Skip to navigation – Site map
2. Contagion adaptative

Comportements adaptatifs sans croyances

Sylvain Béal and Jacques Durieu
p. 119-140

Abstracts

In this paper, we consider situations where agents face repeatedly the same decision problem. We focus on adaptive rules without beliefs. We distinguish between two kinds of models. Firstly, we study adaptive rules that are only based on private information. Decisions are made on the basis of past payoffs. Moreover, some of these models incorporate an aspiration level : the agent compares the payoff which he receives to this aspiration level. Secondly, we present adaptive rules that take into account information about other agents. Each agent observes the actions of others and makes a decision via imitation. Various imitations rules are investigated and discussed.Adaptation, renforcement, seuil d’aspiration, imitation.

Top of page

References

Bibliographical reference

Sylvain Béal and Jacques Durieu, « Comportements adaptatifs sans croyances », Revue d'économie industrielle, 114-115 | 2006, 119-140.

Electronic reference

Sylvain Béal and Jacques Durieu, « Comportements adaptatifs sans croyances », Revue d'économie industrielle [Online], 114-115 | 2e-3e trimestre 2006, Online since 29 November 2007, connection on 02 June 2020. URL : http://journals.openedition.org/rei/358 ; DOI : https://doi.org/10.4000/rei.358

Top of page

About the authors

Sylvain Béal

Post-doctorant à l’Université d’Heidelberg. Ses recherches concernent la théorie des jeux.

Jacques Durieu

Maître de conférences en Sciences économiques à l’Université de Saint-Étienne. Ses recherches portent essentiellement sur la théorie des jeux et l’étude des comportements adaptatifs. CREUSET, Université de Saint-Étienne.

Top of page

Copyright

© Revue d’économie industrielle

Top of page