• 1 Strawson 2008. Michael McKenna (2012: 3–4, 31) says that a Strawsonian approach embraces three idea (...)

1This article proposes a way of viewing expectations and their role on processes of attribution of responsibility. Before I begin, some of the assumptions of the underlying perspective should be mentioned. First, a Strawsonian vision of responsibility is assumed, based on the ideas presented by Peter Strawson in his essay Freedom and Resentment.1 At the same time, in this work I differ from common interpretations of the essay, centering attention on places usually not considered, in particular, the significance of the essay is explored in the legal (not only moral) domain and the importance of expectations (not only reactive attitudes) is discussed in order to understand responsibility.

• 2 Strawson points out that: “The personal reactive attitudes rest on, and reflect, an expectation of, (...)

2On the other hand, the hypothesis that every attribution of responsibility process starts with an expectation is embraced,2 specifically, considering a breached expectation, and that the event that breached the expectation is for what someone is responsible. In this context, one may always ask the one attributing responsibility: “What were you expecting to happen?” with the intention that she makes explicit what she is holding someone responsible for.

• 3 Propositional attitudes are not separated from each other. On the contrary, they act in sets where (...)

6Over the next pages this approach is explained. In order to do so I take into account three of its characteristics: demands are expressed through expectations; they are reasonable or legitimate demands and; it is rational to ask for an explanation every time an event generates a dissonance with the standard that forms the expectation. These three characteristics will help us to distinguish expectations from other propositional attitudes like hopes, illusions and predictions,3 and to show the importance of expectations in understanding practices of attribution of responsibility.

• 4 See Galtung 1959: 214; Mellema 2004: 4.

7We deal with others expecting from them behaviors that have specific meanings. i.e. we face each other using standards which help us to identify and evaluate our actions. This is why expectations are usually defined as evaluative standards.4

• 5 There are two more ideas to consider. On the one hand, expectations are expressed using subjunctive (...)

10Expectations, as demands, are different from predictions yet both have a prospective character. Talking about both we can correctly say that they are formed before the relevant events occur, i.e. the predicted, expected or unexpected event. This makes it possible to compare the standard of the expectation with the event, and to make the dissonance or consonance between them explicit. But in predicting we do not express a demand, if Juan predicts Antonioʼs arrival, he is not demanding it.5

• 6 This issue is considered by Luigi Ferrajoli in the legal domain: ““Las expectativas por otro lado, (...)

11Anyway, expectations cannot be reduced to desires. The fulfillment of an expectation does not suppose the satisfaction of a need or an interest. Sometimes we expect what we do not desire (e.g. Juan expects Antonioʼs arrival to a meeting which he does not want to have because they are committed to talk about something he would rather not to talk about).6 Commonly the standards which are part of interactions have validity independent of an individualʼs desires.

• 7 Wittgenstein 2009: § 581. See also Mellema 1998: 479–481.
• 8 The distinction between expectations and hopes and illusions can be understood as one between kinds (...)

13Having this in mind, an expectation can be distinguished by its legitimacy, and its illegitimacy may be due to various reasons. The reasons are context dependent. As Wittgenstein pointed out: “An expectation is embedded in a situation, from which it arises. The expectation of an explosion may, for example, arise from a situation in which an explosion is to be expected.”7 Thus, to expect that my body will be attracted to the floor in a spaceship is not reasonable. We can distinguish expectations from hopes and illusions by their legitimacy or reasonability.8

• 9 See Smith 1987.

14There is another way in which an individual may be wrong about expectations: having a false idea about her own expectations. Since expectations are propositional attitudes, occasionally they may be opaque to individuals. A person who has an expectation (i.e. an expectation can be appropriately attributed to her) is not always aware of that.9 In addition, sometimes individuals become aware of what they expect after the relevant event happens or after a discussion about how to understand specific events that have attracted particular attention.

• 10 Galtung 1959: 214–215. A person’s awareness of an expectation that has been breached, as well as th (...)

15At first sight, the last affirmation in in conflict with the previously expressed one about the prospective character of expectations. But this conflict is apparent, expectations can be expressed in a postdictive (i.e. can be make explicit, after the relevant event occurs) and in a predictive way.10 To justify the possibility of having an expectation previously to the event is different from being aware of it or to expressing it before the relevant events occur.

• 11 See Mellema 1998: 480–481; 2004: chs. 2 & 3. Although in some places, he apparently confuses both k (...)

16Therefore, there are two ways through which it is stated that a person is wrong regarding expectations. First, it is assumed that the determination of what may be expected in a context is done independently from the concrete beliefs of such individual. Gregory Mellema states that the existence of an expectation does not depend on its possession by the concrete individuals, but what is relevant is the legitimacy to adopt them. In the second case, the determination of the concrete expectations that a person has may be carried out independent of the perception that such a person has regarding her own expectations.11 In the first case, attention is centered on expectation as a standard, in the second one, on expectation as a propositional attitude. In both cases determination of what might be expected or of what someone expects is carried out independently of the concrete beliefs of an individual regarding the situation, and assumes the possibility that they might err.

• 12 Sometimes a person goes beyond the call of expectation ‘by doing more than what is minimally requir (...)

17So far, we have proposed understanding expectations as standards that members of a community may adopt, in the sense that it is legitimate to adopt them under certain circumstances. At the same time, it has been pointed out that expectations present themselves as demands to the world and others. The third characteristic that will be pointed out here involves the relationship between expectations and the events that unfulfill them:12 when having legitimate requirements from the world and others, in the case that they are unfulfilled, searching for an explanation of what has happened is rational.

• 13 The dissonance (or consonance) between the event and the expectation may take place in a variety of (...)

18Johan Galtung notes that expectations, as standards, may be compared to various events. This comparison can have three different results: a consonance between event and expectation, a dissonance between them, or that the event is not consonant nor dissonant, but neutral. In the last case, the expectation is irrelevant as a standard to assess the event (e.g. the expectation of Juan arriving at certain time appears irrelevant, in principle, to asses that a child stole a candy three years before, in another country). On the other hand, the difference between the other two cases is gradual, that is, depending on the expectation. It can be more or less unfulfilled and more or less fulfilled, while also cases of complete consonance or dissonance may be found.13

• 14 Thus, concerning beliefs, Ludwig Wittgenstein writes: “Ask yourself: What does it mean to believe G (...)
• 15 On this see Narváez 2006; Smith 1987; 1994: ch. IV. This model does not define propositional attitu (...)
• 16 Having this in mind, we may distinguish expectations from beliefs, at least under the model that un (...)

20It is possible to identify differences between propositional attitudes through a dispositional-normative model. In this model, to be disposed to (i.e. to be willing to) is characterised by commitments to a certain way of behaving faced with a specific situation that are attributed to a subject.14 The relevant situation, usually, is precisely the occurrence of something opposed to the content of the propositional attitude and what establishes the type of propositional attitude is the response to that.15 In this order of things, the search of an explanation is characteristic of expectations in the case of dissonance with an event.16

• 17 By saying that the unfulfillment of an expectation entitles us to search for an explanation, I am n (...)
• 18 All this things can be discussed. For example, we can debate whether the break of the promise is im (...)

21Applying these ideas to the mentioned example, if Juan is expecting Antonio to arrive at a certain time legitimately (e.g. Antonio promised him), a delay of Antonio allows Juan to ask himself: “Why hasn’t Antonio arrived?” If the situation is considered, Juan had a standard of Antonio’s behavior (e.g. that he would be present in certain place at certain time); by comparing that standard with a relevant event (e.g. that an hour after of what was established, Antonio has not arrived to the meeting place), it may be the case that the mentioned expectation has been unfulfilled (e.g. Antonio is not at the established place and time). This leads to the possibility of searching for an explanation (e.g. Juan may reflect in this manner: “Why hasn’t Antonio arrived? Maybe he had an accident, maybe he didn’t want to meet me, etc.”),17 as well as an evaluation (e.g. Antonio has broken his promise, and that is morally wrong). With regards to the latter, as will be seen, the type of evaluation chosen will depend on the origin of the expectation (in this example, it is judged from the moral expectation of keeping one’s promises, assuming that it is morally wrong).18 This is the entrance to a process of attribution of responsibility that may end in the manifestation of blaming from Juan, in the case of ascribing Antonio the unfulfillment of the expectation. This will be further discussed in the following section.

• 19 Different ways of seeing the distinction between normative expectations and cognitive expectations (...)

23Beyond these common characteristics, in this wide group, it is possible to make some distinctions. A classic distinction, although formulated in different ways, differentiates between cognitive and normative expectations.19

• 20 This clarification is due to the comments of Diego Papayannis, Matias Parmigani, and an anonymous r (...)

24Before analyzing such a distinction, it must be considered that all the expectations mentioned above are normative, this is precisely manifested in the idea that they are legitimate demands that can be expressed as evaluative standards, and distinguishing them from predictions, illusions, and hopes, their normativity has been highlighted. Normativity is a characteristic of them all, not of only a class of them and, viewed this way, there are no non-normative expectations. The label “normative” to classify them may lead to misunderstanding, but it is used in this work due to its widespread use, this is why in the following paragraphs the sense of referring to “normative expectations”, as different from cognitive expectations, will be explained.20

• 21 Paprzycka 1999: 632; Galtung 1959: 215–218.
• 22 In this sense, some can say that we are dealing with predictions. As has been said, when we have an (...)

26The fact that the dissonance becomes unbearable has as a consequence that people commit to an activity directed to achieve consonance. This leads to changes, either in the expectation, or in what explains that the dissonance occurred (ensuring that a similar event doesn’t happen again). In this sense, both Johan Galtung and Katarzyna Paprzycka, define the distinction between normative and cognitive expectations by using the notion of direction of fit.21 More specifically, cognitive expectations have a mind-to-world direction of fit while normative expectations a world-to-mind one. This means that if an event unfulfills a cognitive expectation, the expectation is usually abandoned or redefined, because it is considered false.22 On the contrary, when a normative expectation is unfulfilled, ways of changing the world are looked for. Galtung points out that in the case of unfulfillment of normative expectations formed when facing other people, politics of social control are taken or simply the individual to whom the event that causes the dissonance has been attributed is ignored, all these actions have the goal of avoiding future dissonances.

• 23 See Jakobs 1997: 10–11. In a similar way, Paprzycka links normative expectations directly with sanc (...)

27Günther Jakobs, in his approach to Criminal Law, says that normative expectations are reaffirmed by punishment, emphasizing the expressive function of the latter.23 According to this interpretation with punishment, people are not trying to change the world (at least, not always), but to reaffirm an expectation facing it.

• 24 Mellema 2004: 4–6.

30Considering this, there is a group of expectations that Gregory Mellema identifies as rule expectations.24 These are the ones that are created inside normative systems that are beyond spontaneous interpersonal relations and that are generally created by specialized authorities. Mellema points out that a characteristic of this type of expectations is that the language of obligation appears appropriate to express them. At the same time, in the case of unfulfillment, a punishment is considered a suitable reaction. Cases of such expectations are the ones formed by the rules of a club, religious institutions, or legal codes.

• 25 The same event can be assessed using different expectations. Thus, for example, an action can be co (...)
• 26 Rules expectations (and some normative expectations) may be adopted in spite of our knowledge about (...)

31If the three characteristics of every expectation are considered, in the case of rule expectations, their legitimacy is usually due to the legitimacy of the authority that dictates them and/or to the possibility to impute their acceptance to the persons whom expectations are applied (i.e. from whom something is expected). This, also, assumes many times requirements are far from what can reasonably be carried out (e.g. to expect that citizens respect a legal norm even if it does not make sense or when following it may lead to immoral results),25 or that are contrary to what usually happens (e.g. even though it is common that in a particular neighborhood assaults occur, an individual may expect not to be assaulted).26 At the same time, depending on the authority who formulates the expectation, it is possible to identify the appropriate kind of evaluation linked to the content of the expectation (e.g. legal and illegal in the case of legal institutions). Finally, in this kind of expectations, the most common explanation of the event that unfulfills it is its attribution to a person (i.e. the event is explained by ascribing it to someone), although other explanations may be found. This way in which the three characteristics are manifested is not the only one. A similar analysis can be done of the other expectations that have been mentioned.

• 27 See Jakobs 2006: 127; Kelsen 2009: 74.

32Expectations are central to act and interact with others and with the natural and cultural environment in general. They are one of the most common ways of normalizing reality, allowing us to orientate our conduct.27 This does not mean that every person is aware of every expectation, but that, one way or another, they can be made explicit.

• 28 Gardner 2008: 132. In the quoted article, Gardner comments H.L.A Hartʼs proposal about the differen (...)

33In responsibility processes, people look for the person responsible for an event that excites their interest, to make him respond for that. As John Gardner puts it: “Those who are responsible are those who are singled out to bear the adverse normative consequences of wrongful (or otherwise deficient) actions”.28

• 29 To some authors there is a stronger connection between reactions and the unfulfillment of expectati (...)

35This is in consonance with the idea that the unfulfillment of an expectation may be linked to the adoption of a reactive attitude.29 Reactive attitudes, such as resentment and indignation, are triggered by the occurrence of an event, and are adopted towards others, specifically to whom the event is attributed.

• 30 Wallace points out that: “Reactive attitudes as a class are distinguished by their connection with (...)
• 31 About this, from his second person’s perspective, Stephen Darwall says that: “Reactive attitudes th (...)

36As Jay Wallace says, in responsibility processes, the triggering event of a reactive attitude is one related to an expectation.30 In this way, expectations work as standards that help us to identify the relevant events and to identify the kind of evaluative judgments involved as well.31 Persons are responsible for something that occurs, and this is recognizable by means of expectations.

• 32 See Williams 1995: 40. To consider that only moral expectations are relevant to responsibility lead (...)
• 33 Consequently, it is possible that a specific expectation (and the commitments adopted by identifyin (...)

38In addition, the attribution of responsibility is not always based on the unfulfillment of moral expectations, nor on expectations whose unfulfillment may only occur by performing an action. On the contrary, a broad range of expectations, can lead to processes of attribution of responsibility.32 The connection between the unfulfillment and the person to whom it is attributed is diverse and can be obtained through causal, intentional, and magical explanations, among others. As has been pointed out, expectations have diverse origins and find support in different kinds of reasons. In fact, the same event can be related to different kinds of expectations, and be evaluated in different manners.33

• 34 Feinberg 1970b: 130–131. The same point in Darwall 2006: 80–82 and Mackie 1985: 29–30.

39Therefore, it is recommendable to assume a broad notion on expectations that considers everything that is legitimate to expect and whose unfulfillment encourages the search of an explanation. Also, in principle, this broad range can be related to practices of attribution of responsibility. In Joel Feinbergʼs words: “The point is this: we do not ordinarily raise the question of responsibility for something unless that something has somehow excited our interest”.34

• 35 The discussion of this point is due to some comments from Claudio Michelon and Maribel Narváez. Ind (...)

40It has been noted that expectations are evaluative standards and that, in consequence, in a basic sense, every expectation is normative (i.e. there are no non-normative expectations), beyond the classification of normative and cognitive expectations that may be carried out. At the same time, the breach of such standards would trigger reactive attitudes, justifying the search for a person that is responsible. To finish this work, I would like to examine what seems a legitimate question in this context, Why not simply talk of obligations or conduct rules instead of expectations?35

• 36 Kindhäuser 2009: 500. It is worthy to note that Kelsen’s thinks that this is not indispensable. See(...)

41In criminal law doctrine, a similar role to the one which has been attributed to expectations in the section above, is carried out by general conduct rules. They are understood as “the rules under which something is judged as right or wrong, good or bad, they have a directive (prescriptive) or evaluative (axiological) character”.36 This rules are addressed to citizens (i.e. people from whom certain conducts are expected) and they have the structure of a categorical standard. They are usually manifested as criminal offences.

• 37 In fact, in Criminal Law the rule of law requires rules expectations to conform crimes,
• 38 Hruschka 2005: 28.
• 39 Hruschka 2005: 28.

42Following what has been mentioned in the previous pages, conduct rules can be understood as rules expectations.37 In fact, expectations fulfill the functions that Hruschka attributes to conduct rules. According to this author, conduct rules have, first, a configuration function, being its mission to influence on and to shape people lives.38 This is done by indicating them what they must or must not do or what is allowed to be done and/or to stop doing (i.e. what is expected from them and what can they expect from others). The other is a measurement scale function, directed to the judge (in a broad sense) who evaluates the events ex post facto, using the measure given by the norms.39 To Hruschka, both are two sides of the same coin.

• 40 Thus, for example, expectations can refer to events which do not suppose directly the performance o (...)

43Considering what has been said in the above paragraphs, to some extent the distinction between conduct rules and expectations is merely terminological. But there are reasons that can make us inclined to talk about expectations rather than conduct rules in the context of attribution of responsibility practices. One of those reasons concerns the scope of the approach defended in this work. My concern is with standards that are present not only in criminal law, but in other areas of law and morals as well. The domain of expectations is broader than that of conduct rules, at least in the way in which they are understood by the quoted authors.40

• 41 A more detailed analysis of these examples in Mellema 2004: ch. 9.

44To this, Mellema adds that the domain of moral expectations is even broader than the one of moral obligations, and that the unfulfillment of any of these expectations, in certain contexts, can derive in a process of attribution of responsibility. A couple of examples to illustrate this idea can be useful.41 At a long queue waiting for a table at a restaurant, one can legitimately have the expectation that people who have finished their meal and are aware of others, will stand up and give their place to others within a reasonable amount of time, so it is expected from someone that has committed to write a letter of recommendation to say only positive things about the person he is recommending. Although having these expectations, legitimate in both cases, it cannot be said that the people sitting at a table, or the person writing the recommendation are morally obliged to do what is expected from them. Mellema points out that this type of expectations, which are not comparable to moral duties, can be recognized because, when facing them, the correct reaction (in terms of sanction) is usually less intense. Thus, for example, instead of being expressed through blaming, it is expressed through disappointment. But a less intense reaction, does not mean that the one to whom the unfulfillment of the expectation is ascribed is not being held responsible.

• 42 Another reason to talk about expectations rather than rules is that we say naturally that a person (...)

45The point is that what is required in terms of expectations is broader than what can be recognized as someone’s moral (or legal) obligations. So, not every expectation that generates responsibility is an obligation.42

• 43 This makes room to the possibility of translating conduct rules and obligations into expectations. (...)

46By talking of expectations, we hold a weaker normativity than the one held when speaking of conduct rules and obligations. One can be responsible of things to which one does not have a duty, or at least, it is better to make room for this possibility.43 The difference is, without a doubt, gradual, and if the reader wants to understand conduct rules and moral obligations in a weak sense, the difference between both and expectations becomes imperceptible.

• 44 Kelsen (1967: 114–119).

47Finally, another way of arguing can be considered, having in mind the difference that Kelsen establishes between having an obligation and being responsible. According to Kelsen, obligations determine the existence of delicts, and only the person who has an obligation can commit a delict. Although the sanction is connected to the delict by imputation, the responsible person and the person with the obligation do not have to coincide. In fact, it is precisely this distinction what allows to explain cases of vicarious responsibility, where the one held responsible is a different person than the one that commits the delict.44 This way, Kelsen states that:

• 46 An event may be ascribed to a person (i.e. it is charged to her record. See Feinberg 1970b) without (...)

50Understanding expectations as standards that can be adopted by members of a community in order to evaluate some events and that entitles such members to search for an explanation of those events, allows us to understand their link with responsibility, precisely because people are held responsible due to the occurrence of a wrong, which does not have to be directly linked with the breach of an obligation. Also, the search for an explanation allows us to open the door to the ascription of the event that unfulfills the expectation to a person, whether that person who has or has not the one that commits an illicit conduct.46 To that person, the reactive attitudes will be directed from whom is holding them responsible.