How to overcome the paradoxes around worker dismissal in France and Italy?
- Cet article est une traduction de :
- Comment surmonter les paradoxes en matière de licenciement en France et en Italie ? [fr]
Résumés
L’article s’interroge sur les rapports actuels entre le droit civil et le droit du travail, à la lumière des réformes législatives intervenues dans ces deux pays en matière de licenciement individuel. La comparaison entre les deux systèmes conduit à un constat surprenant : l’affirmation d’un droit commun des contrats protecteur, à l’inverse d’un droit du travail devenu le terrain d’expression du libéralisme. Afin de valoriser le principe d’unité du système juridique et de surmonter cette inversion de tendance paradoxale, nous proposons de prendre en considération le principe n°11 élaboré par la doctrine des Life Time Contracts. La reconstitution théorique proposée ne néglige pas la dimension européenne et en particulier la décision du Comité européen des droits sociaux saisi suite aux réformes susmentionnées.
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- 1 A. Perulli, “Il Jobs Act del lavoro autonomo e agile: come cambiano i concetti di subordinazione e (...)
1In light of the scale of the legislative reforms relating to redundancies in France and in Italy which have led to them being described as a “paradigm shift”,1 the aim of this article is to take a look backwards in order to envisage the future. In other words, the perspective chosen here consists of offering a reading of the equilibrium established by lawmakers in terms of sanctions in the event of unfair dismissal, based on an analysis of the origins of employment law, that is to say its creation as a distinct branch of civil law.
2The “before” corresponds to an aspiration, that of building a more coherent legal system by centring it on the “person”, their essential needs and, for the case that interests us here, by imposing an obligation to limit the prejudicial consequences of the termination of the contractual relationship. The “before” also consists of highlighting an unusual European dimension: the immaturity of the European social project in terms of individual dismissals, rendering the intermediate step of the progressive approximation of the legislation of Member States indispensable; the similarities between the French system of “securing” employment and the growing protection of the Italian contract corroborate this option.
3In France, as in Italy, the protective function of employment law seems to have evaporated, leading, surprisingly, to a need to seek the source of a rebalancing of the employment relationship (I) in ordinary contract law. In view of recent legislative and case law developments, as well as contributions from legal scholars, we will therefore consider whether it is necessary to protect an unfairly dismissed worker at least to the same extent as an ordinary law co-contractor (II). In this sense, the legal theory of Life Time Contracts (LTC) is proving to be an interesting project insofar as it uses the language of social justice in a very similar way to the way it is used in the decision of the European Committee of Social Rights (III).
I - The paradoxical development of civil law and employment law
4The relationship between civil law and employment law is an old question, one that remains unresolved. The starting point for the reflection consists of observing a trend reversal that is occurring in France and in Italy, which can seem paradoxical in certain respects. The comparison between the systems in the two countries produces some surprising common data: the assertion of a protective ordinary contract law, by contrast to employment law which has become an area of expression for liberalism.
- 2 R. Scognamiglio, “Conclusioni”, in G. Santoro-Passarelli (dir.), Diritto del lavoro e categorie civ (...)
- 3 On this topic A. Lyon-Caen, «Du rôle des principes généraux du droit civil en droit du travail», Re (...)
5If we look back at all the essential steps in the history of each of these legal fields, it can only be concluded that employment law was born of a need for an adequate response to the need to protect workers, since they found themselves in a relationship far more unbalanced than that of ordinary law co-contractors. The need to establish a specific status for the employment relationship originates in a structural difference characterising the parties to the contract: civil law is a law between equals “born of freedom”, while employment law is an unequal law that is “moving towards freedom”.2 The performance of an employment contract requires corrective interventions to rein in the discretionary powers of the employer; it is this essential core premise that, in Italy as in France,3 inspired the differentiation of the legal regimes.
- 4 J.-J. Dupeyroux, «Droit civil et droit du travail : l’impasse», Droit Social, 1988, p. 371.
6But the picture is not so clear cut. It is understandable given the opinion that considers the relationship between civil law and employment law as a “path that appears to lead nowhere”.4 In other words, this is not a relationship that can be seen as being established once and for all, but rather a path to disciplinary differentiation which has had - and still has - different levels of depth.
- 5 M. Pedrazzoli, “Quanto servono e quanto sviano le categorie civilistiche”, in G. Santoro-Passarelli (...)
7It we look closely at this path, three trajectories can be distinguished which are not necessarily subsequent upon one another from a chronological point of view, but which can be intertwined and found in the approaches taken by lawmakers, judges and legal scholars. The first trajectory is that of a genuine autonomy of employment law, which advocates a sort of self-sufficiency for the discipline, mainly on the grounds that the categories of civil law could divert the reading that the employment law specialist has of reality5.
- 6 L. Mengoni, “L’influenza del diritto del lavoro sul diritto civile, diritto processuale civile e di (...)
- 7 G. Santoro-Passarelli, “Appunti sulla funzione delle categorie civilistiche nel diritto del lavoro (...)
- 8 L. Zoppoli, La corrispettività nel contratto di lavoro, Edizioni Scientifiche Italiane, 1991.
8Another trajectory is that which looks at the reciprocal relationships between legal categories and the protection mechanisms we find in the two disciplines.6 This vision can be interpreted in different ways: in a hierarchical interpretation, civil law remains for the employment law specialist a reference branch in terms of language and meaning;7 in a more pragmatic approach, it is necessary to verify on a case-by-case basis the applicability of the civil law categories to the legal constructions of employment law.8
- 9 Y. Leroy, «Paradoxe(s) sur ordonnances», Droit Social, 2018, p. 784. The author examines the recent (...)
- 10 A. Di Majo, “Giustizia e “materializzazione” nel diritto delle obbligazioni e dei contratti tra (re (...)
- 11 P. Tullini, “Effettività dei diritti fondamentali del lavoratore: attuazione, applicazione, tutela” (...)
- 12 P. Lokiec, S. Robin-Olivier, S. Deakin, C. Radé, «Droit du travail et responsabilité civile (1st pa (...)
9Finally, the last trajectory emphasises the existence of a movement to gradually align the two branches,9 achieved by developing a more protective vocation for civil law10 on the one hand, and a commodification of the employment relationship,11 on the other. Sometimes we find ourselves in the paradoxical situation of having to invoke the mechanisms of civil law to ensure a more effective form of social justice in the employment relationship.12
10The subject cannot be addressed generally without risking some over-simplifications; the aim of this reflection is therefore to test out this hypothesis concerning unfair dismissal, in light of the relationships between civil law and employment law described above, in order to extract the considerations that will allow a comparatist perspective and the mobilisation of European law.
II - Sanctions for unfair dismissal
11The reforms to the law on dismissal in France and Italy allow us to analyse the relationship between the two branches of the law from a particular angle, insofar as they are emblematic of the development of relations between civil law and employment law. In particular, among the three trajectories mentioned above, it is the last one that seems to be taking form in the most recent legislative measures.
- 13 A. Maresca, “Il nuovo regime sanzionatorio del licenziamento illegittimo: le modifiche dell’art. 18 (...)
12In Italy, from 2012 onwards, lawmakers have undermined a central pillar of the Workers’ Statute (Law no. 300 of 1970), Article 18, which sanctions unfair dismissal with mandatory reinstatement. With the 2015 Jobs Act, they established a regime in which the main sanction consists of limited compensation, limited both in its amount and in the mechanism for determining it.13
- 14 A. Lyon-Caen, «Complexité du barème», Revue de Droit du Travail, 2016, p. 65; J. Mouly, «Les indemn (...)
13In France, the 2017 reform of employment law introduced an imperative “scale” for compensation for dismissal without real and serious grounds (Lab. Code, Art. L. 1235-3).14 Legally, the comparison with the civil law system therefore concerns the relationship that subsists between, on the one hand, in kind remedies and monetary (“equivalent”) remedies, and on the other hand, the validity of the principle of full compensation for damage. This raises numerous questions: whether there is a hierarchy between remedies; the possibility of a forced extension of the contract as an in kind remedy; the extent of the constitutional protection of the principle of full compensation for damage; the ability of compensation to fulfil the different roles that a sanction could play, namely the compensation role, the normative role of a deterrent against illegal behaviour and the role of punishing illegal behaviour. Each question has a different and complex response depending on the legal system in question. It is therefore appropriate that we limit ourselves to remarking that in Italy, as in France, the regulations on compensation in the event of unfair dismissal have had to be confronted with the different forms of equilibrium specific to the Civil Code.
- 15 P. Lokiec, «Regard. Italie: la réforme du droit du licenciement», Revue de Droit du Travail, 2012, (...)
- 16 A. Perulli, «Les ordonnances Macron et le Jobs Act : valeurs et fonctions dans le nouveau paradigme (...)
- 17 On the basis for this theory in legal opinion, see P. Ichino, “A chi serve il diritto del lavoro. R (...)
14Against this background, it is necessary to emphasise that the biggest difference between the two systems concerns the starting point: whereas in Italy it is the principle of reinstatement that is favoured, in French law it is compensation.15 Although the instruments and contexts of the reforms differ in part, the overall intention - stated more or less explicitly by lawmakers - is shared:16 to make the termination of employment contracts more flexible in order to resolve the dualism in the labour market between insiders and outsiders.17 In other words, through the desire to make the cost of dismissing a worker predictable, there is something else at play: the search for a compromise between the protection of an employment relationship in its own right and the value to society of the level of employment.
15The “catchphrases” used to name the reforms also have their significance, through the slogans they use: Italy’s “increasing protection contract”, then, corresponds to France’s “securing employment”. It is in this change of perspective that it is possible to appreciate the unexpected change to the legal techniques of employment law; the indirect effect could well be a re-introduction of the primacy of civil law as a discipline capable of providing more effective protection of the victim of culpable behaviour.
- 18 L. Nogler, “I licenziamenti per giustificato motivo soggettivo o per giusta causa nel d. lgs. n. 23 (...)
- 19 E. Dockès, «Le retour du licenciement abusif», Droit Social, 2018, p. 541. The author examines the (...)
16The central question in this debate is therefore this: is it reasonable to construct legal balances that consider the unfairly dismissed worker as the “most penalised obligor in the legal system”?18 The splitting into two of the branches of the law, as the most suitable response to the specific needs of different contractors, leads to doubts about such a result, which could overturn the “genetic identity” of the laws, and in particular the roots of employment law. This reflection is therefore developing round this common thread: if we do not wish to invoke the Civil Code in employment law,19 then we have to try and find a new equilibrium for the legal system in its entirety.
- 20 See C. Alessi, T. Sachs, «La fin annoncée du plafonnement de l’indemnisation du licenciement injust (...)
17In this analysis, the point of view of case law in the field cannot be ignored. In fact, the legislative measures described above have not left the judges of the highest courts in both countries indifferent, and they have responded to questions of constitutional legitimacy and conventionality. In a necessarily simplifying fashion, it is possible to outline the essential features in comparative law-based approach.20
- 21 Corte costituzionale, 26 September 2018, no. 194. See also Corte costituzionale, 24 June 2020, no. (...)
- 22 R. De Luca Tamajo, “La sentenza della Corte costituzionale n. 194 del 2018 in tema di quantificazio (...)
18Thus, the Italian Constitutional Court21 has found a balance, politically oriented perhaps, between the carrot and the stick. On the one hand, the judge, in keeping with case law, has authorised an intervention by lawmakers to provide protection against unfair dismissal in the form of compensation, as long they can ensure the reasonable nature of the measure; on this point, we observe, critically, that the Court does not specify, on the basis of a supposed lack of competence, how the change from reinstatement to compensation in the event of unfair dismissal could have an impact on the growth of the employment rate. On the other hand, in a more rigorous - or better, more courageous - way, the Court has declared the mechanism for quantifying the damage unconstitutional, insofar as it is linked only to the parameter of the worker’s length of service. In this decision, the crucial argument lies in the necessity to recognise an amount adequate to the prejudice incurred, in line with the principle of equality that prevents different situations being treated identically. Furthermore, particular note should be taken of the passage in which the Court emphasises that the principle of full compensation for damage has no constitutional value. On closer examination, this part of the decision is not devoid of defects. Many22 have thus pointed out the uncertainty that remains as to the parameters to be used to determine the amount of the compensation: a vague definition of the legal nature of the remedy in terms of reparation or compensation, the maintaining of upper limits that render the deterrent function of the sanction debatable.
19It can only be concluded that the Court deliberately chose to take a middle path, which leaves a feeling of dissatisfaction as far as the grounds for its decision, in general, are concerned, and in particular, the ability of the sanction to be an effective remedy for the damage suffered by the unfairly dismissed worker.
20As for French case law, the main point to note is that the landscape is more fragmented, because there is a real gap between the approaches taken by the industrial tribunals (Conseils de prud’hommes) and the higher courts.
- 23 Conseil constitutionnel, 7 September 2017, no. 2017-751; Conseil constitutionnel, 21 March 2018, no (...)
- 24 Conseil d’Etat, 7 December 2017, no. 415243. T. Sachs, «Le barème d’indemnisation du licenciement i (...)
21The French Constitutional Council (Conseil constitutionnel)23 did not find any grounds for considering the “scale” mechanism unconstitutional, on the basis of the public interest which allows lawmakers to adjust the conditions for recognising liability, particularly to ensure the foreseeability of the consequences in the event of unfair dismissal. The absence of constitutional value of the principle of full compensation of damage is a point the two legal systems have in common. However, two differences must be emphasised, which explain why the seising of the French Constitutional Council did not have the same result as in the case brought before the Italian Constitutional Court: the non-existence in France of the “substantive notion of the principle of equality” which led the Italian Court to rule against the determination mechanism; and the fact that the French “scale” was not as strict as the one provided for in the Italian framework, in that the French mechanism still allowed for the possibility of the court determining the amount corresponding to the damage suffered, whilst remaining within the thresholds and limits fixed in the scale. Nevertheless, the invocation of international sources has led some French judges to claim that this regime violates international conventions.24
- 25 Conseil de Prud’hommes of Troyes, 13 December 2018, no. 18/00036; Conseil de Prud’hommes of Grenobl (...)
22However, in spite of the clear position taken by the higher courts, it is important to note the resistance of certain judges,25 who are attempting to call into question the introduction of the “scale” as an adequate remedy, evidence of a sort of dissatisfaction with the current system of sanctions. The arguments most used are, firstly, the need to re-assert, in the event of an unfair dismissal, the different functions of the sanction and, secondly, the requirement to let the court assess, on a case-by-case basis, whether or not adhering to the scale leads to a disproportionate violation of workers’ rights.
23This being the case, even if we can quickly see that there are some common dynamics at work in France and in Italy, from both the legislative and the case law points of view, we may question the watertightness of the legal system, i.e. whether there is a room to manoeuvre and find a balance between the interests of the market and those of the worker who has been a victim of unfair dismissal.
III - The legal theory of Life Time Contracts: towards a re-composition of the unity of the legal system
- 26 L. Nogler, U. Reifner (dir.), Life Time Contracts. Social Long-term Contracts in Labour, Tenancy an (...)
- 27 M. Fabre-Magnan, “Life Time Contracts and General Contract Law in the EU: Pour un Droit Commun des (...)
24There is one very interesting legal theory that could provide a response to the question posed above: an international group of civil law and employment specialists has drawn up a set of 16 principles to govern Life Time Contracts,26 that is to say the long-term contractual relations under which individuals provide goods and services, access a job or a source of income. The initial interlocutor of the research group was the European Union, which was accused of constructing a contractual discipline that was excessively oriented towards a bilateral vision of contractual relations, even if they take into consideration the crucial interests27 of the persons involved.
- 28 P. Ancel, «Postface : Regards d’un civiliste français», in L. Ratti (dir.), Embedding, op. cit., p. (...)
25Based on a multi-disciplinary method, this theory aims to go beyond traditional contractual relations and the homogenisation of the legal disciplines currently in progress,28 first of all by providing judges with instruments that allow them to re-place the person and their needs at the centre of the contract. It is not possible here to go in any depth into the complexities of this project which is highly original in its approach and ambitious in its aims. However, it is possible to try and evaluate some of its intuitions, which seem to be of decisive interest for our subject.
- 29 P. Ancel, «Les dynamiques d’influence dans l’élaboration du nouveau droit des contrats: quel rôle p (...)
26The first virtue of the project resides in the awareness of the need to go back to a stage prior to the European interventions in the form of “hard law” in contractual matters: the hermeneutic intentions of the group seem to emphasise that the construction of a real European identity, sensitive to the values of social justice, must pass through the intermediate stage of a comparison between the legal systems and the implementation of a “progressive approximation of national laws”.29 Within this framework, the comparison between the French and Italian systems is an excellent example. Indeed, a large number of the similarities mentioned above demonstrate the usefulness of reasoning from a comparative law point of view as well as a long-term perspective.
- 30 M. Fabre-Magnan, «Le droit du travail vu du droit civil : l’unité du droit des obligations», specia (...)
27The second virtue of this project consists of having developed a unique methodology which goes beyond the walls of the formalism and the vision of the branches of the law as watertight compartments; the dialogue thus established, structurally, between civil law and employment law could avoid creating paradoxes and unjustified asymmetries. In the perspective of Life Time Contracts (hereinafter LTCs), the issue is not to say which would be the better law, but to understand what mutual lessons can be learned from the “establishment of permanent links between the solutions that come out of the different branches of the law.”30
28What the LTC theory is suggesting therefore is an assertion of a sort of principle of unity of the legal order, which imposes an internal and external consistency between the branches of the law. We therefore have to consider the feasibility of this reconstruction. Thus we can question the capacity of principle no. 11 of the LTCs to overcome the paradoxes linked to dismissals in France and in Italy. This principle conceives of the right to terminate as an extrema ratio measure by recognising the fundamental role of the need to mitigate the consequences.
- 31 G. Centamore, “I licenziamenti in Francia”, in M. Pedrazzoli (dir.), Le discipline dei licenziament (...)
- 32 G. Natullo, “La Cassazione delimita il controllo del giudice sul licenziamento per giustificato mot (...)
- 33 J. Barthelemy, “Le rôle de la jurisprudence dans le droit de la formation”, Droit Social, 2014, p. (...)
- 34 U. Gargiulo, “Lo jus variandI nel nuovo art. 2103 c.c.”, Rivista Giuridica del Lavoro e della Previ (...)
- 35 G. Merlo, «Le rôle de la formation dans le cadre des contrats à temps essentiels à l’existence de l (...)
29With respect to dismissals, this principle could lead to a re-examination of many promising legal measures at national level and also in comparative law. Reference is made, for example to the Italian obligation of “repêchage” (obligation to see if the employee can be redeployed before dismissing them), which has a rough equivalent in France under the name of “reclassement”.31 Likewise, in the case of redundancies on economic grounds, we also remember the much debated question of the scope of interpretation of the “economic grounds” liable to justify the termination of the contractual relationship.32 Furthermore, this principle could be considered as a way of better organising the legal obligations in terms of training the worker,33 in connection with the employer’s ius variandi,34 thereby considering the worker’s professional dynamism as serving the stability of the contractual relationship.35
30Aware that it is possible to address this subject from several angles, this study has chosen to emphasise the consideration of extrema ratio, as a sort of application of the principle of proportionality of the remedy, which would lead judges to ask themselves whether, in cases of unfair dismissal, this principle imposes a certain form of legal protection, or if the effectiveness of the sanction, whatever it is, is protection enough.
31The main value asserted in principle no. 11 is the preservation of the central nature of the relationship between the co-contractors, unlike in the system centred on the categorical imperative of the market. Indeed, at the centre of the interests pursued by the discipline, the contract termination phase is considered as a traumatic moment for one of the parties to the contract, which renders necessary the adoption of regulations allowing the employer to terminate the contract where it is justified and, at the same time, giving the worker enough time to take the measures needed to prepare for the termination and anticipate its consequences.
32This is about promoting a change in the hierarchy of values: Life Time Contracts do not sacrifice adequate protection of the unfairly dismissed worker on the altar of the foreseeability of the cost of dismissal. In the LTC logic, the need to limit the consequences of termination does not oblige lawmakers to provide a certain form of protection, but it does oblige them to make a careful evaluation of the balance between the advantages of the party choosing to terminate the contract and the sacrifices of the party whose contract is terminated. In addition, the emphasis is placed on the fact that in the event of culpable behaviour, the priority requirement should be that of compensating for the damage incurred. The ability to identify this new point of equilibrium allows the dogmatics of LTCs to change perspective when the question of sanctions for unfair dismissal is considered.
- 36 See G. Alpa, “Il dibattito intorno ai danni punitivi”, Contratto e Impresa, 2017, p. 1084.
- 37 D. Amoroso, “Sull’obbligo della Corte costituzionale italiana di “prendere in considerazione” le de (...)
33Another factor must also be taken into consideration, as is shown by the paradoxical trend reversal referred to above: if we note that there is a vigorous debate on punitive damages36 in civil law, the compensatory role of the sanction - fundamental in employment law - then deserves to be rethought. It is very significant that certain aspects of the legal theory behind LTCs can be found in a recent decision of the European Committee of Social Rights. Obviously, the Committee’s decisions have a different legal value depending on the place occupied by international sources in the hierarchy of the sources of each national system, and depending on the acknowledged role of this institution.37 Nonetheless, no-one can dispute the importance of a supranational decision that concerns very similar national legislations, especially when the same question has been put to the oversight body. Reference is made to the complaint, on the one hand, of Force Ouvrière - on which the Committee has not yet given its position - and on the other hand, to the complaint of the Confederazione Generale Italiana del Lavoro (CGIL).
34Indeed, on 13 March 2018, Force Ouvrière filed a complaint with the European Committee of Social Rights against France, challenging one of the 2017 Orders - the introduction of a mandatory scale before the industrial tribunals (Prud’hommes) - considering that the scale which places an upper limit on the compensation of workers unfairly dismissed is contrary to Article 24 of the European Social Charter (right to protection in cases of termination of employment), in that it fails to meet the criteria on appropriate compensation, i.e. the criteria of adequacy, effectiveness and dissuasion as regards the employer.
35In addition, in its complaint, the CGIL alleged that the provisions contained in Articles 3, 4, 9 and 10 of Legislative Decree no. 23 of 4 March 2015 were contrary to Article 24 of the revised European Social Charter, in that they provide, in the event of illegal dismissal in the private sector, for compensation whose amount is limited, thereby de facto excluding any possibility of a court appreciating and fully recognising the prejudice suffered by the worker due to their dismissal.
- 38 G. Orlandini, “L’Europa va contro la riforma renziana”, Il Manifesto, 12 February 2020; S. Giubboni (...)
36Concerning this last complaint, the European Committee of Social Rights (ECSR, 11 February 2020, Confederazione Generale Italiana del Lavoro (CGIL) v. Italy, no. 158/2017) recognised the violation of Article 24 of the Charter. In its decision, the Committee considered that neither the alternative legal channels offering the worker illegally dismissed the possibility of compensation above the upper limit under the law currently in force, nor the conciliation mechanism, as established by the contested provisions, allow the worker unfairly dismissed in all cases to obtain adequate compensation, proportional to the damage suffered and likely to deter the employer from further illegal dismissals. Thus, it is clearly the concept of the «scale» that that the Committee has rejected. It is not yet possible to say what the consequences of this decision38 will be on the position of lawmakers and case law in Italy. The fact remains that it is desirable that the voice of such a supranational oversight body on this subject should not be ignored.
37The ECSR’s decision on Force Ouvrière’s complaint will also be interesting to hear, to see if the result is the same, given the differences in the context and the existence of the «scale» mechanism. The outcomes of these complaints could be considered as a decisive test of the reasoning adopted in this article.
Conclusion
- 39 M. Delfino, “EU rules on individual dismissals: a roar or a meow?”, European Journal of Social Law, (...)
- 40 L. Ratti, “Il pilastro europeo per i diritti sociali nel processo di rifondazione dell’Europa socia (...)
38The importance of the ECSR’s decision and the usefulness of drawing on comparative law are all the more evident in view of the legal vacuum left by European law with regard to individual dismissals. In Italy as in France, Article 30 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union and the more recent Principle 7 of the European Pillar of Social Rights, are, as everyone is aware, the cause of several difficulties,39 which even further justifies the shrewdness of the intuition behind the LTCs. It does not seem realistic to expect to see any harmonised regulations adopted in this area in the near future, which illustrates the need to continue moving forward on the adoption of common rules at European level, relying initially on the resources of comparative law. This can be envisaged from the angle of a soft law or, even better, a new and horizontal legal culture. Although it is difficult to make a judgment on the likelihood of success of such a project, it is, however, possible to say that, if no new initiatives are taken, we will leave behind us a truncated social Europe, in which the gaps will be not so much in the formal proclaiming of rights as in their concrete application.40
39It is therefore more useful than ever to follow alternative paths, such as that of Life Time Contracts, which constitute a perspective that is at once new and anchored in the past, given that it promotes an unprecedented legal method combining the principle of unity of the legal system, drawing on civil law and preserving the roots of employment law in order to provide workers with adequate protection.
Notes
1 A. Perulli, “Il Jobs Act del lavoro autonomo e agile: come cambiano i concetti di subordinazione e autonomia nel diritto del lavoro”, Working Papers C.S.D.L.E. “Massimo D’Antona” .IT – 341/2017, 2.
2 R. Scognamiglio, “Conclusioni”, in G. Santoro-Passarelli (dir.), Diritto del lavoro e categorie civilistiche, Giappichelli, 1992, p. 149.
3 On this topic A. Lyon-Caen, «Du rôle des principes généraux du droit civil en droit du travail», Revue Trimestrielle de Droit Civil, 1974, p. 229; J. Mestre, «L’influence des relations de travail sur le droit commun des contrats», Droit social, 1988, p. 405; A. Supiot, «Pourquoi un droit du travail?», Droit Social, 1990, p. 485.
4 J.-J. Dupeyroux, «Droit civil et droit du travail : l’impasse», Droit Social, 1988, p. 371.
5 M. Pedrazzoli, “Quanto servono e quanto sviano le categorie civilistiche”, in G. Santoro-Passarelli (dir.), Diritto del lavoro, op. cit., p. 85.
6 L. Mengoni, “L’influenza del diritto del lavoro sul diritto civile, diritto processuale civile e diritto amministrativo”, Giornale di Diritto del Lavoro e di Relazioni Industriali, 1990, p. 10. Compare with the position of P. Ichino, “Il percorso tortuoso del diritto del lavoro tra emancipazione dal diritto civile e ritorno al diritto civile”, Rivista Italiana di Diritto del Lavoro, 2012, p. 59.
7 G. Santoro-Passarelli, “Appunti sulla funzione delle categorie civilistiche nel diritto del lavoro dopo il Jobs Act”, Working Papers C.S.D.L.E. “Massimo D’Antona”.IT , 290/2016.
8 L. Zoppoli, La corrispettività nel contratto di lavoro, Edizioni Scientifiche Italiane, 1991.
9 Y. Leroy, «Paradoxe(s) sur ordonnances», Droit Social, 2018, p. 784. The author examines the recent reforms to contract law (Order no. 2016-131 of 10 February) and employment law (2017 Macron Orders) in terms of the paradoxes.
10 A. Di Majo, “Giustizia e “materializzazione” nel diritto delle obbligazioni e dei contratti tra (regole di) fattispecie e (regole di) procedura”, Europa e Diritto Privato, 2013, p. 797; G. Vettori, “Contratto giusto e rimedi effettivi”, Rivista Trimestrale di Diritto e Procedura Civile, 2015, p. 787; C. Castronovo, “Eclissi del diritto civile”, Giuffrè, 2015; H. Barbier, “Le juge des référés et le contrat: textes anciens et réforme du droit des contrats”, Revue Trimestrielle de Droit Civil, 2016, p. 854.
11 P. Tullini, “Effettività dei diritti fondamentali del lavoratore: attuazione, applicazione, tutela”, Giornale di Diritto del Lavoro e di Relazioni Industriali, 2016, p. 311; M. Rouspide-Katchadourian, “Réparation des préjudices : quelles spécificités en droit du travail ?”, Droit Social, 2017, p. 892; J. Mouly, “Les indemnisations en matière de licenciement”, Droit Social, 2018, p. 10.
12 P. Lokiec, S. Robin-Olivier, S. Deakin, C. Radé, «Droit du travail et responsabilité civile (1st part)», Revue de Droit du Travail, 2007, p. 748; M. Fabre-Magnan, «La réforme du droit des contrats : quelques contre-feux civilistes à la déréglementation du droit du travail», Semaine Sociale Lamy, 21 March 2016, no. 1715, p. 10.
13 A. Maresca, “Il nuovo regime sanzionatorio del licenziamento illegittimo: le modifiche dell’art. 18 Statuto dei lavoratori”, Rivista Italiana di Diritto del Lavoro, 2012, p. 415; F. Carinci, C. Cester (dir.), “Il licenziamento all’indomani del d.lgs. n. 23/2015 (contratto di lavoro a tempo indeterminato a tutele crescenti)”, ADAPT University Press, 2015; L. Fiorillo, A. Perulli (dir.), Decreto Dignità e Corte costituzionale n. 194/2018. Come cambia il Jobs Act, Giappichelli, 2019.
14 A. Lyon-Caen, «Complexité du barème», Revue de Droit du Travail, 2016, p. 65; J. Mouly, «Les indemnisations en matière de licenciement», Droit Social, 2018, p. 10; N. Collet-Thiry, «Le plafonnement des indemnités prud’homales: analyse critique et perspectives de mise en échec», La semaine juridique, 2018, p. 1150.
15 P. Lokiec, «Regard. Italie: la réforme du droit du licenciement», Revue de Droit du Travail, 2012, p. 514.
16 A. Perulli, «Les ordonnances Macron et le Jobs Act : valeurs et fonctions dans le nouveau paradigme du droit du travail», Droit Social, 2018, p. 86.
17 On the basis for this theory in legal opinion, see P. Ichino, “A chi serve il diritto del lavoro. Riflessioni interdisciplinari sulla funzione economica e la giustificazione costituzionale della inderogabilità delle norme giuridiche”, Rivista Italiana di Diritto del Lavoro, 1994, p. 460; O. Blanchard, J. Tirole, “Protection de l’emploi et procédures de licenciement”, Rapport du Conseil d’Analyse Economique, La documentation française, 2003.
18 L. Nogler, “I licenziamenti per giustificato motivo soggettivo o per giusta causa nel d. lgs. n. 23 del 2015”, Argomenti di Diritto del Lavoro, 2015, p. 508.
19 E. Dockès, «Le retour du licenciement abusif», Droit Social, 2018, p. 541. The author examines the possibility of applying Article 1780 of the Civil Code if the contract of employment is terminated; S. Laforgia, Diritti fondamentali dei lavoratori e tecniche di tutela. Discorso sulla dignità sociale, Edizioni Scientifiche Italiane, 2018, p. 124.
20 See C. Alessi, T. Sachs, «La fin annoncée du plafonnement de l’indemnisation du licenciement injustifié: l’Italie montre-t-elle la voie?», Revue de droit comparé du travail et de la sécurité sociale, 2018-2, p. 802.
21 Corte costituzionale, 26 September 2018, no. 194. See also Corte costituzionale, 24 June 2020, no. 150.
22 R. De Luca Tamajo, “La sentenza della Corte costituzionale n. 194 del 2018 in tema di quantificazione dell’indennizzo per il licenziamento illegittimo”, Diritti Lavori Mercati, 2018, p. 633; P. Saracini, “Licenziamento ingiustificato: risarcimento e contenuto essenziale della tutela”, Diritti Lavori Mercati, 2018, p. 646; M. V. Ballestrero, “La Corte costituzionale censura il d.lgs. n. 23/2015: ma crescono davvero le tutele?”, Lavoro e Diritto, 2019, p. 243; L. Mariucci, “Tra prudenza e coraggio: i licenziamenti dopo la sentenza n. 194/2018 della Corte costituzionale”, Lavoro e Diritto, 2019, p. 235; A. Zoppoli, “La Consulta interviene sul Jobs Act ma ne evita il cuore: il nuovo bilanciamento nella disciplina del licenziamento”, Diritti Lavori Mercati, 2019, p. 222.
23 Conseil constitutionnel, 7 September 2017, no. 2017-751; Conseil constitutionnel, 21 March 2018, no. 2018- 761.
24 Conseil d’Etat, 7 December 2017, no. 415243. T. Sachs, «Le barème d’indemnisation du licenciement injustifié : l’épreuve (fatidique) du droit international et comparé», Revue de Droit du Travail, 2018, p. 802.
25 Conseil de Prud’hommes of Troyes, 13 December 2018, no. 18/00036; Conseil de Prud’hommes of Grenoble, 22 July 2019, no. 18/00267; Court of Appeal of Reims, 25 September 2019, no. 19/00003. See J. Mouly, «La barémisation des indemnités prud’homales : un premier pas vers l’inconventionnalité ? (À propos du jugement du conseil de prud’hommes de Troyes du 13 déc. 2018)», Droit Social, 2019, p. 122; M. Peyronnet, «Conseils de prud’hommes : conventionnalité (ou non) du plafonnement des indemnités de licenciement?», Dalloz actualité, 2019; P. Lokiec, «Barèmes d’indemnisation en cas de licenciement abusif : la résistance des juges», Recueil Dalloz, 2019, p. 248. It is, however, necessary to emphasise the position of the Court of Cassation, Plenary Ass., of 17 July 2019, no. 19-70.010, which is in line with that of the Constitutional Council.
26 L. Nogler, U. Reifner (dir.), Life Time Contracts. Social Long-term Contracts in Labour, Tenancy and Consumer Credit Law, Eleven International publishing, 2014; L. Ratti (dir.), Embedding the Principles of Life Time Contracts. A Research Agenda for Contract Law, Eleven International Publishing, 2018.
27 M. Fabre-Magnan, “Life Time Contracts and General Contract Law in the EU: Pour un Droit Commun des Life Time Contracts », in L. Ratti (dir), Embedding, op. cit., p. 33.
28 P. Ancel, «Postface : Regards d’un civiliste français», in L. Ratti (dir.), Embedding, op. cit., p. 310.
29 P. Ancel, «Les dynamiques d’influence dans l’élaboration du nouveau droit des contrats: quel rôle pour les efforts d’uniformisation et le droit comparé dans les réformes nationales des droits des contrats?», Colloquium «Tendances et paradoxes du droit contemporain des contrats», Montreal, 14 October 2016.
30 M. Fabre-Magnan, «Le droit du travail vu du droit civil : l’unité du droit des obligations», special issue, Semaine Sociale Lamy Regards croisés sur le droit social, suppl. no. 1095 of 28 October 2002, p. 32.
31 G. Centamore, “I licenziamenti in Francia”, in M. Pedrazzoli (dir.), Le discipline dei licenziamenti in Europa. Ricognizioni e confronti, Franco Angeli, 2014, p. 72; M.T. Carinci, “L’“obbligo di ripescaggio” nel licenziamento per giustificato motivo oggettivo di tipo economico alla luce del Jobs Act”, Rivista Italiana di Diritto del Lavoro, 2017, p. 203; C. Colosimo, “L’obbligo di repêchage alla luce del rinnovato art. 2103 c.c.”, Notiziario di Giurisprudenza del Lavoro, 2020, p. 51.
32 G. Natullo, “La Cassazione delimita il controllo del giudice sul licenziamento per giustificato motivo oggettivo”, Rivista Giuridica del Lavoro e della Previdenza Sociale, 2017, p. 257; V. Speziale, “Il giustificato motivo oggettivo: extrema ratio o “normale” licenziamento economico?”, in A. Perulli (dir.), Il licenziamento per giustificato motivo oggettivo, Giappichelli, 2017, p. 119.
33 J. Barthelemy, “Le rôle de la jurisprudence dans le droit de la formation”, Droit Social, 2014, p. 1008; S. Brun, “Capacità, valutazione e insufficienza professionale nell’ordinamento francese”, Giornale di Diritto del Lavoro e di Relazioni Industriali, 2016, p. 55.
34 U. Gargiulo, “Lo jus variandI nel nuovo art. 2103 c.c.”, Rivista Giuridica del Lavoro e della Previdenza Sociale, 2015, p. 619; F. Liso, “Brevi osservazioni sulla revisione della disciplina delle mansioni contenuta nel decreto legislativo n. 81/2015 e su alcune recenti tendenze di politica legislativa in materia di rapporto di lavoro”, in L. Calcaterra (dir), Tutele del lavoro ed esigenze della produzione. Le riforme del quinquennio 2011-2015. Studi in onore di Raffaele De Luca Tamajo, Editoriale Scientifica, 2018, 1239.
35 G. Merlo, «Le rôle de la formation dans le cadre des contrats à temps essentiels à l’existence de la personne», in L. Ratti (dir.), Embedding, op. cit., p. 117.
36 See G. Alpa, “Il dibattito intorno ai danni punitivi”, Contratto e Impresa, 2017, p. 1084.
37 D. Amoroso, “Sull’obbligo della Corte costituzionale italiana di “prendere in considerazione” le decisioni del Comitato europeo dei diritti sociali”, in Forum di Quaderni Costituzionali La normativa italiana sui licenziamenti: quale compatibilità con la Costituzione e la Carta sociale europea? Atti del seminario in previsione dell’udienza pubblica della Corte Costituzionale del 25 settembre 2018 sulla questione di costituzionalità sul d. lgs n. 23/2015, 2018, p. 81.
38 G. Orlandini, “L’Europa va contro la riforma renziana”, Il Manifesto, 12 February 2020; S. Giubboni, Anni difficili. I licenziamenti in Italia in tempi di crisi, Giappichelli, 2020, p. 177; R. Diamanti, “Il risarcimento danni conseguente al licenziamento illegittimo. Il percorso della Corte di giustizia, della Corte costituzionale e del Comitato Europeo dei diritti sociali”, Lavoro Diritti Europa, 2021.
39 M. Delfino, “EU rules on individual dismissals: a roar or a meow?”, European Journal of Social Law, 2013, p. 306; A. Adinolfi, “Disciplina del licenziamento individuale e fonti europee: quali limiti ed obblighi per il legislatore nazionale?”, Rivista Diritto Internazionale, 2015, p. 1109; O. Razzolini, “Effettività e diritto del lavoro nel dialogo fra ordinamento dell’Unione e ordinamento interno”, Lavoro e Diritto, 2017, p. 463; P. Saracini, “La nuova centralità del licenziamento dopo il Jobs Act: ce lo chiede davvero l’Europa?”, Rivista Internazionale di Studi Europei, 2017, p. 35. See also Court of Justice of the European Union, 4 June 2020, C-32/2020. This decision reminds us that Article 30 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union is a standard that is “pending” in every field.
40 L. Ratti, “Il pilastro europeo per i diritti sociali nel processo di rifondazione dell’Europa sociale”, in W. Chiaromonte, M. D. Ferrara (dir.), Bisogni sociali e tecniche di tutela giuslavoristica. Questioni aperte e prospettive future, Franco Angeli, 2018, p. 7.
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