Migration Policies and Threat-based Extraversion. Analysing the Impact of European Externalisation Policies on African Polities

*Politiques migratoires et extraversion. Comment analyser l'impact de
l'externalisation sur les systèmes politiques africains*

*Políticas migratorias y extraversión. Cómo analizar el impacto de la
externalización en los sistemas políticos africanos*

Ferruccio Pastore and Emanuela Roman

Electronic version

URL: <https://journals.openedition.org/remi/14591>

DOI: 10.4000/remi.14591

ISSN: 1777-5418

Publisher

Université de Poitiers

Printed version

Date of publication: 1 October 2020

Number of pages: 133-152

ISBN: 979-10-90426-66-5

ISSN: 0765-0752

Electronic reference

Ferruccio Pastore and Emanuela Roman, "Migration Policies and Threat-based Extraversion. Analysing the Impact of European Externalisation Policies on African Polities", *Revue européenne des migrations internationales* [Online], vol. 36 - n°1 | 2020, Online since 03 janvier 2022, connection on 28 juin 2022. URL: <http://journals.openedition.org/remi/14591> ; DOI: <https://doi.org/10.4000/remi.14591>

Research Note

Migration Policies and Threat-based Extraversion. Analysing the Impact of European Externalisation Policies on African Polities

Ferruccio Pastore¹ and Emanuela Roman²

Introduction: Africa as a Growing Priority for the External Dimension of European Migration Policies

Since 2015 the geography of unauthorised “mixed flows” (including both refugees and other categories of migrants) across the EU’s external borders has changed substantially (Pastore, 2015). While detections along what the EU’s border agency Frontex calls the “Eastern Mediterranean route” (from Turkey to Greece across the Aegean Sea) dropped from almost 900,000 in 2015 to about 50,000 in 2018 and 71,000 in 2019, the volume of arrivals along the “Central Mediterranean route” (from Libya and Tunisia to Italy) grew from around 150,000 in 2015 to about 181,000 in 2016, to decline again to 30,000 in 2018 and 11,000 in 2019. In the meantime, the “Western Mediterranean route” (connecting Morocco to Spain) gained importance: while in 2016 crossings were at an historical low of 14,500, they reached 76,000 in 2018 and decreased again to about 33,000 in 2019.³

This complex series of shifts has been driven by multiple factors. On the one hand, the effective implementation of the control component of the extremely

¹ Director at the Forum for International and European Research on Immigration (FIERI), Piazza Arbarello 8, 10122 Torino, Italy; ferruccio.pastore@fieri.it
He is the author of the first, fourth and fifth sections.

² Researcher at the Forum for International and European Research on Immigration (FIERI), Piazza Arbarello 8, 10122 Torino, Italy; emanuela.roman@fieri.it
She is the author of the second and third sections.

The research on which this article is based benefits from the generous support of Compagnia di San Paolo. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the WIDER Development Conference on “Migration and mobility – New frontiers for research and policy”, jointly organized by UNU-WIDER and the African Research Universities Alliance (ARUA), 5-6 October 2017, Accra, Ghana. The authors thank the students and researchers who, through their comments during that conference, contributed to improve the contents of this article. The responsibility for any error or inaccuracy rests exclusively on the authors.

³ Source: International Organisation for Migration (IOM), <https://migration.iom.int/europe?type=arrivals> (accessed on 17 June 2020).

controversial EU-Turkey deal of March 2016 (European Commission, 2017a; European Stability Initiative, 2019) certainly played a crucial role. On the other hand, shifts across migration routes have been critically influenced by the persisting instability in Libya, where the migratory pressure from the African continent has increasingly been concentrated (UNHCR, 2017; UNHCR, 2019). However, in 2018 the bulk of the irregular maritime crossings to the EU shifted again, partly away from Libya toward Spain, mainly due to a set of largely informal cooperation arrangements reached in summer 2017 between Italian and Libyan authorities.⁴

This overall dynamic generated the perception among officials and policy-makers that migration pressure from Africa was on the rise. In the words of Frontex analysts:

“Coinciding with the increase in the Central and Western Mediterranean, detections of African migrants reached a record high of over 180,000, compared with an average of about 40,000 detections between 2009 and 2013. This surge reveals a *steady increase in migration pressure from the African continent*, and in particular West Africa.”
(Frontex, 2017: 18)

The dominant perception in Brussels and the main European capitals that the most pressing priority is now migration from Sub-Saharan Africa has produced immediate repercussions on the EU's agenda setting. While the so-called “external dimension” of European migration policies traditionally had a very broad and little prioritised geographical scope (as evident, for instance, with the Global Approach to Migration launched in 2005), since 2016 an opposite approach has prevailed. With the “new Partnership Framework with third countries” launched by the Commission in June 2016 (European Commission, 2016) a narrow set of short-term priority countries is singled out for immediate action. Besides Jordan and Lebanon, included for their key role in hosting massive amounts of Syrian refugees, all priority countries are in Sub-Saharan Africa: Ethiopia, Mali, Niger, Nigeria and Senegal.

This is a strikingly heterogeneous assemblage of countries, including two regional powers like Nigeria and Ethiopia, two among the poorest world's countries (Mali and Niger), and one traditional and “easier” partner like Senegal. The only common denominators amongst the five being: a) their role as origin and/or transit zones in current unauthorised (and unwanted) flows towards Europe; and b) the apparent viability of some political cooperation in this field. In fact, other key countries like Eritrea or Sudan have not been included due to their internal political situation, which would probably make it too embarrassing for the EU to engage directly.

These are the EU's immediate priorities. However, a wider target is represented by the expanding pool of potential beneficiaries of the “Trust Fund for Stability and addressing root causes of irregular migration and displaced persons in

⁴ On the growing trend towards informalisation of international agreements in the migration sector, see Cassarino (2007 and 2018).

Africa”, established by the Valletta Summit in November 2015 and currently worth around 4.7 billion euros (pledged).⁵

In at least one policy field, thus, describing Africa as Europe’s top priority is neither a paradox nor a provocation. It is an emerging fact with deep practical implications in terms of contents and prospects of political relations between the EU, its member states and African countries. But it also has important conceptual implications in terms of modes of interaction among these actors. Indeed, the growing salience of the external dimension in European migration strategies endows Sub-Saharan leaderships with unprecedented opportunities to capitalise on securitised perceptions of migration by positioning themselves as proxy implementers of restrictive migration policies inspired by potential destination states in the EU. This is what we propose to frame theoretically as “threat-based extraversion”.

In the following section, we will analyse some recent trends in the external dimension of European migration policies. In the third section, we will provide an overview of the academic literature on this increasingly relevant area of European migration policies, highlighting its partial focus and euro-centric bias. In the fourth section, drawing on the path breaking work of Jean-François Bayart (2000; 2009), we will introduce the concept of “threat-based extraversion” as a tool to analyse the impact of the increasingly heavy European migration-related conditionality on African political counterparts. Finally, we will devote some concluding remarks to the potential role of Afro-European research cooperation for rethinking and rebalancing the EU-Africa migration policy agenda.

The Evolving (and Contradictory) Contents of European Foreign Migration Policies

Since 2011, the geopolitical earthquakes in the EU’s southern and south-eastern neighbourhood have brought to unprecedented levels of exposure of the bloc to unplanned (and largely unwanted) migration. Feeling seriously threatened, in a context of growing public anxiety and ruthless political competition over migration issues, European governments and institutions have first attempted to find internal solutions through a fairer distribution of reception and protection “burdens” among member states (Wagner *et al.*, 2018). However, this strategy has blatantly failed, as demonstrated first by the disappointing outcomes of the relocation decisions of September 2015, and then by the inconclusive negotiations on the reform of the Dublin Regulation. To compensate these failures, policy efforts have been increasingly concentrated on external responses aimed at preventing migration and/or stopping migrants (Pastore, 2017; Carrera *et al.*, 2019).

Still, preventing migration and stopping migrants is clearly not the same. A certain level of ambivalence, or even ambiguity, about real priorities and ultimate goals of the external dimension of migration policies has characterised the EU’s action in this field since its beginnings in the early 1990s (Boswell,

⁵ https://ec.europa.eu/trustfundforafrica/content/homepage_en (accessed on 17 June 2020).

2003). On the one hand, it has always been clear and explicit that stemming “illegal” migration was a key goal, pursued not only by combating organised human smuggling,⁶ but also by deterring, blocking and if necessary repatriating individual unauthorised migrants.

On the other hand, since the end of the 1990s, on paper at least (for instance in the landmark Tampere Conclusions of the October 1999 European Council), external migration strategies have been less exclusively focused on law enforcement and more comprehensive, pursuing preventive goals along with coercive ones. Although at that time a majority of European states was ruled by Centre-Left majorities, this programmatic turn was not just driven by ideological concerns. The awareness started growing that dealing with migration from least-developed countries only through repressive means could entail serious diplomatic backlashes and other types of unwanted side effects in the medium and long term.

A more balanced approach to the external dimension of migration has become routine at EU level, at least at rhetorical level. Official EU documents say that Europe’s foreign migration policy is not just about stemming unauthorised flows; it is also about preventing them by creating legal alternatives, informing about the risks of irregular migration and, above all, addressing the “root causes” of the phenomenon.⁷ For instance, according to the “European Agenda on Migration” (European Commission, 2015), the most recent encompassing planning document in this policy field, the EU’s migration strategy rests on four pillars: i) “reducing the incentives for irregular migration”; ii) “saving lives and securing external borders”; iii) fulfilling “Europe’s duty to protect” through “a strong common asylum policy”; and last, but officially not least, iv) “a new policy on legal migration”.

On paper, all four pillars are equal and built in parallel. In practice, however, the degree of priority is extremely uneven and, if one looks at the discourse of the real power holders, i.e. at the European Council’s documents, this becomes quite explicit. For instance, in June 2016, the Heads of state and government made it very explicit that the repatriation of unauthorised migrants was far more pressing than other policy goals, by stating that “cooperation on readmission and return will be a key test of the partnership between the EU and [its] partners” (European Council conclusions, 28 June 2016, point 2). When meeting again in December 2016, the European Council prioritised once again the same strategic objective: it called “upon member states to continue and step up their engagement under the Partnership Framework” and declared that it “will keep progress on stemming the flows and improving return rates under close review” (European Council conclusions, 15 December 2016, point 2).

6 A critical milestone, from this point of view, was the adoption of the Protocols against smuggling and trafficking attached to the 2000 Palermo Convention against transnational organised crime. EU member states were a decisive force behind this important development, which paved the way for a global criminalisation of behaviours that until that moment had been treated as harmless (and were often very popular) almost everywhere, except in a few immigration states in Western Europe and North America.

7 For an analysis of the plurality of strategic approaches (and of the associated rhetorics) used by European governments and institutions in this field, see Carling and Hernández-Carretero (2011).

Under growing political pressure, with electoral outcomes throughout the European Union increasingly conditioned by migration issues, this hierarchy of priorities seems to have gradually been interiorised also by the European Commission. As a matter of fact, also for the usually more principled and rights-based EU executive body, “the overall philosophy appears to be ‘whatever works’” (Lehne, 2016).

This shift is made very clear for instance by the way in which ongoing cooperation with Niger – one of the priority countries of the EU’s New Partnership Framework and the main transit corridor from the whole West Africa to Libya and Italy (Brachet, 2009) – is described by the Commission:

“Cooperation with Niger as a key transit country continues to be effective. [...] There has been a clear decline in departures of migrants from Agadez towards Europe (from the peak of 70,000 departures in May to 6,524 in January 2017). The number of migrants being directed towards the International Organisation for Migration for repatriation has increased, together with voluntary returns.” (European Commission, 2017b: 3)

Meanwhile, development projects in the region of Agadez meant to address the root causes of migration and provide economic alternatives to the smuggling industry had a very limited impact, as in the case of a training project for brick-making and jewellery production that benefitted (the unimpressive number of) 600 persons (European Commission, 2017b: 3). Through the Trust Fund for Africa, the EU funded also a project called PAIERA, Action Plan for a Rapid Economic Impact in Agadez. The project, worth 8 million euro, envisaged a compensation scheme for those who decided to leave the smuggling industry to start an alternative small business. However, two years after its launch, only 371 out of 6,500 applications were approved, causing disappointment and frustration in the local population (Howden and Zandonini, 2018; Zandonini, 2019).

The Euro-centric Bias of Most Academic Literature on the “External Dimension” of Migration Policies

As we will argue in the next section, the recent evolution of European migration policies towards Sub-Saharan Africa is deeply affecting not only Afro-European relations at different levels, but also internal political dynamics in several African countries. This broad impact of European migration policies, however, has so far been largely neglected by academic literature on migration policies.⁸

European studies and European migration studies have mainly analysed the emergence of an “external dimension” in the EU migration and asylum policies from an “internal” perspective, as a further development in the process of Europeanisation of migration and asylum policies. From this point of view, the suppression of internal border controls in the Schengen area has required not only an enhanced cooperation among member states, but also an increased cooperation with countries of origin and transit in order to strengthen controls

⁸ This section builds upon the research carried out in the framework of the MEDRESET Project (<http://www.medreset.eu/>) funded under the European Commission’s Horizon 2020 Programme for Research and Innovation (Grant Agreement No. 693055). See in particular Roman *et al.* (2017).

at the EU external borders and to deter and curtail irregular migration into the EU. Therefore, according to Boswell (2003), the process of externalisation was to some extent the “natural continuation” of the process of Europeanisation of migration and asylum policies. Similarly, Lavenex highlighted the continuity between internal communitarisation (“shifting up”) and external widening (“shifting out”) of European migration policies, with migration law enforcement as a constant priority (Lavenex, 2006: 330).

In line with this introverted perspective on the external dimension of migration policies, a number of scholars have emphasised also the role played by European national bureaucracies both in Europeanisation and externalisation processes (Guiraudon, 2000 and 2003; Guiraudon and Lahav, 2000; Lavenex, 2006). According to these authors, both processes can essentially be interpreted as strategies by interior ministries and immigration officials to emancipate themselves from normative and institutional constraints on their essentially restrictive and control-oriented approaches to migration policy-making.

Even though these studies represent an important key to interpret the externalisation of migration policies, they are overall characterised by a Euro-centric approach that frames EU external policies in the area of migration as part of the EU integration process. Little attention is paid to the impact of such policies on “partner countries” outside Europe.

Along with literature that has tried to explain the reasons for and the main features of the externalisation of EU migration policies towards its southern neighbourhood, another abundant strand of literature has addressed this process critically, from different perspectives and involving various disciplines. Critical legal scholars have typically criticised EU external migration policies from a human rights perspective, focusing on how “*non-entrée* policies” (Hathaway, 1992) and cooperation with third countries in the area of migration management and border control may hamper migrants’ access to protection and right to asylum (Gammeltoft-Hansen, 2006, 2011, 2012 and 2014; Gammeltoft-Hansen and Hathaway, 2015). Others have focused on states’ responsibility for migrant deaths occurring as an indirect effect of their restrictive migration policies (Spijkerboer, 2007 and 2013).

Critical migration studies have often shared a prevalent geographical focus on the Mediterranean region, identifying the securitisation of migration as one of the essential features of externalisation (Huysmans, 2000 and 2006; Collyer, 2006; Ceyhan and Tsoukala, 2002; Lutterbeck, 2006; Bigo, 2005).

Also the increasing involvement of private actors and international organisations in the management of migration at or outside the borders of the EU, has been an important topic for critical migration studies. Delegation of archetypical state functions to non-state actors has often been interpreted as a way to maximise the effectiveness and minimise the costs and visibility of measures and operations in the fields of migration control, border surveillance, immigration detention and forced return. Several scholars have focused on migration management as a way for international organisations like the IOM and the UNHCR to legitimise and expand their role and activities, to affirm their own logic, and to partly emancipate themselves from their own funders — i.e. the states (Geiger and Pécoud,

2014; Koch, 2014; Korneev, 2014; Pécoud, 2015). In a similar vein, migration management has often been analysed as a lucrative business for private actors, as an “industry” producing profits and specific “services,” i.e. assistance to migrants in organising migration or to states in controlling it (Andersson, 2014; Gammeltoft-Hansen and Nyberg Sorensen, 2013).

A contiguous cluster of critical literature on the governance of irregular migration to Europe is increasingly concerned with the issue of human smuggling. A number of scholars have examined the criminalisation of migrant smuggling and have denounced the dominant criminological approach characterising research on this topic. They have also pointed out the framing processes that have resulted in smugglers being over-simplistically represented as criminals (Baird, 2016; Tinti and Reitano, 2017; for a comprehensive analytical and critical literature review on migrant smuggling, see Baird and van Liempt, 2016). At the policy level, some of these authors have claimed that European policy responses aimed at countering migrant smuggling should go beyond a dominant security-oriented approach and envisage more structural and comprehensive solutions, including accessible pathways for people in need of protection to cross the Mediterranean into Europe (Achilli and Sanchez, 2017). Most of these different branches of critical literature on EU external migration policies do also share a certain Euro-centric approach, if only because their criticism is based on European categories and discourses.⁹

In contrast, some international relations scholars have adopted an alternative perspective. They argued that far from being solely a unilateral process whereby the EU and its member states export migration control instruments outside their territory, EU external migration policies consist of a network of complex and ever-changing bilateral and multilateral relations, whereby the EU, its member states and third countries exercise power or pressure on the counterpart across different policy fields (Paoletti, 2010, 2011a and 2011b; Cassarino, 2005, 2007 and 2010; Pastore, 2002; Paoletti and Pastore, 2010; Pastore and Trinchieri, 2008; Pastore, 2016; Tsourapas, 2017 and 2018).

According to these scholars, the EU’s external dimension cannot be understood only in terms of “mechanical” delegation of migration control functions to countries of origin and transit (as it has traditionally been) but rather as a “bargaining process,” where both parties involved are able to affect the behaviour of their counterpart by using all instruments at their disposal, not only in the area of migration, but also through issue linkages with other policy areas (e.g. foreign affairs, trade, development, energy, security).

9 A sharp criticism of the Western-centric bias of most academic literature and of dominant theories on migration policies is the one levelled by Natter (2017). Among the few exceptions she highlights, most are sectorally focused on emigration and diaspora policies (de Haas and Vezzoli, 2011; FitzGerald, 2006; Gamlen, 2008; Miller and Peters, 2014) or on specific cases of bilateral or multilateral cooperation (Adepoju *et al.*, 2010; Fine, 2015; Lavenex and Uçarer, 2002). A few other studies of migration policies in non-Western contexts are identified (Garcés-Masareñas, 2012; González-Murphy and Koslowski, 2011; Poutignat and Streiff-Fénart, 2010), but they are also criticised as partial or superficial, as “often limited to historical or descriptive accounts of policy developments, [or because they] treat states as single, coherent entities without paying attention to their fragmentations, do not grant them autonomy of their decision making in front of international actors, or ignore the dynamics between civil societies and administrations within those countries” (Natter, 2017: 4). These arguments are developed further in Natter (2018).

Threat-based Extraversion as a Conceptual Tool to Make Sense of the Impact of Migration-related Conditionality in African Contexts

A non-mechanical and non-univocal understanding of political relations between migration-receiving and migration-sending countries, as the one advocated by the authors cited at the end of last section, crucially implies the recognition of the agency of the latter group of countries on the international scene. In the case of Sub-Saharan African sending countries, this is an important and not self-evident implication. Indeed, Africa has traditionally occupied a marginal and theoretically blurred position in the field of international relations and international political studies (Dunn and Shaw, 2001; Gruffyd Jones, 2005; Nkiwane, 2001). According to these accounts, when African countries South of the Sahara have occasionally peeped out on the international relations scene, they have normally done so in second lead roles, mechanically and passively responding to external constraints and more specifically to the political will of their Western and Northern counterparts.

This understanding of the international role of Sub-Saharan African countries, while generally unsatisfactory, appears particularly unsuited to analysing the relations with European countries and institutions in the field of migration management. In trying to overcome this analytical obstacle, a valuable conceptual help comes from the theory of extraversion developed by Jean-François Bayart (2000 and 2009). In his historical sociology of the state in the African context, Bayart distances himself from the mainstream of the dependency theory and from the classical work of authors like Walter Rodney and Basil Davidson, arguing that asymmetries of wealth and power are far from necessarily implying passiveness:

“[...] The uneven and asymmetrical character of the relations between Africa on the one hand, and Asia and Europe on the other, which was accentuated from the 1870s onwards and culminated in the military occupation of the continent, does not exclude the possibility that Africa may have played an active role throughout this long process of reduction to a state of dependency.” (Bayart, 2000: 218)

Extraversion as a strategy of governance and a form of agency is defined as the capacity of African elites to “compensate for their difficulties in the autonomization of their power intensifying the exploitation of their dependants by [...] mobilizing resources derived from their (possibly unequal) relationship with the external environment” (Bayart, 2009: 21).

In Bayart’s account, the primary (although not the only)¹⁰ way in which African oligarchies “capture” the “rent generated by dependency” (Bayart, 2000: 222) is through their capacity to act as gatekeepers controlling the access of external

¹⁰ Migration, in particular, is not absent from Bayart’s conceptual framework. On the contrary, “flight”, i.e. the more or less forced migration of refugees and displaced persons, is singled out as one of the six major “formalities of action” that constitute the basic “grammar” of the relations between Africa and the rest of the world. However, migration is not considered as a strategic diplomatic resource for African states, as it is increasingly becoming, but merely as an individual option for African people and one of several forms of bottom-up connection between Africa and its richer neighbours.

actors to domestic natural resources (including, for centuries, human resources in the form of slaves) and extracting value from this intermediation.

This historically consolidated (and still very actual) form of resource-based extraversion finds, in our view, a useful analytical complement in an emerging form of extraversion that we propose to qualify as *threat-based*, because it capitalises on perceived threats stemming from Africa, that Western actors intend to prevent or avert. In this context, the profit margin for African leaderships resides in their capacity to assure (or at least convince) Europe of their ability to keep such threatening phenomena under control, presenting themselves as credible candidates for effective security outsourcing.¹¹

Threat-based extraversion is obviously not an entirely new phenomenon, nor does it apply only to irregular and unplanned migration. Another area in which the concept can fruitfully be applied is, for instance, that of transnational organised crime and terrorism.¹² Amongst recent examples, one could think of the decisive role that the growing perception of the threat associated with transnational terrorist organisations operating in Africa, particularly in the Sahel region, had in President George W. Bush's decision to set up a United States Africa Command (AFRICOM) in 2008, and in the parallel upgrade of military and intelligence cooperation with a number of African countries (Andersson, 2019).

Nevertheless, with migration things are different in at least two crucial respects. On the one hand, migration is perceived as a *much more diffuse threat*, one that does not stem from however blurred galaxies of militants but potentially from Africa's rapidly expanding population as a whole.¹³

On the other hand, in comparison with terrorism, the "African migration threat" is perceived as *less global in nature*. Although human smuggling networks are generally growing in power and sophistication, in the African case they are still essentially regional or continental in reach. The pressure felt in Europe is not felt, for instance, in North America (in fact, African migration does not feature high in the rich catalogue of security-framed migratory priorities of the Trump administration). The relatively limited reach of smuggling networks has important strategic implications: dealing with Africa's present and future migration is perceived as a real issue only by European governments (and not by all of them at the same degree), certainly not by the US administration nor by the international community as a whole.

11 Non-EU countries, and especially EU neighbouring states can use different approaches and try to deploy different degrees of coercion in their attempts to capitalise on their position as refugee host countries and/or potential transit corridors. In theorising "refugee rentier states", for instance, Tsourapas (2019) makes an important distinction between Jordan's and Lebanon's "back-scratching strategy" based on bargains, and Turkey's more aggressive (and allegedly more rentable) "blackmailing strategy" based on threats (Tsourapas, 2019: 1).

12 For a similar argument, see Keen and Andersson (2018).

13 For projections on the demographic future of Africa, see the 2019 Revision of the *World Population Prospects* regularly updated by the United Nations' Population Division, whose dataset can be accessed here: <https://population.un.org/wpp/> (accessed on 17 June 2020). On the instrumental uses of demography to sustain alarmist narratives aimed at boosting populist consensus, see Héran (2018).

Getting back to Europe, mixed migration flows from Africa have undoubtedly become a major Achilles' heel, with ever more evident geopolitical implications. Thus, the leaderships of states embodying a tangible migration threat for Europe are placed in a new and potentially very profitable strategic position where they can provide their services as proxy migration controllers at high prices. There are two resounding precedents. A first example of the profit opportunities deriving from Europe's migration fears is the Treaty on Friendship, Partnership and Cooperation, signed by Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi and Libyan *rais* Muammar Gaddafi in August 2008. In that case, the price for cooperation in controlling migration flows was set in 5 billion dollars to be paid by Italy mainly in kind (i.e. with infrastructures financed through a raise in taxes over Italian energy companies operating in Libya) over twenty years (Paoletti, 2010, 2011a and 2011b; Paoletti and Pastore, 2010; Tsourapas, 2017). But the most spectacular advertisement of the lucre potential associated with Europe's migratory Achilles' heel, although not limited to African migration, came with the signature of the EU-Turkey deal of March 2016, worth 6 billion euros over a much shorter lapse of time (Peers and Roman, 2016; Rygiel *et al.*, 2016).

Studying Migration-related Extraversion in Practice: A Research Agenda with Policy Implications

The long-term detrimental effects of resource-based extraversion (i.e. the reinforcement of the autocratic features of African political systems, the systematic depletion of economic and human resources, disincentives to local economic accumulation and investment, powerful perverse incentives to protracted civil and international conflicts, etc.) have been widely studied.¹⁴ Conversely, targeted empirical research on the effects of migration-related extraversion on specific African contexts is still virtually non-existent.

This article is a preliminary and mainly conceptual exploration of some important emerging phenomena and it does not have any systematic empirical ambition. Based on the authors' past research on the external dimension of European migration policies, however, it is possible to tentatively identify several types of possible perverse effects of an unbalanced approach indiscriminately prioritising migration controls and the "struggle against illegal migration" over the promotion of legal mobility and the prevention of forced migration.

A first possible risk is that an unbalanced and overly repressive externalisation of migration controls undermines the political stability of African "partner states" of origin and transit. Different dynamics can concur in generating this perverse effect. In a context of threat-based extraversion such as the one described above, the primary political interlocutors of European states mainly interested in the outsourcing of migration controls tend to be security apparatuses. In polities (not just in Sub-Saharan Africa of course) where the democratic control on the military and police is already limited, this additional external incentive may lead to further concentrations of power. The authoritarian involution observed in Turkey after the signature of the March 2016 migration deal, or the worsening of

¹⁴ For a compelling analytical reconstruction of these self-destructing mechanisms, see Bates (2008).

political repression in Ethiopia in a phase of intensified migration cooperation with the EU (at least until the election to the premiership of Abiy Ahmed in April 2018) may be partly explained in this way.

The almost obsessive emphasis put by European and international actors on border security and the countering of irregular migration can have a noxious influence on African political behaviours also in another sense, namely by discouraging openness towards intra-African refugee flows. Actually, such a dynamic is already at work, as effectively summarised by Sipho Mthathi, Oxfam's Executive Director in South Africa, in a powerful intervention before an audience of EU leaders at the European Development Days:

"Governments in Africa are watching what Europe is doing. They see how Europe wants to prevent migration because Europeans think of migration as a problem. As a consequence, some of our governments are changing their approach and copying the European template. They have started to make deals with other countries to make sure that people stay there. [...] Some African governments are now using Europe as an excuse for not taking responsibility. They say: 'If Europe doesn't do it, why should we – with fewer resources – do it?' The European approach seems to be that they want to pay, and somebody else will take responsibility. But it's creating a chain reaction where nobody takes responsibility."¹⁵

However, an excessive focus on migration restrictions and readmission can have destabilising effects also by undermining popular consensus for African governments that accept to perform a containment role on behalf of European states of destination. Several observers have argued, for instance, that the iron lid on the geographical mobility of Arab youth, imposed by Schengen's Europe but enforced by North African autocrats, had a significant role in generating the explosive tension that led to the 2011 uprisings.¹⁶

Furthermore, exogenous restrictions on international mobility can have detrimental side effects on regional political and economic dynamics. This is for instance happening in Western Africa, where the European emphasis on reinforcement of border controls risks hampering, if not thoroughly disrupting,

¹⁵ Speech given on 20 June 2017, full text available here: http://oxfameu.blogactiv.eu/2017/06/20/africa-to-eu-live-up-to-responsibility-on-migration/?utm_source=EurActiv+Newsletter&utm_campaign=e32a813b96-Bmail&utm_medium=email&utm_term=0_bab5f0ea4e-e32a813b96-245335561 (accessed on 14 December 2018).

¹⁶ There seems to be a growing awareness also among African governing elites of the potentially disruptive local impact of repressive migration policies induced by exogenous conditionality. A striking sign comes from a very explicit passage — a sort of general "safety clause" — of the "Memorandum of understanding on cooperation in the development sector, to combat illegal immigration, human trafficking and contraband and on reinforcing the border security" signed by the Italian Prime Minister Paolo Gentiloni and the Head of the Libyan National Reconciliation Government Fayez al-Serraj on 2 February 2017. The passage reads: "Recognizing that measures and initiatives undertaken to solve the irregular migrants' situation in accordance with this Memorandum don't have to damage in any way the Libyan social fabric or threaten the demographic equilibrium of the Country or the economic situation and the security conditions of Libyan citizens" (unofficial English version available at: <http://www.asgi.it/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/ITALY-LIBYA-MEMORANDUM-02.02.2017.pdf>. The official Italian version is available at: http://www.repubblica.it/esteri/2017/02/02/news/migranti_accordo_italia-libia_ecco_cosa_contiene_in_memorandum-157464439/; both accessed on 14 December 2018).

the already difficult economic integration within the transnational space of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS).

Finally, a security-driven externalisation of European restrictive migration strategies, if not accompanied by parallel and tangible development advances, risks producing unintended and negative effects on the specific dynamics of irregular migration, by boosting professional smuggling and corruption among border guards, as well as by redirecting flows along more remote and dangerous routes. Such dynamics, well documented for instance along the Mexico-US border (Andreas 2009; Massey *et al.*, 2016), can now be observed in the North of Niger and elsewhere in the Sahara.¹⁷

All these potentially harmful side effects that European migration strategies and threat-based extraversion patterns risk inducing are completely neglected in the European public debate and greatly underestimated in policymaking circles.

Documenting such dynamics is a complex research endeavour for several reasons. From a methodological and epistemological point of view, because it requires in-depth and systematic cooperation across disciplines and between European and African scholars. From a practical point of view, this emerging research agenda may be hampered by difficulties accessing the field (e.g. in border regions or in the remote areas where refugee camps are often located) due both to logistical obstacles and political restrictions (Andersson, 2016 and 2019).

Nevertheless, however challenging, this is a very important research agenda, both because it is empirically and theoretically innovative, and because it is highly politically relevant. As a matter of fact, if the perverse dynamics that we have tentatively described are not carefully considered and countered through a more balanced and cooperative approach, EU-driven migration strategies in Africa are at high risk of backfiring, and eventually reinforcing the very “push factors” of forced migration that they are meant to mitigate.

References

Achilli Luigi and Sanchez Gabriella (2017) What Does It Mean to Disrupt the Business Models of People Smugglers?, *MPC Policy Briefs*, 09, [online] last checked on 14/12/2018. URL: <http://hdl.handle.net/1814/46165>

Adepoju Aderanti, van Noorloos Femke and Zoomers Annelies (2010) Europe's Migration Agreements with Migrant-Sending Countries in the Global South: A Critical Review, *International Migration*, 48 (3), pp. 42-75.

Andersson Ruben (2019) *No Go World. How Fear is Redrawing our Maps and Infecting Our Politics*, Oakland, University of California Press.

17 See, for instance, Flynn (2015) and Raineri (2017). The redirection of irregular migration flows along alternative routes is now officially acknowledged also by the European Commission: “[...] the decrease registered [along traditional routes] does not necessarily translate into a one on one reduction of the overall flow reaching Libya, as new routes by-passing the reinforced border controls are being exploited. These new routes are more difficult to use and riskier, leading to higher prices demanded by the smugglers for transport, and higher risks for the migrants” (European Commission, 2017c: 4).

Andersson Ruben (2016) Here be dragons: Mapping an ethnography of global danger, *Current Anthropology*, 57 (6), pp. 707-731.

Andersson Ruben (2014) *Illegality, Inc. Clandestine Migration and the Business of Bordering Europe*, Oakland, University of California Press.

Andreas Peter (2009 [2000]) *Border Games. Policing the U.S.-Mexico Divide*, Ithaca, Cornell University Press.

Baird Theodore (2016) Defining Human Smuggling in Migration Research: An Appraisal and Critique, *EU Working Papers RSCAS*, 30, [online] last checked on 14/12/2018. URL: <http://hdl.handle.net/1814/41508>

Baird Theodore and van Liempt Ilse (2016) Scrutinising the Double Disadvantage: Knowledge Production in the Messy Field of Migrant Smuggling, *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 42 (3), pp. 400-417.

Bates Robert H. (2008) *When Things Fell Apart. State Failure in Late-Century Africa*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

Bayart Jean-François (2009) *The State in Africa. The Politics of the Belly*, Cambridge, Polity Press.

Bayart Jean-François (2000) Africa in the World: A History of Extraversion, *African Affairs*, 99 (395), pp. 217-267.

Bigo Didier (2005) Frontier Controls in the European Union: Who Is in Control?, in Didier Bigo and Elspeth Guild Eds., *Controlling Frontiers: Free Movement Into and Within Europe*, Aldershot, Ashgate, pp. 49-99.

Boswell Christina (2003) The "External Dimension" of EU Immigration and Asylum Policy, in *International Affairs*, 79 (3), pp. 619-638.

Brachet Julien (2009) *Migrations transsahariennes : vers un désert cosmopolite et morcelé (Niger)*, Paris, Éditions du Croquant.

Carling Jørgen and Hernández-Carretero Maria (2011) Protecting Europe and Protecting Migrants? Strategies for Managing Unauthorised Migration from Africa, *British Journal of Politics and International Relations*, 13 (1), pp. 42-58.

Carrera Sergio, den Hertog Arie Pieter Leonhard, Panizzon Marion and Kostakopoulou Dora (2019) *EU External Migration Policies in an Era of Global Mobilities: Intersecting Policy Universes*, Brill/Nijhoff.

Cassarino Jean-Pierre (2018) Informalising EU readmission cooperation, in Ariadna Ripoll Servent and Florian Trauner Eds., *The Routledge Handbook of Justice and Home Affairs Research*, London, Routledge, pp. 83-98.

Cassarino Jean-Pierre (Ed.) (2010) *Unbalanced Reciprocities: Cooperation on Readmission in the Euro-Mediterranean Area*, Washington, Middle East Institute.

Cassarino Jean-Pierre (2007) Informalising Readmission Agreements in the EU Neighbourhood, *The International Spectator*, 42 (2), pp. 179-196.

Cassarino Jean-Pierre (2005) Migration and Border Management in the Euro-Mediterranean Area: Heading towards New Forms of Interconnectedness, in IEMed Ed., *Mediterranean Yearbook 2005*, Barcelona, pp. 227-231.

Ceyhan Anastassia and Tsoukala Ayse (2002) The Securitization of Migration in Western Societies: Ambivalent Discourses and Policies, *Alternatives: Global, Local, Political*, 27, Special Issue, pp. 21-39.

Collyer Michael (2006) *Migrants, Migration and the Security Paradigm: Constraints and Opportunities*, *Mediterranean Politics*, 11 (2), pp. 255-270.

De Haas Hein and Vezzoli Simona (2011) *Leaving Matters: The Nature, Evolution and Effects of Emigration Policies*, Oxford, UK, International Migration Institute, University of Oxford, [online] last checked on 14/12/2018. URL: <https://www.imi.ox.ac.uk/publications/wp-34-11>

Dunn Kevin C. and Shaw Timothy M. (Eds.) (2001) *Africa's Challenge to International Relations Theory*, Palgrave, Basingstoke.

European Commission (2017a) *Seventh Report on the Progress made in the implementation of the EU-Turkey Statement*, COM(2017) 470 final, Brussels, [online] last checked on 13/12/2018. URL: https://ec.europa.eu/neighbourhood-enlargement/sites/near/files/20170906_seventh_report_on_the_progress_in_the_implementation_of_the_eu-turkey_statement_en.pdf

European Commission (2017b) *Third Progress Report on the Partnership Framework with third countries under the European Agenda on Migration*, COM(2017) 205 final, [online] last checked on 14/12/2018. URL: https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/com_2017_205_f1_report_from_commission_en_v8_p1_880005_0.pdf

European Commission (2017c) *Fourth Progress Report on the Partnership Framework with third countries under the European Agenda on Migration*, COM(2017) 350 final, [online] last checked on 14/12/2018. URL: https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/4th_progress_report_partnership_framework_with_third_countries_under_european_agenda_on_migration.pdf

European Commission (2016) *Communication on establishing a new Partnership Framework with third countries under the European Agenda on Migration*, COM(2016) 385 final, [online] last checked on 14/12/2018. URL: https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration/proposal-implementation-package/docs/20160607/communication_external_aspects_eam_towards_new_migration_ompact_en.pdf

European Commission (2015) *Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions. A European Agenda on Migration*, COM(2015) 240 final, [online] last checked on 14/12/2018. URL: https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration/background-information/docs/communication_on_the_european_agenda_on_migration_en.pdf

European Stability Initiative (2019) *The EU-Turkey Statement three years on*, ESI Core Facts, April, [online] last checked on 01/07/2019. URL: <https://www.esiweb.org/pdf/ESI%20core%20facts%20-%20EU-Turkey%20Statement%20three%20years%20on%20-%202015%20April%202019.pdf>

Fine Shoshana (2015) *La gestion des migrations internationales en Turquie : Acteurs, savoirs, pratiques*, in Camille Schmoll, Hélène Thiollet et Catherine Wihtol de Wenden Eds., *Migrations en Méditerranée ; Permanences et mutations à l'heure des révolutions et des crises*, Paris, CNRS Éditions, pp. 103-112.

FitzGerald David S. (2006) *Inside the Sending State: The Politics of Mexican Emigration Control*, *International Migration Review*, 40 (2), pp. 259-293.

Flynn Daniel (2015) *Corruption stymies Niger's attempts to stem flow of migrants to Europe*, *The Guardian*, 22 June, [online] last checked on 14/12/2018. URL: <https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2015/jun/22/corruption-niger-attempt-stem-flow-migrants-europe-smugglers-sahara>

Frontex (2017) *Risk Analysis for 2017*, Warsaw, [online] last checked on 14/12/2018. URL: http://frontex.europa.eu/assets/Publications/Risk_Analysis/Annual_Risk_Analysis_2017.pdf

Gamlén Alan (2008) The Emigration State and the Modern Geopolitical Imagination, *Political Geography*, 27 (8), pp. 840-56.

Gammeltoft-Hansen Thomas (2014) International Refugee Law and Refugee Policy: The Case of Deterrence Policies, *Journal of Refugee Studies*, 27 (4), pp. 574-595.

Gammeltoft-Hansen Thomas (2012) The Externalisation of European Migration Control and the Reach of International Refugee Law, in Elspeth Guild and Paul Minderhoud Eds., *The First Decade of EU Migration and Asylum Law*, Leiden and Boston, Martinus Nijhoff, pp. 273-298.

Gammeltoft-Hansen Thomas (2011) *Access to Asylum: International Refugee Law and the Globalisation of Migration Control*, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

Gammeltoft-Hansen Thomas (2006) Outsourcing Migration Management. EU, Power, and the External Dimension of Asylum and Immigration Policy, *DIIS Working Papers*, 1, Copenhagen, Danish Institute for International Studies (DIIS).

Gammeltoft-Hansen Thomas and Hathaway James C. (2015) Non-refoulement in a World of Cooperative Deterrence, *Columbia Journal of Transnational Law*, 53 (2), pp. 235-284.

Gammeltoft-Hansen Thomas and Nyberg Sørensen Ninna (Eds.) (2013) *The Migration Industry and the Commercialization of International Migration*, Abingdon and New York, Routledge.

Garcés-Mascareñas Blanca (2019) Beyond methodological western-centrism. The "control gap" debate reconsidered from a global perspective, in Agnieszka Weiner, Saskia Bonjour and Lyubov Zhyznomirska Eds., *The Routledge Handbook of the Politics of Migration in Europe*, Routledge.

Garcés-Mascareñas Blanca (2012) *Labour Migration in Malaysia and Spain: Markets, Citizenship and Rights*, Amsterdam, Amsterdam University Press.

Geiger Martin and Pécoud Antoine (2014) International Organisations and the Politics of Migration, *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 40 (6), pp. 865-887.

González-Murphy Laura and Koslowski Rey (2011) *Understanding Mexico's Changing Immigration Laws*, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, Washington, DC, Mexico Institute.

Gruffydd Jones Branwen (2005) Africa and the Poverty of International Relations, *Third World Quarterly*, 26 (6), pp. 987-1003.

Guiraudon Virginie (2003) The Constitution of a European Immigration Policy Domain: A Political Sociology Approach, *Journal of European Public Policy*, 10 (2), pp. 263-282.

Guiraudon Virginie (2000) European Integration and Migration Policy: Vertical Policy-Making as Venue Shopping, *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 38 (2), pp. 251-271.

Guiraudon Virginie and Lahav Gallya (2000) A Reappraisal of the State Sovereignty Debate. The Case of Migration Control, *Comparative Political Studies*, 33 (2), pp. 163-195.

Hathaway James (1992) The Emerging Politics of Non-Entrée, *Refugees*, 91, pp. 40-41.

Héran François (2018) Comment se fabrique un oracle. La prophétie de la ruée africaine sur l'Europe, *La Vie des idées*, 18 septembre, [en ligne] consulté le 02/07/2019. URL : <http://www.laviedesidees.fr/migrations-afrique-prejuge-steph-smith-oracle.html>

Howden Daniel and Zandonini Giacomo (2018) Niger: Europe's migration laboratory, *Refugees Deeply*, 22 May, [online] last checked on 17/06/2020. URL: <https://www.newsdeeply.com/refugees/articles/2018/05/22/niger-europes-migration-laboratory>

Huysmans Jef (2006) *The Politics of Insecurity: Fear, Migration and Asylum in the EU*, London, Routledge.

Huysmans Jef (2000) The European Union and the Securitization of Migration, *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 38 (5), pp. 751-777.

Keen David and Andersson Ruben (2018), Double games: Success, failure and the relocation of risk in fighting terror, drugs and migration, *Political Geography*, 67, pp. 100-110.

Koch Anne (2014) The Politics and Discourse of Migrant Return: The Role of UNHCR and IOM in the Governance of Return, *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 40 (6), pp. 905-923.

Korneev Oleg (2014) Exchanging Knowledge, Enhancing Capacities, Developing Mechanisms: IOM's Role in the Implementation of the EU-Russia Readmission Agreement, *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies*, 40 (6), pp. 888-904.

Lavenex Sandra (2006) Shifting Up and Out: The Foreign Policy of European Immigration Control, *West European Politics*, 29 (2), pp. 329-350.

Lavenex Sandra and Uçarer Emek M. (Eds.) (2002) *Migration and the Externalities of European Integration*, Oxford, Lexington Books.

Lehne Stefan (2016) *Upgrading the EU's Migration Partnerships*, Carnegie Europe, 21 November, [online] last checked on 03/07/2019. URL: <http://carnegieeurope.eu/2016/11/21/upgrading-eu-s-migration-partnerships-pub-66209>

Lutterbeck Derek (2006) Policing Migration in the Mediterranean, *Mediterranean Politics*, 11 (1), pp. 59-82.

Massey Douglas S., Durand Jorge and Pren Karen A. (2016) Why Border Enforcement Backfired, *American Journal of Sociology*, 121 (5), pp. 1557-1600.

Miller Michael K. and Peters Margaret E. (2014) Migration Policy and Autocratic Power, APSA Annual Meeting paper, *Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association*, Washington, DC.

Natter Katarina (2018) Rethinking immigration policy theory beyond "Western liberal democracies", *Comparative Migration Studies*, 6 (4), pp. 1-21.

Natter Katarina (2017) *Immigration Policy Theory: Thinking Beyond the "Western Liberal-Democratic" Box*, paper presented at the 14th IMISCOE Annual Conference, Rotterdam.

Nkiwane Tandeka C. (2001) Africa and International Relations: Regional Lessons for a Global Discourse, *International Political Science Review*, 22 (3), pp. 279-290.

Paoletti Emanuela (2010) Relations among Unequals? Readmission between Italy and Libya, in Jean-Pierre Cassarino Ed., *Unbalanced Reciprocities: Cooperation on Readmission in the Euro-Mediterranean Area*, Washington, Middle East Institute, pp. 54-76.

Paoletti Emanuela (2011a) *The Migration of Power and North-South Inequalities. The Case of Italy and Libya*, Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan.

Paoletti Emanuela (2011b) The External Dimension of European Migration Policy: The Case of Libya and Tunisia in Light of the Recent Protests, in IEMed Ed., *Mediterranean Yearbook 2011*, Barcelona, European Institute of the Mediterranean, pp. 292-296.

Paoletti Emanuela and Pastore Ferruccio (2010) Sharing the Dirty Job on the Southern Front? Italian-Libyan Relations on Migrations and Their Impact on the European Union, *IMI Working Papers*, 29, [online] last checked on 14/12/2018. URL: <https://www.imi.ox.ac.uk/publications/wp-29-10>

Pastore Ferruccio (2017) *Beyond the Migration and Asylum Crisis. Options and lessons for Europe*, E-Book Series Aspen Italia Views, Aspen Institute - Treccani, Rome, [online] last checked on 14/12/2018. URL: <https://www.aspeninstitute.it/aspensia-online/article/ebook-beyond-migration-and-asylum-crisis-options-and-lessons-europe-0>

Pastore Ferruccio (2016) Migration and the future of EU-Africa relations, *Aspenia*, 71-72, pp. 209-219.

Pastore Ferruccio (2015) The Forced, the Voluntary and the Free. Migrants' categorisation and the tormented evolution of the European migration and asylum regime, *Studi Emigrazione – International Journal of Migration Studies*, 52 (200), pp. 569-586.

Pastore Ferruccio (2002) Eneas' Route. Euro-Mediterranean Relations and International Migration, in Sandra Lavenex and Emek Uçarer Eds., *Externalities of Integration: the Wider Impact of the Developing EU Migration Regime*, Lanham/Boulder/New York/Oxford, Lexington Books, pp. 105-123.

Pastore Ferruccio and Trinchieri Luca (2008) La Libia nel sistema migratorio mediterraneo. Dinamiche di mobilità e risposte politiche, *Mondi Migranti*, 2, pp. 21-53.

Pécoud Antoine (2015) *Depoliticising Migration. Global Governance and International Migration Narratives*, Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan.

Peers Steve and Roman Emanuela (2016) The EU, Turkey and the Refugee Crisis: What could possibly go wrong?, *EU Law Analysis*, 5 February, [online] last checked on 03/07/2019. URL: <http://eulawanalysis.blogspot.nl/2016/02/the-eu-turkey-and-refugee-crisis-what.html>

Poutignat Philippe and Streiff-Fénart Jocelyne (2010) Migration Policy Development in Mauritania: Process, Issues and Actors, in Martin Geiger and Antoine Pécoud Eds., *The Politics of International Migration Management*, New York, Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 202-219.

Raineri Luca (2017) La guerra ai migranti genera mostri. Il caso del Niger, *Limes*, 6.

Roman Emanuela, Pastore Ferruccio, Ponzo Irene, Harrami Noureddine and Lahmidani Marouan (2017) Investigating Cognitive and Normative Frames of Southern and Eastern Mediterranean Stakeholders on Migration and Mobility Issues, in Their Relations with the EU, *MEDRESET Methodology and Concept Papers*, 6, September, [online] last checked on 14/12/2018. URL: http://www.medreset.eu/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/medreset_cp_6.pdf

Rygiel Kim, Feyzi Baban and Suzan Ilcan (2016) The Syrian refugee crisis: The EU-Turkey "deal" and temporary protection, *Global Social Policy*, 16 (3), pp. 315-320.

Spijkerboer Thomas (2013) Moving Migrants, States, and Rights. Human Rights and Border Deaths, *Law and Ethics of Human Rights*, 7 (2), pp. 213-242.

Spijkerboer Thomas (2007) The Human Costs of Border Control, *European Journal of Migration and Law*, 9 (1), pp. 127-139.

Tinti Peter and Reitano Tuesday (2017) *Migrant, Refugee, Smuggler, Savior*, London, Oxford University Press.

Tsourapas Gerasimos (2018) Labor Migrants as Political Leverage - Migration Interdependence and Coercion in the Mediterranean, *International Studies Quarterly*, 62 (2), pp. 383-395.

Tsourapas Gerasimos (2017) Migration Diplomacy in the Global South: Cooperation, Coercion and Issue Linkage in Gaddafi's Libya, *Third World Quarterly*, 38 (10), pp. 2367-2385.

UNHCR (2019) *Libya – UNHCR Update*, 21 June, [online] last checked on 01/07/2019. URL: <http://reporting.unhcr.org/sites/default/files/UNHCR%20Libya%20Update%20-%2021JUN19.pdf>

UNHCR (2017) *Mixed Migration Trends in Libya: Changing Dynamics and Protection Challenges*, [online] last checked on 14/12/2018. URL: <http://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/LIB-HCR-MAS-Final-Report.pdf>

Wagner Martin, Kraler Albert and Baumgartner Paul (2018) *Solidarity – an integral and basic concept of the Common European Asylum System?*, CEASEVAL Working Papers, WP5/2018, June, [online] last checked on 14/12/2018. URL: http://ceaseval.eu/publications/Solidarity%20%E2%80%93an%20integral%20and%20basic%20concept%20of%20the%20Common%20European%20Asylum%20System_%20.pdf

Zandonini Giacomo (2019) After crackdown, what do people employed in migration market do?, *Al Jazeera*, 4 March, [online] last checked on 17/06/2020. URL: <https://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/crackdown-people-employed-migration-market-190303114806258.html?fbclid=IwAR0HumHckfTAY-dyGPv3BkEgXPBKczXqlnzNgqg8mnR5F26QB7ZoC7MFPDCU>

Ferruccio Pastore and Emanuela Roman

Migration Policies and Threat-based Extraversion. Analysing the impact of European Externalisation Policies on African Polities

Following the crisis of 2015-2016, the European Union and its member states have increasingly prioritised the external dimension of their migration policies. The impact of such key policy development on non-European polities, especially African ones, has so far been neglected by research. Building upon the work of Jean François Bayart, the authors analyse this emerging configuration through the concept of "extraversion", by expanding its original focus on the intermediation role of post-colonial African leaderships in the exploitation of natural resources by foreign actors. In what the authors call "threat-based extraversion", governments of non-European migration-sending (and/or transit) states capitalise on securitised international perceptions of migration by positioning themselves as proxy implementers of restrictive migration policies dictated by potential destination states in Europe. The article identifies some potential perverse effects of threat-based extraversion and sketches an agenda for future research.

Politiques migratoires et extraversion. Comment analyser l'impact de l'externalisation sur les systèmes politiques africains

À la suite de la crise de 2015-2016, l'Union européenne et ses états membres ont attribué un degré de priorité croissant à la dimension extérieure de leurs politiques migratoires. L'impact de cette évolution sur les sociétés et les systèmes politiques des pays non européens concernés, spécialement en Afrique sub-saharienne, a été jusqu'à présent négligé par la recherche. Les auteurs abordent le thème à partir du concept d'« extraversion », développé par Jean-François Bayart pour analyser les stratégies d'intermédiation des dirigeants politiques post-coloniaux finalisées à l'exploitation des ressources naturelles. À travers le concept d'extraversion basée sur les menaces (*threat-based extraversion*), les auteurs analysent la façon dont les gouvernants des états d'origine et de transit capitalisent sur des perceptions fortement sécuritisées des migrations africaines, en se posant comme exécuteurs délégués des politiques restrictives inspirées par les pays européens de destination. L'article identifie les effets pervers potentiels de cette nouvelle forme d'extraversion et esquisse un agenda de recherche future.

Políticas migratorias y extraversion. Cómo analizar el impacto de la externalización en los sistemas políticos africanos

Tras crisis de 2015-2016, la Unión Europea y sus estados miembros han priorizado cada vez más la dimensión externa de sus políticas migratorias. Hasta ahora, el impacto de este crucial desarrollo político sobre las sociedades y los sistemas políticos de los países no europeos, sobre todo del África subsahariana, ha sido descuidado por los investigadores. Los autores analizan este tema a partir del concepto de «extraversión», desarrollado por Jean François Bayart para analizar las estrategias políticas de los dirigentes post-coloniales, basadas

en la mediación para la explotación de los recursos naturales por parte de actores extranjeros. Teniendo en cuenta lo que los autores llaman «extraversión basada en la amenaza» (*threat-based extraversion*), analizan cómo los gobiernos de estados no europeos emisores de migrantes (y/o de tránsito) sacan provecho de percepciones «securitizadas» de las migraciones africanas, posicionándose como ejecutores delegados de políticas migratorias restrictivas inspiradas por potenciales estados de destino en Europa. El artículo identifica algunos posibles efectos negativos de la extraversión basada en la amenaza y dibuja una agenda para investigaciones futuras.