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Editorial

Revus (2024) 54
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1This issue features three original research articles alongside a section of critical commentaries, each offering unique insights into the evolving landscape of jurisprudence.​

2The first article by Maribel Narváez Mora (2024a in English and 2024b in Spanish), proposes a formal model of norms as functions. Drawing on the notions of direction of fit and maximal solution, the paper presents a novel account of normative structure in which norms allocate correctness and incorrectness over sets of actions and their complements. This model departs from traditional logic-based accounts by eliminating the need for conditionals, denying formal negations of norms, and distinguishing between blockade and antinomy. It also reconfigures how logical consequences may be drawn, without relying on formal relations between normative functions, thereby offering a new framework for understanding normative rationality.

3The second article by Miodrag Jovanović (2024), bridges cognitive psychology and legal philosophy. The author examines the processes of categorization in the natural versus human-made world and emphasizes the relevance of typicality judgments—a key insight from cognitive science—for conceptualizing law. Jovanović argues that the prototype theory of concepts undermines certain metaphysical assumptions underpinning analytical jurisprudence, revealing that legal theorists often operate with outdated or psychologically implausible models of human cognition. The paper thus calls for a reorientation of legal conceptual analysis grounded in empirically informed understandings of how we think.

4The third article by Piotr Bystranowski (2024) empirically examines the charge that general jurisprudence is both insular and irrelevant. Utilizing co-citation analysis, the article identifies a core set of texts within general jurisprudence and maps their citation patterns across broader legal-philosophical literature. The findings support the view that general jurisprudence is indeed highly self-referential, but also challenge the assumption that it lacks external engagement: despite its inward focus, it continues to stimulate interest and dialogue in related academic communities.

5The issue also features four in-depth contributions in the section ‘Reflections and replies’, each engaging critically with core theoretical debates and offering substantial developments in response to recently published work in this journal. The first one by Cuizhu Wang (2024) expands upon Giuseppe Rocchè’s (2024) critique of Joseph Raz’s model of exclusionary reasons. Wang brings together theories of bounded rationality and social norms to illuminate the limitations individuals face in applying exclusionary reasons in real-world contexts. She shows how both cognitive biases and normative social pressures interfere with the rational ideal of filtering out personal preferences when following authoritative directives. The commentary enriches Rocchè’s critique by offering a more nuanced, empirically grounded picture of the constraints on legal authority and practical reasoning.

6The second critical reply by Svan Relac (2024), offers a pointed critique of Sara Azevedo’s (2024a and 2024b) recent account of uninormative conflicts—cases where multiple conflicting norms derive from a single general norm. While Azevedo contends that such conflicts are best understood as conflicts in abstracto and must be resolved through balancing, Relac challenges both claims. Drawing on distinctions between conflicts in abstracto, in concreto, and conflicts of instantiation, the author argues that uninormative conflicts stem from empirical, not logical, incompatibilities and thus do not necessitate resolution through balancing. This critique deepens the ongoing debate about the scope of normative conflicts and the role of axiological assumptions in legal reasoning, offering a careful reconsideration of the conceptual foundations underlying normative conflict theory.

7The issue also features a third reflective reply by Kenneth Einar Himma (2024). In this contribution, Himma critically examines Miodrag Jovanović’s (2024) defense of prototype theory as an alternative to traditional, metaphysically driven conceptual analysis. Himma argues that the psychological account of how we form concepts (prototype theory of concept formation, PCF) cannot by itself justify a semantic theory of graded conceptual content (prototype theory of conceptual content, PCC). He further contends that PCC, even if well-articulated, is not a genuine alternative to metaphysical theorizing, since conceptual truths—such as those about the nature of law—are necessarily true if true at all. Ultimately, Himma suggests that the two approaches may be complementary: while prototype methods may help illuminate how concepts are used or understood in practice, metaphysical analysis remains essential for identifying the necessary conditions of legal concepts and ensuring conceptual clarity in jurisprudence.

8Concluding this section is the final reflection by Jaap Hage (2024), which offers a detailed critique of Maribel Narváez Mora’s (2024a and 2024b) proposal to treat norms as functions. While acknowledging the strengths of Narváez Mora’s foundational assumptions—that norms lack truth values and attach facts to actions—Hage identifies several conceptual and logical limitations in treating norms as mappings from actions to binary evaluations of correctness. As an alternative, he proposes a bifurcated framework that sharply distinguishes between rule-logic and deontic logic. Within this framework, norms are treated as logical individuals rather than functions, enabling a monotonic—and potentially non-monotonic—form of rule-logic that accommodates both the reasoning structure of normative systems and the defeasibility of normative judgments. Hage’s intervention reorients the debate toward a more precise conceptual architecture for handling norms and obligations, bridging formal logic and normative reasoning.

9Collectively, these contributions reflect Revus’s ongoing dedication to enriching contemporary debates at the intersection of law, philosophy, and related disciplines. We hope this issue encourages readers to explore new angles, question familiar frameworks, and contribute to the evolving conversation on legal and constitutional theory.

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Bibliography

Azevedo S. (2024a). Uninormative conflicts in the general theory of normative conflicts. Revus – Journal for constitutional theory and philosophy of law, 53. URL: http://journals.openedition.org/revus/10392

Azevedo S. (2024b). Conflictos uninormativos en la teoría general de los conflictos normativos. Revus – Journal for constitutional theory and philosophy of law, 53. URL: http://journals.openedition.org/revus/10636

Bystranowski P. (2024). Self-absorbed, yet interesting? A bibliometric study on general jurisprudence. Revus – Journal for constitutional theory and philosophy of law, 54. URL: http://journals.openedition.org/revus/10886

Hage J. (2025). Norms as functions and as individuals. Revus – Journal for constitutional theory and philosophy of law, 54. URL: http://journals.openedition.org/revus/10989

Himma K.E. (2024). Conceptual analysis and the prototype theory of concept formation. Revus – Journal for constitutional theory and philosophy of law, 54. URL: http://journals.openedition.org/revus/10991

Jovanović M. (2024). Prototype theory of concepts and analytical account of law. Revus – Journal for constitutional theory and philosophy of law, 54. URL: http://journals.openedition.org/revus/10821

Narváez Mora M. (2024a). Norms as functions. Revus – Journal for constitutional theory and philosophy of law, 54. URL: http://journals.openedition.org/revus/10490

Narváez Mora M. (2024b). Las normas como funciones. Revus – Journal for constitutional theory and philosophy of law, 54. URL: http://journals.openedition.org/revus/10608

Relac S. (2024). Identifying and resolving uninormative conflicts: A reply to Azevedo. Revus – Journal for constitutional theory and philosophy of law, 54. URL: http://journals.openedition.org/revus/10951

Rocchè G. (2024). Exclusionary reasons and mental contamination. Revus – Journal for constitutional theory and philosophy of law, 52. URL: http://journals.openedition.org/revus/10412

Wang C. (2024). Dual constraints on agent decision-making: expanding Rocchè’s critique of Raz’s exclusionary reasons. Revus – Journal for constitutional theory and philosophy of law, 54. URL: http://journals.openedition.org/revus/10714

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References

Electronic reference

The Editors, “Editorial”Revus [Online], 54 | 2024, Online since 17 April 2025, connection on 14 May 2025. URL: http://journals.openedition.org/revus/11006; DOI: https://doi.org/10.4000/13rpl

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