside from the well-worn subject of so-called media objectivity), insofar as it is crucial to determine who thinks what, about what, and about whom. Moreover, these questions are also indispensable for studying narratives (fictional or not), in the third person and a fortiori in the first person, especially when they have unusual themes (Gustave Flaubert, Salman Rushdie...) or represent with a certain narratorial neutrality worlds that arouse fear and disapproval (Les Bienveillantes, Littell, 2006), causing the reader to doubt what the author (who is not the narrator, even less so his characters) thinks. This is also the case when stories describe with the same distance characters derived from axiology and value systems with opposing polarities, or even violently antagonistic ones (Fyodor Dostoevsky, Louis-Ferdinand Céline, Marcel Aymé...).

Finally, my questions about POV relate to the mechanisms used to construct meaning in discourse, and thus to the link between meaning and interpretation. They are also accompanied by an in-depth semantic reflection on the mechanisms of meaning through work on figures (even if, here once again, I do not reduce the mechanism of figurations to tropes (antimetaboles, spoonerisms, approximations, antanaclases, syllepses, lapses, etc.), for example by also looking at figures of thought (irony, humor, hyperbole...), taking into account all the figurative processes of discourse in lists, repetitions, connivance phenomena (see note 1 above), etc.
In some ways, my work on POVs is the prism through which I have worked for the past 20 years, and I think the interest of it is fourfold:

- a theoretical-didactic interest, deepening the study of subjectivity, making it possible to consider a large number of markers and clues, by analysing their effects on the reader, and thus going beyond formalist descriptive observations, disconnected from any interpretative considerations. This applies both to the reading of works and to literary writing or the question of style, via the rewriting or writing of imitations/inventions (Rabatel, 2004); and it also touches upon the questions of subject matter and intentionality, as constructed in and by discourse;

- an anthropological interest by attempting to account for the continuum of pre-reflective perceptions to thoughts, words and action (Rabatel, 2008a: 417-420 ; 440-449 ; 464-469), against the background of what Alain Berthoz and Bernard Andrieu (2011) describe using a very enlightening portmanteau word: perceivaction. In doing so, they ensure that the whole infra-verbal dimension of thoughts and emotions that accompany and transform perceptions into intentional, imaginative reflections is heard; through flashes of inspiration or more elaborate reasoning, which ultimately become embodied in actions and intellectualized in repertoires of rules for acting and living (Ferry, 1991; Jouvent, 2009: 12-13). It is up to the linguist to account linguistically for these different forms of expression of reflexivity (see above my proposals on the various forms of POV);

- a psycho-social interest by relating my POV theory to empathic, cognitive, and emotional approaches, giving a socio-cultural meaning to grammatical markers. In turn, this enables us to analyze how enunciators are able to put themselves in other people's shoes, imagining what they might, want to or should perceive, feel (sentiments, emotions, feelings), think, say, do, and the implications of these representations as regards understanding situations, and the choices and constraints that each of us are subject to (Rabatel, 2016). This empathic shift does not only involve others (heterodialogue), it also affects the subject/speaker, who is capable, through self-dialogic reflexivity, of multiplying perspectives (spatially, temporally and conceptually) in order to better understand complexity;

- a political interest, insofar as the work on empathic displacements (Berthoz, 2004) and narrative imagination (Nussbaum, 2010: 121-122; 1995: 202-204) allows us to construct, based on an understanding of the complex relationship with otherness, an awareness of oneself, of others, and of the collective, which must be taken into account in the construction of objects, concepts, and decisions. This political interest seems to me even more important since I am advocating all-encompassing empathic mobility. In other words, we must put ourselves in the shoes not only of those close to us, but of everyone, including those furthest away from us; we need as well to practice empathy from subject to subject but also put ourselves in the shoes of groups and institutions (Morin, 1999; Nussbaum, 2010; Rabatel, 2015b). All of this gives content and meaning to the ethical and political values which are fundamental to living together in society, but which are today undermined.

I would like my position to be understood through all these dimensions: it is only then that interdisciplinary dialogue can be productive. We all need to come together and set aside our certainties and disciplinary preoccupations. In conclusion, and to put it another way, I willingly admit that I am not a narratologist, but I consider my work to be of interest (in particular) to narratology, just as I have said on other occasions that I am not a didactician, but that my work sometimes touches on didactics.
Conclusion

I now come to the last question dealt with by Raphaël Baroni, that of the institutional anchorage of narratology. In this case, I will be Gramscian, considering that the battle is first of all a battle of ideas (and therefore also an ideological battle) and that it is because of the excellence of its works that a science may be recognized - even if it takes time⁴. Of course, I am not naive enough to believe that one can work without institutional means or recognition, and without orders, but at least narratology, like the linguistics I practice, does not require as many resources as other scientific fields. This fact alone explains why I stress the importance of the quality of scientific exchanges and productions, betting on the likelihood (for that is what it is) that sooner or later field agents will take into consideration those whose work is important to the development of their own interests. On the condition, however, that those interested in the development of new ideas and their inclusion in the field (and the dominant parts of the field) give themselves the means to do so, and of course that institutions also give them the means to do so, in particular in terms of funding and temporary lecturer (ATER) and post-doc posts, before recruiting young researchers with tenure, the number of which alas is constantly being reduced in all disciplines.

I do not have a clear-cut opinion about whether narratology should, as a matter of principle, come under the departments of French language and literature, language sciences or information-communication. Based on the narratological productions I am familiar with, I do not find them very compatible with the scientific practices of the last two options. One might also consider that it would be just as possible to recruit narratologists in sections 7 to 15 of the National Board of Universities (CNU), i.e. all the sections that combine language and literature. Moreover, pragmatically, I notice that, in many medium-sized universities, there are no autonomous language science departments, whereas information and communication sciences are developing and adding language science researchers to their teams. What is more, it would only make sense to have a narratologist in language and literature departments if at the same time other paradigms, equally valuable for understanding texts, were represented (see above). Such a situation first requires a profound redefinition of disciplines, certainly not by abandoning the preparatory courses for competitive examinations for the recruitment of teachers, but by offering courses that are partly independent of the latter. Of course, it would also be a good idea (we still have to dream!) to change the content of these competitive exams, even if this is far from easy given the weight of conservatism, including among colleagues whose cultural conservatism is in contradiction with their political convictions.

Although these hypothetical institutional and academic reforms are complex because they provoke resistance from lobbies and depend (in France) as much on the Ministry of Higher Education and Research as on the Ministry of Education, indeed on the Prime Minister and President of the Republic, the opportunities for debate can nevertheless be multiplied without waiting for these reforms to be implemented. I applaud the opportunity for debate provided by Raphaël Baroni, and the role played by 'Questions de communication' via its "Exchanges" section, in so many of its earlier issues. This review demonstrates that it is possible for a university to be a place of academic excellence, of disciplinary cross-fertilization, and of controversies, both as regards theoretical questions as well as their social implications. More reviews should play this role, albeit
in different forms, and networks should be set up to debate and discuss topical issues. Opportunities for interdisciplinary exchange around common objects or concepts should be multiplied, and these objects and concepts tested against conflicting bodies of work. This would be a good way of moving forward, encouraging people to make deeper and richer theoretical choices as well as to trail-blaze new territories.

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NOTES

1. I would also like to thank Michèle Monte and André Petitjean for their remarks.

2. To avoid multiplying self-quotes, please refer to my personal web page: http://www.icar.cnrs.fr/membre/arabatel.

3. Rarely has a candidate varied so much in his/her proposals and numbers, and never has the internet - fueled by the elected candidate and his supporting websites - spread so many lies as in the 2016 US presidential election.

4. I close this text on 02/12/16, the day after F. Hollande gave up the idea of running again for the French vote. There were lots of comments going around saying that one of the reasons for his failure was that he had not told any great stories. Admittedly, what he said was by far insufficient. But is a great story as "imperative" for the outgoing as for the incoming - and indeed is it done in the same way by all challengers? It is difficult to tell a great story when one has a track record to justify... Moreover, given the scale of the ideological crisis of the models of social transformation, is it possible to tell great stories when the ideological substratum of progressive politics is lacking? It seems to me that the French were expecting a message that would help them diagnose, provide explanations, and offer perspective; all things that come beneath storytelling, even in its weaker versions.

5. No doubt this general description does not do justice to the efforts being made to re-orient training programs here and there; however, it is likely that the increasing scarcity of recruitment is weighing negatively on these efforts.

6. Not counting the training courses for future teachers on how to teach literary, grammatical and linguistic concepts that are not limited to the simple implementation...
of sequences, and which, depending on the local situation, suffer from a lack of investment or an insufficient number of hours budgeted for them. Added to which is a serious lack of continuing education everywhere.

7. Department 7: Language sciences: general linguistics and phonetics; department 8: ancient languages and literatures; department 9: French language and literature; department 10: comparative literature; department 11: English and Anglo-Saxon languages and literatures; department 12: Germanic and Scandinavian languages and literatures; department 13: Slavic languages and literatures; department 14: Romanesque languages and literatures: Spanish, Italian, Portuguese, and other Romanesque languages; department 15: Arabic, Chinese, Japanese, and Hebrew languages and literatures, other linguistic fields.

8. I limit my remarks to France, especially from an institutional point of view.

9. But the importance of the fundamental dimension of narratives was already implicit in the critical understanding of storytelling I outlined above.


11. However, this distinction should not be made more rigid, since observables are dependent on theoretical and methodological frameworks.

12. I am not sure that things have changed that much, especially for young people who are trapped into specializing early on without first getting an overview of the discipline...

13. All these components are expressed linguistically through the enunciative postures of co-, over- or under-enunciation, all of which are observable positions regarding the interactional co-construction of POV: see Rabatel (2012: 34-40).

14. I like to quote this saying attributed to Max Planck: "Truth never triumphs but its opponents eventually die"...

ABSTRACTS

The paper first reviews the paradoxical situation of the crisis in narratology, highlighting the fragility of an expansionism undermined by empiricism, due to the thinly stretched links between current research and the theoretical frameworks of narratology, which have been reduced to a succinct box of tools, disconnected from any interpretive issues. More than just a facile critique of formalism, the paper questions the relevance of theoretical modelizations given a wider cultural and political crisis. Secondly, it responds to Raphaël Baroni’s questioning of the reluctance of certain researchers to consider themselves to be narratologists, despite the fact that their work has shed new light on narrative analysis; referring to his own work, the writer covers some of his disagreements with the narrative theories of the 70’s. Thirdly, he tries to define the pragma-enunciative, rhetorical-textual concepts that characterize his approach and that transcend the category of narrative. Fourthly, the paper discusses some institutional or academic propositions about the place of narratology or that of other theoretical frameworks contributing to the analysis of narratives. It describes, in particular, the conditions which could
facilitate interdisciplinary exchanges and improve the training offered to students, especially future language and literature teachers.

En premier lieu, l'article revient sur la situation paradoxale de la crise de la narratologie en insistant sur la fragilité d’un expansionnisme miné par l’empirie, en raison du lien distendu des travaux actuels avec les cadres théoriques de la narratologie, réduits à une boîte à outils sommaire déconnectée des enjeux interprétatifs. Par-delà la critique facile du formalisme, il inscrit la suspicion envers les modélisations théoriques dans une crise plus vaste, culturelle et politique. En deuxième lieu, il répond à l’interpellation de Raphaël Baroni s’interrogeant sur les réticences de certains chercheurs à se considérer comme des narratologues alors que leurs travaux ont renouvelé l’analyse des récits ; en appui sur ses travaux, l’auteur dégage certains de ses désaccords avec les théories du récit des années 70. Dans un troisième temps, l’auteur essaie de préciser les concepts pragma-énonciatifs, rhétorico-textuels caractéristiques de sa démarche qui transcendent la catégorie récit. En quatrième lieu, l’article discute quelques propositions institutionnelles ou académiques relatives à la place de la narratologie ou à celle d’autres cadres théoriques contributifs de l’analyse des récits. Il traite notamment des conditions susceptibles de faciliter les échanges interdisciplinaires et d’améliorer l’offre de formation à destination des étudiants et, plus particulièrement, des futurs enseignants de langues et lettres.

INDEX

Mots-clés: narratologie, analyse pragma-énonciative des récits, formalisme, formalisation, empirie (storytelling), relativisme, interdisciplinarité

Keywords: narratology, pragma-enunciative analysis of narratives, formalism, formalization, empirical research (storytelling), relativism, interdisciplinarity

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