Catherine Marshall, Political Deference in a Democratic Age. British Politics and the Constitution from the Eighteenth Century to Brexit
Catherine Marshall, Political Deference in a Democratic Age. British Politics and the Constitution from the Eighteenth Century to Brexit, Cham (Switzerland): Palgrave Macmillan, 2021, 354 p.
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1Irreverence for Britain’s constitution, customs and usages, but also for the rule of law itself led to the resignation of the leader of the Conservative party and British Prime Minister, Boris Johnson, on 7 July 2022. This dramatic episode of British politics clearly shows that political deference in modern Britain still matters, as Catherine Marshall, a Professor of British Studies at CY Cergy Paris Université, demonstrates in her book published in 2021 by Palgrave Macmillan, entitled Political Deference in a Democratic Age. British Politics and the Constitution from the Eighteenth Century to Brexit (354p).
2She takes her readers on an institutional and political journey from aristocratic deference in the Victorian Age to egalitarian deference in a democratic age, using her expertise in the history of ideas in mid-Victorian England and British history generally. More specifically, she explores deference as a concept and as a political force brought to light originally by Walter Bagehot in The English Constitution (1867). As the author explains, the aim of the book is “to describe a type of political respect specific to the “Anglo-British constitution” (p1) – this last used by Ian Ward in his work The English Constitution. Myths and Realities published in 2004. Beyond an analysis of the evolution of the meaning of this key concept, described by Catherine Marshall as one of the four pillars of the constitution together with parliamentary sovereignty, the rule of law and conventions, the author is “trying to make sense of all things English” (pv).
3The book is divided into two well-balanced parts dealing respectively with “the theory of deference from the eighteenth century to 1911” and “the practice of deference in a democratic age”. It ends with the 2016 referendum on Britain’s European Union membership and its aftermath. Each part is evenly subdivided into five chapters. The first five chapters are devoted to the different definitions of deference, placed in context, while the last five chapters focus on voluntary (rational) deference from 1911 to 2016.
4Without questioning the clarity of the general outlines, one might regret however the choice of “a User’s Guide” in the heading of the second part which does not do justice to such a scholarly work. However, the rich material contained in the bibliography and in the book itself gives it an encyclopaedic quality. This is particularly the case of its substantial, well-organized, bibliography (pp325-26) which refers to highly valuable primary sources scrutinized by Catherine Marshall in her work. Well written, this book, while dealing with technical legal and political concepts, remains throughout highly accessible to all readers.
- 1 See the chart on p5 encapsulating the different categories of deference.
5The first part of the book is based on an attempt “to draw the typology of different types of deference” (p18) showing that as the regime evolved in England from an aristocratic to a democratic one, the concept of deference itself moved from an original hierarchical form “based on the respect of the past” – but mainly “involuntary and coercive” – to an egalitarian one “based on the rational and independent acceptance of citizens”1. In this first part, the author traces the concept of deference back to the 1867 work of Walter Bagehot, The English Constitution. She emphasises the division of the constitution identified by Bagehot between on the one hand the “dignified parts of the constitution” (the monarchy and the House of Lords) associated with “hierarchical deference” and its “efficient parts” (the Cabinet and the House of Commons) on the other hand. Catherine Marshall’s starting point is that “deference is based on the deferential nature of the Englishman” shaped by “customs, attitudes and beliefs about politics” (p67). She argues that deference originally acted as “a glue” or “stabilizing” element for the “Anglo-British” uncodified constitution in “an atmosphere of mutual respect and reciprocal obligations”.
6In doing so, the author endeavours to correct a number of misunderstandings and a simplistic definition of deference limited to a concept applying only to attitudes towards the monarchy. She tries to re-establish the historical basis of deference using key primary and secondary sources but also wants deference to be acknowledged as a political force. She shows how its meaning evolved with the transformation of society, not only in England but also in the United States and France. She explains that the United States adapted the concept to a new republican context opting for “an egalitarian type of deference”, different from the “English voluntary form of hierarchical deference” (p37). She is, however, more critical regarding the attitude of French revolutionaries in the eighteenth century towards deference. Yet one could argue that the drafters of the 1789 Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen most notably Mirabeau – in the first phase of the revolution (sometimes described as the legal one) did not want a republic but rather aimed at reforming the French monarchy to make it a constitutional one. Not only were they eager to protect the right to property but they still showed much deference to the person of the King (King Louis XVI, who was not executed until 1793). The first part of the book ends with the Asquith government’s Parliament Act 1911 which is rightly described as a turning point in the constitutional and political history of the country” making both efficient parts of the Constitution (the Cabinet and the House of Commons) more powerful” (p117).
7In the second part, the author reflects on how deference works in practice. She argues that voluntary deference, defined as “the foundational core of the English constitution” (p73) – survived multiple challenges. She highlights the growing tensions between the priority given to liberty upon which deference was originally based and democratic equality with the extension of franchise via the Reform Acts (of 1832, 1867, 1884 and 1918), but also the rise of the power of the executive as well as the emergence of a new party, the Labour party, hostile to deference related to a “class concept”. She points out that far from disappearing with the birth of the “democratic age” and the evolution of “the vote as a trust to the vote as a right” (p62), deference found a new raison d’être. She adds that more recently deference – and beyond the constitution – faced two “revolutionary changes”, Britain’s membership of the European Community in January 1973 and devolution under the government of Tony Blair after the landslide of his party, New Labour, in the 1997 General Election. Both played a significant role in turning the “Old constitution” into a “New Constitution” – in the words of Vernon Bogdanor – seriously “destabilizing” the existing constitutional settlement, in the view of Catherine Marshall.
- 2 Vernon Bogdanor in his book Devolution in the United Kingdom, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001 (...)
8There are some puzzling comments in the second part of the book devoted to more contemporary issues (in the 20th and 21st centuries), especially concerning Britain’s accession to the European Community and the devolution process which are both perceived in a fairly negative way. The author does not mention the fact that devolution was partly motivated by political considerations in a context of rising nationalisms within the Celtic nations. Besides, the asymmetrical nature of the Union pre-existed devolution. If some like the Scottish Labour politician Tom Dalyell predicted that devolution would break-up the Union, others like the former Labour British Prime Minister Gordon Brown, now leading a Constitutional convention set up by the Labour Opposition believe it could be the main way forward but in a transformed federal-type of Union. Unlike what is suggested in the book – but which is clear in the definition provided by Vernon Bogdanor in his writings on the topic2 – devolution was not based on transfers of parliamentary sovereignty but only on limited executive and/or legislative powers to Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland. In other words, devolution itself remains based on deference to what is a key pillar of the British constitution, parliamentary sovereignty. The Westminster or “national” Parliament is still the only Parliament which can legislate for the whole country.
9Beyond providing a better understanding of deference as a concept and as a political tool, the book covers key institutional and political issues regarding the nature of power, the relationship between those who govern and the governed or in the words of the author “rulers and ruled”.
10If the book focuses on the past for a better understanding of the present constitution and the role (voluntary) deference plays to sustain it, it also addresses the future. Indeed, the author deals with topics which are more important than ever, such as the role of the judiciary. Surprisingly, the Act of Settlement of 1701 which protects judges from arbitrary removal – originally from the King – at the origin of a long tradition of independence of the judiciary in the country, is not mentioned unlike the Constitutional Reform Act 2005 which finally completed this process in the twenty first century. The author also refers to the drift towards an ever more powerful executive, the protection of Human Rights and the debate about codifying or not the constitution. This is of critical importance at a time when on 22 June 2022 the British government under the premiership of Boris Johnson introduced a Bill of Rights Bill officially to provide the country with “a modern Bill of Rights” and “prevent the incremental expansion of rights without proper democratic oversight”. This measure aims to repeal the Human Rights Act 1998 which incorporated the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms into English domestic law. In July 2022, in the Conservative leadership contest, the former Lord Chancellor and secretary of state for Justice, Elizabeth Truss, even suggested departing from the European Convention on Human Rights altogether. In such a worrying context, this book makes an even more highly valuable contribution.
11Finally, if the Celtic nations are not the theme of this book, which is explicitly devoted to the history of England and the meaning of deference there, their role in the future of the Union must not be underestimated. Wales itself – which is not mentioned in the index of the book – for a long time considered as a minor nation within the Union, could contribute to the survival of the United Kingdom as a Union. The Welsh Labour party, a pro-devolution, pro-Union party, which in 2022 celebrated its one hundred years in power in Wales, has launched a constitutional consultation process for a stronger Union based on shared-governance and mutual respect which are both inconceivable without deference.
Notes
1 See the chart on p5 encapsulating the different categories of deference.
2 Vernon Bogdanor in his book Devolution in the United Kingdom, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001, pp2-3. defined devolution as “a process that involves the dispersal of power from a superior to an inferior political authority and which consists of the transfer to a subordinate elected body on geographical basis, of functions at present exercised by parliament”.
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Elizabeth Gibson-Morgan, “Catherine Marshall, Political Deference in a Democratic Age. British Politics and the Constitution from the Eighteenth Century to Brexit”, Revue Française de Civilisation Britannique [Online], XXVII-3 | 2022, Online since 04 January 2023, connection on 13 January 2026. URL: http://journals.openedition.org/rfcb/10109; DOI: https://doi.org/10.4000/rfcb.10109
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