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Parental proxy voting and political representation

Miklós Könczöl

Abstract

This paper reviews the proposal to give parents extra votes that they can cast as proxies on behalf of their children. Justifications of parental proxy voting (PPV) are examined with a focus on various interpretations of the concept of ‘proxy’. The first part of the paper assesses the notion that PPV does not violate the principles of equal and direct suffrage. Contrary to proponents of PPV, I argue that parents voting on behalf of their children cannot be considered as merely expressing children’s political preferences, and that persons who are taken to be unable to make a decision themselves cannot be represented in this way. Thus, PPV actually allocates extra voting rights to parents, giving additional weight to their preferences in decision-making. The second part turns to parents as possible proxies for children’s interests, with their extra votes being meant to overweigh those of the elderly or of non-parents. PPV thus understood could be supported by the claim that parents are better situated to represent their children’s interests than the average voter. Proposals of PPV usually refer to parents’ better access to information, their shared interests with their children, and/or their selflessness. These arguments are, however, either irrelevant or questionable, and do not therefore actually speak in favour of the introduction of PPV. In conclusion, while PPV is usually depicted as making political decisions simultaneously more democratic and more prudent, it does neither. Since these aims cannot be achieved through a single institution, different methods to achieve each aim need to be explored.

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1 Introduction

  • 1 First by Löw (1974). On the subsequent debate, see the overview by Westle (2006). While the idea (...)
  • 2 Cf. van Parijs (1998), Jakab (2019, 2020). Sustainability is used rather broadly in the related l (...)

1This paper deals with a proposal, formulated repeatedly in several countries (but most prominently in Germany) since the 1970s,1 to have parents vote as proxies on behalf of their children until they become of legal voting age. While the proxy proposal is part of efforts to find institutional solutions for problems related to sustainability,2 the arguments formulated in the discourse go beyond the question of efficiency, i.e., whether the proposed reform could contribute to more sustainable policies, and raise fundamental problems of constitutional law, as well as legal and political theory.

  • 3 See, within the context of German constitutional law, Müller-Franken (2013), with further referen (...)
  • 4 See, e.g., Müller-Franken (2013: 59, with reference to Pechstein 1996: 84–85).
  • 5 See, e.g., de Briey (2007).
  • 6 On the lack of convincing empirical arguments, see Müller-Franken (2013: 104, quoting Westle 2006 (...)
  • 7 Cf. Offe (1994, quoted by Goerres & Tiemann 2009: 58).

2While its supporters tend to regard it as a kind of panacea for several issues concerning sustainability and democracy, the proposal has provoked quite some controversy. It has been challenged from at least three perspectives: first, as violating the democratic (and constitutional) principles of equal and direct (personal) suffrage;3 second, as unnecessary, since the lack of suffrage does not mean a lack of representation for children;4 and third, as unhelpful, either because extra parental votes may not, or at least not only, be used to promote sustainability or children’s interests,5 or because these votes may not suffice to make a difference in terms of voting outcomes.6 Related to this latter point, a ‘reform paradox’ may arise in the sense that wherever such an institution would receive the necessary support within the electorate to be enacted, it would not be necessary.7

  • 8 For that usage, see, e.g., Reimer (2004), de Briey (2007), Goerres and Tiemann (2009), and Reimer (...)
  • 9 There may be at least one exception to that, in case one regards suffrage as a good (see Hermann (...)

3The arguments anticipating or in response to the above objections can be classified as either ‘deontological’ or ‘consequentialist’.8 While a clear distinction between the two may be difficult to make in some cases, they do clearly differ in their scope in that the former are meant to explain why children should have suffrage,9 whereas the latter are aimed at justifying parental voting on behalf of children.

  • 10 As a parallel, see the well-known proposal to abandon equality for proportionality in democratic (...)

4In what follows, I focus on the concept of, and justifications offered for, parental proxy voting (PPV). In doing so, I shall distinguish between what seem to me two different sets of arguments and examine each in turn. The first, the ‘Equal Suffrage Account’, sticks to the notion that PPV actually means suffrage for children, yet with their right to vote being exerted by their parents on their behalf. The second, the ‘Unequal Suffrage Account’, is meant to provide justification for the extra votes that are to be cast by parents. While most proponents of PPV combine these in some form, the two sets seem to be relatively independent, at least in the sense that arguments used to support the Unequal Suffrage Account may work even if those formulated in favour of the Equal Suffrage Account do not hold.10

5I am going to tackle each of the accounts by looking at the interpretations of ‘proxy voting’ they are (or could be) based on. In the case of the Equal Suffrage Account, neither of the possible interpretations seems to be adequate for defending PPV, for conceptual reasons. While there is a different interpretation underlying the Unequal Suffrage Account that may provide strong arguments for some kind of a proxy, it does not work for parental proxies specifically. What follows for children’s representation in political decision-making is that they either ought to be able to participate directly, or their interests should be represented by a more reliable proxy. These two possibilities do not exclude one another, but their functions cannot be merged in one institution, and certainly not in PPV.

2 The equal suffrage account

6Given that children under a certain age do not currently have suffrage, an argument for PPV requires at least the following steps:

(1) Children should be enfranchised.

(2) Children cannot cast votes.

(3) Parents should vote on behalf of their children.

  • 11 This claim is most often supported by referencing the concept of popular sovereignty: since child (...)
  • 12 See e.g., Reimer and Schanda (2016: 64).
  • 13 That is why the institution is sometimes referred to as ‘children’s vote vicariously exercised’ ( (...)
  • 14 See e.g., de Briey, Héraut, & Ottaviani (2009). For the same reason, opponents of PPV argue that (...)

7The proposal, in its above form, presupposes that the vote belongs to the child. Children, qua citizens, are regarded as having the right to vote (1),11 but also as needing a proxy to cast the vote for them (2). This solution is often commended as being in line with the constitutional principle of ‘one person, one vote’.12 Proponents of PPV stress that even though parents would be able to cast more than one vote this way, the additional votes would not be their own.13 This is important, since the most obvious objection to PPV, already mentioned above, is that it actually amounts to plural vote.14

8As mentioned above, my focus is on the justification of (3), i.e., the question of whether it is the parents, rather than either average voters or experts, who should act as proxies for their children in a political decision-making process. Thus, I am not dealing here with the validity of either (1) or (2), but accept them for the sake of argument, and confine myself to examining what interpretations of ‘proxy’ can be used to support arguments in favour of (3). It seems that there are two such conceptions, which I discuss in turn below. The first regards the proxy as someone who merely expresses the child voter’s decision (1.1), whereas in the second, the proxy makes the decision on behalf of the child (1.2).

2.1 Casting the vote

  • 15 Cf. Art. 38(1) of the Grundgesetz.
  • 16 See e.g., Löw (2002), Fröhlich (2011).
  • 17 See Representation of People Act 2000, section 12(1), and Code électoral, article 147bis, respect (...)
  • 18 Cf. Müller-Franken (2013: 78), also pointing out that ‘proxy voting’ in the above sense depends o (...)

9To counter the objection that PPV would violate the principle of direct suffrage,15 the institution of voting by intermediary is often mentioned, e.g., the British and French solutions of ‘voting by proxy’ or ‘vote par procuration’, which are offered as an alternative to voting by mail for people who are unable to attend voting in person.16 One has to apply for proxy voting, and entrust someone who has the right to vote to cast one’s vote.17 In that usage, then, a ‘proxy’ is an intermediary for performing the physical actions related to voting. It is important to see here, however, that the parallel with PPV is not a very close one. Voting by proxy is reserved for persons who would be able to cast a vote at the time were it not for their specific conditions,18 while proponents of PPV assume that children qua children cannot vote themselves, other conditions aside (that is, children who would be able to attend voting are equally excluded).

  • 19 See Löw (2005: 38–39), quoting the example of Lionel Jospin, who, having failed to receive enough (...)
  • 20 Cf. Gaa (1997: 345).
  • 21 E.g., Reimer & Schanda (2016: 182).

10In the above case, unlike the person entitled to the vote, a reliable proxy would be both physically and legally able to cast the vote and be expected to cast the actual vote of the incapable voter, i.e., the vote expressing the decision of the latter, similar to an agent acting on behalf of a principal. The ‘principal voter’, to be sure, can instruct the proxy to cast the vote according to her own best judgement.19 The institution nevertheless requires that the former can at least make a decision to be expressed through the vote cast by the latter. Thus, in the case of PPV, acting as a proxy seems to refer not only to the actual casting of the vote (in the sense of placing the ballot into the box or performing a similar action), but to include the moment of decision-making too.20 Apparently, even proponents of PPV focus on that latter interpretation, using the parallel of ‘voting by proxy’ only to argue that direct suffrage does not require that the vote be cast personally.21 Yet, in the case of children, it is not their presence that is lacking, but, arguably, their capability to make a decision.

2.2 Making the decision

  • 22 See, e.g., Gaa (1997: 345), Hinrichs (2002: 52).
  • 23 See Hattenhauer (1996: 16), Reimer (2004), also Schanda (2012: 83), pointing out that the persona (...)

11The idea of PPV implies, by definition, that children (or at least some children) cannot make the decision themselves, but also that someone else can do so on their behalf. The question is, again, whether that departs from the principle of direct suffrage. A parallel with marriage is sometimes drawn here. Those opposing PPV argue that there are certain highly personal decisions that cannot be made by any other than those concerned. In modern times, so the argument goes, both marriage and electoral votes belong to this category.22 In response, proponents of PPV claim that the nature of voting differs from marriage, since the latter is a personal decision with consequences that affect one’s personal life to a definitive extent, while the consequences of one’s vote appear in a very different way.23 For proponents of PPV, what needs to be expressed is one’s interests. Even if one does not believe, unlike people across many historical periods and many cultures, that one’s spouse could adequately be chosen by someone else, we have good reason to think that one’s interests related to political decision-making can be fully taken into account by another person.

  • 24 See, in general, UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, Art. 12(1) on the right of the child t (...)
  • 25 Cf. Schanda (2012: 83), Reimer & Schanda (2016: 68).

12On this account, what makes parents not only suitable proxies but the best possible candidates to act as proxies, is their closeness to the person they are representing. They are close to their children both in terms of information and motivation. They may be best situated to know their children’s personal interests not only due to the fact that they spend a considerable amount of time with them, but also because they are emotionally motivated to take interest in considering the possible effects that public decisions would have on their children. Thus, in case their children do actually have some kind of electoral preference, they may be both able and willing to discuss the matter with them. A possible parallel here may be decisions concerning children’s education. Although parents choose their children’s schools, they are meant to, and possibly do, take their children’s opinion into account.24 That motivation can also extend to the act of voting: even though there may be conflicts of interests between parents and children, parents are the most likely to act selflessly, or at least to pay due respect to their children’s interest, even by splitting the votes they cast.25

  • 26 Cf. Steffani (1999: 792).
  • 27 Cf. Merk (2009: 535).
  • 28 See e.g., Nopper (1999: 151).

13A similar argument highlights that the special link between parents and children is appreciated by most modern legal systems, which make parents the guardians of their children’s financial and other rights. Children actually do have rights they cannot exert themselves, as well as duties they cannot fulfil by their own actions.26 They may have the legal capacity to acquire property, e.g., by inheritance, but the related decisions are beyond that capacity. It is parents who have the legal power, and duty, to decide and act in the best interest of their children.27 Thus, the argument is not just one of consistency (voting rights should be regulated in the same way as property rights, or educational rights, etc.), but also one of analogy: legislators, on this account, express their trust in parents as proxies for their children’s interests and preferences in a number of contexts, which should be followed for voting as well.28

14Leaving a more detailed discussion of the above considerations concerning the suitability of parents as proxy voters to the next section, it is worth mentioning that the idea of PPV entails regarding parents as proxies in terms of making, rather than just expressing, voting decisions on behalf of children. The latter interpretation of ‘proxy’ is only mentioned to show already existing and constitutionally admissible parallels for the institution proposed. Yet, the notion that parents make decisions on behalf of their children raises the question of whether (2) and (3) are compatible, i.e., whether it is at all possible to make decisions on behalf of persons who are assumed not to be capable of making those decisions themselves.

  • 29 For the distinction between formal and substantive representation, see Böckenförde (1982: 318–322 (...)
  • 30 In terms of religion, the German Act on the Religious Education of Children, Art. 5 provides that (...)
  • 31 On the proposal to lower the age limit for suffrage at the German federal elections, see e.g., Kn (...)
  • 32 See e.g., Rosenberg (2016) on the justification of exclusion due to inability.

15PPV is usually argued for by saying that it improves the political representation of children. Yet, it seems there are at least two different interpretations of representation at play here. If one urges that it is the suffrage of the child that is exerted by the parent, then the parent must do more than just take into account the interests or preferences of the child. Within the limits of the Equal Suffrage Account, which is meant to comply with the principles of equal and direct suffrage, the proxy voter would be expected to represent the child in a substantive way, such as by making the decision the child would make, reflecting their exact preferences.29 Here, the problem may be that children may not be interested in making political decisions at all. Even though they may have preferences in terms of, e.g., schools or religion at a relatively early age,30 that may not be the case with politics. Yet, if one assumes that children in general start having political preferences at an earlier stage than acknowledged by current regulation, for instance at 14 or 16 rather than 18 years, then, in the absence of compelling arguments against extending suffrage, a lowering of the voting age limit would seem adequate.31 If, however, there are children who can be safely assumed on the basis of their age not to have political preferences,32 that leaves no place for proxy voting in the former sense either.

16Most proponents of PPV, however, do not seem to conceive of voting as the expression of individual decisions, but concentrate on the effects of the proposed changes on the composition of the electorate, and consequently on voting outcomes. For that reason, their actual focus is not on the equality of suffrage but the inequality of voting power. Such an inequality is necessary, they argue, for the sake of an adequate representation of children’s interests (i.e., making decisions favourable for them and their future perspectives), and for public decisions supporting more sustainable policies. We shall now turn to this claim.

3 The unequal suffrage account

17An interpretation of ‘parental proxies’ as proxies of interests thus requires a different argument, replacing (1) and (3) as follows:

(1’) The interests of children should be taken into account with a greater weight than is currently given at elections/referenda.

(3’) Parents should have additional votes to be able to represent these interests more efficiently.

18(1’) is actually the assumption underlying most proposals for PPV, and does not in itself contradict the Equal Suffrage Account either. (3’), in turn, is a more explicit (and therefore less frequent) formulation of the claim regarding the desirable outcome. What is more important for us here, however, is that the arguments supporting parental proxies (3), mentioned briefly in section 1.2 above, can be used to support that reformulated proposal (3’) as well. I shall now examine these in turn: first the ‘access to information’ argument, then the one of ‘altruism’. I then turn to a third possible argument, according to which even without being particularly well-informed or selfless, parents may represent children’s interests better than other candidates since they share much of these.

3.1 Information

19As for the first argument, we need to ask what makes parents better informed in terms of their children’s interests than other possible candidates (such as teachers, NGOs, or experts in various fields). Starting from their closeness, the obvious answer seems to be that they have direct access to a wide array of information concerning the personal needs of their children. Even if it is not parents who spend the greatest average amount of time with their children, they spend time together in a range of situations. Moreover, their attention may be less divided than that of, e.g., teachers, who usually need to pay attention to several children at the same time. Similarly, it is parents who may best know their children’s preferences, especially political preferences, as these are most often shaped by parental influence rather than by peer groups (who could not, according to the proposal, act as proxies anyway).

20Here we may have another look at the possible parallels for parental decision-making mentioned above. Schooling choices, for one, can be made by parents because they are best situated to take the child’s individual needs and preferences as well as the available options into account. The same may be said, albeit less cogently, about financial decisions. A common feature of these parallels is that the decisions are made in situations that are intimately related to the personal future of individual children: their physical and intellectual development, health, social network, financial situation, etc. With respect to the alleged parallel with marriage, however, the objection is made that it differs from voting, since the impact of voting is not linked to the personality of the decision-maker.

21Once we regard parents as proxies for children’s interests, i.e., as decision-makers rather than decision-expressers, the represented preferences and interests lose their strictly personal character. Moreover, political decision-making, as conceptualised by proponents of PPV, is impersonal in the sense that even though voting is motivated by personal interests, what the votes express is the voters’ preferences informed by the perceived interests of specific groups to which the represented individuals belong. Although such a claim is controversial in itself, more important for us is that while parents as proxies may have privileged access to information regarding the personal interests of their children, they cannot be expected to perform above the average when it comes to representing the best interests of children qua children (as opposed to the elderly). They may, of course, be competent voters, but that is not due to their personal links to their own children. In other words, if one claims that PPV does not violate the principle of personal suffrage and wishes to promote children’s group interests by way of giving extra votes to parents, then the kind of information necessary to become a competent proxy voter is not what parents qua parents have access to. Indeed, other possible proxies with access to expert information may seem to be stronger candidates.

3.2. Altruism

  • 33 Cf. Reimer & Schanda (2016: 182).
  • 34 Cf. Cupti (1998), Palmore (1999: 45).

22The second argument is based on the notion that parents would make better proxies than other people by virtue of being more altruistic towards their children.33 In general, the problem of generational egoism seems to be at the very source of the proposal. Gerontocracy has no inherent negative connotations and has even been praised by several authors addressing the history of political ideas.34 It becomes problematic only if one looks at the relation between generations as a conflictual one. In this section, I first consider whether the conflictual approach is adequate, before raising the question of whether PPV can actually build on parental selflessness.

  • 35 See, e.g., Peterson (1992), Hinrichs (2002).
  • 36 Cf. Gründinger (2014), quoted by Schickhardt (2015: 192).

23Speaking of an opposition of generations may seem justified based on changes in age-specific policies on the one hand, and political attitudes on the other. As for age-specific policies, the diverging trends in child poverty and the poverty of the elderly are often highlighted,35 together with the impacts of austerity measures on pensions as opposed to education. Attitude surveys further show a difference in support for pro-elderly and pro-youth policies among different age groups.36

24Yet, such data are often far from unequivocal, leaving them open to various interpretations. Moreover, arguments based on them are criticised because they fail to take private transfers into account. Grandparents, for instance, may support their children and grandchildren financially, thus spending part of the pro-elderly expenditure in a pro-youth way, which, however, remain invisible if one only focuses on state policies. A more careful survey of transfers would suggest a more nuanced picture of inter-generational relations. Further, in terms of attitudes, it is less than evident that elderly people would lack intimate relationships with younger age groups, through their children and grandchildren for instance. This makes such a clear-cut opposition, as suggested by the frequent use of the concept of ‘gerontocracy’, difficult to support.

25Now, even if one accepts that there is a conflict of interests between different age groups, there are problems that result from the above considerations. PPV gives extra votes to parents, and the most common justifications for that refer to their broader time horizon, due to the links they have to their children. That constructs a twofold opposition: (1) parents versus the elderly, and (2) parents versus non-parents. The problem here is that if the elderly are regarded as having a less future-oriented perspective, and if PPV is meant to remedy gerontocracy, then it is hardly more than just a second-best option to disenfranchising the elderly. In the sense of (1), the extra votes go to parents not qua parents but as presumably younger people. In that case, however, inequality is created, in the sense of (2), among people belonging to the same age group: those who have children can cast more votes than those who do not.

  • 37 Cf. Brighouse & Swift (2009).

26As for the selflessness of parents as proxies of their children, the first thing to note is the difference between altruism towards one’s children and altruism towards younger age groups in general. Parental partiality towards their children is indeed legitimate,37 but if amplified through extra votes, it may bring about inequality among children, as the burdens of political decisions may not be evenly distributed within the same cohort. The same applies to differences among families: parents with many children would have more votes than those with say one or two, in which case their extra votes may lead to family policies favouring larger families to a disproportionate degree. While the chances of such outcomes depend on the actual demographic situation of the given society, they cannot be neglected in assessing the power of arguments yielded by the Unequal Suffrage Account.

  • 38 Schreiber (2004: 1344) and Vanhuysse (2013) regard that as something that should be compensated f (...)
  • 39 See Weber (1958), quoted by de Briey (2007).
  • 40 See Van Parijs (1999, p. 323), quoting Andrew Williams (ibid., n. 72).

27Second, due to the fact that they have to care for their children and not just themselves, average per-capita family income may be considerably lower for parents than non-parents in the same age group.38 That may shorten their time horizon, if not in terms of attitudes, then in practice, as they may not be able to afford being selfless39 in terms of social sustainability. Moreover, in comparison to elderly people, young parents may have more to expect from generous pro-elderly policies in the present as well as the future. On the one hand, public support for older age groups alleviates the individual burden of looking after one’s own parents. On the other hand, younger people may have more years left to spend being supported themselves, especially given the increasing life expectancy in Western societies.40

  • 41 Adrian (2016).
  • 42 As taken into account by dual-interest approaches to parental rights (see e.g. Brighouse & Swift 20 (...)

28The question of egoism and altruism can also be raised from a different perspective. It has been argued that the current system of voting, which assumes that each voter takes the interests of non-voters into account, raises too high of a moral standard for those not having emotional ties to non-voters as in the case of non-parents. PPV would then absolve voters, at least in terms of children’s interests, from the moral burden attached to voting in an egoistic way.41 From the above considerations it seems clear that parents may have such a burden themselves, as they may have competing interests42 or emotional ties that point in different directions when it comes to political decision-making.

  • 43 De Briey (2007).

29Finally, there is a more practical, and perhaps weightier, caveat against labelling groups of voters as egoistic or generationally short-sighted. On the one hand, such a distinction weakens the sense of moral equality among the members of the political community. On the other hand, and perhaps even more importantly, such a perceived discrimination (be it age-based or status-based) may provoke a bloc voting behaviour in groups that are now diverse regarding their political preferences.43

30The ‘selfless proxy’ argument, as we have seen, presupposes a clear distinction and a conflict between the interests (and corresponding attitudes) of different (age) groups. While the grounds and practical consequences of that conception may be open to doubt themselves, we have also seen that parents’ interpersonal altruism may not easily translate into an intergenerational one. In the last part of this section, I look at a possible counterargument, according to which parents may not need to have access to information concerning children’s interests or to be particularly altruistic.

3.3 Shared interests

  • 44 De Briey (2007) rightly opposes this argument to the ‘selfless proxy’ one, arguing that the forme (...)

31The above considerations notwithstanding, one may still argue that parents make the best proxies available, not because of their ability to know their children better or because of their altruistic motivations, but because of their situational proximity to their children’s interests. Their interests may be the closest to their children’s from some relevant perspective, either because they share the same interests or because their interests are somehow related to (or derived from) those of their children.44 An example for the former may be family allowances: both parents and children benefit from these, hence their interests coincide, and, one may add, that is what separates them from other groups not receiving such benefits. Thus, parents need neither specific information nor a selfless attitude when deciding about a policy affecting family benefits, since by following their own interests they also advocate those of their children. What needs to be made sure is only that they use those resources properly. The latter kind of case is where there is no coincidence but rather some close relation between parents’ and children’s interests. Educational spending may be an example, as it later results in higher payments for pensioners.

32While such an argument may succeed in raising doubt about whether parents need to know children’s specific interests and to have an altruistic attitude, it seems that some kind of general information may nevertheless be necessary. For such an ‘invisible hand’ to work, parents need knowledge not (only) of children’s interests but their own (as well). Part of today’s sustainability issues result not from generational egoism, but from shortsightedness regarding one’s own interests: one may think of ill-advised and yet popular policies, the sustainability of which does not go beyond electoral cycles. Moreover, shared interests are not limited to parents: any person belonging to an older generation may profit from higher pensions and, consequently, may regard the public financing of education as an investment. The same applies to emotional ties, which may similarly exist in relationships beyond those between parents and children. Thus, while parents do not seem to be in a privileged position in terms of motivation, one cannot argue, either, that shared interests can compensate for the lack of competence.

4 Conclusion

33In this paper I discussed arguments for and against parental proxy voting (PPV), trying to shed light on the logical relations between these, while critically examining them. In doing so, I did not follow the usual division of deontological and consequentialist arguments, but instead distinguished between arguments remaining within the framework of equal suffrage, and those not grounded in it. Equal-suffrage arguments emphasise the constitutional construction underlying PPV, according to which parents, when acting as proxy voters, cast the votes of their children, meaning they do not have a plural vote. That interpretation, however, is difficult to maintain, and proponents of PPV often bring in unequal-suffrage arguments as well. Within the latter group, I distinguished three types of arguments: those related to the notion that parents would make informed proxies, those based on the assumption that they would use their extra votes in a selfless manner, and, third, that shared interests make parents capable of representing children’s interests, even if they do not know it. I have argued that each of these arguments is open to doubt and some important objections.

34Without repeating what has been said on the preceding pages, it seems important to note that my observations regarding the two lines of argument have different consequences. The conceptual problems resulting from the two interpretations of proxy voting within the Equal Suffrage Account suggest that there is no way to defend PPV against the charge of violating the principle of equal suffrage. Not all proponents of PPV are, however, equally sensitive to that kind of objection, and some may contend that the adequate representation of children’s interests should prevail over currently held constitutional principles. In the second part of the paper, an examination of arguments in favour of parents’ (as proxies of interests) having extra votes has shown that these, too, are open to serious objections. Thus, even if one would be willing to favour some kind of plural vote, parents may not be the strongest candidates for allocating the additional votes. Yet, perhaps in trying to address the perceived inadequacy of political decision-making, one should focus less on the issue of voting power, together with the underlying decisionist image of the political process, and instead focus more on how to make political deliberation more robust, with long-term perspectives receiving due consideration.

35From the perspective of children’s political representation, proposals of PPV indirectly highlight a dilemma. The Equal Suffrage Account is partly based on arguments in favour of extending suffrage to children, which is then bracketed by the claim that children cannot be expected to contribute to political decision-making. Taking the conceptual problems discussed above seriously, a more convincing version of that approach would examine the possibility of actually having children vote. Even though an age limit may be in order, a small extension of genuine suffrage seems a more important step here than giving adults plural votes. As for the Unequal Suffrage Account, it is based, partly again, on a negative assessment of the quality of decisions. Here, my argument points towards different ways of introducing checks into the procedure of decision-making. The dilemma is due to the fact that the first way, extending suffrage, would allow for a more democratic model, while the latter, building in checks, would make it more aristocratic. That said, the dilemma only emerges if one promises, as most proponents of PPV, to make political decision-making both better informed and more democratic at the same time. Apart from such pretences, the two ways are not exclusive. Indeed, the one may compensate for the other, both in terms of quality and democratic legitimacy.

Acknowledgments.This paper summarises research undertaken within two projects, ‘Taking Age Discrimination Seriously’ (grant ID: 17–26629S) at the Institute of State and Law of the Academy of Sciences of the Czech Republic, Centre for Law and Public Affairs (CeLAPA), and ‘Institutional Reforms in Ageing Societies: Legal and Political Perspectives’ (grant ID: OTKA K 112900) at the Centre for Social Sciences, Budapest.

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Notes

1 First by Löw (1974). On the subsequent debate, see the overview by Westle (2006). While the idea has found support across German parliamentary factions (cf. Jesse 2003: 8–9), such a reform has never been adopted. The discussion continues, however (see, more recently, Adrian 2016). In Hungary, the proposal has been formulated several times since the democratic transition (for a brief overview, see Reimer & Schanda 2016: 70). In 2011, shortly before enacting the new constitution, the government sent questionnaires to the electorate, which included a question about parental proxy votes. The majority of the respondents rejected the idea. For the discussion in constitutional scholarship since 2011, see Fröhlich (2011) and Schanda (2012) who are in favour of the proposal, Jakab (2017, 2020) who maintains some practical reservations, and Bodnár (2014), M. Balázs (2017, 2018) and Kurunczi (2018) who are against it. For an overview of similar proposals in other countries, see van Parijs (1998: 309–310) and Reimer and Schanda (2016: 63–64), as well as de Briey, Héraut, and Ottaviani (2009) on the Belgian plural voting system at the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries, and Bertaux (2011: 126–127) on the proposal for a family vote in France in the 1910s and 1920s.

2 Cf. van Parijs (1998), Jakab (2019, 2020). Sustainability is used rather broadly in the related literature, including environmental, financial, and demographic aspects. A natalist perspective seems to play an important role in many proposals (cf. van Parijs 1998: 314, and, for a more recent example, Löw 2005), with a clear focus on fertility rates in the works of Paul Demeny (see e.g., Demeny 1986, 2012), after whom the term ‘Demeny voting’ is used for PPV (cf. Sanderson & Scherbov 2007: 548).

3 See, within the context of German constitutional law, Müller-Franken (2013), with further references.

4 See, e.g., Müller-Franken (2013: 59, with reference to Pechstein 1996: 84–85).

5 See, e.g., de Briey (2007).

6 On the lack of convincing empirical arguments, see Müller-Franken (2013: 104, quoting Westle 2006, and Kahl 2009). See also Goerres and Tiemann (2009), based on data from German general elections, arguing that while age may be relevant for voting behaviour, the introduction of PPV would not have made any considerable difference for the election results between 1994 and 2005. The possibility of conflicts of interests even among the group of parents is emphasised by Wernsmann (2005: 66).

7 Cf. Offe (1994, quoted by Goerres & Tiemann 2009: 58).

8 For that usage, see, e.g., Reimer (2004), de Briey (2007), Goerres and Tiemann (2009), and Reimer and Schanda (2016). In addition to these two groups, Westle (2006) distinguishes constitutional arguments.

9 There may be at least one exception to that, in case one regards suffrage as a good (see Hermann 2011: 44–45) and argues that parents deserve the extra votes (as they produce public goods from private goods). A similar argument (among others) is put forth by Vanhuysse (2013). I am not going to address that kind of claim directly here, but it seems to be countered by the argument that on the same account, parents may not be the only candidates for allocating extra votes (see Westle 2006).

10 As a parallel, see the well-known proposal to abandon equality for proportionality in democratic decision-making by Brighouse & Fleurbaey (2010).

11 This claim is most often supported by referencing the concept of popular sovereignty: since children are part of the people, so the argument goes, they should not be excluded from the exertion of sovereignty through suffrage (see e.g., Peschel-Gutzeit 1999: 560, Merk 2009: 531–534, Schanda 2012: 81, Reimer & Schanda 2016: 73). A similar argument links suffrage to the recognition of human dignity (see e.g., Knödler 1996: 559–561, Schreiber 2004: 1344, Löw 2005: 34–35, Merk 2009: 534).

12 See e.g., Reimer and Schanda (2016: 64).

13 That is why the institution is sometimes referred to as ‘children’s vote vicariously exercised’ (abbreviated as ChiVi/KiVi, see e.g., de Briey 2007), or as ‘Stellvertreterwahlrecht’ (see e.g., Müller-Franken 2013: 6–7). I am going to use the term ‘parental proxy voting’ to emphasise the role of parents, which is the focus of the following arguments.

14 See e.g., de Briey, Héraut, & Ottaviani (2009). For the same reason, opponents of PPV argue that there is no practical difference between parents casting their own extra votes or those of their children, see e.g. Wernsmann (2005: 54–55).

15 Cf. Art. 38(1) of the Grundgesetz.

16 See e.g., Löw (2002), Fröhlich (2011).

17 See Representation of People Act 2000, section 12(1), and Code électoral, article 147bis, respectively.

18 Cf. Müller-Franken (2013: 78), also pointing out that ‘proxy voting’ in the above sense depends on the explicit will of the voter, with the law only providing for the possibility to have a proxy cast the vote on one’s behalf.

19 See Löw (2005: 38–39), quoting the example of Lionel Jospin, who, having failed to receive enough votes to enter the second round of the 2002 presidential elections, was reported to say he would have one of his friends vote for him, as he could not decide which one of his competitors to support.

20 Cf. Gaa (1997: 345).

21 E.g., Reimer & Schanda (2016: 182).

22 See, e.g., Gaa (1997: 345), Hinrichs (2002: 52).

23 See Hattenhauer (1996: 16), Reimer (2004), also Schanda (2012: 83), pointing out that the personal character of suffrage is not among the constitutional requirements.

24 See, in general, UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, Art. 12(1) on the right of the child to ‘express [his or her own] views freely in all matters affecting the child, the views of the child being given due weight in accordance with the age and maturity of the child’.

25 Cf. Schanda (2012: 83), Reimer & Schanda (2016: 68).

26 Cf. Steffani (1999: 792).

27 Cf. Merk (2009: 535).

28 See e.g., Nopper (1999: 151).

29 For the distinction between formal and substantive representation, see Böckenförde (1982: 318–322).

30 In terms of religion, the German Act on the Religious Education of Children, Art. 5 provides that children above 12 can decide on denominational changes in their education, and above 14 they are completely free to choose their religion.

31 On the proposal to lower the age limit for suffrage at the German federal elections, see e.g., Knödler (1996), and Hoffmann-Lange & De Rijke (1996). See, more recently, Lőrincz (2018) on the relationship between age and rational deliberation.

32 See e.g., Rosenberg (2016) on the justification of exclusion due to inability.

33 Cf. Reimer & Schanda (2016: 182).

34 Cf. Cupti (1998), Palmore (1999: 45).

35 See, e.g., Peterson (1992), Hinrichs (2002).

36 Cf. Gründinger (2014), quoted by Schickhardt (2015: 192).

37 Cf. Brighouse & Swift (2009).

38 Schreiber (2004: 1344) and Vanhuysse (2013) regard that as something that should be compensated for by means of giving them extra votes.

39 See Weber (1958), quoted by de Briey (2007).

40 See Van Parijs (1999, p. 323), quoting Andrew Williams (ibid., n. 72).

41 Adrian (2016).

42 As taken into account by dual-interest approaches to parental rights (see e.g. Brighouse & Swift 2006, Shields 2019).

43 De Briey (2007).

44 De Briey (2007) rightly opposes this argument to the ‘selfless proxy’ one, arguing that the former is preferable to the latter.

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References

Electronic reference

Miklós Könczöl, “Parental proxy voting and political representation”Revus [Online], 51 | 2023, Online since 19 September 2023, connection on 09 December 2023. URL: http://journals.openedition.org/revus/9753; DOI: https://doi.org/10.4000/revus.9753

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About the author

Miklós Könczöl

Research fellow at the Centre for Social Sciences, Institute for Legal Studies, and associate professor at Pázmány Péter Catholic University, Faculty of Law, Budapest (Hungary). E-mail: konczol.miklos(at)jak.ppke.hu

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