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Computing Bitcoin on Soviet Legacies

Material Geopolitics of Cryptocurrency Mining in Global East
Miner du bitcoin sur l'héritage soviétique : géopolitique matérielle du minage de cryptomonnaies dans l’Est global
Hugo Estecahandy

Résumés

Cet article examine la géopolitique matérielle du minage de cryptomonnaies dans l’Est global, et plus particulièrement en Russie, au Kazakhstan et au Kirghizistan. En s'appuyant sur une approche géopolitique et en proposant une modélisation multicouche de l'infrastructure Bitcoin, l'article soutient que le minage de cryptomonnaies n'est pas seulement un phénomène numérique, mais un processus profondément matériel ancré dans des contextes territoriaux et politiques parfois très locaux. L’article explore comment les infrastructures énergétiques et les réseaux politiques de l'ère soviétique façonnent la croissance du minage de cryptomonnaies dans ces régions. L'étude met en évidence le rôle des acteurs locaux ou étatiques, des réseaux de pouvoir formels ou informels et des monopoles énergétiques dans la facilitation ou la restriction du minage numérique. S'appuyant sur des travaux de terrain menés entre 2019 et 2023, cette recherche illustre comment le minage numérique tire parti d'une électricité bon marché et de cadres réglementaires faibles, mettant parfois à rude épreuve les réseaux électriques nationaux. Elle explore également l'imbrication du minage de cryptomonnaies avec la politique locale : la Russie le reconnaît comme une industrie stratégique, le Kazakhstan met en œuvre une réglementation stricte et le Kirghizistan est confronté à des défis énergétiques liés au minage numérique informel soutenu par l'État. La recherche contribue à la littérature croissante sur la matérialité numérique et la géopolitique des réseaux numériques, soulignant l’importance de l’adaptation méthodologique pour saisir les rapides évolutions de la géographie de certaines infrastructures numériques. 

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The author would like to thank the team at the Institut français d'études sur l'Asie centrale (IFEAC) in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, for their hospitality and support.

L'auteur tient à remercier l'équipe de l'Institut français d'études sur l'Asie centrale (IFEAC) à Bichkek, pour leur accueil et leur soutien

Introduction

  • 1 ‘U.S. Treasury Designates Facilitators of Russian Sanctions Evasion’. U.S. Department of the Treasu (...)

1In April 2022, just weeks after Russian invasion of Ukraine, the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), the U.S. agency responsible for enforcing global financial and economic sanctions, sanctioned BitRiver, a Russian-based cryptocurrency mining company1. BitRiver and its many subsidiaries across the Russian Federation have become a major actor in this alternative digital industry. This company, alongside with other specialized firms, started developing digital mining operations on an industrial scale, initially capitalizing on the favorable technical and natural conditions in Eastern Siberia (Estecahandy, 2021). The company’s operations later expanded into remote locations such as gas fields in the Arctic. In its statement, the OFAC justified its actions by stating that BitRiver’s operations “help Russia monetize its natural resources."

  • 2 Принят закон о легализации майнинга [Law on legalization of mining passed]. (2024, July 30). Госуда (...)
  • 3 Application-Specific Integrated Circuit, processors dedicated to a specific task.

2In July 2024, Russian government enacted its first national legislation regulating cryptocurrency mining. They officially classified it as a strategic industry and recognized the use of cryptocurrencies “as a tool for circumventing sanctions”2. This event highlights the extent to which certain cryptocurrency networks – primarily Bitcoin – are tied not only to physical space and the resources they consume through digital mining, but also to political actors in the territories where this computing power is concentrated. Cryptocurrency mining involves using computing power to secure certain digital financial networks, such as Bitcoin, in exchange for potential rewards in the form of newly minted coins, a process known as “proof-of-work” (PoW). Since the creation of Bitcoin in 2009, this activity has evolved rapidly. It started with the involvement of individuals using their own computer processors, but it includes large-scale operations that use hundreds, if not thousands, of dedicated machines called ASICs (Application-Specific Integrated Circuits)3. As Maurer et al. observed in the United States as early as 2013, these digital mining machines are strategically concentrated to maximize profitability. The increasing worth of digital currencies has transformed cryptocurrency mining into a lucrative industry with substantial profit potential. The "industrialization" of cryptocurrency production has led to the emergence and the concentration of "mining farms", many of which operate on a client-hosting model that takes advantage of regions with plentiful and inexpensive resources, such as Siberia (Estecahandy, 2021). While Russian authorities, have designated digital mining as a strategic industry, the high electricity demands of cryptocurrency mining have sometimes caused problems on local communities, even within Russia.

  • 4 Coin Market Cap: https://coinmarketcap.com/community/articles/6364d2b6c7f9941d5a4a6b8d/
  • 5 Guest, P. (2023, January 12). Bitcoin mining was booming in Kazakhstan. Then it was gone. MIT Techn (...)
  • 6 Rekhviashvili, L. (2021, March 15). A Louder Periphery: Guardians of the Rioni Valley against the “ (...)
  • 7 Bami, X. (2023, April 17). Seizing Crypto-Mining Equipment Has Saved Kosovo ‘Millions’, Govt Claims (...)
  • 8 Bacchi, U. (2021, March 1). Analysis—Crypto tears: Bitcoin miners face blame for Abkhazia energy cr (...)

3Power outages and malfunctions have been reported around the world, particularly in former Soviet countries such as Moldova4, Kazakhstan5 and Georgia6, as well as economically isolated post-socialist territories such as Kosovo7 or Abkhazia8.

4China banned cryptocurrency mining in 2021, citing its substantial energy consumption and environmental concerns. Many mining farms were primarily powered by coal-burning electricity. The crypto mining industry faces significant criticism for its environmental impact, and researchers have devoted considerable attention to measuring these effects, particularly in relation to Bitcoin (de Vries et al., 2022; Stoll et al., 2023). This has often led to negative portrayals of the industry. Despite the large volume of digital data generated by the cryptocurrencies networks and industries (Zook & McCanless, 2021), the inability to pinpoint the precise location of mining processors makes it impossible to create an accurate global geography of Bitcoin’s computation power, and therefore its environmental and energy footprint (Sai & Vranken, 2024).

  • 9 Petchenko, I. (2024, March 11). Майнинг-фермы vs население КР в условиях энергокризиса: Кто важнее (...)

5Cryptocurrencies networks reliant on mining engage in a complex dialectical relationship with the physical environments in which the processors operate. In their study of mining farms in Washington State, Lally & al. (2022) characterize digital mining as ‘parasitic computing’, which draws on local power and grid infrastructure, which themselves are the product of a previous biophysical and sociopolitical context – without necessarily providing positive local benefits. Similar to Siberia, cryptocurrency mining has been developed in former USSR territories where electricity is generally affordable and widely available, due to the Soviet-era power plants and grids that were highly developed at the time. Large-scale cryptocurrency mining has been established in Kazakhstan, especially following its official ban in neighboring China. A significant share of this computational power has been plugged into the national electric grid in an opaque manner (Estecahandy, 2024). According to Kazakhstani officials, this has further strained the aging electricity grid of Central Asia, causing a historic blackout that left parts of southern Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan without power for several hours in January 2022. In Kyrgyzstan, a country facing an electricity shortage, corruption cases involving individuals connected to the state-owned electricity network were exposed in 2023, suggesting that informal digital mining has continued despite electricity rationing measures9.

6While the availability and cost of electricity are the primary factors for the location of cryptocurrency mining operations, the establishment of “mining farms” is also shaped by relationships between cryptocurrency miners or farm owners and local actors who facilitate the development of these activities. Wyeth et al.'s (2023) study of the 'material geography' of a cryptocurrency mining firm in Georgia illustrates how miners interact with local authorities to develop their operations. To build on this framework, along with the political ecology explored by Lally & al., I propose an exploration of the material geopolitics surrounding cryptocurrency mining in three post-Soviet territories: Russia, specifically the Siberian region of Irkutsk, as well as Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan.

7The main point of this article is that while cryptocurrency mining in the former USSR developed in part due to the region’s Soviet industrial legacy, the specific forms, scales, and impacts of this digital activity are heavily shaped by local networks and power dynamics. Concerned actors may include local authorities, as demonstrated by China's mining ban or the recently enacted laws regulating cryptocurrency mining in Kazakhstan (2023) or in Russia (2024). Additionally, individuals or companies that own or operate the electricity infrastructure, who can benefit from the presence of digital mining. Examining the growth of cryptocurrency mining in the former USSR highlights the importance of specific networks of actors, such as those that privatized energy infrastructures following the collapse of the Soviet Union. These actors have concentrated power over certain resources and territories. In some cases, they even exceed official political authority leading to the emergence of informal digital mining operations, as seen in Kazakhstan.

8Therefore, this article argues that local politics and its networks of actors must be reintroduced into studies on the materiality of digital infrastructures. Understanding the dynamics of these networks is essential for analyzing the logics and challenges associated with the deployment of specific digital activities within specific territories.

9This article aims to examine the relationship between the availability of natural and technical resources within a territory and the influence of local political networks, whether formal or informal, on the emergence of a digital activity such as cryptocurrency mining. In addition, this analysis explores how physical factors affect a digital network like Bitcoin. To do this, I primarily adopt a geopolitical approach rooted in the French school of geopolitics initiated by the geographer Yves Lacoste in the 1970s, while also drawing on concepts from sociology and science and technology studies (STS).

  • 10 Statoshi Nakamoto is a pseudonym for the person or the group of persons, still anonymous in October (...)

10This method also makes it possible to examine how some authoritative actors, particularly governments of territory where digital mining is deployed, interact with the broader digital network. For example, they may try to regulate its effects. As sociologist Madeleine Akrich notes, "the technical object is no more to be confused with a material device than it is with the set of uses that this device 'fulfils': it is very precisely defined as the relationship constructed between these two terms [and it] is the design and measurement of a set of relationships between completely heterogeneous elements" (Akrich, 2006 : 160). Although Bitcoin's original design stemmed from the ideas and goals of its pseudonymous creator(s) Satoshi Nakamoto10, the forms and uses of Bitcoin are constantly evolving. The widely-discussed impact of cryptocurrency mining on physical spaces is a byproduct of this evolution and was not necessarily anticipated during its initial development. As a digital infrastructure, a term which typically refers to large-scale physical and material systems necessary for human organization and activity (Bowker & al., 2010) and “more abstract entities, such as protocols (human and computer)” (Ibid.), Bitcoin relies on communication channels, an energy supply, users, and structural limits. Bitcoin has its share of visible and invisible elements, like all digital infrastructures (Star, 1999, Bowker & al., 2010) as well as more “traditional” infrastructures as cities are (Latour & Hermant, 1998).

11Therefore, the ASICs present in a given territory are merely one of the many components of the Bitcoin digital infrastructure, constantly interacting with other entities, individuals, and algorithms that make it up. In Kazakhstan, the regulation tools for cryptocurrency mining operate through third-party services (exchange platforms, mining pools), which are also part of the Bitcoin infrastructure. While this article initially explores the uses of geopolitical methods to analyze the challenges of digital mining development within physical spaces, I then discuss the relevance of expanding these analyses to include government strategies to regulate digital activities through the infrastructure.

12In this paper, I use the geopolitical lens to reintroduce political dynamics into the analysis of cryptocurrency mining, as well as its geographical distribution at different levels. This approach enables an examination of the strategies and networks of specific actors, sometimes at a very granular level, who shape the landscape of digital mining. This analysis focuses on three case studies where I conducted fieldwork, aiming to shed light on the unique geopolitical dynamics driving the growth of cryptocurrency mining in the Global East.

13This article therefore mobilizes the concept of “Global East”, an alternative framework proposed by Martin Müller to complete “the distinction between a richer, powerful Global North and a poorer, less-powerful Global South” (Müller, 2020 : 235). The Global East concept is particularly useful in acknowledging the territorial and political specificities of the post-Soviet and post-socialist spaces, which are often overlooked in conventional Global North-South frameworks. This term allows us to reveal the influence of the common Soviet technical legacy in energy infrastructures and the forms of political power that have been built on it after the collapse of the USSR, without simply conditioning all the issues and dynamics of these spaces to their Soviet past.

14Using this concept, I also situate this study within an existing body of social science literature on cryptocurrency mining which adopts a “bottom-up” approach. Previous research has examined the dynamics of digital mining in “Global North” countries with energy surpluses available for purchase on free markets, such as in the U.S. (Maurer & al., 2013 ; Lally & al., 2022 ; Stoll & al., 2023), Canada (Atkins & al., 2021) or Iceland and Norway (Upham, 2022). Recent academic work also focuses on countries in what authors refer to as the “Global South”, highlighting the social impacts of cryptocurrency mining in El Salvador and Venezuela (Rosales, 2021, Patel, 2024), where digital mining is driven by a search for financial alternatives amid a context of crisis. This research shows that digital mining in these regions is often dominated by local networks of powerful actors who attract foreign investors, with limited benefits for the local population.

15This study is the culmination of several years of research that began with a first fieldwork in Siberia in 2019. This first fieldwork, meticulously prepared over several months, started in February 2022 in the Irkutsk region, Russia, where cryptocurrency mining had been developed on a significant scale. However, the Russian invasion of Ukraine forced me to leave Russia, ending this initial exploration. Following this, I made the immediate decision to continue my research from a new location, where fortunately the limited availability of international flights from Siberia could take me at that time. Over a discontinuous period spanning over more than nine months, from March 2022 to September 2023, I conducted a geopolitical study of cryptocurrency mining in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. In total, during these four years, I conducted around fifty interviews with actors directly or indirectly involved in cryptocurrency mining or belonging to the local digital, energy, and political spheres in these three countries.

16This material geopolitics of digital mining in the Global East is first and foremost an invitation to an exploration, not only from the shores of the immense Lake Baikal, the icy, windy steppes of Kazakhstan, or the mountains of Kyrgyzstan, but also through the various dimensions that contribute to the existence of a complex digital infrastructure.

17This article is divided into four distinct parts. In the first, I theorize the material geography and geopolitics of Bitcoin through its mining process. Drawing on literature from the sociology of infrastructure applied to digital spaces, I propose a multilayered model of Bitcoin’s infrastructure, focusing on the interactions between the physical, protocol, and application layers. It illustrates how local electricity networks, particularly in post-Soviet states, are leveraged for mining. This framework facilitates a discussion on the factors shaping the location of digital mining operations and the impact of politics in their development. Through this analysis, I highlight the unique geographical and geopolitical dimensions of cryptocurrency mining, distinguishing it from other sectors of the digital economy, allowing for a better understanding of the cases studied.

18In the second part, I explore the transformation of cryptocurrency mining in Russia from a local subsistence activity to a strategic national digital industry. I begin my analysis in the Siberian region of Irkutsk. This section discusses the informal, small-scale crypto mining operations that have emerged in economically disadvantaged areas, influencing local socio-economic dynamics. I then examine how hydropower resources are integrated into mining operations and show how regional energy monopolies – “energopowers” – such as EN+ support this industry. I also analyze the rise of "technopowers" in Russia’s cryptocurrency sector emphasizing the political and economic forces driving the growth of digital mining to a strategic national industry.

19The third section analyzes the informal and "gray" cryptocurrency mining networks in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan. It highlights the intersections between political corruption, state-captured energy resources, and digital mining. It illustrates how regional elites have used their informal connections to enrich themselves through cryptocurrency mining, sometimes at the cost of public infrastructure and services.

20The final section discusses the material geopolitics of cryptocurrency mining in Russia, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan, emphasizing the need to reassess the power dynamics that influence the industry, specifically in former Soviet states where energy infrastructures have become a contentious resource. This study also reflects on the analytical techniques used. It evaluates the paper’s contributions and the need for adaptation to capture the rapidly evolving geographies of digital infrastructures in future research. The paper concludes by questioning the implications of "off-grid" mining operations and their potential to shape future trends in digital infrastructure and environmental impacts, particularly in light of the increasing demand for computing power for Artificial Intelligence (AI).

Towards a material geopolitics of cryptocurrency mining in Global East

  • 11 Muir, M. (2021, November 22). China’s exiled crypto machines fuel global mining boom. Financial Tim (...)

21The geopolitics of cryptocurrency mining came to light following China's ban announced in May 2021, leading to massive relocation of computing power. Although it remains impossible to pinpoint the exact locations of this activity, and therefore its precise geographic distribution, this period has highlighted certain geographical and political patterns and trends. Data on the migration of digital mining processors from China shows that many were relocated to nearby areas with cheap electricity, such as Siberia and Kazakhstan, which are the subject of this paper, or to the United States11. The exodus of crypto miners seeking for affordable electricity has, in some cases, led to the creation of local electricity supplies and occasionally placed strain on certain power grids, as the well documented case of Texas demonstrates.

22Cryptocurrency mining has surged in this US state since 2021, driven initially by cheap electricity from flared gas on oil fields, and later on the Texas grid. The governor of Texas saw this energy-intensive industry as a way to fund wind energy development (Bruno et al., 2023). This favorable climate attracted cryptocurrency miners seeking to redeploy their processors. However, the increased electricity demand exceeded supply during periods of extreme weather. The regional grid operator therefor asked mining farms to shut down during peak hours, offering compensation for lost profits, which totaled several million dollars. This raised the risk of higher electricity bills for traditional customers (Lee et al., 2023). Researchers suggest that the industry's mobility and flexibility, combined with appropriate local policies, could lead to a more strategic geographic distribution of mining farms across grid nodes. This would help to balance the load and improve the efficiency the electricity system (Menati et al, 2023). These recent studies underscore the industry’s high capacity for adaptation and evolution, as evidenced by its dynamic geographical shifts.

23The materialization of these digital networks involves local actors in the electricity and land sectors, or even the government. This explains the particular nature of industrial-scale cryptocurrency mining in the former USSR, where electricity is mainly generated from energy infrastructures inherited from the Soviet Union, which have sometimes fallen into the hands of private actors. This tangible outcome is the product of operations of cryptocurrency networks based on proof-of-work, as well as the uses and economies that have emerged from and within these networks. It is also the result of the relationship between the digital network and the territory – and its actors – where it becomes tangible.

The Bitcoin Infrastructure: A Multilayered Geopolitical Space

24The processors used for cryptocurrency mining must be examined alongside other components of the Bitcoin infrastructure. While the location of these processors is largely influenced by resource availability in certain regions, they are continuously interacting with the wider network. As explained in the final section, understanding these connections is crucial for analyzing cryptocurrency mining, as they can affect the growth and evolution of this industry in specific geographical areas. Recent regulations on cryptocurrency mining in Kazakhstan (2023) and Russia (2024) are partially enforced through third-party applications.

25I propose a visualization model (Map 1) of Bitcoin infrastructure, including a hypothetic path of bitcoins transaction. This will help us understand the dynamics behind the materialization of this digital infrastructure. I divide it into three layers – physical, protocol, and applications – drawing on previous studies of digital networks, such as the Internet (Ventre, 2011), which enable it to be represented as a multilayered space. This method of visualization, popularized in STS by technology philosopher Bratton in his book The Stack (2015), facilitates the analysis of the political and strategical implications within and between each layer of digital networks. It also conceptualizes the Internet, digital networks, and cyberspace as geopolitical spaces (Douzet, 2014).

26I depict the roles and locations of the main entities and individuals make up the Bitcoin infrastructure. For example, most users typically operate their cryptocurrencies through third-party services, such as exchange platforms or e-wallets, that handle the majority of Bitcoin transactions (Makarov & Schoar, 2021). Bitcoin nodes store full or partial copies of the blockchain – the ledger that records all transactions – and are updated synchronously. Computing power is represented by mining farms, many of which are located in regions offering optimal conditions, particularly near power plants. In the “application layer”, I depict mining pools, which are platforms that allow several miners to combine their computational power, thereby boosting their chances of obtaining the reward in bitcoins, which is then shared among participants (De Filippi & Wright, 2018).

27Assuming the sender uses a cryptocurrency exchange, the process starts with the transaction request being initiated through the third-party service where the sender holds an account. The request is then directed to the Bitcoin protocol (steps 1 and 2). It enters a new transaction block, waiting for validation and communicated to the Bitcoin nodes (step 3). Miners then recalculate the entire Bitcoin blockchain to verify the transaction’s validity and transmit the computational results to their respective mining pools (step 4). The “winning” pool submits the required results to the protocol (step 5) and is rewarded in bitcoins. The validity of the transactions in this new block is then communicated to all nodes, and the transaction is added to the blockchain (step 6). Finally, the recipient is notified of the completed transaction through their third-party service (steps 7 & 8).

Map 1.

Schematic path of a transaction information through Bitcoin digital infrastructure.

Estecahandy, 2023.

28This approach reveals part of the otherwise invisible infrastructure, as well as some centralization processes within each layer. However, some aspects remain obscured, such as the concentration of power within the protocol layer, particularly when technical interventions in the code are necessary, and only a small group of actors has the technical and political authority to make and implement these decisions (De Filippi & Loveluck, 2016, Musiani & al., 2018). The materialization of cryptocurrency networks, fueled by mining operations, has given rise to unique political economies and strategies adopted by certain actors, including miners who mere their computing power in mining pools (Rella, 2023). Additionally, it has resulted in the establishment of specialized infrastructures designed to house computational power and enhance operational efficiency, in large-scale mining farms in specific geographical areas.

The Changing Geography of a Flexible Digital Industry

  • 12 I consider electricity as a "resource" as it results from the transformation of matter by skilled a (...)

29Affordable electricity is crucial for physical digital infrastructures, such as datacenters, and is the primary “factor of location” (Bakis, 2013). The challenge is to ensure that monthly electricity costs do not exceed Bitcoin rewards. Bakis' location factors for datacenters draw on Weber's theory of strategic industry location (1929 [1909]), emphasizing proximity to resources and markets. In cryptocurrency mining, proximity to electricity generation or distribution infrastructure is key to minimize connection costs, as interviews with mining farm operators in Siberia, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan confirmed. Electricity is acting as a “resource” akin to Weber's work12. While natural factors like water bodies or cold climates were once crucial for cooling, advances in processor technology and cooling methods have diminished their importance, although traditional cooling remains more cost-effective. Finally, a reliable Internet connection is essential for transmitting calculations to mining pools, with faster transmissions increasing chances of receiving rewards.

30Local politics also play a significant role in the establishment of digital mining operations (Lally & al., 2022 ; Weyth & al., 2023 ; Rella, 2023), as seen in China or Texas and as I show in Russia, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan. The political factors in the cryptocurrency mining deployment in the former USSR, where relationships with the local powerholders – formal and informal – shape its development, differ from those that influence other digital infrastructures, in particular datacenters. The deployment of datacenters can be linked to state’s digital sovereignty strategy or its global political and economic ambitions, as in Russia or China (Cattaruzza, 2020). Some regions attract these infrastructures to develop a new economic sector and gain political importance nationally (Vonderau, 2019). Datacenters are typically located near Internet network physical nodes and customers, creating specific geography and negotiations with local authorities (Marquet, 2019).

31Unlike datacenters, which store and process data for customers and administrations needing rapid access to data, cryptocurrency mining farms focus solely on “production”. The value produced, such as bitcoins, is stored on digital wallets potentially located across the globe.

32Mining farms tend to follow the spatial logic of early 20th-century transformation industries or extractive industries, where energy is used to extract value. This contrasts with the logic behind most datacenters. In Siberia and Kazakhstan, the largest mining farms are located near energy-intensive industries such as aluminum production. Thus, cryptocurrency mining appears geographically anchored, near electricity supplies, while also remaining flexible, subject to legislative changes or new electricity price opportunities. Although datacenters are labeled as 'impermanent infrastructures' (Velkova, 2019), the geographical mobility of datacenters seems to be increasingly more constrained by economic and political factors.

33Cryptocurrency mining, on the other hand, can be deployed anywhere with cheap electricity and a stable Internet connection, leading to differences in the geographies of datacenters and cryptocurrency mining farms. First, cryptocurrency mining can be operated at both industrial and micro scales, allowing individuals to mine from their homes, as documented in China (Hou, 2023), Georgia (Muskhelishvili & al., 2023), and as I observed in Siberia and Kazakhstan. Crypto mining, when operated on an industrial scale, brings limited positive externalities to the local area, primarily benefiting electricity suppliers and sometimes political actors. In the former USSR, mining developed through political networks that share a common technical legacy. The material geopolitics of cryptocurrency mining in the Global East reveals not only the location strategies of digital miners but also the strategies and power of actors facilitating its emergence.

From a local subsistence activity to a strategic national digital industry: the emergence of cryptocurrency mining “technopowers” in Russia

  • 13 Muir, M. (2021, November 22). China’s exiled crypto machines fuel global mining boom. Financial Tim (...)

34BitRiver, the company targeted by U.S. sanctions since April 2022, operates Russia’s largest mining farm and plays a key role in the country’s digital mining sector. By September 2021, the company could handle at least 1.8 million processors displaced from China13. Established in 2019, the farm is located in Bratsk, within the Irkutsk oblast, Eastern Siberia. It occupies a refurbished building in an industrial area, in this city dedicated to aluminum production, and has an electrical capacity of 100 MW. The facility takes advantage of the region’s cold, dry climate that enables efficient, low-cost air-cooling. It is also connected to a major section of the Trans-Europe Asia fiber optic backbone. Most significantly, the farm is located near a massive hydroelectric dam with an installed capacity of 4,515 MW, the third most powerful in Russia, and 19th in the world. The dam’s turbines are powered by the Angara River which flows from Lake Baikal through the Irkutsk region. Several other hydroelectric plants along the river contribute to making hydropower the dominant electricity source in the area, resulting in the lowest electricity costs in Russia.

Photo 1.

A group of locals can be seen strolling along the frozen banks of the Irkutsk City Hydroelectric Plant, which is one kilometer long and generates 662 MW of power, built on the Angara River.

Hugo Estecahandy, February 2022.

35Bratsk’s mining farm shares location logic similar to digital mining operations studied by Lally & al. (2022). These crypto mining operations were attracted by the low-cost of hydropower produced by the Grand Coulee Dam on the Columbia River in the United States. The authors highlight the correlation between the growths and impacts of digital mining in this region of Washington State and the biophysics, political history, and socio-ecology of the river and the dam, alongside favorable pricing introduced by local political and energy regulatory agencies. While the Grand Coulee Dam was a product of U.S. development policies during the 1930s’ "Big Dams Era", the Bratsk dam emerged from centralized Soviet policies in the 1950s, aimed at expanding the industrial and extractive sectors, many of which had shifted east of the Urals during the World War II.

36Following the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the regional energy provider Irkutskenergo became one of the only four regional electricity companies in Russia that avoided political centralization under a single State entity in 1992 (Boute, 2015 : 83). It was gradually privatized. While this cheap, abundant electricity has enabled large-scale cryptocurrency mining, benefiting the local energy company, it also spurred smaller, undeclared digital mining.

An Alternative Bottom-up Digital Activity Taking Advantages of Local Resources

  • 14 In the 2010s, these personal garages - which can be found in profusion in any urban space in the fo (...)

37Upon my return to Irkutsk in early February 2022, the first place I went to escape the -34°C cold was a bar in the southeast outskirts of the city. The first person I spoke to, a waitress, told me she had an ASIC running in her living room. A nearby customer interjected, explaining that he was also engaged into cryptocurrency mining and sourced processors directly from China for resale. This anecdote underscores the widespread nature of digital mining in the local community, a trend I first noticed in April 2019 and observed through March 2022. During these visits, around 20 individuals outside of my formal research – journalists, local students, taxi drivers, and pub customers – shared their personal experiences with crypto mining. Some had relatives involved in undeclared digital mining, while others had set up tiny operations in containers or a garage14 with friends. Others, like the waitress, engaged in “home digital mining”. Individuals engaged in small-scale digital mining characterized it as a moderate-income generator, without revealing specific figures. The waitress showed me a photo of her ASIC, noting, “Once you get the machine, it’s really easy to operate. I just connected it to a computer and waited for the income. I also built a wooden box and put the machine inside to muffle the noise”.

  • 15 Заработок с последствиями: ТОП-5 пожаров в Приангарье, произошедших из-за майнеров [Earnings with c (...)
  • 16 Фермы ставят даже в будках: Иркутские энергетики оценили ущерб от майнеров в 1,8 миллиарда рублей [ (...)
  • 17 Volobuev, A., Katkov, M., & Stepanov, V. (2021, October 13). Президенту и правительству пожаловалис (...)

38This ease of use for “plug-and-play” ASIC operation explains why digital mining is so prevalent in Irkutsk. However, it has also caused several problems. Local media often report bitcoin mining-related incidents, such as fires caused by poorly designed installations15, and undeclared mining farms discovered by local energy companies illegally connected to the public power grid. In February 2022, the director of a subsidiary of Irkutskenergo reported that while 60 “white” – legal – crypto miners registered their activity, 1,200 households were involved in “gray” – undeclared – digital mining, a number believed by law enforcement to be tens or hundreds of times higher16. Bitcoin mining is so widespread that local power companies have dedicated sections on their websites and social media to address this issue, including toll-free phone numbers to report illegal operations. In 2021, the regional governor formally complained to the Russian government about the strain on the electrical grids due to undeclared digital mining. He blamed the increase in mining operations and devices from China17, noting that Irkutsk’s proximity to China, where most ASICs are manufactured and operated until the mid-2021 ban, contributed significantly to the region’s mining boom. In a conversation I had with a crypto miner in 2019, they mentioned that companies like Bitmain, a leading Chinese ASIC manufacturer, offered free delivery to Irkutsk. A parallel market also emerged, primarily dealing in second-hand processors or those imported from China by opportunistic intermediaries, like the customer in the Irkutsk pub.

39While some cryptocurrency miners formerly based in China may have relocated to undeclared facilities in the Irkutsk region, it is primarily their mining equipment that crossed the border. These machines have been hosted in commercial farms like BitRiver's, but have also been purchased by private individuals and installed opaquely. This "parasitic" interference with the electrical grid, as termed by Lally & al. (2022), originated locally, driven by the low price of electricity inherited from the Soviet era and the desire for a complementary income in an economically marginalized region. Unlike the “crypto-regionalism” observed by Atkins & al. (2021) in Canada, where political and economic actors publicly promote cryptocurrency mining to attract investment, in Irkutsk, this activity arose from personal initiatives for subsistence. The idea of a “crypto-region” defined as the integration of digital/financial technology into regional economic imaginaries (Ibid. : 70), is not entirely absent but less formalized. I noticed this rhetoric in Irkutsk, though it did not come from 'gray miners,' who preferred anonymity, or large companies, but from local entrepreneurs.

  • 18 Interviewed in April 2019 and February 2022 in Irkutsk, Russia. Website of the project and company, (...)

40Before the establishment of powerful crypto farms or widespread use in private households, cryptocurrency mining in the Irkutsk region was initiated by local entrepreneurs in the mid-2010s. They tried to develop alternative economic activities, taking advantage of the resources of their region, remote from Russia’s main economic centers. During the period of March 2019 to February 2022, I had the opportunity to meet and speak with a dozen of these entrepreneurs, all of whom saw Bitcoin mining as a potential economic boon for Irkutsk. While some downplayed the environmental impact, citing the region’s reliance on hydropower, others pursued “green mining” projects. For example, an entrepreneur developed “crypto house” that use the heat from ASICs for household heating 18. Environmental awareness in the region led to many such projects.

  • 19 Interviewed in March 2019 in Irkutsk, Russia.

41Another entrepreneur intended to heat outdoor pools at a resort using processor-generated heat and has also “branded” Irkutsk as the “Krypto stolitsa” (“crypto capital city”) to attract foreign investors. It was an isolated attempt of “crypto-regionalism” 19. The rise of digital mining has fostered a local "bottom-up" innovation scene, though these entrepreneurs represent only a small fraction of the region’s computation power compared to large commercial farms and gray miners.

Energy Monopolies and Political Influence in Digital Mining Development

  • 20 Commuter electric trains common to most of former USSR countries.
  • 21 National Guard of the Russian Federation.
  • 22 Coordinates: 52.78567303754712,103.61280361584349
  • 23 The soils of the industrial zone were heavily polluted with mercury during the operation of the pla (...)
  • 24 Сортировочная [Sortirovochnaya]. (2021, October 28). Катастрофа в Усолье-Сибирском: Как ртуть, свин (...)
  • 25 Майнинг-отель и ферму нашли в здании бывшего Усольехимпрома. Прокуратура обратилась в суд [A mining (...)

42In 2019, local sources informed me that Usolye-Sibirskoye, a small town 70 kilometers northwest of the regional capital, once a major hub for chemical industries, hosted a mining farm with at least 110 MW installed capacity. Following a 90-minute ride on elektrichka20 and a two-hour walk through snowfall, passing through a town center reflecting post-Soviet industrial decline, I reached the industrial area. Nestled amid the ruins of a chemical plant and a coal-fired power plant was the suspected location of the farm, enclosed by concrete walls. Unfortunately, I was stopped and detained by private security and Rosgvardia21 personnel with rusty Kalashnikovs, who questioned me for hours before ordering me to leave. In 2024, I used satellite images from Google Earth Pro to visit again the area22. I noticed that most of the buildings had been razed, likely for soil decontamination of the now infamous “Siberian Chernobyl”23, paving the way for the “Vostok” eco-technopark project (Kuzevanov, 2023). However, two clusters of buildings persisted, encircled by electrical transformers installed between 2018 and 2019. This setup indicated the presence of a mining farm, confirmed by a 2021 video report24 or a 2022 local press article25.

43These findings validated the information I collected in 2019. They also supported my conclusions regarding the political connections required to carry out such operations (Estecahandy, 2021). The establishment of these farms likely involved negotiations between the farm owners, the local authorities, and the regional electricity supplier. In this case, the farms obtain electricity from the Usolye-Sibirskoye power plant, originally built to support a now-defunct industrial area. Like all power plants in the Irkutsk Oblast, the Usolye-Sibirskoye plant is owned by EN+’s local subsidiaries. Moreover, as is the case with many large-scale cryptocurrency mining farms in the region, including those in Usolye-Sibirskoye and Bratsk, EN+ plays a pivotal role.

44The Irkutsk region’s energy production is solely controlled by EN+ and its affiliates, including Irkutskenergo, which was founded and long-term dominated by Russian oligarch Oleg Deripaska, close to Vladimir Putin. After facing US sanctions in 2017, Deripaska relinquished control of EN+, allegedly for the sake of protecting his commercial interests (Gaur et al., 2023). A single actor controls the key resources for cryptocurrency mining and thus influences the development of the industry. Another factor attracting digital mining infrastructures to EN+ is its ownership of the Russian aluminum giant Rusal, which controls a significant amount of the region's industrial land, particularly in Bratsk, where aluminum processing is the main industry.

45EN+, and by extension Deripaska, have gained significant political influence by managing electricity resources to support its aluminum operations. The control over energy resources grants political power over both the populations that rely on this energy and the authorities, a dynamic referred as "energopower" (Boyer, 2014). Rogers expands on Boyer’s idea, characterizing Russia’s Perm region as an energopolitical regime, where Lukoil, an oil company, wields significant politico-economic power by funding local initiatives (Rogers, 2014). Similarly, EN+ has built up energopolitical power in the Irkutsk region, monopolizing electricity and heat generation since the 2000s. As a key actor in the local economy, the company wields influence by financing infrastructures and public activities.

Photo 2.

EN+ is financing several installations in the city of Irkutsk, materializing the company image to the population.

Hugo Estecahandy, February 2022.

The Emergence of Cryptocurrency Mining as a Strategic Industry in Russia

46EN+ plays a crucial role as an energopower for cryptocurrency mining companies, but these companies are also valuable to EN+, which gains new energy-intensive clients. BitRiver has become a key partner for EN+, leading to the creation of a joint venture in 2020, the cryptocurrency mining company “Bit+”. However, when the U.S. imposed sanctions on BitRiver, it targeted a significant partner of EN+ and indirectly, Oleg Deripaska, a major Putin’s ally. These sanctions also served as a warning to other actors in a sector emerging as strategically important in Russia.

47BitRiver, Russia's largest cryptocurrency mining company, initially grew thanks to the Irkutsk region’s resources and its close relationship with the local energy provider. However, the company later diversified its operations, opening more farms across Siberia and establishing subsidiaries for digital mining powered by gas-powered electricity. The new farms, located on oil fields near the Ural regions and gas fields in the Russian Arctic, operate “off-grid”, using electricity generated from extracted gas.

  • 26 Rosatom supplies cryptocurrency mining farms in the west of the country with Kalinin nuclear power (...)

48EN+, along with other prominent energy companies like Rosatom26 recognized the potential of industrial digital mining farms at an early stage. Russia’s gas companies – facing sanctions that threaten exports – have also started benefiting from cryptocurrency mining. The high electricity consumption and mobility of mining make it strategically important not only for Russian energy giants but also for the state, whose economy relies heavily on the energy sector, especially in a wartime economy. Companies like BitRiver have become 'technopowers', a term coined by historian Gabrielle Hecht to describe the use and design of technology to achieve political goals (Hecht, 2009 [1998] : 15). These companies helped elevate their industry’s strategic importance, leading to the 2024 law legalizing cryptocurrency mining.

49On February 24, 2022, Russia invaded Ukraine, prompting me to end my fieldwork. Since I am from an “unfriendly” country, I left Russia in March and stopped communicating with my Russian contacts. However, I continued working on the geopolitics of cryptocurrency mining in Central Asia. A few weeks earlier, in January 2022, an international power blackout hit Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan, officially attributed in large part to the growth of cryptocurrency mining in Kazakhstan. Having traversed Siberia from east to west and reached Uzbekistan, I then made my way to Kyrgyzstan, where I was able to continue my research, shifting my main focus to fieldwork in Kazakhstan.

Gray mining on state-captured energy: computing through informal networks of power in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan

  • 27 Sam Bankman-Fried’s Big Investment: Bitcoin Mining in Kazakhstan. (2023, January 19). Wall Street J (...)

50In December 2021, just before the Central Asia energy crisis reached its peak, Sam Bankman-Fried, founder of the now-bankrupt cryptocurrency exchange FTX, met with Kazakhstani President Tokayev. Bankman-Fried was later sentenced to 25 years of prison for embezzlement in late 2022. During the investigation into the FTX financial collapse, documents were made public that shed light on his visit to Astana. The American entrepreneur was there to negotiate electricity prices and access for a local cryptocurrency mining company, in which he had invested 100 million USD a few months earlier27, Genesis Digital Assets. Established in 2017, Genesis took advantage on the technical and climatic advantages of northern Kazakhstan to establish large-scale mining farms. The windswept steppes, where freezing conditions prevail half of the year, attracted the first wave of miner thanks to the massive Soviet-era coal-fired power plants, particularly in the northeastern Pavlodar region.

The Rise and Fall of Kazakhstan as a Cryptocurrency Mining Hub

  • 28 I couldn’t manage to visit the site, despite numerous requests. To read and see more about this far (...)

51Low electricity prices in Washington State (Lally & al., 2022) and Eastern Siberia result from complex socio-political dynamics related to hydroelectric dams and rivers. Kazakhstan’s electricity generation is predominantly fueled by the northeastern Pavlodar region and its substantial coal-fired power plants, which are located near the world’s largest open-pit coal mine in Ekibastuz. This mine extracts low-quality, highly polluting coal that powers three-quarters of Kazakhstan’s electricity (Askarova et al., 2022). The “electric heart” of Kazakhstan, developed by the Soviet Union to support heavy industries like aluminum production in Pavlodar city, is also crisscrossed with high-voltage power lines and transformers. Genesis secured 280 MW of power for several mining farms. The country's largest official mining farm, owned by company Enegix and with an installed capacity of 180 MW, is located near a high-power transformer south of Ekibastuz. Built in 2020, the six warehouses housing processors are secured by armed guards28. Additionally, a 220-kilowatt line connects the transformer, partly owned by Enegix, to the site, where another smaller transformer converts that electrical power into 35-kV lines for the warehouses.

Photo 4.

Partial view of the Ekibastuz pit, world's largest open-air coal mine.

Hugo Estecahandy, May 2023.

  • 29 Interviewed in February and May 2023 in Almaty, Kazakhstan.

52Although industrial mining farms were established in Kazakhstan, they could not meet the soaring demand that emerged in mid-2021 following the Chinese ban on cryptocurrency mining. Trucks loaded with processors started entering Kazakhstan to connect to its power grid. An employee from Enegix29 mentioned receiving numerous daily calls from China-based miners seeking infrastructure for their computing needs. The CEO of a Kazakhstani company specializing in reselling ASICs, whom I met in Astana in 2023, explained that the parallel market for processors on Telegram had surged at the time.

  • 30 Verbinin, A. (2021, November 11). Энергосистема Казахстана оказалась под угрозой из-за майнеров [Ka (...)

53Chinese miners who could not to afford to move or connect their machines elsewhere, sold their equipment in an attempt to recover some of their losses. Within months, the country's energy consumption soared by 8%, exceeding typical increase of 1% to 2%30. In southern Kazakhstan, where the power grid is fragile and shared with Central Asia’s most populated region, “gray” cryptocurrency mining has become a significant issue. Processors, acquired at a discounted price after the Chinese ban, were sometimes crammed into residential apartments in cities like Almaty, as seen by one of my contacts. The aging grid was not built to handle such high energy demands. As I have previously discussed, Kazakhstan’s energy grid challenges, along with the 2023 national law regulating cryptocurrency mining and market (Estecahandy, 2024), highlight the influence local political structures, which control electricity and heat generation. These “micro” energopowers have enabled digital mining to develop beyond the reach of official regulation.

Gray Miners in Gray Areas: Local Enerpowers and Kazakhstan’s Energy Crisis

54The numerous police operations to shut down mining farms following the 2022 blackout, along with official Kazakhstani statements, have revealed the involvement of prominent figures in cryptocurrency mining. These individuals are linked to the politico-economic network of former President Nursultan Nazarbayev, commonly known as “the Family” (Peyrouse, 2012), who used state resources for personal gain (Issacs, 2011). Following Nazarbayev’s departure from the presidency in 2019, Tokayev’s administration gradually replaced his network. Among those implicated is Kairat Sharipbayev, former director of Qazaqgaz – a company specializing in gas transit – and husband to Nazarbayev’s eldest daughter, who allegedly used his company's infrastructure to fuel mining farms. Similarly, entrepreneur Yerlan Nigmatulin, who owns metal factories in Karaganda, is said to be linked to undeclared cryptocurrency mining. The government's response, including regulation implemented in April 2023, reflects ongoing internal political conflicts between Tokayev’s and Nazarbayev’s factions, using tactics like “name and shame” or taking away benefits from the Family’s members.

55Alexander Klebanov, a powerful oligarch in northeastern Kazakhstan with a monopoly over electricity generation and distribution, is accused of teaming up with Bolat Nazarbayev, the brother of the former president, to establish undeclared cryptocurrency mining farms. Klebanov acquired critical infrastructure during 2000s. This “capture of the state” strategy was applied by several businessmen from the 1990s, taking advantage of the former USSR states' fragility to privatize public structures (Kinyakin, 2013). He then developed its energower, mirroring the strategies of Russian oligarchs like Deripaska, but without the same ongoing political protection once Nazarbayev presidency ended. Klebanov’s mining farms, sometimes located within its own power plant boundaries I referred to as “gray areas” - semi-private spaces controlled by individual actors who exert a form of micro-authority (Minassian, 2011) – served both his interests and those of other political-economic actors.

56In November 2022, the boilers of the small in-town Ekibastuz thermal power plant owned by Klebanov, mainly used to generate heat for the 113 000 inhabitants, failed, leaving the town without heat in -30°C weather, causing pipes to freeze and burst. A state of emergency was declared, and Klebanov faced widespread criticism.

Photo5.

Gutted streets of Ekibastuz for exploded heat pipes fixing.

Hugo Estecahandy, May 2023.

57Earlier in 2022, a chimney collapse at another of its coal-fired power plants killed a woman, and a system failure at a different facility caused multiple fatalities in Petropavlovsk31. Despite corruption scandals, and the gradual nationalization of the Ekibastuz power plant, Klebanov remains one of the Kazakhstan’s richest individuals in Kazakhstan32, who invested in sectors such as telecommunications, aviation, and metallurgy. He has enriched himself and reinforced his political weight through cryptocurrency mining while neglecting the country’s aging energy infrastructure.

58Although gray mining may have exacerbated Kazakhstan's energy crisis, the root cause is the outdated power transmission network, received minimal maintenance since the Soviet era. The deteriorating grid, combined with the rapid and unchecked cryptocurrency expansion, has led to a critical situation.

When the State Captures the State: Officials-Backed Gray Mining in Kyrgyzstan

59In Kyrgyzstan, located south of Kazakhstan, where I carried out fieldwork in 2022 and 2023, several recent corruption cases involved cryptocurrency mining. In this country, which faces an electricity shortage due to the depletion of water resources that generate 80% of its power, some mining farms have gained access to tens of megawatts from the national grid through the involvement of state officials. The general population, meanwhile, faces electricity rationing. In 2023, the Kyrgyz investigative media outlet Kloop exposed several cases where cryptocurrency mining farms were established with the approval of government officials.

  • 33 Soltonoy, A., Mukhin, V., & Reznikova, E. (2023, July 26). А вы собирайте кизяк. Миллионы государст (...)

60One such case involved a mining farm connected to the national power grid, operated by a company called “Solarcoin LLC”, cofounded by a woman with close ties to members of the administrative committees of two public energy entities:"Elektrichetskye Stantsyy" (electric power plants), and "NESK" (distribution)33. Despite a 2019 decree prohibiting the use of public electricity for cryptocurrency mining, informal networks comprising political elites and private actors have enabled such operations. These coalitions have gained access to critical state infrastructure, worsening energy shortages and undermining public services. “Solarcoin LLC”, co-founded by a Chinese company, exemplifies this dynamic. Close ties with key public officials enabled the establishment of a large-scale mining farm, further straining the national energy grid.

  • 34 Mukhin, V., Soltonoy, A., Reznikova, E., & Lee, A. (2023, July 4). Тариф «Охреневший». Правительств (...)

61High-level government officials are involved in dubious transactions, such as the cryptocurrency mining farm project at Kambar-Ata 2 hydroelectric dam, also investigated by Kloop34. The dam will produce 120 MW of electricity, but only 90 MW can be distributed. In June 2023, Alibek Japarov, head of the Kyrgyz Ministries and Presidency cabinet, allocated 30 MW to “MBT Stroy” without a public tender. “MBT Stroy”, founded in 2022 and later re-registered as an IT firm, was granted access to the state hydroelectric plant to buy electricity at below-market prices. This followed Deputy Energy Minister Taalaibek Tolubaev's approval of cryptocurrency mining equipment at the plant. “MBT Stroy” is owned by Alexei Zaitsev, who controls "A Group," a Russian metal trader. Zaitsev’s companies are based in an industrial complex privatized by the family of ex-President Kurmanbek Bakiyev. Kloop's investigation links Zaitsev to local corruption, including the Bakiyev family. During his father’s presidency, Maxim Bakiyev seized public assets. Despite a ban on cryptocurrency mining and Maxim's past exile, MBT Stroy’s privileged access to public electricity shows ongoing ties between Zaitsev and the political elite.

62In May 2022, Kyrgyzstan’s Deputy Energy Minister, Tilek Aytaliev, announced that the government was considering allowing a cryptocurrency mining farm at the Bishkek power plant. This proposal faced strong opposition from the plant's employees, who voiced concerns in an open letter. By September 29, the project was officially canceled. The plan was controversial due to the national mining ban, the country's strained electricity grid, and the critical condition of the aging Bishkek coal-based plant, which generates 812 MW (about 20% of national power) and provides heating for the capital city.

Photo 6.

Panoramic view over Bishkek and its coal-fired power plant.

Hugo Estecahandy, April 2023.

  • 35 Djanibekova, N. (2018, January 30). Kyrgyzstan: Freeze Turns to Hot Fury Over Bishkek’s Power Plant (...)
  • 36 Putz, C. (2024, February 7). Bishkek’s Ever Problematic Power Plant Explodes. The Diplomat. https:/ (...)

63The plant has had serious issues, including a 2018 malfunction just months after Chinese-led renovations, raising corruption concerns35. In February 2024, an explosion damaged the plant, shutting it down for a day36. These incidents show the plant’s unsuitability for a 24/7 mining operation. While privatized plants in Kazakhstan have become "gray zones" for secretive mining, in Kyrgyzstan, government officials themselves seem to be privatizing critical infrastructure. State capture appears to be happening from within, with officials using their power to grant mining rights to private entrepreneurs, often foreign, in public facilities.

Discussion and conclusion

64The material geopolitics of cryptocurrency mining in Russia, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan allows for a reevaluation of the actors and power dynamics shaping the development of this activity. This discussion takes into account the specificities of power structures within these regions. Additionally, it is crucial to critically examine the value of developing approaches to study the relationships between local actors and the broader digital infrastructure. Furthermore, it is essential to adapt these approaches in light of the ongoing shifts in the geography of digital mining.

65The areas subject to this analysis share a common technical heritage, specifically the electrical grid that was developed during the Soviet era. However, there are differences in the definition of "parasitism" as proposed by de Lally et al. (2022). This parasitism stems from undeclared cryptocurrency mining, which develops in two distinct ways. Firstly, it may arise from small-scale or individual digital mining operation, typically unbeknownst to governmental bodies or electricity providers. Such instances have been noted across several geographical regions. Secondly, informal mining can also be conducted by actors with control over access to electricity. This broadens the concept of parasitism, making it clear that it is not solely a direct result of the cryptocurrency mining industry. Rather, it is also the of politically and economically privileged actors who exploit the electrical grid for their own benefit, often weakening the grid to gain financial or political advantages without regard for the broader societal impact. The concept of parasitism in relation to electrical grids—and more broadly to resources and energy—can already be applied to certain actors or networks of actors as a result of their practices in acquiring and exercising power. Although the Irkutsk region produces sufficient electricity and cryptocurrency mining benefits key political and economic actors at both the regional and state levels, the strain on the electrical infrastructure—specifically power lines and transformers—has become critical. A recent study indicates that Irkutsk's power grid is nearing its capacity, identifying cryptocurrency mining, both informal and official, as a primary contributing factor (Osak & Buzina, 2023).

66This use of energopower and political influence to maintain opacity about undeclared digital mining can even reach the highest levels of governments, as is evident in Kyrgyzstan. However, the state may also choose to regulate this activity, either by preventing mining in gray zones, as in Kazakhstan, or by formalizing it into a structured and legitimate national industry, potentially strategic, as Russia has done.

67For example, Kazakhstan regulates digital mining through a set of methods and tools that, in theory, allow for the tracking of interactions between registered mining farms and the pools to which they are connected, as well as the cryptocurrency exchanges (Estecahandy, 2024). Unlike the strategies defined as “governance by the infrastructure” observed on the Internet (Musiani et al., 2016, ten Oever, 2021), Kazakhstan’s goal is not to increase its geopolitical power on the global stage or in the digital network. It does not seek a leading a leading role in the governance of Bitcoin or other cryptocurrency networks. Instead, their objective is to regulate digital mining operations, within Kazakhstani territory, “through the infrastructure”.

68Russia, on the other hand, has introduced new legislation to create a national cryptocurrency-based ecosystem, with the mining industry as one component. The framework supports a geopolitical and strategic narrative, particularly during wartime, aiming to promote de-dollarization efforts for international financial flows and state reserves using alternative financial tools. This strategic vision is also reliant on the application layer, specifically cryptocurrency exchanges that will facilitate the movement of digital currencies. Following Russia’s designation of cryptocurrencies as a strategic priority, the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) initiated measures targeting Russian exchanges. This was officially to combat cybercrime and money laundering by certain elites. Geopolitical conflicts and tensions are not only concerning the mining industry, as evidenced by the sanctions against BitRiver, but also extend to the application layer and the broader infrastructure. This material geopolitics of Bitcoin and cryptocurrencies, and the visualization methods developed in the first part of the paper, will be particularly significant in illustrating how the technical approach of authorities in regulating or weaponizing cryptocurrency mining relies on the digital infrastructure.

  • 37 Interview with DATT Energy CEO in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, in September 2023.

69Cryptocurrency mining is strategically important to influential Russian actors and the energy sector, as discussed in the second part of this article. The location of BitRiver’s mining farms on oil and gas fields highlights a significant shift in digital mining geography. This trend has accelerated in recent years. This change is facilitated by the mobility and flexibility of digital mining installations which operate "off-grid", independently of conventional electrical grids, using electricity produced near resource extraction sites like gas fields in Texas or the Russian Arctic. While these “off-grid” infrastructures don’t strain on public grids, they can also, in some specific cases, provide opportunities to fund renewable energy production infrastructure. Cryptocurrency mining companies are increasingly emphasizing this point to attract investors and respond to criticisms about the industry’s perceived environmental impact, often labeled as highly energy-consuming (Halaburda & Yermack, 2023). For example, in electricity-deficient Kyrgyzstan, the start-up DATT Energy37 – as well as other companies – has initiated the construction of two small hydroelectric power stations in the mountains south of Lake Issyk-Kul. A portion of the electricity generated by these plants will possibly be used by cryptocurrency miners. The primary goal is to recover construction costs as quickly as possible. Afterwards, the electricity will be allocated to other sectors, or made available to the local population.

70The shift toward off-grid computing goes beyond cryptocurrency mining. Some mining farms now offer GPU computation rental services for AI model generation due to the growing computational demands of deep learning language training. This trend raises crucial questions about the future forms – and geographies – that high-performance computing "as a service" in the future.

71In conclusion, this article aims to contribute to the field of “geography of the digital”, as outlined by Ash, Kitchin, & Leszczynski (Ash et al., 2018), by examining Bitcoin as a geopolitical and geographical object and space. Using layered visualization clarifies how Bitcoin and similar digital networks operate, including the spatial distribution of actors and the concentration of power within these networks, both in the physical and application layers. It underscores the concentration of power within Bitcoin’s physical layer and digital mining, despite its theoretically decentralized infrastructure. It also highlights the complexity of assessing Bitcoin’s geography and therefore environmental impact. This study, however, shows that its negative effects on physical space stem primarily from a lack of regulation and rationality in its deployment.

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Notes

1 ‘U.S. Treasury Designates Facilitators of Russian Sanctions Evasion’. U.S. Department of the Treasury. Retrieved 1 October 2023 (https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy0731).

2 Принят закон о легализации майнинга [Law on legalization of mining passed]. (2024, July 30). Государственная Дума [State Duma]. http://duma.gov.ru/news/59800

3 Application-Specific Integrated Circuit, processors dedicated to a specific task.

4 Coin Market Cap: https://coinmarketcap.com/community/articles/6364d2b6c7f9941d5a4a6b8d/

5 Guest, P. (2023, January 12). Bitcoin mining was booming in Kazakhstan. Then it was gone. MIT Technology Review. https://www.technologyreview.com/2023/01/12/1066589/bitcoin-mining-boom-kazakhstan/

6 Rekhviashvili, L. (2021, March 15). A Louder Periphery: Guardians of the Rioni Valley against the “Namakhvani Hydroelectric Power Plant (HPP).” Lefteast. https://lefteast.org/a-louder-periphery-guardians-of-the-rioni-valley-against-the-namakhvani-hydroelectric-power-plant-hpp/

7 Bami, X. (2023, April 17). Seizing Crypto-Mining Equipment Has Saved Kosovo ‘Millions’, Govt Claims. Balkan Insight. https://balkaninsight.com/2023/04/17/seizing-crypto-mining-equipment-has-saved-kosovo-millions-govt-claims/

8 Bacchi, U. (2021, March 1). Analysis—Crypto tears: Bitcoin miners face blame for Abkhazia energy crisis. Reuters. https://www.reuters.com/article/idUSKBN2AT1UB/

9 Petchenko, I. (2024, March 11). Майнинг-фермы vs население КР в условиях энергокризиса: Кто важнее для государства? Economist.Kg. https://economist.kg/enierghietika/2024/03/11/mainingh-fiermy-vs-nasielieniie-kr-v-usloviiakh-enierghokrizisa-kto-vazhnieie-dlia-ghosudarstva/

10 Statoshi Nakamoto is a pseudonym for the person or the group of persons, still anonymous in October 2024, behind the creation of Bitcoin.

11 Muir, M. (2021, November 22). China’s exiled crypto machines fuel global mining boom. Financial Times. https://www.ft.com/content/0dbe4f9f-a433-4288-858e-c4b852f4c340

12 I consider electricity as a "resource" as it results from the transformation of matter by skilled actors, as defined by the geographer Claude Raffestin (1980).

13 Muir, M. (2021, November 22). China’s exiled crypto machines fuel global mining boom. Financial Times. https://www.ft.com/content/0dbe4f9f-a433-4288-858e-c4b852f4c340

14 In the 2010s, these personal garages - which can be found in profusion in any urban space in the former USSR - became hotspots for the informal economy, generally being transformed into a place of commerce (cafés, car repairs, spare parts sales) and earning the appellation “garazhniki”. See: JURENKOV, K. and PORTNYAGINA, M. (2016). A Look Inside Russia’s Booming Garage Economy. Worldcrunch,. July 3rd, 2016. https://worldcrunch.com/culture-society/a-look-inside-russiaas-booming-garage-economy

15 Заработок с последствиями: ТОП-5 пожаров в Приангарье, произошедших из-за майнеров [Earnings with consequences: Top 5 fires in Angara region caused by miners]. (2023, December 22). IrkutskMedia.ru. https://irkutskmedia.ru/news/1648784/

16 Фермы ставят даже в будках: Иркутские энергетики оценили ущерб от майнеров в 1,8 миллиарда рублей [Farms set up even in the boxes: Irkutsk power engineers estimated the damage caused by miners at 1.8 billion rubles]. (n.d.). TeleInform. Retrieved September 29, 2024, from https://i38.ru/obichnie-ekonomika/fermi-stavyat-dazhe-v-budkach-irkutskie-energetiki-otsenili-uscherb-ot-maynerov-v-1-8-milliardov-rubley

17 Volobuev, A., Katkov, M., & Stepanov, V. (2021, October 13). Президенту и правительству пожаловались на майнеров криптовалют [The President and the government were complained about cryptocurrency miners]. Vedomosti. https://www.vedomosti.ru/technology/articles/2021/10/13/890912-prezidentu-pravitelstvu

18 Interviewed in April 2019 and February 2022 in Irkutsk, Russia. Website of the project and company, Imagine 8: https://www.imagine8.solutions/home

19 Interviewed in March 2019 in Irkutsk, Russia.

20 Commuter electric trains common to most of former USSR countries.

21 National Guard of the Russian Federation.

22 Coordinates: 52.78567303754712,103.61280361584349

23 The soils of the industrial zone were heavily polluted with mercury during the operation of the plants, but especially when they were abandoned. Major demercurization work is currently underway. See : missing ref

24 Сортировочная [Sortirovochnaya]. (2021, October 28). Катастрофа в Усолье-Сибирском: Как ртуть, свинец и фосфаты стали неотъемлемой частью жизни людей [The catastrophe in Usolye-Sibirskoye: how mercury, lead and phosphates have become an integral part of people’s lives, at 5’15”. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_4DqTkFKpBA

25 Майнинг-отель и ферму нашли в здании бывшего Усольехимпрома. Прокуратура обратилась в суд [A mining hotel and a farm were found in the building of the former Usoliekhimprom. The prosecutor’s office appealed to the court]. (2022, November 2). IrCity.ru. https://ircity.ru/text/society/2022/11/02/71785901/

26 Rosatom supplies cryptocurrency mining farms in the west of the country with Kalinin nuclear power plant.

27 Sam Bankman-Fried’s Big Investment: Bitcoin Mining in Kazakhstan. (2023, January 19). Wall Street Journal. https://www.wsj.com/podcasts/the-journal/sam-bankman-frieds-big-investment-bitcoin-mining-in-kazakhstan/673044da-62a4-48e8-8856-2b865e7d823c

28 I couldn’t manage to visit the site, despite numerous requests. To read and see more about this farm, read the great report made by journalist Peter Guest: Guest, P. (2023, January 12). Bitcoin mining was booming in Kazakhstan. Then it was gone. MIT Technology Review. https://www.technologyreview.com/2023/01/12/1066589/bitcoin-mining-boom-kazakhstan/

29 Interviewed in February and May 2023 in Almaty, Kazakhstan.

30 Verbinin, A. (2021, November 11). Энергосистема Казахстана оказалась под угрозой из-за майнеров [Kazakhstan’s power system is threatened by miners]. Kazakhstanskaya Pravda. https://kazpravda.kz/n/energosistema-kazahstana-okazalas-pod-ugrozoy-iz-za-maynerov/

31 https://orda.kz/aleksandr-klebanov-kto-stoit-za-katastrofoj-v-ekibastuze/

32 https://forbes.kz/ranking/object/52

33 Soltonoy, A., Mukhin, V., & Reznikova, E. (2023, July 26). А вы собирайте кизяк. Миллионы государственных киловатт продают майнерам, связанным с чиновниками. KLOOP.KG. https://kloop.kg/blog/2023/07/26/a-vy-sobirajte-kizyak-milliony-gosudarstvennyh-kilovatt-prodayut-majneram-svyazannym-s-chinovnikami/

34 Mukhin, V., Soltonoy, A., Reznikova, E., & Lee, A. (2023, July 4). Тариф «Охреневший». Правительство Жапарова по дешевке отдает электричество фирме, связанной с Бакиевыми. KLOOP.KG - Новости Кыргызстана. https://kloop.kg/blog/2023/07/04/tarif-ohrenevshij-pravitelstvo-zhaparova-po-deshevke-otdaet-elektrichestvo-firme-svyazannoj-s-bakievymi/

35 Djanibekova, N. (2018, January 30). Kyrgyzstan: Freeze Turns to Hot Fury Over Bishkek’s Power Plant Failure. Eurasianet. https://eurasianet.org/kyrgyzstan-freeze-turns-to-hot-fury-over-bishkeks-power-plant-failure

36 Putz, C. (2024, February 7). Bishkek’s Ever Problematic Power Plant Explodes. The Diplomat. https://thediplomat.com/2024/02/bishkeks-ever-problematic-power-plant-explodes

37 Interview with DATT Energy CEO in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, in September 2023.

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Référence électronique

Hugo Estecahandy, « Computing Bitcoin on Soviet Legacies »RESET [En ligne], 15 | 2025, mis en ligne le 05 juillet 2025, consulté le 09 juillet 2025. URL : http://journals.openedition.org/reset/5951 ; DOI : https://doi.org/10.4000/14adh

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Auteur

Hugo Estecahandy

PhD Candidate at the IFG-Lab (French Institute of Geopolitics), Paris 8 University, and GEODE – Geopolitics of the Datasphere research project 

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