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Rita Santos, Sílvia Roque and Tatiana Moura
Representations of Gender, (Armed) Violence and Security in Resolution 1325

Gaby Zipfel
Gender, Violence and Sexuality in Armed Conflict Situations

Júlia Garraio
The Instrumentalization of Sexual Violence in German Cold War Anti-Communist Discourses

João Aldeia
Investigating Homelessness

Helena Machado and Susana Costa
Biolegality, the Forensic Imaginary and Criminal Investigation

Carlos Fortuna
Heritage, Tourism and Emotion

Malcom Miles
A Post-Creative City?

Luís Mendes
Marginal Gentrification as Emancipatory Practice
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

Rita Santos, Silvia Roque and Tatiana Moura  
*Missed Connections: Representations of Gender, (Armed) Violence and Security in Resolution 1325* ................................................................. 3

Gabriel Zipfel  
*“Let Us Have a Little Fun”: The Relationship between Gender, Violence and Sexuality in Armed Conflict Situations* ............................................................. 32

Júlia Garraio  
*Hordes of Rapists: The Instrumentalization of Sexual Violence in German Cold War Anti-Communist Discourses* ................................................................. 46

João Aldeia  
*Investigating Homelessness: In Defence of a Declared and Concerned Ontological Politics* ........................................................................................................... 64

Helena Machado and Susana Costa  
*Biolegality, the Forensic Imaginary and Criminal Investigation* ................................................................. 84

Carlos Fortuna  
*Heritage, Tourism and Emotion* ........................................................................................................... 106

Malcom Miles  
*A Post-Creative City?* ................................................................................................................................. 123

Luís Mendes  
*Marginal Gentrification as Emancipatory Practice: An Alternative to the Hegemonic Discourse of the Creative City?* ........................................................................................................... 140
This issue of RCCS Annual Review begins with three articles focusing on women, war and violence, and concludes with two texts on creative city policies. The other articles included here present a critical examination of various issues: the dominant trends in homelessness research; the social representations and uses of DNA technology in criminal investigation in Portugal; and the relations between heritage and tourism in the contemporary world.
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Missed Connections: Representations of Gender, (Armed) Violence and Security in Resolution 1325* 

This article analyzes the limitations of the United Nations Security Council Resolution on Women, Peace and Security (1325/2000) as a product of the concepts of gender, violence and security underpinning it. Although it represents an important historical advance, recognizing the potential role of women in peacemaking processes and post-conflict agreements, and ensuring that violence against them is taken seriously both nationally and internationally, the Resolution nevertheless has a number of limitations and challenges. It is argued here that the Resolution is (only) a first step towards the recognition of the connections and possibilities of dialogue between gender, violence and security, and that it does not necessarily transform the way each concept and the connections between them are understood within the United Nations, its member states and even non-governmental organizations dedicated to gender issues, particularly women’s groups. The limits of the Resolution are questioned by analyzing contexts of armed violence other than wars or post-conflict situations that are not covered by 1325, focusing particularly on their gender dynamics.


Introduction

The unanimous approval of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325 on “Women Peace and Security” was met with enthusiasm by various sectors of the academic and activist communities, which praised its uniqueness and importance (Rehn & Sirleaf, 2002; Hill et al., 2003).

The Resolution’s importance can also be measured by the number of times it has been translated since being approved – at the time of writing it has been translated into over 100 languages (Peace Women, 2012) – and by its relevance to activist work carried out by civil society organizations. According to the NGO Working Group on Women, Peace and Security, one of the key organizations in the creation and approval of Resolution 1325, most of the respondents to a 2005 questionnaire on civil society activity (out of a total of over 100 participants in two workshops devoted to the Resolution) confirmed that they were using

* Article published in RCCS 96 (March 2012).  
This is a longer revised version of the text “UNSCR 1325: Is it Only about War? Armed Violence in Non War Contexts” (Santos, Roque & Moura, 2010), focusing on the centrality of war and its equation with violence in Resolution 1325. It has resulted from several research projects carried out between 2005 and 2010 by the Center for Peace Studies and the Observatory on Gender and Armed Violence.
the Resolution in their work, despite the fact that most did not know exactly how it was being implemented by other civil and governmental organizations (2005: 83-84).

In fact, not only has this Resolution raised the level of awareness and debate regarding women, peace and security in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), but it was also the first time the UNSC acknowledged civil society's, and particularly women's, participation in formal peacekeeping processes and operations (Hill et al., 2003). Its Preamble underlines this aspect by “reaffirming the important role of women in the prevention and resolution of conflicts and in peace-building” (UNSC, 2000), and stresses the responsibilities of the UN member states and security council in launching “effective institutional arrangements to guarantee their protection and full participation in the peace process” in order to “significantly contribute to the maintenance and promotion of international peace and security” (ibidem).

Resolution 1325 also identifies a set of actions to be taken by UN member states in order to address the needs and roles of women in the prevention and resolution of conflicts and in peacebuilding. The first recommendation (Article 1) – suggesting its importance within the framework of the Resolution – concerns the representation of women: it determines the need for member states to “ensure increased representation of women at all decision-making levels in national, regional and international institutions and mechanisms for the prevention, management, and resolution of conflict.” Articles 2, 3 and 4 emphasize the role and contribution of women at various decision-making levels in peace processes, in conflict resolution, and within the United Nations. These articles are complemented by references to the importance of gender mainstreaming (Articles 5 and 6), which has the purpose of facilitating increased representation and participation of women at all levels and spheres of conflict prevention and management, and in peacebuilding. For many feminists, 1325 is a landmark precisely because of this factor, as it acknowledges women as agents with their own agendas and concerns (Rehn & Sirleaf, 2002; Cohn, 2004).

The appeals regarding the need to consolidate the mechanisms for women’s protection (UNSC, 2000, Articles 8-10), which reinforce representations of women as particularly vulnerable to violence, are complemented by recognition of their agency in the prevention and resolution of conflicts and in peacebuilding processes (especially at the local level), and therefore the need to support them (Articles 2, 4 and 8a). This construction of women as agents of peace, which permeates the Resolution, has been criticized as being essentialist
and counter-productive as it fails to consider women as equal participants in the political process (Cohn et. al., 2004: 137).

Resolution 1325 has also been praised for consolidating broader meanings of security and peace (Porter, 2008; Cohn et. al., 2004). It implicated states in the provision of security with regard to women (Article 10) through the prosecution of those responsible for war crimes, including crimes of a sexual nature and others that mainly affect women and girls (Article 11), and by including the “different needs of female and male ex-combatants” in “the planning for disarmament, demobilization and reintegration” (Article 13) and in “Security Council missions” (Article 15).

While Resolution 1325 has some intrinsic value for attempting to recognize the experiences of women and girls in war and post-war situations and for seeking to improve their situation (stating that security also depends on the attention given to gender relations), despite its good intentions, it has helped to inscribe, institutionalize and reproduce assumptions and concepts which condition the pursuit of gender equality, peace and security, at both the national and international level. Therefore, it serves merely as a first step towards the recognition of the connections between gender, violence and security, failing to change the way we understand each of these concepts or the way they operate within the United Nations, its member states and non-governmental organizations dedicated to gender issues (such as women's groups).

This article aims to contribute to the growing body of academic work in the field of feminist perspectives in International Relations (IR) – despite the abundant criticism and resistance which exists within the discipline. These perspectives converge in the claim that international relations are a product and producer of another type of relation: gender-based power relations. This is why the word relations in the field of IR deserves to be highlighted (Sylvester, 1994). Gender is important for the study of international relations in conceptual, empirical, methodological and normative terms, and constitutes a “political theory which coexists with and interacts with the political movement dedicated to eradicating the problems that women experience because of their sex” (Sjoberg, 2006: 43).

According to the feminist motto “the personal is political and international” (and vice-versa) (Enloe, 1989), this article seeks to understand the connections between the sphere of (inter)personal violence and the international context in which the Resolution is applied, taking as a reference the expressions of gendered armed violence in non-war contexts, in
which around 87.8% of all lethal armed violence in the world occurs (Geneva Declaration, 2011).

In fact, like other documents, Resolution 1325 is “produced by and productive of particular concepts, discourses of gender, violence, peace and security” (Shepherd, 2008: 14), rooted in different feminist traditions. The analysis of these concepts is crucial not only to understand the ambit and implications of Resolution 1325, but also to identify what was not included and therefore remains outside the document, and more importantly, to recognize what could have been different. The limitations of the Resolution, which will be analyzed in detail below, are related to: 1) the notion of gender present in it (focusing on women and, more specifically, on women as victims or peace-makers); 2) the conception of instances of threat exclusively as instances of war or post-war, which generally considers only the short term and not the broader processes in which violence occurs; 3) the idea of security as something that centers provide to peripheries through paternalistic policies (such as the increased representation and participation of women at all levels of decision-making in conflict-resolution, post-war reconstruction and peace-building processes), gender mainstreaming, and even repressive policies.

This article is partly inspired by the work of Laura Shepherd (2008) on the conceptualization of gender relations and security underpinning Resolution 1325, though it seeks to deepen and broaden the understandings of violence included in and excluded from it. By emphasizing the connection between zones of peace and zones of war, this article gives special attention to one of the aspects of the production and reproduction of violence which is omitted by the resolution: gendered armed violence in non-war contexts. Armed violence serves as an example of the lack of definition of the boundaries between zones and times of ‘peace’ and war (though it is not the only one, as not all violence implies the use of weapons). We highlight this type of violence because it has been facilitated by the dissemination of small arms, due to their portability, accessibility and utility in various civil conflicts.

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1 For a more detailed analysis of the influence of each school of feminist thought on the text of Resolution 1325, see Pratt (2009).

2 By gendered violence or gender violence, terms used synonymously throughout this article, we mean any violence committed in the name of sexual hierarchy, or in other words, any violence that is meant to establish, impose or perpetuate gender inequality, and whose targets are defined according to their gender (Kimmel, 2005).

3 Small arms are conventional weapons meant for personal use. They include revolvers, semi-automatic pistols, rifles and carbines, submachine guns and machine guns (UNO, 1997: par. 23-33). These are weapons widely
Representations of Gender, (Armed) Violence and Security in Resolution 1325 contexts. As we will see, these weapons are instruments of (aggravated) violence in both the public and ‘private’ sphere, not only in war or post-war contexts, but everywhere (for example, in situations of domestic violence). They are also used, in a somewhat more pronounced way, in contexts marked by significantly high levels of armed violence (organized or otherwise), such as in urban areas of Central and South America, sub-Saharan Africa and Asia, and also in the USA.

1. Gender: Synonym of women as victims

Despite the recurrent use of the term “gender,” women and children” and “women and young people” are identified as the main targets of the Resolution (UNSC, 2000: Preamble). This identification of women as the targets of the Resolution and the concomitant omission of men from the document reveals and reproduces a conception of women and gender as equivalent, ignoring the relational dimension of gender (relations of inter- and intra-masculinities and femininities), which we understand as the system of signification which creates social hierarchies based on associations with male and female traits (Wilcox, 2010: 64).

Women, like children, are represented as the “vast majority of those affected adversely by armed conflict” (UNSC, 2000: Preamble) – although this is not empirically supported (Jones, 2000) – and described as “increasingly targeted by combatants and armed elements” (ibidem), which excludes them from the role of combatants or perpetrators of violence, as analyzed by D’Amicco & Weinstein (1999), Moser & Clark (2001), Sjoberg & Gentry (2007) and Mackenzie (2011). Women are also identified as having “particular needs” and requiring “special forms of protection” (UNSC, 2000: Preamble), particularly in response to “gender-based violence.” The persistent coupling of “women and children” reinforces representations of women as helpless dependent beings (Enloe, 1990) and as society’s cultural depositaries (Puechguirbal, 2004: 11). As Shepherd states, these representations fix “bodies in relation to a biologically determined narrative of sex difference that universally subordinates the female and requires that the female be weak” (2008: 106). Therefore, Resolution 1325 helps crystallize the image of women as victims, neglecting their

used by regular and irregular armies, and by civilians. Throughout this article, the terms light weapons, small arms, firearms and weapons will be used interchangeably.

4 A few examples: “gender perspective” (UNSC, 2000: Articles 5-6), “gender considerations” (Article 15), “gender dimensions” (Article 16) and the reality of “gender-based violence” (Preamble and Article 10).
Representations of Gender, (Armed) Violence and Security in Resolution 1325

contribution to violence and their possibility of expressing a tactical agency\(^5\) through which they deal with violence and uncertainty (Utas, 2005).

These representations are complemented by other equally simplistic images that (using Shepherd's expression) “fix” the identification of women to informal political activism (UNSC, 2000: Preamble and Article 2), and to which other problematic recommendations are linked, such as the increased participation and representation of women in formal and informal power structures (Articles 1, 3 and 4). The reference to the importance of women’s participation “in the prevention and resolution of conflicts and in peace-building” (Preamble) (which, in the text, precedes the representation of women in formal politics and is therefore presented as more significant) is constructed by recognizing the connection between women and these activities. This recognition is based on the homogeneous representation of women as caregivers, mothers, peaceful and inherently pacifist. This essentialist equation between women and peace reproduced by 1325 is also mythicized (Enloe, 1989; Pettman, 1996; Cockburn, 2001; Goldstein, 2001; Moser & Clark, 2001), and despite its potential usefulness in the short/medium term in enabling marginalized groups to come together and create projects for social change (Spivak, 1987), it may be harmful to the emancipatory goals of the feminist struggle (Butler, 1999) by reinforcing the gender stereotypes which are at the basis of the “war system” (Reardon, 1985).

Men, on the other hand, are never explicitly mentioned in the Resolution. This coincides with Connell’s observation concerning the debate on the exclusion and marginalization of women from the decision-making centers in which “men are implicitly present as the power-holders” (2005: 1806). Despite the apparent omission, men and (some) masculinities are implicitly represented in the discourse of 1325, either as the main perpetrators of violence (“combatants,” perpetrators of “gender-based violence,” namely gendered violence in which women are the victims), or as responsible for the protection of “women and children.” Regarding this last point, the main addressee of the Resolution, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, personifies the male subject par excellence as responsible for ensuring the protection of the women under 1325 (victims of war and of post-war violence) (UNSC, 2000: 5).

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\(^5\) Mats Utas uses the concept of tactic agency – short term answer to the social structure – as the opposite of “strategic agency” – an action capable of predicting the future. It is deployed in a shared social place, populated by other social agents, and depends on specific situations. Therefore, the categories of victim and agency are not mutually exclusive. Agency can be exercised in uncertain or adverse circumstances, as exemplified by young women’s “social navigation” of war zones in Liberia (Utas, 2005: 407-408).
Articles 2-5, 16, 17). This (sub)text hides the fact that most men lack access to power and that many (most?) do not use violence to assert themselves. It also masks the violence that men (particularly the youngest or most excluded) frequently experience in a context of war and elsewhere (Barker & Ricardo, 2005; Munn, 2008).

We believe it is necessary to make these aspects visible so as to deepen the understanding of the structural inequality between the sexes and the way gender constructs underpin war and violence (Cockburn, 2010), but also in order to perceive, in a broader sense, the role of structural violence (discrimination, inequalities, exclusion, economic crisis) in the reproduction of gendered violence (as we will see below). By ignoring the experiences of other women and other men in different structures of social differentiation (such as class, ethnicity, nationality, sexual orientation and age), Resolution 1325 can also be considered a means of reproduction of “white western heterosexual feminism.” Its silence on local, national, and global power structures such as capitalism, neocolonialism and imperialism (manifested, in their most extreme form, in foreign military interventions), analyzed by post-colonial feminists (Spivak, 1987; Eisenstein, 2004; Pratt, 2009), reveals this bias.

2. Violence: A synonym of (post-)war (and peace: a synonym of the absence of war)

In the Preamble to the Resolution, there is no reference to violence. 1325’s field of action is very clear: it is “war” or “armed conflict” (UNSC, 2000) which causes flows of “refugees and internally displaced people” (UNSC, 2000) and opposes civilians to “combatants and other armed elements,” impeding the maintenance of long-term peace and security (UNSC, 2000: Preamble). In turn, and as a result of this understanding, peace and security are defined as the absence of armed conflict, and the Resolution suggests that “durable peace and reconciliation” will prevent future violence (ibidem).

This perspective ignores the contributions made by feminist thought in International Relations to the way formal peace in itself can support and aggravate power differences (Enloe, 2000). The Resolution’s equation of violence and war excludes from its scope other cultures and structures of violence that allow space for the emergence of war and violence, which in turn may add elements or contribute to the reproduction of gender differences

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6 According to Michael Kimmel (2005), more than being just perpetrated in the name of male hegemony, violence is an attempt to win back power. It is often the result of economic conditions which prevent men from performing their “traditional” roles, or of social transformations which allow women access to positions and opportunities to gain freedom and autonomy.
Based on the notion that one of the sources of violence is patriarchy (Reardon, 1985), as well as on the study of actual violence experienced by women, some feminists (Moser & Clark, 2001; Moura, 2007 and 2010) established a continuum (geographic, temporal and of scale) (Cockburn, 2001) between the different types of violence and injustice, underlining their connections and challenging the utility and perversity of distinctions between war and peace.

Violence perpetrated using firearms is one of the examples of the existing relation between gendered violence in zones and times of “peace” and of war. The focus on this type of violence is appropriate and necessary for a number of reasons. A substantial part of the violence, insecurity and morbidity around the world is associated with and facilitated by the dissemination of firearms (resulting from their portability, accessibility, easy use and low cost), not only in war zones, but also in contexts of peace, particularly in so-called “developing” and “developed” countries which are relatively stable in political terms, but have significant levels of interpersonal, criminal and domestic violence involving firearms. In fact, most firearm deaths and injuries generally take place in countries that are not involved in declared armed conflicts. The global character of armed violence is also evident in the production and trade (legal and illegal) of drugs and small arms/light weapons, as well as in militarization processes, gender power asymmetries and social exclusion that mark scenarios of war, peace and post-war to different degrees.

Currently, there are 875 million small arms in the world, 75% of which are owned by civilians (Small Arms Survey, 2013). The civilian population is also the main victim of armed violence: it is estimated that every year between 200,000 and 270,000 people lose their lives in firearm-related incidents in countries which are formally at peace – around double the number of deaths that occur in situations of war (Geneva Declaration, 2011). According to the report “The Global Burden of Armed Violence 2011,” which analyzed data from 186 countries, about 12.2% of all lethal armed violence took place in contexts of armed conflict, while 87.8% of deaths occurred in non-war situations. The number of people around the world with physical and emotional scars resulting from this type of violence is much higher.

Our starting assumption is that the connections between firearms and violence are not only important but also complex and dynamic. In this sense, we support the argument that access to guns is not in itself responsible for violent acts. However, it is an important risk factor in the dynamics (for example, mortality rate and scale of violence) and implications of violence (suicide, homicide and crime rates, as well as the possibility of armed conflict and institutional fragility), although the strength of this effect varies from context to context (Briceño-Léon, 2002; Greene & Marsh, 2012).
The distribution of armed violence varies across regions, countries and spaces. Areas of Central and South America, the Caribbean and sub-Saharan Africa are the most heavily affected regions (Geneva Declaration, 2011), where firearm-related mortality rates may reach epidemic proportions. In accordance with the World Health Organizations (WHO, 2001), epidemic levels are reached whenever mortality rates exceed 10 deaths per 100,000 inhabitants. Countries that are emerging from armed conflict, especially those in situations characterized as violent peace, are often the ones most affected by armed violence. According to a study which analyzed 30 post-war countries, the homicide rate tends to be 25% higher than normal in the first 5 years after a civil war (Collier & Hoeffler, 2004: 12).

In fact, the period following a war is not necessarily accompanied by a reduction in violence, lethal or otherwise, and the level of criminal, social and political armed violence is often maintained, influenced by the dynamics of the war economy (such as the trafficking of goods or people, begun during the war and continued because it is profitable for the leaders of the “parallel” economy) (Rausch, 2006) or motivated by the characteristics of the post-war period. In the latter case, the social dissemination of firearms and a change in attitudes towards these weapons and towards violence in general may facilitate particular expressions of armed violence, such as domestic violence, gang- or crime-related violence, war-related acts of vengeance, human rights violations committed by security forces and ethnic conflicts, among others (Muggah, 2006; Cukier & Sidel, 2006). El Salvador is frequently cited as a prime example of this, as its homicide rate increased drastically after the conflict was over: between 1990 and 1995, homicides increased from 79 to 139 per 100,000 inhabitants (Briceño-León, 2002: 13). In Mozambique, there was also a significant increase in violent crime, especially armed violence, in urban centers in the southern parts of the country (Leão, 2004) after the withdrawal of the ONUMOZ (United Nations peacekeeping mission), peaking in 1996 and 1997. Initiatives such as the 1995 government plan to combat crime – which included the establishment of riot police units in areas...
particularly affected by violence, the reintroduction of district divisions for police, and increased cooperation between police forces and neighboring countries (Operation Rachel) – sought to respond to these problems (Santos et al., 2011).

In regions affected by epidemic rates of armed violence, this type of violence also tends to be concentrated in specific areas of territory. Cities tend to be the focus of what some authors (Briceño-León, 2002; Koonings & Kruijt, 2005 and 2009) call the “new violence” (to explain the transition from repressive and politicized state-sponsored violence during a dictatorship to dispersed violence within the microsocial fabric), and may become scenarios where mechanisms of legal and democratic organization coexist with manifestations of state and non-state criminal violence. In some of these contexts, the combination of social and economic asymmetries and high levels of unemployment, unplanned urban growth, low-quality infrastructures and general impunity have given rise to high concentrations of violence in urban territories circumscribed by scenarios of institutionalized peace, facilitated by the increased availability and non-regulation of firearms.

Even in countries or regions where rates of armed violence are not so high, insecurities stemming from the use, perception and fear of firearms have significant effects on the lives of people in the form of criminal violence (organized crime, street crime, domestic violence, etc.), whether institutional or self-inflicted. In Canada and Switzerland, for example, as in other industrialized countries, there are more firearm-related suicides than firearm-related homicides. In the former, 633 armed suicides and 137 armed homicides were registered, just for 2002, while in Switzerland (one of the countries with the highest rates of armed mortality and morbidity in Europe), there were 36 armed homicides and 412 armed suicides (Cukier & Sidel, 2006). In both cases, the victims were predominantly men. The role of firearms in situations of domestic violence is also worthy of attention, as we will see in further detail below. In France, where there are roughly 20 guns per 100 citizens, 1 in 3 women murdered by their husbands is shot (Henrion Report, 2001). In the case of Canada, access to firearms is one of the five main risk factors related to female homicide in situations of domestic violence (Killias et al., 2001).

In non-war scenarios characterized by high levels of armed violence committed by civilians or state agents (such as El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Brazil, Venezuela, South Africa and the United States, to give some examples), as well as in contexts with lower rates
of armed violence, the all-important relationship between firearms, gender constructs/relations and security is frequently underestimated or completely overlooked.

As regards victimization, although men are the main direct victims (WHO, 2001; Cukier and Cairns, 2009), women are also victimized by “wars” between armed gangs (formal, informal, criminal or “official”), particularly through gendered violence. In El Salvador, for example, the country with the highest rate of female homicides in the world (129.46 per million inhabitants) (Flores, 2010), the majority of female victims of firearm-related violence are murdered in public spaces, and the deaths frequently occur after rape at gunpoint (Ormusa, 2009). Also in Ciudad Juarez, in Mexico, where 370 women were murdered between 1993 and 2003, 137 of these were raped prior to being killed (Amnesty International, 2010).

Moreover, various gender-oriented studies into firearm-related violence have shown that firearms play a significant role in violence against women, both in the home and in nearby public places (Wintemute et al., 2003; Vetten, 2006; Hemenway et al., 2002; Moura, 2007). Contrary to what might be expected, these studies, carried out in different geographical contexts, reveal important similarities. They demonstrate that firearms are particularly dangerous if they are accessible to an acquaintance of the victim within the household, irrespective of who they belong to or whether they were acquired for self-protection. In Brazil, in 2004, 42% of the female victims of homicide were murdered with firearms, mainly at home (ISER, 2005). In Canada, 25% of the female victims of domestic violence were shot (Cukier and Cairns, 2009: 22). In Norway, since 2000, 80 women have died at the hands of their current or former partners, and in one third of these deaths firearms were used (Masters, 2007). In Switzerland, between 2000 and 2004, 859 women were murdered in domestic incidents, of which 365 were with a firearm (Office Fédéral de la Statistique, 2006). A recent study in Portugal revealed that, between 2007 and 2009, there were 191 recorded cases of domestic violence in which firearms were used (Moura et al., 2013). A national survey carried out in partnership with the Portuguese Association for Victim Support (APAV) showed that 30.7% of the 101 women who had resorted to the association and chose to answer the questionnaire claimed that the person responsible for the violence owned or had access to a firearm. The percentage of victims that said they did not know whether or not their partner had access to a firearm at home was also significant (39%). Not knowing means having to deal with that doubt and, therefore, the eminent discovery of its existence.
Furthermore, even when women are not directly targeted by armed violence, they frequently have to bear the burden of its emotional and socioeconomic effects, having to patch together fragments of lives and societies that have been destroyed by it (Moura, 2007). In Brazil, groups made up of relatives of victims of armed violence, mostly women and especially mothers, are an example of this. Together with other social movements and agents in civil society, these groups fight for justice and memory and against violence (Moura et al., 2010).

Regarding the sex of aggressors, similarly to contexts of “formal” war, it should be pointed out that, although the visible part of this violence is masculine and predominantly young (Dowdney, 2005), only a small minority of young males actually get involved in armed violence (Jütersonke et al., 2007). The use of firearms is frequently related to cultural-based views of masculinity in which firearms are associated with virility. Some boys see weapons as a powerful way of obtaining status, power and access to material goods and women (Barker, 2005). As well as constructing their identity vis-à-vis other men, boys also form a significant part of their identity in their intimate relationships through violence perpetrated against their female partners. In line with this violent (and armed) form of masculinity, some adult men acquire guns as an integral part of the construction and perception of their roles as protectors (Kimmel, 2005). On the other hand, many men and boys have become active in the struggle against armed violence, campaigning for greater regulation of the international sale of small arms and better legislation on the right to own firearms, and sometimes join campaigns to eradicate violence against women (such as the “White Ribbon” campaign created by Canadian men to oppose men’s silent complicity in violence against women). At the same time, some women and girls also support armed masculinity and violence either by acquiring weapons and/or directly participating in armed conflict themselves, or by encouraging men to participate and subtly reinforcing stereotypes which associate men with violence and protection through the glorification of firearms and demand for weapons as a way of obtaining material goods and status (Moura, 2007; Moura & Roque, 2009).

The fundamental idea which we want to underline is the following: the connections between violence in non-war or formal peace scenarios and extreme forms of violence in war situations frequently originate in the prevalence of gender ideologies and technologies such as small arms, which glorify aggression as an appropriate expression of power and protection. Armed violence and the ownership and use of firearms are, therefore, also a
product of gender constructions, based on the exacerbation of a hegemonic and militarized form of masculinity associated with familiarity and fascination with firearms (Connell, 1995: 2012), and on the persistence of subaltern groups of male and female subjects over whom male power is exerted.

We have argued that the dominant conceptual framework through which violence is usually understood actually contributes to the (perceived) non-existence of that violence, preventing us from recognizing its full extent and ubiquity. According to Vanessa Farr,

Framing gun violence as “abnormal” [...] prevents us from seeing that armed conflict is not anomalous but takes place on the extreme end of a continuum of violence. It hides the fact that the abuse of women and other oppressed people in times of peace is only a less intense expression of the full-scale violence that erupts in times of war – which means that war is not so much an aberration as an exaggeration, in organized form, of the violence, often facilitated by prolific guns, that exists even in nonwarring societies. (2003: 4)

As we have seen, forms of gendered armed violence may coexist in countries that have recently emerged from war, in troubled areas with significantly high levels of armed violence (organized or otherwise), particularly in urban areas, and in stable countries, which may have much lower levels of armed violence but are nevertheless affected by it, in either the public or (more frequently) private sphere. Despite its local nature, armed violence is a global phenomenon due to its prevalence as well as its dependence on and connection with scenarios of war, peace and post-war where the legal and illegal trade in drugs and small arms, militarization, gender power imbalance and social exclusion are on the increase and exacerbated. However, with this example, we do not wish to conceal other dimensions of armed violence (as Resolution 1325 does), or minimize the importance of structural violence in maintaining gendered violence, both in times of war and of peace.

As Cynthia Cockburn states,

[...] patriarchal gender relations predispose our societies to war. They are a driving force perpetuating war. They are among the causes of war. This is not, of course, to say that gender is the only dimension of power dimension implicated in war. It is not to diminish the understood importance of economic factors (particularly an ever-expansive capitalism) and antagonisms between ethnic communities, states and blocs (particularly the institution of the nation-state) as causes of war. (2010: 140, our underlining)

Hence, we must emphasize that Resolution 1325’s silence on power structures at the global, regional and national level (ranging from the neoliberal\textsuperscript{11} order and military

\textsuperscript{11} The “neoliberal order” refers to an approach to economic and social policy based on neoclassic economic theories that stress the effectiveness of private enterprise, free trade and open markets.
complexes to new and old forms of colonialism) is also compounded by its silence on other forms of gendered violence. This neglect contributes to the naturalization of micro-level violence, experienced at the interpersonal level by both women and men worldwide, thereby constituting one of the mechanisms of perpetuation of spirals of violence.12

By omitting structural violence and the gender order that sustains it from the causes of violence against women, the Resolution situates “the problems” in clearly identified parts of the world, and attributes their origins to local issues in the “violent” periphery. This localization gives rise, in turn, to security policies which are also localized – in the supposedly “peaceful” and orderly centers, as we will discuss next.

3. Security: Synonym of (paternalistic or repressive) intervention by centers in the periphery

In the context of Resolution 1325, security is conceived as the prerogative of United Nations member states (UNSC, 2000: Preamble; Article 11) and, ultimately, of the United Nations Security Council, which is granted “primary responsibility [...] for the maintenance of international peace and security” (Preamble).

Besides being the prerogative of the member states and of the United Nations Security Council, security is also associated with peace in the title of the Resolution, and understood as the antithesis of “armed conflict” (Preamble) and especially as the protection of women. The “prevention and resolution of conflicts and peace-building,” in the figures of the peacekeeping and peacebuilding forces and gender mainstreaming (Preamble) for which the United Nations Security Council is responsible, take place in war zones and are associated with member states’ internal affairs, as opposed to the international sphere. Similarly, efforts to increase female participation and representation are mainly directed towards states and, more specifically, towards the processes of conflict prevention and resolution. By articulating what should be required from member states regarding the protection of

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12 We are not arguing for an automatic understanding of the relation between structural and direct violence. In fact, “the notion of structural violence” may ignore “that structures are reproduced and changed in social practices by acting subjects” and that “the relation between structure and violence is always mediated by agency” (Robben, 2008: 88). Moreover, by using the concept of a continuum of violence, we are not arguing that all violence is the same in intensity and scale, or in terms of motivation, as stated by Mackinnon (1994) in her seminal work on mass rape as a form of gender violence. The concepts of continuum, spirals, chains and mirrors of violence (Scheper-Hughes & Bourgois, 2004) are useful, in our opinion, because they leave room for the contextualization of social practices: direct violence is influenced by – and not automatically or exclusively generated by – other forms of violence that are less visible.
women (i.e., that they “ensure increased representation of women” [Article 1], “provide candidates to the Secretary-General” so he can “appoint more women as special representatives” [Article 3], “provide to member states training guidelines and materials on the protection, rights and the particular needs of women” [Article 6], and “increase their voluntary financial, technical and logistical support for gender-sensitive training efforts” [Article 7]), Resolution 1325 constructs the international sphere as “the negotiator of gender equality, in opposition to conflict-torn domestic domains that may have more pressing agendas” (Shepherd, 2008: 125).

The prioritization of the protection of women during and after the conflict, as well as the delimitation of spatial boundaries for armed conflict and the provision of peace and security are extremely problematic. The emphasis on the need to protect women in the context of armed violence ignores the fact that women are not more vulnerable in times of war per se: they become more vulnerable because of preexisting inequalities, originating from gender power hierarchies, which are also present in so-called peaceful societies (Puechguirbal, 2010: 176). It also ignores the way various types of violence structure the lives of individuals worldwide, and the situations where women actively participate in the subordination of other women and men. As stated in the introduction to a volume of the International Feminist Journal of Politics dedicated exclusively to the analysis of Resolution 1325, Women continue to be represented in UNSCR 1325 and related mainstream policy documents solely in gendered terms. An articulation of the intersections between gender and other social categories and structures along which oppression, marginalization and violence occur (including nationality, class, ethnicity, religion, sexuality and age) is completely absent and even actively prevented in such representations. This has particular consequences for how women’s agency is perceived [...]. A critical feminist approach thus should not only demand that gender (rather than women) becomes an integral part of conflict analysis and conflict resolution, but also remain wary as to how ‘gender’ is used and with what political implications. (Pratt & Richter-Devroe, 2011: 494; 496)

Moreover, the construction of “member states” as security providers (and the state as the key peacebuilding entity) reinforces the idea that this is the model of political organization par excellence, and that states are the ultimate authority on security, while overlooking their role as producers of violence, particularly against their own civilians (Youngs, 1999). Member states which are called on to provide “voluntary financial, technical and logistical support for gender-sensitive training efforts” are also perceived in opposition (and as hierarchically superior) to “states in which armed conflicts take place" (i.e., those
discussed by the Resolution) and to which the adjectives “indigenous” and “local” (Articles 8 and 15) are applied.

Furthermore, by identifying the international community of states as the model and the main agent responsible for peace, security and the defense of the rights of women, the international sphere is perceived as external to conflict (Shepherd, 2008: 126) and distinct from the national zones where violence is located. By camouflaging the power relations in play at the global and regional level and their role in the production of violence (both direct and structural or symbolic), this association between the international stage and conflict perpetuates the division and hierarchical relationship between the international and national spheres.

The association of security provision with peacekeeping, peacebuilding and gender mainstreaming policies also raises a series of questions regarding feminist approaches to IR. Peacekeeping operations have been criticized not only for being unable to keep the peace (given that peace transcends the absence of conflict), but also for contributing to the perpetuation of patriarchal structures and cultures, in some cases involving the exploitation of women and girls (as well as men and boys) in local communities, and the reproduction of spirals of violence resulting from difficulties in fulfilling expectations with regard to income-generating mechanisms (Olsson & Tryggestad, 2001). Moreover, the analysis of key UN documents on peace operations reveals the “masculine norm” underpinning these processes. These, as N. Puechguirbal explains,

> privilege physical toughness, heterosexual macho bravura, the denigration of women and femininity, an exclusionary focus on issues affecting men and, in a Foucauldian sense, disciplinary approaches to multifaceted problems [...] and hence deny the agency of women, maintaining them in a subaltern position and preventing them from contributing more actively in peacebuilding and conflict resolution processes. (Puechguirbal, 2010: 174)

Post-war reconstruction processes have also been analyzed as based on and reproducing inequalities (not only gender-based), and as being generally accompanied by violence (Ayoob, 2002: 38). Sometimes, armed conflict situations actually allow gender barriers to be challenged: men’s and women’s roles may be redefined as a result of mobilization for war, while the social turmoil created by armed conflict – especially as a result of the recruitment of male relatives for the war effort and the loss of others, but also due to female participation in violent groups or the migration of women (Murguialday & Vázquez, 2001) –
may allow women the opportunity to experience other roles besides the ones underlying the patriarchal division of functions.

As stated by Christine Chinkin,

> Concepts of reconstruction and rehabilitation may be misnomers in the case of women. Both concepts assume an element of going back, restoring to a position or capacity that previously existed. But this is not necessarily what women seek. [...] The goal should rather be societal transformation – not restored dependence and subordination. (Chinkin, 2004: 32)

Finally, the concept of gender mainstreaming (one of the main focuses of the Resolution) warrants special consideration. Defined as a norm which intends to apply “a gender perspective in all policies and programs, so that an analysis of its potential effects on women and men can be made before any decisions are taken” (United Nations, 1995: 116), in the context of 1325, gender mainstreaming is understood primarily as synonymous with protecting women and guaranteeing them greater participation in peacekeeping operations (and less as the analysis of the differentiated impact of post-war policies). These understandings not only essentialize women as peaceful civilian victims, under the protection of male soldiers, militarized states and male representatives in the United Nations Security Council, but also silence gender attitudes which glorify male violence, consent to violence against women and support socioeconomic gender inequalities which affect men and women in contexts of armed conflict, post-war and peace. This ultimately signifies the negation of female agency and the perpetuation of stereotypes such as women-pacifists-victims and men-aggressors-protectors. Another problem of gender mainstreaming is its alignment with international neoliberal norms which seek to integrate women into western markets, including in armed conflict or post-war contexts (True, 2011: 85). As a result of the internalization of these norms by western countries, gender inequality is essentially seen as a problem of developing countries.

In the light of these critiques, and given that 1325 has already been integrated as an instrument of international governance within the United Nations system, as well as in the mandates of regional organizations (Magallón, 2008: 71), this Resolution can be considered a product of a conservative policy and approach regarding the gendered aspects and effects of armed violence. It also contributes to the deepening of the unequal power relation between the center and the periphery, “where ‘zones of conflict’ are assisted by the ‘international community’ to integrate into global mechanisms of production and consumption, thereby
securing not only the conflicts in question but also the reproduction of a neoliberal world order” (Shepherd, 2008: 399).

Thus, Resolution 1325 can be seen as a liberal tool of consensus generated around peacebuilding processes, based on the resolution of problems of the “dangerous” “undeveloped” periphery by the central elites and by mechanisms of global governance, thereby justifying hegemonic projects (neoliberalism and liberal peace). More than an effect of power, gender violence is therefore instrumentalized for hegemonic operations and projects (Nayak & Suchland, 2006). These mechanisms mask processes of gender violence and peacetime violence that are not exactly materialized in the idea of “women as victims or pacifists.” Following this line of thought, Harrington argues that, in the framework of peacekeeping missions, 1325 is mainly an instrument for dealing with the new post-Cold War realities of international security, rather than an instrument for changing them. She also questions the instrumentalization of gender discriminatory practices, such as 1325, which do not take into account other factors of structural violence and especially its effects in maintaining global hierarchies, explaining that the mandate to eradicate gender violence and empower women can ultimately justify external military intervention (Harrington, 2011).

Moreover, and despite addressing issues regarding the participation of women in international institutions and processes (UNSC, 2000: Articles 1, 3 and 4), the special emphasis on the need to support national and local initiatives, especially in areas traditionally associated with women (Articles 8, 13 and 15), such as reconciliation and justice, may reinforce the association of the female sex with the domestic domain, reestablishing the public-private division.

These preconceptions regarding women, war and the international sphere are perpetuated by the actions and initiatives carried out by governments and civil society organizations to implement and supervise Resolution 1325. For example, the National Action Plans (one of the main instruments for the implementation of 1325) of most of the thirty-five countries which have adopted them to date (mainly countries of the global North)

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13 The institutional and political model frequently called the liberal peace project assumes the objective of resolving the “periphery’s” problems through the internalization of its causes and the externalization of its solutions. Therefore, this model ignores the role that international institutions and policies have in maintaining and aggravating processes of inequality and difference which, on the one hand, produce violence and, on the other, are supported by this same violence (Paris, 2002; Duffield, 2001; Richmond, 2009).

14 These are: Australia (2012); Austria (2007); Belgium (2009); Bosnia-Herzegovina (2010); Canada (2010); Chile (2009); Ivory Coast (2007); Croatia (2011); Denmark (2005, revised in 2008); Slovenia (2011); Spain (2007); USA
coincide in terms of sector priorities; they adopt and promote a gender perspective with regard to their foreign policy, namely through: i) the promotion of gender integration in all phases of peace missions, including post-war reconstruction and peacebuilding operations; ii) the inclusion of gender and UNSC 1325 issues in the sensitization and training of peacekeeping forces; iii) the promotion of women’s human rights in conflict and post-conflict zones, and support for women’s participation and representation in peace negotiation and treaty implementation processes; and finally, iv) promotion of gender equilibrium and the integration of gender issues in the planning and execution of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) activities (Gumru & Fritz, 2009; Sheriff & Barnes, 2008). Of these, only two countries, Portugal and the Philippines, mention measures to be taken at the national level in order to address gender violence in the internal sphere, centered on the regulation of small arms and light weapons. In the first case, there is only a vague reference in the Action Plan Framework section (Portuguese Government, 2009: 4), which is not fleshed out in the program part of the Plan. In the second case, there is a specific objective regarding gendered armed violence in the country, more specifically the promotion of investigation into female victimization as a result of the use of firearms, and the evaluation and reinforcement of laws concerning the ownership and use of firearms, both nationally and internationally (Philippines Government, 2009: 4 and 5).

By contesting the analytical separation between declared war and other violent practices, such as the phenomenon of the territorial over-concentration of armed violence in contexts where there is formally peace (Moura, 2010), we run the risk of generating misinterpretations concerning the type and level of security policy that is better suited to deal with gendered armed violence. We do not mean to subscribe to the notion that all domains of life should be securitized, or that a militarized response is justified to combat it,
as has frequently occurred in the post-9/11 world. We are aware that national and urban policies designed to contain threats such as drug-trafficking, terrorism and “undesirable” elements (migrants and delinquents) have in many countries found renewed inspiration in this context of beefed-up internal security. These policies have in some way become an internationally legitimized application of what L. Wacquant describes as being, in the USA, a paradox of the neoliberal penal system: it aims to create “more State” in the areas of law enforcement, courts and prisons in order to solve the generalized increase in objective and subjective insecurity, which in turn is caused by “less State” in the economic and social spheres of advanced first world countries (Wacquant, 2009).

Our argument in this article, in contrast, stresses the need to politicize gendered armed violence in non-war contexts both nationally and internationally, as opposed to the emergency scheme approach. Thus, we wish to draw attention to the structural, cultural and ideological foundations of violence and politicize them. This is the opposite of the theories and policies that justify military intervention in the name of human rights protection (“Responsibility to Protect”).

The policies and programs pursued by states and civil society to combat armed violence, particularly in contexts characterized by high levels of urban armed violence, have mostly focused on public expressions of armed violence of a criminal nature. Consequently, repressive strategies for fighting violence have been favored, such as the approval of tougher prevention measures and the adoption of more rigorous policing models (Small Arms Survey, 2007). The debates in Brazil and El Salvador about the reduction of the age of criminal responsibility, the routine use of elite troops to patrol the shanty towns of Rio de Janeiro (Justiça Global, 2004) and the introduction of the Mano Dura (“strong hand”) and Super Mano Dura policies in El Salvador and Central America – which aimed to repress street gangs, but led to the detention and accusation of suspected gang members on the basis of physical appearance alone (Carranza, 2005) – are examples of these populist penal strategies. In 2007, the Mérida Initiative was put into action by the USA. It was a large-scale project inspired by Mano Dura, based on the transfer of weapons and preparation and training of police and military forces in Mexico and Central America, which fostered repression and human rights violations (Fitzpatrick Behrens, 2009).

Besides this, and unsurprisingly, given that men make up the majority of users and victims of armed violence worldwide, prevention policies and programs have been directed almost
exclusively at men and boys, giving little or no attention to the role and impact of armed violence on women and girls. As women are not considered the main risk group in armed violence, investigation initiatives and political proposals have been inadequate to map out the complexity of women’s involvement in this type of violence or to reveal the full impact of these initiatives and proposals on women. However, the continuum of violence experienced by women and girls in these contexts is a synthesis of the main social ingredients of violence and its cultural base. Therefore, alongside an in-depth knowledge of the involvement of men and boys in armed violence, a clear understanding of the needs, rights and vulnerabilities of women and girls is essential for a general reduction of armed violence.

In the absence of guided research, investment in the social and economic roots of armed violence (including its role and connections to models of masculinity and femininity), efforts to prevent, investigate and prosecute violent acts, and attention to violence survivors, repressive measures such as the existing prevention policies are doomed to fail or become counterproductive.

In this sense, we argue for a broad application of 1325 regarding gender and armed violence. One of the main implications of effectively taking into account the continuum of (armed and gender-based) violence in non-war contexts is the fact that states will have to be responsible for creating nationwide policies designed to combat and prevent armed violence in the domestic sphere. As with other human rights agreements, UNSCR 1325 may be symbolically important, giving weight to campaigns that seek to change or reinforce national laws and policies. From a national and local point of view, the recognition of armed gendered violence would involve, for example, support for research and the development of local policies and programs with the objective of curbing and preventing this type of violence (supply and demand) in conjunction with international measures. Another crucial aspect is the improvement of national legislation regarding the right to bear firearms, through the introduction of stricter criteria which would exclude people with a history of domestic (or community) violence from obtaining licenses. In this context, the harmonization of gun-control and domestic-violence legislation is of the utmost importance (Masters, 2007), as countries that have harmonized laws, such as Canada and Australia, have seen a significant decrease in homicide rates, especially amongst women (40% and 57%) (Hung, 2004; Mouzos and Rushforth, 2003).
Another implication concerns states' responsibility in the international sphere regarding the promotion of and support for the development of policies and legislation to prevent the dissemination of light weapons, small arms and armed violence, namely by supporting the International Arms Trade Treaty, the United Nations Programme of Action to Prevent, Combat and Eradicate the Illicit Trade in Small Arms and Light Weapons and its respective regional declarations, as well as national legislation on armed violence. In addition, structural violence in the contradiction identified by Wacquant should be taken into account, as should the lack of attention given to access to education, justice and job opportunities, as well as the pernicious results of security privatization.

In short, by adopting this feminist approach, we want to make visible the mechanisms that produce violence and insecurity, and their expressions at the macro- and micro-social levels, rejecting the formal dichotomy between war and peace (and, consequently, between different forms of violence, and the agents and spaces involved so as to acknowledge “minor” forms of violence). We also want to highlight the dangers inherent in the dichotomous approaches that characterize mainstream analyses of armed violence in scenarios of peace, which set up an opposition between expressions of armed violence that receive great attention and are the object of (generally repressive) public security policies, on the one hand, and, on the other, expressions of micro-level violence that are less direct, and as a result of their marginalization perpetuate vicious cycles of armed violence, making it difficult to devise more effective ways of preventing and combating it.

Conclusion
Resolution 1325 refers exclusively to scenarios of war and post-war, which are perceived as the sites of real and significant threats to women and girls. This observation is corroborated by a close analysis of the measures included in the various National Action Plans produced to date, which reveal that attempts to implement 1325 have mainly focused on foreign policy, neglecting these countries’ internal needs and responsibilities. In other words, most National Action Plans refer to countries other than the ones which drafted the Plans in the first place. However, threats and insecurities experienced by women, girls and subordinate men, particularly those that stem from the dissemination and use of light weapons, are common in various contexts besides war zones.
Whether in contexts of war, post-war or formal peace, the availability of firearms and the ease with which they circulate contributes significantly to higher levels of violence, and also masks the indirect impacts of armed violence. By recognizing the existence of these contexts, characterized by the presence and frequent use of firearms and the perpetuation of a war system that maintains and reproduces the marginalization of women and violence by and against men (generally poor and young), we have shown the restrictive and perverse nature of the traditional definitions of war and peace, and emphasized the need to broaden the horizons when analyzing violent phenomena and designing mechanisms for preventing and combating violence in those places. If these types of violence were taken into account, Resolution 1325 would be broadly interpreted so as to be also applied to “peaceful” states, particularly those with high rates of armed violence. This would oblige states to consider Resolution 1325 beyond the field of foreign policy, reflecting on its meanings and implications in the respective national contexts, and taking into account the continuum of manifestations of violence.

Despite the Resolution's possible transformative capacity, given its potential to rethink and change the way security is conceived, its revolutionary capacity “recycled more than redefined the debate on women, violence and security” (Cohn et al., 2004: 137). In other words, the Resolution's contribution is limited by the definitions and concepts which guide and structure it, and does not change the way in which gender, violence and security are understood and applied. By ignoring the abovementioned expressions of violence and the established relations between war and peace, by favoring the experiences of some women at the expense of others and neglecting men, and by confirming the responsibility of the international community (materialized above all in the United Nations Security Council) to guide belligerent countries towards peace, Resolution 1325 continues to be insufficient in terms of its scope and ambition, and perpetuates the war system which it is supposed to confront and dismantle.

More specifically, the reinforcement of the initiatives planned to prevent and combat the dissemination of small arms, traditionally aimed at young males, the support given to national civil disarmament projects and campaigns for the destruction of small arms, as well as progress in the training and accountability of security agents and armed forces, are important steps in the prevention and inhibition of social armed violence (Santos, Moura and Roque, 2008).
If Resolution 1325 could be interpreted in this perspective, going beyond the traditional conception and spectrum of intervention supported by the UN member states, it would become a more appropriate tool for strengthening violence prevention in our societies, as it would more precisely reflect the global reality of gendered armed violence, without being restricted to contexts of declared war.

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Revised by Teresa Tavares

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“Let Us Have a Little Fun”: The Relationship between Gender, Violence and Sexuality in Armed Conflict Situations*

The genealogy of sexual violence in war, inter-war and post-war periods can only be understood through an analysis of the relationship between gender, violence and sexuality. Armed conflicts function as a kind of magnifying glass, making visible definitions of sexual identity constructed through the legitimization of violence. Wartime crimes of sexual violence, viewed until now as limit phenomena characteristic of a state of exception, thus point to regularities whose form and function may vary but whose reference points are rooted in the social expression of power.

Keywords: women’s studies; femininity; war; masculinity; violence; sexual violence.

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However, a perspective that views women as active subjects in all situations and men as frequently feminized in acts of violence reveals the arbitrary nature of the sexual identity construct that has imposed itself in so durably in western history. Sexual identity constructs are defined essentially through the body. Although it is clearly unsatisfactory to consider the body as a historically immutable and self-evident entity, and although discourse analysis may prove useful in deconstructing bodily constructs in order to overcome restrictive preconceptions, it is nevertheless necessary to simultaneously understand and thematize the factual existence of the body and the respective perception of pain within a particular historical and cultural environment of life and experience.

We can usually only speak meaningfully about violence when it is located in relations of violence, and when these relations of violence are, for their part, based on relations of power: i.e. one subject grants him/herself the right to carry out a violent act, during which s/he seeks to subjugate the target of that violence as object. Therefore, as Popitz states, there is power to injure on one side, and a vulnerability to injury on the other. The attribution of a gender identity to these positions (the man with the power to wound and the woman vulnerable to be wounded) is well known, and all too often considered an anthropological constant derived from the assumed particularities of biological sex.

The acts of violence that I shall describe here generally seek not only to injure a body and cause pain and suffering, but also to humiliate. I expressly mention these somewhat obvious commonplaces because, strangely enough, theory has often overlooked them. Popitz’s claim shocks and unsettles not as an abstraction, but when the inarticulate body and its perception of pain are taken into account.

“The first blow,” wrote Jean Améry in his attempts to deal with the experience of torture in Nazi prisons, “makes the prisoner aware that he is impotent – and, in this sense, contains the essence of all that follows. [...] The other, against whom I am physically in the world and with whom I can only be while he does not touch the boundary that is the surface of my skin, imposes his own corporality upon me with that blow. He is on top of me and with this he annihilates me.” He adds: “It is like a rape...” (Améry, 1977: 56).

This is surprising. Whilst the common argument seems to diminish the sexual dimension of the threat by claiming that rape is torture, Améry’s comparison can be read as a hint to the interconnection between torture and sexuality. However, as in the past, it continues to
come up against the persistent subconscious idea that rape and sexual violence are ambivalent acts, in which the aggressor-victim positions are ambiguous.

This attitude is perfidiously underpinned by a fact that constitutes a specific feature of sexual violence and which I take as a starting-point for some of the points that I wish to make here: sexual violence not only causes pain to the victim, it also potentially represents an invasion of his/her libido. Blood runs, sperm is spilt, and tears are wept, not only of pain, but also of shame.

Debates around sexual violence, particularly those that occur in armed conflicts, are permeated by considerations about whether they are crimes of violence that make use of sexuality, or whether sexuality is actively relished in these crimes of violence. I’m afraid that the first definition overlooks the extent and the drama of this specific form of violence. The rapist himself – to the extent that he uses his body, or more precisely, his penis – cannot avoid feeling sexual excitement, even if violence, rather than sexual pleasure, motivates the act. What is more, the act, for its part, inflicts upon the victim something that is much more than an offence against physical integrity – s/he is potentially robbed of an expression of fundamental life, which is generally supposed to be positive:

The victim’s as well as the torturer’s sexual structures are involved in the psychodynamics of this interaction, and the victim experiences the torture as directed against his or her sexual body image and identity with the aim to destroy it. Thus, the essential part of sexual torture’s traumatic and identity-damaging effect is the feeling of being an accomplice in an ambiguous situation which contains both aggressive and libidinal elements of a confusing nature. (Inger Agger & Soren Buus Jensen, apud Skjelsbaek, 2001: 220)

In the case of the Korean Kim Young Suk, one of twenty thousand so-called “comfort women” that were sexually enslaved by the Japanese army during the Second World War, it is difficult to believe that the rapist succeeded in exciting her libido by force. Suk describes how she was treated by Officer Nakamora:

‘You Korean girl, you are pretty, let us have a little fun.’ But I was only twelve years old and had no idea what ‘Let us have a little fun’ meant. Nakamora took out his penis and he undressed me and I was so afraid. He forced me to lie on the floor and injured me with his bayonet and I bled. He took off my pants and raped me until I bled.¹

We can conclude from this account that Officer Nakamora derived “fun” from both the physical and verbal cruelty and from the sexual act of penetration. His assumption that the victim would also “have fun” may seem cynical, but may not be as much as we might expect.

¹ Recorded testimony given in the Tokyo Tribunal.
“One, two, three, four. Every night we pray for war. Five, six, seven, eight. Rape. Kill. Mutilate” (example quoted in Askin, 1997: 377). This rhyme, containing the equivalent of the “Blood, Sperm and Tears” triad, is hammered into American marines during their training, presenting rape, killing and wounding as the fun aspect of war. We should not assume that recruits take this view of war literally. However, these and other similar examples from military jargon undermine the argument that the association of sexual pleasure and pleasure in inflicting violence is only generated through brutalization during the course of warfare.

Cooper, an American GI stationed in the United Kingdom during the Second World War, asks his rape victim, “Why don’t you speak to me – all the girls around here do,” and threatens her: “If you don’t let me get what I want, I’ll strangle you.” Before letting her go after the rape, he asks her if she would like to go dancing with him the following week. Porter, a companion, beats his victim unconscious in order to get what he wants. Then, he helps her to dress, gives her some money and asks where the nearest phone booth is as he has to find his way back to Kingsclere. We are not dealing here with an escalation of violence in a combat zone. These soldiers have not been brutalized by combat; they are young men serving in supply units.

“Rape is neither private nor public; it is both of those things simultaneously: with its help, the border between the two fields is traced and controlled” (du Toit, 2007: 25). This is what is in fact found in both civilian and military scenarios.

My proposal is that a thick description of acts of sexual violence should trace the lines that define these acts in times of peace, war and post-war. Although sexual violence increases substantially in war and has specific functions in that context, it brings with it premises that have arisen in peacetime (or rather, in periods between wars), and is not exhausted after the war. Wartime practices, as a “state of exception,” and practices of sexual violence experienced as permissiveness have to be part of this description, as they are inscribed into a society’s potential for experience and action, transmitted from generation to generation.

Despite all this, in civil life, the association between the use of massive violence and sexual pleasure is still predominantly believed to be pathological. Hence, it is surprising that, in war, it may be considered “combat effective” in a way that is relatively uncontested and

\[2\] Cases described in Lilly (2007: 54; 59).
persistent, especially after successful war operations. The former officer Yoshio Suzuki recounted the following to the Tokyo War Crimes Tribunal:

As the head of an artillery unit I myself allowed the soldiers after an operation in 1944 to ‘do as they pleased.’ In a group of older women I met a woman who was about thirty. I sent the others away – she tried to get away by way of the toilets. Seeing her like that heightened my sexual arousal. I undressed her, she was naked and I raped her brutally, beat her with my rifle. She couldn’t defend herself, she was shaking, her face was white, and she was speechless, she obeyed me without contradiction.¹

Numerous declarations from soldiers prove that combat and the exercise of violence up to the point of killing in fact function as a sexual stimulant (Baker, 1981; Greiner, 2007). In this case, the victim’s fear increased the aggressor’s arousal. However, we need to analyse more closely the extent to which the fear felt by the aggressor (fear of losing control, of losing his life in combat) is in turn actively discharged in the form of aggression, particularly against women. I will return to this question later.

In the following description by a Vietnam war veteran, hatred and frustration function as a sexual stimulant:

She was crying. I think, she was a virgin. We pulled her pants down and put a gun to her head. [...] I was taking her body by force. Guys were standing over her with rifles, while I was screwing her. [...] Baby-san, she was crying. So a guy just put a rifle on her head and pulled a trigger just to put her out of the picture. [...] That’s what the hatred, the frustration was. (testimony quoted in Baker, 1981: 211)

Declarations made by aggressors suggest that, in sexual violence, misogyny may also be discharged upon the depersonalized object. Thus, a Serbian rapist describes his victim, who had already been raped by twenty other men, as follows: “her hair [was] sticky. She was disgusting, full of sperm.” After the rape, he killed her “with five bullets in the belly” (case described in Pohl, 2004: 9).

After the First World War (alongside the debates around the so-called hysteria of war), mention was already being made to the way soldiers’ sexuality was transformed through the brutality of war, causing not only impotence but also a constant association between sexual sensation and massive acts of violence (that is to say, they derived pleasure from killing). Jonathan Shay, an American therapist who treated Vietnam War veterans, describes similar consequences of war in his book Achilles in Vietnam (Shay, 2010/1994).

¹ Yoshio Suzuki, testimony given before the Women’s International War Crimes Tribunal on Japan’s Military Sexual Slavery.
In recent years, there has been an increasing number of documented cases of sexual violence practised by members of peacekeeping forces. More research is required to understand the extent to which these situations should be considered the consequence of crimes practised in previous wars or as an autonomous phenomenon. The case of Rhongi, a member of the peacekeeping forces in the former Yugoslavia who intentionally raped and murdered an eleven-year-old Albanian Kosovar girl, shows how also in this field sexual violence is sometimes accompanied by extreme brutality: “Rhongi had told some soldiers that he had a plan to grab a little girl and rape her, but would have to kill her to get away with it and would blame the Serbs” (Lilly, 2007: 32). This member of the peacekeeping forces has clearly no problem confessing to satisfying a sexual desire of this type, and is only concerned with how to avoid being punished for his act. He seems to have found the solution: killing the victim, the witness to the crime. The idea that he has of himself as peacekeeper does not seem to have been shaken by this incident.

War and masculinity are closely bound up in everyday discourse in a way that does not seem to have been affected by either the entry of women into the armed forces or by the marked transformations that have taken place in recent decades in the way war is waged – which has no longer anything to do with the myth of the heroic body-to-body combat. The association between sexuality and violence in war is by no means taboo, as is frequently claimed; on the contrary, in war propaganda or in subtexts such as war narratives, it is explicitly present as a natural consequence of the state of exception that is war, or as collateral damage. At the same time, it nevertheless seems to have escaped public and theoretical debate.

Despite the public thematization of sexual violence in violent conflict in recent decades (and the scandal in the wake of revelations of such crimes),4 there continues to be a certain amount of hesitation about trying to gauge the interdependence between these two affective manifestations. The notion that there is an inevitable association between war and violence, because it is inherent to the nature of things, is tolerated provided that (ideally) the exercise of violence is “honour-bound” and limited by rules and agreements.

“Few have wanted to look into the mechanisms which create perpetrators,” writes Inger Skjelsbaek in “Sexual Violence and War,” “perhaps out of fear that the possibility of

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4 The contradictions between the thematization and “dethematization” of violence are analysed in Stanley & Feth (2007).
committing the same crime is a potential we all have” (Skjelsbaek, 2001: 212). It was not only in the case of Lyndie England that we were confronted with the fact that women also belong potentially to those “all.” In Kelly Dawn Askin we find the following examples:

They would undressed a man, line the rest of us [men] up and make us perform oral sex on him, another prisoner. There were two Ustaša women, sisters [who were prison guards], who liked to force us to do this. (Askin, 1997: 270)

Prisoners of Serbians were “lined up naked while Serbian women from outside undressed before the male prisoners. If any prisoner had an erection, his penis was cut off. (Askin, 1997: 270)

However, the media coverage of the England case demonstrated how a female aggressor could be used unhesitatingly to show sexual violence as a phenomenon of exception, an anomalous behaviour for women, and mostly restricted to pathological aggressors.5

The argument that the detailed public description of sexual attacks functions like pornography, causing further aggression to the victim (an argument that has been hypocritically repeated in this context, despite the fact that Abu Ghraib has in fact been the reiterated object of pornographic restagings), fails to problematize a sexuality that makes use of violence in this way, and instead displaces the shameful moment of the act from the aggressor to the victim. Behind the pretext of wanting to protect victims from renewed exposure, women are still secretly being blamed for being sexual subjects that transgress their boundaries and before whom men are helpless.

However, denying the humiliation experienced by victims ends up prolonging their suffering. Accounts by victims show how important it is for them that their social environment recognises as an injustice what happened to them as subjects (including the humiliation), and to know whether it attributes this to the aggressor or stigmatizes the victim as a shamed and dishonoured object. Louise du Toit argues:

My continued use of the term “victim” is not meant to betray insensitivity towards the feelings of those who have survived rape, nor to further deny women’s agency and subjectivity by emphasising our powerlessness in the face of rape. I believe we need to critically interrogate these feelings rather than simply affirm them. Rape victims much more than other victims (say of car crashes) resist the associations of powerlessness tied up with the term “victim” because powerlessness lies at the heart of the humiliation and injury of rape. It is thus important to address the root of the problem (women’s lack of political subjectivity and agency) rather than be satisfied with superficial linguistic changes. One does not become a survivor by denying the extent to which one has been a victim. In fact, such a stoic denial of victimhood with its emphasis on the victim’s agency and resilience may well inadvertently prevent thorough

5 On this matter, see the very informative study by Oliver (2007).
investigations such as the one undertaken here into the ways in which wider societal beliefs endorse a rapist ethic. (du Toit, 2007: 4-5)

Many of the efforts to control or operationalize the power of aggression hide the vulnerability of the male person through the active expression of his power to injure a female or effeminate person, in peacetime as well as in war. However, in war, where masculinity is constructed most sharply and its characteristics are most in demand, the construction of masculinity is also shown to be particularly fragile. The combatant, who is required to kill and therefore granted the disposition to do so (power of aggression), also has to come to terms with his own vulnerability, with the possibility of being killed. Sex is revealed here as a “category of conflict” (Knapp, 2001): the painful ambivalences of dealing with one’s own fear and weaknesses may be resolved by assuming an invulnerable form of masculinity, an artificial hypermasculinity (Bereswill, 2006: 244). In order to make sense, this variant of masculinity tries to rid itself completely of its feminine opposite – during and after the First World War, for example, this was taken to extremes by Ernst Jünger, for whom the experience of war became an orgiastic and erotic substitute for women. Another variant consists of escaping subjugation through the violation of an opposite.

In order to successfully instrumentalize the act of rape for military purposes (in the sense of increasing the soldiers’ willingness to fight and kill), a regulation that imposes limits is also necessary. Occasional voluntary individual acts, which are always predictable and can be counted on from the outset, are in principle punished. Whether or not there is de facto punishment will depend upon the military commanders’ assessment of the act’s combat effectiveness. This military calculation (which involves releasing and using the soldiers’ potential for violence to combat the enemy) coexists somewhat problematically with the soldiers’ own motives for becoming sexually violent. Indeed, they may be opposed in the most grotesque fashion, as in the case quoted by Johanna Bourke regarding the My Lai massacre of 16 March 1968, when women were raped and killed in the most cruel manner:

Of course some men had been shocked by what they had done or seen, but ‘war was war’ and there were other battles to fight. However, Lieutenant [William L.] Calley was very definite about his duty to obey orders. A useful insight into Calley’s attitude can be taken from his autobiographical account of the massacre, Body Counts (1971). He recalled that at one stage during the bloody morning, he came across Dennis Conti forcing a young mother to give him oral sex. Calley ordered Conti to “Get on your goddam pants!” but admitted he did not know “why I was so damn saintly about it. Rape: In Vietnam it’s a very common thing. [...] I guess lots of girls would rather be raped than killed anytime. So why was I being saintly about it? Because: if a GI is getting a blow job, he isn’t doing his job. He isn't destroying communism ...
Our mission in My Lai wasn't perverted, though. It was simply 'Go and destroy it'. [...] No difference now: if a GI is getting gain, he isn't doing what we are paying him for. He isn't combat-effective." (Bourke, 1999: 173)

Dennis Conti, who thought he could exercise his right to the spoils of war and enjoy himself sexually, was wrong. What was expected of him was that he should use his capacity for sexual violence in a way that was combat-effective.

The American General Patton was also more concerned with imposing limits than with punishing the crime itself: “I then told them that, in spite of my diligent efforts, there would unquestionably be some raping, and that I should like to have the details as early as possible so that the offenders could be properly hanged.” However, on another occasion he said tersely: “If a soldier don’t fuck, he won’t fight” (apud Lily, 2007: 29).

The 20th- and early 21st-century wars that we are considering here as theatres of sexual violence are distinguished not only by their totalitarianization but also by a gradual erosion of their limits. This emerges in a particularly clear manner in asymmetrical wars. The classic distinction between the home front and the war front has become obsolete: the constellations of belligerent powers and theatres of war have altered. It is therefore necessary to analyse the consequences of these changes for the form of bellic violence in discussion here.

The logic traditionally underpinning the regulation of warfare is oriented towards the possibility of constructing a synoptic battlefield. Ulrich Bröckling has devoted himself to the study of this, and describes it as “space of contingency par excellence,” as a “zone of frictions, [...] place of fortune, of unexpected opportunity, of suddenly changing luck” (2003: 189). In this space of contingency in which the “extended duel” (Clausewitz) of life and death takes place, “all actors are obliged to use maximum strategic and tactic calculation, and to make a rational use of force and an efficient use of violence” in order to produce clarity and a superior perspective. What is required are “operations that are carefully prepared and coordinated, [...] spontaneous improvisation, command and obedience, as well as initiative and self-accountability.” This is a challenge in a situation that is determined by “extreme emotions – from a feeling of paralysis caused by fear of death to the furore of the ecstasy of combat,” feelings that “inhibit or disinhibit action and alter its direction.” Those that act in it have a “radicalized experience of contingency,” which “requires no less radical concepts for controlling it,” such as those manifested in the rigid demands for obedience and military
disciplinary tactics. Thus, Bröckling describes military action as “management of contingencies with the aim of aligning all activities with a view to augmenting one’s own potential for violence and, consequently, weakening the enemy’s.” That action thus takes into account “the inevitable limit, which can never be previously defined, of all the planning and organization” that “determines the military efforts to control individual and collective action in war.” He continues: “Whoever wants to command does not only need power but also knowledge. And to deal with frictions or get around them, it is necessary to know them. [...] One has to take account of things that escape calculations” (Bröckling, 2003: 189-90).

General Patton, mentioned above, tried hard to fulfil precisely this requirement.

Normative control, traditional disciplinary practices supported by moral training and punishment of transgressions are the means of military authority used. A glance at military training practices shows how these instruments are radically determined by conceptions of sexual identity. Frank J. Barrett, an American professor of systems management, used interviews to analyse “the construction of hegemonic masculinity” through the example of American marines (Barrett, 1999). The idea of being hegemonic in relation to others is transmitted by “hate training,” in which the adversary is degraded as inferior, threatening, despicable. The female becomes the cumulus of that inferior and despicable other. The slang of both the soldiers and their military instructors is riddled with sexism. It is clear that a real hatred of women could be constructed from this, a hatred that is unlikely to be manifested in combat situations alone.

**Male bonding/Exclusion of women**

Jonathan Shay claims that the gender system is transferred to the army and that social roles based on gender identity are redistributed in that context: “Armies, like families, are institutions that create a world. Both successfully engender the new member’s respect, loyalty, love, affirmation, gratitude and obedience” (Shay, 2010: 150). The formation of primary groups and communities of partners (two men joining up as a unit) plays an essential role, as Bröckling also stresses:

> The feeling of being in the hands of an impersonal machine of destruction and powerless on the battlefield, and the awareness that you might die at any moment [makes] soldiers turn

6 On this matter, see ch. 5 (“Love and Hate”) in Bourke (1999).

7 On the significance of this other – or rather, of this inferior, threatening female other against whom one acts – being in practice predominantly female and the male opposer being classified as feminine, see Pohl (2002).
into themselves in an existential way. The certainty of being part of a group and of being able to count on your companions may not be able to eliminate this experience of atomization, though it may compensate for it a little. [...] The interconnection and reciprocal reinforcement of institutional norms and primary group norms are especially revealed in the codification of masculinity. The need to be a man is part of what is most commonly expected from a soldier. It corresponds to social conceptions of the army as an agency of socialization, it is inscribed as a subtext in military training programmes, and also forms a central part of the code of conduct of primary groups. These are constituted not only as communities of protection and solidarity, but also as egalitarian leagues of men, which produce cohesion through the devaluation of supposedly feminine characteristics and exteriorise homoerotic libido by transforming it into aggression. (Bröckling, 2003: 197-8)

This militarily desirable aggression, considered vital for generating readiness to fight, is deployed with all intentionality not only against enemy combatants, but also for “combat effective” mass rapes of the female as well as the male civilian population, as happened in Belgium in the First World War, in Nanking, in the former Soviet Union, in Berlin, Bangladesh, Vietnam, the former Yugoslavia, Rwanda – the list does not end here.

Sexual violence against men

Sexual violence against men during wars is one of the “most well-kept taboos of our culture” (Seifert, 2003: 243). However, as some examples show, it occurs on a regular basis.

During the Nanking attack, Chinese men were anally raped or forced to practice sexual acts on one another while the soldiers watched and laughed (Iris Chang, *apud* Mischkowski, 2006). In the spring of 2000, the *New York Times* reported that male prisoners detained by Russian troops in a camp in Grozny, Chechenia, heard the screams of men being raped by their captors. It was also reported that the aggressors gave female names to their victims after the rape (Lilly, 2007: 20).

In Kelly Dawn Askin’s book we find reports like the following from Bosnia-Herzegovina:

They [the Serbian soldiers] took us outside, and one by one, they beat us and pulled teeth... They tortured us in all possible ways. They would take two brothers ... and force them to have sexual intercourse... They would take two friends outside and force them to take one another’s penis into their mouth... We would hear through the gates how they ordered men to molest or rape one another. (Testimony quoted in Askin, 1997: 271)

We might be tempted to suppose that the public debate on the form of violence suffered by these men would lead to a stronger condemnation of sexual violence in general. This presumption is belied by Antjie Krog, who recounts that, during the trials of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa, men refused to use the word “rape” in their testimony. They declared that they had been anally penetrated or that iron bars had been
inserted into them. “By doing so,” the author argues, “they make rape a women’s issue. By denying their own sexual subjugation to male brutality, they form a brotherhood with rapists that conspires against their own wives, mothers and daughters.” The term “rape” is, according to Krog, “reserved exclusively for the sexual submission of women and thus becomes sexist in meaning” (Krog, 1998: 182).

The crimes of sexual violence described here are usually accompanied by other forms of abuse that can lead to the death of victims. Sexual violence does not occur without social objectives and patterns, or in a social vacuum. It has specific meanings for the enemies, the victims and the aggressors, respectively.

In accordance with the self-proclaimed soldier’s mission, women should be protected, defended and kept away from combat. However, it is precisely this that makes them a target for aggression. They symbolize the territory that has to be defended, and whose profanation is particularly humiliating. The woman’s body becomes a battlefield both for a man-to-man fight and for a struggle against the whole of an ethnic, cultural or religious community. However, violence perpetrated on female subjects is omitted from the narrative of war. Thus, the reports of mass rapes in Belgium during the First World War, which so shocked public opinion, thematized not so much the suffering of women as the humiliation of the nation by brutalized enemies, with clear propaganda intentions on both sides.8

Violence/Desire

No matter how much military leaders might earnestly try – though in most cases without great conviction (Greiner, 2007) – to take control of the broom to which they delegated their powers, like the sorcerer’s apprentice in Goethe’s ballad, and no matter how they try to fulfil the task of imposing order and preventing, through military-style violence, “derailments” and manifestations of dissolution in precarious and diffuse situations, rarely are these objectives achieved. Even draconian measures (hanging, forced perpetual labour) did not prevent the American soldiers in the United Kingdom, France and Germany during the Second World War from raping women “just for fun,” most commonly with weapons.9 While in France the stereotype, inherited from previous generations, of the sexually permissive French woman functioned as a licence to rape, in Germany there were also motives of

8 On this matter, see Horne & Kramer (2004) and Crauthamel (2008).
9 On this matter, see Lilly (2007).
hatred and revenge. Thus, a soldier that had visited Dachau before an act of rape argued that a woman being undressed by three Americans was nothing compared to what had happened in the concentration camp (Lilly, 2007: 136). The sexual crimes committed in this scenario, as occasional and individual acts, had no military meaning and contravened the rules; as such, they were indeed punished (ibidem: 29). Nevertheless, these attempts at disciplinary control are not comforting, as they are not directed strictly and systematically against the practice of sexual violence.

In her book of memoirs Seed of Sarah, the Hungarian Jew Judith Magyar Isaacson describes how the Lichtenau camp commander one day ordered her to follow him:

The Kommandant strode ahead in his stiff breeches and pounding boots. Instinctively, I followed, my head cast down, my eyes on the graveled road. I had a flash of recognition, as if I had followed a past master in such dumb obedience. Do women inherit memories of rape? I recalled the myth of the Sabine women and the tale of Hunor and Magor and their abducted mates, the legendary ancestors of Huns and Magyars. ‘My plight is not unique,’ I told myself, ‘I am caught in an ancient rite of sex and war.’ (Isaacson, 1990: 90)

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Hordes of Rapists: The Instrumentalization of Sexual Violence in German Cold War Anti-Communist Discourses*

In German Cold War anti-communist discourses, the image of the Red Army as a “horde of rapists” worked as a strategy of exclusion in the construction of a national identity based on “Western values.” This paper analyzes the ideological dimension of the stereotypes of raped women and constructions of masculinity in two emblematic texts about the flight and expulsion of Germans from Eastern and Central Europe, and an anti-communist American propaganda novel. The mass rapes of German women in the context of World War II were signified as the result of “Asian barbarism” and communism. The instrumentalization of wartime rapes, by demonizing the Soviet Union, fostered the two pillars of foreign policy in the Federal Republic: European integration and the transatlantic alliance.

Keywords: anti-communism; Adenauer era; Flucht und Vertreibung [flight and expulsion]; sexual violence; xenophobia.

Post-1945 Germany is probably one of the places where the ideological rivalries and tensions of the Cold War played a greater role in determining the shape of states and national identities. The Adenauer era (1949-1963) may be summarized as a conservative period during which the country gradually joined Western political, economic and military organizations. Under the leadership of Chancellor Konrad Adenauer (1876-1967), the Federal Republic of Germany strived to win the confidence of the Allies and thus make room for itself among Western nations. The country’s joining of NATO in 1955, as well as its rearmament, and the emergence of an ideal of masculinity strongly linked to a supposedly non-aggressive militarism, must be understood in the light of the nation’s reinvention of itself as part of the West.¹ Anti-communism was central to this process of formation of the Federal Republic. Eric Weitz (2001: 220-22) observes that Adenauer’s deep distrust and fear

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¹ See, in this context, some of the research conducted by Robert Moeller. In his work on German popular cinema of the 1950s, he analyzes the way in which, after the military collapse and the discredit of the sort of “racially superior” masculinity promoted by the Third Reich, the young state set itself to build an ideal of “morally superior” masculinity: that of the law-abiding citizen who does not partake of nationalist, expansionist obsessions, but, when under threat, is capable of taking up arms to defend family and country (Moeller, 2001: 123ss.; Moeller, 2006b).
of communism were the reason for his emphatic defense of the Transatlantic Alliance, thus making German reunification hard to achieve in the context of the Cold War. The Chancellor’s view of the Soviet Union as the emblem of the worst that the age had to offer – from Marxism-Leninism to totalitarianism, pan-Slavism and atheism – was in fact widely shared in the public sphere of the young state, bolstered by the SPD’s\(^2\) traditional animosity toward the communists.

Dictated by the desire for closer ties with the West, this foreign policy coexisted with strong, East-leaning electoral pressure at the domestic level. I allude to the *Vertriebene, i.e.,* the expellees from the territories lost by Germany in the war (East Prussia, Silesia, Pomerania) and from its neighboring countries (Czechoslovakia, the Baltic states, etc.).\(^3\) These Germans, who made up about 16% of the population of the Federal Republic, were organized into powerful leagues and associations and rose to be an extremely strong pressure group, proving instrumental in the conservatives’ consecutive victories. Until as late as 1969 there was a government ministry solely devoted to them,\(^4\) and they managed to have one of their major claims included in the political debate: the recovery of their homes, which meant challenging the borders that had emerged from the war.\(^5\) Adenauer’s governments successfully navigated this seeming contradiction between a West-oriented foreign policy and a constituency that had its sights set on the East. Conditions were created for the expellees to start anew in the young republic, and steps were taken to get them to view the State as their new *Heimat* [homeland]: significant government aid to promote their economic welfare, a political discourse on the Federal Republic as the home of all Germans,

\(^2\) Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands – the Social Democratic Party of Germany.

\(^3\) The word *Vertriebene* is closely linked to the concept of *Flucht und Vertreibung* [flight and expulsion], which designates one of the greatest migrations in human history (late 1944 through 1949) and on which there is an extensive literature. The Soviet offensive of 1945 caused a massive flight of Germans to the West. After the war, several regions in Central and Eastern Europe witnessed the violent expulsion of their German communities. Allied decisions in favor of redesigning the eastern borders (whereby Germany was to lose a significant part of its territory) and of ethnically homogeneous states also contributed to the expulsion of millions of Germans during the second half of the 1940s. The experience of flight and expulsion became one of the most controversial sites of memory in German culture (see, e.g., Hahn and Hahn, 2003).

\(^4\) Bundesministerium für Vertriebene, Flüchtlinge und Kriegsgeschädigte – Ministry of the Expellees, Refugees and War Victims.

\(^5\) This issue was a common concern of the main political parties at the time, as evinced by several election posters showing maps of Germany with 1937 borders and the caption “Das ganze Deutschland soll es sein” – “It has to be all of Germany.” (A 1949 CDU poster can be seen at [http://www.wahlen-98.de/HTML/ARCHIV/AFSETTIMELINE.HTM](http://www.wahlen-98.de/HTML/ARCHIV/AFSETTIMELINE.HTM); a 1948 SPD poster is available at [http://www.museen-sh.de/ml/digi_einzBild.php?pi=146_54-1996&inst=146&mab_id=146&namelnst=Stadtmuseum%20%20Warleberger%20Hof&page=7&action=vonsuche&r=82](http://www.museen-sh.de/ml/digi_einzBild.php?pi=146_54-1996&inst=146&mab_id=146&namelnst=Stadtmuseum%20%20Warleberger%20Hof&page=7&action=vonsuche&r=82)). With Willy Brandt’s Ostpolitik, the SPD moved away from these claims, which came to a final end with the 1990 Unification Treaty.
incorporation of the memory of the lost East into the national identity, good official relations with the leagues and support for their cultural activities. No doubt political leaders knew that there was no turning back: with the signing of the Potsdam Agreement on 2 August 1945, the Western Allies had sanctioned the redrawing of borders and population transfer as a way of preventing tensions in the future. Government policies to provide support to the expellees may thus be seen as a way of alleviating that loss. Adenauer’s famous visit to Moscow in 1955 has all the signs of this course of action. The goal of this historical trip was not to discuss borders or the return of the expellees, but rather an issue regarding which German public opinion felt very strongly at the time: the liberation of the German soldiers still held captive by the Soviets. As far as official discourse was concerned, the success of this mission was decisive in portraying the Federal Republic as the homeland of all Germans.

The purpose of the present paper is to clarify one aspect of the abovementioned seeming contradiction between a West-oriented foreign policy and a constituency whose interests lay to the East. Based on discourses about the mass rape of German women by Soviet soldiers — a key experience of flight and expulsion — I will attempt to show the way in which the memory of what the expellees went through tended to reinforce the two pillars of the Federal Republic’s foreign policy in the context of the Cold War: European integration and the transatlantic alliance. I will use two emblematic, expulsion-related texts to analyze the way in which the image of the Soviet rapist was conducive, in that particular context, to the construction of a certain pro-European and pro-Western German identity. The first of these two works, *Martyrium und Heldentum Ostdeutscher Frauen. Ein Ausschnitt aus der Schlesischen Passion 1945/4* (1954) [The Martyrdom and Heroism of the Women of East Germany: An excerpt from the Silesian passion, 1945-1946], was written by Johannes Kaps, a prominent theologian in Catholic circles and in the Bavaria-based community of expellees, who strived to raise awareness in the “Christian West” about the expulsion of Germans as a result of the war. The volume in question is a collection of stories of sexual violence, killings

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6 For studies on sexual violence perpetrated by the Soviet Army against German women, see, among others, Naimark (1995) and von Münch (2009).
7 Johannes Kaps (Breslau, 1906 – Munich, 1959) came from a Catholic family and was ordained priest in 1935. In 1939, shortly after the outbreak of World War II, he returned to Breslau. According to Hans-Ludwig Abmeier, Kaps seems to have devoted himself to the cause of the release of persecuted priests and against the deportation of Jews and “cross-breeds” (but Abmeier adds that, because of the destruction of war, there are very few documents to confirm it). A witness of the capitulation of Breslau on 6 May 1945, Kaps gave testimony of the atrocities committed against the German population. In August 1945 he left the city and took refuge in the West, giving an account of the conditions of extreme deprivation of the German population of Silesia, after
and hardship that bear witness to an engagement, from a German Catholic point of view, with the rape of German women. The second text, Ostpreußisches Tagebuch. Aufzeichnungen eines Arztes aus den Jahren 1945-1947 [Prussian Diary. A Physician’s Notes 1945-1947], is by Hans Graf von Lehndorff, the descendant of an influential Prussian family and a prominent figure in expellee circles. Endorsed by the Federal Republic’s authorities, von Lehndorff’s journal was one of the most popular memoirs of expulsion of its time.
Finally, I will also argue that the image of the Soviet rapist running through these expellee accounts ultimately plays a role that is similar to that of an American propaganda novel that was hugely successful in 1950s Germany: The Big Rape (1951), by James Wakefield Burke.

which he travelled to Rome to apprise Pope Pius XII of the situation. In the following years he was very active in providing support to the expellees now living in the Federal Republic. As of 1952, he was the head of the Catholic Church’s Parish Register Services and of the Expellees Archive, in Munich [Katholischen Kirchenbuchamtes Archiv und für Heimatvertriebene]. With a view to internationalizing the expellees’ issue, along the goals set forth by then Minister of Expellees Hans Lukaschek, Kaps’s trilogy on Silesia was translated into English, French, Italian, Spanish and Portuguese during the 1950s (Abmeier, 2000/2001: 183-185). The English translation, by Gladys H. Hartinger, was first published in Munich by Christ Unterwegs, in 1955.

This is the closing volume of a trilogy on the end of German Silesia. Two volumes had already been published: Vom Sterben Schlesiischer Priester 1945/6 [The Martyrdom of Silesian priests 1945-46], in 1950, and Tragödie Schlesiens 1945/6 in Dokumenten [The Tragedy of Silesia 1945/6 – A documentary account], in 1952/53. Most of the accounts in the 1954 volume were collected in the early 1950s for Kaps’s unpublished Beiträge zur Geschichte der Erzdiözese Breslau in den Schicksalsjahren 1945 bis 1951 [Contributions to the history of the Archdiocese of Breslau in the fateful years of 1945-1951].

The diary was originally published in 1960 as part of a government project to collect documentary evidence on the expulsion of Germans from Eastern and Central Europe [Dokumentation der Vertreibung der Deutschen aus Ost-Mitteuropa]. The original title of the diary was Ein Bericht aus Ost- und Westpreußen 1945-1947 [A Report from Eastern and Western Prussia 1945-1947]. In 1961 it was published autonomously (München: Biederstein) under its present title, and it went through numerous editions over the years. In the 1960s it was translated into several languages. The English translation, entitled East Prussian Diary: A Journal of Faith, 1945-1947, was published in 1963.

A member of an ancient line of Prussian nobility, Hans von Lehndorff (Graditz bei Torgau, 1910 – Bonn, 1987) is related to several important figures in twentieth century German history: his grandfather, Elard Januschau-von Oldenburg (1855-1937), was an influential member of the conservative camp during the Weimar Republic, and Heinrich Graf von Lehndorff-Steinort, who was executed in September 1944 for participating in the July 20 conspiracy to assassinate Hitler, was his cousin. Hans von Lehndorff studied medicine and was running a military hospital in Königsberg when the Red Army took the city. He fled to the West in 1947, and from the time of his arrival in the future FRG he kept links with expellees’ organizations. In 1981 he was awarded the most prestigious prize given by East Prussia’s associations of expellees: the Preußenschild, awarded by Landmannschaft Ostpreußen (Hamburg).

The texts analyzed in this article are in line with the ideological manipulation of sexual violence directed against German women in World War II. Although the memory of these violations was particularly felt in nationalist and anti-communist milieus and even in revisionist discourses, one should not associate the issue exclusively with these sectors, as it was also addressed by texts from many other quadrants. Thus we have the Russian testimonies to start with, namely by Lew Kopelew (the autobiography in which he tells of the violence committed by the Red Army against the German people was published in the Federal Republic in 1976 under the title Aufbewahren für alle Zeit [To Be Preserved Forever], with an afterword by the writer Heinrich Böll) and Alexander Solzhenitsyn (his memories of the atrocities against the Germans upon the conquest of East Prussia were the inspiration for Ostpreußische Nächte. Eine Dichtung in Versen [Prussian Nights. A Poem], published in the Federal Republic also in 1976). On the German side there are a number of accounts, memoirs and even some literary texts whose ideological provenance differs from that of the texts analyzed in the present article.
The image of Asia or the East as the embodiment of a barbarian, dangerous and cruel Other is a recurrent one in the construction of European and Western identities. After the October Revolution, Russia (and, eventually, the Soviet Union) emerged as a catalyst for fears, the Eastern “monster” incarnate, as anti-communism gradually took on orientalist connotations. Bolshevism and Communism were not viewed as European or Western phenomena, but rather as the hallmarks of an alien counter-model. The German territory provides a paradigmatic illustration of this meaning of Bolshevik Russia as the incarnation of the absolute Other (see, for instance, Ayçoberry, 2003; Moore, 2003). These phobias associated with anticommunism existed in several European countries. In Germany they ran throughout the 20th century, and spearheaded some of the more salient continuities between the Third Reich and the Federal Republic. Horrid images of sexual violence were common in this context, as attested to by anti-Bolshevik Nazi propaganda, which never stopped to frighten people with the “hordes of Soviet rapists,” especially in the last months of the war.¹² As noted by Atina Grossmann, this is exactly where propaganda proved ominous. And that, in turn, helps us understand the impact of these National Socialist discourses and imaginaries upon Germany’s memory of defeat, as well as the country’s self-perception as a people of victims (1995: 113-117, 1998: 221-24).

The propaganda of Adenauer’s conservative era made blatant use of the traumatic experience of the rape of German women by members of the Red Army to justify some of its political positions, which explains its portraying of the Soviet Union in terms of an aggressive, repellent masculinity.¹³ Let us consider a 1952 poster of the Volksbund für Frieden und Freiheit [People’s Union for Peace and Freedom], an organization first established in 1949. It alludes to rape using it as a metaphor for German-Soviet friendship,


¹² The phobia of the “hordes of Mongolian savages,” eager to murder, pillage, destroy and rape, had been one of the fears most fostered and exploited by the National Socialist authorities to mobilize people for the fight against the Soviet offensive, especially after the Nemmersdorf massacre (October 1944), when German women and girls were brutally raped and murdered. Regarding the use of racist stereotypes for demonizing the Soviet Union in pre-1945 Germany (not just in National Socialist circles) and the image of the rapist soldier in wartime propaganda, see, for example, Ayçoberry (2003: 455-65) and Moore (2003: 31-42).

with the purpose of exposing the rival German state as the offspring of a female Germany overpowered by a male Soviet Union. Elisabeth Heineman pays special attention to a poster of the conservative coalition CDU that reads “Nein, Darum CDU” [No, therefore CDU], in which the Soviet Union is portrayed as a threatening Asian man. According to Heineman, this type of imagery, which resonated with the age-old phobia of Genghis Khan’s “hordes of rapists” and had figured so prominently in wartime propaganda, is a clear indication of how sexual violence against German women was used in the Federal Republic as an expression of Asian barbarism and as a metaphor for the brutalization of Germany and its Western Christian culture by communism (Heineman, 1996: 355, 367-73). In the public sphere, therefore, rape and violation were not recalled as acts of sexual violence against women and young girls in the framework of armed conflicts marked by patriarchal cultures with a strong ethnic component. Instead, they were made into political images that were firmly embedded in Cold War discourses. The two German texts I will now proceed to analyze, together with the novel The Big Rape, are perfect illustrations of this signification of sexual violence.

Martyrs of Bolshevism

In the preface to Kaps’s book, written by Joseph Ferche – who presents himself as the sole surviving bishop in Silesia to have witnessed firsthand the invasion of the enemy from the East – the atrocities that fell upon the German people at the end of the war are presented as part of an ancient history of Christian suffering at the hands of the infidels: “The aim of this book is to record for history the heroism shown by German women and girls during the onslaught of the Bolshevik hordes, and to serve as a cautionary tale for the Christian West and the world as a whole” (Kaps, 1954: 7).\(^{14}\)

In the words of the bishop, in the years 1945/46 Silesia resembled an arena of martyrs, a place where believers suffered harsh trials (ibidem: 7). Thus the book’s epigraph is a quote from the Roman Breviary alluding to the Virgin and Martyr Saint Lucy: “If I am dishonoured against my will, my chastity will secure for me a double crown of victory” (ibidem: 3). Maria Goretti, the twelve-year-old Catholic Italian girl who was killed in 1902 as a result of attempted rape, and the ceremony of her canonization in 1950, play a crucial role in the introduction. Goretti is presented as a forerunner of wartime German women: “In the East

\(^{14}\) Translated from the German.
we had hundreds of Marias Goretti: is there anyone who speaks of them?” (*ibidem*: 9). The depositions themselves, gathered from German believers, including a large number of priests and nuns, are framed by religious terms and imagery. In order to find a language and categories for making sense of their experience of the end of the war and of Soviet occupation, the expellees resort to the Christian imaginary, as illustrated by the following excerpts (the first by a nun, the second by a “young mother from Breslau”):

The Russians lost all sense of shame. They were hordes of Mongols of the worst kind, as we were to learn later, with a satanic look on their faces. Then our martyrdom began [...]. (*ibidem*: 75)

It must have been like this among the early Christians, a community joyful and true, nothing fake about it. (*ibidem*: 126)

The emphasis on sexual violence is used to demonize the Soviet Union as a polity that does away with the most basic social and moral norms when it brutally smashes the pillars of patriarchal society and Christian morality: it respects neither female virginity nor marriage bonds, nor does it refrain from lusting after the spouses of Christ. The amount of cases involving the rape and murder of nuns, some of them told in the first person (*e.g.* Kaps 1954: 43ff.), together with corpse desecration/violation (*ibidem*: 82), stand out as the epitome of the lack of values, the civilizational chaos and the savagery of which the victors are accused in these testimonies. See, for instance, the rape and killing of an eighty-five-year-old deaf-blind nun (*ibidem*: 90). The following deposition summarizes the message that runs throughout the book, as it accuses atheism and communism for sexual violence: “That is the great tragedy of the Russian people: once they were forcibly deprived of religion, the people did not know the seventh or the tenth commandment, nor the sixth and the ninth! Many women and girls were dishonored in a violent and most bestial manner” (Kaps, 1954: 99).

These acts of violence are imputed to the negation of God in the aftermath of the October Revolution. In this context where blame is pinned on communism, the last few pages, devoted to the “good Slavs” – the Poles and Russians who protected German women – are of the utmost importance. In his introduction to the second chapter, Kaps had already argued for the need to tell between a minority of Polish communists, who, led by hatred and

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15 The abundance of depositions by clergy and members of religious orders, as well as the ample use of Christian imagery by the expellees, are primarily a direct consequence of the method of documentation adopted by Kaps, who moved mostly among church-going expellees from the Munich area.
Soviet influence, participated in the rapes, and the majority of the Polish population, supposedly made up of good, God-fearing people.

The text’s silences and omissions are an immediate giveaway of the problematic nature of sexual violence as a signifier of communism. In fact, no mention is made of the extremely high levels of sexual violence committed by the German troops in the East, or of the rape of German women by members of the Western Allied Forces. This has to do, to a certain extent, with the dual, Manichean way in which this phenomenon is viewed: since sexual violence, according to the text’s logic, is a hallmark of the non-believers, it cannot conceivably be practiced on a large scale by Christian nations. And given that the abuses suffered by Silesian Germans are not analyzed as part of the spiral of violence caused by the war and the crimes initiated by the German people in the political context of the attack on the Soviet Union, the German women who were raped tend to be perceived as the victims of a conflict that goes beyond the framework of the Second World War. These are stories about Christian girls and women who were abused by the Bolsheviks, where violence is framed, on the one hand, in a narrative of Christian persecution, and on the other in the fecund tradition of the Christian martyrs of chastity (Goretti, Saint Lucia and others). As a result, the Soviet Union is primarily seen as a scourge of believers, and rapes emerge as the recurrence of an ahistorical phenomenon: the fight of Evil versus Good, sin versus chastity, barbarism versus civilization. Both geographically and culturally, the borders are easy to draw: from the Bolshevik East (Asia) comes barbarism; the Christian West (Europe) is where Good dwells. There, in Christian Europe, is where the German people supposedly belong.

Within the framework of Cold War geopolitics and anticommunism, the aims of The Martyrdom and Heroism of the Women of East Germany are inextricable from a subtext that calls for the re-Christianization of Europe and which can be summed up by the final words of one of the testimonies: “Almighty and kindly God, give the Russians the grace of conversion and bring peace to all peoples” (Kaps, 1954: 46). The allusions to the “good Slavs” should also be seen in this light. For Kaps, the gruesome war experiences had surely caused many on both sides to feel closer to the divine, and that return to God was to be the force leading to future reconciliation and peace among the peoples of the world: “Let us then hope that the innocent victims from Eastern Germany have not suffered in vain, but rather laid the

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16 On sexual violence perpetrated during the attack on the Soviet Union, see, e.g., Mühlhäuser (2010).
17 On sexual violence by members of the U.S. military, see, e.g., Lilly (2007).
foundations for a better Christian future for both Germans and Slavs” (ibidem: 23). This desire to rechristianize Europe also had in mind certain social practices of the Federal Republic of Germany. In his introduction, Bishop Ferche writes that the sacrifices recounted in the book should be held up as an example at a time when so many German women lightly risked their honor (ibidem: 8). Throughout the text it becomes more and more obvious that re-Christianization is just another word for regulating moral behavior and sexual norms (disapproving sex outside marriage, condemning abortion, promoting the ideal of woman as wife and mother), which clearly places the book within the period’s conservative offensive on social mores.\(^{18}\)

**An Asian avalanche**

Lehndorff’s diary also resorts to biblical imagery to depict Germans as the victims of persecution, associating them with the chosen people and the followers of Christ, while the Soviets are viewed as their ruthless executioners.\(^{19}\) Just as in Kaps’s book, the sufferings of German women are imbued with Christian allusions. The Doktora is typical of this tendency to depict the victims of rape as innocent figures, sacrificed by the invaders’ bestiality and lust. The suggestion of a link between this character and two major biblical texts, the Epistle to the Hebrews and especially the eighth chapter of Romans (between the pages of which the narrator finds his companion’s diary after she dies), is extremely relevant. The latter text, intended to provide spiritual guidance to the early Christians in times of persecution, makes redemption of carnal sin contingent on transcending the flesh by way of the spirit. The body may be abused and destroyed, but if the spirit remains pure, the soul will fear neither death nor eternal damnation.\(^{20}\) This is a crucial question for the image of the victim as constructed

\(^{18}\) For an analysis of the way in which Kaps uses sexual violence in wartime to promote some central tenets of the Catholic doctrine of the period, see my “Mártires cristãs do bolchevismo: as violações de alemãs na Segunda Guerra Mundial sob um olhar católico” [Christian Martyrs of Bolshevism: A Catholic perspective on the rape of German women during World War II], in Mário Matos and Orlando Grossegesse (eds.), *Intercultural Mnemo-Graphies/ Interkulturelle Mnemo-Graphien/ Mnemo-Grafias Interculturais*. V. N. Famalicão: Edições Húmus (forthcoming).

\(^{19}\) Here are a few examples: the plagues of ancient Egypt are invoked to describe German suffering at the hands of drunken soldiers (Lehndorff, 2005: 72); when the narrator feels tempted to kill a Soviet soldier, he sees himself in Moses’s shoes (ibidem: 75); upon being arrested, he thinks of Jonah swallowed by the whale (ibidem: 80); during a storm, he imagines himself dealing with Noah’s predicament (ibidem: 140); when he flees Königsberg, two women friends give him a replica of Raphael’s Liberation of Saint Peter (ibidem: 163).

\(^{20}\) Kaps follows a similar line of thought when he quotes Augustine and a 1945 epistle by the Hungarian bishop József Mindszenty to absolve from sin the women who were raped by the Soviets.
by the text: the flesh, the physical or material appearance, had been fouled, but the spirit, guided by one’s devotion to others and to the Christian faith, had stayed pure.

Although Lehndorff dwells longer on the crimes of the Third Reich (albeit mostly within a narrative framework that views Germans as the victims of Hitler), the account of the years he spent under Soviet occupation perpetuates the dichotomies that were central to Kaps: civilization/barbarism, Christianity/communism. From the start the East is associated with savagery. Its famished herds (suggestive of the Soviet advance) are viewed as a harbinger of chaos (Lehndorff, 2005: 10). The bonfires in the hospital courtyard, around which the conquerors size up their loot, remind the narrator of a gypsy camp and make him imagine himself in the heart of Asia; next he describes Königsberg as an island invaded by gray lava (ibidem: 68, 70). The conquerors seem the incarnation of an Eastern barbarity that destroys people, civilization and nature. The arrival of the Red Army brings with it the violent destruction of German culture, the collapse of a Christian order and the onset of chaos. The soldiers are described in terms that suggest animal brutality (“hyenas,” “baboons” [ibidem: 73; 77]), especially in the context of the rapes. The Soviets and their collaborators plunder, destroy, rape, dance like savages, and get drunk. The Germans, on the other hand, toil, clean up, cultivate the land, help each other, try to comfort those who suffer the most, read the Bible, sing and pray to the Lord. Belief in God emerges as the crucial difference between the two peoples, as suggested when the author attempts to explain the rapes:

And this raucous language, this barking which the Word seems to have deserted long ago. And these fierce children, these fifteen and sixteen year olds, throwing themselves at the women like wolves, not really knowing what is at stake. This has nothing to do with Russia, nothing to do with any particular people or race – this is the godless human being. (Lehndorff, 2005: 67)

The Russian people’s alleged lack of culture is repeatedly hinted at throughout the narrative, but in the end sexual violence is mostly laid at the door of the October Revolution and its parting with God. Thus German suffering comes across as a product of a society that is devoid of spiritual values, which is a reading in line with the dominant discourses of the

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21 It is important to point out Lehndorff’s efforts to present his family as an example of German suffering at the hands of the Nazi and Soviet authorities: his mother, who had been sent to the Gestapo prisons, was killed by the Soviets in January 1945; his aunt was arrested by the Nazi authorities and later subjected to the torment of Soviet occupation; and his cousin Heinrich Graf von Lehndorff-Steinort was executed in 1944 for participating in the attempt on Hitler’s life.

22 There are moments when this image is somewhat qualified. That is the case, for example, when, apropos of cannibalism among the Germans, Lehndorff acknowledges that such acts are caused by hunger (rather than by Asian culture, as stated earlier with regard to cannibalism among the Russians) (2005: 160).
Federal Republic’s leagues and associations of expellees. In addition to perpetuating the image – much cherished in expellee circles – of East Prussia as a land of extreme beauty destroyed by Soviet rage, the diary, just like Kaps’s text, depicts the Germans from the Eastern territories as the blameless victims of the crimes committed by National Socialist Germany. It fashions them into a paradigm of Western Christian culture, a civilizing hub embodied in a cultured, orderly society, under threat from the East. Both Kaps and Lehndorff thus demonstrate in exemplary fashion how the traumatic experience of flight and expulsion was suffused with religious meaning and lent itself to the anti-communist struggle. The depiction of the expellees and of the raped women as epitomes of a persecuted Christian culture dissociated them from the National Socialist regime and made them appear solely as emblems of Soviet terror.

Thus the homogeneous, terrifying image of the Red Army that runs through the accounts of the expellees tended to discredit the German Democratic Republic while legitimizing the Federal Republic and the Western powers. After Germany’s complete military defeat in 1945, in the midst of all the international rivalries, the fears and ideological confrontations of the Cold War, the stories of persecution and abuse at the hands of the Red Army and the descriptions of deprivation and economic chaos under Soviet occupation came to be understood, first and foremost, as evidence of the vicious nature of communism and of its inability to ensure the well-being of the people. They were also interpreted as signs of the urgent need to join those Western military and political institutions that presented themselves as counterweights vis-à-vis Soviet power and as alternative systems to the communist economic model. Hence the importance of the geographical structure of the accounts: survival only becomes possible with the promise of reaching those zones occupied by the Western Allies. The idyllic landscapes to the East might well be lost, but under the protection of the West it was still possible to start anew, living with dignity and preserving the memory of the past. As Lehndorff puts it at the end of his diary,

Now it was time to take the first steps on the path that offered me a new existence. And I was faced with the question: what will this new existence be like, and who will make the decisions

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23 On the type of memory of the past that was dominant within the leagues, see, for instance, Hahn and Hahn (2003: 338-51), Moeller (2001: 51-87) and Münz and Ohliger (2003: 380-1).

24 A number of studies show how the Cold War favored the appropriation, in the Federal Republic, of flight and expulsion as a collective German experience, and argue that this site of memory was given a central role in the construction of a national identity as a people of victims (see, e.g., Heineman, 1996; Moeller 2001; Moeller, 2006a; Ohliger and Münz, 2003: 384-5; Schmitz, 2007).
on it? Will this be an indifferent existence, one hardly worth living? Or will God, in His mercy, grant me, as well as all those who went through the same as I, the grace of being able, throughout our lives, to say something about what we saw and heard? (2005: 286-7)

So it was that this type of memory contributed to the construction (perhaps the maintaining) of an absolute Other, an enemy who, although geographically placeable, was mainly the product of cultural constructs. This brutal, atheistic Asian enemy rising out of the expellees’ accounts helped the Federal Republic define itself within the international order of the Cold War as part of Western Europe. If peril lay to the East, then salvation was in the West: to wit, in the Federal Republic – the bona fide Germany – and with the Western Allies and their political, military and economic structures (NATO and the EC), as only these were in a position to protect the Christian West from the godless East.

Germany as a female body for the taking

In their instrumentalization of rape to denigrate the Soviet Union, the expellees’ accounts are echoed by a 1950s best seller that at first glance might strike us as the antithesis of the conservative Christian discourse observed both in Kaps and Lehndorff. I allude to the novel *The Big Rape*, by James Wakefield Burke, an American war correspondent who supposedly worked as a public relations adviser under General Clay himself in the years 1947-48. Presenting itself as a documentary novel, the text, which is primarily to be read as pulp fiction, draws from historical events (the rapes committed by the Soviets during the conquest of Berlin) to create a fictional web of adventure and revenge filled with violent, sadistic sexual encounters. Martin Meyer conjectures that the novel was sponsored by the U.S. authorities in the context of the fight against the Soviet Union’s ideological influence and expansion on German soil (Meyer, 2001: 168). There are, indeed, unmistakable marks

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25 The original text was published by Rudl in Frankfurt am Main in 1951. There followed the New York edition, in 1952, by Farrar, Straus and Young. There were many other editions, including by other publishers. There are two German translations: the first, by Werner Asendorf, is entitled *Die grosse Vergewaltigung* (Frankfurt am Main: Rudl, 1952); the title of the second translation, by Ursula Lyn, is *Frau komm* (Berlin: Amsel-Verlag, 1953, 1956).

26 Lucius D. Clay (1897-1978) is known for the decisive role he played in occupied Germany, particularly during the Berlin Blockade (1948-49), one of the tensest moments of the Cold War.

27 See the poor quality of the paper used in these editions and the pictorial content of the front and back covers.

28 In truth, mass rapes became a serious public relations problem for the Soviets, which might explain, among other things, the humiliating defeat of the KPD (German Communist Party) in the 1946 elections in the city of Berlin, a former bastion of communist power in the Weimar Republic. For that reason, some voices close to the SED (Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands, the party that was to rule over the German Democratic
of anti-communist propaganda in The Big Rape. Through the use of sexuality and of masculinity/femininity stereotypes aimed to generate national constructs and national paths, the text ultimately seeks to undermine the credibility of Soviet power among its audience. To that end, it resorts to such pre-1945 stereotypes as the Mongolian hordes. Let us look at the Red Army’s last appearance in the novel:

Eight or ten Russian soldiers of the Oriental type were standing or milling around, waiting for their officer to make up his mind. The officer was a smallish lieutenant, with a round Mongolian face and up-slanted eyes. He was pacing up and down angrily. Behind the group of soldiers they saw Bruno. He was suspended by his hands and feet, spreadeagled between two trees. He was alive but barely conscious. His clothes had been stripped off and they could see the marks where he had been flayed and beaten. The lieutenant stormed, ranted. [...] The officer was boiling mad. [...] Pointing to Bruno he cried an order: “Sderite s nego zhiyem kozhu!” Lilo’s fingers dug into Marlene’s arm. “Let’s get out of here!” [...] “There’s nothing in the world we can do for Bruno now” [...]. Lilo knew she would never tell anyone that the Mongolian lieutenant had ordered: “Skin him alive!” (Burke, 1953: 316-7)

Rape committed by the members of the Red Army is used to associate communism with savagery and to conjure up the image of an Asian, barbaric, bloodthirsty East.29 In the description of Soviet soldiers there are recurrent intimations of a threatening, repellent and perverse masculinity: the use of violence as sexual gratification and the celebration of military victory; the transmission of venereal diseases; drunkenness as a normal condition for sexuality; repeatedly abusing the same woman in violent orgies; and also the presence, during sexual encounters, of torture-related practices. This kind of negative masculinity is a dramatic counterpoint to the healthy, protective, more potent masculinity personified by the American soldiers,30 who are viewed as saviors when they arrive in Berlin at the end of the novel:

A few days later Lilo stood at the edge of this same wooded area and watched the first detachment of Americans come into Berlin. She saw the new Commandant for the U.S. Sector of Berlin. [...] Behind the general’s car came his deputy, a colonel [...]. Lilo felt naked as they

Republic) attempted to attribute the persistence of the rapes in the collective memory to Western propaganda (Grossmann, 1998: 223-225).

29 The Big Rape recuperates a number of stereotypes that had been very common in the anti-communist discourse of the Third Reich, albeit in the new context of rejection of National Socialism, and eschewing the anti-Semitism of Nazi propaganda (namely its identification of Soviet leadership with a Jewish elite accused of manipulating the uncultured Russian people in order to destroy the West).

30 Needless to say, the U.S. military also had to deal with numerous cases of sexual violence perpetrated by American soldiers against German women and girls (see, for instance, Lilly, 2007). Based on the testimony of a number of American officers, Atina Grossmann (1998: 225-6) comes to the conclusion that in the early years of the occupation the Americans showed little surprise or disapproval in relation to the sexual violence committed by the Soviets against German women.
[the colonel’s eyes] rested for a brief moment on her. There was something strong and fierce about this little man. [...] Lilo recalled what Pavel had said about him and now, having seen him, she understood why the Russians did not want to deal with him.

Then came the 82nd Airborne. They were giants of men – tall, huge, powerful. There seemed to be no small or even medium-sized soldiers among them. They were giants all! In contrast to the Russians there was something immediately sharp and commanding about these troops. Their uniforms were neat, clean and trim. With their trousers tucked in their paratrooper boots they all seemed to have extraordinarily long legs. Their faces were uniformly bright and clean. All seemed to be happy. There were no dark brooding faces. (Burke, 1953: 317-8)

This is the higher masculinity (both in a moral sense and in terms of physical potency) the female protagonist accepts and embraces at the end of the novel. Petra Goedde (1999) argues that personal interaction between the American soldiers and German women helped transform the United States’ perception of Germany, from male aggressor to feminized victim. The Big Rape paradigmatically illustrates this feminized image of the former enemy as a fragile entity threatened by evil, dangerous masculinities. There is, in the character Lilo, a clear identification between the female body and a nation in search of direction. As a personification of Germany in defeat, the character serves as a kind of battleground for the ideological struggle of the Cold War. She starts her sex life with Bruno, a childhood friend who had allowed the system to manipulate him and who, as a member of the SS, symbolizes criminal Germany, guilty of the war crimes committed in the concentration camps. The young man’s fanaticism is a decisive factor in making Lilo lose interest in the relationship as German defeat spells the waning of that masculinity. Faced with the risk of rape, she chooses to submit to one of the conquerors – Pavel, the handsome torturer of the Soviet secret services. The protagonist then experiences moments of seduction and sadomasochistic ecstasy with one of the victors of the battle of Berlin, but her lover’s dark, calculating and even cowardly side becomes increasingly salient and causes her to lose interest in him. Finally she envisages the Americans as the bearers of a protective masculinity and the promoters of a decent future for herself, her family, and Germany as a whole. The final paragraphs, in which the protagonist becomes fully aware of Germany’s absolute defeat and decides to join her former enemies, clearly shows the intersection of sexuality and politics by conveying Germany’s alignment with the United States through the metaphor of female sexual surrender:

31 Lilo realizes that Pavel will never help her avenge the rape of her mother and sister by the two Red Army soldiers because he fears the repressive Soviet machine and values his power as a Soviet officer above all else.
Suddenly the realization struck hard and deep and poignantly in her heart that Germany had lost the war, was completely felled, utterly flat on its back, abysmally prostrated and finally kaputt! [...] Sobbing as if her heart had burst into a thousand pieces she threw herself onto the ground and wept into the earth. [...] 

She arose finally [...]. She felt an opening of the heart, a freshness. She smiled her slanting smile. [...] There was cool vengeance in something that had been drummed into her head over and over again. Dr. Goebbels had preached it almost continually in the last days of the war. Paul, Papa, Bruno and Pavel had said it: that the West would eventually fight the East. 

When the West and the East finally came to open war, where would Germany stand? One thing was clear: Germany would be the main battleground. Her people, then, were again to be ground by the engines of destruction. [...] Survival! Above all things she must survive. If enough strong-hearted Germans managed to survive, the Vaterland would live. She had survived the rape of Berlin. Surely she could manage from here on. Papa had given her a thumbnail sketch of the Americans. The preview she had seen pleased her. Through Bruno she had learned when to give herself; through Pavel she had learned when not to give herself. What could the Americans teach her? Well, she was ready to meet the enemy. [...] 

She walked with the confident tread of one going forward to a pleasant sure duty, and in the supple freedom of a woman who had habitually walked in her girlhood, bare-foot and bare-legged, on the brown sea sand. Thus she took her way along Argentinische Allee, toward the Stars and Stripes, which waved in the July afternoon over the US Press Center. (Burke, 1953: 318-20) 

The protagonist’s final choice is decisively influenced by her father, who alerts her to the need to submit to American authority and accept atonement, but who also comforts her with the prospect of a future of abundance under U.S. protection. This particular character, who represents an old, conservative Germany which had coexisted with and yielded to Nazism without ever having shared its values, is crucial for the redemption of the German people. This aspect must surely have contributed to the book’s popular success in the Federal Republic. It offers a vision of the past in which most Germans of the 1950s liked to see themselves reflected, and that is essentially similar to the propositions underlying Lehndorff’s memoir: the crimes of the Third Reich were the responsibility of a small minority (the party leaders, the SS, the Gestapo); “ordinary” Germans were morally decent individuals; the Soviet invasion was accompanied by extreme forms of brutality that, by and large, had unjustly hit the innocent majority of the population; even for the victims of Nazism themselves, Soviet power had brought nothing but more suffering and death. In this regard, the fate of the two Jewish sisters in the novel is of major significance: having survived the anti-Semitic persecutions under the Third Reich, they are brutally raped by a group of drunken Red Army soldiers on the night before the First of May, the great Soviet
holiday, as a consequence of which the youngest of the two, aged 12, dies of a venereal disease contracted on that occasion.

This type of construction of the past, based on the demonization of Soviet power and the victimization of the German people at the hands of the Red Army, was not targeted at German audiences alone. In fact, the novel is an attempt to counter Soviet cultural influence and seduce the German public by the allure of a strong alliance with the United States, while seeking to justify in the eyes of Americans their country’s new alliances in the Cold War world: the former Soviet allies were now the enemy, and the former German enemies had become allies.

**Final considerations**

The persistent objectification of the sensual female body, the recurrent associations between desire, sexual pleasure, danger, power and violence, a sort of voyeurism in the belabored description of the sexualized, raped female bodies, the profuse descriptions of sexual encounters, and the very setting of a central moment in the heroin’s revenge in a luxury brothel (probably based on Berlin’s famous Salon Kitty), are all conventional features of a certain type of “adult” entertainment literature, the kind of pulp fiction that blends violence and libertinism and to which *The Big Rape* belongs. These traits stand in sharp contrast to both Kaps and Lehndorff, whose approaches to sexual matters are characterized by modesty and understatement. While in these two authors the victims of rape are asexual beings and models of domestic and Christian virtues, in Burke we have women who are sexualized and available, female bodies ready to be taken and enjoyed and who are also willing to enjoy. In the ideological context of the Cold War, however, the two stereotypes of the raped woman underlying these texts – the angel and the seductress – play a similar role as far as the political reinvention of Germany is concerned: to bear witness to Soviet brutality and to indicate that the right course for the new Germany, the good Germany, lay with the Western Allies.

When the issue of the rapes became the subject of wide media attention in unified Germany, particularly in the context of the reception of the 1992 documentary *BeFreier und Befreite* [Liberators Take Liberties], the texts analyzed here had been, to a large extent, all but forgotten. There was at the time constant talk of the persistence of a taboo regarding the sexual violence committed against German women. The present paper should leave no
doubt about the fact that in Germany the memories of the rapes were not a new topic in the public domain. On the contrary, they had a past history of ideological instrumentalization, and one not immune to racist discourses. What director Helke Sander, as well as other German feminists who took an interest in the subject, sought to do should then not be perceived as the breaking of a taboo, but rather as an attempt to redeem the memory of sexual violence through the reinvention of a discourse whereby the suffering could be expressed outside a nationalistic, xenophobic mold. Therefore, in order to understand the meanings acquired by this theme in post-unification Germany one must take into account the hegemonic discourses of the Adenauer era in which those memories had been recollected.

Translated by João Paulo Moreira
Revised by Teresa Tavares

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Investigating Homelessness: In Defence of a Declared and Concerned Ontological Politics*

Quantification and pathological individualization are the two dominant trends within homelessness research. In acquiring near-exclusive status in this research, they constitute a regime of truth and produce a series of unsustainable negations: they deny that they produce the realities which they study, they deny that other realities may be produced, they delegitimise any alternative methodological positionings, and render power relationships and domination invisible, thus obscuring the injustice of life on the streets. As an alternative to this regime of truth, this article argues for the mobilisation of a declared ontological politics that is concerned with the welfare and dignity of homeless people.

**Keywords:** homelessness; ontological politics; power; regime of truth; research methodology.

Introduction

There is a dominant regime of truth in homelessness research. It is composed of two separate but complementary aspects, namely the tendency towards quantification and pathological individualization of the phenomenon. This regime of truth, like any other, constitutes the materialisation of certain realities produced by the research process itself, which can only be accomplished at the cost of actively rendering alternative realities invisible (Foucault, 1978, 1991; Mol, 2002; Foucault, 2003; Law, 2004; Santos, 2006, 2007). However, the main problem of this dominant position is not the fact that it creates absences: they are an integral part of the methodological process of making sense of the world. What does prove problematic is (1) the process by which invisibilities are transformed into negations, with the result that all realities not present in the dominant methodological practice are viewed as impossibilities, thus reducing the field of possibilities to what is made to exist; and (2) the fact that the particular absences created by this regime of truth are essential to understanding homelessness as something characterised, above all else, by injustice and extreme domination. By emphasising the “major statistical trends” of the phenomenon, this regime produces a superficial view of homelessness that prevents access to the plurality of ways of thinking and acting that characterise it, leaving out of the produced reality actors, spaces and interactions that are vital to the study of life on the streets. Assigning individual

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causes to a phenomenon that occurs for structural reasons helps naturalise – and, in extremis, deny – problems in the housing and labour markets and in state and institutional actions in the “welfare” sector, thus providing support for a particular way of blaming the “victims” for their situation.

Concern for the wellbeing and dignity of those who are homeless does not allow researchers to be complicit in the reproduction and reinforcement of this regime of truth. It is essential to carry out an exercise in ontological politics (Mol, 2002; Law, 2004) which allows another reality of the phenomenon of homelessness to be produced: an ontological politics that recognises the multiplicity, complexity and fluidity of its different features and does so by emphasising the concern to improve the living conditions of homeless actors. However, we also need an ontological politics that explicitly defines itself as such and that, unlike the prevailing regime of truth, which denies making choices about what it makes present and absent, explains the reasons why certain presences are preferable to others, as well as openly acknowledging the fact that it creates absences. This exercise should function on two complementary time frames. The first involves the initial step towards a concerned and declared ontological politics: a rejection of rendering invisible the domination and injustice that characterize homelessness. Since it is only by taking injustice and domination into account that it is possible to combat them, the second political ontological moment is concerned, by necessity, with the collective production of a more just reality, which does not include people living on the streets.

I will begin by reflecting on the dominant regime of truth in what concerns the two dimensions referred to above. My main argument is not that these research positions correspond to incorrect perspectives, since this would have to be based on the idea that

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1 In the sense of enactment, which should be distinguished from construction. Both concepts refer to the idea that the objects and realities studied are brought into existence by the methodological practices deployed to study them and that there is no reality external to these practices. However, the concept of construction supposes that these methodological practices stabilise gradually and also stabilise the objects/realities which they study – produce. Bearing in mind that the denial that they produce the realities being studied is an integral part of the very practices that produce them, the concept of construction is based on the idea that the realities being studied and the practices used to study them may gain sufficiently general acceptance for one of the multiple practices and one of the possible multiple realities to acquire the appearance of exclusivity. The idea that these practices may be altered, thus changing the reality that has been made to exist, is not ignored, but the cost of such alterations is emphasised. The concept of enactment rejects this possibility of unique stabilisation. It acknowledges that there may be stabilisations, but these will always be multiple, depending on the various practices deployed in each space-time. Thus, enactment has a performative dimension: the realities which practices make present only remain present while the practices are executed. On the notion of enactment, see Mol (2002) and Law (2004).
there is a reality of homelessness that is exterior to the methodological practices deployed to study it. I do not believe that such an exterior reality exists, and therefore the issue in question is not one of perspective. It extends further than this: quantification and pathological individualization, rather than perspectives, are the wrong methods for studying and producing a phenomenon characterised by domination and injustice. They make present parts of the reality of the phenomenon that do not contribute towards understanding or solving it (the use of drugs and alcohol and mental illness), and render absent the fundamental realities of life on the streets (the labour market and housing, the role of the state, the survival strategies of those who live on the streets, disrespect, stigmatisation, social disqualification and poverty). As an alternative, I defend a methodological position that explicitly acknowledges itself as a process that produces reality, that creates presences and absences, that states the reasons why certain presences are more desirable or necessary than others, that clarifies what it makes invisible, and does all this on the basis of a concern

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2 Throughout the text, the fundamental epistemological distinction between perspectivism and constructivism will be deployed, introducing into the discussion the idea of ontological politics, understood as a particular type of constructivism. In broad terms, I understand perspectivism to be a methodological position that conceives of the reality being studied as something external to the methodological process of supplying meaning for the world. Hence, methodology is not a matter of “producing” but “discovering” a reality, and the different ways of describing and analysing it are conditioned by the different positions which the subjects occupy in the world, leading to separate “views” of the same reality, which is therefore approached from different standpoints. In this way, the possibility of “agreement between perspectives,” in the sense of approaching the correct reality, is something contemplated by perspectivism. Constructivism, on the other hand, rejects the unity of the real, affirming that the actual differentiated positioning of the subjects creates different realities. As this is not a solipsistic position, this construction of reality is a collective exercise, carried out by relational networks rather than isolated individuals (no isolated element in the network has total control over the reality they all produce), from which different phenomena result which, in discursive terms, are often given the same name. Ontological politics emerges as a way of clarifying certain constructivist premises. Firstly, it accentuates the relational nature of the production of reality, contesting certain constructivist lines which, whilst taking interaction as a tacit starting assumption, do not make this explicit, thus creating confusion between “constructivism” and “solipsism.” In making ontological politics the centre of the methodological procedure, we are forced to accept that realities exist outside individual perceptions, yet there are no realities outside the meanings that are constructed by a relational network. In addition, a methodology that makes its political ontological nature explicit reveals a possible dimension of intentionality in the production of realities: if these are performed by interactionally linked individuals, it is then plausible that, collectively, they may strive to enact them in a politically or morally desirable way.

3 It becomes essential to deploy a broad concept of method. In doing so, it becomes clear that any methodological position has a political dimension. The methodological choices we make are far from reducible to the different techniques for producing information, and even less reducible to taking a position on the “quantitative/qualitative” dichotomy. Taking the notion of ontological politics as its base, a moral positioning concerned with the welfare and dignity of the actors whose lives are being studied obliges the researcher to contribute towards improving their living conditions through the work s/he is doing, which should enable a better world to be produced, namely by revealing the relational inequalities that reduce certain individuals’ life possibilities. I understand “wrong” methods to be all those which, conversely, contribute in some way towards reproducing a status quo in the distribution of power that continues to hurt actors already being hurt in the studied phenomena.
that results from the indignation felt by the researcher in the face of the oppression and injustice that characterise homelessness.

“How many homeless are there (and who are they)?”

There is no consensual definition of homelessness in space or time or amongst institutions and researchers. The only thing that all the definitions seem to have in common is the fact that they are based on what lacks to the individuals who live on the streets: the lack of housing, social ties, money, physical and/or mental health, etc. Not only does a consensual definition not exist, but more than this, it cannot exist, given that the homeless do not constitute a “separate category” from the rest of society but are part of a continuum of precariousness – in housing, to a large extent – together with the domiciled population. The “homeless” category only exists to the extent that it is created by the methodological practices deployed by researchers, by professionals who work with subjects living on the streets and by policymakers who work on the phenomenon.

These actors consider the conceptual range of the definition to be an essential issue. It wavers between very restricted definitions – to be “homeless” stricto sensu, literally sleeping on the street or in some other “public” space not destined for this purpose – and other very broad definitions, in which being “homeless” becomes linked to and confused with many other situations of precariousness and vulnerability, in particular housing vulnerability (Jacobs, Kemeny and Manzi, 1999; Brousse, 2005; Gaboriau and Terrolle, 2009).

Definitions with different ranges will always produce different figures for the number of individuals living on the streets. In general, non-government institutions use broader definitions and state institutions more restricted ones, duly resulting in larger or smaller “homeless populations.” This difference also originates – in a complementary way – from the way in which the “homeless” are counted. From a statistical point of view, it is possible to “measure” this “population” as stock – considering the number of subjects that correspond to a given definition of “homeless” at a particular point in time – or as flow – taking the number of individuals that correspond to a given definition of “homeless” over a period of

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4 There are various discussions regarding definitions of homelessness. Brousse (2005), Jacobs, Kemeny and Manzi (1999) and Damon (2008: 2-7, 129-148) consider it necessary to define a population, despite identifying various problems in the process. The qualitative positions of Hopper (1997), Rullac (2012), Zeneidi-Henry (2002: 16-50) and, in particular, Gaboriau (2004) and Gaboriau and Terrolle (2009) appear more interesting, being characterised by rejections of a definition, which they consider unnecessary for a conception of homelessness that emphasises its procedural links with other situations of structural poverty and domination.
Governments usually prefer to “measure the homeless population” as stock, given that the figures are always lower than those for flow, and institutions that do not depend directly on the government in general opt for measurements of flow. NGOs that work with homeless people have a clear interest in justifying their existence and institutional continuity and therefore need funding. Using a broad definition of “homeless” to support measurement by flow will provide figures that are always much higher than those measured by stock based on a more restricted definition. If the available (produced) statistical data allow us to state that “there are many homeless individuals,” it will then be necessary to preserve the institutions that work with them. Conversely, it is in the interest of governments to publicly present a relatively low number of homeless individuals in order to downplay the problem. Moreover, measurement by flow will always show a higher number of individuals who are “temporarily” homeless, i.e. who do not live on the streets for long periods of time, whereas measurement by stock will overrepresent the number of “the chronic homeless,” i.e. those who have been homeless for several years.

The multiple forms of calculation make quantification problematic, to say the least, if not impossible. However, additional issues relating to practical difficulties should also be mentioned. The fact that various homeless individuals cannot be visually identified as such (Gaboriau, 2004: 115-116; Damon, 2008: 3; Gaboriau and Terrolle, 2009; Rullac, 2012) or the difficulty in gaining access to many of the sleeping places that these individuals choose for reasons of privacy and protection – often in spaces where people may walk past without realising that a human being is sleeping just a few metres away (Pichon, 1996, 2002; Gaboriau, 2004: 115-116) – make it difficult to accept that it is possible to obtain representative figures for the “homeless population.” The possibility of carrying out a survey in collaboration with the “welfare” institutions that work with people living on the streets would not help in obtaining data that could be interpreted as representative either – at least, not representative of the population which the study intends to cover. Several homeless individuals shun contact with these institutions and will not eat or spend the night in them (Snow and Anderson, 1993; Pichon, 1996, 2002; Gaboriau, 2004; Damon, 2008: 228-229;

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5 On issues regarding methods for calculating the “homeless” population, see Brousse (2005) for a view which, whilst identifying their problems, defends the usefulness of quantification. See Gaboriau (2004) for a firm rejection of the quantitative position. Between total rejection of quantification (Gaboriau) and the search for solutions to the problems of calculation (Brousse), Damon (2008: 129-148) stands closer to the latter than the former position. Hopper (1997) and Zeneidi-Henry (2002: 38-42) are further removed from Brousse, defending qualitative methodologies but without the fierce criticisms of quantification levelled by Gaboriau.
Rullac, 2012; Gowan, 2010). They cannot therefore be found in institutional facilities and, in the case of various subjects, no institution can say where they sleep at night. These individuals will not figure in any statistical survey said to be “representative of the homeless population,” regardless of the method chosen to gather the data. In the final analysis, institutional contact does not serve to define any “homeless population,” but only to create a conceptual distinction (whether intentional or not) between “those with secure housing” and “individuals who are users of services.”

It is impossible for researchers to safeguard themselves from these questions by resorting to a “representative” sample procedure which allows them to ignore individuals who are impossible to contact. Given that it is not possible to count these subjects, we cannot know how many they are, and therefore how can we work on the basis that they are residual for a statistical survey of this population?

In short, the only populations about whom quantitative data can be produced are the “identifiable homeless” on the streets or in institutions (regardless of the definition used) and the “users of services” (Gaboriau, 2004; Gaboriau and Terrolle, 2009). However, studies referring to homeless individuals that are repeatedly taken to be “representative” of this population have thus the perverse characteristic of actually referring to another population. As Gaboriau and Terrolle state,

In short, the survey is feasible. It has already been done. It will be done today with the guarantee of competent statisticians and experts. It will allow for substantial funding. It will provide the illusion of the quantifiable and the “known” – if “quantity” is better defined, we feel we are in control of the situation. This apparent rigour will serve as an alibi for some cause or another. But it will provide a figure that does not correspond to the population of homeless people. (2009: 15)

These problems mean that there are no reliable statistics for homelessness (Blau, 1992: 15-30; Hopper, 1997; Gaboriau, 2004; Zeneidi-Henry, 2002: 38-49; Damon, 2008: 139-144). Given the enormous difficulties regarding quantification, the validity of any future statistics produced on the problem may also be questioned. Even if the data produced were reliable, would it help us to understand the living conditions of people on the streets? Given that data reliability is low or non-existent and that, even if this were not the case, a quantification of the number of people living on the streets would not serve to understand how they live, it is reasonable to state that “the number of these homeless people does not help us to understand them better or to perceive the reality of their bond to society” (Guibert-Lassalle,
2006: 46). This being the case, we should view any figures for the number of homeless individuals – whether officially, institutionally or academically produced – with less than full confidence, regardless of the definitions or statistical procedures used. The only thing we know for certain about the phenomenon is that there are too many individuals living on the streets. We do not know this because there are 500 of them, or 5,000, but because, as Machado Pais states, “it does not matter to me how many [homeless individuals] there are – even one would be too many” (2006: 38).

More than being important to studying the phenomenon, defining what being “homeless” means is vital for its statistical quantification, since these calculations serve to support political measures. The way in which people are defined as “homeless” is a power mechanism that classifies particular individuals in a particular social position, reinforcing a position of structural domination (Gaboriau, 2004: 113-115). In other words, as previously stated, the methodological practice of defining a “homeless population” is a means of creating the “homeless” as a category. This category will always be disqualified in various ways – not least because it is based on what subjects lack – and it will be on this basis that the institutions working with homeless individuals will find justification for intervening over those who live on the streets in a way that denies their capacity to act and think. There are therefore political aspects to the definition of “homeless” that must be considered (Hopper, 1997; Zeneidi-Henry, 2002: 16-50; Gaboriau, 2004; Damon, 2008: 2-7, 129-148; Rullac, 2012). Through this categorisation, homeless individuals are generally represented as a “homogeneous group,” denying the huge diversity of situations, behaviours, biographies and worldviews of people who live on the streets. This homogenisation facilitates the development of public policies, given that they tend to be viewed as having a “single object.” Since the actual empirical heterogeneity of homelessness is ignored, these policies will target an abstract subject produced as real, rather than concrete individuals. Thus, this political treatment of the phenomenon will always result in a mismatch between the policy targets and the subjects to which they are applied.

As stated at the beginning of this section, there is a total continuity between situations of domination, poverty and precariousness (whether housing-related or other) experienced by

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As an example, it is with this reduced degree of certainty that we should view the data which tells us that there were 1,377 homeless individuals, in the restricted sense, in Portugal in 2007-2008 (data not “statistically representative” of the country, but gathered in Lisbon in 2007 and in Coimbra and Amadora in 2008) (Edgar, 2009: 74).
actors “with” and “without” homes. If there is no straightforward divide between “with” and “without a home,” then it is not possible to define and statistically calculate a “homeless population” (Gaboriau, 2004; Gaboriau and Terrolle, 2009). Thus, a definition of homelessness is of little sociological use. Failing to define it does not make it difficult to study; on the contrary, it revalues the empirical, which comes to be seen as the only valid source for determining whether the individuals with whom the researcher interacts may or may not be considered “homeless.” Any definition, whether broader or more restricted, will always be an exercise in dichotomous compartmentalisation of reality and this should be avoided: it is precisely by looking at the interaction between those “with” and “without a home” that it is possible to produce sociologically relevant work.

In addition, a definition based on “what these subjects lack” has the immediate effect of obscuring “what they have.” This may not be much, and it may even be devastating in its scarcity – ever-present in their daily lives – but it does not mean that we should ignore what they have: representations of the world and of themselves, desires, knowledges, capacities, values, feelings. The question posed by Gaboriau and Terrolle is imperative: “Couldn’t we talk about the wretched in some other way, in terms of what they think, with their outlook on life and on our society?” (2007: 29). Homelessness research has to look both at what individuals lack and what they possess; it has to recognise the voice of those who live in the misery which is life on the streets without ignoring the fact that this misery is real and limiting. Academic-scientific discourse on the phenomenon has to be constructed with those who live on the streets and take into account how they see their situation.

**Pathological individualization**

The pathological individualization of homelessness features as the other dominant methodological stance, which very often supplements quantification. There are two ideal-typical registers for pathological individualization: (1) one derived from the medical model; and (2) another referring to the “amorality” of homeless subjects, represented as actors who reject the domiciled normativity of the rest of society. In socio-historical terms, the latter prevailed up to the early 20th century, emphasising that homeless individuals were to blame for their situation and focusing on their “amorality, laziness and (possible) dangerousness.” During the period of strong state regulation and relative economic prosperity that followed the Second World War, the structural dimensions of poverty began to be emphasised, and
attention was paid to the factors that led certain groups and subjects into dominated situations (Castel, 1996, 2003; Gowan, 2010).

Since the 1980s the medical model has gradually established itself as the guiding force behind the definitions, representations and actions of domiciled society to address homelessness and people who live on the street. It is now the official position of “welfare” institutions and prevails in academic-scientific research. This model conceives of the phenomenon as a series of individual cases, viewing the fact that people live on the streets as a symptom of individual disturbances or disorders (Blau, 1992; Lyon-Callo, 2008; Gowan, 2010). It is therefore a perspective that argues that what is needed is to identify and treat individual problems. Medically, “homelessness [is] neither the result of criminality nor social injustice […] but a symptom – of addiction, mental frailties, post-traumatic stress syndrome and other sicknesses” (Gowan, 2010: xviii). Thus the ideal-typical medical model distances itself from the “(a)moralising” register but contributes as much as the latter towards actively rendering invisible the systemic aspects of homelessness (Gowan, 2010).

For Conrad,

medicalization consists of defining a problem in medical terms, using medical language to describe a problem, adopting a medical framework to understand a problem, or using a medical intervention to “treat” it. This is a sociocultural process that may or may not involve the medical profession, lead to medical social control or medical treatment, or be the result of intentional expansion by the medical profession. Medicalization occurs when a medical frame or definition has been applied to understand or manage a problem. (1992: 211)

It is therefore a process by which a particular phenomenon comes to be understood and managed in accordance with an analytical framework derived from the medical model. Whilst the medical profession does not necessarily have to be involved in the process, its presence reinforces the domination of medicalization as a means of observing and dealing with the phenomenon. Three separate but complementary levels of medicalization can be identified: i) a conceptual level, in which a medical vocabulary is deployed to frame the phenomenon; ii) an institutional level, in which the organisations involved use a medical approach to deal with a specific problem within their area of expertise; iii) and an interactional level, in which the direct doctor–patient relationship is present and in which the former defines and (medically) treats an individual problem that may or may not be social in origin (and therefore, in empirical terms, not a pathology of the subject-patient). It is only on this third level that the medical profession is always involved (ibidem: 211).
The involvement of the medical profession is not a *conditio sine qua non* for the medicalization of a phenomenon. In recent decades, the medical model has been extended to various aspects of society, and several professions not directly linked to medicine have begun using a medicalizing discourse. The capacity to “medically” define behaviours and people – for Conrad (1992), the main indicator of the power of the medical model – is present in various research studies on homelessness originating in psychology and social work, among others, which use medical frameworks to approach the problem and see the identification of individual pathologies in each homeless person as their principal concern. The main objective of such studies is to discover – define, produce – the “mental illness” or alcohol and/or drug addiction that prevents a particular homeless individual from getting off the streets and “integrating” into domiciled society. In this register, the solution for getting off the streets (not for ending homelessness, but for each individual exit) lies in the personal conversion of the individual, in his/her adaptation to a society which, although it may be seen as unjust, is above all naturalised (Blau, 1992; Lyon-Callo, 2008; Gowan, 2010). The individualization of causes and solutions for homelessness renders invisible the structural factors that make certain subjects “homeless,” and thus homelessness comes to be seen as a “symptom of the severe mental illness and substance abuse of the few and [as having] little to do with working and housing conditions for the many” (Gowan, 2010: 50). As a consequence of the dominance of the medical model, the category of the “mentally ill and deviant homeless” is created and homogenised; it is a category that is “separate from the rest of society” and whose existence is not due to the way in which society is organised, but rather to individual factors that differentiate “homeless” subjects from those who are “domiciled” (Blau, 1992; Lyon-Callo, 2008; Gowan, 2010).

In rejecting the medical model as a means of constructing knowledge on homelessness, it should be borne in mind that

systemic inequities contribute to the production of many behaviors that are commonly read as pathological disorders among people without permanent shelter. Reading these behaviors as individual disorders certainly plays a role in silencing work against exploitative social conditions and in limiting our ability to work more effectively against the condition that [this] work documents. (Lyon-Callo, 2008: 52)

Various behaviours on the part of homeless individuals which are taken to be indicators of “pathologies” are more or less efficient ways of dealing with the harshness of life on the streets. However, “with the medicalization of social problems, it becomes common sense to
understand the coping strategies of homeless people as symptoms and evidence of mental illness” (ibidem: 53). Amongst other things, the “medicalization” of certain behaviours turns the “homeless” into the “passive victims” of pathologies, denying them the capacity to act and reflect on the world and on themselves, socially and morally justifying that they should be biopolitically managed by “welfare” and repressive institutions.

The medical model and the “(a)moralising” register are ideal types. In praxis – including the praxis of production of academic-scientific knowledge – the two models combine, creating an archetype of the “homeless” individual that is characterized simultaneously by “mental illness, drug addiction, alcoholism, laziness, amorality and criminality”; therefore, this individual must be taught to “integrate” into society. In practice, the medical model is not axiologically neutral but, on the contrary, incorporates moral considerations, leading to the complementarity of “repressive” and “welfare” practices and discourses (Feldman, 2006; Lyon-Callo, 2008; Gowan, 2010). The dominant research trend is therefore not reduced to the ideal-typical medical model but refers to pathological individualization in general, whether this occurs under the register of “mental illness” or “sociocultural deviance,” or even (as is more common) a combination of both.

Pathological individualization combines with quantification, with the latter contributing a great deal to the former. Given that, as seen in the previous section, there are more “homeless” when the population is measured as flow rather than as a stock, and that calculating them according to the latter restricts the population to a group of subjects who have been on the streets for a long time – and therefore can be supposed to be more adapted to these living conditions – a restricted definition that supports quantification by stock facilitates the “pathologisation” of the phenomenon (Wright and Rubin, 1998: 41-46; O’Sullivan, 2008: 74). This facilitation of “pathologisation” results from the absence of a longitudinal view of measurements by stock, which can also lead to confusion between the causes of homelessness (i.e. the reasons why subjects end up on the streets) and the effects of life on the street which, at most, may be causes for the persistence of homelessness (i.e. the reasons why subjects remain on the streets). This confusion may lead to psychological, drug and alcohol problems being interpreted as the causes of the phenomenon when in reality they may be derived from the situation of living on the streets, and may therefore be factors that partly explain why certain individuals remain homeless (Blau, 1992: 17; Phelan and Link apud O’Sullivan, 2008: 74). Some methods of statistical production distort the
phenomenon more than others, facilitating pathological individualization, but all statistical production has a distorting effect. As Blau states, “social science research [...] consistently turns demographic characteristics into causes of homelessness” (1992: 17).

A declared and concerned ontological politics
As with any other method, quantification and pathological individualization produce specific realities; each of these methods constructs a particular kind of homelessness, mobilising specific practices, discourses, actors and materialities and does so by studying concrete spatial-temporal contexts. Like any other method, quantification and pathological individualization make parts of homelessness present, and do so at the cost of rendering other parts invisible (Law, 2004). In conceiving of the issue in this way, the problem of quantification and pathological individualization is not that they are wrong perspectives. The argument of this text aims to extend beyond perspectivism, considering that quantification and pathological individualization are wrong methods, incapable of producing realities that take into account the enormous power differences and structural domination that characterize homelessness.

We are not facing a problem of perspective since, if we were, we would have to believe that there is one essentialist reality of homelessness that can be discovered through the correct use of certain methodologies. This is not the case. This phenomenon, like any other, is produced by the methodological practice itself (Mol, 2002; Law, 2004). The problem with quantification and pathological individualization is the fact that, whilst being as selective about the realities they produce as any other method, they do not acknowledge this. The reality of homelessness they produce is brought into existence at the cost of annulling alternative realities. It constitutes a regime of truth (Foucault, 1978, 1991, 2003), a particular representation of the possibilities of reality. It is a regime of truth that is as much discursive as material – discourse is, in itself, materiality but, pursuing Foucault’s reflections based on the ideas of Law (2004), Mol (2002) and Latour (1987), a regime of truth is also constituted by things, objects, and the physical practices of subjects. The regime of truth constituted by the combination of quantification and pathological individualization has to be deconstructed since, given its dominant character, it denies that other realities of homelessness exist or may exist. The statements which these methods make about the phenomenon acquire the status of (quasi) exclusivity, and are thus uncritically accepted by the media, politicians,
ordinary citizens and the sections of academia that dominate research in this area. New statements will be produced based on them, supported by a spiralling process that, as it advances, has the effect of increasingly hiding the choices which these methods make, in particular the realities of the phenomenon which are repeatedly made invisible – public policies that are incapable of ensuring a dignified standard of living for those who live on the streets, deregulation of the housing and labour markets, the capacity of homeless actors to act and reflect, the unofficial interactions in which they are involved, the multiple survival strategies they are forced to develop in the face of the failure of the state and the market, etc. As Law (2004) and Latour (1987) argue, a fundamental part of the process of knowledge production – of reality production – is its retrospective annulment. Its production context is, to a great extent, negated by its justification context (Feyerabend, 1993).

Since the reality of homelessness is produced by the methodological practices we mobilise to understand it, the truth about this reality is also produced by these practices and is not, therefore, a criterion for knowledge validation (Foucault, 1978, 1991; Mol, 2002; Foucault, 2003; Law, 2004). It could only be so if there was only one reality of homelessness, exterior to the practices of knowledge production, passive, coherent with itself, and able to be discovered through the use of various methods. If this were the case, we could argue that one perspective on it would be better than another and seek the appropriate method for accessing this reality. However, we are not in this kind of situation. Homelessness is characterised above all by its fractionality (Mol, 2002; Law, 2004). It is multiple – composed of the failures in the labour and housing markets, failures of the state, the subjectivities and survival strategies of those who live on the streets, the set of institutional disciplinary and “welfare” measures, the discourses about it, and all the other factors that may be included in a discussion of the subject. Yet it is multiple without being plural, it is more than one without being various: all the different realities of homelessness that we can identify, that we can produce, are linked. They combine, coordinate and cooperate in complex ways, contributing

On the process of producing statements in scientific practice in general, see Latour (1987) and Law (2004). However, the statements of those who defend this regime of truth do not go unquestioned, and various authors, although still a minority within academia, have contested them. The work of Gaboriau and Terrolle (Gaboriau, 2004; Gaboriau and Terrolle, 2007, 2009), Lyon-Callo (2008), Gowan (2010), Hopper (1997, 2003) and Bourgois and Schonberg (2009) are exercises in the deconstruction of quantification and individualized “pathologisation,” by making visible the structural and interactional dimensions of homelessness which the dominant regime of truth renders invisible. These authors, in different ways, use ethnographic approaches to produce alternative realities of homelessness, emphasising the domination and injustice that are present in the lives of homeless actors. Despite the heterogeneity of their work, it is possible to find a common positioning on homelessness, one which I share.
to constructing one reality of homelessness with an apparent singularity, and this is achieved by reducing what may exist to what is actively made to exist, turning the realities produced by quantification and pathological individualization into a single reality with the status of exclusivity and denying the existence and legitimacy of the alternative realities that are made invisible in the process.

It is useless to study homelessness if we do not feel outraged by the fact that there are people living on the streets, who are oppressed, hungry, cold, treated without respect, without dignity. To study homelessness is useless if we do not feel revolted when we see these people’s capacity to act denied as they are constructed (reified) as “mentally ill,” or when we see them in possession of a purely negative action when they are constructed (reified) as “criminal and idle.” It is this reality of domination and injustice that should be studied. In order to do so, we need different methods from those which have acquired the status of near-exclusivity. We need a broader understanding of method – a *method assemblage* (Law, 2004) – that allows us to make present the injustice of life on the streets, the institutionally produced elements of domination, the suffering felt by concrete bodies, the indignation of homeless actors over this, and the panoply of power relations that can be observed in the interactions in which they are involved. This exercise should be carried out openly and must assume a concern for a better world, a desire for the elimination of the enormous power differences that disqualify those who live on the streets, and a recognition that the only way to do this is to eliminate the existence of people living on the streets. We need a methodological positioning that explicitly places the researcher in the field and acknowledges his/her influence over the research and its influence over him/her. We need a methodological approach which assumes that the researcher considers that there are some realities of homelessness that are more important to produce than others, given that not all can be present simultaneously (Law, 2004). However, this being the case, this declared commitment to the construction of a particular reality through the mobilised methodological practice also implies that the realities that are deliberately made absent are made explicit. This does not mean that all of them should be made explicit in the same way – multiplicity would make this impossible – but that we should, at least, clarify that we are producing absences during the research process, that we are aware of doing so and that we want to do
so – to make present the structural dimensions of the phenomenon, to openly make absent the “mental illness” of homeless actors, to make implicitly absent other realities. If it is not the search for truth but the production of reality(ies) that directs methodological practice, then methodology is a political problem *par excellence*. Method is the means of producing the realities that we, as a society, are interested in producing. It therefore becomes necessary to acknowledge this aspect of method in studying homelessness or any other subject. Investigating the world is an exercise in ontological politics (Mol, 2002; Law, 2004), an exercise in the production of realities: “a politics that has to do with the way in which problems are framed, bodies are shaped and lives are pushed and pulled into one shape or another” (Mol, 2002: viii). It is, however, necessary to make this selection explicit and to seek to develop methodologies that enable fluid, complex and sometimes incoherent realities to be produced, rejecting the exclusivity of any particular reality, specifically the one that is currently dominant. Ontological politics is an integral part of any method: it is through it that we make the choice about which realities are made present and which are made absent. However, quantification and pathological individualization are exercises in a covert ontological politics which does not acknowledge — in fact, rejects — its nature as an ontological politics. They produce knowledge and realities but in the same process they deny that they do so. They choose the reality they produce, at the same time choosing the knowledge about it that is made present, whilst denying that they do so. They locate the realities they produce outside their own methodological practices, denying that they influence them whilst producing knowledge about them. In this way, they reduce discussion of homelessness to questions of perspective: they argue that the reality is the same but the perspectives on it are different. However, if “the reality is the same,” given that quantification and pathological individualization present themselves as the accepted “correct” methods, their “perspective” on this reality, which is exterior to the practices, cannot fail to be correct. If the “perspective” is “the correct one,” then it must also be exclusive, given that the alternative “perspectives” must be “wrong.” This negation for the sake of methodological domination is unsustainable, and what is rendered invisible by these presences is too important to remain absent. Feyerabend’s (1993) logic must be

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9 See Law (2004) for a broader discussion of the relationship between “presence,” “manifest absence” and “absence as Otherness” (implicit).

10 Or at least, it could come to be, given that certain “minor” imprecisions are recognised in the practical application of the method.
recognized as fundamental in methodological practice: “anything goes,” provided that it is justified. Any reality that is produced is legitimate, provided that the fact that we are producing it and the way in which we do so are duly explained. However, whilst it may be legitimate to produce all realities, not all of them are desirable. It is here that ontological politics becomes particularly relevant. Opting for the reality that does not conceal domination or the one that makes those living on the streets responsible for living on the streets are substantially different choices, and a researcher who is concerned with human dignity cannot be complicit in the production of the latter.

If quantification and pathological individualization are not the path(s) to follow, this is, to a large extent, due to the profoundly decontextualized nature of the statements they make. The knowledge they produce is related to a particular context – a particular reality – but the part of the process that leads to the annihilation of its own influence on the production of reality conceals the space-time of this reality. It turns that which is local knowledge (which all knowledge is)\(^\text{11}\) into “universal” knowledge. A reality produced in a specific way in a concrete space-time thus becomes the reality, not only for this time and space but for many others as well.

One of the main problems of the dominant regime of truth is this “universal” nature. To a large extent it is by denying its parochialism that the reality it produces may be presented as singular and exterior. It is only possible to fight against this if contextual research into homelessness makes its contextualisation explicit. In the positivist model of knowledge, universalism is seen as the prime objective of information produced by research. Yet this can only be achieved by the process of obscuring research practices, an integral part of which is the negation of the context in which they occur. A declared and concerned ontological politics can only exist to the extent that it is relative to specific situations. These cannot be made invisible; they are a fundamental part of the reality which the method seeks to make present.

This research positioning regarding homelessness cannot be affirmed as “universal.” It is not “generalizable” in the positivist sense – which should be translated as “decontextualized.” Instead, a concerned and declared ontological politics must function through a praxiography (Mol, 2002) of a specific context, an ethnography of the practices of a

\(^{11}\) See Law (2004), Latour (1987) and Flyvbjerg (2011) on the local and contextual nature of all knowledge produced.
particular space-time.\textsuperscript{12} The concern with the injustice resulting from major power imbalances which amount to domination can only be transformed into a part of what we produce as present if the research field is approached intensively over a prolonged period.\textsuperscript{13} The subjectivities of the actors, the resources they deploy to confront domination and survive, the discourses which homeless subjects incorporate, readapt, rearticulate, produce and circulate, their relations in areas outside the public eye, in short, a substantial part of the set of practices that make up the phenomenon cannot be observed when the realities we want to produce do not include them. They cannot be observed when what we are looking for are the superficial “main trends” of the phenomenon, the identification (production) of problems in terms of existing clinical frameworks or the dominant representations of the “amoral” character of the “undeserving poor.” Homelessness understood as domination requires an approach to what lies beyond what is immediately visible when we look at life on the streets. When the interest lies in making unjust power relations present, we also have to look at what is taking place in the “backstages” (Goffman, 1959) of social life, in the hidden transcripts (Scott, 1985, 1990) of dominated actors.\textsuperscript{14} Looking at these realities does not allow us to look at others. Once again, what is important is to make explicit that the reality that a clear and concerned ontological politics wants to produce is that of the relational production of power, not as an end in itself, but as part of a wider ontological politics. As previously stated, all realities are equally legitimate but not all are equally desirable. Making present the reality of the relational production of power in homelessness is desirable to the extent that it is perceived as unjust and degrading. The political exercise includes fighting this reality. Yet it is only by producing it as present in all its complexity – the first step in a declared and concerned ontological politics – that it is possible to fight it and seek to create

\textsuperscript{12} Since Nels Anderson (1965; Anderson and Rauty 1998), the first “classic” reference in homelessness research in academia, it is clear that this phenomenon has to be the subject of contextualised and prolonged ethnographic study.

\textsuperscript{13} The recent ethnographies by Gowan (2010) and Bourgois and Schonberg (2009), curiously both carried out in San Francisco, offer excellent examples of the possibility of studying homelessness in ways which criticise the dominant regime of truth, proposing the construction of alternative realities for life on the streets, and emphasising the enormous power differences and structural and interactional injustices in the lives of homeless actors. Whilst it is possible to disagree with the particular positions taken by the authors, both works are exemplary not only for the profound knowledge they reveal of the realities studied but also for their committed stance towards fighting this domination and injustice and the fact that they explicitly assume the position of authors in the field.

\textsuperscript{14} In this respect the good example of research provided by Bourgois and Schonberg (2009) should be noted. Their photo-ethnography of homeless addicts in San Francisco is an interesting exercise in studying what takes place precisely in social spaces of difficult access for researchers.
another, more just, reality that does not include people living on the streets – the second political ontological step.

A conclusion...

... must be rejected, given that the process is open and ongoing. The methodological positioning defended here does not aim to present itself as “the path” for research to follow, but one possible path. The details of contextual findings can only be approached and resolved contextually. Providing “universal” methodological guidelines for approaching specific fields of research is nonsensical and counterproductive. It hinders good research. We need rules, but contextual rules, adapted to the occasion (Feyerabend, 1993; Law, 2004; Flyvbjerg, 2011). What validates the sharing of the knowledge we produce is not the fact of using the same procedures in different space-times but the explicitness of the different ways of doing what we do. This is the main problem with the dominant regime of truth in homelessness research. It produces too many negations, reduces the scope of the possible to what already exists, so that it no longer makes sense to think of a better (different) world than the one that already exists, given that this becomes the best (only) world possible. It negates the research context through pretensions to “universalism” and does not acknowledge parts of this context due to methodological standardisation. It denies that it produces reality(ies), that it produces presences and invisibilities. It denies that it is possible to produce alternative realities using alternative methods. The dominant regime of truth rejects its political ontological nature. The only defensible general rule is that of explicitness: “anything goes,” but we have to be aware of what we are doing and account for how we do it. This will vary according to the context being investigated but, in the particular case of homelessness, it cannot make injustice and domination invisible. Rejecting the methodological domination of the regime of truth discussed is the first step towards approaching and fighting the praxiological domination (which must be) present in homelessness.

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References


Biolegality, the Forensic Imaginary and Criminal Investigation*

This text discusses some aspects of the local configurations of social representations and uses of DNA technology in criminal investigations in Portugal. The approach to the sociotechnical network which aligns forensic science with state governance policies, criminal investigation practices and laws, and the cultural imaginaries surrounding DNA and criminal investigation work is based on the concepts of biolegality and the forensic imaginary, which are, in turn, anchored in notions of biocitizenship and bioidentification, respectively. An interpretative and qualitative theoretical-methodological perspective has been adopted, based on an analysis of legislation and an understanding of the meanings and relevance attributed to the use of DNA technology by members of the Portuguese Criminal Police. The objective is to discuss aspects of the local tensions created by processes involving the export of DNA technology, which has its origins in societies and cultures with different traditions of technology governance, regulation of criminal investigation procedures and submission of evidence in court.

Keywords: database; biolegality; forensic imaginary; criminal investigation; DNA technology.

Introduction

Police criminal investigation work and the creation and expansion of genetic databases for forensic purposes are based on a sociotechnical network which aligns forensic science with state governance policies, laws and criminal investigation practices, fuelling cultural imaginaries that combine a belief in the infallibility of the use of DNA technology to identify criminals with the promise of effectively fighting crime. It involves the coproduction of criminal justice and technoscience – an “idiom” (Jasanoff, 2004) – that produces “centres of calculation” (Latour, 1987) that have effects on both the practices of actors working within the justice system – the courts, police and forensic experts – and the governmentality of the bodies and identities of those subjected to the collection, classification, storage and management of information (Machado et al., 2010).

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In this text we discuss certain local outlines and configurations created by the use of DNA technology in criminal investigation work in Portugal. Our approach is based on an analysis of the law that created and regulates the operations of a DNA database for forensic purposes and of the law that establishes the principles for the organisation of criminal investigation work, as well as on an interpretation of the meanings attributed by officers of the *Policia Judiciária* (Criminal Investigation Police) to the use of DNA technology in criminal investigation practices in Portugal. In the first section we present a summary of the theoretical debate on the relationship between criminal justice and biotechnology, on the basis of concepts of biolegality and the “forensic imaginary,” which are, in turn, based on the ideas of biocitizenship and bioidentification, respectively. In the second section we discuss certain local outlines and configurations created by the use of DNA technology in criminal investigation work in Portugal. Based on an analysis of legislation and interviews held with members of the Criminal Investigation Police, we analyse some of the local tensions created by the export of DNA technology to societies and cultures with different histories of technology governance, regulation of criminal investigation practices and submission of evidence in court. We also argue that the contingencies associated with the use of DNA technology in criminal investigation work in Portugal can have an impact on public confidence in the criminal justice system.

**Biolegality and the forensic imaginary**

The concept of biolegality, a term proposed by Lynch and McNally (2009) to refer to the coproduction of biotechnology and legislation within the context of criminal justice, entails two main elements: on the one hand it refers to interactions between law and science, resulting in attempts to make genetics conform to the needs and constraints of the judicial legal system; on the other hand, it broadens the debate on forms of biocitizenship by extending the discussion on new configurations of identity and citizenship to the application of genetics in criminal investigation work – in other words, to *suspect identities* associated

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1 The interviews result from ongoing research conducted by Susana Costa, involving actors from the different national criminal police bodies. The interviewees were selected on the basis of one fundamental criterion: all potential participants had to have had previous professional experience that provided them with specialist knowledge of the field of criminal investigation in Portugal. This article focuses on a group of six interviews held in 2011 with members of the Criminal Investigation Police.
with individuals or groups identified as having a high risk of committing crime, who should be watched and investigated.

The theoretical debate on biocitizenship has centred on emerging forms of citizenship anchored in concepts of health and biology (Rose, 2007), and one of the most widely discussed topics concerns the transformation of bodies and identities through technological applications and medical knowledge. The application of new genetic technologies constructs new individual and collective identities – “techno-scientific identities” (Rabinow, 2008) – which are “generating new ‘biosocialities’ – new modes of social relationships deeply linked to living with such identities” (Clarke et al., 2009: 23). Recent literature on the new identities and new forms of citizenship resulting from the application of genetic technologies has focused mainly on medical identities associated with healthy and sick individuals/groups at risk and on civic identities based on social movements which defend the rights of patients and families facing problems of a medical and genetic nature (Akrich et al., 2008; Atkinson et al., 2007; Gibbon & Novas, 2008).

Biolegality extends the theoretical debate and the empirical application of the idea of biocitizenship to the context of government policies designed to fight and deter crime by strict surveillance of suspect bodies – or what may be called “genetic suspects” (Hindmarsch and Prainsack, 2010). In this sense, and in the words of Lynch and McNally, “instead of producing ‘at risk’ medical identities, biolegality produces ‘risky’ suspects, ‘pre-suspects’ and ‘statistical suspects’” (Lynch and McNally, 2009: 284). Suspect identities therefore emerge from both criminal investigation practices and genetic expertise in the development and use of DNA databases for forensic purposes. Yet they are also constructed by the subjects themselves who are the targets for the collection of biological samples and whose profiles are included in increasingly complex technological systems for computerising and systematising genetic information which may be cross-referenced with other types of information of interest to the police (their biography or ‘criminal career’, criminal records, fingerprints, photographs, etc.) (Prainsack and Kitzberger, 2009; Machado et al., 2011a).

Identification created by the DNA profile produces the illusion of certainty, the removal of doubt and the perception of the infallibility of technology, minimising any ambiguities and practically eliminating the possibility of doubt and uncertainty (Aas, 2006: 150), the key elements which fuel the so-called “forensic imaginary” associated with the construction of DNA profile databases.
According to Williams (2010), this forensic imaginary combines two central ideas, namely that biology and genetics are sciences that can efficiently identify individuals, thus making them central to crime scene analysis – i.e. bioidentification – and that the growing use of DNA profiles will improve the efficiency of criminal investigation and thus prevent and deter crime.

Various authors have discussed the role of bioidentification – or identification via the body, including identification from DNA profiles but also dactyloscopy (identification from fingerprints) and anthropometry (identification using physical measurements of the human body) used in various countries throughout the world including Portugal in the 19th century (Cole, 2002) – as an integral feature of the development of the modern state apparatus (Cole & Lynch, 2006; Garland, 2001; Lyon, 2001). In this way, the criminal’s career becomes visible to the state and potentially dangerous bodies are more easily controlled: a link is created between a particular (unique, identified and individualised) body and a state archive (databases of criminal records, fingerprints and, more recently, DNA profiles). This is a “credible link” for scientists, bureaucrats and judicial actors, as well as the general public (Cole, 2002), and is connected with political and social processes that legitimise the scientification of police work in conjunction with the creation and expansion of databases containing genetic information for the purposes of criminal investigation.

The forensic imaginary therefore represents what some authors have called the imaginary of the “truth machine” (Lynch et al., 2008), which, to a great extent, is fed by the cultural messages transmitted by the media. There is a vast amount of literature nowadays on the so-called CSI effect, a reference to the famous television series Crime Scene Investigation, whose structure and narrative logic appear to promote public perceptions of forensic science, particularly DNA technology, as a kind of “super science” which is absolutely infallible in combating crime. The CSI effect was originally used to assess allegedly distorted perceptions of forensic science by jurors in real-life trials, which would supposedly translate into an emphasis on the assessment and valuation of DNA evidence (for a summary of the debate, see Cole and Dioso-Villa, 2007).

Due to its “credible” mixture of elements that are both fictional and based on real-life forensic science procedures in criminal investigation work supported by advanced technologies (Deutsch & Cavender, 2008; Durnal, 2010), CSI constitutes a cultural performance that creates myths around “wishful-thinking science” (Kruse, 2010: 88). It is
therefore likely that, on the basis of these narratives, the public may construct an imaginary of forensic science, identification technologies using DNA profiles and the investigators themselves, which, although based on the apparent authenticity of certain techniques, ignores the contingencies of their application in the real world of criminal investigation and laboratory analysis.

This text analyses certain configurations of the tensions between biolegality and the forensic imaginary created by the legal and regulatory circumstances of criminal investigation and the biopolitical process of creating a database of DNA profiles for forensic purposes. The discrepancies between the collective imaginaries concerning the efficiency of DNA technology in identifying criminals and the local realities of the legislation which regulates both the operations of the DNA database used for criminal investigation and the organisational structure of crime investigation, judicial cultures and police practices in this area clearly illustrate the tensions created by the process of exporting DNA technology to societies and cultures that have very different histories of technology governance and ways of building public trust from the societies and cultures in which they originated. It should be emphasised that the use of DNA technology in the criminal justice system has its origins in England and the USA, both countries that have adversarial justice systems (Lazer, 2004). Thus the incorporation of DNA as scientific evidence in inquisitorial justice systems such as the Portuguese may create additional complexities which have not yet been fully discussed (Toom, 2010).

Criminal investigation and DNA databases in Portugal

In central countries which have served as the model for establishing DNA databases, such as the United Kingdom and the United States of America, there is a clear emphasis on the role of the scientifization and professionalization of the police through the use of genetics in criminal investigation (Cole, 2002; Nuffield Council, 2007; Williams, 2003; Williams et al., 2004). However, this is not the case in countries such as Portugal, where various factors combine to restrict and subordinate police investigation work to legislation: the work of the police in gathering biological samples from crime suspects is dependent on an order issued by a judge; the constraints established by Law 49/2008 of 27 August (Law on the Organisation of Criminal Investigation) increase the grey areas of crime scene management; and investment in human and technological resources for police work is insufficient (Costa,
2003; Machado and Santos, 2012). We will begin with a brief analysis of the legal instruments which regulate the creation of the DNA database for civil and criminal identification purposes and the organisation of criminal investigation work.

In 2004, the legal system for medical-legal and forensic reports was established under Law 45/2004, limiting them to the *Instituto Nacional de Medicina Legal* (National Institute of Legal Medicine – INML) – a state institution directly supervised by the Ministry of Justice – and its branches. Only in exceptional cases, when it is clearly impossible for the INML to provide the service, can they be produced by third parties contracted or recommended by the Institute (Article 2.2 of Law 45/2004). The central role of the INML in producing forensic reports was reinforced in 2008 by Law 5/2008, which created a DNA database for civil and criminal identification purposes: the body responsible for the database and all its operations was the INML (Article 16.1 of Law 5/2008).

Law 5/2008 contains a range of provisions that attribute control and decision-making powers concerning the creation of DNA databases to judges, who are responsible for ordering the collection of samples (Article 8.2 of Law 5/2008) and the inclusion of profiles (Article 18.3 of Law 5/2008). The inquisitorial tradition\(^2\) influenced the legislative choices, as is the case in other countries where judges and public prosecutors play a more important role in the creation of databases, for example, by assuming responsibility for the inclusion and removal of profiles, as in Germany, Belgium, Spain, France, Holland, Italy, Latvia and Luxembourg (Machado *et al*., 2011b).

In addition to the legal restrictions on the process of collecting biological samples from individuals suspected of criminal activity, police criminal investigation work in Portugal also faces restrictions regarding the procedure for communicating the results of the analysis by the body which has the custody of the database, the INML, which can convey them only to the judge who, in turn, communicates this information to the Public Prosecutor’s Office or the criminal investigation bodies, if s/he deems it necessary and when it has been duly requested (Article 19.1 a) and b) of Law 5/2008). Police access to genetic information during

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\(^2\) In the inquisitorial tradition, the judge plays a leading role in conducting the trial and assessing the evidence, heading the examination and deciding which evidence is admissible. The fundamental difference is that whereas the adversarial system offers scope for confronting two versions of the facts in order to resolve the case, the role of the court in the inquisitorial system is to “determine the truth” (Toom, 2010). In the conclusions to this text the main differences between the inquisitorial and adversarial systems will be discussed in detail in order to provide a perspective on the respective impacts of the two different systems in terms of the admission and assessment of evidence, specifically with regard to the submission of DNA evidence in courts.
the course of criminal investigations is therefore very restricted, hierarchical and bureaucratic.

These restrictions on police work are also heightened by the hierarchical organisation of criminal investigation work, regulated by Law 49/2008 of 27 August, which, although directed by the judicial authority (Article 2.1 of Law 49/2008), is also assisted by the criminal police bodies: the Policia Judiciária (PJ – Criminal Investigation Police), 3 Policia de Segurança Pública (PSP – Public Security Police) and the Guarda Nacional Republicana (GNR – National Republican Guard)4 (Article 2.2 and 2.3 of Law 49/2008), with the PJ being supported in its investigations by the Laboratory of the Criminal Investigation Police and the PSP by the Unidade de Policia Técnica (UPT – Technical Police Unit).

The forensic imaginary of the infallibility and efficiency of DNA technology is based on judicial and criminal investigation practices and cultures in countries which not only have significantly expanded the genetic databases used to investigate and combat crime (due to an almost total absence of restrictions on the inclusion and retention of profiles), but have also conferred broad powers on the police with regard to the process of collecting and analysing samples and obtaining access to information. For example, whereas in Portugal biological samples can only be collected from formal suspects and those convicted of premeditated crimes involving an effective prison sentence of 3 years or more, following an order issued by a judge (Article 8 of Law 5/2008), in England and Wales the police may collect biological samples from anyone under arrest and the profiles are retained indefinitely.

As previously stated, the differences concerning the countries that have provided the model for investing in and developing the applications of DNA technology within criminal investigation work create local tensions that may even reinforce images of the inefficiency of the Portuguese police (Machado and Santos, 2009a; Machado and Santos, 2009b). This can be seen by comparing the police investigation procedures and the ways of accessing and using genetic information in crime investigations that can be found today in Portugal – involving a genetic database that is still in its early stages, with many restrictions on its

3 The PJ is supervised by the Ministry of Justice (MJ).
4 The Policia de Segurança Pública (PSP) has the primary function of safeguarding internal security and protecting the rights of citizens. The Guarda Nacional Republicana (GNR) is militar in nature but is primarily involved in neighbourhood police work, intervening in areas such as domestic violence and the protection of nature and the environment. Both PSP and GNR are supervised by the Home Office (MAI).
expansion and very limited police access – and the situation in England, for example – the country which has the oldest DNA database in the world (created in 1995) and which has pioneered the uses of DNA technology in criminal investigation work.

The scientification of police work and local contingencies

The legitimization of police criminal investigation work has resulted, to a large extent, from what may be termed the scientification of police work, supported by the growing use of technology in procedures to secure the crime scene and collect and analyse traces, combined with one of the foundation stones of the “forensic imaginary,” namely the need to use advanced technologies to increase the speed and efficiency of criminal investigation work (Lynch et al., 2008; Williams and Johnson, 2008).

A substantial part of the technologies that support this police work is based on the development and expansion of modern systems for human identification and classification of individuals on the basis of biological characteristics, such as fingerprints and DNA databases. As Caplan and Torpey state, the history of criminal investigation has been defined by “repeated efforts to rationalize and standardize practices of identification and the systems for the storage and retrieval of the expanding documentation that this generated” (Caplan and Torpey, 2001: 9).

Within the range of technological resources applied to criminal investigation, the collection of traces from crime scenes and of biological samples from suspects and formal suspects stand out nowadays. These can be compared with the existing biological material or genetic profiles in police archives or forensic databases, and the use of the latter is increasing significantly throughout the world (Hindmarsh and Prainsack, 2010). Police criminal investigation work supported by DNA technology is an illustration of the way in which technology can act as a centripetal force that gathers, organises and holds together a wide range of social, political, technological, human and non-human elements (Latour, 1987), creating what Michel Callon has termed an actor network to describe a set of heterogeneous elements linked by a technological network which “could at any moment redefine their identity and mutual relationships in some new way and bring new elements into the network” (Callon, 1987: 93).

Applying this idea to the uses of DNA technology in criminal investigation work, it may be established that the human social actors consist of the crime investigators, forensic experts,
perpetrators of crimes and the courts, whilst the non-human set of actors includes DNA identification technology and other technologies used in criminology such as lophoscopy, dactyloscopy or ballistics. Non-human social actors may also include the entire range of items and traces left at the crime scene, the so-called “silent witnesses” or “dumb witnesses” to the criminal act, of which the perpetrator may have inadvertently left a potentially incriminating trail (footprints, fingerprints, fibres of fabric, hair, blood, semen, etc.).

Within this context, in the following sections we will analyse representations of the role of DNA technology and the constraints on police work that result, according to the actors interviewed, from the disparity between the tensions created by the forensic imaginary – the idea, widely disseminated both by the media and by the political powers and some fringes of the forensic expert community, that the growing use of DNA profiles will improve the efficiency of criminal investigation – and the constraints created locally, both in the field (in crime scene management) and through legislation.

**Crime scene management and DNA database assessment**

The site where a crime takes place requires the intervention of criminal police investigation bodies (OPCs) to recover any traces left there. As a rule, crimes of a sexual nature and homicides demand the most exacting type of work in which the use of DNA technology may be more necessary, although this does not invalidate the use of other techniques to gather traces, such as fingerprinting.

Portuguese law establishes that the first step to be taken by the police after a crime is reported is to inform the Public Prosecutor’s Office (Article 248 of the Code of Criminal Procedure – cf. Castelo & Pereira, 2007). However, even before receiving orders from the

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5 Criminalistics, a science whose aim is to identify extrinsic objects relating to crimes and criminal identification, is traditionally described as the “science of individualization” (Kirk, 1963). Forensic science makes a distinction between identification and individualization. Whereas individualization signifies the possibility of defining a unique source as the origin of a trace taken from a crime scene from a range of other possible sources, identification only narrows down the potential source of origin to a group or class of objects (Cole and Dioso-Villa, 2009: 3), to the extent that “it is the process of establishing the identity of an individual, this being a group of features which individualize him” (Pinheiro, 2008: 13). A new epistemology of forensic identification (Cole, 2009) now claims that it is impossible to achieve “perfect” individualization, and so one should speak in terms of probabilities rather than certainties (Saks and Koehler, 2005). In the case of forensic genetics, DNA only allows for identification and not individualization (Amorim, 2012).

6 It is the responsibility of criminal police bodies, even on their own initiative, to gather information about crimes and as far as possible prevent their consequences, discover the perpetrators and execute the necessary and urgent measures required to safeguard evidence.
appropriate judicial authority, OPCs may proceed with the necessary and urgent measures required to secure evidence, and continue after the intervention of the Public Prosecutor’s Office to recover new evidence (Article 249.1 & 3, respectively – cf. Castelo & Pereira, 2007).

As set out in Article 7 of Law 49/2008, crimes involving homicide and sexual aggression are, in particular, the responsibility of the Policia Judiciária, assisted by the Laboratory of the Criminal Investigation Police. The technical police unit working with the PSP or the GNR is, in turn, responsible for carrying out the necessary investigations with a view to producing material evidence of a crime, such as an inspection of the area, preservation of any traces found, preservation of the crime scene, securing the area and denying access to outsiders, searches, the questioning of witnesses in order to determine what took place and, in certain circumstances, the collection and removal of traces, together with an identification of the crime scene, either in the form of a written description or with the additional use of audio and video equipment to assist in the process. Thus, given the nature of its responsibilities and the human, material, technical and scientific instruments at its disposal, the Laboratory of the Criminal Investigation Police assumes a rearguard position, stepping in after another criminal investigation body has carried out the initial investigations (Article 3.4 a) and b) of Law 49/2008).

However, what the law establishes is based on the assumption that all OPCs are capable of intervening swiftly and efficiently at the crime scene, not only complying with the principle of the immediacy and urgency of the actions (Braz, 2010: 36), but also the principle that the first police body to be informed of the crime should be the one to proceed to the scene and carry out the initial investigations, with a view to preserving the crime scene and executing the initial protective measures which are so important to the future investigation.

The initial phase, known as the judicial inspection, implies careful analysis of the crime scene in order to gather physical and witness evidence. It is a crucial stage and, above all, important to the strategic planning of subsequent interventions and to determining who is responsible for the management of the crime scene. In fact, the existence of a “golden hour” associated with the crime scene is reflected in all the subsequent phases of the criminal investigation. Originating in work developed by English police bodies, as some of our interviewees reported, it is based on the idea that the first hours of investigation following a crime are crucial to discovering the truth or finding the key to the enigma.

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7 This English expression was used several times by the interviewees.
Consequently, in a specific crime scenario, the faster the police intervene, the greater the chances are of police officers providing an accurate description of what they have found there, making it necessary to intervene as quickly as possible and preserve as much of the scene as possible, keeping it close to the original scene at the time when the crime took place.

The period of judicial inspection which precedes the more technical and specialised criminal investigation work may therefore be considered a crucial phase for solving the “puzzle.” However, it is perhaps the most vulnerable phase in the entire process, since a crime scene is also a “complex, precarious and fragile” site (Braz, 2010: 212) that can easily be destroyed and may be damaged by external factors (weather conditions), human factors (contamination), incorrect procedures, and a lack of appropriate human and material resources, among other elements.

According to the interviewees, the discrepancies between the different OPCs, whether in terms of human resources or their level of specialisation and training, are well known, and different kinds of knowledge and practices amongst the police forces intervening in crime scenes are also evident. As one interviewee stated, weakness in the training of members of other police forces may compromise the success of criminal investigation work:

Some members of other police forces are not very aware of what has to be done. So, until the Policia Judiciária arrive on the scene what happens is that the other police have to preserve the area. They do it much better and more thoroughly now than they used to a few years ago! There’s no comparison! But even so, maybe because they’ve been poorly trained [...] despite good intentions, it’s not done properly [...]. And this is one of the difficulties we face.

As previously stated, the police officers who arrive first at the crime scene – usually the GNR or PSP – are responsible for carrying out the initial investigations, later assisted by the specialist police forces. On the basis of the information which these first actors communicate to the other entities, the crime can be classified, and according to this classification, the following can be decided: Who is responsible for managing the crime scene? Who coordinates the operations? Who directs them? Who authorises the actions to be taken? What type of intervention and technical instruments are required? Which operational agents should be dispatched to the scene? Who carries out the work?

8 As stated in Article 171.4 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, “If the judicial authority or appropriate criminal police body is not present at the scene, it is the responsibility of any law enforcement officer to provisionally carry out the measures referred to in Point 2 if the obtaining of evidence is otherwise threatened” (cf. Castelo & Pereira, 2007).
According to one of the interviewees, the ambiguities in the law and the difficulties in producing a correct classification of the crime in the field, which would enable decisions to be made on responsibilities for managing the investigation, create difficulties in operationalizing police work and, in his words, “we can still see that a lot of things are made impossible because of bad management of the [crime] scene.” The same interviewee added that it is sometimes difficult to define who is responsible for collecting samples in a given context: “[W]hen a crime occurs at a certain location, anything that has to do with a place, with an event, the first problem to sort out is knowing which police body is responsible for dealing with it.” He went on to emphasise the conflicts which these grey areas create in terms of fieldwork:

Sometimes there are battles over responsibilities [...] and sometimes the reason why things happen and the perception of why [the police forces] failed in the field [...] is not fully explored. For example, the question of stolen vehicles: without question, this is the responsibility of the GNR, but very often the vehicle becomes the responsibility of the PJ [...] when it’s a matter of vehicle trafficking and falsification. [...] The crimes that take place [that are the responsibility of the PJ] don’t always come clearly labelled...

One factor that may create additional contingencies for criminal investigation concerns precisely the fact that initially it is not always possible to identify the type of crime in question.

The same interviewee also adds that, in his opinion, the “other police” do not have the specialist technical training or material resources to package the material gathered from crime scenes or, even if they do, they frequently misuse this material.

[...] nowadays the rule for correct packaging stipulates a set of sample bags for each of the items depending on type and size, following two principles [...] first, anything organic is put in [...] a paper bag and anything volatile in a hermetically sealed bag. In practice, we sometimes get exactly the opposite!

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9 Article 9 of Law 49/2008 states that “if two or more criminal police bodies consider that they are not qualified for investigating the same crime, the conflict shall be decided by the appropriate judicial authority at each stage of the process.”

10 Article 2.4 of Law 49/2008 stipulates that “the criminal police bodies work on the case under, and are functionally dependent on, the appropriate judicial authority, without prejudice of the judicial organisation in question.” However, Article 8.1 states that the Public Prosecutor may allocate “the investigation of a crime [...] to another criminal police body provided that it is, in concrete terms, more suited to carrying out the work and specifically when: [...] d) The investigation does not require particular mobility or highly specialised technical resources.”

11 Article 7 of Law 49/2008 on the competences of the Policia Judiciária in criminal investigation lists the crimes that are their responsibility.
Another important issue related to the stance to be adopted by the “other” OPCs involved in the judicial investigation should also be emphasised. Their involvement in the scene may be more dynamic or more static, depending on the judgement of those actually present in the field to make this decision. A dynamic attitude on the part of the OPCs who assist in crime investigations presupposes that they limit themselves to the protective measures that are strictly necessary to preserve the original crime scene, and this is also valid for the members of the *Polícia Judiciária* who arrive at the crime scene whilst awaiting officers with more specific technical skills. However, the simple fact that they have to carry out the initial measures stipulated by law may, in itself, given the constraints in terms of training and the technical and human resources available, lead to poorly executed procedures. One of the ways of minimising potential errors is therefore to adopt a static position:

The first thing to do at the crime scene is to put your hands in your pockets! Because we all have a tendency to touch things, to see, and so the first response is to use your eyes and look, make this the first step, understand what is going on [...].

Therefore, according to the interviewee, if a static attitude presupposes immediately safeguarding traces to prevent any risk of any important traces – usually the preserve of the “other” criminal police forces (the GNR or PSP) – becoming damaged or spoiled, the truth is that this may mean that those that should have been collected immediately may be lost. Thus, officers with little training who opt for a dynamic attitude will fulfil their duty of safeguarding the crime scene and the traces left there. However, since this is carried out by officers who, in general, have neither the appropriate qualifications to do the work properly nor the necessary resources to ensure proper collection, it may irremediably ruin the evidence left by criminals.

When these local officers arrive at the crime scene, aware that they are not empowered to act and that they should wait for qualified personnel and resources, they may be contributing towards ensuring that important traces are damaged by third parties by not being collected in good time, i.e. within the “golden hour” that applies to all crime scenes. As one of the interviewees stated, the importance of acting in good time does not only concern the need for traces to be collected as quickly as possible to prevent any subsequent contamination, but also ensuring that all the important traces are collected at the time,
avoiding the need to return to the scene to collect new samples which will probably not be in the same condition as the others.

[...] the English call this the “golden hour,” the need to get to work as soon as the crime is reported, not only to collect traces but to get the perpetrator, because he could be escaping, etc., etc., and so we work ... when a crime is reported ... at 300 – not 200 – at 300 or 400 an hour! In these circumstances, naturally, mistakes can be made because something or other gets forgotten. Then, naturally, it’s up to the team management to take responsibility, right?

Whether one or another of these attitudes is adopted, there is, in fact, always a risk. Consequently, one way of minimising this is to make a detailed record of all the steps taken by individuals approaching the crime scene, i.e. “noting entrances and exits in the assessment of the crime scene [...], because we [police/technicians] also leave footprints when we enter.” This situation becomes one of the contingencies of the crime scene which is practically impossible to avoid unless, as one of the interviewees stated, the agent acts like “a dummy with a fishing rod,” conveying the idea that only being suspended above the crime scene would minimise the possibility of technical staff contaminating the area, namely by leaving footprints.

[...] there are no fishing rods but he [the police officer]¹² has to arrive and cause as little damage as possible to the scene he has to observe. But if he needs to go somewhere where he has to lean on a door to get in or open up a room, he has to record this afterwards! He has to say that the position of that door changed because of my entry, not because the offender escaped or any other individual came in.

Another obstacle to successful criminal investigation work concerns the restrictive nature of the legislation that regulates the creation and operations of the DNA database in Portugal. As one of the interviewees said, the law was, above all, a political solution for avoiding conflicts between different interests (forensic experts, the police and human rights activists), indicating that one of its major weaknesses is the fact that the inclusion of profiles is dependent on a decision made by a judge:

I hear complaints from all sides. [...] In the end, it’s a bad law [...] you can’t leave it up to a judge to decide whether a profile should be included or not, you can’t! It should be automatic [...] it’s the judgement of Solomon, to avoid any friction.

¹² In referring to the police, this interviewee includes any of the forces that deal with the crime scene, whether the PJ, GNR, PSP or even technical staff from the Laboratory of the Criminal Investigation Police (LPC) and the Technical Police Unit (UPT) of the PSP. It may be said that this is a rule which everyone should follow as closely as possible.
Another interviewee referred to the limitations created by the restrictive nature of the DNA database, namely the fact that it is obligatory to eliminate profiles at the end of the case or the maximum limitation period for criminal proceedings stipulated in the Code of Criminal Procedure:

I think that there is this excessive guaranteeism regarding certain issues that are perhaps out of place. Such as the question of retaining profiles [...] criminal records have a very short lifespan nowadays! If we had rules like this for fingerprint [databases], our database would be practically useless!

The need for an efficient DNA database is also stressed in the following extract, in which the interviewee argues that DNA profiles should not be removed from the database and criticises the need for the intervention of a judge for data to be communicated to criminal investigation bodies:

The profiles should be retained indefinitely [in the DNA database]. But the law reflects a political will, and I do think it’s a miracle that we finally have a law [on the DNA database]. But the efficiency of the database is going to be greatly reduced by Article 913 [...] The red tape will be endless.

The interviewees strongly criticised the inefficiency of the DNA database because it made the retrospective use of information that could have been obtained by retaining profiles impossible as a basis for comparison with biological material collected from a crime scene:

A micro-database, a pseudo-database which, in essence, won’t tell me anything more than the fact that the individuals who are in it were criminals [...] What I really want is a database constructed in such a way that it can tell you who someone is from a biological trace found at the crime scene.

These discourses clearly illustrate the tensions created by legislation which, on the one hand, is framed by a legal culture that subordinates the role of the police to judicial authority but, on the other hand, reversed the logic behind the functioning of the DNA database, favouring the power of forensic science. As one of our interviewees stated,

The use of DNA in criminal investigation work has been subordinated to the interests of scientific research. Without denying the merits of research, I would say that it is an unduly lengthy process that is directed more towards scientific discovery. This rationale does not serve the interests of the police and criminal investigation: we have to have responses in good time.

13 Article 19.1 of Law 5/2008, mentioned by the interviewee, establishes the following: a) Data is sent from the INML to the appropriate judge according to the type or stage in the proceedings, and following a duly justified request; b) The judge referred to in the previous point communicates the said data, when considered necessary or upon duly justified request, to the Public Prosecutor’s Office or criminal police bodies, providing a decision by reasoned order.
One of the fundamental premises for the success of a DNA database for purposes of criminal investigation is the possibility of increasing the amount of information gathered by extending the criteria for the inclusion of profiles and their non-removal (McCartney, 2006: 55-57). The genetic suspect referred to earlier derives from the retrospective use of genetic information, and features as a pillar of biolegality and the forensic imaginary. In the light of these interviews, it may be said that the main elements in the political message of the efficiency and infallibility of DNA technology in identifying criminals and combating and deterring crime would appear to be compromised.

**Conclusion**

The models for criminal investigation police work and the use of DNA technology to identify individuals that prevail in the collective imaginary – both in government discourse and in the cultural messages conveyed by the media – reproduce, with a greater or lesser degree of truth, criminal investigation practices in countries such as England or the USA that are based on the following: (1) the existence of very extensive DNA databases and broad police powers with regard to the collection and analysis of genetic information; (2) material and scientific resources which provide materials and technical guidelines for the collection of material from crime scenes in accordance with scientific procedures that do not compromise the chain of custody; (3) organisational cultures that clearly establish the principles, routines and practical actions relating to criminal investigation procedures, through which the materials destined for laboratory work and the results of scientific analysis subjected to peer scrutiny and auditing are produced (Williams and Johnson, 2008: 6-7).

The interviews reveal the position of the *Polícia Judiciária* within the sociotechnical network created by the uses of DNA technology in criminal investigation. The results show how this network involves heterogeneous elements, social actors who occupy different positions in social relationships involving power and the legitimation of expert knowledge. Actors invested with different capacities to use genetic information in criminal investigation are confronted, on the one hand, with the symbolic subordination of law to forensic science, which appears to characterise the regulatory culture of Portuguese society (Santos, 2002) and, on the other hand, the hierarchical and operational subordination of the police to the judicial authority assisted by forensic science (Machado, 2011).
As concluded by Costa (2003), there are tensions between laboratory work involving the analysis of materials collected from crime scenes, which seeks to harmonise with international forensic science procedures, and specific local features produced by the Portuguese legal system. At the same time, criminal investigation work supported by DNA technology appears to clearly illustrate the variety of ways of incorporating science and technology derived from specific national and local features. The contingencies associated with criminal investigation in Portugal reveal a complex interconnection of knowledge and practices, particularities of the legislation that not only regulate the organisation of police work but also the creation and use of a DNA database for criminal identification. They are indicative of an investment in the globalisation and harmonisation of procedures based on the experiences of other countries, but nevertheless grounded in a legal, professional and criminological culture with national and local features and particularities.

In short, the reality of criminal investigation work in Portugal appears far removed from the models of biolegality and the forensic imaginary projected by countries that already have wide-ranging experience of using DNA technology for three reasons: (1) the lack of technical and scientific training for the PSP and GNR and of material resources to enable these police forces to collect traces efficiently from crime scenes; (2) the ambiguity of the law and the difficulties involved in applying it practically in terms of clearly defining responsibilities for criminal investigation work; (3) legal restrictions on using and accessing information stored in the DNA database supervised by the INML, and the lack of operationality of this type of instrument to support criminal investigation work.

In addition to these factors, which explain the discrepancy between the Portuguese situation and the model of biolegality and the forensic imaginary originating in countries that have routinely used DNA technology for decades, there are also considerable differences in terms of the functioning of the courts. The incorporation of DNA technology into criminal investigation practices originated in the adversarial justice system, for example the American or English system, whereas the Portuguese system is based on an inquisitorial regime. In adversarial systems, the trial is the occasion for a confrontation between the representatives of the state and the accused, in which the presentation and discussion of the evidence is liable to be publicly deconstructed in court. This enables the soundness of the evidence to be tested or, conversely, its weaknesses, any technical doubts, or even the possibility of a breakdown in the chain of custody. Therefore the adversarial process may be characterised
by attempts to discredit evidence submitted by the other party and by the triumph of one of the versions presented to the court and jury (Cooper, 2004). It is precisely this “regime of scepticism” aimed at deconstructing scientific evidence that can be seen in the adversarial system (Toom, 2010: 176) which enables the defence and the prosecution to confront each other, or even the discourse of the expert(s) (Jasanoff, 2006). The role of the judge in the adversarial process is that of a passive and impartial arbitrator who is responsible for defining the rules of the trial and the admissibility of the evidence that is presented. The judge does not conduct the inquiry or prescribe measures for collecting evidence, and the parties present autonomous arguments based on different versions of the facts.

In contrast, in inquisitorial legal systems, as is the case in Portugal and most countries in Western Europe, the judge plays an active role as a ‘fact finder’, and rulings are based on judicial inquiry and the search for the ‘truth’. In countries such as Portugal, the Public Prosecutor bears the burden of proof and, even though the defence may request counterproof and additional expert opinions, these have to be accepted by the judge. These characteristics of the Portuguese justice system mean that the practice of admitting counterproof in courts is rare (Costa, 2003; Costa et al., 2003) and may have two different consequences: less use of DNA evidence in trials in Portugal (Machado and Prainsack, 2012: ch. 3), and the creation of a scenario which favours perception of this technology as a “truth machine” (Lynch et al., 2008) which is not contested due to the abovementioned restrictions on the admission and assessment of counterproof.

Finally, it should be stated that popular representations of criminal investigation and the justice system are frequently based on a comparison between real-life cases and the imaginary projected by fictional representatives of the police, in which the use of sophisticated technology, scientific methods and brilliant deductions can solve the most complicated cases speedily and without error (Machado and Santos, 2012). As we have seen, the narratives of fictional criminal investigation series, specifically the television series Crime Scene Investigation (CSI), may create a disproportionate belief in the efficiency of criminal investigation work supported by DNA identification technologies. In this sense, the creation of unrealistic expectations may lead to an increase in negative assessments of the work of the Portuguese police amongst the general public in Portugal, and thus reduce confidence in the criminal justice system (Machado and Santos, 2012). In fact, real-life criminal cases widely covered by the media in Portugal that remain unsolved – of which the case of the
disappearance of Madeleine McCann is a prime example – may reinforce images of the inefficiency of the Portuguese police that also coincide with negative representations of the justice system in Portugal, which is seen as slow, inefficient and discriminatory.

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Heritage, Tourism and Emotion*

The present paper starts with a discussion of the relationship between heritage and tradition and proceeds to address the complex process of assigning meaning to heritage and to objects, places and sociocultural practices. In this context, tourism presents itself as a powerful means of enhancing the emotional significance of such objects, places and social practices. The current pursuit of emotional experiences plays a key role not just in the development of memory tourism, but also in dark tourism and reality tourism. The different ways in which those experiences are perceived are seen here as modes of social dispute over meanings. Today’s emphasis on the psycho-emotional aspects of the tourist experience suggests the possibility of a sharp worldwide increase in tourist supply of a strong emotional kind.

Keywords: places; memories; objects; heritage; sociocultural practices; tourism – psycho-emotional aspects.

Introduction

These are times of constant threats and risks, when any attempt to describe the world has proved to be a truly complex task. We no longer have at our disposal the solid political, cultural and ideological referents that used to frame our analysis and interpretation of the world just a few decades ago. In this regard, the year of the fall of the Berlin Wall, 1989, stands as a watershed. The fall was accompanied by the collapse of the political and ideological beliefs underlying many a bold description and classification of the world and by the spread of the seeds of neoliberalism, which at once naturalizes and enfeebles today’s political and academic debate.

In this context, the debate on heritage and tourism continues to be quite relevant, but it takes on new contours that need to be considered. An examination of the relations between these two cultural areas will allow us to put into proper perspective not only the ways in which they feed each other, but also the ways in which they influence behaviors and beliefs regarding society in general.

With respect to the way in which heritage relates to tourism and society, I would like to begin by submitting a premise that is fairly disseminated these days, and according to which the actions aimed at heritage conservation and protection have no direct relationship to the notion that human beings are possessed of an unflagging desire to preserve and maintain

* Article published in RCCS 97 (June 2012).
their traditions and ways of life. I do grant that passing on one’s cultural tradition to future generations is a political and cultural imperative of humankind, but it is also my contention that the argument for heritage conservation and protection has its own institutional autonomy and should not be confused with preserving the sociocultural traditions of communities and nations.¹

**Heritage and tradition**

What does it mean to say that to preserve one’s heritage is not the same as to preserve cultural tradition?

The difference between the two resides, first of all, in the fact that tradition, viewed as the cultural reproduction of behavioral patterns and ways of thinking and doing, manifests itself at every instant in our social practices, evincing a vibrancy and dynamism that lend it a concrete, constantly renewed and almost plastic quality while also reinforcing a reassuring sense of proximity to one’s social past. In contradistinction to tradition’s sense of proximity between past and present, the institutional practice associated with heritage conservation calls, first and foremost, for the establishment of a historical distance by means of which the objects, places or social practices can be seen as documents of a more or less remote past. The establishment of such a temporal distance is crucial for heritage itself to be named and endowed with meaning. In fact, in that very distance resides the patrimonializing, or heritage-instituting, act, here understood as the ability of political institutions to define what the historical and cultural heritage is / is not, and thereby stipulate what should / should not be the object of protection or conservation, which is to say, of formal and broad social recognition.

Typically the heritage-instituting act has to do with the formal recognition of certain objects, places or sociocultural practices that happen to be (re)invested with historical meaning, even if they are devoid of any link to present collective life or to their past functions and meanings. This process, which I have termed the “detraditionalization of tradition” (Fortuna, 1997), entails an acknowledgement of the ontological autonomy of the patrimonialized goods. In other words, if the patrimonialized objects, places or sociocultural

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¹ In fact, according to Neil Silberman, today’s excessive emphasis on heritage preservation, caused in part by the modern tourism industry, is prone to lead to a parody of nations and communities, given the elaborate efforts to suit them to the goals of contemporary mass tourism (Silberman, 1996).
practices cease to be significantly linked to the subjects’ actual everyday existence, they *ipso facto* start to be viewed as an end in themselves. They may then, by virtue of the temporal distance underpinning their being recognized as heritage, present themselves as disconnected from their immediate reality and the lived present, as well as severed from the specific social uses they may have once had.

This allows for a clarification of the distinction between the cultural, material and symbolic aspects that make up what we call tradition. The most trivial of social acts, the casual use of certain instruments or, by the same token, the prosaic use of language and the familiar ways in which we go about things, are all constitutive elements of tradition and are, therefore, carried out as part of our habits, without recourse to mental or practical protocols. Ordinary use, in such instances, is the most basic practical means for the preservation of tradition, and therefore quite distinct from the conceptual elaboration and the selection that preside over the definition of heritage.

This is not to say that social life can follow its normal course without the presence of heritage. Today’s patrimonialist strategies seek to ground their action exclusively on the preservation of endangered resources, both material and cultural. But we can see through such fallacious rhetoric. These are times of blatant inflation as far as heritage is concerned, where patrimonialization (i.e., the process of transforming places, traditions, and artifacts into heritage to be protected and exhibited) is also at the service of the market and of tourism. Heritage inflation has its limitations in terms of efficacy. Hence Henri-Pierre Jeudy’s legitimate question as to whether future action aimed at heritage protection will not reside in unavoidable, selective destruction or in the declassification of some of the goods that now have heritage status (Jeudy, 2008).

The objects, places and sociocultural practices with heritage status are invested with historical and cultural meanings that highlight mnemonic, aesthetic or technical-scientific traits and values which transcend the original meaning and value directly associated with their past practical usefulness. The question at hand – to stay with the above notion regarding our turbulent times and the difficulties of classification resulting from the collapse of the old epistemological and theoretical certainties – is to ascertain the current meaning of heritage and who is to define it.

I will here avail myself of the classic interpreter of “the modern cult of monuments,” Austrian author Alois Riegl (1858-1905), who held that the meaning of monuments does not
lie in what such works may have been or stood for, nor in the use they once may have been put to, not to mention the fact that oftentimes they no longer bear any connection to their original purpose. On the contrary, the attribution, in the present, of value and meaning to those goods and resources, according to Riegl (1984), is mainly the responsibility of modern subjects. As such, we ourselves update the meaning of heritage in accordance with our own value systems, and in this way we transfer a variety of operative meanings onto a number of objects, places and sociocultural practices from a more or less remote past, which in turn update the present they seek to be in harmony with (Choay, 1999).

This constitutes extraordinary food for thought. Still, Riegl’s definition of patrimonial value leaves open the following question: Ultimately, what is the real source of the value and meaning of heritage in general? The main difficulty in this regard is to identify the agents that actually produce the patrimonial meaning inscribed in the classified goods. And here we are faced with a wide range of possibilities. The attribution of meaning is a task many social players can engage in. On one hand, it may be seen as a specialized skill possessed by experts – academics, scientists, technicians – or by agents closely associated with the heritage market, such as entrepreneurs, promoters, journalists, or tourism operators. On the other hand, the classification of, and attribution of meaning to, heritage may be the result of the practice of tourism itself – for tourists, as the immediate recipients and consumers of heritage, are not exempt from freely assigning unique attributes and meanings to the objects, places or practices which they consume – just as it may also be the work of citizens, associations and movements of a civic, political or social nature.

The attribution of value is closely linked to the specific nature of the heritage items in question. In the case of symbolic events and historical celebrations, for instance, value is typically attributed solely by experts. When it comes to the historical value of a given work or place, however, value may be the “consensual” outcome of informal acts of both negotiation and confrontation between experts and the public at large. This is the case, for example, with numerous attributions of patrimonial value at the local or municipal level, where recognition derives from participatory initiatives promoted within the community.

In other instances, namely in situations that are not institutionally covered, the attribution of meaning falls on the direct recipients, such as tourists with no link to the contextual reality. This is the case with remnants of the cultural past that tend to draw meaning from the mere fact that they are thought to be exemplars of an alleged distant
past. It should be added that on occasion the meaning of heritage is the object of differing interpretations by the technical experts and the tourist consumers. Thus, while the former tend to assess situations according to elitist criteria that lay claim to universality, the latter often tend to spontaneously value material and immaterial popular culture expressions of what they deem to be historically relevant to a particular community. There is virtually no dialogue between these two approaches, apart from the mediation resulting from the occasional meetings, conferences or texts devoted to the study of the reasons for this technical and ideological clash and the way in which it occurs.

Tourism and emotion

Saying that there is no actual dialogue among the different views on the meaning of heritage is not the same as saying that the definition of what cultural heritage is cannot be understood as the outcome of a process whereby disputed meanings are negotiated. That is why even the abstract, well established values commonly attributed to historical heritage – *e.g.* antiquity, authenticity, rarity or beauty – are likely to have their meaning altered whenever the emotional, social or political inclination of the recipients is added to the more pragmatic criteria of the experts. In fact, there is nowadays an obvious emphasis on the practical effects of emotion (or collective emotion) that is associated, for instance, with the drama and sublimity bestowed on a heritage object or asset on account of its aesthetic uniqueness or historical rarity. The concept of emotion I am using here is clearly indebted to the concept formulated by neuroscientist António Damásio (2003), which refers to the way in which the body responds to outside stimuli as they are processed by the brain. This process can be of a more or less conscious nature, and so when I speak of emotion I mean an autonomous reaction on the part of the body, of which the individual may not be aware. This particular sense of the term – somewhat close to the notion of feeling and affect – has gained wide currency in the social sciences.

Thus we can assume, with David Lowenthal (1975: 52-67), that emotion can be intimately linked to that feeling of a shared past that the *antiquity* of things and places has the potential to stir in every individual. It is a most singular sensation, stemming from our being able to visit, witness or even touch the vestiges, perhaps unique ones, of a more or less

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2 The present paper does not address the causes of this phenomenon. Instead, it dwells more fully on its effects.
significant cultural or architectural past. The antiquity of heritage fosters a feeling of closeness to a(n) (imagined?) community marked by a well-balanced coexistence of technology, art, culture and nature, a feeling that proves both reassuring and moving when compared to our messy present. On the other hand, however, the sight of vestiges of the past is also conducive to a feeling of being in the presence of something truly original or whose rarity strikes us as absolutely exceptional and therefore highly appreciated in today’s repetitive, copycat consumer culture. The perception of the past in terms of continuity and sequence is the kind of feeling that heritage allows us to experience, as it conveys an impression of cumulativeness that amounts to a cultural process in which we engage both as inheritors and bequeathers at once. This dual condition extends to the notion of finality, which is also a hallmark of heritage and often read as a sign of personal or civilizational stability, since it tends to be recognized as the ability to see a project through its full completion – as opposed to the feeling of guilt over an unfinished work, in itself a sign of present disorder and of a compromised, ever-postponed future.

The above attributes of historical heritage and of monuments in particular can be expanded to other aspects that affect the psycho-emotional conditions of reception by visitors and tourists alike. Natalie Heinich emphasizes the way in which authenticity triggers an emotion centered on aspects related to the monument’s origin and current condition (Heinich, 2009: 66-67). By the same token, one is likely to feel moved by the simple presence of an edifice or by the memory of some famous personage who happened to live, work, or die there, or who, more prosaically even, made use of some artifact, no matter how trivial. And then there is also the beauty of monuments, which is prone to prompt an aesthetic selection of their most salient representative elements (ibid.: 244). This, in my view, is a dramatic and emotional aspect seldom taken into account in the appraisal of the patrimonial value and the meaning attributed to objects, places, or practices of the past.

The above digression on the attributes of patrimonialized goods of the past allows us to understand the potential for psychological stimulation inherent in the reception or tourist consumption of historical heritage. Notwithstanding the argument – going as far back as

3 The German philosopher and sociologist Georg Simmel offered an original approach to this topic in his 1911 paper on “the ruin” and the tension between culture and nature. According to Simmel, there emanates from the age-old ruin a feeling of peace and gravity having to do with the telluric demise of human works (culture) under nature’s power (the collapse of buildings) and the establishment of a new balance of factors (Simmel, 1959). We shall come back to the theme of emotion set off by the contemplation of ruins.
Walter Benjamin’s reflections on the problem of the work of art in the age of mechanical reproduction (Benjamin, 1968) – that the massive use of information and communication technologies (as illustrated by modern tourism) to replicate the images of and references to the salient elements of our built or natural heritage is bound to diminish the emotional impact felt by individuals, the fact is that such technologies tend to enhance, rather than diminish, the level of personal gratification and emotivity caused by close contact with the patrimonialized object.

As I have observed elsewhere in this regard (Fortuna 1999: 32), in 1896 Pierre de Coubertin, the founding father of the modern Olympics, recorded in his journal the “overwhelming sensations” elicited in him by the ruins of Olympia:

I kept watch for sunrise, and as soon as its first rays had crossed the valley, I rushed toward the ruins. [...] It was a moral architecture I was going to gather lessons from, and it magnified every dimension. My meditation lasted all morning. [...] All morning long I wandered in the ruins. (Coubertain, apud Rojek, 1993: 113)

As described by Coubertin, the ruins’ peculiar power to make visitors feel as if the present has been suspended and to embark on a sort of reverie, derives from the direct, combined psychological effect that the attributes of the historical and monumental heritage – antiquity, rarity, continuity, sequence, finality, authenticity and beauty – may have on art recipients in general and tourists in particular. Standing before the ruins, the man behind the modern Olympic Games is also clearly possessed of that melancholy feeling that is typical of the romantic vision of artists, writers and poets, and of which Christopher Woodward (2002) gives such a compelling account.

To be accurate, it should be added that, according to Walter Benjamin, the state of heightened concentration with which individuals perceive artistic or architectural objects, whether in a tourism-related or any other context, can result in the observing subjects being absorbed by the objects, as opposed to the state of distracted perception in which it is the objects that get to be absorbed by the subjects (Benjamin, 1968: 239). The subjects’ emotional response is produced, not by their immediate experience, but rather by their interpretation of the particular circumstances of that experience. Furthermore, the emotion experienced by individuals at a given moment in time depends on their degree of belonging and identification with the surrounding culturescape. In other words, emotions are but the specific ways in which individuals are connected to their respective communities, and their
significance grows in proportion to the individuals’ sense of collective participation in those communities (Le Breton, 2009: 126).

As to the above-mentioned idea of emotion as sentiment, it partakes of the whole notion of bodily changes caused in a more or less autonomous way by all sorts of inner drives and external stimuli. Here we enter the realm of unconscious dimensions, corresponding to feelings eliciting from the body physiological responses that are neither immediate nor linear. This means that the response of individuals to the same stimulus may not only vary but be actually determined by other aspects, such as the recollection or knowledge of responses experienced by others. As already pointed out, the feeling of heightened enjoyment and total evasion derived by Pierre de Coubertin from his close contact with the ruins of Olympia requires a certain degree of identification with others with whom the symbolic meaning of the place can be shared. Under similar circumstances, the contemplation of such alluring, entrancing places as those described by Coubertin may ultimately generate the feeling of “loss of a sense of reality” and even lead to the psycho-emotional imbalance conventionally termed the “Stendhal syndrome.” This is a pathological, non-conscious condition, a psychic disturbance involving dizziness, tachycardia and hallucinations. It is a result of the intense excitement caused by an individual’s reaction to the beauty and perfection of the objects or places s/he comes face to face with (Magherini, 1989), a feeling which is culturally shared with those who – as is the case with Stendhal – manifest a profound sense of romantic evasion.

This state of affairs should be acknowledged both as a central ingredient in any strategy aimed at promoting historic and monumental tourism, and as a feature of heritage politics in general. In view of the current inflationary trend in the conservation of objects, places and sociocultural traditions – which seems to intensify in times of economic and social crisis – the use of heritage seems to support Jean Baudrillard’s claim with regard to consumer culture: it is the so-called traditional objects, places and sociocultural practices that conserve us, not the other way around.

Nowadays, the relationship of heritage with the past is intimately linked to the whole debate on the place of memory in contemporary society, and the way in which this fact relates to the tourism industry is, in itself, proof of the key role played by history and culture in certain types of modern tourism. We now live literally immersed in and seduced by collective memory, its objectification and its narrative. Many contemporary tourist cities
owe their importance as popular visiting sites in a highly competitive international market precisely to the way in which they value and invest in their own past (Sturken, 2007).

The city of Berlin is a clear illustration of this powerful relationship between tourism, heritage, and a memory of the city based on an impressive historical narrative of its past. In fact, tourism is the driving force and the main beneficiary of this new industry, which is not just urban and cultural but also heritage-related. It is worth remembering, however, that as early as the 1920s Robert Musil, who was to become famous for his novel The Man Without Qualities, exposed the paradoxical invisibility of Berlin’s public monuments. Musil’s critique was intended to proclaim that our ignorance about ancient monuments, their true history, the identity of their occupants and the nature of the ceremonials for which they once offered a setting creates a feeling of indifference in striking contrast to what I have just said about their power to move and stir us. This indifference, often shared in equal parts by tourists and local residents, causes buildings, monuments and heritage in general to be regarded with as much detachment as if they were not there at all. Paradoxically, according to Musil the monument’s mental invisibility is intensified as at every instant, on either side of the street, other monuments and works of incalculable architectural value stand before our absent-minded eyes and total lack of information. The message here concerns the need to be taught on the history and heritage of cities. Without such an education collective memory seems to cease to exist, which in turn has negative repercussions on tourist potential at the local level, as the industry professionals know only too well.

There is no denying the topicality of the relationship between tourism, education and memory. On the one hand, we can consider the fact a vast number of heritage policies these days promotes a virtual race to the landmarks of local history and local memory. On the other hand, we should reflect on the role of the artistic strategy adopted by Javacheff Christo and Jeanne Claude, when they shroud – thereby rendering invisible – unique natural and architectural sites. Is this a paradoxical way of showing by hiding? We may well agree with that, considering how visitors and tourists flocked by the thousands to admire the two

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4 A recent study on the city of Coimbra tested this hypothesis of the close relationship between tourism and heritage. As it turns out, Coimbra’s tourism strategy hinges primarily on one single historical-patrimonial resource – the University – both with regard to its buildings and to its immaterial heritage. That was, in fact, the basis of the University’s recent application to be inscribed in UNESCO’s World Heritage List, which only shows the failure to enhance other elements of the local urban-cultural heritage (Fortuna et al., 2012b).
renowned artists’ aesthetics of packaging when, in June 1995, they kept the Berlin Reichstag in wraps for 14 days.\(^5\)

The power of seduction (or emotion) exerted by the monument upon its visitors is threatened by continuous repetition and, most of all, by the lack of information about its real meaning. In the words of the contemporary German philosopher Andreas Huyssen, the feeling is expressed in the paradoxical assertion according to which Berlin is becoming invisible because nothing is less visible than a monument (Huyssen, 2003: 32). In this light, the well-known artistic endeavors by Javacheff Christo and Jeanne Claude are proof of the real meaning of that monumentality which finds in the (temporary) “disappearance” of monuments one of the most unexpected articulations of their value and their narrative.

But let us return to the question of the relationship between heritage and memory. Since memory is mostly materialized in spatial terms, it may be argued that the twentieth century, with its surge of sites devoted to the celebration of collective memory, was characterized by a hypertrophy of memory. We adopted places of memory to record the vanished “atmospheres” that are believed to have once existed in well-delimited territories. Metaphorically, it was as if we focused on the traces of the past in order to preserve the signs of the most significant roots of our identity, which amounts to a symbolic reenactment of territorialized intimacies – i.e., of what we might call “microterritorialities” (Fortuna, 2012a). There are instances in which the kind of tourism that feeds on the memory and monumentality of places seems to be trying to compensate individuals for losing their cultural identity, or to compensate whole peoples for their loss of identity as nations or communities.\(^6\) In other instances, however, it is as if this identity were afraid of being shown, lest it reveal the atrocities and even the horror of our past history. Such cases work as cautionary tales to prevent tragedy from repeating itself. Isn’t this the reason why, for example, Anne Frank’s house has become one of Amsterdam’s main tourist attractions?

\(^5\) John Cage’s famous music piece 4’33”, just as, in the domain of cinema, the film Snow White by Portuguese director João César Monteiro, upend the conventional meaning of artistic performance and take on some traits of the aesthetic and emotional paroxysm reached by art in the creations of J. Christo and J. Claude.

\(^6\) This particular hypothesis shows much of the heuristic potential of the notion of “compensatory space,” proposed by Fredric Jameson (1991) and later developed by Wong Chong Thai (1997) to designate the place where all sorts of subjectivities meet, and which therefore may serve as an alternative to the demarcated space of personal or group interests. As the pursuit of alternative personal spaces and experiences, tourism can be viewed as a means for creating “compensatory” spaces, including in the context of historical-monumental spaces, which, as I have argued elsewhere, fuel the search for the roots of one’s identity (Fortuna, 1999: 23-44).
In fact, tourism as we know it today has become one of the most powerful vehicles of the memory industry and of the abuses and savagery of civilization in particular. Dark tourism – a term often used to refer to this craving for the past history of horror – is clearly on the rise, as it promotes places associated with brutality, terror, suffering and death (Janssen and Lagerkvist, 2009). The same applies to the tourist exploitation of places made notorious by the practice of crimes. The ability of such places to entice the curiosity of visitors goes back to the early nineteenth century, thanks to the efforts of tourist agents and promoters, but also publishers and booksellers. We may ask ourselves why we ended up accepting and encouraging such trivialization of horror and such non-sense, given its inherently paradoxical sense of history. We look on, without protest and hardly any indignation, as these sites are constantly turned into first-rate attractions of contemporary leisure and tourism. With the complacency and actual support of governments, substantial investments from global tourism are devoted to the instrumentalization of such places and the promotion of the narrative of human suffering they evoke. From Nelson Mandela’s prison to the Jewish extermination camps, from New York’s Ground Zero to the hellish work conditions of native American laborers in the colonial mines of Potosi (Bolivia), all these lieux de mémoire (Nora, 1986) have come to be viewed as modes of re-presenting a variety of more or less exotic, if not macabre, ways of “belonging” to a community and partaking in a certain collective “experience.” And this in spite of what such “experiences” represent in terms of cultural loss and affront to democracy and human dignity. The irony of the emotions generated by this sort of “experience” can only be understood within the framework of the tourism system that characterizes today’s post-emotional society and the socio-temperamental barbarism it promotes (Meštrović, 1993).

At stake here is the conversion of these sites of contemporary tourism into Foucauldian heterotopias, that is to say, into places laden with unexpected or unfamiliar meanings (Foucault, 1986), like counter-sites, which convey locally embedded narratives and meanings alongside fanciful descriptions, so that they have a real existence while being out of place.

Besides these tourist offerings of unusual places marked by a past of horror and suffering, we are now also given a steady choice of hallucinating travel experiences that not too long ago were considered mere fantasies of utopian writers. Hence the recent offerings of adventure tourism with their promise of unique sensations, such as those derived from a ten-minute space trip at 4,200 km per hour, or a 2 ½ hours descent into the Mariana Trench in the Pacific Ocean, the deepest point on Earth (11 kms) (Lopes, 2012).
Having said that, I also wish to point out the fact that the current hypertrophy of memory is, to a large extent, fueled by tourism (namely historical and cultural tourism). Indeed, tourism has fostered many narratives about experiences and identities whose meanings are constantly being reinterpreted and often made to fit standardized codes of acceptance. Such acceptance seems to be predicated on the emphasis given to the emotions and ways of being and feeling of modern individuals, rather than on a critique of objective history or on a rejection of historiography as an instrument of ideological domination (Haroche, 2008). Both tourism as a practice and the post-tourist subject (Urry, 1990) resist all objective readings of the past and of history. In truth, they mistrust all fantasies of the future, even though they accept and promote or consume their enactment and seem ready to experience that simulacrum of reality, provided that the emotions thus afforded are powerful and realistic enough.

There is nothing problematic about the fact that it falls on tourism to engender the narrative of our culture’s superimposed, patrimonialized times and places. I can even speculate that we may soon have to adapt ourselves to the touristification of emotion, wherever the possibility arises to forge extreme settings and experiences. I can think, for example, of the likelihood of the use, for tourist purposes, of an experience such as that of the 33 miners who were rescued in the Atacama Desert, in Chile, in October 2010, and shown live on television around the world. In today’s sickly commodified culture, it is not in the least odd to admit that we may be about to witness a tourism marketing campaign exploiting the San José drama and the ironic transformation of the mines into one of those sites that boast a mixture of rejoicing and the memory of horror. One should not be surprised if, in such a scenario, a real or virtual tour were offered in the rescue capsule that descended 700 feet into the mine, accompanied by in vivo and in situ accounts recited to tourists by the miners themselves or their families, with due praise to the human skills and community solidarity evinced there during the dramatic 69-day occurrence. After all, isn’t this one of the latest and most appreciated heritages of humankind? Isn’t it one of the most authentic documents of reality and of tenacious human resilience, witnessed live by millions?
of human beings? Wasn’t it a case of huge collective enthusiasm over the effectiveness and benefits of science and technology placed at the service of the community, and to such a happy outcome? Isn’t this the narrative that today’s society, faced with all kinds of challenges and seemingly insoluble crises, wishes to pass on to the future as both a token and a legacy of past experiences?

To this list of unexpected tourist possibilities one might add the growing importance of tourist experiences in unveiling the geographies of destitution. Slums, townships and *favelas* are at the mercy of the unbridled voyeurism that is being fostered all over the global South these days, as shown by a number of recent studies (Sarmento and Brito-Henriques, 2013). In this respect, the global South is becoming a showcase for the multiple repertoires of everyday precariousness and sheer *survivalism* the poor experience as a way of life. *Touring poverty* – that is perhaps the formula that best encapsulates the perverse encroachment on bits and pieces of the lives of others. In more or less staged and inauthentic fashion, these fragments of lives are promoted and sold in “packages” and on websites of numberless tourist agencies to affluent, prospective visitors and consumers. Their strategy rests on the exploitation and consumption of experiences, which is the new philosophy of international, post-cultural “reality tourism.” *Touring poverty* – an experience that, in the words of Thope Lekau, illustrates how “one man’s destitution is another man’s adventure”9 – eloquently sums up the new tourism and the way in which it is driven by otherness and social difference, rather than by historical or cultural difference. This is a modality of tourist consumption that paradoxically sees poverty as “a generator of wealth” for the benefit of promoting agents and a variety of informal schemes (Sharp, 2009: 94-97). It remains to be seen whether otherness and social difference, now at the mercy of tourism’s inner logic and once they have been turned into commodities for elite consumption, will be able – and if so, how – to create mechanisms for the sociopolitical empowerment and emancipation of both the individuals and the communities now being targeted by this intrusive, tourist “gaze”. On the other hand, given what this experience entails in terms of border-crossing and cultural face-off, we also wonder whether it may not bring with it some momentary pause and allow for the rethinking and recontextualization of a world torn by violent dialogical relations.

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9 Thope Lekau, the owner of an inn located in Khayelitsha, a township in the outskirts of Capetown, is quoted by Bianca Freire-Medeiros, in a paper devoted to the analysis of this modern type of touristic exoticism (Freire-Medeiros, 2010).
What I think should be stressed, to sum up these thoughts on the seduction/emotion generated by monuments and how they relate to memory, whether we speak of dark tourism or touring poverty, is the need to identify cultural heritage as an uneven bargaining arena and a meeting point where a false consensus among socially contested meanings is forged. Emotion, as I have tried to show, is certainly one of the ingredients of that negotiation.

Coda

If, as I mentioned earlier, we now live in a world of manifest political and classificatory uncertainty, it is equally obvious that we should find it very difficult to define what heritage is or isn’t. I even grant that only through democracy will we be able to find the terms of a general consensus on the concepts and players involved in the classification, at once technical and popular, of what constitutes one’s heritage and its political meaning. There is no consensus among the experts to begin with, but then neither do the latter see eye to eye with the public that stands to gain from the protection and enhancement of heritage. I believe that when we speak of a culture of excessive patrimonialization, i.e., of how heritage has been blown out of proportion, or when we expose the slack criteria that allow for the classification of too many items as heritage, the thing being questioned, to a large extent, is precisely this difficulty in establishing socially negotiated criteria, through a democratic, truly open exchange of arguments and full transparency of meanings. When no robust criteria are in place, meanings fail to be negotiated. And this, in turn, has often led to undesirable situations where many monuments and other cultural marks rose to heritage status in the same manner that “art” became “culture” or culture came to be indistinguishable from spectacle.

By way of conclusion I wish to emphasize, with regard to the uneven nature of the criteria used for classifying objects, places and social practices as heritage and their tourist use, the political import of these classificatory exercises, which are also an indication of the uncertain nature of our present.

I find a clear illustration of this in the very evolution of the concept of heritage as a result of the actions and policies aimed at asserting identities and in the emergence of “new” particularistic interests. A case in point is the saga around the uses, by early twentieth century experts in natural history, of the dissected body of a Botswana warrior who died in
1830. After being exhumed and embalmed, the warrior’s body was brought to Paris by two French naturalists, the Verreaux brothers – Jules Edouard and Pierre – who put it on public display until it was sold to Francesc Darder, a Catalan naturalist. Darder included the warrior’s body in the personal collection that was to be the nucleus of the Darder Museum of Natural History, which he himself established in Banyoles, near Barcelona. The African warrior’s body remained on display there from 1916 to 1997, when a decision was finally reached with regard to the complaint presented in 1991 by Alphonse Arcelin, a Haitian physician, who claimed that it was both ethically offensive and morally intolerable to keep the young man’s body on exhibit. The issue rose to international prominence, and in 1997 the town of Banyoles was forced to order the removal of the mummified body, which was later reburied in the warrior’s native soil (Bagué, 2000: 88).

This story serves to prove the changing, disputed meaning of heritage. The dissected body was regarded as heritage as long as the prevailing notions of civilization and science were those legitimizied by the political and scientific practice of colonialism. But in a historical context of globalization and respect for cultural diversity, which is also a context of scientific relativism, the public display of the body in question was reinterpreted as an obscene, racist provocation, thus losing all its previous legitimacy as heritage.

The lesson to be gleaned from this incident is that heritage is always a selection and a choice, its meaning being a value that is attributed through sociocultural negotiation. Therefore it is the result of reflective social action, which may express itself in either a technical or an indirect manner. In its technical manifestation, the attribution of value derives from the judgment of experts and follows academic, technical and scientific principles. When reflectivity expresses itself indirectly, on the other hand, technical and scientific considerations yield to judgments born out of more spontaneous, popular – although no less legitimate – social views.

The various cultural associations, social movements, social platforms and networks devoted to the defense and protection of heritage, which have mushroomed around the world in recent years, are a clear demonstration of the increasing importance of such indirect social reflectivity. No only do they demand that positions be adopted with respect to cultural goods that were previously deemed of marginal technical and scientific value, but they also devote themselves to the certification of the cultural value of those goods. An extremely difficult task, to be sure, for whoever has to deal with classifications and with
meaningful narratives about objects that are displayed in museums, especially in ethnographic museums where the presence of postcolonial narratives makes itself more or less felt (Sharp, 2009: 94-97).

Therefore, and to conclude, for something in a plural society to be regarded as heritage there must exist social subjects from a variety of backgrounds and political-ideological inclinations. Another determining factor is the position those subjects occupy in the social structure, and, not least, the general ability and readiness to both acknowledge and embrace the cultural goods of others – whether other groups, other social times, or those other places with which we share this existence of ours in the troubled world of contemporary culture.

Translated by João Paulo Moreira
Revised by Teresa Tavares

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A Post-Creative City?*

Culturally-led urban redevelopment became the norm throughout Europe during the 1990s. It was rationalized as the idea of a creative city – a city for a new creative class – and characterized by the insertion of new art museums in post-industrial zones, the designation of cultural quarters, and the adoption of city branding strategies based on reductive images of the city as a cultural site. In some cases, local cultures were marginalized; in others, the promised new prosperity did not arrive while the aestheticisation of space led to gentrification. The creative city is not a socially coherent but – in contrast to the modernist city of public well-being – a socially divisive city, in which culture as the arts is privileged over culture as the articulation of shared values in everyday life. The 2008 financial services crisis has interrupted this trajectory, however, providing an opportunity to re-assess the idea of a creative city and the values implicit in it. Alternatives emerge in direct action – notably Occupy in 2011-12 – and activist art. Could there be a post-creative city? Could the creative imagination of diverse urban groups lead to new socio-political as well as cultural formations? That might be another urban revolution.

Keywords: cities; counterculture; creative city; culture industry; urban regeneration.

Context
In the 1980s, the dominant narrative of urban change in Western Europe and North America maintained that culturally-led redevelopment would solve a range of urban problems linked to de-industrialisation. As manufacturing was moved to the global South, unemployment rose in the global North, factories became derelict, and inner-city areas decayed. At the same time, the de-regulation of commerce shifted the balance of economic control from the state, with its responsibility for public benefit, to the market. In this environment, the cultural (or creative) city, based on a cultural economy, began to replace the city of material production and public institutions, in a proliferation of consumer choice and lifestyle consumption. Gradually, new uses were found for old buildings, often as museums or media hubs. Richard Sennett shows in The Corrosion of Character (1998) that the creativity of the new economy included new, flexible and insecure employment patterns. The lower paid were de-skilled but a new elite of creative problem solvers emerged in the cultural, media, and financial services sectors. These creative types fed new streams of consumerism related to but extending beyond the arts, for instance in designer-bars, designer-labels and designer-lifestyles. As they bought into the self-images purveyed by branded goods and

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services, the creative class was seen as a force for urban change. On the urban periphery little changed. It was an inverted urban revolution, as the rich rose up to expel the poor to the social, cultural and economic margins.

Culturally-led urban strategies relied largely on selective images of cities rather than on the breadth of experiences and sensory perceptions which would reflect a socially and ethnically diverse urbanism. The model of a cultural city spread from Western to Eastern Europe after the dismantling of the Berlin Wall in 1989, and is now commonplace in Asia, Australasia and Latin America as well. The cultural city is promoted as a vibrant city where new economic sectors such as media, communications and financial services replace manufacturing, and can also regenerate a city’s spirit. Of course, the spirit of a city is in the mind of the image consultant, but its promotion is intended to attract young professionals with relatively high spending power, who can contribute to economic renewal. The difficulty is that while cultural strategies are said to regenerate inner-city and de-industrialised zones, they are not driven by concern for civic renewal, which implies public benefit, but by economic and commercial motives (higher land values, and so forth), meeting the desires of a new elite. Under the surface, the cultural city is a city of property development, benefiting from de-regulation and a reduction in the scale and scope for state intervention in the city’s image.

As a result, a city’s future shaping is increasingly in the hands of the private sector, or public-private partnerships within a market ethos. Meanwhile, cities compete for investment and cultural tourism as semi-privatised city-states. Branding is key to the process, mapped from product promotion to city promotion and trading on the rapid visual transformations which high-profile arts projects provide. De-industrialised areas are cleared, and city managements encourage an idea of their city as a creative hub or centre of technological innovation, so that their city is an attractive base for the creative class. That class, in turn, colours the images for external perception on which a city’s growth is based, privileging newness and modernization – now a by-word for economic rationalization – over social cohesion or justice. Culture lends the venture a respectable veneer because, in classical and neo-classical thought, culture is attributed universal value: to be cultured is to be civilized. The art collector can pretend to be a Renaissance prince, living in a gated compound and working in a gleaming steel-and-glass corporate fortification, seeing the urban landscape only through the car windscreen.
Two models
Two related but distinct models of culturally-led urban regeneration emerged in the 1990s. In North America, Richard Florida asserted the role of the creative class in driving new urban economies, citing the previous growth of a meritocracy in the sciences and identification of an urban managerial class. Members of the creative class work in sectors ranging from the arts, design and the media to communications, advertising, public relations and financial services. They have the money capital to support lifestyle consumption, and gain cultural capital by visiting art galleries, becoming museum members, and collecting contemporary art. As it happens, trading in new art is like trading in derivatives: speculative but potentially bringing a high return if sufficient confidence is conjured in the market. And creative types move into renovated inner-city districts, driving gentrification (Smith, 1996). Florida sees the creative class as internally diverse, however, including not only media professionals and fashion designers but also, citing Paul Fussell, those attracted to cities for creative experiences, and to the new economy because its patterns of organization are non-hierarchic. This seems to update early-twentieth-century ideas of cities as where ties of family and land were broken, and contracts made from common interests (Tonnies, 1955); but the difference is that, for Florida, the creative class not only find common leisure pursuits but are also instrumental in driving urban growth (whereas workers drawn to manufacturing contributed to but did not drive wealth creation). It is easy to see this when a new art museum is surrounded by new outlets for designer clothes, food and drink. In the metropolis of the 1860s to 1910s, cafés were meeting places for artists, writers and critics, and department stores offered middle-class wives an escape from domestic isolation in suburban villas. That was liberating. But the emphasis in the creative city is on the culture of consumerism, in which identities can be constructed through elite consumption. Art museum previews and events offer one site for the display of creative status, but the rise of a new class of collectors among professionals in financial services and media sectors, for instance, is more influential in shaping the future of a post-industrial city.

Florida defines the creative class, then, as “people [who] engage in creative problem solving, drawing on complex bodies of knowledge to solve specific problems” (2004: 69).

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They are educated and self-managed, and able to work in teams, or semi-autonomous cells, within a corporate setting. In contrast, and as if to normalize a social division, Florida defines a growing service class of low-skilled, low-paid operatives and care workers, who are not at all self-managing but keep the creative city running by looking after the invisible requirements of the creative class. Many are recent migrants. For Florida, this class “has been created out of economic necessity” (2004: 71) – which de-politicises the issue in keeping with the ethos of neoliberalism.

The other model, advocated by UK-based arts consultant Charles Landry – in The Creative City – gives more emphasis to arts projects than to arts professionals, following a trend among arts managers to talk up their sector as able to solve unemployment, crime or dereliction. But Landry combines this with a loose version of Florida’s approach, when he asserts (from visits to several European cities),

Successful cities seemed to have some things in common – visionary individuals, creative organizations and a political culture sharing a clarity of purpose. They seemed to follow a determined, not a deterministic path. Leadership was widespread, permeating public, private and voluntary sectors. It expressed itself in courageous public initiatives and often risky business investments, and in a tissue of interconnected projects whether for profit or the public good. (2000: 3)

Unlike Florida, Landry gives credit to the voluntary sector; but he also aligns public good and private interest in what he calls courageous initiatives. I suggest this masks a growth in public subsidies for private gains, as when flagship cultural initiatives (with public or lottery funds) drive gentrification.

Permeating his approach, however, Landry seems to retain a European sense of culture as a good thing, so that new art museums indicate a broad, undefined feeling of renewal. I think Landry is poised between culture for itself and the arts as a utility (a means to other ends). There is a danger here of conflating high culture and the culture (in a social science sense) of everyday lives, while attaching a desire for a sense of belonging to heritage culture, an elite domain which reflects the belonging only the few:

Cultural heritage and contemporary expressions of it have provided a worldwide focus for urban renewal. In the midst of economic development we find inspiration in the buildings, artefacts, traditions, values and skills of the past. Culture helps us to adapt to change by anchoring our sense of being: it shows that we come from somewhere and have a story to tell; it can provide us with confidence and security to face the future. Cultural heritage is more than buildings – it is the panoply of cultural resources that demonstrate that a place is unique and distinctive. (2000: 39)
This merges diverse cultural pasts in a homogenised present. Landry writes of the “weight and significance” which “the presence of the past in the present” can lend a city; but when he says that to erase memories is “throwing an asset away,” he does not say whose memories of what pasts he has in mind (2000: 266). When he mentions an “ideas bank,” the mapping of the latter term onto the documents of past social formations seems bland. Although he does not cite it, the development of London Docklands is a case of historical erasure: the only reference to a history of labour militancy is a bronze sculpture of three dockers near the Excel exhibition centre: the foreman stands above giving orders, the workers look down. Their faces cannot be seen at eye level, and the whole is an image not of militancy but of conformity.

The redeveloped centre of Birmingham demonstrates the mapping of economic values onto culture on a larger scale. The pedestrianized streets and public squares – Centenary Square and Victoria Square – which were designed in the 1980s and 1990s are filled with sculptures and decorative street furniture. They are well used by office workers and commuters, yet the vibrancy is deceptive: globally commercial rather than grounded in locality. Most of the food outlets are transnational franchises, and the dominant new buildings are a convention centre and an up-market U.S. chain hotel, lending the zone the feeling of a central business district. Birmingham’s nineteenth-century civic buildings watch the spectacle, co-opted to the city’s efforts – reflected in postcards stating City of Culture, a designation the city has not won from the EU or the UK – to find a way out of de-industrialisation.

Impacts
The effects of culturally-led urban renewal have been varied. In one way, the inner city has been rehabilitated, if as a gentrified district where the creative class enjoys the frisson of living in sight of areas of deprivation. Hoxton in London demonstrates this, with a mix of new art galleries, gentrified housing (some of it inhabited by successful artists), and post-war estates of social housing which have received only cosmetic improvement. This reverses the post-war trend towards suburbanisation, and goes against the post-modern trend to exurbs (Soja, 2000: 233-263); but the aestheticisation of urban space re-codes inner cities as elite zones where residual and new migrant-service populations are out of place. In place of centres of governance or public institutions, urban villages and sites of lifestyle consumption
set the scene. Where new public spaces are provided, they are surrounded by bars and cafés: all the seats are for consumers.

As said above, the cultural narrative is a response to de-industrialisation. Old industries were unionized and resistant to the erosion of workers’ rights. As immaterial production dominates the image projected in city branding, cities are de-politicised and their futures determined by market forces. Where heritage is used in regeneration, it denotes an artificial optimism which denies areas of possible contestation or overt difference. In new cultural developments, such as the Guggenheim in Bilbao, the gloss is totally to the fore – almost blinding.

The ambition of many such schemes, with flagship cultural institutions and cultural quarters, is to attract cultural tourism. This trades on art and heritage to encourage professionals and business people to visit a city on a weekend break, or to stay on after a business convention or a conference, boosting trade in hotels, restaurants, boutiques and museum shops. All this creates employment, but this is not as positive an impact as it might seem because much of that employment is in low-skilled, low-paid, part-time work in bars and museum catering or security (Loftman & Nevin, 1998). Cultural tourists spend more than beach tourists, nonetheless, and Barcelona’s city authority adopted a policy to encourage cultural tourism in the 1990s (Dodd, 1999), alongside its hosting of the Olympic Games in 1992 (see Degen, 2004). But the policy had two unusual aspects: it was aligned to the building of a Catalan (national not regional) cultural infrastructure, with a new National Auditorium and National Theatre; and, because cultural tourists want authenticity, events in the new venues were advertised only in Catalan. Wanting to be explorers, cultural tourists like to discover the city’s transitional zones. In old bars and narrow alleys, they enjoy the frisson of mixing with artists, sex-workers and migrants. El Raval, the old red-light district, offered such opportunities in Barcelona, but its designation as a cultural quarter formalises the arrangement, perhaps too much. The new contemporary art museum (MACBA, designed by Richard Meier) is a hub for the creative class (Photo 1).
It is still surrounded by narrow streets overhung with balconies, amid alleys in which old shops and bars continue to serve local publics; yet, through the 2000s, the area took on a gentrified aspect and became less diverse – rents are controlled but renovation has meant higher service charges – so that, while El Raval remains transitional, it no longer feels like a district in an old, Mediterranean port. Where infill apartment blocks have been inserted, they are without balconies, which may seem tangential; but the balconies were a transitional space, neither a public nor a private space but both – a transgression of boundaries. The new facades do not allow this, more reminiscent of northern European
cities (where the money is). And there is a New Ramblas (Photo 2), a wide public space – but it connects only narrow streets (in contrast to the old Ramblas, connecting the city centre to the port and well used by locals and visitors). Like public art, public space seems now to be colonized by gentrification.

![Photo 2: New Ramblas, Barcelona](image)

Photo by the author

The outcome, then, of culturally-led urban redevelopment tends to be gentrification through aestheticisation and (often needed) renewal of the built environment. David Ley (1996) recognized this in Vancouver, arguing that post-industrial cities and societies saw land uses (especially re-uses) as dominated by the wants of young middle-class professionals – Florida’s creative class – so that gentrification represents, as Lees, Slater and Wyly (2008: 92) summarise from Ley, “a new phase in urban development where consumption factors, taste, and a particular aesthetic outlook [...] saw an ‘Imagineering of an alternative urbanism to suburbanization’.”

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3 See Ley, 1996: 15.
The cultural city, then, houses the creative class in an ambience of affluence and display. It is a city of presentation. In its branded, symbolic economy, even street-life and contestations of space are re-packaged – as in the case of the co-option of graffiti to the art market. I think this demonstrates culture’s soft-policing function, not banning an activity but putting it in a new category where its content is safe. Graffiti was once, depending on viewpoint, a voice for the voiceless, or a plague; now it is a commodity. The creative city rehabilitates the inner city but undoes the consensus of the post-war welfare state in a new barbarity of market forces. While the new elites are separated in their gated compounds from the poor, culture, as Sharon Zukin writes, is a means of control:

Controlling the various cultures of cities suggests the possibility of controlling all sorts of urban ills [...]. [T]he cultural power to create an image, to frame a vision, of the city has become more important as publics have become more mobile and diverse, and traditional institutions [...] have become less relevant mechanisms expressing identity. Those who create images stamp a collective identity. [...] By accepting [these identities] without questioning their representations of urban life, we risk succumbing to a visually seductive, privatized visual culture. (1995: 2-3)

Art, Management, and Utility
In the 1980s, the practice of locating art in non-gallery spaces expanded the art market but reflected two other factors: for artists it offered a means to engage wider publics than those who went to galleries, and to refuse the commodity status of art. For administrators it allowed expansion of art’s public-sector infrastructure, tapping resources from non-art sources in the public sector. For artists, however, the departure from the gallery was brief. The art-world soon reincorporated them into a mainstream in which names were traded in place of objects. For art’s infrastructure, the move outside the gallery coincided with a shift from a model of administration in the public interest – in the UK, as part of the post-war welfare state – to one of arts management. This offered employment in arts institutions and agencies but introduced competition between those who once freely shared ideas. The extent to which arts managers saw the whole public sector as their territory is illustrated by an extract from a report for the National Endowment for the Arts (NEA):

No longer restricted solely to the sanctioned arenas of culture, the arts would be literally suffused throughout the civic structure, finding a home in a variety of community service and economic development activities – from youth programs and crime prevention to job training and race relations – far afield from the traditional aesthetic functions of the arts. This extended role for culture can also be seen in the many new partners that arts organizations have taken on in recent years, with school districts, parks and recreation departments,
convention and visitor bureaus, chambers of commerce, and a host of social welfare agencies all serving to highlight the utilitarian aspects of the arts in contemporary society.

George Yúdice quotes this passage in *The Expediency of Culture*, noting that the expansion of art’s sphere of interest followed a reduction in public subsidy in the US. Utility addressed the need to find new sources of funding, which required a new case for art. Art was no longer a self-evident element of civilization but part of the service sector – far from the autonomous aesthetic pursued by New York critic Clement Greenberg in his 1939 essay “Avant-garde and Kitsch.” Greenberg saw the avant-garde as detached from society, transposing revolution from the state to style. In the late nineteenth century, the Secessions of Berlin, Munich and Vienna refused institutional conservatism. In the 1900s, this became an attack on bourgeois values, as in Dada; but in the 1960s it was an attack merely on the previous art movement. Greenberg writes that

the true […] function of the avant-garde was not to ‘experiment’, but to find a path along which […] to keep culture *moving* in the midst of ideological confusion and violence. Retiring from public altogether, the avant-garde poet or artist sought […] the expression of an absolute in which all […] contradictions would be either resolved or beside the point. (1986: 18)

There is a yawning gulf between Greenberg’s aesthetic and the NEA’s utility. But there are three further complications.

First, if art abandons autonomy to be reconstructed as utility, it fits into the economic model of a sector. Art is not usually thought of as an industry (yet has producers and consumers) but in this guise art becomes an economic driver in redevelopment, while the art market is a major contributor to the national economy, with tourism, insurance, and financial services. For Yúdice, art’s status as utility follows from the end of the Cold War. He writes that the dismantling of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 “pulled the rug out from under a belief in artistic freedom, and with it unconditional support for the arts, as a major marker of difference with respect to the Soviet Union” (2003: 11). He continues,

Art has completely folded into an expanded conception of culture that can solve problems, including job creation. Its purpose is to lend a hand in the reduction of expenditure and at the same time help maintain the level of state intervention for the stability of capitalism. (*idem*: 12)

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Perhaps. But during the Cold War, Western art was constructed as a mode of free expression in opposition to Socialist Realism, the utility of which was to uphold the system. If aesthetic autonomy is replaced by utility, it mimics Soviet culture. Further, in the expanded model of culture which Yúdice mentions, seeming to reference Rosalind Krauss’s essay, “Sculpture in the Expanded Field” (1979), but possibly using a coincidental turn of phrase, it is not only the boundary between art and social work which comes down but also the boundary between art forms, and between art, design, fashion, architecture and the media. Perhaps, though, it is worth making a short detour into Krauss’s essay.

Reprinted in Hal Foster’s 1983 collection of essays on Post-Modernism, it established a critical basis for art no longer defined by formal purity but in relation to a plurality of adjacent fields. Art is not-architecture, not-landscape, and so forth. The immediate problem faced by Krauss was how to write seriously about a sculpture by Mary Miss, the form of which was a hole in the ground. The outcome was to chart an expanding territory for art, drawing on a history of sculpture’s departure from the monument with Rodin, and – perhaps unintended by Krauss – to open association with non-art fields. A blurring of the boundaries between art forms is not far from a blurring of the divide between art and culture – between art as taste, and cultures as the shared habits of everyday lives – but is also a conformity with the expansive tendencies of post-industrial business sectors. Perhaps Yúdice has a point, if not exactly the one he makes. The end of the Cold War enabled Western art to relinquish its anti-ideological status, and – when the East is part of a single global economic terrain – to become another industrial sector, as if art is not-commerce (which is radically different from not being commerce).

The second complication is that art as utility emphasises display but not production. Few cities which pursue policies for culturally-led redevelopment provide facilities for artists (Berlin is an exception). The art on which a city trades may be that of the past rather than the present, the result of transnational art collecting. A cultural city does not need art to be produced at all, and artists are merely a postmodern picturesque presence. Art districts such as SoHo in New York, or Hoxton in London, attract the new bohemians (Bohos), but few are artists. But culture is highly visible, and much less costly than renewing infrastructures. Again, while semblance dominates the city, the outcomes claimed are not always delivered.

There have been successes – notably Glasgow and Barcelona. But there have been failures. In Sheffield, a de-industrialised steel city, a new contemporary music centre designed by Nigel Coates closed when visitor numbers failed to match predictions. It is now used by one of the city’s two universities, its façade inscribed “empowering, enriching, celebrating, involving, entertaining” – a rhetoric read by architectural critic Owen Hatherley (2010: 110) as reminiscent of the Blair regime’s fantasy of Cool Britannia. Hatherley sees much urban redevelopment in this way, an eclectic rag-bag of out-of-context stylistic references: “wavy roofs give variety, mixed materials help avoid drabness, the windswept ‘public realm’ is a concession to civic valour […] [but is] Pseudo-modernism” (ibidem: xiii). Of the ‘Urban Renaissance’ announced by Blair and his friend architect Richard Rogers, Hatherley retorts that it was “the very definition of good ideas badly thought out and (mostly) appallingly applied” (ibidem: xv). After the 2008 financial services crisis, that Renaissance is over. The new UK government in 2009 saw it as a New Labour project and got rid of it, the Education Minister declaring that architects (like Rogers) would no longer be paid to design schools (Hatherley, 2011: xv).

Cultural projects are, in any case, less affordable in austerity Europe. In Sheffield, a large hole in the ground occupies a city-centre site where development stopped when the money ran out. This is not uncommon across the UK. The map is being redrawn. Buried deep in the holes which now occupy urban centres is the hope which once characterised modernism; but the holes are not a result of bombing (as in the 1940s) but of the wild excesses of capitalism.

In this vein, Zygmunt Bauman views globalization as breeding new kinds of insecurity:

> Thrown into a vast open sea with no navigation charts and all the marker buoys sunk and barely visible, we have only two choices left: we may rejoice in the breath-taking vistas of new discoveries – or we may tremble out of fear of drowning. One opinion not really realistic is to claim sanctuary in a safe harbour. (1998: 85)

This contrasts with the optimistic certainties of international modernism, and the renewal of humanism in the post-war rebuilding of European cities afflicted by the bombing of civilian areas in the 1940s. Perhaps the Modernist city was a reaction to trauma. After the slaughter of the 1914-1918 war, amid deep social readjustment, international modernism proposed a new society. In the post-1945 period the project was renewed, notably in the UK
in the Festival of Britain, a nationwide series of events in 1951 remembered for the Royal Festival Hall. The Festival guide book states:

It will leave behind not just a record of what we have thought of ourselves in 1951, but, in a fair community founded where once there was a slum, in an avenue of trees or in some work of art, a reminder of what we have done to write this single, adventurous year into our national and local history.6

In 2011, on its 60th anniversary, a celebration of the Festival was held on the same site. But in 2011, 60% of the space on posters advertising the celebration of the Festival related to places to eat or drink – a festival of consumerism, not national renewal. But I suspect that the idea of a national identity which informed the 1951 event is no longer viable. London today is multicultural in a way not imagined in 1951, implying a cosmopolitanism in which culture bridges different ethnic and interest-based publics; or it may mask a persistent division when culture is used as a mask of cohesiveness. Tim Butler (2003: 2469) writes, “In a city which is massively multi-ethnic, its middle classes, despite long rhetorical flushes in favour of multiculturalism and diversity, huddle together into essentially White settlements in the inner city.”

Similarly, the editors of Cosmopolitan Urbanism comment,

The global practices of gentrifiers [...] seem to reflect the attitudes and practices of cosmopolitanism, including an active celebration of [...] diversity. However, it may in fact produce an exclusion of difference by drawing symbolic boundaries between acceptable and non-acceptable difference. (Binnie et al., 2006:16)

For Leonie Sandercock, cultural difference is the defining quality of cities now. She writes,

We all grow up in a culturally structured world, are deeply shaped by it, and necessarily view the world from within a specific culture. [...] And yet we are capable of critically evaluating our own culture’s beliefs and practices, and of understanding [...] those of other cultures. We are capable of imagining and desiring cultural change. (2006: 47)

If cultures are always evolving, and tend to hybridity in a world of migrations, cities become key sites of cultural negotiation and contestation of rights to space and visibility. Sandercock observes,

[...] negotiating peaceful intercultural coexistence block by block, neighbourhood by neighbourhood, will become a central preoccupation of citizens as well as urban professionals and politicians. The right to the city is the right of all residents to presence and the right to participate as an equal in public affairs, to be engaged in debating the future of the city and creating new intercultural spaces and built forms. (Ibidem: 48)

6 Cited in The Guardian, 22 April 2011, p. 3.
This goes against the grain of redevelopment, which uses selective pasts fixed in an ersatz historical presence, designed to include some and exclude other publics. Or, for the creative sector, cultural difference is another commodity, de-contextualised like the T-shirts which show Che or Mao long after the 1960s insurrections in which these images first appeared have been forgotten. Even Communism can be commodified in the interests of neoliberalism

**The Culture Industry**

Culture has been a means of social ordering since the nineteenth century, and enhances the prospects of capital by constructing a society of consumption. To extend the quotation above, Zukin writes that, while culture is a means of control through selective imagery,

> With the disappearance of local manufacturing industries and periodic crises in government and finance, culture is more and more the business of cities – the basis of their tourist attractions and their unique, competitive edge. The growth of cultural consumption [...] and the industries that cater to it fuels the city’s symbolic economy, its visible ability to produce both symbols and space. (1995: 1-2)

Zukin’s reading of consumer culture mirrors the art market’s colonisation of graffiti, too:

> Styles that develop on the streets are cycled through mass media [...] where, divorced from their social context, they become images of cool. On urban billboards advertising designer perfumes or jeans, they are recycled to the streets, where they become a provocation, breeding imitation and even violence. [...] The cacophony of demands for justice is translated into a coherent demand for jeans. *ibidem*: 9

But if culturally-led urban regeneration was the strategy of the 1990s and 2000s, presented as improvement on a nineteenth-century model of social ordering, today the regeneration sector seems to have taken the place of culture as the driving force of change. It is much nastier.

Post-crash, the regeneration industry is a threat to communities as estates of social housing on potentially valuable sites are regenerated by private-sector developers seeking to re-code them by expelling residual inhabitants. Of the Heygate Estate in South London: a local Councillor asserts that its tower blocks are “really difficult to maintain”; if it was “a model estate when it was built, it hasn’t stood the test of time.” The architect disagrees: “I don’t think it was [...] a failed estate. There are failed estates but this wasn’t one of them [...] There weren’t any problems until relatively recently [...]. Councils always go for big-bang, new-built solutions, as opposed to looking after what they’ve got.”

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message is social mixing – Hatherley writes, “Housing associations tell people we’ll pepper-pot you with some stockbrokers and that’ll make everything OK. Then you’ll somehow become more cultured through osmosis” (2011: 10) – but the reality is peripheralisation. Nineteenth-century reformism transmutes into modernising neoliberal brutalism. Heygate is not an isolated case. A resident of another estate targeted for redevelopment says, “We are the wrong sort of people in the right sort of postcode. [...] We’re sitting on a golden nugget of land. They’ve never thought for one minute that we’re human beings.”

The latest turn in this vile narrative is the emergence of what Naomi Klein calls catastrophe capitalism. Writing after hurricane Sandy, she notes that private-sector interests see opportunities in a reconstruction paid for from public funds. She notes, too, that “upmarket real estate agents are predicting that back-up generators will be the new status symbol with the penthouse and mansion set.” Even more alarmingly, she adds that climate change is seen as “a kind of spa vacation, nothing that the right combination of bespoke services and well-curated accessories can’t overcome.”

A Post-Creative City?

I could end on that gloomy note. But is the story over? Klein says no: it is time for people to resist, rejecting neoliberalism’s de-politicisation of society. In Bristol, a cosmopolitan and cultural city in the West of England, the creative class of artists, students, and squatters has turned angry. Faced by gentrification, and after months of opposition to the opening of a Tesco supermarket in the Stokes Croft district, the new store was trashed one night in May 2011. A newspaper reported a tense atmosphere after “heavy-handed [police] tactics had provoked a night of violent rioting” while the elected representative for the area was quoted as saying, “It’s a very hippyish, counter-culture type of area with lots of arts shops. [...] There were two people playing saxophones on top of a bus shelter and a photographer was taking pictures. A police officer walked across and pushed him over.” The supermarket soon reopened, but wall paintings still attest to opposition. This followed other protests, against student fees, austerity measures, and the tax avoidance of trans-national companies.

Ibid.
Owen Bowcott, “Police operation against anti-Tesco rioters was heavy-handed, claims Bristol MP,” The Guardian, 23 April 2011, p. 4.
There are alternative cultural formations, too. In Hamburg, the group Park Fiction successfully opposed plans to privatise a site in an area where artists had squatted several blocks, bringing together diverse local publics to design and produce a park in a waterfront site. Park Fiction has begun working in other cities as well: in Copenhagen, a sign proclaims the cancellation of a bar’s fashion parties, inviting hipsters to move elsewhere (Photo 3).

**Photo 3: “All our fashion parties are cancelled…” poster by Park Fiction, in a bar in Copenhagen**

Another poster advertises sessions to help hipsters come off the drug of fashion. It is easy to criticise such campaigns as marginal, yet they suggest a new alliance between art-work and everyday cultures. Perhaps that is one basis for a post-creative city. Another must now, after the winter of 2011, be Occupy. However ephemeral, and after the short-lived appearance of anti-roads protest in the 1990s, or anti-capitalism in the 2000s, memories of Occupy linger in many cities – there is an alternative to the way things are. I doubt, however, that those who camped in public spaces were as much trying to change state policy as undergoing a more personal, transformative experience – in moments of sudden, spontaneous clarity after which nothing remains exactly the same. This is a new revolution.
What forms it will take as austerity pulverizes society and clarity dawns I cannot predict, but it will not go away.

References


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**Marginal Gentrification as Emancipatory Practice: An Alternative to the Hegemonic Discourse of the Creative City?**

The main purpose of this article is to present and discuss marginal gentrification as a potential emancipatory practice. This movement is spearheaded by the less privileged sectors of the new middle classes, individuals who are underemployed or in temporary, precarious employment yet still prefer to live in central areas of the city, thus becoming pioneer gentrifiers. They refuse the conventional suburban norms and revanchist city canons, and thus, as a group, they may become an alternative to the dominant narrative presented by the creative city.

**Keywords:** creative city; cities; gentrification; urban development; cultural policy.

**Introduction**

There is an extensive and growing literature on the creative city. Many contributions mention the importance of urban creativity and the cultural industries for urban economic development, whilst others contest the neoliberal ideologies and the effects of segregation, polarisation and social exclusion inherent in the single-minded vision and consensus agenda of the creative city. The transformations in urban landscapes that have accompanied the emergence and development of policies based on Florida’s theory (2002, 2004) are well known. Various authors have testified to the effects of social polarisation on urban areas in the wake of such policies, namely the ruptures in artistic communities and the uprooting of residents with a lower socioeconomic status as well as of non profit-making organisations headquartered in urban areas recently designated as cultural districts (Booyens, 2012).

Gentrification¹ is, in the final analysis, one of the harmful effects most widely cited in urban critical theory analyses of the idea and practice of the production of the creative city and the branding of creative districts. As part of creative city policies, urban rehabilitation and regeneration measures – also determined by the need to improve the image of the city and make it more attractive within the strategic framework of global interurban competitiveness – very often imply the eviction of residents with a lower socioeconomic

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¹ Article published in *RCCS 99* (December 2012).

¹ The main concern of this text is not to problematize the conceptual definition of gentrification, since a large amount of academic literature is devoted to this issue and there is a relative consensus on the core characteristics of the process within the academic community. For a more in-depth examination of the concept, I would refer to the extensive international bibliography discussed in Portuguese in Rodrigues (1992, 2010) and Mendes (2008).
status from central areas, hence condemning them to socio-spatial marginality (Atkinson, 2003; Hutton, 2004; Newman and Wyly, 2006; Lees et al., 2009; Jacob, 2010; Stolarick et al., 2010; Parker, 2011; Krätke, 2012).

David Harvey (2010, 2011, 2012), Neil Smith (1996, 2002, 2005) and Jamie Peck (2005) are amongst the authors who stand out for their criticisms of the creative city, framed within the debate on urban policies in the service of neoliberal ideology and the production of the revanchist city. They argue that the “regenerative” discourse of the creative city within the context of urban policies designed to enhance the image of the city, although aimed at embedding the existing population, modernising the economic fabric, increasing employment and economic growth, as well as improving the quality of urban life in general, still, in practice functions as a mechanism for legitimising the established power and mobilising major public investment which, in the final analysis, is diverted away from helping the neediest and serves as a subsidy for the richest (the banks, financial institutions, major economic and civil construction groups, entrepreneurs, politicians, etc.).

State interventions designed to enhance the creative city unleash contradictory mechanisms of expulsion and reappropriation. The new urban policies represent a major orientation towards the market and consumers, to the detriment of the less privileged classes. The authors point out that, to a large extent, the public-private partnerships that are frequently developed in this context constitute a veritable subsidy for the wealthiest and the most powerful companies and organizations, promoting strategies of control, power and domination of urban space, a fundamental condition for perpetuating the reproduction of capital, which is, in turn, essential for the capitalist system of production and consumption. All this takes place at the cost of investments in services for collective consumption. In the final analysis, whilst the attraction and growth provided by gentrification benefit all, the primary gains are reaped by real estate developers, businesses and financial institutions, very often at the cost of uprooting residents and the frailer businesses from the regenerated areas, thus leading to a process of exclusion. Opting for investments that favour the reproduction of capital implies that less attention is paid to the “city of the majority,” with particularly serious effects for the neediest areas where the most underprivileged are concentrated (Arantes, 2000). The emergence of the “revanchist city” produced by the neoliberal offensive has been explored by Neil Smith, who removes the social mask of consideration and “institutional beneficence” inherent to these recent real estate products.
of the new urban management, arguing that they promote a logic of social control that favours the reproduction of capital and the ruling classes.

Significant changes in the housing market in inner city areas include the emergence of new real estate developments designed for residential use which have contributed towards creating the phenomenon of “marginal gentrification.” This is a movement that involves less privileged sectors of the new middle classes that are attracted by the social and cultural environment of the city centre.

My main aim in this paper is to present and critically discuss marginal gentrification as a potential critical and emancipatory practice, and marginal gentrifiers as a faction of the liberal left within the new middle class which actively and effectively seeks out social (and ethnic) mixing in old, traditional neighbourhoods in the city centre. It may be seen as a critical social movement that provides an alternative to the single-minded, dominant narrative which the creative city represents. Since this is a theoretical and exploratory essay on this issue, without a direct empirical base, the text follows a hypothetical-deductive methodology, and is therefore constructed on the basis of postulates and concepts already established in the literature consulted. By establishing relations between hypotheses, the text presents a possible perspective for interpreting the phenomena in question.

1. Marginal gentrification as a reaction to modern urban planning

Nowadays gentrification occurs in various ways in different neighbourhoods in different cities, and therefore involves a variety of protagonists (Lees, 2000). However, in the last 40 years the debate over the definition of the concept has been clear. According to Savage and Warde (1993: 87-88), four processes must combine in order for gentrification to take place: i) the reorganisation of the social geography of the city, involving the displacement, in central areas, of one social group by another with a higher status; ii) a spatial regrouping of individuals with similar lifestyles and cultural characteristics; iii) a change in the built environment and the urban landscape, with the creation of new services and residential rehabilitation that involves important architectural improvements; iv) a change in the land system which, in most cases, leads to a rise in the price of real estate and an “extension in the system of domestic property ownership.”

The term gentrification has thus been used to describe the arrival of groups with a higher socioeconomic status, usually the young middle class, in rundown city centre areas. These
areas then become socially, economically and environmentally enhanced, undergoing a process of filtering up. This constitutes a process of socio-spatial change in which the renovation of residential properties in working class or traditional neighbourhoods by new, relatively well-off residents leads to the displacement of former residents who cannot afford the rising housing costs that accompany this regeneration (Pacione, 2001). Consequently, it is a process by which poor working class neighbourhoods in city centres are renovated by an influx of private capital and middle class landlords and tenants – the same neighbourhoods that had previously experienced disinvestment and the exodus of the middle class. According to Smith (1996), the socio-spatial process entailed by gentrification represents a dramatic and unexpected inversion of what the majority of 20th century urban theories had envisaged as the evolution of the city centre. Having said this, gentrification develops in a variety of socio-spatial and geographical configurations which need to be distinguished, taking into account whether the process is led by flows of investment capital (theories of production and supply) or is constituted as an urban social movement (theories of consumption and demand).

Clay (1979) produced one of the first important studies on gentrification. He developed a stage model for this phenomenon that has been widely accepted by the academic community, typifying a series of aspects ranging from the initial pioneer gentrification phase to the fourth and final phase of maturing gentrification. The final stages in Clay’s model – which embody the conventional paradigm for what is commonly termed gentrification – increasingly involve middle class families or individuals (yuppies and dinks) and real estate developers who aim to capitalise on the “rent gap” created by the opportunity for investment, thus raising the potential property value in these neighbourhoods as a result of dwellings being bought up for renovation and resale to the wealthier members of the new middle class.

In contrast, in the first stage of gentrification, the social groups who are the pioneers of gentrification have very different characteristics from those which define the typical gentrifiers as members of the new middle class. Firstly, they assert their identity by rejecting “what they interpret as the suburban lifestyle of middle class families” and the major urban redevelopment residential projects; “as an alternative, they value the historic inner city,

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2 For a clarification in Portuguese of the concept of “rent gap,” see Mendes (2008) and Rodrigues (2010).
which is seen as more ‘human’ and in which close, neighbourhood relations still exist” (Rodrigues, 2010: 123).

Referring to the pioneer gentrifiers, Rose (1984) developed the concept of the marginal gentrifier. As argued by the author, the process of marginal gentrification, which should be distinguished from mainstream gentrification, generally involves the less privileged sectors of the new middle classes that display a significant gap between their high levels of educational capital and culture and their low level of economic capital. They are individuals who are underemployed or in precarious, temporary employment but prefer to live in central areas of the city, thus becoming pioneer gentrifiers, presumably attracted by the non-conformist lifestyle and the tolerant, socially and ethnically mixed urban environment of city centre neighbourhoods and rejecting the conventional normativity of modern urban planning. Among them, Rose highlights women, students, artists, young couples and single-parent families. There is an obvious parallel between the concept of the marginal gentrifier and the preference given by these individuals to appropriating and residing in the city centre and what Florida (2002, 2004) termed the creative class and its proclivity for open, tolerant and plural communities.

Marginal gentrifiers assign great value to the notion of urbanity, and this also results from their valorisation of the city centre as opposed to the idea of social massification and homogeneity introduced by suburban developments and the new real estate products of modern urban planning (many of which are also located in the centre, due to urban restructuring), which, in their opinion, give shape to a model that is the antithesis of urban life in the periphery or in already regenerated urban areas. By valorising the occupation of the city centre, they refute the widely held idea of the “death of the city,” and assert their critical opposition to the trend towards the exurbs and the “mass-produced” suburbs which are seen as “anti-city.”

Usually seen in a negative, relativized way, i.e. in opposition to the centre, the characteristic features of both the suburbs and the recently restructured urban areas – both examples of modern urban planning – become associated with an entire morphological and territorial field characterised by a social experience and a kind of architecture and spatial organisation that are monotonous, homogenous, lacking in quality, commonplace and amorphous, typically understood as the “sub-urban,” or, in other words, inferior to the urban. Modern urban planning is, in effect, associated with a type of extensive urban sprawl,
resulting either from a highly regulated planning process that produces a very homogenous spatial organisation (hence the idea of monotony), or from more spontaneous forms of urban growth, poorly regulated by the land planning authorities and very often characterised by poor basic infrastructures and limited and inadequate access to better goods, services and facilities.

From this perspective, it is to be expected that for the gentrifiers, as shown by Caulfield’s work (1994), the suburbs correspond to a stigmatised socio-spatial representation. They represent exclusion from the urban condition, with high levels of marginality and socio-spatial segregation, social anomie and deficit in citizenship. As such, the suburbs offer a precariously existence as a “political arena” for civic and social participation. In contrast, the centre is associated with quality, with a genuine, typical, heterogeneous, different and cosmopolitan environment that is “authentically urban,” so that its central condition comes to be perceived as socially distinctive. In fact, the notion of the periphery cannot be defined in itself, in a restricted sense, since it represents realities that are devoid of meaning and value unless they are related to other reference points, namely the centre. Álvaro Domingues states that “it is the extent of its distance from the centre that clarifies the (physical, social, morphological, etc.) peripheral position, and all the more so when the attributes of the centre enjoy greater visibility, positioning, power and distinctiveness” (1994: 5). Therefore “distance” in relation to the centre is also a socially constructed distance which, via the dichotomous image of the centre/periphery, relativizes and simplifies the position of these two types of organisation of metropolitan space. In this dichotomy, the centre is defined in terms of its diversity and density of social relations, intensity of civic life, access to information, and accumulation of cultural, political and economic resources, whereas the suburbs represent the exact opposite. As a social space, the periphery and the suburbs are perceived in terms of their dependent and subaltern relationship to central areas, and from this emerges the distinctiveness of living in the city centre.

The image that prevails in the social construction of the suburbs is that of suburban sprawl, corresponding to increasingly large, rundown, featureless areas, composed of vast unvarying expanses of housing estates (their main function being residential), lacking aesthetic and functional comfort and diversity and with an absence or shortage of public spaces, poor environmental quality, far from the centre and therefore enforcing journeys to and from work that are often incompatible with lifestyles based on what is offered by the
city centre, and poor infrastructures – in other words, inadequate public and private services and facilities in terms of both quantity and quality. In short, these conditions construct an image of the suburbs as places devoid of urban meaning and identity. The image of the mass-produced suburb as “anti-city,” with dysfunctional areas of various kinds, is the main sign of what some authors have warned will be the imminent death of the city. The suburbs generally comprise low quality peripheral housing estates and single-purpose zoning which negate urban quality based on diversity and multifunctionality. Having begun as a means of escaping the confusion of the city, the suburbs have turned into the exact opposite.

Obviously this characterisation of the periphery and the suburbs, although common and widely accepted, far from exhausts the diverse territorial features of the concept, particularly bearing in mind the current logic of urban organisation and structuring as an immediate and systemic component of economic and social restructuring, which deconstructs the simplistic model of the classic metropolis. This discourse is based on the idea of the monocentric metropolis surrounded by a series of concentric circles whose functioning is strictly dependent on the centre. However, it persists in gentrifiers’ social representations of modern urban planning.

Therefore, a vision based solely and exclusively on this perspective of a clear centre/periphery dichotomy has little validity and is, to a certain extent, artificial, given that the social construction of the periphery and the suburb, understood in these terms, corresponds in general to a social “preconception.” Nevertheless, it clearly predominates in the social representations of gentrifiers, and therefore has a great influence on their symbolic motivational structure and their decision to live in the city centre.

Understanding the suburbs in the general and common sense meaning of a monotonous, low quality way of life based on a lack of quality space, reduced to the most basic function of providing housing and suffering from a general lack of infrastructures, access to goods, services and additional urban facilities which nowadays are part of minimal urban comfort, the gentrifier comes to identify the historic centre as a socially distinctive space that is more compatible with, and conducive to, upward social mobility in the current phase in their life cycle. The marginal gentrifier, according to Walter Rodrigues, also values the old areas of the city “for their distinctive urban planning, typical architecture and traditional historic neighbourhoods, genuine local people and small, local traditional shops” (2010: 123; my italics). All these aspects produce an urban environment that contrasts with the suburbs and
the mass-produced “socially dehumanising, ‘featureless’” qualities of urban development – in other words, places where the “urbanalized” production of contemporary space prevails, increasingly dominated by shopping centres (the high churches of consumerism) and private condominiums, amongst other new real estate products to emerge from urban regeneration.

2. Marginal gentrification as a critical and emancipatory social practice

Another aspect that is even more important to these reflections – also mentioned by Rodrigues (2010: 123) – and that characterises gentrification in city centres as an emancipatory practice is the fact that marginal gentrifiers value “diversity, tolerance and the freedom of expression of cultures and lifestyles (concepts dear to the official discourse of the creative city) which they associate with the identity of the historic centre, interpreted as an emancipatory, liminal space, in contrast to the greater social, cultural and lifestyle homogeneity and uniformity” of suburban areas and modern urban planning.

Following the same line of thought as Caulfield (1994) and Beauregard (1986), Ley (1996), Butler (1997) and Lees (2004) argue that one of the hallmarks of the new middle class is their ability to explore the emancipatory potential of the city centre to create a new, culturally sophisticated and less conservative urban class. Ley and Mills (1986), in turn, suggest that gentrification in Canadian cities began with a marginal counterculture that was searching for inner city areas that could represent an ideology that was against the prevailing modern ideology of the 1950s and 60s. For example, the authors showed that the gentrifiers living in central areas of the city were more likely to support liberal or minority candidates. In addition, the reformist politicians themselves were often professionals who emerged from neighbourhood activism in city centres.

In his 1994 study, David Ley showed that the main gentrified districts in the three largest cities in Canada – Toronto, Montreal and Vancouver – had a predominantly liberal electorate that believed in socially inclusive measures and reformist policies for equity and multiculturalism. According to the author, these policies featured reforms that aimed to reconcile the management of economic growth with that of human development, and that promoted improvements to public services, particularly housing and transport, and more open urban government, envisaging various forms of empowerment.
This political identity of the marginal gentrifiers is consistent with their practice. Their move into neighbourhoods does not entail the displacement of long-time residents, since they often occupy houses that are vacant or part of the normal turnover in the neighbourhood rental or sales market, and therefore changes to the housing stock are insignificant. Moreover, once again quoting Rodrigues (2010: 124), “renovation work […] is almost exclusively undertaken by the gentrifiers themselves, with little recourse to the professional property development sector. The do-it-yourself nature of gentrification in this initial phase is inherent to the nature of the process itself and the lifestyles of its protagonists,” mainly young adults from intellectual and artistic professions or other creative occupations associated with urban regeneration and culture, architecture and design. This being the case, it is not unexpected that only small-scale renovations take place at this stage, in which rehabilitation work motivated by “love of one’s first home” usually predominates.

All these factors explain the occasional and fragmented involvement in the process of gentrification in local neighbourhoods. Typically, gentrification begins with some families seeking small spaces available in rundown neighbourhoods that offer environments suitable for alternative lifestyles (for example, avant-garde artists or gay and lesbian communities). This first wave corresponds to an embryonic process of gentrification, according to Mendes (2008), which develops slowly and intermittently, manifesting itself in urban space in a random and fragmented manner, on a small scale circumscribed to a few homes or, at most, a few blocks in a neighbourhood. This initial stage of gentrification, observable in areas in the centre of Lisbon and other cities in southern Europe, must be distinguished from the patterns of gentrification as a global urban strategy in the service of the revanchist city and the neoliberal offensive that underlies it, which is more widespread in cities in the Anglo-Saxon world.

This multifaceted perception of the process emphasises the importance of the temporal and spatial context for understanding the complexity and specificity of the geography of gentrification in southern European cities and warns against the assumption that conventional theory can be directly applied to all levels of the global urban hierarchy. This sensitivity to context is displayed in an article by Smith and Graves (2005), who use the city of Charlotte, North Carolina, as a case study to illustrate a geography of gentrification in which the motivations/explanatory factors and characteristic trends in each stage do not fit within the conceptual framework of traditional theories of the phenomenon. In this
medium-sized U.S. city, gentrification was introduced for the first time in the early 1970s, when business leaders recognised the importance of revitalising the central area of the city in a way that would reinforce its corporate identity and allow for strategic management of the city image on the basis of objectives that were conducive to this. The production of gentrification in this context, contrary to what might have been expected, was characterised by the complete absence of *marginal gentrifiers* and the traditional groups of urban pioneers, leading some theorists to question the validity of the traditional stage model advocated by Clay (1979). In addition to providing an analysis of gentrification in terms of the urban hierarchy (and on a regional scale), something that had been neglected for a long time, the article helped to introduce a critical approach that was more flexible and contextual in terms of understanding the causality of gentrification as a process.

Collectively, traditional research on gentrification has produced two main principles which are central to the most important urban studies of this process. Firstly, the process develops in a series of temporally and spatially specific phases as it advances in urban space (the pioneer study by Clay, 1979). Secondly, its causality derives to a great extent from factors associated with either supply (theories of production) or demand (theories of consumption) (Ley, 1996; Smith, 1996; Lees, 1994; Lees, Slater and Wyly, 2008). These explanations have tended to diverge, with each seeking to impose the supremacy of one sphere over the other in studying the process of gentrification.

Supply-based theories, which are markedly Marxist-influenced, have sought to emphasise the importance of capital and the various institutional agents (the state, local authorities, banks and other financial institutions) in the process of restructuring urban space, whereas demand-based theories emphasise consumption rather than production in the housing and urban land market. In short, the theories that uphold the primacy of production derive the process of gentrification from the flow and circulation of capital in urban areas, seeking to explain this process by the devaluation of urban land and the generation of returns by new investment. Leading contributions include the work of Neil Smith and David Harvey in the 1970s and 80s.

In turn, the theories that focus on consumption see gentrification as a direct consequence of changes in the demographic and social structure of populations, the lifestyle of certain sectors of the middle class and the values and patterns of consumption associated with this. They argue that these changes are framed within the emergence of a post-modern social
and urban condition, whose signs and manifestations are difficult to ignore, as demonstrated in the work of Chris Hamnett, David Ley and Tim Butler.

Whilst considerable attention has been paid to the analysis of the most recent stages in the process (Hackworth and Smith, 2001) and to exploring the intersection and complementarity of theories of production and consumption, explicit attention has very rarely been paid to the argument that the stages of gentrification and their respective causal dynamics are shaped differently according to the spatial scale and urban context in which they take place. Moreover, there remains a tendency to assume that the motivations, mechanisms, actors and phases in gentrification identified in global cities have parallels in smaller cities. However, a still emerging literature suggests that there is a pressing need for more sensitive geographical analyses which demonstrate that “gentrification is not the same everywhere” and that in some cases the differences may be enough to call into question the accepted theoretical models (Lees, 2000).

The muddled nature of the concept of gentrification is particularly evident in light of a geographical perspective. In fact, the various processes commonly referred to as gentrification in the literature are very useful in demonstrating contrasting geographies (Van Criekingen and Decroly, 2003). On the one hand, there is a revanchist perspective on the successive flows and violent and contested advances on the frontiers of gentrification in U.S. city centres that views them as expressions of anti-urban development, and therefore tends towards an interpretation of cause and effect that focuses on socio-spatial conflicts and unequal and fragmented urban development, both generated by the global circuits and cyclical movements of capital. On the other hand, Canadian and European analyses have focused more on the contribution made by gentrification to the creation of emancipatory, tolerant and socially diverse urban environments in city centres. Analyses of causality in the latter case are inclined to emphasise individual actions and choices (agency) within the context of a concern on the part of public policies and municipal authorities to create quality urban space for all (in the Lefebvrian sense of the right to the city and urban revolution). The arguments and public policies that promote and recognise gentrification as a positive process for neighbourhoods contrast with those which view it as a socio-spatial phenomenon that has harmful effects on the social environment of these urban areas. These two discourses on the effects of the process, which dominate academic literature on
gentrification, are referred to by Lees (2000, 2004) as the “emancipatory city thesis” and the “revanchist city thesis,” respectively.

The emancipatory city thesis is largely implicit in the literature on gentrification that addresses the gentrifiers and their forms of agency as social actors spearheading the process, as for example in the work of David Ley (1994, 1996) and Tim Butler (1997). However, it is in the work of Jon Caulfield (1994) that this argument is effectively acknowledged by being stated explicitly. It revives an old thesis in which the city is portrayed as an emancipatory or liberating space. Caulfield’s analysis (1994) centres on gentrification in Toronto, Canada, and describes the unfolding of this complex process in the inner city as an emancipatory social movement and gentrification itself as a critical and emancipatory social practice. According to this argument, gentrification is a process that unites people in the city centre and creates opportunities for social interaction, promoting tolerance and cultural diversity. It is seen as a liberating experience, both for the gentrifiers and for those who come into contact with them. Caulfield argues that encounters between “different” people in the city are inherently liberating, providing opportunities for subverting the prevailing consumer culture and creating social activities that expose the contradictions of capitalist space, thus opening up opportunities for developing alternative urban projects.

3. Diversity and social mixing in the creative city: Contradictions between the discourse and practice of the gentrifier

Gentrification has been associated with social movements in the centre which support diversity, difference and social mixing. According to a longstanding tradition of research into the process, the “liberal” desires of the new middle classes for the difference and diversity in/of the city are the key to explaining the gentrification process and for creating a more diverse and tolerant city. They draw attention to the fact that the benefits of socially mixed urban communities have become an undeniably important subject in urban political discourse. Sociocultural diversity has always been a leitmotiv of new demands for housing in historic and traditional city centre neighbourhoods. One of the best advantages afforded by life in the heart of the city is known to be the exposure to social, cultural and ethnic diversity. The diverse urban environment is a constant source of stimulation and renewal and a reminder of the cultural relationality from which identities and lifestyles are constructed (Lees, 2008).
In a certain way, this “spirit of diversity” has been associated, even historically, with the particular capacity of cities to be creative and generate innovation (Hall, 2000). Spurred by the discourse of the creative city, the issue of social mixing has recently moved to the forefront of the debate on gentrification (Bridge et al., 2012). To some extent, this has been stimulated by neoliberal urban policies promoting social mixing. However, recent research has revealed the inability of gentrified neighbourhoods to remain socially mixed, leading theorists, technicians and specialists to rethink the association between gentrification, displacement and residential segregation. At present there is no evidence for the generalized assumption that the policy of (marginal) gentrification will help extend and promote social mixing, and therefore increase the social capital and social cohesion of urban communities. The work of Rose (2004) and Davidson (2010) in particular shows that little evidence has been found to prove that significant interactions take place between populations, and that shared perceptions of community between the gentrifiers and the local population are very rare. Davidson, for example, argues that the specific nature of the new forms of gentrification (such as private luxury condominiums) have played an important role in the emergence of what he calls “social tectonics,” consequently influencing urban spatial organisation towards growing segregation on a micro scale and the fragmentation of contemporary urban space. This is also because the geography of the gentrifiers’ sociabilities tends to take the form of enclaves that are disconnected in social-spatial terms from the surrounding social fabric and contiguous areas.

There have been a number of studies on social interaction in these neighbourhoods which point to the fact that social networks amongst neighbours tend to be socially segregated, especially in terms of socioeconomic status and ethnicity. An influx of well-off residents in an underprivileged middle class neighbourhood may not enhance social cohesion, since the contact between individuals/families with low and higher incomes tends to be superficial at best, and frankly hostile at worst (Osman, 2011). In their discourse, the new middle classes reveal a desire for diversity and difference, but in their everyday practices they tend towards self-segregation. The notions of diversity lie only in the socio-spatial representations of the gentrifiers – in their self-image as cosmopolitan citizens – rather than in practical actions, reflecting a form of defining and distinguishing themselves as a specific class faction rather than the actual social appropriation of space in a tolerant, open and plural way. There has been no transfer of social capital from the groups with a higher socioeconomic status to
those with a lower status, nor any other of the results expected from the introduction of a middle class population into rundown central city neighbourhoods. In part, this is due to the transience of the new residents, but also to the spatially segregated nature of the new real estate urban developments located next to rundown communities deprived of any socio-spatial continuity. As Davidson (2010) argues, the people in the two lifeworlds rarely cross paths. They do not work in the same places or use the same form of transport. They do not go to the same restaurants or public places. They have different family structures. They also have different expectations and aspirations with regard to the community and the “supposed” social mix, an indicator of the diversity and heterogeneity essential to embedding the creative class. According to the empirical data that Davidson gathered on local relations between the gentrifiers who moved into a neighbourhood and the long-term residents, social ties rarely crossed class and ethnic boundaries, and the social networks in the neighbourhoods seemed impermeable to the changes taking place around them, with confrontations also registered between the norms of the gentrifiers and those of the long-term residents. Along the same lines, Loretta Lees (2008) offers a biting critique of social mix policies based on the rhetoric of gentrification and their actual ability to produce genuinely inclusive urban environments.

To a large extent, the emancipatory thesis reflects the ideologies associated with marginal, pioneering gentrification. There is a significant body of arguments on gentrification as a liberating, critical and countercultural process. However, a temporal dimension underlies our understanding of how the process advances. For the approach that considers the pioneering phase of gentrification, this presents more positive aspects and possibilities for alternative urban development (the centre as liminal space) than the later, more aggressive phases of the process.

**Final considerations: The commodification of difference and tolerance in the creative city**

The ambiguity and contradictions between the discourse and practice of gentrification that promotes social mixing and “difference,” which is based on an emancipatory understanding of urban space, reflect the contradictions evident in the programme for creative cities launched by Florida’s thesis (2002, 2004). Put simply, difference is “included” in the discourse of the creative city but in a very limited way: it is not implemented in practical terms, and is very often short-sighted in its view of the real social and housing conditions of
minority groups. There are two aspects to this contradictory treatment of “difference” in the discourse of urban planning associated with creative policies. On the one hand, “difference” is appropriated by urban cultural policy with the aim of transforming it into a positive marketing point to sell cities as good places to live in, work and visit. This represents the neoliberalisation of difference, in the opinion of Catungal (2009), to the extent that the concept is instrumentally manipulated by territorial marketing campaigns to forge an idea of multicultural urban life which is attractive to young professionals. On the other hand, the negative impacts of creative city planning on forgotten communities and people remain largely unacknowledged by advocates of the ideology of the creative city (Barnes et al., 2006; Zimmerman, 2008).

In his powerful and frequently quoted critique of the creative city, Peck (2005) observes that the cult of creativity in urban politics reproduces boosterism agendas, supporting previous forms of urban entrepreneurialism. The effect, observes the author, is to reinvent cities as growth machines and places for the accumulation of capital, and to focus on attracting the new middle classes as the key factor in more competitive urban economies, embracing the culture of the new capitalism or, following the same line of thought but in the words of Allen Scott (2006), the cultural economy of late capitalism.

One particular impasse for urban critical theory in general is that the political agendas for the creative city continue to use the liberal forms of multiculturalism as a framework for narrating/forging a glocal identity in conjunction with new forms of transnational, cosmopolitan and creative citizenship, a common form of constructing hegemony under transnational capitalism. There is growing recognition that, on an urban level, multiculturalism and diversity should be boosted to attract talent and promote creativity and innovation. Difference is commercialised, reduced to a commodity that can be deployed to attract human capital, tourists and investment and promote a vibrant urban economy (Okano and Samson, 2010). Emphasis is placed on creating bohemian neighbourhoods and on the commodification and celebration of difference through public events such as festivals and public art (McGuigan, 2009; Vivant, 2010). In this respect, it is important to explore whether the cultural landscapes that are vital to the creative city really serve to promote particular memories to the detriment of others and, if so, how this is being done. Moreover, both the forms of public urban art and the use of the built heritage, as well as other artistic expressions that flood urban landscapes, cannot be viewed purely in terms of their economic
function as mere commodities for a creative class, serving the neoliberal trade interests of the city-enterprise. In fact, they are deeply political manifestations that enable the negotiation of difference within the context of increasingly multicultural cities (Scott, 2006; Pratt, 2008, 2010, 2011).

In many cases, the appropriation of ethnic and cultural diversity to sell the creative city is an expression of power and privilege whereby practices of “difference” and “tolerance” are drained of political and cultural meaning. However, this tendency also suggests that the commodification of difference may potentially provide an opening for more critical forms of multiculturalism to produce, appropriate, experience and manage contemporary urban space, recognising that these processes involve not only control, but also resistance. This, in my view, is the first step towards reclaiming diversity in the contemporary urban society of the creative city, in order to reinvent the narrative codes and destabilise the conventional theories of the city, whilst also allowing for the emergence of new ways of seeing that enable a more plural, open, democratic and critical urban space to be produced.

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