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Editorial

Revus (2024) 53
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1The present issue of Revus contains four original articles as well as a lively discussion on an article published in one of our previous issues.

2The issue is opened by Azevedo (2024), who deals with the problem of “uninormative conflicts”, namely conflicts stemming from a single legal norm. In her article, the author seeks to whether – and if so, how – such conflicts can be considered within the broader concept of normative conflicts. Moreover, she seeks to demonstrate that theoretical instruments developed against the background of plurinormativity can also be applied to uninormativity. Azevedo’s article is here available both in English as well as in Spanish.

3Next, Coloma, Larroucau and Páez (2024) engage with the problem that the rationalist conception of evidence lacks influence in judicial fact-determination. They identify and discuss three problematic beliefs that on their view must be overcome if the theory is to have a greater influence on how facts are adjudicated in specific judicial decisions. Their article is available in Spanish.

4Martin Matczak (2024) then takes up the problem of the constitutive conventions’ primacy in law, as argued by Andrei Marmor. In opposition to the later, Matczak argues, first, that constitutive conventions do assist in solving coordination problems and, second, that they do not necessarily precede coordination convention, be it logically or temporally. To show this, the author argues that the powers of authorities can be reversely accommodated after they have already been exercised. Moreover, he claims that constitutive conventions in law are not autonomous but that they are components of other conventions that resolve coordination problems.

5Finally, in his article, Tomasz Gizbert-Studnicki (2024) deals with a classic topic in the positivist jurisprudence, namely the nature of the separation thesis which is itself entailed by the social sources thesis. The author examines four arguments seeking to preserve the separation thesis from the prevailing view that the thesis is false since, so it is said, interpretation of law necessarily involves moral evaluation. Gizbert-Studnicki thoroughly examines arguments for and against each of the four accounts and concludes that while none is fully satisfactory, one does show more promise than the others.

6Rounding up the issue are two in-depth contributions in the “Reflections and replies” section. First, Jorge L. Rodríguez (2024) critically engages with David Duarte’s paper “Rights as formal combinations of normative variables”, published in issue 51 of Revus (Duarte 2023). Rodriguez – who originally peer-reviewed Duarte’s paper – challenges Duarte’s norm-based analysis of fundamental legal positions. He furnishes eight arguments against his discussant’s analysis, claiming, among other things, that his account does not fully respect the distinction between norms and propositions.

7To this challenge, Duarte (2024) replies in the final article of this issue. At the end of the day, while acknowledging the sharpness of Rodríguez’s critique, Duarte maintains that the offered criticisms do not require him to drop any of the premises on which he builds his account.

8The diversity of this issue’s topics and the quality of arguments expounded by the authors demonstrates Revus’s continued dedication to promote high-impact research at the crossroads of law and philosophy.

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Bibliography

Azevedo, S. (2024). Uninormative conflicts in the general theory of normative conflicts. Revus – Journal for constitutional theory and philosophy of law, 53. URL: http://journals.openedition.org/revus/10392

Azevedo, S. (2024). Conflictos uninormativos en la teoría general de los conflictos normativos. Revus – Journal for constitutional theory and philosophy of law, 52. URL: http://journals.openedition.org/revus/10636

Coloma, R., Larroucau, J., & Páez, A. (2024). Sobre el impacto judicial de la concepción racionalista de la prueba [On the judicial impact of the rationalist conception of evidence]. Revus – Journal for constitutional theory and philosophy of law, 53. URL: http://journals.openedition.org/revus/10230

Duarte, D. (2023). Rights as formal combinations of normative variables. Revus – Journal for constitutional theory and philosophy of law, 51. URL: http://journals.openedition.org/revus/9714

Duarte, D. (2024). The norm-based approach facing criticism. A Reply to Jorge Rodríguez. Revus – Journal for constitutional theory and philosophy of law, 53. URL: http://journals.openedition.org/revus/10790

Gizbert-Studnicki, T. (2024). The separation thesis and legal interpretation. An overview. Revus – Journal for constitutional theory and philosophy of law, 53. URL: http://journals.openedition.org/revus/10856

Matczak, M. (2024). Constitutive conventions in law and the problem of their primacy. Revus – Journal for constitutional theory and philosophy of law, 53. URL: http://journals.openedition.org/revus/10317

Rodriguez, J.L. (2024). Legal positions reexamined. A critique of Duarte’s norm-based analysis. Revus – Journal for constitutional theory and philosophy of law, 53. URL: http://journals.openedition.org/revus/10667

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References

Electronic reference

The Editors, EditorialRevus [Online], 53 | 2024, Online since 17 April 2025, connection on 22 May 2025. URL: http://journals.openedition.org/revus/11004; DOI: https://doi.org/10.4000/13rpk

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