37 | 2019
Varia
-
Symposium on legal normativity
Revusov forum.
The following reaction papers and critical notes all refer to Brian H. Bix's essay Kelsen, Hart and legal normativity published in Revus (2018) 34.-
A problem for the unambitious view of legal normativity [Dostop prost]
-
Understanding normativity [Dostop prost]The impact of culturally-loaded explanatory ambitions
-
On legal things to do: external and internal legal reasons [Dostop prost]Comments on Brian Bix’s ‘Hart, Kelsen and legal normativity’
-
The tigerish nature of legal normativity [Dostop prost]
-
Kelsenian imputation and the explanation of legal norms [Dostop prost]
-
Legal normativity as a moral property [Dostop prost]
-
Bix on the normativity of law [Dostop prost]
-
On the nature of legal normativity [Dostop prost]Response to commentators
-
-
Symposium on risk regulation and tort law
Revusov forumUr. Diego M. PapayannisIn the previous issue of Revus (2018) 36, we published the main article of this Symposium on Risks regulation and tort law: “Principles of risk imposition and the priority of avoiding harm” by Professor Gregory C. Keating. In that article, Keating argued that quite often safety regulations protect against physical harm and health injury by requiring potential defendants to take more than efficient precautions. These demanding standards of care are rational, contrary to what the economic perspective might suggest, for in general there is an asymmetry between the costs of devastating physical injuries and the economic benefits derived from the untaken precautions.
In this issue, we present three critical contributions. In “Justice luck in negligence law”, Professor Mark F. Grady qualifies Keating’s proposal as normative, and claims that it is inconsistent with the actual practice of US Courts. In order to apply Keating’s preferred rules, the system should be reformed to prevent juries from “forgiving” negligence, as they do on many occasions where perfect compliance is deemed to be too costly. This might lead us to eliminate juries altogether when the impulse to “forgive” is likely to be strong.
Next, in “Cost-benefit analysis outside of welfarism” Professor Mark A. Geistfeld highlights that Keating’s rejection of the cost-benefit analysis is unwarranted. Keating seems to identify cost-benefit analysis with welfarist or utilitarianist positions. However, cost-benefit analysis is just a methodology absolutely compatible with a liberal-egalitarian framework. In this way, Geistfeld tries to show that the more demanding standards of care pointed out by Keating in cases where the prospects of physical harm are at stake fit perfectly well within the cost-benefit framework.
Finally, Professor Dan Priel’s contribution “Do societies prioritize harm prevention?” challenges the very idea that the avoidance of significant risk of physical harm plays a privileged role in actual tort doctrine. According to Priel, the main normative concern of tort law rules is with the distribution of losses. In fact, he argues, it is not obvious that societies do prioritize in general the avoidance of losses. Moreover, he claims that is not clear at all that prevention should be advanced as a goal when the associated costs of doing so are too high.
This highly stimulating and enlightening debate will be completed with Professor Keating’s reply in a subsequent issue of Revus.
-
Justice luck in negligence law [Dostop prost]
-
Cost-benefit analysis outside of welfarism [Dostop prost]
-
Do societies prioritize harm prevention? [Dostop prost]
-